

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

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Predicting Conflicts via Maternal Mortality Rates?

Human Security and the Emergence of Armed Conflict

Diploma Thesis

Prague 2016

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Year of Defense: 2016

Bibliographic Record

SOMMEROVÁ, Gabriela. *Predicting Conflicts via Maternal Mortality Rates? Human Security and the Emergence of Armed Conflict*. Prague, 2016. 58 pp. Diploma Thesis (Mgr.). Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Political Studies, Department of Security Studies. Academic supervisor: doc. PhDr. RNDr. Nikola Hynek, M.A., PgDip Res, PhD.

Abstract

This diploma thesis provides a fact-based examination of the relevance of assumptions concerning the relationship of human insecurity and the emergence of conflict. This is done with a quantitative analysis of cross-country data on human insecurity and conflict during the period of 1990 – 2010. The approach of the thesis steps beyond the prevailing discussions on human security focused on normative judgements on the nature, legitimacy or applicability of the concept. Through a statistical analysis, it challenges the use of uncontested and ungraspable, yet influential, narratives of human security that result in implementation of inadequately informed programs and policies aimed at prevention of conflict by the international community and other actors. The analysis finds that a random set of indicators of human security, rather than human security as a concept, are related to conflict emergence. As a result, the thesis suggests surpassing the preoccupation with the use and application of the concept and instead accentuates inductive approach to formulating evidence-based conflict-prevention programs inspired by the ideas of human security rather than reasoned by the concept of human security.

Keywords

Human Security, Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Security, Early Warning, Development, Quantitative Analysis

Number of characters: 115'880 (spaces included)

Abstrakt

Předložená diplomová práce zkoumá relevanci lidské bezpečnosti jako prostředku k předcházení vzniku konfliktů. Množství programů a politik mezinárodního společenství a dalších aktérů je koncipováno s předpokladem, že zlepšováním indikátorů lidské bezpečnosti docílí snížení rizika vzniku konfliktů. Představená kvantitativní analýza porovnává míry indikátorů lidské bezpečnosti s četností vzniku konfliktů v období mezi lety 1990 – 2010 s cílem evaluace adekvátnosti těchto předpokladů. Analýza tak překračuje existující, především normativní diskuse o lidské bezpečnosti, které se věnují převážně definici, konceptualizaci, legitimitě či využitelnosti konceptu v praxi. Představená statistická analýza problematizuje nedostatečně prozkoumané diskurzy lidské bezpečnosti, které navzdory své nepodloženosti vedou k implementaci množství programů s cílem prevence konfliktů. Představená analýza zjišťuje, že náhodný set indikátorů lidské bezpečnosti vykazuje vztah se vznikem konfliktů a součástí lidské bezpečnosti tedy mají souvislost se vznikem konfliktů. Relevance konceptu lidské bezpečnosti jako takového však potvrzena není. Výsledkem je návrh k upuštění od snah o aplikaci existujícího konceptu lidské bezpečnosti a ke změně způsobu formulace programů a politik zaměřených na prevenci konfliktů směrem k indikativním postupům inspirovaným idejemi lidské bezpečnosti, nikoli konceptem lidské bezpečnosti jako takovým.

Klíčová slova

Lidská bezpečnost, konflikt, prevence konfliktů, bezpečnost, včasné varování, rozvoj, kvantitativní analýza

Počet znaků: 115'880 (včetně mezer)

Declaration

I declare that I have prepared this thesis on my own, using the sources and literature indicated. I have not used this thesis to obtain other academic degrees. I agree that the thesis be made accessible for study and research purposes.

In Prague, 8 May 2016

Gabriela Sommerová

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor doc. PhDr. RNDr. Nik Hynek, M.A., PgDip Res, PhD. for his intriguing insights on human security that turned to be the essential foundation of my making sense of the “humanitarian beast” I had already been a part of but struggled to understand. I would like to further thank Michal Parízek, M.Sc, PhD. for his indispensable tips on statistical analysis and for shared interest in quantitative methods. Finally, I would like to thank Miloš Hejný for decoding the mysteries of automatized merging of two dozen diverse datasets that effectively kick-started this engaging process.

