CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

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The positions of the Afrikaners in the New South Africa

Master's Thesis

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Abstract:

The aim of this thesis is to investigate conditions of the Afrikaners in the "New" Republic of South Africa and whether the Afrikaners have a strong desire for claiming their right for self-determination and would be able to establish their own ethnic-state, so-called *volkstaat*. The Afrikaners are a significant minority, the descendants of the Western European settlers who came to South Africa in the 17th century and during the following centuries they developed their own culture, language, religion and national heritage including their own national identity and politics. The strong national awareness, patriotism and the affiliation with the new-born nation gave the birth for the Afrikaner nationalism, which was enhanced with the important historical event, today known as the Great Trek and series of the Anglo-Boer Wars. The Afrikaner National Party was a leading proponent of the racial segregation and proposed the idea of *apartheid* under the persuasion of the white supremacy and the political dominance of so-called *whiteness*. In 1994, when the racial equality was promoted and the black African National Congress came into power, the Afrikaners became politically underrepresented and economically, socially and culturally marginalized. This article examines changes and the current positions of the Afrikaners and explores conditions which could possibly lead the white minority to establish their own white-only state.

Keywords:

Republic of South Africa, Afrikaners, Afrikaans, nationalism, volkstaat, self-determination, apartheid, African National Congress, National Party, Democratic Alliance, Freedom Front Plus

Range of Thesis:

152,655 characters with spaces, excluding the initial pages, the list of bibliography and appendices

Declaration of Authorship:

1. I hereby declare that I compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. I hereby declare that all the resources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. I hereby declare that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.
4. I agree that this work might be published for study and research purposes.

Prague, 11.5.2016   Bc. Klára Walterová

Acknowledgments:

Master Thesis Proposal

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Proposed topic:

The positions of the Afrikaners in the New South Africa (working title)

Registered in SIS: Yes   **Date of registration: June 2014**

Topic characteristic:

Téma mé diplomové práce se bude týkat postavení Afrikánců v Jihoafrické republice. Diplomová práce se bude zabývat změnami, kterými prošla afrikánská komunita v předešlých letech. Jelikož historie usazování Afrikánců v Jihoafrické republice sahá až do 16. století, moje diplomová práce se proto více zaměří na změny, kterými prošla afrikánská komunita v posledních dvaceti letech. Práce tedy bude zejména pojednávat o procesech, které měly vliv na postavení Afrikánců v rámci celonárodního pojetí Jihoafrické republiky, a to především po pádu apartheidu.

Afrikánci jsou velice specifickým jihoafrickým národem. Po několik století si v mnohonárodnostní Jižní Africe uchovávaly svůj vliv, a to zejména v politice, kultuře, médiích a ozbrojených složkách. Dodnes si podrželi vliv zejména v ekonomice, médiích, armádě a policii (afrikánští důstojníci jsou velice váženými a respektovanými osobami). V několika uplynulých letech však afrikánská menšina ztratila většinu svých politických pozic, kterých se vzdávala velice neochotně. Také vliv na vedení politiky státu a utváření rozhodovacích procesů rapidně klesl, s čímž se Afrikánci dodnes nedokázali smířit a i nadále hodlají využívat svých politických, ekonomických a soci-kulturních práv, které budovali několik posledních staletí.

Research questions:

Práce si bude klást takové výzkumné otázky, jako jakými prostředky Afrikánci usilují o udržení svého vlivu, zda jsou tyto snahy úspěšné nebo mají šanci uspět a v jakých sférách si chtějí udržet své vlivné pozice. Práce se bude snažit najít odpovědi na otázku, v jaké situaci se Afrikánci nacházejí nyní, případně jaká je konkrétní situace v Jihoafrické republice. Práce se tedy pokusí podat ucelenější pohled na postavení Afrikánců v rámci mnohonárodnostní země, v Jihoafrické republice.

Hypothesis:

I po pádu apartheidu a uskutečnění prvních všerasových voleb si afrikánská menšina v Jihoafrické republice dokázala udržet svůj vliv, byť v některých oblastech mohl poklesnout, dostatečně velký na to, aby se dokázala odtrhnout od mateřské země a založit vlastní nezávislý stát nebo aby dokázala politicky vést zemi.

Topic choice:

Téma mé diplomové práce nebylo zvoleno náhodně, ale cíleně podle mých osobních preferencí. Můj osobní zájem zahrnuje především výzkum rozvojových zemí afrického kontinentu. Do tohoto zájmu spadá i Jihoafrická republika, která je sice v současné době považována za nejrozvinutější africkou ekonomiku, nicméně se stále prezentuje jako rozvojová země se středně vysokými příjmy. Mým záměrem však není sledovat ekonomické aspekty země, ale jak afrikánská menšina ovlivňuje dění uvnitř státu. Zároveň je toto téma zvoleno takticky, protože je Jihoafrická republika spojována především s apartheidem jako unikátní případ rasové segregace a tomuto tématu je také věnována na akademické půdě značná pozornost. Méně se už však zkoumá národnostní složení země a zejména pak postavení a vliv Afrikánců jako národnostní menšiny a jejich chování uvnitř státu. Téma se proto jeví z mého pohledu jako významné s možným přínosem pro výzkum chování národnostních menšin v mnohonárodnostním státě.

Master's thesis aim:

Z tohoto důvodu je práce pojata jako unikátní případová studie, která zkoumá postavení Afrikánců jako jedné z národnostních menšin v rámci Jihoafrické republiky. Práce se pokusí nabídnout hlubší analýzu a rozsáhlejší zmapování soužití národnostní menšiny Afrikánců s ostatními obyvateli JAR, jejich vliv a situaci, ve které se v minulosti nacházeli, a

také jak se tato situace vyvíjela dodnes. Cíl práce proto bude sledovat komplexní zmapování daného případu a vytvoření uceleného obrazu Afrikánců v JAR. Cíl práce se bude v podstatě rovnat průzkumu množství změn, ke kterým došlo za vymezený čas v postavení Afrikánců uvnitř Jihoafrické republiky. Dalším obecným cílem práce je popis a zhodnocení nynější situace, ve které se Afrikánci nachází.

Work methods:

Předkládaná diplomová práce bude využívat především metody sběru dat, přičemž sběr dat bude zohledňovat předmět (téma) diplomové práce. Budou proto užita jen data užitečná k podpoře cíle práce, která budou spadat do ohraničeného časové úseku.

The main variables:

- Nezávislá proměnná: Vliv Afrikánců na vytváření politických procesů v JAR
- Závislá proměnná: úroveň politické nezávislosti

Proposed outline:

Úvod: Afrikánci v historickém kontextu

- Kořeny afrikánského nacionalismu

Stať: a) Změny v postavení Afrikánců po pádu apartheidu

- přechodová fáze od apartheidu k prvním všerasovým volbám
- politická reprezentace Afrikánců
- demografické změny

b) Postavení afrikánské menšiny v mnohonárodnostním státě

- Jazykové statistiky, role afrikánštiny
- jazyková politika
- ústavní zakotvení majetkových práv
- proměna voličského chování Afrikánců
- politické subjekty reprezentující Afrikánce
- ekonomická situace Afrikánců
- útoky na bílé farmáře

c) Snaha Afrikánců o osamostatnění a vytvoření nezávislého státu

Závěr: Možný budoucí vývoj postavení Afrikánců

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Table of Contents

List of abbreviations

AA – Affirmative Actions

ACDP – African Christian Democratic Party

AIC – African Independent Congress

ANC – African National Congress

ANCYL – African National Congress Youth League

APC – African People's Convention

Avstig – Afrikaner-Vryheidstigting

AWB – Afrikaans Weerstandbeweging

AZAPO – Azanian People's Organisation

BEE – Black Economic Empowerment

COSATU – Congress pf South African Trade Unions

COPE – Congress of the People

CP – Conservative Party

DP – Democratic Party

EFF – Economic Freedom Fighters

FAK – Federasie von Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge

FF – Freedom Front

FF+ − Freedom Front Plus

GDP – Gross domestic product

GNU – Government of National Unity

HNP – Herstigte Nationale Party

ID – Independent Democrats

IEC – Electoral Commission of South Africa

IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party

MF – Minority Front

MWU – Mine Workers' Union

NFP – National Freedom Party

NNP – New National Party

NRP – New Republic Party

NP – National Party

PAC – Pan Africanist Congress of Azania

PFP – Progressive Federal Party

PRAAG – Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep

RNP – Reunion National Party

RSA – Republic South Africa

SABC – South African Broadcasting Corporation

SACP – South African Communist Party

SAHO – South African History Online

SAIRR – South Africa Institute of Race Relations

SANSA – South African Network of Skills Abroad

SSA – Statistics South Africa

TRC – Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UCDP – United Christian Democratic Party

UDM – United Democratic Movement

VOC – Verenighte Oost-Indische Campagnie

Introduction

Republic of South Africa (RSA) is a multinational, multi-ethnic, multilingual and multicultural country. It is also considered to be one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Since the fall of apartheid and the accomplishment of the first fully democratic and elections in 1994 in which all South African races participated, RSA has been called a "rainbow nation" (the unity among the diversity of South African people). This name, often using as a metaphor for RSA nowadays, was invented and subsequently propagated by South African Bishop Desmond Tutu and it was given to RSA regarding to its unique mixture of ethnicities which make up the state of RSA and in which all ethnic groups, after the decades of repression under the era of apartheid, are equal and have the same rights under the constitution approved in 1996 (Bornman 2006: 384). The slogan "One nation, many cultures", which was used as a campaign slogan by the African National Congress (ANC), attests more than nothing else about the unique diversity united under one South African nation.

Being recognized as a multi-ethnic country, South African population has been classified into four ethnic groups: blacks, coloureds (people of the mixed race), whites and Asians/Indians. The ethnic polarization prevails and still dominates over the socio-economic sphere of the country and it is crucial and plays an essential role in the formation of politics of the country. The cultural background had been driving the country to the profound ethnical and racial differences. This trend is one of the main topics of this study and will be discussed onwards.

Yet the main aim of this text is to analyse only one specific group – Afrikaners. This group of white South Africans, together with other English speaking whites, is nowadays numbered by 4,500,000 persons out of nearly 55,000,000 total South African population (SSA 2015: 4). The Afrikaners are descendants of the Western European settlers, coming to the southernmost point of Africa in order to find and establish new sales areas for their overseas trade business during the first half of the 17th century. Therefore, they are of the mix European origin. They were formed mainly by Dutch settlers, following by German tradesmen, French Huguenots, British and other Europeans and people of the mixed race. In spite of this cultural mixture, they shaped a new nation and considered themselves to be a part of the African continent. During the centuries they developed their own culture, language, religion and national heritage including their own national identity and also run their own politics. South Africa became their only motherland.

Thus the strong national awareness, patriotism and the affiliation with the new-born nation gave the birth for the Afrikaner nationalism. The projection of the *Afrikanerdom* as the main phenomenon of the young Afrikaner community was enhanced with the important historical event, today known as the Great Trek, which was nothing else than the escape to the inland from the British domination. After the era of the *Voortrekkers*, series of the so-called Anglo-Boer Wars and the following establishment of the Union of South Africa under the rule of the British Empire, the Afrikaner nationalism only grew stronger and the climax came with the establishment of the National Party (NP), which was a leading proponent of the racial segregation and the discrimination on the racist base. The NP came into the power in 1948 and proposed the idea of *apartheid* which led the country to the total racial (including the territorial) segregation under the persuasion of the white supremacy and the political dominance of so-called *whiteness*. This construct gave the Afrikaners the privilege to be the only governing force which exercised a separate development of all life spheres of the whites and the blacks.

The apartheid ceased to the end in 1994 and the racial equality was promoted. The South African Afrikaans-speaking whites had been transformed themselves from the ruling power to the permanent white minority. The environment of the "New" RSA raised the question about socio-economic and political positions of the Afrikaner nation. Most of the Afrikaners, especially those who were born after the end of apartheid (so-called "Born frees"), might have some difficulties with seeking for their place in the South African society and finding the historical patterns they could identify themselves with. For instance, several recent studies have discovered that the Afrikaners identify themselves strongly with their ethnic and language group (Afrikaans-speaking whites) as well as they regard themselves to be "South Africans". Nevertheless, they see themselves significantly less strongly than other South African ethnic groups to be a part of the South African state, which means they do not identify themselves with the Rainbow nation mentioned above (for example, see Bornman 2010: 237-254).

This paper will verify a hypothesis, whether the political, socioeconomic and cultural conditions have worsened for Afrikaners in the post-apartheid RSA as much as this situation could lead Afrikaners to the idea of claiming their right for self-determination and establish their own nation-state and whether the changes in Afrikaners' positions contribute to Afrikaner separatist tendencies. The hypothesis will be based on a premise that the Afrikaner nationalism survived the end of apartheid (despite the idea of a "rainbow nation") and it is

still very much in place. Instead of an examination of the legal framework, applying for secession, establishing of a nation-state and research of internal/external self-determination, the paper will rather focus on an objective/subjective assessment of Afrikaners' conditions which might lead to the establishment of such a state.

Moreover, the text will explore changes in lives of the Afrikaners in the post-apartheid RSA and processes which have an influence over the position of the Afrikaners among other racial and ethnic groups in the RSA. It will also examine the impact on the contemporary trends in shifting Afrikaner identity and the impact of the transformation from apartheid to the democratic state on the political and socio-economic structures of the Afrikaners. Finally, it will investigate the means which are used by the Afrikaners for sustaining and controlling their political power achieved during the apartheid era. This will also include the examination of the Afrikaners' effort to reach their self-determination. More general intention of this text will be to give a comprehensive view of an actual position of the Afrikaners within the New RSA. To do so, the paper will raise following questions:

1. What changes have been brought into the discussion about the Afrikaner nationalism and the Afrikaner identity after the end of apartheid regime?
2. Are the Afrikaner nationalism and the desire of the self-determination of Afrikaners leading to the construction of the *volkstaat* still relevant?
3. If so, which are the specific projects and efforts for building such a *volkstaat*?
4. Is a "rainbow nation" real or does the racial division still matter?
5. What are the socio-economic and political conditions for the Afrikaners under the twenty-six-rule of the ANC and do white people (in general) have future in RSA?

The work will begin with a theoretical part. As through the whole text we will allude to a term of a nation and nationalism, the first chapter will render a theoretical explanatory of nationalism which later in the chapter will be specified on a special case of Afrikaner nationalism. To carry out my research, I chose the premordialist and constructivist approach. This phrase is extensively important to be understood for the work residuum.

The chapter two will provide with the introduction to the history of the Afrikaner nation. For the full understanding of the birth, the creation and the evolution of the Afrikaner nationalism is immensely important to see it within the historical background. Therefore, the first chapter will provide an ideological and political overview and it will situate the Afrikaner nationalism into the historical context. The description will initiate with the early settlement

in 1652, it will mention the events which shaped the Afrikaner nation during the 18th and the 19th century and it will continue with the formation of the Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and the 1940s. The chapter will conclude with the characterization of the Afrikaners' policy of the state under the apartheid rule.

The chapter three will discuss the dismantling of apartheid and the phase of the transformation of the country from the apartheid regime towards a democracy and it will examine changes made during this period as results of mutual negotiations and adopted constitution. The paper will present the immediate response of the Afrikaners on the gradual decomposition of apartheid, the changes in their behaviour in the post-apartheid RSA and the reaction of becoming minority which was mostly either adaption or emigration.

The fourth chapter will represent a core of the thesis. It will complement a previous chapter and deal with the observation of some particular demonstrations of the Afrikaners' position and ways promoting the Afrikaners' identity within the multinational state. It will pay attention to a role of Afrikaans and its usage as a political tool and it will indicate some language statistics. It will also show some social-economic, cultural and political trends in the current situation as well as the shifts occurred in the behaviour of the Afrikaners as the voters and the political representation of the Afrikaners. Finally, it will make a note on the safety situation regarding to the occurrence of the attacks on the white farmers and so-called "hate speeches".

The following chapter five will examine possibilities of the Afrikaners' self-determination and their separatist tendencies which might lead to the realization of the Afrikaners' *volkstaat*, thus an independent state which would be reserved for white South African citizens only. It will focus on the specific projections of such a state and how it could be planned.

In conclusion I will summarize the principal arguments of the text and collect the observations discovered in this piece of work. Also, in this part I will attempt to answer the questions imposed in the very beginning in the text and affirm or disprove a hypothesis. I will undertake to give and idea about the potential future course in lives of the Afrikaners in RSA.

