The Role of China in the United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations

Role Číny v mírových operacích Organizace spojených národů
Acknowledgement

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To end with, I want to proclaim that any factual, grammar, stylistic, spelling or any other errors are solely my responsibility.
Declaration

I thereby declare that I have written this thesis myself and used only the cited sources.

Prague, ...........2015
Keywords:
United Nations, peacekeeping, Chinese foreign policy

Klíčová slova:
Organizace spojených národů, mírové operace, čínská zahraniční politika
Abstract
This bachelor thesis looks into the topic of China and United Nations peacekeeping operations. The aim is to show China’s changing role with respect to its ideological policies and principles, as well as to its interests and capabilities. A special attention will be paid to major shifts in China’s attitude and the reasons for them, as demonstrated on chosen peacekeeping operations.

Abstrakt
Tato práce se zabývá Čínou a její rolí v mírových operacích Organizace spojených národů. Cílem je ukázat proměny role s ohledem jak na čínské ideologické politiky a principy, tak na její zájmy a schopnosti. Zvláštní pozornost bude věnována důležitým zvratům v čínském přístupu a jejich příčinám, které budou ukázány na vybraných mírových operacích.
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List of abbreviations

CPC Communist Party of China
FPU Formed Police Unit
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
PLA People's Liberation Army
PRC People's Republic of China
UN United Nations
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Mission on Cyprus
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPKO United Nations peacekeeping operations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNITAET Timor
UPKO United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
WDP White Defence Paper
1. Introduction

1.1. An overall introduction

The role the PRC plays in the United Nations’ peacekeeping operations is a topic has not yet attracted general attention. This is a pity, though. The changes in Chinese approach and behaviour towards UN peacekeeping reflect changes both in domestic and international affairs, and comply also with changes in China’s status.

Most scholars researching PRC foreign policy, modern history or military often make only minor comments on China’s role in this area and very few of them seem to realise its importance in Chinese rapid development we have been witnessing. There are exceptions, though. The International Crisis Group, a security research non-governmental organisation, composed an excellent work “China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping” in 2009. This report was preceded by a paper of He Yin, an Associate Professor at a Chinese peacekeeping training centre and former peacekeeper. However, their excellent works pay little attention to ideological background. This blank spaced filled to a certain extent Gill and Reilly with their article “Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: A View from Beijing”. This work dedicates enough space to Chinese ideological principals but concentrates on the principle of state sovereignty at the expense of many Chinese interests or other principles.

The aim of this bachelor thesis is to describe the nature of UN peacekeeping itself and the role of China in it, taking into considerations its politics, ideology, needs or interests, and how are all factors mutually connected. Great attention is paid to principles of Chinese foreign policy and its goals. Even though some concepts do not reveal themselves in China’s behaviour or attitude explicitly, they still do shape them: the devil is often in the detail and may not be seen
at the first glance. I believe that the ideological background will help the kind reader to better understand the background on which China’s actions are formed.

This thesis, however, does not aim to describe every move taken by the PRC in the field of UN peacekeeping. I concentrated on the events when either a significant change in the behaviour occurred or when the event reflected Chinese characteristics and tried to answer, or at least contemplate upon, some problems such as how does China benefit from participation or non-participation, what are the motivations and reasons or how international community perceives China in UN peacekeeping.

I hope that this work could be of some use both to sinologists and people interested in international politics or security studies.

1.2. On sources and translation
This thesis draws of sources in English, Chinese and rarely Czech. The information about concrete operations or UN Charter was extracted from UN documents or press releases in English. The information about Chinese principles of foreign policy and ideology were taken analysed from PRC official documents or speeches or Chinese leadership. Secondary literature, mostly papers, articles and monographs, was used to support extracted information with other facts and to provide broader context needed for better comprehension of a problem.

I encountered several problems while translating the Chinese primary sources: “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” (Guofang baipi shu: Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang de duoyanghua yunyong 国防白皮书：中国国防武装力量的多样化运用) and “White paper on China’s Peaceful Development” (“Zhongguo de
heping fazhan” baipi shu 《中国的和平发展》白皮书). There are both Chinese and English versions freely available on trustworthy websites and there was seemingly no reason for not analysing the English versions, which would have saved much effort.

However, it is interesting that there are direct links in the English online version of The Diversified Employment of Chinese Forces to the following Appendixes:

a) Appendix I: Joint Exercise and Training with Foreign Armed Forces
b) Appendix II: Participation in International Disaster Relief and Rescue
c) Appendix III: China’s Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations

The Chinese online version, however, mentions all above-listed Appendixes only as “Appendix I, Appendix II, Appendix III” (fujian 1, 2, 3 附件 1, 2, 3) and at the end of the WDP 2013 dryly suggests the reader to “look for the [picture] content in the relevant document specially issued by Xinhua agency” (neirong qing jian Xinhua xinwenshe tupian zhuanxian suopei de xiangguan gaojian 内容请见新华社新闻图片专线所配发的相关稿件) without providing the actual link or any hint. Whatever the reasons may be, I confess to having ultimately failed at finding “the relevant document”.

Having this experience, I have decided to issue my own translations of Chinese materials. But there were other reasons too. The first was that the Chinese official and ideological materials are written in Chinese as first and any language mutation must be a translation which always

\[1\] See http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2012.htm
differ from the original text, be it in terms of facts or modality. I dare to argue that modality or connotation of a word, phrase or sentence plays a great role, especially in the field of ideology. However, I have decided to use the official English version while translating names, chapters or core concepts for convenience of those who do not (yet) read Chinese.

1.3. The problem of “China”

I am very well aware of the “China” problem, i.e. who is the true representative of Chinese people and culture – whether the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China. I do not take any stand on this issue here. But since this thesis deals with United Nations, and the representative of China to United Nations is PRC, the term “China” in this thesis refers to the People’s Republic of China. The Republic of China is referred to as “Republic of China” or “Taiwan”.

2. What is peacekeeping

2.1. Introduction

The Cambridge Dictionaries Online (Cambridge University Press undated) defines peacekeeping as “the activity of preventing war and violence, especially using armed forces not involved in a disagreement to prevent fighting”. Another definition, somewhat more extensive, provides the Capstone Doctrine (United Nations 2008: 18) as follows:

“Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.”

In this thesis, by the term “peacekeeping” I understand all kinds and forms of United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping. I do realise that the ambiguity whether the word “peacekeeping” is used as a hyperonym or a hyponym may cause a certain deal of confusion. However, taking into account the above definitions and the concept of three generations of peacekeeping, as shall be introduced further, I believe that this dichotomy is justified. After all, an official United Nations (UN) document states that the boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred (Ibid.) and they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. (Ibid.: 20) Sometimes the term “United Nations peace operation” is used; yet it is often, inconsistently, deliberately, and mutually substituted with the phrase of “peacekeeping operations”. The reason might be that, as Doyle and
Sambias (2006: 11) point out, “peacekeeping per se is nowhere described in the [UN] Charter” and the arguably most complex description provides the Capstone Doctrine. Despite the fact that there is, in my opinion, a need for more accurate and narrow definitions of the terms used in the field of UNPKO, I have no capability, knowledge, or space in this bachelor thesis to resolve this issue and will therefore stick with the current custom.

2.2. Legal and ideological background of UNPKO
The Capstone Doctrine (United Nation 2008: 13) states, that “United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the Charter” but also stresses that the UNSC does not need to explain the connection of a UNPKO with human rights. However, Chapter VII is arguably of the same importance at least: “The Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order.” (Ibid.: 14) Whereas the Chapter VI relates to pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter VII describes the range of actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggressions, including deployment (United Nations 1945)

Just like any other organization, UN must abide its Charter. There are quite a few articles in the Charter that may seem to forbid any state, or UN itself, to deploy an operation that would somehow interfere with the domestic affairs of a state, despite the state having become a failed state. This left UNPKO in a kind of a moral grey zone. But since UN was established to protect peace around the world and sometimes it seems that without an intervention a peace would never be reached, there has been need for interventions.
On 26 June 1998, just when the Kosovo crisis was extremely relevant, the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reflected on intervention:

“Article 2.7 of the [UN] Charter protects national sovereignty even from intervention by the United Nations itself. (...) But let me remind you (...) that that Article forbids the United Nations to intervene ‘in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State’. (...) Violations of sovereignty remain violations of the global order. Yet in other contexts the word ‘intervention’ has a more benign meaning. We all applaud the policeman who intervenes to stop a fight, or the teacher who prevents big boys from bullying a smaller one. (...) Our job is to intervene: to prevent conflict where we can, to put a stop to it when it has broken out, or -- when neither of those things is possible -- at least to contain it and prevent it from spreading. (...) It is also what the Charter requires of us, particularly in Chapter VI, which deals with the peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII, which describes the action the United Nations must take when peace comes under threat, or is actually broken.” (United Nations 1999)

By this speech he pushed UN interventions out of the moral grey zone, at least a little bit.

2.3. The aim and forms of UNPKO

The peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace agreement. (United Nations 2008: 16) Every deployment must have a consent of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) which consists of five permanent members (United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and China), and of ten non-permanent members
that are elected for two years by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (United Nations Security Council undated) In general, an authorization for an intervention (i.e. an action not limited solely to but including peacekeeping operations) requires the affirmative vote of nine states of the UNSC, including no negative votes from the five permanent members, and four positive votes from the elected members. (Doyle and Sambias 2006: 9) Then the UNSC issues a resolution, giving the operation a mandate which is binding for all UN participants.