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List of Abbreviations

HS	Human security
IAEG	Inter-agency and Expert Group
ICC	International Criminal Court
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
NGOs	Non-governmental organizations
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PRIО	International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIО)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Department of Peace Research, Uppsala University
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly

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Introduction

Presented thesis provides a fact-based evaluation of the presumed but unconfirmed association of human security deprivation with the risk of emergence of armed conflict. It does so through quantitative analysis of cross-country data on human security deprivation and numbers of state and non-state armed conflict during the period of 1990 to 2010. The analysis tests the rationale of human security that has since its formulation in the mid-1990s and acceptance in the international community resulted in formulation and funding of number of human security inspired programs and policies directed towards prevention of conflict. This thesis provides an evidence-based evaluation of the relevance of human security for conflict prevention and challenges acceptance of uncontested and unverified narratives in international security.

Current understanding of human security in the international community was formed with the publication of the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) issued by the United Nations Development Programme. According to the prevailing narrative, human security challenged the established understanding of security in consigning the individual, instead of the nation or a state, as the point of reference of security. Not only did the state lose its prime as the subject of security, it was attributed with the role of provider of security to its respective citizens, promoting their safety, security and well-being, in cooperation with international and sub-national actors. The individual became entitled to security from physical and other threats and altogether to a life in dignity.

The improvement of living conditions and security of individuals, a noble cause in itself, became understood as one of the central mechanisms of establishment and promotion of peace and prevention of conflicts; the 1994 Human Development Report directly stated that “the reasons for conflict and war today are often rooted in poverty, social injustice and environmental degradation” (UNDP, 1994 p. 38).

Upon these findings, the United Nations (UN) urged the international community to cooperate with the state members, non-governmental organizations and other relevant actors to reach a consensus on security because “poverty and infectious

diseases are threats in themselves, but they also create environments which make more likely the emergence of other threats, including civil conflict.“ (UN, 2004 p. 2).

Promotion of human security was accepted by the international community as a method of conflict prevention. Since then, human security has served as one of the leading narratives behind humanitarian and developmental projects, refocusing development aid towards mechanism of conflict prevention while securitizing¹ the field and reshaping the agenda of humanitarian and developmental actors and legitimizing right of international community for intervention into a state's affairs.

As a result of these narratives and developments, human security provoked extensive discussions over its legitimacy. The critics asserted that human security only served to justify power politics of the West vis-à-vis non-Western states, especially the states of the global south, imposing liberal peace and meddling in their affairs (Zarkov, 2015; Hintjens, et al., 2015; Tadjbakhsh, 2007). As a result, it was hardly surprising that human security discourses were rarely used by the non-Western states, let alone the individuals whom it was meant to protect primarily.

Despite the fact that the rise of criticism resulted in reformulation of some of the attributes of human security (see the follow-up on human security, UN General Assembly, 2012), the underlying assumptions that were brought to life by human security discourses during the past two decades, such as the links between human security and conflict prevention, the existence of the nexus between security and development, the role of security of an individual and overall the deepening and broadening of security as such continue to stand behind formulation of programs and policies that are explicitly or implicitly linked to human security.

The fact that human security continues to shape international agenda to this day is pronounced in the persistent focus of peace promotion programs on the issues such as the changes in environment or reduction of poverty, the acceptance of the

¹ Securitization is a process of reproduction of reality through naming and labelling issues to be a security threat to the survival of the subject of security. The threat is then used to lobby for implementation of measures that stand above normal politics or are a special sort of politics required to ensure the subject's survival. Securitization of issues changes the political or societal landscape and the security culture in the long-term, allowing the non-traditional issues to enter the security sector. In the past, these included human security or the development issues (see Buzan, et al., 1998; Waever, 2011; Williams, 2003; Daase, 2010).