The presented text will draw on academic sources related to the subject of the work. It will use academic articles of the research workers dealing with the question of Afrikaners' nationalism, identity or ethnicity, because these are the major coinciding concepts which have

occurred the most during making a research for relevant information. The most researchers are based in South African universities, namely the Stellenbosch University (one of the universities traditionally considered as Afrikaner, also one of the lecture language is Afrikaans), the University of South Africa, the University of the Cape Town and the University of the Free State. Specifically I will draw on several publications of an Afrikaner historian H. Gilliomee, which can give me an overwhelming view. As the other source, several articles from journals and the information from the South African Institute of Race Relations will serve. In the part of the text dealing with a history I will use historical sources, both monographies and sources accessible online. For the demonstration of Afrikaners' changes in political and socio-economic discourses in the post-apartheid RSA, Statistics of South Africa will be applied. Specifically I will use the census 2001 and 2011 and also the statistical actualization from last two years. For demonstration of a political representation of Afrikaners, I will derive data from the official resources of the national elections. The work will observe the Afrikaners' positions and arrangement in South African society in pre-apartheid era, during the period of transformation and in post-apartheid era and it will make comparison with other ethnic groups, included in RSA's population. The work will be considered as the qualitative research. As the work method I have selected the analytical and descriptive methods, combining with the historical analysis.

1.   Theoretical background

This chapter will provide a theoretical part of the study. As the whole text is dealing with an issue of the Afrikaner nationalism and other terms related to this issue, such an identity, nation, ethnicity, race, etc., I will explain nationalism as one of the political ideologies and on this base I will give an idea about a concept of Afrikaner nationalism which was shaped with Afrikaner identity. To do so, I will show how the nationalist conception works within primordialism and constructivism as two very different approaches.

1.1   Nationalism

The question of nationalism and meaning of this word was studied by many political scientists and sociologists who produced an immense number of approaches. Many of them mention a term "nation" as fundamental unit of nationalism. This term has been used since the 13th century as an appellation of race or mankind and in that time it was left without any political subtext. Later, nation and nationalism was seen as something even identical. For example, D. Třeštík states, that *"if the ethnic group and nation almost always come as a result of some ideology, the nation and nationalism are seen identically: the nation is the nationalism and vice-versa, the nationalism is the nation"* (Třeštík 1999: 50).

Thus for the purpose of defining the nationalism itself, it is desirable to answer the question what the nation is and how is represented. Often the term nation is used interchangeably with other words, such as race, state, ethnic group or country. Within an objective concept, nations are cultural entities: basically a group of people speaking the same language, having the same religion, sharing the same history and social patterns. This can be a case of French-speaking citizens of Quebec in Canada where majority of Canadians speak English or Indian Sikhs in Punjabi, fighting for their own nation-state Khalistan where they could declare their religion, different from the rest of the country. Sometimes, the nation emphasizes a racial unity as a central element and demands a preservation of race purity. The nation is represented by pseudonym of a *volk,* referring to cultural unification and blood-bond. The race purity is required by a racial segregation and in extreme cases might lead to genocide, as we witnessed in Nazi Germany. Subjectively, the nation considers itself to be a distinguishable separate political community which differs from others. Simply, the nation is a psycho-political product. Unlike an ethnic group, the nation has some political aspirations

which possibly lead to self-determination and the establishment of a nation-state (Heywood 2008: 138).

The question of the nature of nationalism itself and to define nationalism mostly remains a subject of a larger discussion because it is meant to be a comprehensive phenomenon. In primordialist vein, nearly every time, the nationalism is associated with the demarcation of a territory due to a nation, or a group of people evincing the same or similar characteristics as discussed above, which are seeking for gaining or retaining its self-governance, i.e. independence, recognition or autonomy. Nationalism always forms a national identity in some way and shapes its politics – it is strongly bounded to usage of political power. This identity originated from shared language, religion, ethnicity and economy, resulting in common "identity politics" which contributes to an emotional attribute of its demonstration (Smith 1998: 146-199). A. Smith provides an idea of "ethnosymbolism" which is combination of primordialist and constructivist approach. Smith understands that the nation originates in its ethnicity, but does not agree with nation's stationary position within the timeline. The nation is able to reflect changes and the static core of nation is no longer applicable (Smith 1995: 10-15).

According to a modernist approach, nationalism is delivered from an ethnic origin of modern nations which are determined with their territorial citizenship, common law and shared culture. Thus the civic nationalism defines a membership of the nation. Smith observes an ethnic nationalism which is characterised as an ethnic conception, concentrated on a group genealogy, vernacular culture, native history accompanying with native customs and on popular mobilization of the folk (Smith 1993: 48-62). E. Gellner shows the nation as an "imagined political community", because he speaks about a specific historical period in which an ethic group is living and forms a part of a social group which is not able to last forever and one day ceases to exist. The main aim of such a community is to amalgamate all political and national unities and create unified and coordinated legal institutions, supported with shared language (Gellner 1993: 57). Gellner also speaks about a theory of a political authorization in which particularizes that ethnic boundaries must be identical with political borders and they cannot lie in contradiction. Within a state, ethnic boundaries do not separate political power holders from others (ibid: 12).

This discourse leads us to a conception of a political nationalism in which a nation is the only authorized entity of political power exercise. Nationalism is seen as a political

principle and also as a form of a political organization. The highest principle is a right for nation self-determination, forming a nation-state. To reach autonomy was desire of many nations and ethnic groups which felt imprisoned in great multinational empires. Sometimes it occurred in a form of national liberation or emancipation from foreign hegemony. This self-declaration was the strongest after the First World War when Woodrow Wilson under the auspices of the League of Nations formulated the concept of nation-state and its right of self-determination. Ultimately, this concept of sovereignty proclamation ended in the Second World War. Then, in the second half of the 20th century, nationalism is linked to thoughts of anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa, to Soviet Union collapse and subsequent declaration of independence in Eastern Europe, whose politics led to many ethnic conflicts and racism. In Western Europe, nationalism combines supra-nationalism, regionalism and nation-states.

The basic thought is that each nation-state should be reserved only for one specific nation. For nationalists, the nation-state is considered to be the most convenient political organization regarding to its legitimacy in which a political power can be applied legitimately and constitutionally. The national bounds are stronger than any other social divisions, because citizens belong together by their feeling of a political and cultural unity. Eventually, nationalism legalizes the authority of a state power and governs in a harmony with a "nation-interest" (Heywood 1992: 141-142).

For some researchers, the nationalist ideology is no longer valid in modern society. As Gellner anticipated, the nationalism would run its course of harshness and eventually would become comradelier while modernity would be on the rise, but, at the end, nationalism and the nation would survive. In contrast, E.B. Haas's premise of the decline of nationalism is made within functionalist and modernist paradigm. He suggests that the modern nation-state in the outbreak of globalized economy and acceptable patterns of emigration is no longer able to provide goods and services to its citizens and therefore nationalism stands on the half-way of its demise (Hass 1997: 50-71). However, Haas's theory fails to provide explanations about contributions of citizens which were already done by time.

1.2 Afrikaner nationalism

Firstly, I will make a manifestation of the Afrikaner nationalism using the primordial approach, because it gives us a suitable explanation of the Afrikaner ethnicity substance which stood behind the birth of the Afrikaner identity. Primordialism emphasizes continuity

and stability over the time and justifies the Afrikaner ethnicity as a core force of creating the Afrikaner nationalism. Primordialism also stresses the belief system which also serves in forming of the Afrikaner identity. Secondly, as a contrast I chose constructivist approach, in which individual components are willing to accept changes in the timeline and the focus is not built on essential identities. The constructivism is helpful in explaining subjective structures, such as individual experiences, and creates those "political imagined communities". It shows the role of Afrikaner culture and language in the formation of the Afrikaner nationalism and produces an emotional adherence and aspiration as a leitmotif for establishing a nationalist movement.

1.2.1 Primordial approach

As it was indicated earlier, the primordial approach operates with ethnic roots as the nature of the Afrikaner nationalism. The ethnicity had created the Afrikaner identity which is seen as a deeply embedded organic changeless "monolithic volk". The Afrikaner nationalism had been positioned as timeless, invariable and centred-located in this approach. Due to this static perception, the Afrikaner ethnicity does not provide any space for further changes or the evolution of the mobilization and the Afrikaner nationalistic movement renaissance (Hofmeyr 1987: 95-100).

Thus the Afrikaner nationalism was almost always characterized by its strong ethnic disposition. Hence it has been seen as an ethnic nationalism, as a moving force of the nationalist mobilization, constructed on common language, religion and culture. M. Kriel defines the Afrikaner nationalism and puts nationalist activism and ethnic conspicuousness at the same level. For her, the nationalism is equal to politicalized ethnicity. However, she edits that in the post-apartheid RSA, the Afrikaner nationalism is still alive, but works under the disguise of non-nationalist, racially re-ranking societal organizations and other civil-society activities. Instead of calling for ethnic origin of the Afrikaner nationalism and establishing of the Afrikaner *volkstaat*, the fully self-governed white-only entity, Afrikaner nationalism is supported with a promotion of Afrikaans, cultural, religious, family and other traditional values (Kriel 2012: 447-466). Therefore, hereby Kriel's statement, the primordial perspective is deviated from its nature of mobilizing political forces in order to use political power for self-recognition.

Ethnic belongings and the nature of ethnicity in primordial approach was advocated by L. Schlemmer. In his work he literally states that the belonging emotions to whichever

ethnicity are human needs, based deeply in a nature of mankind. Thus the ethnic substance of Afrikaners is likely to be converted in profound ethnic Afrikaner consciousness (Schlemmer 1999: 20-67). Nevertheless, this ethnic consciousness is being become relevant in the moment when political tools are used to achieve its ethno-political goals and Schlemmer's thesis does not provide an explanation when the emotional movement based on ethnic consciousness is transformed to a serious political movement. In primordial approach there is always a space for emphasizing the vital variances among peoples, groups of people and individuals, culturally and linguistically different. To do so, primordialism uses the ethnic consciousness and ethnic substance to show the presence of ethnic mobilization whose success is driven with political, socio-economic structures and embedded ideologies. Despite of a fact that primordialism works with elucidation how the Afrikaner nationalism assures itself in its well-being and promotes certain ways how to achieve its success, primordial approach is not able to demonstrate in which moments the ethnic mobilization is present and how contributes to the success or failure of an ethnic nationalist movement.

Still, the biggest criticism of the primordial approach remains in little space which is provided to explain changes made in time. The premordialism cannot explain why the ethnic consciousness is occurring stronger in some moments than in others. The premordialism is focus on the ethnicity as the core issue and driving force of the Afrikaner nationalism, but due to its timeless perspective does not reflect when this ethnic reality is absent or not, when is weakening or strengthening. Even though, it is still relevant to give a persuasive comprehension of the ethnic origin of the Afrikaner nationalism.

1.2.2 Constructivist approach

Unlike the primordialism, the constructivist approach is not static and reflects changes within a nationalist movement and national identity in the timeline. Through the agenda of the A. Wendt's socially constructed reality, the constructivist approach sees the ethnicity and Afrikanerness, the process of the Afrikaner nationalist arrangement, as discursively constructed phenomena, emerged from Afrikaner social diversity creating among Afrikaans-speaking whites and politicized the aspiration for a concord of political and ethnical boundaries.

The Afrikaners see themselves as a group of people owning self-imagined common characteristics, who wanted to distinguish racially from constructed "others". The constructed imaginary of whiteness is occurred as an invisible driving force which moves dynamically

with social structures. D.T. Goldberg proves in his work, that imagined whiteness structures are still relevant in the New RSA and actively re-shape a racial order (Goldberg 2009: 245-326). Thus M. Steyn introduces the set of articles, renaming "white talk", in which Steyn makes an effort on the rehabilitation of the Afrikaner whiteness in the post-apartheid RSA and provides a space for the reconciliation of the disgraced Afrikaner manifestation of the white supremacy. She anatomises a problematic construct of whiteness and its deployment within a multi-ethnic deracialized discourse. She points out that it has been made a little effort to examine the post-apartheid reproduction of whiteness and recent research is rather focused on a political hegemony of the "black others". She claims that the Afrikaner whiteness has been historically rolled into ethnic/nationalistic discourse and in the current South African history, when apartheid became the past and the Afrikaners has being experienced the identity crisis, they have run to the point of the rehabilitation needs (Steyn 2004: 143-169).

Other researchers rather focus on the social discourse how to understand the Afrikaner nationalist movement. A. Norval tries to find equilibrium between a discourse of modern South African society and the Afrikaner nationalist ideology. She focuses on the apartheid discourse and how this discourse institutionalizes a particular worldwide socio-political vision. She explains how socially constructed imaginary of apartheid became a sanctuary of the Afrikaner nationalism and eventually created images for identification in which new subjective positions were constructed. She explains that apartheid as a construct was successful until the reformist period of the 1980s, when apartheid no longer gave an evidence of its meaningful necessity, applying for a social division within a quickly changed society and its organic crisis came along. Apartheid ceased to serve as a supporting element for the Afrikaner nationalism. Norval claims that successfully embedded hegemonic discourse precedes a discourse about nationalism. In this process the Afrikaner identity is chosen as the only one suitable for the political representation. The existence of Afrikaner identity sought to produce a reading of a social reality and this technique of the construction of subjectivity was aimed exclusively at the Afrikaner community and no other subjected groups. Its purification and construction stood at the first place (Norval 1996: 7-173). Norval does not provide an explanation about the place of individuals and how (and additionally, why) they contribute to the success and acceptance of Afrikaner nationalist leaders within the hegemonic discourse.

Proceeding to cultural and linguistic side of the Afrikaner nationalism, the Afrikaans language movements can serve as a great support of the Afrikaner nationalist determination. Gaining a status of Afrikaans as an official language became a big success in the Afrikaner

nationalism and strengthening of the Afrikaner identity. Thus the linguistic nationalists followed steps of Gustav Preller, a crucial person who was instrumental in the institutionalization of Afrikaans and additionally contributed to the myth of the Great Trek, playing a key role in the establishment of the Afrikaner nationalism, and which was resurrected again in 1938 at the occasion of its centenary. I. Hofmeyr makes criticism about Preller's "invention of tradition", in which she questions his memory and creative recall and dubs the Preller's approach with "imagined tradition". In her essay, Hofmeyr gives three profound reasons why Afrikaner women and workers were enthusiastic in joining the Afrikaner nationalist movement and therefore how individualism became important within the adherence of the Afrikaner nationalism. She put Afrikaner language and culture within this framework as a strong moving persuasive force. Popular Afrikaans literature helped to create a dominant Afrikaner identity (Hofmeyr 1987: 95-123; 1988: 521-535).

Turning to the role of individuals and subjectivity provides a good explanation what motivates people to support or actively join in the nationalist adherence. The nationalist imaginary and personal experience as a social construct is still seen as a valid scheme for study of nationalism. It perfectly reflects changes made in a nationalist discourse but overvalues a role of individuals and groups and their identification with particular nationalist symbols and values. It rather should focus on better assimilation of subjectivity and its integration into yet existing structures in order to give a better explanation how such individuals might be helpful in understanding of the nationalist movement.

2.   Afrikaners within the historical context

The aim of this chapter will be to provide a historical background of the Afrikaners. It will give an idea about the first Afrikaner settlement in an area of RSA, beginning in the middle of the 17th century, continuing through the history of shaping and building Afrikaners' identity during the 18th and 19th century with an emphasis on historical events which had the main influence on the Afrikaners' nation. Yet the main focus will be given to the birth of the Afrikaner nationalism and its origin and its formation during the first half of the 20th century because for the purpose of this work is rather significant to know the reasons for building the rule of apartheid and understand the importance of the white (Afrikaner) supremacy and also, how apartheid worked.

2.1   Early settlement

The oldest known history of the first settlement of Afrikaners in South Africa has been dated from the 6th of April 1652 when the Dutch boat *Drommedaris*, under the leadership of the naval surgeon Jan van Riebeeck, landed in Table Bay which today is a part of Cape Town (*Kapstad*). The ship was sent by the Dutch East India Company (*Vereenighte Oost-Indische Compagnie*, VOC). The aim of the VOC was to build a solid refreshment stop for ships passing by and continuing to the East. This place was later given a name the Cape of Good Hope. From the beginning all residents were employees of the VOC and few years later they were released from the service of the VOC and proclaimed of free citizens (*vryburghers*). Also, they were allowed to establish their own farms. As a result of the seeking for more space for growing their crops, they penetrated into surrounding area, belonging to a group of indigenous people called Khoikhoi (that time called *Hottentotten*). Later, nearly all of the Dutch settlers possessed slaves, selected from Khoikhoi (Worden 2007: 9-15).

