

Abstract

The bachelor's thesis "American reaction to French withdrawal from NATO military forces" deals with problematic decision of French president Charles de Gaulle from March 1966, when he decided to leave NATO military forces. American president Lyndon B. Johnson and his Secretary of State Dean Rusk were forced to deal with new situation in foreign policy. France was a key member and partner in NATO and the withdrawal might complicate the whole future of Alliance. However crisis might be difficult to deal with, American reaction was kind, tolerant and fully accepting new status quo decided by France. For understanding such a position was necessary to examine historical documents as well as the correspondence between key players. The major part of thesis is based on primary sources, which means the correspondence between State department and particular Embassies. The first part of bachelor's thesis analyses the characters and priorities in foreign policies of presidents on both sides of Atlantic sea, with aim to understand the reasons of French withdrawal as well as the docility of American reaction. The second part is focused on a moment of French withdrawal and presidential communication. The third part studies the preparations in American administrative before the March 1966. It explains tendencies in Johnson's government and influence of Dean Rusk on decision making. The paper attained the conclusion that the decision for docility in approach to Charles de Gaulle was made because of attempt to keep NATO compact as well as the effort to sustain security in Europe. Another reason for such a decision was the attitude of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who thought from the very beginning that USA needed to wait until de Gaulle left his office.