International Criminal Court, the establishment of programs on security sector reform, assigning the demining centers to carry on development projects or externally enforced capacity-building of any actor from local non-governmental organizations to the national governments. As a result, while the term “human security” may not be pronounced as often today as it used to be (Chandler, 2012 p. 216), human security contributes to shaping and impacting the international agenda to this day.

It is therefore of interest to examine the relevance of underlying assumptions of human security within the domain of peace promotion and prevention of conflict. This thesis aims to answer the following questions. Is there any evidence for association of human security deprivation with emergence of armed conflicts? Does human security deprivation bring implications to state and international security? Is there a justification for presentation of humanitarian, human rights and development programs as methods of peace-promotion? Does human security discourse legitimately proposes interventions, military and non-military, for promotion of peace beyond the mere accentuation of existing power relations with all the related implications?

The goal of this thesis is to provide fact-based examination the accuracy of the assumptions behind human insecurity and conflict emergence. While human security continues to advocate and stand behind programs and policies promoting security, development, humanitarian aid, human rights or peacebuilding, to my knowledge, the link between human security and emergence of armed conflict has not been confirmed empirically. A comprehensive examination of association of human security and conflicts with available data on human security and conflict should provide a fact-based insight into these assumptions.

The results of the analysis may find that there is no measurable association of human security and conflict. This result would imply that the possibility that human security justifies policies and programs serving other than peace-promotion purposes is impossible to rule out, while at the same time implying that the improvement of human well-being, indeed an honorable aim, should not be presented as a conflict-prevention mechanism as it creates biased ideas of the nature of non-Westerners as prone to engagement in conflict and as a result contributes to a self-fulfilling prophecy creating the very same issue it seeks to prevent.

On the other hand, confirmation of existence of association of human security deprivation with armed conflict opens up wide range of options for the use of human security measures for prevention of conflicts, including creation of tools for early warning on high-risk environments using available data as well as further push for initiatives for establishment of accurate programs and policies on prevention of conflict. These motivations make the current analysis well worth the effort.

The thesis follows accordingly. First, I establish the methodology of the analysis of the association of human security deprivation with conflict emergence. Second, I present leading concepts and discussions on human security and the implications of human security for the international agenda as well as an overview of theories of conflict emergence, attempting to establish a theoretical link between the two. In the following part of the thesis, I analyze cross-country data on human security indicators and conflict emergence to measure quantitative links between the two in order to evaluate the relevance of their association, explaining the result of the findings for the understanding of the relevance of the concept of human security and the applicability of human security-inspired programs and policies as a method of promotion of peace.

In addition, I provide some reflections on the process in which human security entered and shaped the international agenda and the understanding of the transforming human security narratives. In a conclusion, I stress the application of the alternative approaches to the current methods of formulating and implementing programs and policies aimed at prevention of conflicts, starting with some of the findings presented in this analysis. Finally, I suggest areas of further research on the evolution of current forms of human security as well as the alternative methods of construction of conflict-prevention programs.

Methodology and Approach

The thesis occupies itself with this basic premise. Providing that the logic of prevention of conflict through improvement of human security is based on correct assumptions, favorable measures of human security should be associated with decreasing chances of emergence of conflict in a country.

Examining the association of human security deprivation to conflict emergence follows this basic hypothesis:

There is an inversely proportional relationship between human security and the emergence of armed conflict in a country.

In other words, favorable levels of human security lead to decreased chances for a conflict to occur, while unfavorable levels of human security lead to increased chances for a conflict to occur. This shall maintain for state (interstate, intrastate) and non-state (including civil) conflicts.

Despite that the components of human security are considered indivisible, equal and interconnected in theory (UNDP, 1994), not all of the human security indicators may mark equally strong association with conflict emergence, given any association is found. Should the association between human security indicators and conflict emergence be confirmed, the analysis attempts to determine the strongest stand-alone predictors as well as strongest combinations of predictors of conflict. I expect the analysis to provide one of the following results.

- . *There is an inversely proportional relation* between human security and the emergence of conflicts in a country (1);
- . *There is no relation* between human security levels and the emergence of conflicts in a country (2);
- . Alternatively, only *state conflicts* (1a) or *non-state conflicts* (1b) are associated with the measures of human security.