Some of the first *vryburghers* became farmers (*Boers*); they were given an arable land by the VOC which they fertilized for their own purposes and were allowed to possess cattle. The VOC had been looking for a new land and also a labour needed for the newly established farms. The Dutch settlers (sometimes called *Trekboers*) constantly penetrated more and more inland, primary to the north and northeast beyond *Kapstad* (see appendix 1). In those new seized areas they came into the conflicts with indigenous tribe groups of Khoisan and Xhosa. The natives could not resist the pressure of the European colonisation and shortly, it caused the break of their social structures (Penn 2005: 6-10).

Regarding to relations between the Dutch settlers and the native people, it is interesting mention the impact of religion. The social and economic structures were constructed by the Dutch Reformed Church *(Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk)*, proceeding from the strict Calvinistic theology. However, the South African Calvinism differed from the Calvinism practising in Europe due to its isolated development and missing the influence of the Enlightenment. According to the South African Calvinists, they were the only chosen people by God and were given the doctrine of their predestination of the salvation of the Natives who were seen as savage and uncivilized pagans (Du Toit – Giliomee 1983: 922). The Boers believed that they became the God's heirs of the Covenant as it was being ascribed in the Old Testament. They felt threatened by the indigenous Black people living around them. Naturally, this fear thrived on the idea that the superior power comes from the white Christians who were allowed and justified to subjugate the black and coloured pagan people of "Negro" race (Stokes 1975: 74). Later, the Boers even portrayed themselves as the old Israelites because they found some characteristics in common. For instance, both nations were surrounded by enemies and even though they managed to build the strong identity through their racial and religious exclusivity (Desai 2001).

It is needed to notify of the Boers' lifestyle outside *Kapstad*. The inland settlement was very sparse, each person lived in the area about 10 km² and the Boer's families stayed very separately and isolated from each other. These manners led to a very specific and idiosyncratic Boers' lifestyle, characterising with disobedience to any kind of authority, preferring separatisms, accompanied by social and cultural isolation. The only education came from Bible, which again, was strongly influenced with Calvinism, especially driving from the Old Testament. Thus the Boers considered black and coloured South Africans to be an inferior race, predestined to serve to white people (Theal 1905: 110-114).

2.2   South Africa under the British rule

The British came to South Africa for the first time in 1795, but they settled only until 1803. Then during the Napoleonic Wars they returned to the Cape colony in 1806. The British noticed a perfect location of the Cape which was extremely favourable for overseas trade. In 1814, after the Peace Settlement and the Anglo-Dutch Treaty, the Cape was ceded to the British permanently. Almost immediately the Boers came into a conflict with the British because of the slavery abolition in 1807. Disrespecting the law, the Boers kept their native black servants, treating them due to their "inferior" black race. The following Abolition of

Slavery Act in 1833-1834 freed more than 35,000 slaves and practically put the blacks in the same vertical level as the Boers. Certainly, this was in a contradiction with the Calvinistic doctrine of the white supremacy. Therefore, the emancipation of the Cape slaves caused a profound resentment and strong opposition against the British rule, deepened during the following period (Magubane 1996: 42; SAHO 2011).

The slavery abolishment gave impulse for the legendary Great Trek (*Die Groot Trek*) which began in 1835 and around 6,000 *Voortrekkers* participated. In 1845, there were already 15,000 *Voortrekkers* taken a part, leaving their homes in the Cape Colony and seeking for new unoccupied lands in the north, where vast uninhabited areas could serve as their new home (Giliomee 2003: 161) (see appendix 2). The significant escape from the British hegemony is being given in the biblical connection with the Exodus of Israelites from Egypt. *Voortrekkers* have being seen as God's chosen people. (Giliomee – Mbenga 2007: 150-152). The British government was unable to administrate newly annexed Boers' territories and consented to recognize an independent Boer republic the *Orange Free State* in 1854. Three years later the second Boer republic was established – the *South African Republic* (*Transvaal*) (see appendix 3). The period of the Great Trek was formally terminated (History World).

As an effort to distinguish the Afrikaners from other ethnic group in South Africa and for the strengthening of the national determination and the establishment of the Afrikaner nation, the Afrikaners developed their own language – *Afrikaans*. It was a language coming from Dutch, French, German and native languages such as Khoisan or San and which was spoken by the Dutch settlers from the late 1600s and later, in the 18th century, it was also used by slaves. Thus, it was considered by British to be a language of poor people. Afrikaans was referred to be "Hottentot language" or "kitchen language". Simply, it was neither acceptable nor respected language. Afrikaans was used as a tool of the resistance against the British dominance and the favouritism of English. One of the primal actions was the First Afrikaans Language Movement, beginning in 1875, but it did not meet with the success. It was also time of the first Afrikaans literature and first educational institutions, holding lectures in Afrikaans. The First Afrikaans Language Movement was followed by the Second Afrikaans Language Movement which functionally lasted until 1925 when Afrikaans was eventually recognized as the official language (Hofmeyr 1987: 95-123).

The clashes between the British and the Boers resulted in the Second South African War (*the Anglo-Boer War*), 1899-1902[1]. Although the British had a significant military predominance, for a long time they were unable to breach a warlike determination of the Boers. To do so, they practised a scorched-earth policy and introduced the first-world concentration camps where the Boers, including women and children, were kept under miserable conditions (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). The Boers' loss in the war followed by the Union of South Africa Act in 1910, establishing the unification of two former Boer republics and two former British states (Natal and the Cape), represented by the British Governor General, but the British influence remained very limited. The union refused the black South Africans as citizens. Thus the war was showed to be another occasion for producing glorified Boer personalities, national heroes, such as Generals Jacob "Koos" de la Rey, Christiaan de Wer, Louis Botha and others. The South African War has been carrying a special symbolism in the later formation of the Afrikaner nationalism.

2.3 *Afrikaner nationalism in the 1930s and the 1940s and the apartheid era*

The creation of the Union deeply divided the Afrikaner camp itself. Some Afrikaner leaders, such as generals from the South African War Jan Smuts or Louis Botha, had a liberal and moderate vision of the Afrikaner nationalism and advanced closer cooperation and staying loyal to Great Britain hence they preferred a white nation comprising of Afrikaners as well as British. This was in a precipitous contradiction with an idea of other Afrikaner leaders, such as D.F. Malan and J.B.M. Hertzog, who saw an Afrikaner nation consisting exclusively from Afrikaners as a distinct nationality (Lemon 1987). This division of the Afrikaners will play an important role in the future development of the Afrikaner nationalism.

However, the both camps shared the same opinion about the privilege of a white race, which had to be protected from other races. Therefore the first racist legislation was enacted: *Mines and Work Bill of 1911*, restricting the black workers employment, and *Native Land Act of 1913*, which introduced a strict segregation for he Blacks by establishment of reservations for black men only, and which represented by means the hardest legislation, imposed on black South Africans. The reservations made up around 7.3% of a land, mostly less fertile (although

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[1]The First South African War between the Boers and the British was held in 1880-1881.

the black population represented 80% of a total South African population) (Science Encyclopedia).

As the Great Depression harshly hit the economy of the country, a significant number of Afrikaner farmers were left unemployed. Together with repetitive period of droughts, they were forced to move to urban areas. Naturally, they lacked skills needed for other kinds of work than farming. The Carnegie Committee, formed in 1932, said that around 300,000 whites (17% of the white population) classified themselves as very poor. These extremely poor or unemployed Afrikaners became "the poor white problem". Nevertheless, through the high rate of economic growth from 1933 and aid from farming co-operatives and from the government, stabilizing the prices of some fundamental products and advancing a low-interest without the profit motive, and also through the legislation preferential whites before blacks, the Afrikaner farmers completely recovered by the late 1930s (Gilliomee 2003: 435-436, Guelke 2005).

The Afrikaner political leaders were worried about a declining support of the Afrikaner nationalism among newly urbanized Afrikaners, which possibly could lose a sense of their unique separate Afrikaner identity. In order to resurrect a historical glory of the great Afrikaner nation, they prepared a majestic centenary celebration of the Great Trek. Its epic projection demonstrated the uniqueness of the *Voortrekkers*. Oppressed with the British imperial tendencies and attacked by the native tribes, the Afrikaners re-established their nation and strengthened a national identity. In these circumstances the nationalists transmitted symbolism into the present economic landscape, when the Afrikaners walked a long difficult journey in time of the Great Depression due to set up a new urbanized nation and eliminate a rural poverty. The message was oriented to the importance of the united Afrikaner nation. Some streets were even renamed with opulent *Voortrekkers'* names. The parade itself was impressive: *"It was pure Nuremberg, and there was more to come at the foundation-stone ceremony two days later when 200,000 gathered on Monument-hill for the biggest, most elaborate, and most emotive folk rally in the history of the Afrikaner people"* (cited in Guelke 2005). Here, the comparison with the Nazis and the Nazi Germany is more than desirable: the same year the *Ossewa Brandwag* (Oxwagon Sentinels) was founded to preserve the spirit of the celebrations, just like the Nazis did during their pompous rallies.

The Afrikaner nationalism's parallels with the National Socialism in Hitler's Germany were seen even elsewhere; many Afrikaner politicians sympathized with the Nazi ideology

before the Second World War outbreak. Several features of these two ideologies were in common, but the Afrikaner nationalist ideas of the preservation of a white race were not derived from the Nazism. They shared with the Nazism some characteristics, but the Afrikaner nationalists found a Nazi glorification of a race, leader, blood and nation a little too extreme (Bloomberg 1990: 143). Both emerged from Christian nationalists, but unlike the National Socialism, the Afrikaner nationalism did not aspire to racism of extermination, but the racism of oppression (Balibar 1991: 39-40).

Together with Afrikaner Calvinism, the language presented the core symbols in consolidation of the Afrikaner nationalist movement. The standardisation of Afrikaans meant a turning point in mobilisation of the Afrikaners. It became the main icon of what means being Afrikaner socially, culturally and politically. The standard Afrikaans had not arisen only as a dissent against English, but also as a racial and class recognition of the Afrikaners (van der Waal 2012: 449-450).[2] The Second Afrikaans Language Movement was linked to the foundation of *Afrikaner Broederbond* (a secret organization of the Afrikaner brotherhood) which brought forth *the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge* (Federation of Afrikaans Cultural Associations, FAK). Later, this became the biggest conglomerate of Afrikaans cultural organizations. J. Leerssen talks about FAK as an act of "cultural cultivation" (Leerssen 2006: 559-570). The fundamental press spreading Afrikaner nationalistic thoughts were the Afrikaans-only newspaper *Die Burger*, *Volksblad* and *Transvaler* (the Afrikaans-only newspaper still can be found in contemporary RSA). The Afrikaners' trade union and the Afrikaner women movement also played a significant role. In this regard, social, cultural and linguistic discourse was taken very seriously.

By 1931 South Africa became a British dominion and after an approval of Status of Union Act the influence of Great Britain upon the South African politics remained extensively limited. However, the British Governor General was left as the final person passing laws, but without a possibility of a British monarch's advice (Loveland 1999). The implementation of the apartheid policy was a climax of the Afrikaner nationalism, which was formally legislated with a victory of the RNP in 1948. It was a strategy how to favour the Afrikaners in political, cultural and socio-economic field. It intervened in all spheres of life – education, religion,

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[2] Both Afrikaans and English became the official languages, but they did not own the same socio-economic role. Traditionally, Afrikaans appeared to be a language of a "white rural area", whereas English was used mainly in big cities. After the migration of the Afrikaners into cities, they became bilingual while the Anglophone population did not have good knowledge of Afrikaans. This led the English-speaking population to tend to maintain relations with other Anglophone countries while Afrikaans speakers inclined to separatism (Hnízdo 1996: 28).

health, daily life. In the first phase, known as *the petty apartheid*, *the Prohibition of mixed Marriages Act 55* and *the Immorality Amendment 21* were approved in a course of the race purity preservation (Horáková 2007: 120). Due to *the Group Areas Acts* and *the Population Registration Act* all people were classified in four racial groups: the White, Black, Coloured or Asian/Indian. In the 1960s apartheid culminated in so-called *Grand apartheid*, when the total racial segregation was completed by the creation of Bantustans or Homelands for Black people only. In period 1976-1981 four Bantustans were formed and given "independence".[3] From 1960 to 1980 around 3,5 million of black people were forcibly removed to those Bantustans, which served as a source of cheap labour force for the whites, living predominantly in the cities (Piknerová 2008: 34-35).

Due to the white-only referendum held in 1960, South Africa was proclaimed a republic and definitively terminated all political ties with Great Britain, including the withdrawal from the Commonwealth. According to the South African Constitution, approved the following year, the head of the republic became a president. The Constitution was changed in 1983 after a strong critics coming from the international community about the repeated violation of the human rights, based on racial segregation. With this constituting change a post of prime minister was cancelled. His position was replaced by a post of president, who culminated a significant political power. The tricameral parliament was formed; each house was represented by one segment of population on the race base – the Whites, the Coloured and the Asians/Indians. The black population remained excluded from the political life (Piknerová 2014: 98-100).

In the late 1980s, after a series of bloodshed and escalating violence from the government as well as the black opposition, RSA was caught in the international isolation. It was clear, that the apartheid regime would not be sustainable any longer and after the state of emergency 1985-1989, series of reforms and the pressure from the oppressed black population and from the international community was finally dismantling under the government of the president F.W. de Klerk. The rule over the country was passed on to the black majority leading by the government of President Nelson Mandela who began a new, non-racial and democratic era.

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[3] On the legal base of *The Bantu Homelands Constitution Act* from 1971 the Bantustans were allowed to get self-governing status, but their citizens lost a South African citizenship from the date of the independence declaration. However, the four "independent" Bantustans were denied an international recognition and faced a territorial fragmentation and inconvenient climatic-geographical conditions. Therefore, the concept "segregated, but equal" was only an illusion (Piknerová 2008: 35).

3.   Transformation period

This chapter will examine the era of the RSA's political transformation from the rule of apartheid towards to a democratic, one-nation and multiracial RSA. It will attempt to give awareness about the negotiation process and how the Afrikaners were shifted in political, socio-economic and linguistic field and how they dealt with the loss of their political power and modified themselves from a ruling political force in one of other South African minorities. The chapter will also describe shifts made in the Afrikaner identity and transient identity crisis which occurred simultaneously with the handing over of a political power of the former ruling NP to the present-day government-controlling ANC.

3.1   Description of the transformation period

The 1980s was a period of the first increasing negotiations between the NP and the ANC which eventually headed towards to a famous speech of the president F.W. de Klerk at the annual opening of parliament on the 2nd February 1990. In this speech de Klerk announced the end of apartheid and immediate release of political prisoners. He launched set of talks leading to an adoption of the interim constitution, introducing a framework for a democracy consensus, and culminating with the first all-race elections in 1994 (The Nelson Mandela Foundation). The period 1990-1994 is being marked as the first phase of the transformation. The most important for the NP was to achieve an agreement which would inflict as little damage as possible and the Afrikaner minority could keep its privileged positions, mostly in civil service, armed forces and economic field and an overwhelming process of losing political power would not be harmful and the rights of the Afrikaner minority would be respected and protected.

The second phase of the transformation period continued after 1994 and ended in 1999 with the second democratic elections. Those elections counted for an achievement of a competitive democracy and also marked the end of the Mandela era due to the election of Thabo Mbeki as the second South African black president. In this period the final constitution was adopted, today declared to be one of the most progressive in the world. For a post-apartheid South African society the crucial question was how to deal and reconcile the past full of human rights violations and how to construct a new political culture which would eliminate racial and ethnical boundaries within entire South African population and eventually move forward to greatly promoted metaphor of a rainbow nation. This discussion resulted in

the Promotion of national unity and reconciliation act 34 of 1995 which determined the Truth and reconciliation commission (TRC), promoting a national unity and overcoming of iniquities committed since 1960 (Justice and Constitutional Development RSA 2005: 1-2). The TRC provoked excessive optimistic expectations, connected with euphoria and illusion of nation reconciliation, enhanced by President N. Mandela (Horáková 2007: 125).

The transformation of the country led to the invention of the "new South Africa", in which new national symbols played an important role. The nation-building was created through the "rainbowism", which designated an idea of "diverse, but united nation". The Mandela's charisma created a true "rainbow myth", which quickly spread within a deeply race-divided nation (Bornman 2010: 239). This vision was enhanced by three crucial principles: nation-building, reconciliation and non-racialism. In the new post-apartheid society, "race" and "ethnicity" should become irrelevant factors and RSA created an illusion of "racial harmony" because of its peaceful and bloodless political transformation, but RSA continued to use a division of a society on a racial base (Horáková 2007: 124).