2.4. Generations of UNPKO
As Doyle and Sambias (2006: 10) mention, the UN’s agenda for peace and security has rapidly expanded with the end of the Cold War. The UNSC summit held in January 1992 requested the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to prepare conceptual foundations of the UN role in peace and security in his seminal report, An Agenda for Peace (1992). In this report he defined types of peace operations as follows:

- **Preventive diplomacy** [i.e. conflict prevention] is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur. (Boutros-Ghali 1992: under Article 20) Doyle and Sambias (2006: 10) clarify, that this includes confidence-building measures, fact-finding, early warning and possibly “preventive deployment” of UN authorised forces; preventive diplomacy seeks to reduce the danger of violence and increase the prospects of peaceful settlement.3

• *Peacemaking* is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. (Boutros-Ghali 1992: under Article 20) The Capstone Doctrine (2008: 17) adds that the United Nations Secretary General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his or her own initiative, may exercise his or her “good offices” to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations.

• *Peace-keeping* [or peacekeeping] is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned⁴, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace. (Boutros-Ghali 1992: under Article 20)

There is no plain and straightforward definition of peace enforcement in the Agenda for Peace and its description needs to be extracted from various places in the document.⁵ A very nice summery present Doyle and Sambias (2006: 10):

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⁴ Compare with the definition at the beginning of this thesis. Note that the Secretary General and the Capstone Doctrine (2008) definitions are slightly different. This again reflects the ambiguity of terms in the field of UN peacekeeping. Furthermore note the Capstone Doctrine mentioning that without a consent, a UNPKO risks becoming a party to the conflict and being drawn towards enforcement action (2008: 32).

⁵ See the Articles 42, 43, 44, and 45 of Agenda for Peace (1992).
- **Peace enforcement**, authorised to act with or without the consent of the parties in order to ensure compliance with a cease-fire mandated by the Security Council acting under authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, these military forces are composed of heavily armed national forces operating under the direction of Secretary General.

Furthermore, Doyle and Sambias (2006: 11) present an idea of three generations of UN peacekeeping:

a) first generation peacekeeping, which calls for the interposition of a force after a truce has been reached

b) second generation operations that rely on the consent of the parties

c) third generation operations that operate with [UN] Chapter VII mandates and without a comprehensive agreement reflecting the parties’ acquiescence

It is vital to note that peacekeeping troops are by no means to be mistaken for, or misinterpreted as, a primary combat force. Under the Security Council mandate, this task is traditionally assigned to peacemaking operations. The peacekeepers may, however, use force at the tactical level in self-defence or in defence of the mandate but the authorisation of the Security Council is required. (United Nations 2008: 34) These peacekeeping operations are called “robust” peacekeeping operations and seem to resemble peace enforcement operations. This might be one of the reasons why there are still blur lines in the terminology of UNPKO. ⁶ There are also multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations that almost always include

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⁶ See the chapter 2.1.
peacebuilding activities and make up the majority of the [...] peacekeeping operations. (International Crisis Group 2009: 2)

2.5. Peacebuilding
The ultimate aim of any form of UNPKO is to end violence, provide both secure and stable environment favourable to sustainable peace and the rule of law with respect to human rights (Ibid.: 23). Another key factor is to prevent the conflict from re-emerging after the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers. Peacebuilding activities therefore play an essential part of most of successful UNPKO. Despite the wide diversity of individual missions, there are at least four prerequisites that need to be met should the aftermath’s peace be sustainable. These are:

a) Restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain public order
b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights
c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes
d) Promoting social and economical development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by the conflict (Ibid.: 25)

The Capstone Doctrine (2008: 26) remarks that UNPKO generally lack the programme funding and technical expertise to comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes, and that they are yet mandated to play a catalytic role in the following critical peacebuilding activities:

a) Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants
b) Mine action (e.g. minesweeping)
c) Protection of promotion of human rights
d) Electoral assistance  
e) Support to the restoration and extension of state authority

Since there is limited space in this thesis and a picture is worth a thousand words, I take the liberty to present a chart from the Capstone Doctrine (2008: 23):

**Chart 1**

![Chart showing the core business of multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.](chart.png)

As far as PRC’s engagement is concerned, the White Defense Paper 2013 (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013, under Guoji mienan jiuyuan he rendaozhuyi yuanzhu 国际灾难援助和人道主义援助 [International Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Aid]) says:

“Chinese armed forces actively participate in international governmental humanitarian aid and disaster relief actions; they [also] provide material and medical aid and send rescue teams to relevant disaster-stricken countries, provide minesweeping assistance and participate in international disaster relief cooperation.” (Zhongguo wuzhuang liliang jiji canjia zhengfu zuzhi de guoji zainan jiuyuan he rendaozhuyi yuanzhu, xiang youguan shouzaiguo tigong jiuyuan wuzi ye...
yiliao jiuzhu, paichu zhuanye jiuyuandui fu shouzaiguo jiuzhu jianzai, wei youguan guojia tigong saolei yuanzhu, kaizhan jiuzhu jianzai guoji jiaoliu. 中国武装力量积极参加政府组织的国际灾难救援和人道主义援助，向有关受灾国提供救援物资与医疗救助，派出专业救援队赴受灾国救援减灾，为有关国家提供扫雷援助，开展救援减灾国际交流。

PRC’s role in peacebuilding activities listed above differs to a great extent: sometimes there is comparatively less action for various reasons (for instance in the area of promoting human rights due to PRC’s rather ambiguous stand on human rights in general), sometimes there is a great deal of involvement. The principles, motivations, and historical development of China’s role in UNPKO shall be described in the following chapters.
3. Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence and the UN Charter

Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence (heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze 和平共处五项原则) were first publicly mentioned by Zhou Enlai (周恩来) on 31 December 1953 during negotiations with India over disputed territories in Himalayas that took place in Beijing:

“We believe that relations between China and India will get better every day. There are some unsolved problems that are to be solved and smoothly solved they definitely will be. After founding the New China, the principles of handling relations between China and India were laid down. These are mutual respect for state sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in state’s inner affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. (Women xiangxin, Zhong Yin liangguo de guanxi hui yitian yitian di haoqilai. Mou xie chengshu de, xuan’erweijue de wenti yiding hu shunli de jiejue de. Xin Zhongguo changli hou jiu quelile chuli Zhong Yin liangguo guanxi de yuanze, na jiu shi huxiang zunzhong lingtu wanzheng, hubu qinfan, hu bu ganshe neizheng, pingdeng huhui he heping gongchu de yuanze. 我们相信，中印两国的关系会一天一天地好起来。某些成熟的、悬而未决的问题一定会顺利地解决的。新中国成立后就确立了处理中印两国关系的原则，那就是互相尊重领土主权、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互惠和和平共处的原则。) (Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan 1990: 63)

Later on, these principles were stated in the foreword of the Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (Guanyu Zhongguo Xizang difang he Yindu zhi jian de tongshang he jiaotong xieyi 《关于中国西藏地方和印度之间的通商
和交通协》) signed on 29 April 1954. The Sino-Soviet joint declaration from 12 October 1954 closer specified the first principle as “mutual respect for state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity” (huxiang zunzhong zhuquan he lingtu wanzheng 互相尊重主权和领土完整) and on 28 June 1954 the joint declaration of the Chinese and Indian government reformulated the Chinese wording of the principle of “equality and mutual benefit” to pingdeng huli 平等互利. (Wang and Wang 2000: 33) This has been the last change yet. The principles have been mentioned in countless treaties or speeches and have become one of the most stable and persistent parts of Chinese foreign policy. They were incorporated even into the PRC Charter (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa 中华人民共和国宪法), Chinese White Defence Papers (Guofang baipi shu 国防白皮书), or the White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development.