Potential results of the analysis provide diverging implications for the role of human security in global security agenda.

An *inversely proportional* relation between human security and emergence of conflicts in a country (1) would confirm there is an association of human security indicators with the emergence of conflict. While examination of causality links would require further analysis using alternative methods, proven association of human security with conflict would enable construction of relevant programs and policies and propose assessment of areas with increased likelihood of emergence of conflict based on human security measures creating a tool contributing to early-warning mechanisms.

On the other hand, finding *no relation* (2) between human security and conflict would make it impossible to deny the allegations that the link between human security and conflict is purely a rhetorical one and is possibly used for legitimization of policies and projects with purposes other than peace-promotion.

Visual representation of the presumed outcomes and implications is in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Expected Outcomes of the Quantitative Analysis and their Implications



Method and Operationalization

The association of human security measures and emergence of armed conflict is examined through quantitative analysis of available cross-country data in the observation period of 1990 to 2010.

It is understood that the deprivation of human security is unlikely to represent a universal source of conflict. Theories of conflict causes assume different causes for different types of conflict with prevailing understanding that multiplicity of mechanisms is necessary to create an enabling environment for a conflict to occur; these theories are further presented in the first part of the thesis. At the same time, the human security definition is too fluid to be tested in any way that would cover all of its the possible forms and components.

The quantitative cross-country analysis relies on the best-possible and to my knowledge the most representative arbitrarily chosen data and definitions. In all, the

data include 196 country observations, including Palestinian territories due to its status of UN observer and not including dependent territories, such as Hong Kong, or unrecognized territories, such as Kosovo, due to the availability of data.

While a number of definitions human security are available, to operationalize the concept, I use the indicators of human security suggested by the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) that in a broad and comprehensive manner described human security in current understanding and remains commonly cited (Paris, 2001; Tadjbakhsh, 2007).

The armed conflict includes interstate conflict, including two or more states as parties to the conflict, intrastate conflicts including parties of which at least one is state (Gleditsch, et al., 2002 p. 1) and non-state conflict (Sundberg, et al., 2012 p. 2).

The analysis covers the observation period of 1990 until 2010. The post-Cold War period is chosen specifically due to the discussed changes in the trends and the nature of conflicts as well as the changes in rhetoric concerning the causes of conflicts. Arguably, the power balance-driven, interstate conflicts and proxy wars of the Cold War were to a large degree replaced by non-state conflicts and civil wars, trends of which are documented in the Human Security Reports (Human Security Report Project, 2011; 2012; 2013). Human-centered approaches to prevention of conflict stemmed from the changing nature of the conflicts waged since the end of the Cold War. The year 2010 as the end of the observed period is based on the availability of human security indicator data. As Eck (2005 p. 11) poignantly stated, researcher is always “at the mercy of the available data in terms of choosing time periods”.

The cross-country approach is chosen due to the availability of data. Given that the logic of human security narratives includes assumptions that the people deprived of human security are more likely to engage in conflict, regional approach could reveal more information than a cross-country examination.

Expecting linear relationship where the decrease of human security leads to increase in conflict emergence as presumed in the hypothesis, in the analysis, I calculate simple and multiple regressions with human security indicators as independent variables (predictors) and conflicts as dependent variables (response

variables) to determine the level of association of the two. It shall be noted that this approach cannot confirm eventual causal mechanisms, as explained below.

In the analysis, I first use simple regressions to determine the strength of particular independent variables. Unless all the predictors are significant, I suspect that should the strongest predictors show no association with conflict, the weaker predictors do not confirm the association either.² Therefore, I choose the strongest predictors per human security component. The strongest predictors per component of human security are then compared to conflict emergence in multiple regressions, determining the comparative strength of human security as a concept.

If the analysis finds any correlation, I follow with interactions of independent variables to find the combinations of human security indicators that have the strongest association with conflict when interacting in an enabling environment.