Thus a construction of a new united national identity was not an easy task, because the country lacked a commonly accepted national identity and sense of nationhood. As D. Horáková indicates: *"A new RSA was characterized by a specific cultural policy of shaping a new national culture in parallel with the building of a new, united South African nation"* (Horáková cited in Riegl 2010: 118). South African society has been highly heterogeneous, complex and deeply segmented not only on cultural, racial, linguistic and religious base and varied historical background, but also on economic and/or class status. RSA still recognized South Africans due to their racial division into four population groups (black, white, coloured, India/Asian) and newly, due to the Constitution, used another secondary division according to language group (Bornman 2010: 239) (see appendix 4). Therefore, the creation of a national identity became one of hot topics in the debate about a post-apartheid dispensation.

3.2 Political transformation of RSA

For purpose of a peaceful country's political transition to democracy, a short-lived interim government of national unity (GNU) was founded after the first general elections. The GNU had a character of a big coalition of the winning ANC, the NNP and the IFP, and it secured elementary political stability during the transition (Piknerová 2013: 59). However, the GNU lasted until 1996, when F.W. de Klerk disembarked and took out the NNP. This step

caused that the Afrikaners and a larger group of English-speaking whites stood out without any formal political representation. Later on de Klerk committed a political suicide of the NNP by his resignation from politics and his successor, M. van Schalkvyk, continued in this trend and after a fatal debacle in the 2004 general election, he announced a demise of the NP and recommended to join the ANC under the T. Mbeki administration (Giliomee 2003: 655-657).

The political marginalization caused a deep crisis in an Afrikaner nationalist movement unity and emerged its division. Those contradict visions of the Afrikaner nationalists started to separate from each other already in the reformist period of the 1980s when the Conservative Party (CP) split off from the NP and other right-wing Afrikaner parties such as Freedom Front (FF), Herstigte Nationale Party (HNP) and organizations such as Afrikaner Volksunie, Vereniging van Oranjewerkerkers, Boeerstat Party or Afrikaans Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) were on the rise. In spite of their poor results in elections in the period 1981-1994 and diminishing popularity (and this decline did not vanish in the next election in 1999), they continued to have an influence on the Afrikaner nationalism in the transformation period and further (see appendix 5). They attempted to protect the Afrikaner identity by separating themselves from other racial groups, because they did not agree with the "one nation" concept (South Africa Yearbook 1982; 1987/88; 1989/90; 1995; Election Resources on the Internet 1994; 1999).

The FF was the only right-wing Afrikaner party which participated in the 1994 elections. It gained 2.2% of votes and 9 seats (but gained only 0.8% of votes and lost 6 seats in the 1999 elections). The NP, which wanted to distance from the apartheid past, opened its membership to all racial groups, and was expected to gain a broad, mixed-race electorate. It gained 20.4% of votes and 82 seats (only 6.9% and 28 seats as NNP in 1999). The results copied the geographical distribution of Afrikaners: the NP won the Western Cape and lost the Northern Cape by three seats in a favour of the ANC. In other nine provinces gained from 3 to 21 seats (Election Resources on the Internet 1994; 1999) (see appendix 6).[4] The Afrikaner voters were polarized; some of them voted even for the ANC or other "black" parties and the Afrikaner unity was shattered once and away.

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[4] After the federalization of RSA, according to Interim Constitution, the country was divided into 9 provinces which were created to become electoral bastions of the ruling ANC. Only in two provinces the ANC was not successful: in the Western Cape, which retained its predominantly Afrikaans and Anglophone character, and in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, which historically has remained an electoral basement for Zulus and their IFP (Piknerová 2008: 36).

The first democratic elections instantly indicated the following political discourse. Four hundred mandates in the National Assembly were elected with the proportional electoral system with its aim, defined in Interim Constitution, to guarantee a political representation of minority segments of a society and reduce expected tensions. The purpose of the electoral system was fulfilled and the elections took place in a peaceful atmosphere. Although seven political subjects (fourteen in the 1999 national elections) were given a mandate, the party's system is not extremely fragmented[5] and the main political competition has been enacted between the ANC and the NP/NNP, today the DA. The ANC attacked the constitutional majority and remained a party with a predominant position until now (Riegl 2014a: 105-106).

3.3 Changes in the transformation period

In this place I will provide information about the main changes, which were made during the transformation period and then continued to have influence on a South African society until now. Namely I will make a note about changing procedures in economic and language policy.

3.3.1 Deracialising the economy

Deracialising the economy was one of the most essential steps which the ANC government made in the beginning of the transition. The economy's transformation was strongly bonded to racial redress of the society. Previously disadvantaged black population was racially redressed with the promotion of equality in public service and corrective actions. The equality section is recorded in the Constitution as follows: *"Public administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad representation"* (South African Government 2016a). These interventions introduced the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and Affirmative Actions (AA). There were pursued on voluntarily basis already since the early 1990 and officially enacted as the *Employment Equity Act* in 1998. The economic policies implemented an idea of positive discrimination of black people and giving them preferences to white people. BEE should empower black companies through loans, aid and consultancy service

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[5] The higher number of political parties in legislation can be explained with several factors. Primary, it is caused with the combination of proportional electoral system and a strong personalisation. Secondary, there is absence of entrance clause (even a party with 0.25% votes can enter), combined with an unequal distribution of society's segments across the territory (Riegl 2014a: 106).

and improve current economic situation of black South Africans by introducing quotas on a number of people employed in several occupations and on number of students receiving to secondary schools, colleges and some universities. Due to legislation AA reserves up to 80% new job positions exclusively for blacks. The provision was clear: when business staff did not match with ordered race quotas (i.e. it was observed to be "too white"), it was forced by government to re-employ it under the threat of contract denial. This situation predominantly gave employment to inconvenient personnel with insufficient education.

Although BEE initially increased percentage of black business owners and blacks in leadership positions[6] (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003: 10), on the one hand, these economic interventions overall have worsened a situation because remain remote from the black poor mass and helped to create a new superclass of well-connected rich blacks, now enjoying all their privileges resulting from BEE and AA policies. On the other hand, thousands of Afrikaners have been left unemployed or have been exposed to a threat of poverty. A great number of young Afrikaners have been denied scholarship or entry-level positions while their parents see their savings in the stock market have been frittered away on a large scale (van Rensburg 2009). In this sense, BEE and AA have not shown their expected effectivity and caused a huge disillusionment not only within the white population, but also within other race groups. Additionally, BBE and AA formed a new racial ranking which puts a white minority somewhere at the bottom, while promoted and evaluated black majority through the black empowerment. Racial recognition was rather strengthened than weakened. AA policy had an uneven effect on Afrikaners, because it mostly caused harm to working-class and lower mid-class Afrikaners (previously employed in state companies) while high class and elites maintain their great economic status.

The interests of working- and middle-class Afrikaners have been represented and protected by influential trade union *Solidariteit* (Solidarity), previously known as the Mine Workers' Union (MWU). *Solidariteit* occupied a prominent place in the transition era and in post-apartheid RSA, because since 1994 it has been successfully involved in call for minority rights protections and has actively contributed to re-building Afrikaner identity politics. MWU was formed in 1902 and actively supported the Afrikaner nationalist movement and apartheid regime until the late 1970s and meantime became a stable government partner. It

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[6] For example we can have a look on Johannesburg Stock Exchange, where black-owned companies expanded their share from R4.6 billion in September 1995 to R66.7 billion in February 1998. Additionally, a number of black people in civil service increased as well: from 2% in 1994 to 30% in 1996 (Lodge 1999: 108)

assured electoral support of the NP by white workers and in exchange the white working-class received secured job opportunities and additional benefits as pension rights and health care (Boersema 2012: 411-415).

In the early 1990s MWU called for the unification with other white union in order to create "a white super union" and to surpass the newly established more powerful black union Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)[7] and continued to protect white working class while blaming the NP for retreating from a rule of white superiority. For its racial rhetoric MWU became isolated and lacked the membership. Since 1997 the MWU has completely changed its public strategy and adapted to new neo-liberal society order. Here we witness a shift from pure racism and narrative Afrikaner nationalism defence to true language of rights. Since 1990s MWU had progressively assisted to a great number of white workers, affecting with AA. In 2001 MWU changed its name to *Solidariteit* which symbolizes the transformation from a small right-wing union to a communal modern trade union which still has an immense influence in the political debate over Afrikaner issues (ibid).

3.3.2 New language policy

The problematic status of Afrikaans was a very profound issue in a post-apartheid social re-arrangement. Due to a national survey, conducted by L. Schlemmer in 1997, respondent South African language communities came to the conclusion that for white Afrikaans-speaking South Africans ability of using their language was one of the areas in which they felt the most vulnerable. For them, losing their language would be equal to commit a national suicide (Schlemmer 1999). It is no surprise that Afrikaans, building basically from the late 17th century and creating from its Creole origin, became an important and great part of the Afrikaner hard-built identity, it bears sense of national heritage and cultural values and serves as a repository of Afrikaner history. For those reasons, changes made in the Afrikaans position-shifting in the transformation era occurred as one of the most painful.

During the negotiating process, the NP wanted to keep the pre-1994 status of Afrikaans in order to avoid the deterioration in favour of English. That was not possible, because the ANC wanted to stipulate the equal right and status of other African languages as

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[7] COSATU, together with South African Communist Party (SACP) will make a formal alliance with the ruling ANC, which lasts until now and therefore the SACP does not participate in elections as an individual subject. After the last 2014 general elections, relations between COSATU and the ANC were left in tensions.

well on one hand, but they did not require treating all languages equally on the other. Thus due to the constitution, Afrikaans was 'degraded' from privileged language to one of eleven official languages. In reality, Afrikaans has been marginalized much more than this. For the ANC, Afrikaans still bears legacy of apartheid and its remembrance. Therefore, the ANC attempted to favour English as a main communication language. There was even a requirement that English should become the only language using in military and police forces (Hnízdo 1996: 28).

The weakening of Afrikaans can be observed since the early 1970s, as the Afrikaner nationalist movement was also in decline, but after 1994 Afrikaans was found in a worse situation. For instance, since 1994, the usage of Afrikaans has been rapidly declined in advertising, commerce and industry. Some of Afrikaner companies even changed their names in due to hide their Afrikaner background. A significant decline of Afrikaans has also occurred in usage of television and radio. The changes in language policy in the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) can serve as a good example. In 1995, SABC performed 33% of programming in Afrikaans. This number declined to 3.7% in 1996, which is even less than broadcasting in both main languages from Nguni group isiXhosa and isiZulu. The announcements at airports and railway stations are no longer held in Afrikaans as well. Afrikaans has been abandoned as a language of signage and product labelling and there is an effort to push Afrikaans out of academic field: less scientific articles are written in Afrikaans. What is probably the most hurting is the dramatic reduction of Afrikaans in the state's bureaucracy and dropping of the Afrikaans relevance with legal system. Also, some of originally Afrikaans universities and other educational facilities are forced by the government to provide classes in English-medium instructions and become accessible to non-Afrikaans speakers (Louw 2004: 46-47). This Afrikaans marginalization of Afrikaans was certainly inequitable, because in 1996, Afrikaans was not only the first language of 57.7% of white South Africans, but also of 81.42% of coloured population (SSA 2004: 4, 9).

3.4 Emigration

Other Afrikaners, who were not satisfied with changes and the country's transformation and did not agree with the ANC's political takeover and refused to adapt to profound changes made during the negotiations, opted for the other option: the emigration. To those émigrés who left the country after the 1994 reversal, the ANC government failed to provide with any positive vision of their future. The loss of ethnic-purified state, dominated

with whiteness privilege, resulting in upcoming identity crisis as discussed below, the loss of a political power, leading to a loss of access to the civil service and loss of an ability to protect and advance Afrikaans language, this all proceeded to an easier process of emigration. Moreover, Afrikaners perceived that their minority rights would be under the threat and that it would increase their sense of political and cultural powerlessness.

However, rapidly increasing crime and violence became new, but the most exceptional reason for emigration.[8] Almost every Afrikaner émigré or someone from his family or close relatives experienced some kind of crime, such as theft, hijacking or even murder. Unflagging fear of crime and profound concern about personal safety and safety of family members made for many Afrikaners unbearable to live in RSA. As other decisive factor for emigration were stated: incompetence and deterioration of government structures, high corruption and mismanagement in public service, disempowerment caused by AA and BEE, falling standards of education and health care, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, high rate of unemployment and persisting inability of job procuring, restrictive labour laws, distrust in the ANC government, high personal income tax, inflation and unstable currency (van Rooyen 2000: 93-170).

Besides the neighbouring "Black African" states, the most popular destinations of Afrikaner emigrants became Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. These countries were chosen because they are English-speaking, first-world and most of their population is Caucasian, so their own ethnicity would not be challenged (ibid: 139-140). Afrikaners also opted for those countries because of family ties, high living standards, cultural, religious and biological similarities and fitting skill demands (ibid: 139-158). However, measuring size of Afrikaner post-apartheid exodus is quite complicated, because statistics differ widely (there are no longer statistics recorded by the South African government). We can have a look at official numbers: due to SSA, 304,112 white South Africans emigrated in the period of 1986-2000 (SSA 2015: 4). The five major recipient countries together received three quarters of all South African emigration in the period of 1989-1997, which counts for at least 310,000 persons, and this number has been growing since then. This amount of persons emigrated was being considered so massive, that

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[8] Since the 1990s, when all Africans were given an opportunity to move freely to previous white-only areas, the post-apartheid RSA has being experienced a law and order crisis, including an enormous increase in murder, robbery, assault, kidnapping, burglary, fraud and drug-related crime. Between 1994 and 1999, common robbery has increased of 121% and in between 1994 and 1997, violent crimes has increased of 22% (Louw – Schönteich 2001: 1-4). According to an Interpol report, in 1998 RSA showed the highest per capita numbers of violence-related murders. There were 59 persons murdered per population of 100,000, while in in the USA there were 6 persons murdered per the same population (Mc Cafferty 2003: 11-12).

public relations dubbed this activity a "white flight". New Zealand has turned by far in the most popular destination: in 1991, there were 2,007 registered residents with an origin of RSA, in 1995 there were already 6,762 South African residents, and in 2001 this number increased significantly up to 14,889 persons (Statistics New Zealand 2001).

As up to 20% of Afrikaner émigrés counted for tertiary educated and qualified as scientists, teachers, engineers, doctors, nurses, IT specialists etc., RSA experienced a strong post-1994 brain-drain, which certainly have had further immense consequences on the South African economy.[9] The decision to leave a country and settle down overseas often relies on so-called *bly of-gly-debat* (stay-or-go debate), which can even lead to a separation of many Afrikaner families. This situation has become a common feature of most of the Afrikaner families nowadays. Initially, the decision of emigration met with negative reactions: Afrikaner émigrés were called to be too racist or too cowardly for producing any exertion to live in the New RSA or participating in a construction of a new, common South African identity. Subsequently, this "packing for Perth" has turned into so common phenomenon that it has been seen as something "natural" for the white South Africans.

The majority of Afrikaner émigrés would probably return to their homeland meantime, but a crime environment and constant fear of violence obstruct them to do so. Some of them confess that they are not very happy with their decision to emigrate, although it was necessary: they live in isolation or sadness and suffer from homesickness or bitterness of self-imposed exile. Others happily settled down and made an effort to build a "little South Africa" abroad, with a preservation of Afrikaans and Afrikaner culture and gathering around "braai" (barbecue in Afrikaner style) (Van Rooyen 2000: 137-160). However, the most challenging remains a question about the sustainability of Afrikaner identity outside RSA. As the younger generation more easily assimilates, there will be a huge challenge for the second and third generation and their willingness of maintaining their original identity.

3.5 *Afrikaner identity crisis*

The political power transformation and the "degradation" of the Afrikaners from the ruling force to a white minority have also raised several questions about Afrikaner identity and how to integrate into multi-ethical post-apartheid South Africa. Even though the transition

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[9] The SANSA project (The South African Network of Skills Abroad) tries to give an authentic view of a realistic estimate of the size of professional emigration. The estimation gives a number of professional emigrations in 1994 onwards, which is 56% higher than a professional emigration before 1994. Between 1989 and 1997 RSA lost 41,496 skilled emigrants (Brown, Kaplan and Meyer 2000: 41-47).

period was relatively short, it meant a radical intervention into a deeply rooted Afrikaner nationalism and caused a profound discussion about relevance of *Afrikanerdom*, which was very much relevant in the era of apartheid, but no longer applicable in a deracialized South African society.

After the initial euphoria about a New RSA, when Afrikaners thought, the past could be forgotten and they could become a proper part of African society, the feeling of disillusionment, disappointment, detachment, alienation came along. They believed the TRC process was not fair to Afrikaners and the NP and it had been devised to vilify them. They saw the behaviour of F.W. de Klerk as treason, committing against Afrikaans voters. After the political power transfer to a black majority, Afrikaners started to realize that political and socio-economic changes had gone too far beyond what they could endure. They understood a need of African empowerment, but did not expect that it could lead to their own disempowerment. They agreed the African languages should be placed in equal level with English and Afrikaans, but did not want to see Afrikaans becoming a peripheral language. They agreed with lifting an African history within a South African discourse, but did not anticipate that their own history would be nearly criminalized. They started to feel as second-classed citizens and aliens in their own country (du Preez 2005). They began to feel "switched off", marginalized and "unwelcome minority" with a little contribution to mainstream (Schlemmer 1999).

