Abstract

Bachalor’s thesis ‘British imperial experience in conflict management in Northern Ireland’ discusses British army deployment to Northern Ireland’s Troubles between 1969 and 1998. Thesis observes the use of classical British army counterinsurgency doctrine, which was formed in 1960s in the withdrawal from Empire (doctrine was massively influenced by successful COIN campaign in Malaya 1948-1960). Based on application of particular aspects of the doctrine (namely clear political aim, hearts and minds and civil-military coordination) this thesis describes to which extend army relied on this classical doctrine and to which extend was the doctrine modified and how new tactics and strategies were developed for the specific environment of Northern Ireland. Analysis of British army actions points out that army was strongly leaning towards the classical doctrine during initial years of deployment (1969-1972) lacking intelligence of its environment and made several mistakes because of its inability to reflect specific conditions of the conflict. In upcoming years, especially after direct rule of London was imposed in 1972 and the introduction of police primacy, army focused on intelligence gathering and fighting terrorism and was able to adapt to specific conditions and challenges rather well.