The Wangs present an idea that the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence “could become international basic principles, because they are consistent with the objectives and principles of the UN Charter” (youyu heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze yu lianheguo xianzhang zongzhi he yuanze yizhixing, cong’er shi ta neng chengwei guojifa de jiben yuanze 由于和平共处五项原则与《联合国宪章》宗旨和原则的一致性，从而使它能成为国际法的基本原则。Ibid.). Some might argue that the Five Principles are merely stressing several key points of the UN Charter and the Wangs’ idea might seem a little controversial then. For instance, the UN Charter already states basic principles some of which are in nature similar to the Five Principles; to give a few examples, the principles of mutual respect for state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and mutual non-interference in state’s inner affairs resemble to Article 2, Sections 1, 4 or 7 of the UN Charter. Similar lexis, as shown below, also suggest a link:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 1</th>
<th>di yi kuan 第一款</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ben zuzhixi jiyu ge huiyuanguo zhuquan pingdeng zhi yuanze.</em> 本组织系基于各会员国主权平等之原则。</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

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<th>Section 4</th>
<th>di si kuan 第四款</th>
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<tr>
<td>All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ge huiyuanguo zai qi guoji guanxishang bu dei shiyong weixie huo wuli, huo yi lianheguo zongzhi bu fu zhi renhe qita fangfa, qinhai renhe huiyuanguo huo guojia zhi lingtu wanzheng huo zhengzhi dali</em> 各会员国在其国际关系上不得使用威胁或武力，或以与联合国宗旨不符之任何其他方法，侵害任何会员国或国家之领土完整或政治独立。</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Section 7</th>
<th>di qi kuan 第七款</th>
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<tr>
<td>Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>
| *Ben xianzhang bu dei renwei yuanquan lianheguo ganshe zai benzhishang shuyu renhe guojianai guanxia zhi shijian, bingqie bu yaoqiu huiyuanguo jiang gai xiang shijian yi ben Xianzhang tiqing jiejue;dan ci xiang yuanze bu fang’ai di qi zhang nei zhixing banfa zhi shiyong.* 本宪章不得认为授权联合国干
As demonstrated above, both the English and Chinese versions of both the Five Principles of Mutual Co-existence and the UN Charter have the same wording (territorial integrity – lingtu wanzheng 领土完整) or bear the same notion. I dare to say there is an obvious link between the principle of state sovereignty (zhuquan 主权), equality and mutual benefit (pingdeng huli 平等互利), or mutual non-interference in state’s inner affairs (hu bu ganshe neizheng 互不干涉内政) and the concepts of political independence (zhengzhi duli 政治独立) or interventions in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state (ganshe zai benzhishang shuyu renhe guojianai guanxia zhi shijian 干涉在本质上属于任何国家国内管辖之事件). However brief and shallow this lexical analysis of the UN Charter and the Five Principles of Mutual Co-existence may be, it seems clear that the Five Principles are based on, or at least inspired by, the UN Charter, and that only, seemingly, minor adjustments were made. So why China did not accept the UN Charter at all as one of the pillars of its foreign policy in 1950s? There are two possible, closely connected answers.

First, the PRC was not a member of the UN until 25 October 1971 when the 1976th plenary meeting of the UNGA “restored the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations” and the Republic of China consequently had to pass its seat to Beijing.
(United Nations 1971) Striving for membership but still being a non-member, Beijing could hardly accept a document issued by an organisation that did not recognize the PRC as a sovereign state yet its leadership needed foreign policy principles they could adhere to.

Second, the then-Beijing could not accept the UN Charter because it did not fit its security and ideological interests. The Maoist PRC strongly opposed any kind of “imperialism” and denounced the whole UN project as “an instrument for the US and USSR to expand their respective spheres of influence.” (International Crisis Group 2009: 3) Moreover, the PRC-hostile Republic of China had a powerful ally – the United States that wielded major influence in the UN. Beijing might have been concerned about possible implementation of the Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter that allows the UN to take military action. Nevertheless, after the UNGA issued the Resolution 2758 and Beijing took Taipei’s seat, the PRC accepted the UN Charter. Having had the Five Principles as an official foreign policy gave China’s policymakers a halo of ideological continuity with minor shifts due to situation development.
4. China’s Peaceful Development

4.1. Introduction
Along with the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence, the China’s Peaceful Development policy is one of the key guidelines in PRC’s foreign policy and, just like the Five Principles, this policy is being mentioned not only in many works dealing with contemporary China but also in key papers issued by Chinese authorities.7

“The White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development” was issued on 6 September 2011 by the Information Office of the State Council8 (Guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 国务院新闻办公室) and both the Chinese and English versions were published on its websites. The Chinese version is also to be found on People’s Daily9 websites. All versions are still accessible to date of submitting this thesis and there has been no evidence any of the versions change.

To better understand the structure and context of the document, I list its six parts:

a) Foreword (mulu 目录)

b) The Path of China’s Peaceful Development: What It Is About (Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de kaipi 中国和平发展道路的开辟)10

8 The State Council is the executive state body. It is responsible also for creating the Five-Year Plan. (Dillon 2009: 140)
9 http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/15598619.html
10 In my opinion and with respect to the context, a more adequate translation would be “The Background of of China’s Peaceful Development Path”. The official translation is nevertheless not entirely wrong since it retains the original heading’s function and is not really misleading.
c) What China Aims to Achieve by Pursuing Peaceful Development (Zhongguo heping fazhan de zongti mubiao 中国和平发展的总体目标)\(^{11}\)

d) China’s Foreign Policies for Pursuing Peaceful Development (Zhongguo heping fazhan de duiwai fangzhen zhengce 中国和平发展的对外方针政策)

e) China’s Path of Peaceful Development is a Choice Necessitated by History (Zhongguo heping fazhan shi lishi de biran xuanze 中国和平发展是历史的必然选择)

f) What China’s Peaceful Development Means to the World (Zhongguo heping fazhan de shijie yiyi 中国和平发展的世界意义)

The chapter names more or less describe the structure and content of the document. The relevant parts shall be dealt with as follows.

### 4.2. Core principles of China’s Peaceful Development policy

The China’s Peaceful Development White Paper describes “the way of peaceful development” as follows:

> “From a broader perspective of world history, the way of peaceful development is basically both developing oneself by protecting world peace and protecting world peace by self-development; [it is] emphasizing self-reliance and reform innovations and [thus] develop; keep open door and learn from other countries; [it is] seeking mutual development, mutual benefit and win-win situations in compliance with

\(^{11}\) This being a similar case to the previous one: “General Aims of China’s Peaceful Development”. The omission of the word of zongti 总体 (overall) might be, however, slightly misleading.
economic globalisation development trends; [it is] advocating for harmonious world of durable peace, common prosperity in cooperation with the world community. This way is primarily characterised by scientific development, independent development, open development, peaceful development, cooperative development, and common development.” (Cong geng kuanguang de shijie lishi shiye kan, heping fazhan daolu guijie qilai jiu shi: ji tongguo weihu shijie heping fazhan ziji, you tongguo zishen fazhan weihu shijie heping; zai qiangdiao yikao zishen liliang he gao chuangxin shixian fazhan de tongshi, jianchi sui wai kaifang, xuexi jiejian bieguo changchu; shunying jingji quanqiuhua fazhan chaoliu, xunqiu yu ge guo huli gongying he gongtong fazhan; tong guoji shehui yidaonuli, tuidong jianshe chijiu heping, gongtong fanrong de hexie shijie. Zhe tiao daolu zui xianming de tezheng shi kexue fazhan, zizhu fazhan, kaifang fazhan, heping fazhan, hezuo fazhan, gongtong fazhan. 从更宽广的世界历史视野看, 和平发展道路归结起来就是：即通过维护世界和平发展自己，又通过自身发展维护世界和平；在强调依靠自身力量和改革创新实现发展的同时，坚持对外开放，学习借鉴别国长处；顺应经济全球化发展潮流，寻求与各国互利共赢和共同发展；同国际社会一道努力，推动建设持久和平、共同繁荣的世界。这条道路最鲜明的特征是科学发展、自主发展、开放发展、和平发展、合作发展、共同发展。) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2011, under Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de kapi)

China’s Peaceful Development policy unsurprisingly builds both on old and contemporary guidelines, for instance Hu Jintao’s Scientific Outlook on Development (kexue fazhan guan 科学发展观), Deng
Xiaoping’s economic reforms (kaifang gaige 开放改革) as we can see above, or on time-proven policies, such as Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence: “China has been developing its friendly cooperation with all countries on the core principle basis strictly adhering to Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence” (Zhongguo jianchi zai heping gongchu wu xiang yuanze de jichu shang tong suoyou guojia fazhan youhao hezuo. 中国坚持在和平处五项基本原则的基础上同所有国家发展友好合作。) (Ibid.: under Chuangzao heping guoji huanjing he youli waibu tiaojian 创造和平国际环境和有利外部条件 [Creating a peaceful international environment and favorable external conditions])

4.3. China’s reasons and motivations for the Peaceful Development policy

Many of real reasons and motivations for PRC to pursue the Peaceful Development policy are put down in the White Paper itself. The paper points out that “the Chinese are numerous with limited resources. Almost 20 % of the world population is supported by 7.9 % of world arable land and 6.5 % of world potable water. The achievements of socioeconomic development are shared by 1.3 billion people.” (Zhongguo renkou duo, dizi bo, yong shijie 7.9 % de gengdi he 6.5 % de danshui ziyuan huo he shijie jin 20 % de renkou, jingji shehui fazhan chengjiu yao you 13 yi duo ren gongxiang [...] 中国人口多、 底子薄，用世界 7.9 % 的耕地和 6.5 % 的淡水资源养活着世界近 20 % 的人口，经济社会发展成就要由 13 亿多人共享[...]) (Ibid.: under Heping fazhan shi Zhongguo jiben guoqing de yaoqiu 和平发展是中国基本国情的要求 [Peaceful development is determined by China’s basic national conditions.]) Moreover, China’s lack of
resources is not limited solely to arable land or potable water. China is one of world’s biggest importers of raw materials due to its economic and industrial growth which has been relying on export. Therefore, “[China] has needed peaceful, stable international environment and massive cooperation with foreign countries.” (Shizhong xuyao heping wending de guoji huanjing, kaizhan duiwai jiaoliu hezuo. 始终需要和平稳定的国际环境，开展对外交流合作。) (Ibid.)