This set of negative feelings and confusion about Afrikaner identity deepened, especially in the outset of Thabo Mbeki's presidency, when he proposed a process of accelerating African unification, leading towards an "Africanization" of the society and encouraging "Black nationalism". After his infamous "two nation speech", in which he referred to whites as colonialists, oppressors and arrogant people, who believe to be superior and only try to circumvent black empowerment and make transformation changes impossible. He claimed that Afrikaners only profited from racism and after apartheid they stayed to live in South Africa while black people have to continue to live with this "oppressor nation" and "ruling class" in one state (Mbeki 2000). Subsequently, Mbeki was heavily criticized for intensifying a polarization between classes and neglecting to build relationship within minorities. I agree with this critic as seems to me that T. Mbeki exceeded a Mandela's idea of a peaceful reconciliation and unification of the nation and put the Black Nationalism above the unification.

The Afrikaner identity has always been somehow relied on Afrikaner nationalism. In the post-apartheid RSA, the Afrikaner nationalism completely changed its discourse or worse, someone might call him dead. Afrikaners asked themselves what actually means to be an "Afrikaner". Does it have the same meaning as an "African"? Or "Afrikaans-speaking"? Or both? T. Mbeki intended to create a dominant South African identity and therefore adhered to a nation-building project. However, I am inclined to think that people can have multiply identities. I agree with P. Mulder, the FF+'s leader, who claims that the "Afrikaner" can be also "South African", "African" and a member of an Afrikaans-speaking community, putting in whatever order (Mulder 2007: 22). A. Stuijt points out that the ANC only advanced Afrikaner's identity crisis, which is also connected to their ethnic identity – they have been confused, how to call themselves: "Boer, "Afrikaner", or "White" (Stuijt). This identity crisis came so far that some of pivotal Afrikaner personalities even openly distanced themselves from their Afrikaner identity, while kept using Afrikaans as their language (Giliomee 2003: 616). They probably sought to avoid discrediting their carrier. Other came up with an idea if it was not better to invent a brand-new Afrikaner identity, which would be distanced from any racial categorizing and epitomize features of the democratic New South Africa at the same time.

4. Afrikaners' current positions

This chapter will explore the current positions of Afrikaners within the South African nation in the New RSA. I will focus on several demonstrations of the Afrikaner nationalism in various spheres in contemporary South Africa. For demonstrating such facts, I will use the 2011 census, which provides us with updated information and can serve for comparison with a previous period. Beside this, I will use other more updated sources. The chapter will provide with language and demographic statistics and it will give awareness about political representation of Afrikaners. Furthermore, it will show some socio-cultural trends and how Afrikaners' positions are manifested nowadays.

4.1 Development of Afrikaners' demographic and linguistic structures

In 2015, RSA was home of 54,956,900 citizens (SSA 2015: 4). This number gradually has been increasing. For comparison, due to the 2001 census, the South African population counted for 44,819,778 persons (SSA 2003: 2). Since the end of apartheid, the racial group of white South Africans[10] has registered significant changes. From 1996 to 2001 the population of the whites in RSA diminished due to high rate of emigration, as I showed in previous chapter. From 2001 to 2013, when fewer whites opted for emigration[11], the rate of white population has been slowly increasing (from 4,293,640 persons in 2001 to 4,602,386 in 2013). In last two years, the white population dropped slightly again (4,534,000 in 2015). However, the fertility rate is slightly lower than a decade before and it is expected to remain without a great change in a following decade (Health Statistics 2016).

Last year, the white population made up 8.3% of a total RSA population (SSA 2015: 2). Comparing to other racial groups, a black population has significantly increased, from 35,416,166 in 2001 to 44,228,000 in 2015. The coloureds have increased substantially their population from 3,994,585 in 2001 to 4,832,900 in 2015 and by far they exceeded the white population group. Nevertheless, in a political and economic sector they continue being

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[10] The segment of a group of white South Africans is not homogenous: the Afrikaners (Afrikaans speaking as the first language) form almost 61% and the white English speaking constitutes 36%. Approximately, the Afrikaners made up 5.2% (2,710,461 persons) of a total population (SSA 2012a: 27).

[11] Due to SSA, the international migration assumptions tell us that in period 2001-2006, 133,782 white South Africans left the country, which is almost three times lower number than in previous period. Emigration of white South Africans has been in a slow decline since then (SSA 2015: 4).

marginalized. The smallest (but economically important) group of Asians/Indians has enlarged as well: from 1,115,467 in 2001 to 1,362,000 in 2015 (SSA 2003: 10; SSA 2015: 2).

However, the territorial distribution of the white South Africans is not spread evenly. They are predominantly concentrated in Gauteng province (41.73%) and Western Cape (19.94%)[12]. In other provinces, the white South Africans make up from 9.35% (KwaZulu-Natal) to 1.77% (Northern Cape) (see appendix 7and 8). In Gauteng, where the whites count for 15.6% of a total population, the majority of Afrikaners is located in Pretoria and its close surroundings, while English-speaking whites tend to gather in Johannesburg. In Western Cape, the whites constitute the highest percentage (15.7%) of a total country's population and almost half of Western Cape citizens speak Afrikaans as their first language and one fifth states English as a native language (SSA 2012a: 21, 25). It is the only province where its governor is white and black population does not stand for a majority, mostly because of a high percentage of coloured people, living in this province (48.78%). Several municipalities have the country's highest percentage of the white population, including the province capital Cape Town, which meanwhile has become a hub of white South Africans. Some blacks even make complaints about Cape Town's racial uneven composition and call it a "racist city" (The Economist 2013). The truth is that Cape Town remains one of the most racially segregated cities in RSA. The black population stays in poor and marginalized townships or informal settlements. In contrary, the whites live in affluent Southern Suburbs or coastal areas (World Elections 2014).

One of the hottest political topics remains, however, the position and status of Afrikaans, often attributed by the ANC as an apartheid symbol and a part of the country's dark past. The ANC administration makes an effort to reduce the usage of Afrikaans in mass media and education system. The most exceptional example could be seen in the *taaldebat* (language debate) in Stellenbosch University, traditionally and exclusively using only Afrikaans medium-instructions (the university currently provides some lectures also in English). The former Vice Chancellor decided to teach all lectures in English and using other South African languages will have only supportive function. Thus the *taaldebat* is still ongoing and has overturned into a highly political debate about the power and dominance of one's language and also about the accessibility for education in Stellenbosch for non-

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[12] Both provinces, Gauteng and Western Cape, have the biggest contribution to the South African economy. In 2011, the size of Western Cape economy was 14.2% of a total country's economy. Gauteng represented 34.5% of the total economy. Together with KwaZulu-Natal, the South African third economic strongest province, the three provinces accounted for 64.4% of the RSA's economy (Bouwer 2012: 3).

Afrikaans speakers. The University of Pretoria is faced with the same problem: *#AfrikaansMustFall* campaign, which demands the university to abolish its Afrikaans medium-instruction policy (Makhetha 2015).

Pushing Afrikaans aside has been happening elsewhere: replacing the names of streets, carrying Afrikaner or European names, with names of South African people, fighting against apartheid and participating in its destruction. Thousands of streets throughout the country have been renamed, causing a chaos and confusion for travellers along with South Africans themselves. In some cases, even names of town and cities have a dual appellation: for example, the capital, Pretoria, is Tshwane. This case was brought to the court and only added to a struggle with racial groups (Brown 2010). On the other hand, mainly a younger generation of Afrikaners gradually has switched to English or have become bilingual, adapting to a changing RSA. Many of them recognize the importance and advantage of speaking English in a globalized economy nowadays. Nevertheless, in spite of unquestionable benefit of knowing English, Afrikaans is still better off than other official South African languages. For instance, translating government publications is easier from English into Afrikaans than into other languages; documents in IsiZulu or IsiXhosa languages are nearly impossible to get (The Economist 2012).

Despite the attempt to push Afrikaans aside, the number of Afrikaans speakers has been growing since 2001. There were 5,983,426 (13.3% of a population) people in 2001, who claimed Afrikaans as their first language. In 2011, this number enlarged up to 6,855,082 (13.5%) persons. Afrikaans is the third most commonly used language, more common is IsiZulu (22.7% and 11,587,374 persons) and IsiXhosa (16% and 8,154,258 persons), while English is the fourth most commonly used language (9.6% and 4,892,623 persons) (SSA 2012a: 23-25). Both IsiZulu and IsiXhosa have been in a slight decline since 2001. However, the majority of Afrikaans speakers are not white, but coloured people. In 2011, only 2,710,461 (39.54%) Afrikaans speakers were white, comparing to 3,442,164 (50.21%) coloureds. According to SAIRR, approximately 5.1 million of coloured people will speak Afrikaans by 2025 and the number of white Afrikaans speakers will shrink to only 4 million. In addition, the report says that those "brown" Afrikaans speakers continue to have a significant contribution to the survival of Afrikaans in slowly Anglicized RSA (Prince 2013).

The linguistic question is also important relating to a socioeconomic structure of RSA. Afrikaans and English speakers show a lower unemployment rate than black South Africans,

which has remained significantly lower over twenty-year period. In 1994, only 7% of whites were unemployed in comparison to 43% black unemployed. In 2014, 8% of whites were unemployed, comparing to 40% of black unemployed (SSA 2014: 32) (see appendix 9). The whites also enjoy higher education than the blacks: In 2011, 36.5% of whites completed higher (tertiary) education, while only 8.3% of blacks reached higher education (SSA 2012a: 54).

4.2 Economic overview

Twenty two years after the end of apartheid it appears that RSA a is not getting closer to the idea of a "rainbow nation" and racial division of the society still matters, at least in the country's economy. The inequality[13], poverty and class differences have been rising since 1994 and divide the society strongly. The Afrikaner and Anglophone minority maintains its dominant socioeconomic position and have benefited from the economic gains they had made during the apartheid era. Especially middle-class Afrikaners have quickly adjusted to a new economic environment and many of them have started to run their own business. Three out four Afrikaners are self-employed nowadays. They might receive less support from the government, but they have skills for being successful. For example, Koos Bekker, a media tycoon of an Afrikaner origin, even made bigger his business of Naspers multimedia after the apartheid and made himself the 13th richest South African (Forbes 2016). Therefore, the ANC administration, likely in a case of reducing Afrikaans, exerts some pressure in order to curtail the Afrikaners' power and influence in the economy (e.g. by introducing BEE or AA).

Looking up at the statistics, the principal outcome is that all racial groups have increased their average real income over the long term, even the poorest group of blacks (but a large number of them are still stuck in a deep poverty). However, as I show in appendix 10, the income gap between races has been broadened during the 20th century. The Asians/Indians were the only racial group which utilized economic changes and reduced the income difference in relation to a white racial group, from 42% in 1993 to 60% in 2008. In contrary, the income difference of coloured and black people in relation to whites' income has been growing since the end of apartheid (Leibrandt et al. 2010: 13). Appendix 11 expresses the

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[13] Over two decades after the end of apartheid, South Africa has become one of the most unequal societies in the world. Gini coefficient, the measure for an income inequality, is ranging from 0.66 to 0.696 (1 represents a perfectly unequal society). The inequality rose within black and coloured racial group as well: within black population from 0.53 in 1996 to 0.55 in 2012 and within coloured population from 0.49 in 1996 to 0.53 in 2012. However, the white and Indian/Asian group show opposite results; the inequality measure is declining: within a white group from 0.48 in 1996 to 0.40 in 2012, and within Indians/Asians from 0.52 to 0.44 (SAIRR 2013: 11).

annual per capita personal income in Rands: in 1996 the white racial group earned 41,492 Rands, the coloured group 8,225 Rands, Asian/Indian 20,154 Rands and black South Africans 6,000 Rands. In 2012, the whites earned 187,136 Rands, the coloureds 37,948 Rands, Asians/Indians 98,729 Rands and blacks 24,476 Rands (SAIRR 2013: 11). These numbers only affirm the persisting differences between races.

The annual per capita personal income is closely related to an employment structure, where the white group is still mostly employs at top and senior management, while a majority of black South Africans occupies professionally qualified jobs and workforce at the skilled technical level. With the other words, the black group is employed in a level which is at the bottom of the decision-making spectrum.[14] In 2014, the whites were strongly over-represented relative to a percentage of their economically active population in top management positions, where they occupied 70% of jobs and similarly at senior management in which they occupied 59.3% of jobs. As a contrast, the black population reached only 13.6% positions at top management and 20.5% at senior management. In spite of BEE policy positively discriminating the black population, black South Africans employed 58.5% the skilled technical jobs (while a white population only 22.7%) and this number has increased: in 2010 there was 51% of black skilled technical workers (while only 28.5% whites) (Department of Labour 2016: 33-38).

Overall, the white and also Indian/Asian population noticed a substantial move toward to skilled work; the percentage of skilled white workers grew from 42% in 1994 to 61% in 2014. The Indian/Asian population was the only racial group which has been getting closer to whites: from 25% in 1994 increased its skilled force to 51% in 2014. On the other hand, the black workforce showed only a small improvement in skilled jobs and increased from 15% in 1994 to 18% in 2014. Regarding to semi-skilled jobs, the white workforce decreased from 55% in 1994 to 36% in 2014 (while the proportion of black workers in semi-skilled occupations increased from 42% to 48% over the same period) and only 3% of white South Africans employed low-skilled jobs and this number did not change over twenty-year period (BusinesstTech 2014) (see appendix 12).

But looking below the surface, the Afrikaners are economically losing. The white poverty has been on the rise since 1994. Due to the UN development programme report, 1.5%

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[14] As an exception we can name a racial proportion of judges: in 2000, 75% of judges were white while all other races together made up only 25%. In 2012 there was a significant racial transformation: the white proportion of judges decreased to 38% while other races stood up for 62% of judges (SAIRR 2013: 9).

of whites lived below the poverty line in 1995 but seven years later the number increased up to 6.9%. Another report makes clear that 350,000 whites were classified as poor while some 150,000 belonged to a group of very poor, struggling for survival (Wood 2006). By 2013, it is believed to be more than 400,000 poor whites. Also the white squatter camps became more common. Across RSA, there could be up to 80 white-only squatter camps, many of them are located in Pretoria area (Simpson 2013).

Another issue, which stirs conflicts within a society, is a long-standing discussion over the land reform and how to equitably redress the previously discriminated black population and redistribute the land of which owners are from the overwhelming majority white farmers. Thus during the negotiation process, the government implemented the property rights and filled them into the South African Constitution in Section 25 of the Bill of Rights. According to this section, the state is allowed to expropriate property, even forcibly if necessary, when the purpose of such an expropriation is to redistribute land which refers to colonial or apartheid-era dispossession. However, the state is required to pay the compensation, which *"must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest of those affected"* (South Africa Government 2016a).

In spite of embedding those property rights, many call for speeding up the land reform and expropriating the white farmers without any compensation. This would probably lead to end up as neighbouring Zimbabwe, which under the presidency of R. Mugabe completely destroyed the country's economic structures by the land seizure of white farmers without compensation. For instance, one of the strongest proponents of the land expropriation without compensation is the political party Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which even claimed in recent interview that the party "is the last hope for South Africa" (News24 2016). The leader of the EFF J. Malema promotes so-called "land grabbing" – expropriation of thousands of white farmers and also mining companies, both without any compensation. This openly racist policy would jeopardize the RSA's economy based on raw material extraction (Riegl 2013).

The other voices began to be heard more loudly after the ANC government's clear twenty-two-year failure to redistribute the land. In the outset of the post-apartheid era, 87% of the land was owned by white farmers. The ANC government aimed to relocate 30% of the land in first five years, but it managed to redistribute no more than 8% by 2010 (and 90% of those farms are completely unproductive) (Atuahene 2011). The slow process of redistribution is caused, besides other circumstances, by the implementation of current

"willing-buyer willing-seller" policy, which has been proved as an ineffective system. For accelerating the land reform, in 2015 the president J. Zuma announced establishing an "Office of the Valuer-General" who will be tasked to determine land valuations in forced sales (The Economist 2015). However, the question how to quickly complete equitable land redistribution remains open for future discussions and leitmotif of many radical anti-Afrikaner factions.