As noted, human security measures are based on the indicators proposed by the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). The report groups the indicators in seven interconnected components of human security that include economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security. While the report goes on indicating global threats to human security such as population growth, drug trafficking and international terrorism (UNDP, 1994 p. 34), the cross-country analysis does not allow for testing of the role of these indicators. At least two indicators per human security component are chosen, based on the availability of data from reliable sources, including Millennium Development Goals, World Bank and Freedom House.

The analysis considers the following human security indicators:

- . Formal employment, youth unemployment (economic security);
- . Severely underweight children, undernourished population (food security);
- . Immunization against measles, infant mortality rate, children mortality rate, maternal mortality rate, antenatal care coverage, HIV incidence rate, tuberculosis prevalence rate (health security);
- . Proportion of water resources used, carbon dioxide emissions, use of solid fuels, use of improved drinking water resources (environmental security);

² This is subsequently verified and confirmed in the analysis section.

- . Intentional homicides, ill-treatment and torture (personal security);
- . Proportion of slum population, proportion of women experiencing physical and sexual violence last year and during lifetime (community security);
- . Political rights, civil liberties, ratio of health to military spending by the government (political security).

Next, conflicts are represented by the number of state conflicts experienced in a country during the observation period (interstate and intrastate), the number of non-state conflicts (including civil wars) as well as the combination of the two. The data are drawn from conflict datasets of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Both human security and conflict data are described in more detail in the analysis section of the thesis.

The robustness of the results is tested in regressions adjusted for robust errors regulating heterogeneity of the error terms and the inclusion of control measures. I am further recording for potential limitations of the presented analysis.

Risks and Limitations

The assumptions behind human security and peace promotion suggest that relative deprivation of human security, unless treated, contributes to conflict emergence. Confirmation of the causal link may be therefore advantageous in terms of enhancement of conflict prevention activities or early warning mechanisms. Nevertheless, confirmation of causality cannot be attempted in this thesis due to the scope and method with regards to the obstacles posed by the inherent endogeneity in conflict and human security.

Human insecurity measures, such as undernourishment, unemployment or maternal mortality rates may be both an indication of reasons for discontent motivating the population to demand improvements in conditions and simultaneously, this deprivation may be resulting from a conflict. Human security indicators and conflict emergence are therefore inherently endogenous.

Even though advanced methods such as time-series examination may relate indicators in time and contribute to the confirmation of likelihood of existing causal

links, as correlation cannot imply causation. Proving causal mechanisms requires a more comprehensive study of the phenomenon, requiring control of all other potential causal mechanisms. Quantitative methods, while unlikely to formulate a theory, should be able to empirically support existing theory given the theory is valid. For this reason, econometric modelling methodologies that dominate much peace and conflict research predominantly focus on comparative and correlative studies of trends in conflict emergence and less often attempt to identify causal mechanisms (Zarkov, 2015 p. 4).

Further potential risks and limitations of the analysis related to the method, data, indicators and the operationalization are described in detail the second part of the thesis, section 2.4.1.

Literature Overview

The thesis considers primary and secondary sources concerned with the concept of human security, conflict causation, the link human security and conflict and includes reports, resolutions and peer-reviewed articles and others.

Primary sources such as the reports and resolutions establish the conceptualization and understanding of human security for in the international community. These include the UN General Assembly (2005) *Resolution on the 2005 World Summit Outcome*, the UN General Assembly (2010) *Resolution on Millennium goals* or the UN General Assembly (2012) *Follow-up to paragraph 143 on human security*. The reports include discussions of the issues related to human security, including the UN (2004) report *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, *Report of the High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change*, the report *In larger freedom: Towards development, security and human rights for all* (UN, 2005) or *We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary-General* (UN, 2000), all of which follow the developments of human security and its implications within the international community. Human security definition is based on that established by the *1994 Human Development Report* (UNDP, 1994).

Secondary literature provides a more thorough understanding of human security within broader security environment. This literature predominantly focuses on the discussion of the definitions, application and applicability human security as a concept.