Having the situation outlined, the White Paper further states that “the overall aim of Chinese peaceful development is to modernise the state and ensure common material wellbeing of the [Chinese] people.” (Shixian guojia xiandaihua he renmin gongtong fuyu shi Zhongguo heping fazhan de zongti mubiao. 实现国家现代化和人民共同富裕是中国和平发展的总体目标。) (Ibid.) This statement is followed by a Chinese point of view on the development history and outline, that follows and refers to Deng Xiaoping’s reforms:

“After the Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform in the late 70’s in the 20th century, China adopted and implemented a ‘three-step’ strategy of modernisation development. The first step was to double the 1980-China GNP and to ensure people’s basic living needs. The second step was to double [China’s] GNP again by the end of 20th century and to raise people’s livings to the medium prosperous level. These two steps have already been taken. The third step is to make the per capita GNP reach the level of a medium-developed country, make sure that people’s well-being is quite good, basically finish

12 According to the data of World Trade Organization (undated), China’s share in world imports of fuels and mining products reached 27.9 % in 2013.
modernisation and build a rich, strong, democratic, civilised, and harmonious modern socialist state by the half of this century by the centenary of the People’s Republic of China. The ultimate aim of the ‘three steps’ strategy is to raise people’s both material and cultural living standards, and to realize unity of the rich [Chinese] and the strong [Chinese] state. At the same time, with increasing comprehensive power China shall appropriately perform its international role. (20 shi ji 70 niandai mo shixing gaige kaifang hou, Zhongguo zhiding bing shishi le “san bu zou” de xiandaihua fazhan zhanlüè. Di yi bu, shixian guomin shengchan zongzhi bi 1980 nian fan yi fan, jiejue renmin wenbao wenti. Di er bu, dao 20 shiji mo shixian guomin shengchan zongzhi zai fan yi fan, renmin shenghuo dadao xiaokang shuiping. Zhe liang bu mubiao yijing shixian. Di san bu, dao ben shiji zhongye Zhonghua renmin gongheguo chengli 100 nian shi, renjun guomin shengchan zongzhi dadao zhongdeng fada huojia shuiping, renmin shenghuo bijiao fuyu, jiben shixian xiandaihua, jiancheng fuqiang minzhu wenming hexie de shehuizhuyi xiadaihua guojia. “San bu zou” mubiao de hexin renwu shi, tigao renmin wuzi wenhua shenghuo shuiping, shixian fumin yu qiangguo de tongyi. Tongshi, yao suizhe zonghe guoli de buduan zengqiang, lüxing xiangying de guoji zeren he yiwu. 20 世纪 70 年代末实行改革开放后, 中国制定并实施了“三步走”的现代化发展战略。第一步, 实现国民生产总值比 1980 年翻一番，解决人民温饱问题。第二步，到 20 世纪末实现国民生产总值再翻一番，人民生活达到小康水平。这两步目标已经实现。第三步，到本世纪中叶中华人民共和国成立 100 年时，人均国民生产总值达到中等发达国家水平，人民生活比较富裕，基本实现现代化，建成富强民主文明和谐的社会主义现代化国家。“三
In conclusion, the Chinese government says it has been trying to strengthen the country and to enormously improve common living standards (quadrupling the country’s GNP within twenty years); the White Paper adds that China’s wellbeing and development is dependent on world peace. Assuming that foreign trade is highly limited during war times and looking on the World Trade Organization statistics indicating that China has been an export-oriented country yet still importing large quantity of goods (World Trade Organization undated) at the same time, China’s economic growth really might slow down if a larger share of its trade partners were engaged in a war conflict.

Additionally, the stable and peaceful international environment is not only an interest of the People’s Republic of China merchants. The ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) has been justifying its autocratic rule, connected with human right abuses and poor democratic standards, by economic growth and general improvement of citizens’ living standards. Therefore, already experiencing ethnic tensions, in a case of hypothetical economic rapid slowdown China might see a large wave of socioeconomic tensions which could result in challenging CPC’s authority. The increase of per capita GNP, finishing modernisation and building a rich, strong, and socialist state is then in CPC’s vital interest.
4.4. China’s means to pursue the Peaceful Development policy

The White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development dedicates a rather large space to the ways China shall follow in order to pursue and achieve peaceful development. However, there is little space to inquire into all ways mentioned; moreover few of them are relevant to the topic of this thesis.\(^\text{13}\) I shall therefore deal only with the relevant ones.

Referring to the previous part, it is logical that China wants to “fully take advantage of any favourable circumstances resulting from economic globalisation and local economic cooperation.” (\textit{chongfen liyong jingji quanqiu hua he quyu jingji hezuo tigong de ge zhong youli tiaojian} 充分利用经济全球化和区域经济合作提供的各种有利条件). (Ibid.: under Shishi huli gongying de kaifang zhanlüe 实施互利共赢的开放战略 [Implementing the opening-up strategy of mutual benefit]) Along with its growing monetary, power, and influence potential, China has started active foreign cooperation actions:

\[\text{[China shall] put a greater emphasis on [its] foreign investments. [China will] encourage all types of companies in organised foreign investment and cooperation, support investments in research and development abroad, start foreign contract projects and labour force cooperation, strengthen international cooperation in agriculture, [and] deepen mutually beneficial international cooperation in the development of energy or other resources. [China will] make a}\]

\(^\text{13}\) To name some: accelerating the shift of the growth model (\textit{jiakuai zhuanbian jingji fazhan fangshi} 加快转变经济发展方式), further exploiting own [Chinese] resouce and market strengths (\textit{jin yi bu wajue zishen ziyou shichang youshi} 进一步挖掘自身资源和市场优势), or accelerating the construction of harmonious society (\textit{jiakuai goujian hexie shehui} 加快构建和谐社会) (Ibid.)
great effort to develop projects aiming to improve the lives of host country people and to strengthen the host country’s ability of independent development […]. (Geng jia zhongshi dui wai touzi hezuo. Guli ge lei qiyue youxu kaizhan jingwai touzi hezuo jingying, zhichi zai jingwai kaizhan jishu yanfa touzi hezuo, kaizhan haiwai gongcheng chengbao he laodong hezuo, kuoda nongye lingyu guoji hezuo, shenhua guoji nengyuan ziyuan kaifa huli hezuo. Dali kaizhan youli yu gaishan dongdaoguo renmin he zengqiang dongdaoguo zizhu fazhan nengli de xiangmu hezuo [...]. 更加重视对外投资合作。鼓励各类企业有序开展境外投资和合作经营，支持在境外开展技术开发投资合作，开展海外工程承包和劳动合作，扩大农业领域国际合作，深化国际能源资源开发互利合作。大力开展有利于改善东道国人民生和增强东道国自主发展能力的项目合作[…].) (Ibid.: under Shishi huli gongying de kaifang zhanlue 实施互利共赢的开放战略 [Implementing the opening-up strategy of mutual benefit])

Given some China’s investments in developing and risky regions and its needs to protect its foreign energy supply sources, as suggested in the following chapters, UNPKO present a invaluable means of protection. The effort “to develop projects aiming to improve the lives of host country people and to strengthen the host country’s ability of independent development” present a public-friendly reason for active participation in a mission.

5.1. Introduction

The paper “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces” (WDP 2013) was issued on 16 May 2013 by Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013) It was published, and to date of submitting this thesis still is available, on both the Chinese and English version of the official website of the Chinese Ministry of Defense. Xiong and Wang (2013) state that “this [WDP 2013] is the eighth White Defense Paper the Chinese government issued since 1998. […] The White Defence Paper has about fifteen thousand [Chinese] characters altogether, [and] it was published in Chinese, English, French, Russian, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Japanese. […] The Chinese and English single-volume editions were already printed by People’s Publishing House and Foreign Languages Press. Starting from today [16 April 2013], [the single-volume editions] are distributed in Xinhua bookstores all over the country.” (Zhe shi zi 1992 nian yi lai Zhongguo zhengfu fabiao de di ba bu guofang baipishu. [...] Baipishu quanwen yue 1 wan 5 qian zi, yi zhong, ying, fa, e, de, xi, a, ri 8 zhong wenzi fabiao. [...] Baipishu zhong, ying ban danxingben yi fenbie you Renmin chubanshe, Waijiao chubanshe chuban, jiri qi zai quanguo Xinhua shudian faxing. 这是自1992年以来中国政府发表的第八部国防白皮书。[…] 白皮书全文约 1 万 5 千字，以中、英、法、俄、德、西、阿、日 8 种文字发表。[…] 白皮书中、英版单行本已分别由人民出版社、外文出版社出版，即日起在全国新华书店发行) 14

14 It remains unclear, though, where and how the non-Chinese and non-English have been published and whether they were published in print. I believe that if they were, it was not large-scale publishing.
The WDP 2013 is, by some of Chinese state media, said to be a groundbreaking document: “The White Defense Paper has for the first time made public the overall number of soldiers in the land force, air force, and the navy, the number of soldiers in eighteen land groups, and [mentions] the important [weapon] models used by the Second Artillery Force.” (Baipishu shouci gongbu lu hai kong san jun yuan ‘e, lujun 18 jituanjun de fanhao ji erpao de zhongyao wuqi xinghao. 白皮书首次公布陆海空三军员额、陆军 18 个集团军的番号及二炮的主要武器型号。) (Xiong and Wang 2013) Nevertheless, concrete figures concerning UNPKO can be traced back to WDP 2002. WDP 2000 (which is to-date of this thesis submission the oldest WDP available on Chinese Ministry of Defence’s websites) also presents some figures, however the information are not too thorough.