4.3   Afrikaner political playground

Despite the socioeconomic influence, which remained concentrated in hands of Afrikaner and English-speaking minority, the political influence on creating the New RSA's politics, has been radically diminished at the minimum. After the 1994 general elections, it was clear that the ANC is going to take over the political power over the country and defend the right of a major black population. The political spectrum of white political parties was polarized and differentiated as well as Afrikaner voters who lost their unity and their voting preferences became varied. During the apartheid, the Afrikaners voted for the NP, but in the post-apartheid era, the NP could not "save" the Afrikaner voters any longer.

As I pointed out, the NNP, the successor of the NP, completely vanished from the political map in 2004 after the general elections in which the NNP won less than 2% of the vote. In this year the party's leader M. van Schalkwyk announced the NNP merging with the ANC and encouraged all party's members to join. Schalkwyk himself later went over the ANC and, as a reward of the merger with the ANC; he was appointed minister of tourism and environmental affairs in the T. Mbeki government. The other NNP members crossed the floor in parliament as well as in provincial councils. From 612 former NNP members, roughly one third joined the ANC (Butcher 2002). The ANC saw the parties' merging positively − as a step forward to nation-building and creating a unified South African identity (Munnion 2004). Many Afrikaners has joined the ANC since then; in 2010 the party had more than 820,000 members and some of them were Afrikaners, recently entered. It is estimated that some 2% of Afrikaners vote for the ANC (Times Live 2010).

Before 2004, the NNP tried to reform itself and then made a one-year-lasting alliance with the liberal, white-dominated Democratic Party (now called the Democratic Alliance, DA), which stayed in the Parliamentary opposition to the ruling NP during the apartheid era and represented predominantly the Anglo-South Africans (while the NNP was a political base

for the Afrikaners). The alliance's aim was to construct a joint, single opposition in order to combat the predominant ANC, but soon it was clear that alliance was not sustainable in long-term vision, because of a prevailing enmity between the two parties, dating back to the South African Wars. After the NP's disappearing from the political field, the DA advised to capture the NNP's voters (in the 2004 elections some 257,000 people cast their vote to the NNP) (Meldrum 2005).

The DA meanwhile became the official opposition of the governing ANC. It substantially improved its electoral performance and in the 2014 general elections won 22.23% of votes (over 4 million votes), while in the 2009 elections reached only 16.66% of votes (2.9 million of votes). It gained 89 seats in the National Assembly and 20 seats in the National Council of Provinces. The Western Cape remained the only province where the DA retained its predominant position from 2009 (it gained 57.26% of votes in 2014 and 48.78% of votes in 2009). The DA also became the official opposition of the ANC in other seven provinces (in 2009 only in four provinces) (IEC 2013b; 2014). Before the 2014 elections, the DA was one of the parties which aimed to question the ANC's dominant positions by pointing out the party's incompetence in solving the RSA's main structural, economic and political problems: nepotism, massive corruption, unsuitable macroeconomic management, high rate of socioeconomic inequality and unemployment, social heterogeneity and apartheid heritage. These are issues which significantly endanger the RSA's position of a hegemon of the African continent (Riegl 2014a: 107).

The DA still predominantly represents interests of the Anglophone population, but in recent years it appears that constantly more Afrikaners, coloured, Asian and Indian people cast their vote for the DA. According to Ipsos South Africa, about half of the DA voters are Afrikaans speakers, one third is English-speaking and one fifths speaks some other African languages (Harris 2014). This makes from the DA the only party which is supported by all main population groups in RSA. The DA's aim is to cross a division along the racial lines, because this is the division which still matters the most in voting for any political party in RSA. Addressing to the racial unity, last year the DA has elected its first black leader Mmusi Maimane, who succeeded white Helen Zille (she remains in her position of Mayor of Cape Town and Premier of Western Cape) (The Telegraph 2015).

Yet this black-voters-catching approach might be one of motives which leave many Afrikaners hesitating to vote for the DA, although the party has a white electoral base. The

Afrikaners might feel that the DA does not stand sufficiently to protect the Afrikaners' rights as a minority and also is not able to come out strongly against some ANC's policies, such as AA or BEE, because the party could not give preferences only to one segment of its electorate and such a behaviour would be always harmful for other specific racial groups. Hence by Afrikaners, the DA could be perceived to be too liberal with too centrist tendency. Its abortion and homosexuality support is found by many conservative Afrikaners unacceptable and too distant from Afrikaners' traditional Christian values and right-leaning cleavage.

The only party, which represents exclusively the Afrikaner ground in the Parliament, is, however, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+). As indicated previously, the then FF was the only Afrikaner right-wing party, which under the leadership of C. Viljoen participated in the 1994 general elections. In these elections, the party received its biggest support which has been dropping ever since. Before the 2004 general elections, the FF merged with the CP and added the 'Plus'. The amended party gained 139,465 votes (0.9% of the votes) and 4 seats in the National Assembly. Only in the latest 2014 elections, the FF+ improved its performance and earnt slightly more votes (165,715 votes and 0.9% of the vote), comparing to the previous elections in 2009 (146,796 votes and 0.83% of the vote), but still remained occupying 4 seats in the National Assembly. The FF+ was one of three political parties which defended their mandate from the 2009 national elections in the 2014 national elections and gained more votes than in the previous period (IEC 2013a; 2013b; 2014; Riegl 2014b: 177) (see appendix 13).

In its 2014 election manifesto, the FF+ complains about current attitude of the ANC government toward to an Afrikaner minority. The FF+ claims that the Afrikaners' rights are constantly being violated, because the Constitution does not preserve adequately a cultural diversity of the country. Afrikaners should not be seen only as "white racists with a strange English accent", because South Africa is a country of their origin, just as other South African ethnicities. Therefore, the Constitution should be amended to recognize the country's diversity. Addressing to the ANC's AA policies, the FF+ stands in a strong opposition and proposes to scrap it and so to prevent economic discrimination against young Afrikaners and support them to become independent as entrepreneurs (FF+ 2014).

The aim of the FF+ is to actively protect the Afrikaners' political, economic and cultural rights. It refers to a massive violation of the Afrikaners' rights as a minority, namely mentioning the ignorance of the South African Constitution – claiming the right for self-

determination (Section 235), cultural, religious and linguistic rights (Section 31), the right to a cultural life of one's choice (Section 30) and right of the establishment of the Commission for the promotion and protection of the rights of cultural, religious and language communities (Section 185). The FF+ does not see RSA as a non-racial country where the race does not matter anymore. In the FF+'s point of view, the idea of a 'rainbow nation" is only a tool how to exercise the marginalization of the Afrikaners' minority rights. The nation-building project and sharing of the united South African identity is for the FF+ supporters not valid either: they put the Afrikaner identity on the first place and the South African identity as the second (ibid).

Yet the principal problem of the FF+ poor performance in the national elections might be explained by the electorate which is still polarized along the racial line and hence the FF+'s political survival is strongly and exclusively determined by the white Afrikaans-speaking electorate, identifying itself with the party's right-leaning values and calling for application of the right for self-determination. Secondary, the majority of the Afrikaners cast their votes in favour to the FF+'s biggest rival, the DA (both the FF+ and the DA point at the same sort of electorate), because they are more like to decide for a party, which seems to be politically more feasible and its political platform realistically achievable. This was also one of the footholds which appeared in the DA's electioneering in the last general elections, in which the DA encouraged the Afrikaner voters to vote for the DA, because "the FF+ is too small to make a difference and in addition their leader sits in Zuma's cabinet" (the FF+'s leader P. Mulder is deputy minister of agriculture, forestry and fisheries, appointed in the ANC's government, but due to the Constitution none deputy minister is a cabinet member) and therefore the Afrikaner voters should not "waste their vote on the FF+ and rather vote the DA" (Groenewald 2014).

The FF+ argues that the current ANC government tends to think that all Afrikaans-speaking whites are racists and that the government treats English-speaking whites with greater respect and current policies are set in the manner which cannot forget (or forgive) the past injustices and makes an effort to eradicate Afrikaners' political, cultural and economic power at the minimum and make them feel as the "second-class citizens". Due to the FF+, the ANC tries to set up the racism reverse in a contemporary South African society. Yet the brighter future of the FF+ will be driven by the Afrikaner stronger nationalist movement and mobilization, which is, at least among older Afrikaners, unlikely to happen any soon.

The party's system of RSA can be considered as multi-partism with a predominant party, but the position of the ANC comes closer to a less-known term "ultra-dominant party" (Riegl 2014b: 162). Even though during the 2014 election campaign the opposition parties (mostly the DA) made an effort to challenge a personal integrity of the president J. Zuma referring to corruption scandals and incompetence of the ANC government to solve macroeconomic problems of RSA, the ANC still holds its dominance in electoral system. This could be explain with a big legitimacy given to the party in a combat against apartheid, a deep fragmentation of the opposition, demographic changes (a significant growth of a black population) and programmes of a positive discrimination including social benefits for current 16 million of South Africans (comparing to 2.7 million in 1995) (ibid: 175-176). Therefore, the 2014 national elections did not bring significant political changes, but showed some changes in electoral behaviour.

4.4 Non-political manifestation of the Afrikaner nationalism

When the apartheid ceased to exist, many Afrikaner nationalists soon realized that they will not be able to promote the nationalist movement through the politics and have withdrawn from any political structures, seeking for other channels in which they could express their identity. These current manifestations of the Afrikaner nationalism can be found in few small organizations of intellectuals and individuals which see that the current government pays only a little attention to protect Afrikaans, Afrikaner culture and education and thus the Afrikaner nationalists want to stand for their minority rights. There is also a huge anger and frustration within many Veteran groups (those who served in the military in the 1970s and the 1980s) who are not satisfied with a current position within the South African society. Therefore, they are watched by the security police.

One of the most radical organizations is PRAAG (*Pro-Afrikaanse Aksiegroep*), leading by charismatic Dan Roodt. This organization is one of the most visible in public media. With a contribution of Roodt's participation in several marches, PRAAG is traditionally right-wing, keen to defend Afrikaner cultural and ethnical roots, including Afrikaans and call for Afrikaner self-governance. Unfortunately, the D. Roodt's rhetoric is often seen as racism and verbal attacks targeted at the Afrikaner common enemy – black people. Roodt himself is trying to be personalized as a sophisticated intellectual, sometimes proclaiming himself a modern leader of all Afrikaners (de Wet 2013). Thus this behaviour

damages the reputation of the whole organization and many Afrikaners, who confess to more moderate approach, diverge themselves from this organization.

In the same vein, the Group of 63, a club of Afrikaner intellectuals, was founded in 2000 to seek a further social debate over critical issues, which are imperative for the future of the Afrikaners. They especially criticise the transformation period and the negotiation process, in which the Afrikaner position was the most marginalized and endeavour to renew a settled relation between the Afrikaners and current government. The group claims that a decline of Afrikaans usage is causing a huge alienation of the Afrikaners. They look for redress, but they eschew violence as a mean to achieve their demands. They showed their non-violent path by condemnation of terrorist attacks committed by right-wing extremist Afrikaner group Boeremag, happening from the early 2000s (Laurence 2013). The Group of 63 includes a historian H. Giliomee, sociologist L. Schlemmer and the former leader of the PFP, F. van Zyl Slabbert.

In the economic field, the trade union *Solidariteit* has maintained its position of protecting the economic rights, especially of Afrikaner working-class and Afrikaner males, who became the main victims of the ANC's AA and BEE policies. Generally, *Solidariteit* advocates a competitive, growth-oriented free market, low company taxes and economic freedom. Even though it is reluctant to indicate directly the neoliberal system, its policies successfully declare and promote the neoliberalism in the deracialized RSA. *Solidariteit* is serving as a base for its other civil-rights organizations, namely AfriForum and welfare, civil-service organization Solidarity Helping Hand. Those are organizations who have been trying to learn how to effectively "play" inside the system and state that the ANC has built, to protect Afrikaners' rights and "spaces" for Afrikaners (as a good example serves the fight to retain Afrikaans as a medium-instruction and schools and universities).

AfriForum, founded in 2006, is trying to mobilize the civil society, specifically minority communities and thus supports the RSA's good governance. It seeks to protect minority rights through a democratic debate with its aim to provide real hope for the future. The organization strictly does not align with any political party, but interferes into many spheres of the society (Trapido 2008). For example, more recently, AfriForum defends the white farmers' land rights and criticises the willing-buyer, the willing-seller principle. It also launches the anti-corruption and anti-crime campaign. The both issues have turned to be a serious problem in the post-apartheid RSA. The corruption and frauds of politicians in all

level of politics appear in day-to-day basics. The problem includes also the South African president, J. Zuma, who was very lately accused by the Constitutional Court of handling a long-term corruption scandal on misusing the public money (over 16 million USD) for the reconstruction of his luxurious residence *Nkandla* (Onishi 2016).

In the case of anti-crime campaign, AfriForum points out an issue of large and increasing number of farm murders, particularly of white farmers.[15] The organization criticises the ANC's attitude, lacking attention to address this problem in public media and unwillingness to include it in its common agenda. AfriForum makes an effort to spread public awareness and compel the government to prioritise farm murders and not to remain silent about this issue (AfriForum 2016). It is needed to be stress that a situation about the farmers' murders has become critical. There is a wide range counting the murders. According to Genocide Watch, since 1994, there were more than 70,000 white South Africans killed and from those over 5,000 were farmers (and in 95% cases there is black-on-white crime). Thus murders among white famers occur at the rate of 97 per 100,000 per year, comparing to 31 per 100,000 per year in the entire South African population. The report claims that approximately 50 persons are killed per day and at least 20% of the victims are white. With consideration of a small proportion of white population in RSA, this counts for substantial white murder rate. The motif of such murders is often racial and driven by hatred, dehumanization and desire for revenge of crimes which were committed on black population during the white-only rule (Genocide Watch 2013).

AfriForum was also involved in a case of so-called "hate speech". In 2011, it brought Julius Malema, the then president of ANC Youth League (ANCYL), to the Equity Court for singing a "Shoot the Boer" song in ANCYL rallies. This song was sung during apartheid as a protest song against the then ruling NP and now it was classified as a "hate song", advocating of hatred based on race. AfriForum further stated that the "Shoot the Boer" song initialized a larger scale of murdering white farmers because it happened during attacks on white farmers. However, this was not the first time when the song was used as a tool of hate speech. In 2007, J. Zuma mobilized his supporters by singing "Shoot with a machine gun" and then again in 2012 at the ANC centenary celebration, when he explained that the song had not been

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[15] Red October, which is led by well-known "Afrikaans folk hero", Steve Hofmeyr, is another human-rights promoting organization, trying to draw attention on increasing violence against white South Africans. As a protest gesture, the participants are dress in red and release red hot-air balloons.

intended as a hate speech, but rather to commemorate the fights against apartheid (Genocide Watch 2013).[16]

Not only through various organizations is the Afrikaner culture promoted. Especially the Afrikaner youth has found its own ways in defending the Afrikaner culture, language and heritage without entering the politics. The young Afrikaners have discovered the Afrikaans-language festivals, which in the post-apartheid RSA are not seen only as a help in maintaining the culture heritage and official status of Afrikaans and thus averting it from its possible extinction, but also as an occasion for celebrating the Afrikaner culture and prevent from the feeling of a total alienation. There are more than 80 Afrikaans language music festivals every year, including *Klein Karoo Nationale Kunstefeest*, the biggest festival event held in Oudtshdoom. The role of Afrikaans popular music has been growing significantly.

In this place I would like to mention the song "De la Rey" performed by Afrikaner singer Bok van Blerk. Since 2007, when the song and music video was released, it caused a sensation among white Afrikaans-speakers. The song is about Afrikaner hero, a brilliant general, guerrilla leader and perfect strategist of South African Wars who was thereafter proclaimed by Afrikaner nationalists to be a martyr of all Afrikaners due to his heroic death. The commercial success of the song was outstanding: 200,000 albums were sold in first six months (the most successful Afrikaans album ever) and the music video won the award for the best music video in the MK music awards (digital Afrikaans music TV channel) and thus the De la Rey became a phenomenon (Artsmart 2010). Reactions have been various, sometimes contradict: some perceived the song as an attempt to recuperate the Afrikaner cherish and majestic history and to elevate the Afrikaners' dignity and yet faded glory, others highlighted the song's hidden message to mobilize the Afrikaner nationalist movement and to incite to commit a national treason. Two Namibian Afrikaans radio stations even banned the song because of the "political controversy" (Freemuse 2007). Van Blerk strictly denied that the song carried any political meaning.