These include *Human Security: Concepts and Implications* by Tadjbakhsh, et al. (2007) or *Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods* by Krause and Williams (1996) and others, critics as well as proponents of human security (Acharya, 2001; Buzan, 2004; Daase, 2010; McIntosh, et al., 2010; Martin, et al., 2014; Zarkov, 2015; Jackson, 2015) and those attempting to establish alternative definitions of human security (Paris, 2001; Krause, 2006; Owen, 2008; 2014). It further considers reports by the organizations that promote human security such as *Human Security Now* by the Commission on Human Security (2003).

The understanding of human security instituted in this thesis is inspired by thought-provoking articles by David Chandler, including *Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark* (2008), *The security-development nexus and the rise of "anti-foreign policy"* (2007), *Resilience and Human Security: The post-interventionist paradigm* (2012) as well as the approach to assessing human security introduced by Nik Hynek (2010) in his doctoral thesis *Human Security Assemblages: Transformations and Governmental Rationalities in Canada and Japan*.

The overview of theories on conflict causes follows the framework presented by Greg Cashman in *What Causes War?* (2004), reaching to peer-reviewed articles examining the causes of state and non-state conflict qualitatively and quantitatively (Fearon, 1995; Mansfield, et al., 1995; Hegre, et al., 2001; Collier, et al., 2004; Urdal, 2004; Murshed, 2015; Hintjens, et al., 2015) with regards to the link between conflict and development (Collier, 2003; Larzillière, 2012; Murshed, 2015). Others establish the understanding of the changes of the nature of conflicts after the end of the Cold War (Grey, 1997; Kaldor, 1999; Gurr, 2000; Henderson, 2002) and the trends in the conflicts (Human Security Report 2011; 2012; 2013).

With regards to the data analysis, I generally follow Peter Kennedy's *A Guide to Econometrics* (1998) supported by articles on particular issues such as *Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses* by Brambor, et al. (2005) and Osborne, et al. (2002). Data descriptions follow respective codebooks.

Assessing available sources concerned with human security, generally, secondary literature remains preoccupied with the debates about the concept and its

role in international politics and with options and methods of application of human security in policies and programs, including post-conflict reconstruction, security sector reform, humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect, or the issues of failed states, terrorism, hybrid warfare and their relation of human security to other close fields, especially international development.

What is surprising about the predominant literature on human security is first, that the debates on broad versus narrow concept and the relevance or non-relevance of human security in international politics that started in the mid-1990s are still alive today. Second, that very few works are preoccupied with problematizing and evaluating the underlying assumptions behind current understandings of human security, including the unwavering acceptance of presumptions that there indeed exists a causal link between human security and conflict, however little evidence there is for such link. The presented thesis aims to contribute to challenging the uncontested presumption by verifying the existence of the link between human security and conflict. While the thesis is primarily interested in proving or disproving the association of human security and conflict, the existence of an analysis *per se* is a step towards further introspection and examination of an accepted discourse that represents one of many transient narratives used in the domain of international security.

1. Human Security and Conflict

Considering the changing and complex nature of the ideas behind human security, limitation to the definitions and narratives of reports, resolutions and prevalent literature cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the realities and forms of human security may undertake (Chandler, 2008; Hynek, 2010). This thesis considers prevalent assumptions and establishes common understanding of human security in the policy-making in order to examine and evaluate the concept of human security as used by the international actors.

In this section, I therefore establish a general understanding of the concept of human security in the international community and within the broader discipline of security studies, describe some of the forms it has undertaken as well as the role it plays in current programs and policies. Further evaluation of issues such as the extent to which the discourse of human security mirrors the actual policies, the underlying motivations for inclusion of human security into the discourse and the process through which it established itself and for which purposes, is not within the scope of the thesis. Further, the thesis does not propose or take any normative judgements on the issue, such as critique or promotion of benefits human security could have or has already, beyond presentation of those in the existing literature.

1.1 Human Security

Human security appeared in the spotlight of the international community with the publication of the Human Development Report in 1994 (UNDP, 1994). Almost immediately after the publication of the report, human security stirred broad discussions including on the degree of its novelty, nature, definition and role in the international environment.