Since the sections of WDP 2013 are also key development areas of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) which, as shall be shown further, are closely connected with determining China’s role in UNPKO, I list them as follows:

a) Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces (wuzhuang liliang jianshe yu fazhan 武装力量建设与发展)
b) Defending National Sovereignty, Security and Territorial Integrity (hanwei guojia zhuquan, anquan, lingtu wanzheng 捍卫国家主权、安全、领土完整)
c) Supporting National Economic and Social Development (baozhang guojia jingji shehui fazhan 保障国家机关内及社会发展)
d) Safeguarding World Peace and Regional Stability (weihu shijie heping he diqu wending 维护世界和平和地区稳定)

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There are naturally also Preface (qianyan 前言) and Concluding Remarks (jieshuyu 结束语) but since these hardly are priorities of PLA development, I do not mention them in the list above. The same goes for the chapter “New Situation, New Challenges and New Missions” (xin xingshi, xin tiaozhan, xin shiming 新形势、新挑战、新使命) which introduces Chinese official grounds and point of view on the world security situation.

5.2. Priorities and aims of PLA development as described in WDP 2013

WDP 2013 lists and describes the priorities and aims of PLA development, and summarises one of the key ideas as follows:

[The PLA seeks] to improve the system of a new-type military training, to deepen the adjustment reform policies of military human resources and logistics, intensify development of hi-tech weaponry and equipment, and to build a modern military system with Chinese characteristics. (Wanshang xinxing jundui rencai peiyang tixi, shenhua junshi renli ziyuan he houqin zhengce zhidu gaige, jiaqiang gaoxin jishu wuzhuang zhuangbei jianshe, nuli goujian Zhongguo tese xiandai junshi liliang tixi. 完善新型军队人才培养体系，深化军事人力资源和后勤政策制度调整改革，加强高新技术武器装备建设，努力构建中国特色现代军事力量体系。) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013: under Wuzhuang liliang jianshe yu fazhan 武装力量建设与发展 [Building and Development of China’s Armed Forces])

I would like to point out that the idea of “building a modern military system with Chinese characteristics” is a no new idea or concept. As Blasko (2006: 5) says, “the Chinese military has been in the process of
modernisation and transformation for more than twenty-five years.” A large scale modernisation was initiated in 1979 by Deng Xiaoping’s Four Modernisations (si ge xiandaihua 四个现代化) that were to be carried out in the fields of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defence (i.e. military). (Fairbank 2010: 450) The first step in PLA modernisation was to reduce the number of troops: the initial four million were reduced to roughly 3.5 million in mid-1980s and went on reducing. (Worthing 2007: 187) China also opened up to the world and welcomed foreign connections (Fairbank 2010: 449) I believe that China having started contributing into the UNPKO fund relatively shortly after launching Four Modernisations, as shall be discussed further, is a result of the changes in the then-PRC.

The WDP 2013 outlines some of the areas where modernisation is allegedly needed. They are mentioned as one of the principles of “diversified employment of Chinese armed forces”:

“Win local wars under informationization conditions; expand and deepen the military preparedness. [...] Intensify joint employment of various branches of armed forces and increase the ability of systematically waging war based on information systems. Innovate and develop people’s war strategy skills, [...] improve the quality of national defense mobilisation and reserve force building. [...]” (Lizu daying xinxihua tiaojian xia jubu zhanzheng, tuozhan he shenhua junshi douzheng zhunbei. [...] Jiaqiang jun bingzhong liliang lianhe yunyong, tigao jiyu xinxi xitong de tixi zuozhan nengli. Chuangxin fazhan renmin zhanzheng zhanlüe zhanshu, [...] tigao guofang dongyuan he houbei liliang jianshe zhiliang. 立足打赢信息化条件下局部战争，拓展和深化军事斗争准备。 [...] 加强军兵种力量联合运用，提高基于信息系统的体系作战能力。创新发展人
A great emphasis is also put on the army’s involvement in the society. As already suggested, the PLA should support national economic and social development, which is actually incorporating the China’s Peaceful Development policy into military doctrines such as WDP 2013, putting it next to tasks military in nature. After all, it is clearly stated that

“the diversified employment of Chinese armed forces sticks to the following basic principles [e. g. PLA sticks to the following principles]: To protect state sovereignty, safety, and territorial integrity and to safeguard China’s peaceful development.”

Additionally, PLA is supposed to carry out various tasks of non-war character (suixing fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong renwu 遂行非战争军事行动任务), such as emergency rescue and disaster relief (qiang xian jiu zai 抢险救灾), emergency response and rescue works (yingji jiazhu 应急救援), protection of [Chinese] sea vessels (haishang
baohu 海上保航), or evacuation\textsuperscript{15} of Chinese citizens overseas (cheli haiwai gongmin 撤离海外公民) (Ibid.) and on protection of overseas interests (weihu haiwai liyi 维护好外利益) – energy resources (haiwai nengyuan ziyuan 海外能源资源), legal persons (haiwai faren 海外法人), strategic sea routs (haishang zhanlüe tongdao 海上战略通道), etc. – in general. (Ibid.)

A great emphasis is placed on international cooperation as well. This phenomenon is omnipresent in WDP 2013. Presumably most important principles in the doctrine may be deepening international security cooperation (shenhua guoji hezuo 深化国家安全合作), keeping comprehensive military affairs contacts with foreign countries (quan fangwei kaizhan duiwai junshi jiaowang 全方位开展对外军事交往), developing cooperative military relations that are not aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any other third party\textsuperscript{16} (fazhan bu jiemeng, bu duikang, bu zhendui di san fang de junshi hezuo guanxi 发展不结盟、不对抗、不针对第三方的军事合作关系), participating in international anti-terrorist programs (canjia [...] guoji fankong hezuo 参加[…]国际反恐合作), in ship protection and disaster relief programs (guoji huhang he jiuzai xingdong 国际护航和救灾行动), conduct joint [military] exercises with foreign [armies] (juxing Zhong wai lianyan lianxun 举行中外联演联训), and last but definitely not least participating in UNPKO (canjia lianheguo weihe xingdong 参加联合国维和行动). (Ibid.)

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\textsuperscript{15} With reference to the subchapter of WDP 2013 “Protecting Overseas Interests” (Weihu haiwai liyi 维护海外利益), the evacuation of overseas citizens is perceived as their protection.

\textsuperscript{16} This translation is taken from the English version of WDP 2013 because the translator’s solution is the best possible.
6. China’s motivations and reasons behind participating in and supporting UNPKO

6.1. Acquainting with state of the art and personnel benefits

UNPKO are multinational in nature and, seeing the statistics of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, hardly having personnel of a single country. I believe it is safe to assume that the personnel need to communicate not only within their country’s group but also with other mission-participating countries. This is one of the ways for China to “keep comprehensive military affairs contacts with foreign countries”.

Furthermore, China declares that it will “strengthen strategic guidance to keep up with the times” (yu shi ju jin jiaqiang junshi zhanlue zhidao 与时俱进加强战略指导). (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013, under Qianyan 前言 [Preface]) Whatever “strengthening strategic guidance” really mean, the sentence implies that besides keeping with the times, China wants to keep up with the military state of the art; and it is necessary to know what the current state of the art is in order to keep up with it. Through the international cooperation (which the WDP 2013 also suggests to be desirable) “on peacekeeping duty Chinese officers can gain exposure to the operational practices and methods of foreign military forces.” (Lague undated)

UNPKO are great opportunities to get a first-hand, or at least second-hand, experience of modern technologies, military tactics, ways of command, rescue work or any other procedure China is interested in. As the International Crisis Group report (2009: 14) puts it: “China’s participation in peacekeeping gives its armed forces the opportunity to gain some of the technical skills and knowledge necessary for force modernisation, which has been a focus for China’s armed forces in recent years.” Participating in UNPKO is not limited to gaining skills,
though. Chinese personnel can also improve their current skills. Comprehensive training and field practices (or real missions) can improve the skills and professionalism of personnel (Thompson 2005) which is one of PLA aims as set up in the WDP 2013. He (2007: 55) adds that “many police officers with peacekeeping experience have been dispatched to overseas Chinese embassies as well as international institutions […] to work as police liaison officers.” This proves that PRC leadership is very well aware of benefits that result from participating on a UNPKO and does not hesitate to make a use of it. It is fair to assume that peacekeeping experience is beneficial for all kinds of personnel, such as rescue workers, doctors, etc., too. Another benefit according to He (Ibid.) is that “China’s participation also helps to improve its crisis management response effectiveness, especially in humanitarian operations.”

Besides, UNPKO are not only an opportunity to get familiar with other countries’ military current state or trends but also a way of testing and enhancing personnel skill acquired in one’s own country. In short, peacekeeping deployments have provided practical experience for both military and police personnel. (International Crisis Group 2009: 15)

He (2007: 48) believes that “there are three core reasons for China’s ongoing policy on UNPKO: being a responsible power, strengthening the UN and sharing common concerns for peace and security.” Another point of view presents the work Beyond the Strait (Kamphausen, Roy, Lai, David, and Scobell, Andrew, eds. 2009: 15). Its authors believe that China uses UNPKO “to balance what it sees as overly strong US and Western influence in international security organizations.”
6.2. Raising international influence, disproving the China threat theory, protecting own interests

I also believe that all China’s UNPKO involvements mentioned are essential to meet its proclaimed development and ideological goals.