Very extraordinary and symbolic is the lyrics of the song, which evokes a heroic suffering of Afrikaner soldiers and women and children, languishing in concentration camps

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[16] Hate speeches are not the only example of the ANC government's hostility to the Afrikaners. For example, the ANC constantly uses the language of decolonization. The ANC claims that Afrikaners and other white South Africans are illegitimate white settlers who stole a land during the previous centuries. Additionally, the ANC has been calling for speeding up decolonization of RSA and therefore in January 2015 J. Zuma called for "exorcism of the spirit of Dutch colonizer Jan van Riebeeck from the Cape", proclaiming that "all the trouble began in 1652 when van Riebeeck landed in the Cape" (Times Live 2015).

during the Boer Wars. The song's language suggests that the Afrikaner nation will rise again and thus the general De la Rey could heal the Afrikaners' "power loss syndrome". The stirring chorus is more than explicit: *"De la Rey, De la Rey, will you come to lead the Boers? […] General, general, as one man we'll fall in around you […] Will you come for the Boers? We are ready"* (Youtube 2007)[17]. The melody invokes nostalgia of the past time of valiant ancestors. The singing is accompanied with video which represents the war-time deeds of the general and militant drumming only highlights a powerful impression from the song. The song became so popular among young Afrikaners, that they began to call themselves a "De la Rey generation".

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[17] For full lyrics see appendix 14.

5. *Volkstaat* possibilities

In this chapter, I will discuss claiming of the right for self-determination of the Afrikaner nation and explore possibilities for the establishment and viability of such a self-government entity. I will notify the yet existing projections and make a brief research about a future development which brings the discussion over the establishment of the *volkstaat* among the Afrikaner nationalists.

5.1 *Pursuit for the volkstaat*

Along their history, the Afrikaners have always been referring to self-determination, separatism and tendency to preserve their unique culture and ethnicity and it was also a result of their lifestyle. Thus propelled by fear of being perpetual minority with RSA, the Afrikaner nationalists wish to protect their identity by any means. Their hostility to other racial groups in RSA has been historically sprung from concern about their minority status. Therefore, the vision of building an Afrikaner ethnic state in which the Afrikaner *volk* would be unified and exercise white-only governance, became a desire of all Afrikaner nationalists. Some of them have endeavoured to re-establish and recuperate the former independent Boers republics, Orange Free State and Transvaal, which were lost after second South African War. Others situate a possible *volkstaat* in or around Pretoria in Gauteng or Western/Northern Cape, where the highest concentration of the white South Africans can be found. Moreover, Northern Cape and the north of Western Cape are sparsely populated and therefore it might be more feasible to build an Afrikaner settlement there.

Thus the pursuit for the *volkstaat* appeared as a principal theme in the nationalist discourse already during the 1970s and 1980s when many (approximately 60-80) new Afrikaner political and cultural movements were born. Except two Afrikaner political parties the HNP and the CP, all Afrikaner right-wing movements targeted to gain self-determination and then establish their ethnic state within RSA (du Toit 1991: 640-653). The very first experiment was driven by the group called *Oranjewerkers*, which one of the leaders was H.F. Verwoerd, a son of the *grand apartheid* architect Hendrik Verwoerd. In 1982, the group purchased the town of Morgenzon in today's Mpumalanga to seek an agricultural settlement for unemployed whites, which would eventually lead to the establishment of private farms and avoidance of using black labour force (ibid). Unfortunately, building an all-white homeland failed due to the reluctance of white people to give up employing black servants.

Actually, more blacks than whites live in the town nowadays and the whole project faded (Sly 1992).

The Afrikaner nationalists' dissent with a liberalization of the apartheid regime continued to strengthen during the negotiation process. The Afrikaner right-wing nationalists were concerned about the preservation of the Afrikaner "pure" identity and some of them, the most radical ones, threated by using violence to achieve the establishment of an Afrikaner homeland. For instance, in 1993 the paramilitary right-wing organization AWB was aimed to establish a *volkstaat* by military force in the former Bantustan Bophuthatswana (the present North West province) through the secret coup d'état and mobilizing its leader L. Mangope. The action was described as very awry from the start and ended infamously by brutal killing of two AWB's members. Although the FF's leader General Viljoen was contacted one day before the AWB's intervention (both Bantustans' leaders and Afrikaner right-wing groups were members of Concerned South Africans Groups, later called the Freedom Alliance), he strictly refuted the attendance of himself and his party in the coup (Meredith 2010).

After the unsuccessful militant action in Bophuthatswana, the AWB raided the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park near Johannesburg, where the negotiations between the ANC and NP were held. Then again in 2008, the AWB's leader E. Terre'Blanche claimed the right for establishing an independent Boer (Afrikaner) state in a land of previous Boer republics, State of Goshen and Republic of Shellaland, referring to the Sand River Convention from 1852, which was made between the British and the Boers (Bevan 2008). Both Boer republics were established in a territory of today's Botswana in the late 19th century. Their existence was very short, strongly supported by yet existing Boer republic Traansval and from a view of political science, they can be considered as historical quasi states (Piknerová 2009: 269). After the Terre'Blanche's murder in 2010, the pursuit for *volkstaat* faded out and the AWB has been keeping in silence.

Furthermore, N. Mandela agreed to establish *Volkstaat Council*, which was assigned to inspect possibilities and feasibility of the *volkstaat* foundation and additionally, would be presented of specific proposals. Mandela allowed establishing an Afrikaner homeland, because he knew this thought was not viable. Nearly after four years of set of talks about the *volkstaat* idea, Afrikaner right-wing parties were unable to deliver any concrete suggestions of the *volkstaat* location, how it would work, nor what to do with non-Afrikaners inhabitants living in an area claimed as *volkstaat*. For de Klerk, the pursuit for the *volkstaat* was

described as "a hopeless illusion" (Meredith 2010). Mandela was convinced that the idea of *volkstaat* was supported only by the Afrikaner right-wing which comprised a minority of all Afrikaners.

The *Volkstaat Council* was a group of 20 prominent Afrikaners, created on the basis of the 1994 Volkstaat Council Act 30, which was amended into the 1993 Interim Constitution under the Sections 184A and 184B. The main function of the Council was to *"enable proponents of the idea of a Volkstaat to constitutionally pursue the establishment of such a Volkstaat"* (South African Government 2016b). In reality, the Council's outcome was too general and non-specific to be demanded any immediate actions. Hence the ANC government decided not to support the Council's proposals. Eventually, the Council was removed by the Repeal of Volkstaat Council Provisions Act in 2001 (South African Government 2001). Instead, it was replaced by the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities, ascribed in the South African Constitution as Section 185. Together with the Article 235 of Self-determination, which was inserted into the Constitution on the FF's insistence during the negotiation process, comprise a legal framework which Afrikaner separatists are referring to the most (South African Government 2016a).

For the viability of the whole *volkstaat* project is immensely important its support among Afrikaners. Due to independent survey, conducted in July 1993 and then in May 1996, it was shown that the support for the idea of *volkstaat* decreased. In 1993, 18% respondents would move to *volkstaat*, 29% supported the idea, 34% did not support the idea and 19% of respondents did not have opinion. In 1996, only 9% would move to their ethnic state, 22% supported the idea, 66% did not support the idea and 2% did not know (Theissen 1997). The Afrikaner upper middle class is less open to the idea of self-determination. On the other hand, the recent questionnaire held by Afrikaner newspaper *Die Beeld* has indicated that the support of *volkstaat* is slowly coming back. 56% of respondents would move to a *volkstaat* if one was created, 17% would consider moving there and only 27% would not support the idea (Afrikaner Way 2013). Nevertheless, those survey results were not very relevant, because survey was held only among a small portion of respondents (11,019) and additionally, they do not correspond with poor election results of FF+, whose political support has been remaining low (even though the FF+ experienced a slight higher support in the last general elections).

The Afrikaner nationalists are now, in the post-apartheid RSA, nearly politically powerless, but they have not abandoned the idea of establishing *volkstaat* yet. They are aware that militant rising up against the black-majoritarian state would have fatal consequences on the Afrikaner minority, because the state, military and police control is all concentrated in the hands of the blacks. Therefore, the Afrikaners rather favour to achieve their ethnic homeland through peaceful negotiations and political channels. Currently, the Afrikaner *volkstaat*-seekers are represented by the *Boer(e)-Afrikaner Volksraad*, which is keen to accomplish the *volkstaat* establishment via talks with the ANC government. So far, they have been quite successful in these actions. In 2014, they met the Deputy President C. Ramaphosa who expressed a positive attitude toward exercising Section 185 of the Constitution and additionally, Section 235 as well (IOL 2014). It is also possible that the ANC is using negotiations about the white self-determination as red herring regarding to give to the Afrikaner nationalists empty promises and keep them relatively silent and non-violent about the issue.

One of the most important questions remains, however, a location and size of a proposed *volkstaat*. The FF+ has been active in this field as well; it has been promoting its own *volkstaat* proposal, located in the Northern-Western Cape (see appendix 15). This particular area was already demarcated and used in the CP's and FF's electioneering in the 1995/1996 local government elections, attempting to acquire certain areas which would be consolidated as an Afrikaners-only territory and thus serve as a foundation for *volkstaat*. Both parties showed very poor results in Pretoria, which was previously chosen as a *volkstaat* capital (instead, Pretoria was won by the NP) (Word Press 2014). Therefore, Pretoria is not included in the FF+'s concept, nor, surprisingly, Cape Town. Yet the Northern-Western Cape was demarcated due to its higher concentration of the white Afrikaans-speaking people and the lowest population density in the country (the case of the Northern Cape). In spite of its semi-desert and slightly mountainous character, several natural resources can be found in the location and it is one of the safest areas in RSA, including a coastal line for ports. On the other hand, there is a water and military facilities scarcity and low economic development without any larger cities. The FF+'s *volkstaat* might work on a system of internal self-determination or similarly as Catalonia in Spain and/or devolution in Great Britain.

Another proposal for an Afrikaner homeland was introduced by Dan Roodt from PRAAG. His project has been inspired with a location of former Boer republics (see appendix 16). It is a narrow corridor, stretching from a coastal line of the Western and Eastern Cape,

spanning Port Elizabeth, going through a central RSA, including Bloemfontein and Pretoria, going up to the north, inclusive of Mpumalanga province. The state includes neither Johannesburg, nor Cape Town. Unlike the FF+'s suggestion, the area of the Roodt's proposal receives more rainfalls, but lacks natural resources. Also, a size of this *volkstaat* is quite vast and the state would have very long borders with some narrow strips which would be harder to defend against the main black-population centres, located along the borders. For instance, the state could be easily attacked from Johannesburg or Kwazulu-Natal province because of its massive concentration of Zulu tribes.

5.2 Existing white-only settlements

The *volkstaat*-seekers found themselves caught in a vicious circle of dualistic approach: in one hand, they were promised to legally claim the right for self-determination, but they had to respect the equality measures and prohibition of discrimination due to the Constitution on the other hand. Thus this endless dilemma led them to find another form of expressing their autonomy. To the present day, the Afrikaners have come to the creation of two white-only settlements: Kleinfontein in the Tshwane metropolitan area and Orania in the Northern Cape. Both places are to be found in a private land and occupied exclusively by the white Afrikaans-speaking population. The idea of creating Afrikaner homelands emerged from experience of black Bantustans reserved exclusively for a black population during apartheid. The representatives in both settlements refer to Section 235 in the Constitution, claiming the right for self-determination, and to Section 185, giving them the right to live in a community of their own culture and their own language. Both were established shortly before the end of apartheid and populated by Afrikaners, seeking for security and the protection of their own ethnicity. Some of them were unwilling or unable to live in a new, non-racial society and did not accept Mandela's "one nation" concept.

5.2.1 Kleinfontein

Kleinfontein (in Afrikaans "Little Fountain") was founded by a group of 50 Afrikaners with J. Groenewald in the forefront in Gauteng province, specifically in municipality the City of Tshwane, in 1992. Initially, it was established in a vision of a cultural village. All residents must match with three crucial criteria: they must speak Afrikaans, be Protestant Christians and be descendants of *Voortrekkers*. It is highly important that an applicant not only understands Afrikaans and is familiar with Afrikaner history, culture and ideology, but he or

she is also required to be personally identified with all of this (Raghavan 2013). The majority of the residents came to Kleinfontein in order to find a protection of themselves as an "endangered white tribe" in RSA and doing so, to preserve their culture, language and unique identity. Others sought for safer life, because outside the community, they got tired of living in constant fear of their lives and lives of other members of their family.

Today, the community has enlarged up to 450 shareholders with 300 homes and 1,000 residents. Predominantly, Kleinfontein became a sanctuary for elder people; the average age is 60 years. Younger people rather live in not-so-far Pretoria. Even here a class division is perceptible: middle-class citizens live in two- or three-bedroom brick homes with gardens, while poor whites, who came here from informal settlements outside Kleinfontein, found their home in white squatter camps. Nevertheless, the community has zero unemployment, because management attempts to give a job to everyone. Beside plenty of job opportunities, the community is self-sufficient: electricity is fully distributed by Kleinfontein itself and it also has its own water sources. Additionally, there is a school, bank, retirement centre, church, rugby field and number of shops, pubs and restaurants. All signs are written in Afrikaans and that is also the only language which is used as medium-instruction in a school. The residents celebrate important days for Afrikaners, but ignore other feasts, observed by the black majority (van Zuydam 2013).

Recently, the local officials applied for a change of the settlement's status: they wanted to shift Kleinfontein from the white-only settlement towards recognition as a separate development or town within the City of Tshwane, with a right to run its own affairs. Pretoria refused a petition and Kleinfontein has being remained recognized as a cultural community due to Gauteng legislation. Moreover, the settlement has been waiting for a decision of the country's constitutional court, whether Kleinfontein is able to survive in its current form. The decree will affect a legal aspect of other white-only settlements (Raghavan 2013).

Even though the residents of the community insist that they are not racists, only aiming to protect their culture and language, the community headquarters refused the application of a black man to buy a house and settle down in the community, claiming that none black man would be happy to live surrounded by only white people. The very similar indication of racism occurred when black police officers were prevented from entering to the settlement. Those incidents led several black people from Pretoria to cry for dismantling of Kleinfontein. To them, the community residents refuse to embrace with the New RSA and got

stuck in the apartheid past. After all, the ANC government avoided antagonising the white South African population, because the whites still largely controls the country's economy. Besides, Pretoria's authority did not dare polarizing the city, aware of racial tensions which have been running very high, especially in last few years (ibid).

5.2.2 Orania

The Afrikaners' second settlement is situated in the middle of the Great Karoo, vast semi-desert region, about half-way on the 870-mile journey from Johannesburg to Cape Town in the Northern Cape. It has a long history, beginning in 1963. Originally, Orania had been built as a housing area for workers from nearby irrigation dam project, assigned by the Department of Water Affairs, which was involved in the construction of water scheme in the Orange River. Then, in the 1980s, when the projects came into abeyance and workers moved away, the place became a town of ghosts and were inhabited only with squatters. In 1990, the town was purchased by Carel Boshoff, a son-in-law of H. Verwoerd, and his collaborators from the newly established Afrikaner right-wing Avstig (*Afrikaner-Vryheidstigting* – Afrikaner Freedom Foundation) for 1.5 million Rands (approximately 200,000 USD). The Avstig came with 350 Afrikaners who settled down. New Orania was officially opened on the 11th of April 1991. All founders are also members of *Orania movement* (Kirchick: 78).

Just as Kleinfontein, even Orania aspires to leave its status of an ethnic settlement and be recognized as a broader *volkstaat* with certain ambitions to extend its size up to the Atlantic Ocean and reach its own harbour. Visibly, this idea is overlapping with the D. Roodt's proposal of *volkstaat*. Currently, Orania was incorporated into the Tembelihle municipality and the present Premier pursues an approach of non-interference into Orania's internal affairs. Regarding to politics, Orania constitutes a voting district together with neighbouring farms called the Hopetown District (de Beer 2006: 111). In the 2014 national elections, nearly 78% of voters cast their votes for the FF+. Surprisingly, 4 voters (1.37% votes) voted for the EFF (News24 2014).

Like Kleinfontein, Orania relies on the policy of *selfwerksaamheid* (self-reliance). This policy was probably constructed for the purpose of the self-worth feeling, but opponents say that the Orania's residents aim to limit interactions with other racial groups. The community has its own facilities – calculating from grocery stores, restaurants and hotels through a pecan factory (growing pecan trees has turned into good business) to several churches, two schools and two museums. In contrary, Orania is missing prison and police

station (it claims nearly zero crime-level). Everything was built by the Afrikaner residents themselves in eco-friendly way, using green and sustainable architecture. Orania goes even further: unlike Kleinfontein, it established its own currency Ora, introducing in 2004. It is tied to the value of Rand and exists in 10-, 20-, 50- and 100-ora amounts. The main purpose of the own currency is to keep cash within the community and support the self-sustainable approach. The disadvantage is that the Ora is neither available nor valid anywhere else outside Orania, not even in nearby towns (Delvecki – Greiner 2014: 165-169). The residents permanently demonstrate that Orania has a very high economic potential: its annual growth rate has risen up to 10% and Orania has being targeted by several important investors.