The UN is a multilateral institution. According to the International Crisis Group (2009: 13), “China sees involvement in multilateral institutions as a non-threatening way of promoting its national interests abroad. [...] Moreover, increased involvement in peacekeeping provides an opportunity for China to place more personnel in the UN, boosting its presence in and influence over the organisation and its activities.”

Lastly, China could use its participating and supporting UNPKO as a supportive counterarguments towards those who, reflecting upon PRC’s actions in the South China Sea or at the Pinnacle Islands, would like to argue with PRC government proclaiming that “Chinese love peace” (Zhonghua minzu shi aihao heping de minzu 中华民族是爱好和平的民族) (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2011, under Zhongguo heping fazhan daolu de kaipi 中国和平发展道路的开辟 [The Path of China’s Peaceful Development: What It Is About]) since participating in a peacekeeping operation may suggest a country’s “love for peace”. Nevertheless, it would comply with International Crisis Group’s claim that “China is committed to […] showing that its increasing military power is not inherently threatening. (2009: 13)

The wish for being seen as not an inherently threatening power is closely connected with the China threat theory (Zhongguo weixie lun 中国威胁论), that reflects concerns stemming from China’s economic success (He 2007: 49) and China’s wish to be perceived as a
responsible power (fuzeren guojia 负责人国家) or even responsible great power (fuzeren daguo 负责任大国). (International Crisis Group: 12) These concepts are closely connected. After all, as He (2007: 49) draws on Thompson (2005), “wearing a blue helmet and actively participating in high profile UN peacekeeping activities furthers China’s image as a status quo nation that seeks to contribute to international stability through diplomatic and security measures, thus portraying a good image in eyes of the international community and serving to dispel the China threat theory.”

On the other hand, He (2007: 62) is also clearly convinced that China threat theory as an obstacle to PRC participation in UNPKOs:

“The China Threat theory has a negative impact on Beijing’s policy on UNPKO and presents the Chinese leaders with a dilemma. Although China is willing to further shoulder the responsibilities of a big power for international peace and security, it also wishes to avoid being regarded as too “assertive.” In other words, although China has become increasingly willing to “be selectively active” in the international arena and do something worthwhile, in the foreseeable future, it will not abandon the fundamental principles of ‘keeping a low profile’ and ‘never taking the lead’ (jue bu chu tou 绝不出头).”

I dare to present an opinion that the two “fundamental principles” are dead by now, though. China, having initiated Shanghai Cooperation Group or Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, is no longer following them.

Nevertheless, He (2007: 63) further argues:
“It must be emphasized that without the request of the EU and acquiescence of the U.S., no matter how hard both UN and the Lebanese government appealed to the Chinese government, and no matter how many interests it has in the Middle East, China would not have sent its 182 troops to Lebanon […].”

The International Crisis Group (2009: 28) on the topic of China threat theory concludes that “China is wary of being perceived as too assertive by the West or other developing countries, and overstepping the line between appearing responsible and threatening.”

With reference to the China’s Peaceful Development, the regional stability is in China’s interest. “Instability abroad may not only affect the export of Chinese goods to the conflicting countries and neighbouring regions which suffer from the spillover effects of conflicts, it also affects Chinese access to raw materials in some places.” (He 2007: 53) To sum up, “instability in energy-producing parts of Africa and the Middle East is clearly not in Chinese interest.” (Green 2006) Especially in the Middle East since about 60% of China’s oil imports come from this region. (Ong 2007: 17)

In accordance with the goals and principles of the WDP 2013, UNPKO might also serve as protecting China’s citizens and interests by helping to improve the security situation in relevant countries and

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17 I am not competent to decide whether this statement is completely accurate yet please see below the percentage of Chinese oil imports that origin in the Middle East and note that the author of the claim, He Yin, is Associate Professor at the China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center.

18 Please note that the first UNPKO where Chinese deployed was Lebanon (see above), i.e. Middle East. Despite Lebanon not having the richest oil reserves in the area, the spillover effect might have caused the conflict spread into other regions and thus harming China’s energy security interests.
regions. (He 2007: 54) This may be becoming increasingly urgent, since “Chinese companies, citizens and compatriots have been repeatedly harassed, attacked or kidnapped by terrorists and criminals in foreign countries.” (Ibid.: 53)

6.3. Having become stronger and favourable international environment

PRC does not participate in UNPKOs and supports them just because it might help to meet its goals. A key reason behind is that the PRC can afford the participation and support now, both in terms of monetary and personnel issues.

China is one of the largest economies in the world. He (2007: 44) says that since 1979 “China enjoyed a generally stable social and political environment.” Despite the recent corruption scandals or ongoing society tension, China really (has) enjoyed a generally stable social and political environment, at least compared to other parts of the world: such as Egypt, Syria, Libya, etc. “All these [the stable environment and being one of the world’s largest economies] contribute to the enhancement of national strength and provide China with more resources to increase participation in international affairs, including UNPKO.” (Ibid.)

Another important feature may be the increased capability of Chinese personnel. China invested US $20 million in setting up a civilian police peacekeeping training center in 2003. (Ibid.) After more than two decades, China has accumulated sufficient experience in UNPKO as well as more knowledge about the UN system, which enhances its enthusiasm for UNPKO. (Ibid.: 47) PLA has been conducting joint military exercises with foreign armies. (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guowuyuan xinwen bangongshi 2013, under Zhong wai jundui lianyan lianxun 中外军队联演联训 [Joint Exercises and Training with
Foreign Armed Forces]) For instance, “China and Britain have had much interactions ranging from training assistance to joint seminars, while France is also willing to reach consensus with China regarding long-term cooperation on peacekeeping training.” (He 2007: 46) The PRC thus needs to be less worried about losing the face\(^{19}\), than, for instance, two decades ago.

It is vital to reiterate that UNPKO are multinational operations in nature. China could not participate in UN peacekeeping if other major countries had grave objections against it. US does not oppose Chinese attempts to strengthen its role in the international system at the moment (He 2007: 46) – what is more, all US presidents after Nixon think that the more is China engaged with the international community the better (Saich 2004: 306) and some prominent US scholars call for more cooperation in UNPKO (Shambaugh 2002: 338); Britain and France are also keen on China’s participation in international operations. For example, in 2004 the then British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon said that it would be very welcome if China played a larger role in UNPKO. (He 2007: 46)

\(^{19}\) For non-sinologists’ convenience: In Chinese culture, losing the face \((diu\ mianzi\ 丢面子)\) is one of the worst things that can happen to a person, family, company or even a whole country.
7. The History of China’s Role in UNPKO

7.1. Antagonistic attitude: pre-1971
Except from those described in the Chapter of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, there were other reasons for China to oppose and denounce the UN and peacekeeping operations.

One of them was a possible concern about its own security and territorial integrity. After the outbreak of the Korean War the PLA clashed with UN troops. On the top of that, China was branded by the UNGA as an aggressor. (International Crisis Group 2009: 3) This, the US strong support for Taiwan, and other circumstances had affected China’s attitude toward UN for several years. As He (2007: 17) points out, “the vivid memory […] of Korean War […] and the fact that the superpowers and other western powers supported India during the 1962 China-India Border War […] reinforced its [China’s] impressions that UNPKO could be used by the superpowers to damage China’s state sovereignty and interfere in its domestic affairs, such as the Taiwan Question.”

Besides, the PRC kept on heating up the rhetoric as reads the report of the International Crisis Group (2009: 3):

“Condemnation of UN activities peaked in 1965: in addition to several statements disparaging the organisation that year, a government publication termed the General Assembly’s establishment of the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations a plot by the U.S. to ‘convert the United Nations into a US-controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out the revolutionary struggles of the world’s people’.”
A change in the antagonistic attitude did not come before PRC claimed its seat at the UN.

7.2. Observation period: 1971-1980
When the PRC joined the UN it was still inactive in peacekeeping and refusing to contribute. (International Crisis Group 2009, 4) One reason could be the ideological disagreement with the US and USSR. (He 2007: 17)

Another reason could be China’s domestic problems. The year 1971 was marked by the ongoing aftermath of Cultural Revolution (*wenhua da geming* 文化大革命)\(^{20}\) and the death of a prominent military officer Lin Biao (林彪) under unexplained circumstances, following his plot to kill Mao Zedong (毛泽东). (Fairbank 2010, 442) China lacked both material and human resources during the aftermath (He 2007: 19) and had other concerns.

In addition, China was still a newcomer in the UN and as such was not familiar with the complex system, including the structures, procedures, customs or political environment. (Ibid.)

Whatever the reason, China still condemned and opposed all UNPKO, refused to contribute and abstained from UNSC voting (He 2007: 17), or rather invented a new voting style.