Despite its separatist tendencies and "racist" one-side philosophy, Orania maintains surprisingly good relations with the ANC government. Most of the time, the government prefers to discuss other issues than the existence of Orania. The ANC policy is not concerned about the Afrikaner settlement, because Orania goes with a legitimate concord due to the Constitution. Orania does not attract only tourists and travellers (over 2,000 per year), but also several political representatives. For instance, in 1995, N. Mandela visited Betsie, a widow of H. Verwoerd (he imprisoned Mandela for life sentence) as a sign of a nation's reconciliation. As following, the then premier of the Northern Cape D. Peters made a short visit to admire the community's vivid development. However, the biggest turmoil was caused with a visit of J. Malema in 2009, but without any confrontations, his visit was assessed as very positive. The following year, the invitation was expanded to the RSA's president J. Zuma, who predominantly discussed housing incitement for the Orania's temporary black workers (Delvecki – Greiner 2014: 172).

With a nearly non-existing crime, quite good economic potential and friendly environmental discourse how can be explained that over two decades Orania has increased its number of residents only up to little over 1,000 until today? Firstly, some of applicants longing to settle in Orania were refused for non-fulfilment of entrance requirement (lack of own resources, unwillingness to invest in the settlement, non-commitment to Afrikaner values etc.). Secondly, many Afrikaners are not prepared yet to be denied their current living standards and to build and make everything by themselves and do jobs as manual work, previously reserved only for black or coloured people. Thirdly, many Afrikaners simply do not support Orania and the whole idea of *volkstaat*. They do not agree to live separately from other racial groups and thus ruin a vision of the country's reconciliation. To them, the Orania's residents only escaped from participating in the reconstruction of the New RSA,

because they are too racist to share their country with other racial groups. Fourthly, some Afrikaners probably would move to a white-only settlement if it was located in not so remote and barren territory with scarcity of natural resources, as Orania is. Its placement has nothing to do with Afrikaner historically important centres. Fifthly, most of Afrikaners in RSA live in very good conditions and they are still better off than other racial groups and thus they see more advantageous to continue to live in one state together with other races.

Thus Orania became an unattainable, unrealistic dream in the *volkstaat* pursuit, often bordering with a self-imposed utopia. Together with Kleinfontein, Orania can be perceived as a test of some sort, as a very first experiment of a white enclave's viability. On the grounds of a very low popularity of the white-only settlements within the black population and even among Afrikaners, it will take few more decades to build and develop truly stable and viable Afrikaner autonomous homeland, if ever.

Conclusion

This work examined the survival of the Afrikaner nationalism in the post-apartheid RSA and contemporary situation and positions of the white minority within deracialized South African society with consideration of the Afrikaner history on the RSA's territory. The paper verified hypothesis whether the current conditions under which the Afrikaner has been living, could strengthen Afrikaner separatist tendencies and could lead to perception of the establishment of white-only state, Afrikaner so-called *volkstaat*. The verification resided in research of possible denial and violation of Afrikaners' political, economic and cultural rights and assumption that the Afrikaner nationalism is still alive and relevant. The work laid several questions about the future of white population in RSA, what changes have been brought into the Afrikaner identity and how political and socio-economic Afrikaner structures have been shifted. Finally, the text aimed to give a more comprehensive overview of contemporary Afrikaner life way in RSA.

In the first chapter the study provided a theoretical introduction and dealt with nationalist discourse and the issue of nationalist movement. Then, the nationalist theory was applied on Afrikaner nationalism. Two contradicting approaches were chosen – primordialism and constructivism. I showed that the first named approach is derived from the ethnic substance of the Afrikaner nationalism, which is seen as a substantial element and describes the Afrikaner nationalism as a monolith which absorbs culture, language and traditions. However, the approach is incapable to reflect changes made over the time and does not give us information about the future development. Contrary, I demonstrated that constructivist approach works with formula of imagined communities and emphasizes a contribution of individualist and its subjective experiences.

The chapter two provided a historical background and in-depth view in the formation of the Afrikaner nationalism in timeline. The chapter captured the Afrikaner history from the arrival of Afrikaners' Dutch predecessors to RSA in the 17th century; it continued through a formation of Afrikaner identity under the British rule in the following two centuries and ended with a description of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism during the 1930s and 1940s and an installation of apartheid. I proved that several particular historical events led Afrikaners to consolidation of their positions in RSA and create Afrikaner nationalism. Determined by religion, language and ethnicity, they strongly linked themselves with South African soil and regarded themselves as a white and the only tribe chosen for ruling the country. Driven by a

possible loss of their hard-built identity, the Afrikaner nationalists created one of the most stringent racially segregated states in the world.

The chapter three discussed the transformation period and a political transition from the rule of apartheid towards a democratic country. It examined the handover of the political power to black majority and what steps were taken to build a solid democratic society – how the economic inequality was redressed and how a nation reconciliation was handled. I pointed out main changes in a deracializing process, particularly in political and socio-economic sphere. Additionally, in this chapter the text presented a response of Afrikaners of changes made during this period, which was either adaptation or emigration. I extended the text of a discussion about the Afrikaner identity crisis.

The fourth chapter dealt with various observations of certain demonstrations regarding to the Afrikaners' positions and profile in contemporary RSA. I provided bounteous sources and statistics which showed political, socio-economic and cultural trends in the current situation of the Afrikaner minority. I noted political representation of Afrikaners, demographic and linguistic structures and manners of promoting Afrikaners' position with non-political ways. Eventually, the chapter mentioned the safety situation regarding to the occurrence of the attacks on the white farmers and so-called "hate speeches".

The fifth chapter examined possibilities of Afrikaner self-determination. Within a historical context, the chapter described the pursuit of the Afrikaner nationalists for their own ethnic state. I studied a political background, legality and conditions which would allow the establishment of Afrikaner homeland *volkstaat*. That included political, demographic and geographic circumstances which would construct foundations for a viable Afrikaner *volkstaat*. Finally, I discussed already existing white-only settlements, their feasibility, daily life and quality life and nature of their residents. I concluded the chapter with contemplation about future development of those settlements and I also made a note about a reception of other Afrikaners.

Regarding to a survival and relevance of Afrikaner nationalism, in my point of view, the Afrikaner nationalism has never been dead, but it only changed its nature. During the negotiation process between the NP and the ANC, the Afrikaner nationalists conceded an idea of unified multi-ethnic nation, based on a majoritarian democracy, in which their own ethnicity could thrive, even though Afrikaners became a permanent minority. Once this state was created and the political power was transformed into hands of the ANC, the Afrikaner

nationalists were left without any political power and became politically irrelevant. Thus some Afrikaners are still nationalists in their heart, they are politically powerless now. They have turned to be a minority within a minority with only little capacity to rise their agendas up. So, the Afrikaner nationalism still has its place in the New RSA, but it has become politically completely irrelevant – too weak to be taken seriously by the ruling black-majority government.

According to my perception, the analogy of a "rainbow nation" was helpful only in the first phase of the transformation era. N. Mandela was a unique person to who all ethnic groups trusted. Hence he was used by the ANC to create a "rainbow myth" to get white South Africans hand over the power. As soon as the power transformation was made, the ANC shifted away from the nation reconciliation towards the construction of the Black Nationalism. This approach broadly began marginalizing white minority rights and the white minority has been feeling threaten, angry and frustrated. Also the Afrikaner identity has been strongly fractured. The Afrikaners still consider themselves to be South Africans, but hardly could identify with a "common nation" which the ANC claim is trying to build. Instead, the ANC is constantly participating in building of a "black-African nation".

So, even though the ANC has been trying to strengthen positions of black South Africans by introducing several measures and meanwhile marginalizes political and socio-economic positions of white South Africans, racial divisions still matter and strongly divide a society than ever before. The ANC government has been unable to reduce Afrikaner influence and strength in economy. Thus this social and economic inequality continues to support racial divisions of South African society and vice-versa and even though the white poverty has become more common than before the end of apartheid, Afrikaners could still extremely unlikely slip into poverty comparing to black South Africans and complete a very low rate of poverty in relation to the overall South African poverty.

Regarding to claiming the right for self-determination and creating of Afrikaner *volkstaat*, my hypothesis was not confirmed. The political and economic conditions for the Afrikaners in RSA do not lead them to support this idea and the *volkstaat* establishment was shown as a non-feasible possibility. The Afrikaners are politically marginalized, but economically, socially and culturally are still a very influential minority. As I showed in chapter five, the closest projections to the idea of *volkstaat* are white-only enclaves Orania and Kleinfontein. However, those settlements are so irrelevant (very few inhabitants, small

size, limited opportunities for viable economy and specially Orania, which is located in a parched area with close to no natural resources), that they do not represent even a small irritant to the ANC government. Thus the ANC put a topic of Afrikaner *volkstaat* in a margin of its interest.

To become a viable project, Afrikaner right-wing movements would have to flawlessly specify a location and demarcate a territory, intended for *volkstaat* purpose which would support a viable economy; persuade a great number of Afrikaners to move to such a territory; convince black population to leave and finally, to persuade the ANC government to let it all happen. Although some of Afrikaner nationalists made an effort and drew a *volkstaat* map, those projections are not feasible and lack some of the conditions for creating a nation-state. The only moment, suitable for the establishment of *volkstaat*, appeared during the negotiation process, when the NP still acted from a position of strength, because they still controlled a military apparatus. However, as I showed in my work, the NP failed to do so, because it did a very bad job regarding to the negotiation of the post-apartheid settlement. Nevertheless, the main concern remains safety of white farmers and financial security. As soon as those rights will be secured and guaranteed by current ANC government, the Afrikaner nationalists would leave their desire for self-determination.

To answer a question about the viable future of a white population in RSA, as long as private business will be allowed to thrive, the white South Africans will economically survive and they will live under the constitutional protection of their minority rights. However, the biggest anxiety is caused by demographic statistics: the black population produces many offspring and the white population is not getting even close to those numbers. Therefore, the size of the white population group will shrink significantly. Following words of a famous historian H. Gilliomee: *"demographics is destiny"* (Gilliomee 2003: 595). The white South Africans without any doubts have their place in the new RSA and they were assured about their future after the death of N. Mandela in 2013. Then they invented their own evacuation plan according to their conviction that upon the Mandela death they would face a massive expropriation or even genocide. Unsurprisingly, nothing from this happened and white business continues to flourish as never before.

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
List of appendices

Appendices

## Appendix 1: Initial expansions of the Trekboers from Capetown (picture)

(Our civilisation 2016)

Appendix 2: Routes of the Great Trek (picture)

(Voortrekker history 2016)

Appendix 3: Boer Republics Transvaal and Orange Free State in 1910 (pic.)

(Edmond Chissel 2011)

Appendix 4: Composition of South African society (graph)

(Bornman 2010: 240)

Appendix 5: Results of white political parties in national elections 1981-1999 (table)

Name of party	1981	1987	1989	1994	1999
National Party/New National Party (NP/NNP)	53.32 (131)	52.29 (123)	48.48 (94)	20.4 (82)	6.87 (28)
Progressive Federal Party (PFP)	18.17 (26)	14.03 (19)			
Herstigte Nationale Party (HNP)	13.01	2.99	0.2		
New Republic Party (NRP)	6.41 (8)	1.97 (1)			
Conservative Party (CP)	1.31	26.62 (22)	31.40 (39)		
Democratic Party (DP)			19.97 (33)	1.73 (7)	9.6 (38)
Freedom Front (FF)				2.17 (9)	0.8 (3)
Independents	0.15	1.32 (1)			

(South Africa Yearbook 1982; 1987/88; 1989/90; 1995; Election Resources on the Internet 1994; 1999)

Appendix 6: Results of the 1994 national elections by province (table)

Province	Political Party	Seat gained	% of votes
Western Cape	National Party	23	53.2
	African National Congress	14	33.0
	Democratic Party	3	6.6
	Freedom Front	1	2.1
	African Christian Democratic Party	1	1.2
Mpumalanga	African National Congress	25	80.7
	National Party	3	9.0
	Freedom Front	3	5.7
North West	African National Congress	26	83.7
	National Party	3	9.0
	Freedom Front	1	5.7
Northern Cape	African National Congress	38	91.6
	National Party	1	3.3
	Freedom Front	1	2.1
Gauteng	African National Congress	50	57.6
	National Party	21	23.9
	Freedom Front	5	6.2
	Democratic Party	5	5.3

|			
	Inkatha Freedom Party	3	3.7
	Pan Africanist Congress	1	1.5
	African Christian Democratic Party	1	0.6
KwaZulu-Natal	Inkatha Freedom Party	41	50.3
	African National Congress	26	32.2
	National Party	9	11.2
	Democratic Party	2	2.2
	Minority Front	1	1.3
	Pan Africanist Congress	1	0.7
Free State	African National Congress	24	76.6
	National Party	4	12.6
	Freedom Front	2	6.0
Eastern Cape	African National Congress	48	84.4
	National Party	6	9.8
	Democratic Party	1	2.1
	Pan Africanist Congress	1	2.0
Northern Cape	African National Congress	15	49.7
	National Party	12	40.5
	Freedom Front	2	6.0
	Democratic Party	1	1.9

(South Africa 1995: 40)

Appendix 7: Distribution of white South Africans in relation to total South African population by province, 2011 (in %) (graph)


(SSA 2012b: 55)

Appendix 8: Territorial concentration of all white South Africans by province, 2011 (in %) (graph)

(SSA 2012a: 11)

## Appendix 9: Number of unemployed and unemployment rates by race, 1994 vs. 2014 (graph)


(SSA 2014: 32)

Appendix 10: Annual per capita personal income by race group relative to white levels in %, 1917-2008 (graph)

(Author, copied from Leibrandt et al. 2010: 13)

Appendix 11: Annual per capita personal income by race in Rands, 1996-2012 (graph)

| Year	African	Coloured	Asian/Indian	White	Total
1996	6,000	8,225	20,154	41,492	10,710
2012	24,476	37,948	98,729	187,136	41,916
1996-2012	308%	361%	390%	351%	291%

(SAIRR 2013: 11)

Appendix 12: Employment composition of population groups by skills group, 1994 vs. 2014 (graph)

Employment composition of population groups by skills group

(BusinessTech 2014)

Appendix 13: Result of the 2009 and 2014 national elections (table)

Political Party	Number of votes		% of votes		Seat gained	
	2009	2014	2009	2014	2009	2014
ANC	11,650,748	11,436,921	65.90	62.15	264	249
DA	2,945,829	4,091,584	16.66	22.23	67	89
IFP	804,260	441,854	4.55	2.40	30	3
COPE	1,311,027	123,235	7.42	0.67	30	3
UDM	149,680	184,636	0.85	1.00	4	4
ID	162,915	-	0.92	-	4	-
FF+	146,796	165,715	0.83	0.90	4	4
ACDP	142,658	104,039	0.81	0.57	3	3
UCDP	66,086	21,732	0.37	0.12	2	0
PAC	48,530	37,784	0.27	0.21	1	1
AZAPO	38,245	20,415	0.22	0.11	1	0

MF	43,474	22,586	0.25	0.12	1	0
APC	35,867	30,676	0.20	0.17	1	1
EFF	-	1,169,259	0	6.35	-	25
NFP	-	288,742	-	1.57	-	6
AIC	-	97,642	-	0.53	-	3
Agang SA	-	52,350	-	0.28	-	2
Others	0	178,060	0	1.68	0	0
Spoilt Ballots	239,237	252,274	1.34	1.37	-	-

(IEC 2013b; 2014)

Appendix 14: Lyrics of "De la Rey" song in English (text)

On a mountain in the night

We lie in the darkness and wait

In the mud and blood I lie cold; grain bag and rain cling to me

And my house and my farm

Burned to ashes,

So that they could catch us

But those flames and that fire

Burn now deep, deep within me

Chorus:

De la Rey, De la Rey

Will you come to lead the Boers?

De la Rey, De la Rey

General, general, as one man we'll fall in around you

General De la Rey

And the Khakis that laugh, a handful of us against their whole great might,

With the cliffs to our backs, they think it's all over

But the heart of the Boer lies deeper and wider,

That they'll still discover

At a gallop he comes, the Lion of the West Transvaal

Because my wife and my child are perishing in a concentration camp,

And the Khakis' reprisal is poured over a nation that will rise up again

Chorus:

General De la Rey

De la Rey, De la Rey

Will you come for the Boers?

We are ready

(Youtube 2007)

Appendix 15: Map of the FF+'s proposed *volkstaat* (picture)

(Institute for Security Studies 2016)

Appendix 16: Map of the Dan Roodt's proposed *volkstaat* (picture)

(I luv South Africa 2011)