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\(^{20}\) There have been historical discussions whether the end of the Cultural Revolution was the official end or the end of the *Gang of Four* (*si ren bang* 四人帮) era. For the purpose of this thesis I have decided to present the official end.
The Chinese new voting style is called “fifth voting style”. Until then, it had been a custom to choose one of four voting manners at the UNSC:

a) (being present and) voting for
b) (being present and) voting against
c) (being present and) absent from voting
d) being absent and refusing to participate in voting

The PRC, however, came up with the fifth possibility: being present to the UNSC voting process yet not participate in the voting\(^{21}\). This practice continued into the 1980s and allowed the PRC to honour the principle of non-interference and maintain its good relations with developing countries\(^{22}\). (International Crisis Group 2009: 4)

7.3. Change in voting behaviour and paying dues: 1981-1987

A significant shift in China’s policy towards UNPKO was launched on 14 December 1981 when the UNSC unanimously, i.e. including the PRC, extended the UN Peacekeeping Mission on Cyprus (known as UNFICYP). (United Nations Security Council 1981) As the International Crisis Group (2009: 5) reminds, prior to the vote, the Chinese representative declared, in consideration of “the changes in the international arena and the evolution of the role of UN peacekeeping operations”:

“From now on, the Chinese government will actively consider and support such UN peacekeeping operations as are conducive to the maintenance of international peace and

\(^{21}\) This enabled Chinese diplomats to gain experience without having to get involved and taking responsibility for international affairs

\(^{22}\) Moreover, China felt indebted to a certain extent to other developing countries for their help in restoring its seat at the UN. (International Crisis Group 2009: 4)
security and to the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of the states concerned in strict conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.” (United Nations 1981)

China had refrained from the “fifth voting style” and became arguably more active. Even though that the PRC was mostly abstaining, it started to provide reasons. (He 2007: 20)

China started paying peacekeeping dues in 1982 (International Crisis Group 2009, 5) and sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to study peacekeeping operations the same year. (Pang 2005: 90 quoted in International Crisis Group 2009: 5)

In 1981 it had been ten years since the PRC claimed its seat at the UN and China sure gathered some experience about the whole organisation system, procedures, and customs. The Chinese leadership meanwhile reconsidered its opinion about the UN regime and realised there had been political benefits to be reaped from active participation in the UN, including UNPKO. Nevertheless, China was still focused primarily on economic development (He 2007: 21-23) and did not participate.

7.4. Active approach and showing flexibility in own principles: 1988-2003

7.4.1. First steps
A new era begun when China joined the UNGA Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations 23 in November 1988. (Xinhua

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23 The task of the committee is “to conduct a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping. It reports to the General Assembly on its work through the Fourth Committee (Special Political and Decolonization) and is comprised of 147
Five months later, a Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Yu Mengjia (俞孟嘉), called on the international community to give “powerful support” to United Nations peacekeeping. (He 2007: 24) This was a major shift in China’s policy towards UN peacekeeping compared to the preceding years.

On 16 February 1989 the UNSC decided to implement a Settlement Proposal, which had been agreed at in 1978, in the case of Namibia, and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was thus put in operation. “Its basic mandate was to ensure that free and fair elections could be held in Namibia. Creating the conditions for such elections required UNTAG to carry out a wide variety of tasks, many of which went well beyond those previously undertaken by more traditional peacekeeping operations.” China was already among the personnel-contributing countries (Department of Peacekeeping Operations undated; Namibia – UNTAG background) for the first time and deployed a team of twenty military observers.

7.4.2. Tiananmen incident

PRC’s foreign policy seemed to be on a good track but then came the 4 June 1989 when the PLA massacred students on the Tiananmen Square (Tian’anmen guangchang 天安门广场)24; China consequently found itself in international isolation. The result was not only the

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24 For non-sinologists’ convenience: This is the name of the Tiananmen Square in Chinese. In China, however, is the incident usually referred to as “the fourth-of-June incident” (liusi shijian 六四事件) or “the Tiananmen incident” (Tian’anmen shijian 天安门事件), if referred to at all.
PRC’s top-level international connections being severed. Japan stopped its aid program; US put an arms embargo on the PRC, reduced trade and investments, and stopped issuing loans to China. However, the isolation did not last too long. The then US President Nixon paid Deng Xiaping (邓小平) an unofficial visit in Beijing the very same year in November, and the US Secretary of State James Baker met his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen (钱其琛) even two months earlier. (Fürst 2006: 48)

The first country to lift its sanctions was Japan which re-launched the aid program in 1990. In 1991 the temporary international isolation went away almost completely. NATO needed China not to veto the UNSC decision to deploy an international mission to Iraq (Ibid.) and China, eventually abstained in the UNSC voting for the first peace enforcement UN operation ever, in spite of disagreeing both with Iraq invading Kuwait and US-led coalition attack on Iraq. (He 2007: 28) China may have seen this intervention as a US-led western aggression that uses human rights and humanitarian help as a pretext for demonstration of power and imposing the Western values to any place in the world (Fürst 2006: 46) and again raised Chinese concerns for foreign intervention.25

The year 1991 saw also the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. China believed that it had become, as the last remaining large communist state, US-led onslaught’s target for peaceful evolution (heping yanbian 和平演变) which aimed to “overthrow the socialist system”. (Nelan 1991)

25 See the chapter 7.1.
“After the 1989 Tiananmen incident, China quickly adjusted its strategy on foreign policy so as to break international isolation, ease the pressure of peaceful evolution and restore a favourable international environment for development. Its policy on UNPKO during this period of time mainly served these purposes. […] China tried to avoid confrontation with the U.S. and other important Western powers and did not use its veto rights to block any UNPKO or relevant resolutions in the UNSC, except in the case of Guatemala in 1997 - China vetoed the UNSC draft resolution to deploy military observers to verify the implementation of cease-fire agreements in Guatemala,” argues He (2007: 27)

7.4.3. A key player
The Cambodia case was another important milestone in development of Chinese role in the UNPKO. On 16 October 1991 the UNSC passed the Resolution 717 and established the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC). The resolution was adopted unanimously and China was among the countries who expressed readiness in principle to make the necessary personnel available. (United Nations Security Council 1991) The mission had mandate to assist the four Cambodian parties to maintain ceasefire and to initiate mine-awareness training of civilians. UNAMIC was replaced by United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in March 1992. (Department of Public Information 2003: Cambodia UNAMIC – mandate) “The mandate given to UNTAC included aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period.” (Department of Public Information 2003: Cambodia UNTAC – mandate) The UNTAC mission was the first UNPKO where all five
permanent members of the UNSC deployed together. (He 2007: 28) “China played a key role in […] UNTAC, supporting the mission financially and politically, and sending two PLA engineering units. (International Crisis Group 2009: 5) China’s active approach was aimed mainly on improving its international image, (He 2007: 28) and, arguably, to protect stability in own region.

7.4.4. Breaking own principles

Another example worth noticing is Somalia. China has been, for various reasons, cautious to approve of anything that could be seen as violating any of the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence, especially the principles of state sovereignty or interference in state’s inner affairs. The serious situation in Somalia in the early 1990s called for intervention. Moreover, the PRC was still haunted by the Tiananmen Square legacy and needed to improve its image, as already suggested above. China voted in favour of all peace operations, including UNITAF and UNOSOM II, both of which adopted Chapter VII of the UN Charter and were authorised to use force. (He 2007: 29) However, the Chinese representative insisted that these “prompt, strong and exceptional measures” would constitute an “exceptional action in view of the unique situation in Somalia,” namely the “long-term chaotic situation resulting from the present lack of a Government in Somalia.” (United Nations Security Council 1992 quoted in Staehle 2006: 30) It seems, though, that China later realised that it had bent its own principles too much or that wanted to send a clear message that China does not bend its principles easily and without consequence. Chinese representatives, scholars, and media expressed strong dissatisfaction or even regrets about the outcomes and circumstances of the Somali missions. (Staehle 2006: 31) Nevertheless, the unyielding adherence to own principles had already been broken.
China was very well aware of the Somalia precedence and the potential dangers in its own domestic affairs such as those of Xinjiang (新疆) or Tibet (Xizang 西藏), and after all also Taiwan (台湾) questions. This was strongly reflected in China’s attitude towards the Kosovo crisis in 1998.

7.4.5. Kosovo – not breaking principles

Gill and Reilly (2000: 47) come with a claim that “China’s initial priority was to resist UN involvement in what it dubbed a domestic dispute, despite the obvious regional security and humanitarian implications.” The Chinese representative to the UNSC Shen Guofang (沈国放) addressed the problem:

“The Chinese delegation is concerned about the current situation in Kosovo, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Kosovo is an integral part of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The question of Kosovo is, in its essence, an internal matter of the Federal Republic. It should be resolved properly through negotiations between both parties concerned on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. [...] We do not think that the situation in Kosovo endangers regional and international peace and security. [...] On the one hand, the legitimate rights and interests of all ethnic groups should be protected; on the other, secessionist activities by various extremist elements should be prevented. Many countries in the region are multiethnic. If the Council is to get involved in a dispute without a request from the country concerned, it may set a bad precedent and have wider negative implications.” (United Nations 1998)
The speech clearly reflects Chinese concerns for a “bad precedence”, which added to the Somalia case, could cause serious domestic troubles. China has been proudly referring to itself as a multi-ethnic country. It may have been afraid that if it had approved of an international intervention on the basis of ethnic violence, and similar intervention could be proposed to be taken on PRC’s territories. By denouncing interfering in state’s inner affairs, China got in a more or less open dispute with the then UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.  

NATO eventually had dismissed the UN authority to decide on threats to international peace and stability, when to undertake humanitarian intervention, and started the air strikes (Gill and Reilly 2000: 47) which raised China’s worries. The worries, and objections, were intensified by NATO bombing PRC Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1998. (Ibid.: 48)

The climax of the era of China breaking its principles comes with the crisis at East Timor.

7.4.6. Shift in approach
East Timor used to be a Portugal colony since the 16th century. In 1974 Portugal acknowledged the right of its colonial territories to self-determination, including independence. This was followed by violent clashes between groups favouring independence and those favouring integration into Indonesia which invaded East Timor in 1975 and annexed it a year later. The UN did not recognise this integration, though. On 27 January 1999 the Indonesian President Habibie indicated that he might be prepared to consider East Timor’s independence. On 11 June the UNSC passed the resolution 1246 and

26 See the chapter 2.2.
established the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to organise and conduct “popular consultation” on independence or autonomy and oversee the transition period. (Department of Public Information 2002, East Timor – UNTAET background) China contributed observers for the elections. (Gill and Reilly 2000: 49) But after 78.5% of voters expressed their wish for independence, pro-integration militias launched a campaign of violence, looting and arson throughout the entire territory. The UNSC promptly authorised the International Force in East Timor, led by Australia, to restore peace and security and to protect UNAMET. On 25 October the UNSC established the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNATET) as an integrated, multidimensional peacekeeping operation fully responsible for the administration of East Timor in the transition period. (Department of Public Information 2002, East Timor – UNTAET background) The mission was authorised “to take all necessary measures to fulfil its mandate”, i.e. to use force. (United Nations Security Council 1999)

China’s attitude was almost opposite to that the PRC held on the Kosovo issue despite similar circumstances and open foreign intervention. A senior representative Qin Huasun (秦华孙) emphasised that “the issue of East Timor must be solved through the United Nations” and expressed China’s readiness for support. (Gill and Reilly 2000: 49)

What caused China to almost completely change its rhetoric within such a short time span? Firstly, East Timor is considerably closer to Chinese domestic sphere of influence and the spillover effect could have negative implications for the regional stability, which could harm Chinese interests and wellbeing.
Secondly, after the failed negotiations in Kosovo and NATO intervention, the PRC leadership was concerned about UN, and thus China’s, diminished influence, or wanted to respond in some way to anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. (Ibid.: 48-50)

“In January 2002, China sent 15 civilian police in two batches to UNTAET. This was the first time that China sent civilian police on UNPKO. As UNTAET was a Chapter VII mission, Chinese police officers were authorized to carry light weapons and patrol the community of a foreign country. In other words, compared with its reluctance to compromise in the case of Somalia in the early 1990s, China for the first time signalled that an UNPKO with an enforcement-featured mandate like that of UNTAET could be politically acceptable.” (He 2007: 31)

Not to abandon its principles entirely, China demanded the acquiescence of the Indonesian government for the UNPKO deployment. (Gill and Reilly 2000: 48)

7.5. Increasing and expanding contributions: 2003-2015
The International Crisis Group (2009: 6), referring to the UN peacekeeping statistics, points out that the year 2003 started rapid growth in China’s contributions to peacekeeping operations. Starting with a contribution of 120 military and police personnel, the number raised to 359 a year later. By the end of 2008, China had 2146 officers and soldiers, “including military observers, liaison officials, staff officers and engineering officers […]”. As of 31 July 2015, China had 3078 peacekeepers deployed (161 policemen, 30 military experts and 2887 troops) to ten out of sixteen peacekeeping operations, ranking
eighth among personnel-contributing countries\textsuperscript{27} and first among the UNSC permanent members. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015: Troop and police contributors – contributions by country, and Missions detailed by country) As far as assessed contributions are concerned, the PRC has ranked sixth, behind other UNSC permanent members and Japan. The Chinese share has been 6.64 \% in the years 2013 – 2015. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014)

In April 2004, China dispatched a police contingent to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. This represented another significant change in attitude.\textsuperscript{28} In September, the PRC sent its first formed police unit to United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). (International Crisis Group 2009: 6)

The dispatch to Haiti was a breakthrough in two ways. Firstly, this was the first time China sent a whole unit. He (2007: 33) claims that unlike contingents divided and mixed with personnel from other countries, “the FPU [formed police unit] has strong operational capabilities and can perform various duties that generally neither individual police officers nor military troops can/should do.” I believe that there are two possible factors supporting this claim: it is quite probable that the policemen are colleagues before being dispatched to a mission and that they are therefore used to cooperating with each other; additionally, since the unit was composed of Chinese only, the language barrier was diminished. Chinese troops are known for poor language skills. “The one area where they are often hampered is language and English in particular. On a day-to-day basis they operate well in missions, but during meetings and planning, they can’t

\textsuperscript{27} The personnel most-contributing country to 31 July 2015 is Bangladesh with 9383 peacekeepers in total.

\textsuperscript{28} See the previous chapter.
contribute much. I imagine they could make useful contributions, were it not for this language barrier,” noted a UN official. (International Crisis Group 2009: 7)

Secondly, as He (2007: 33) brings to attention, “this was […] the first time China sent peacekeepers to a UN member state with which it did not have diplomatic relations,” i.e. to a state that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Until then, China usually had used UNPKO as a tool in its efforts to diplomatically isolate the Republic of China, as seen when the PRC blocked the mission to Guatemala, blocked extending the mission in Macedonia (Staehle 2006: 56) or threatened to block a mission to Liberia. (International Crisis Group 2009: 18)

In November 2007 the then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guéhenno appreciated China’s growing involvement but also said that it could contribute even more, particularly in the area of “force enablers”, where it has already provided medical and engineering units. He added that he would like to see a Chinese infantry battalion and air transport units one day. (UN News Centre 2007)

The arguably most important change has come in 2013. On 25 April that year the UNSC issued the Resolution 2100 and established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to support political processes in the country and carry out a number of security-related tasks. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations undated, MINUSMA mandate)

“The Mission was asked to support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centres and lines of communication, protecting civilians,
human rights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons, the extension of State authority and the preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.” (Ibid.)

This was the first time when China dispatched actual security forces. (Wong 2013) To 31 July 2015, the PRC has contributed 402 contingent troops. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2015, Missions detailed by country)

Deploying combat troops to MINUSMA did set a precedence. The UNSC passed resolution 1996 and established the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on 8 July 2011 to support the government in peace consolidation and to help manage the deteriorated humanitarian situation. (Department of Peacekeeping Operations undated, UNMISS background) China followed the trend of increased contributions and deployed a whole infantry battalion to a UNPKO for the first time (CCTV.com 2015) and thus set a new milestone in its UN peacekeeping.
8. Conclusion
The PRC’s role and attitude of towards UN peacekeeping has changed rapidly over the past sixty-six years since its establishment: from sheer antagonism to open and active support. It has been a long road with many twists and turns, though.

At first, the PRC, as a UN non-member and Maoist country, denounced and condemned UN as an imperialistic project of the two superpowers and refused to take any part. Additionally, it was afraid that peacekeeping operations could set an example which could threaten its territorial integrity. China had therefore adhering to the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence which showed firm ideological opposition to any foreign intervention. China also lacked resources to participate.

The first changes came with Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in 1970s. China, in need of modernisation, started opening to the world and carefully observed UN practice.

In early 1980s China took a step forward and refrained from the fifth-voting style. Despite abstaining from UNSC voting, it started to provide reasons for doing so, and started contributing into UN peacekeeping fund.

In 1988 China definitely got actively involved with UNPKO. It joined the UNGA Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations and contributed personnel for the first time a year later. China seemed to be gaining confidence and slowly merging into the international community but faced a huge setback after the Tiananmen incident. However, the setback did not last long. This was arguably the first time when China used its UNSC position to achieve its goals and escaped from the international isolation.
The PRC started getting more and more involved again, even at the cost of partial abandoning its principles. China presumably believed that its position is strong enough and does not need to be afraid of international intervention on its territory too much.

Ideology and principles have played an important role in China’s behaviour in international politics in general and UN peacekeeping naturally as well. The core principles mostly are mutual respect for state sovereignty, non-aggression, and non-interference in state’s inner affairs. The PRC leadership has shown reluctance to abandon them but also willingness to refrain if having a motivation strong enough – such as getting from international isolation after the Tiananmen incident, worries about China’s diminishing influence or threats to its strategic interests. As a result, the PRC was changing its position to following own principles from positive to negative back and forth.

Apart to the weakening influence of ideological principals, the facts that China has large population, limited resources and an economy dependant on foreign trade, as well as strategic supplies under possible threat, play an important factor in shaping China’s UNPKO behaviour as well. A hypothetical harm to Chinese energy security or economy could escalate into social unrests or even challenging the CPC’s authority which is obviously not in the leadership’s interest. UNPKO represent an effective tool of preventing any of these happening.

China’s changing role has been determined mostly by its development and strategic needs. Seeing the growing national strength and confidence, assessed and personnel contributions, and above all combat troops going hand in hand with gradual breach of own principles, I assume that China will be playing bigger and bigger role
in UNPKO and that China will be deploying more troops in general. Eventually, the air transport units will be deployed as well – when the time will be convenient for China. The growing participation is not necessarily a bad thing though: China has huge human and material resources and potential to be a major contributor to the world peace. The days to come will show how will China use this potential.
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