While some scholars celebrated human security as an unprecedented shift defining our age (Tadjbakhsh, et al., 2007), others asserted there is not enough novelty in the concept since some of the main components can be traced to Hobbesian Leviathan (Krause, 2006), Enlightenment (Chandler, 2011) or at least, the previous

Brandt or Brundtland Commissions (Acharya, 2001 p. 3), merely contributing to the long series of broadening of security (Krause, 2006).

The novelty of the concept should lie in the refocus from the security of a state to the security of an individual. The individual becomes the referent object of security and the state, the international community and the individual himself are responsible for achieving this security. Human security further broadens the range of security threats the individual faces and from which he needs to be protected (UNDP, 1994).

The 1994 Human Development Report states that “for too long, security has been interpreted narrowly” (UNDP, 1994 p. 22). There are non-military threats the individual faces more imminently than military threats and needs adequate protection. An individual should be granted “safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression” and “protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life” (UNDP, 1994 p. 23) in order to live life in dignity and to be able to fulfill his or her full human potential. The individual should be granted freedom from fear, meaning the threats to physical safety, as well as freedom from want, meaning any deprivation of basic human needs and opportunities (UNDP, 1994).

To explain the areas that influence the individual’s freedom from fear and freedom from want, the report (UNDP, 1994) listed seven interconnected, mutually enforcing components of human security, each providing a number of examples of threats an individual faces. These components include economic security, food security, environmental, personal, political, health and community security, as well as number of transnational threats such as terrorism (UNDP, 1994). Later, amending the definition of human security, further areas have been added to the list, including social security, cultural security, communication security, freedom from discrimination, freedom from oppressive structures, guarantees of human dignity or promotion of collective peace (Paris, 2001 pp. 91-92).

The difficulty to determine the scope of human security led to discussions over the definition and components of human security. Some promoted comprehensiveness of human security as its main advantage. The UNDP characterized human security broadly as “a child that did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut,

an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced" (Reveron, et al., 2011 p. xiii) or presumed that human security aims to "safeguard the vital core [understood as a multidimensional set of human rights and human freedoms] of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment" (Alkire, 2003 p. 2, 8). The Commission of Human Security campaigned for comprehensive human security (Tadjbakhsh, et al., 2007 p. 53) that includes "far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict." (Commission on Human Security, 2003 p. 6).

Critics subsequently asserted that the broadness of definition only enables to "keep together a jumbled coalition of 'middle power' states, development agencies and NGOs" (Paris, 2001 p. 88), allowing any actor to accept their own understanding, let alone practice, of human security, while pointing out that there is a considerable gap between the rhetoric and the actual practices of the actors who promote human security (Krause, 2014 p. 76).

Others attempted to narrow down the definition and the composition of human security in order to make it a workable and applicable concept (Paris, 2001; Owen, 2008), often through prioritization of particular components according to their perceived importance or selection the freedom that was perceived superior. For example, King and Murray (2002) attempted to redefine human security to include only those elements that are "important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk" (King, et al., 2002 p. 8). The Canadian Human Security Report Group focused only on insecurity resulting from lethal violence, arguing that issues of freedom from have already been covered elsewhere (Human Security Report Project, 2011; 2012; 2013). These attempts subsequently received criticism for adding little value or for prioritizing amongst indivisible issues without sufficient explanation why some of the components of human security are more important than others (Buzan, 2004; Paris, 2001; King, et al., 2002).

The “narrowing” versus “broadening” of the definition of human security was paralleled by further discussions such as on the comparative added value of “freedom from fear” or “freedom from want”, the clash between “human-centered security” and “national security” as well as the degree of novelty human security brought to international environment. These discussions became the main lens through which human security was perceived, challenged and understood (Chandler, 2008), all awhile human security continued to make its way beyond the discourses to programs and policies of the international community.

1.1.1 Establishment of Human Security

How could such imprecise and debated concept become firmly established within both the academic and the policy-making world?

It is presumed that human security entered the academic and the policy-making world after the end of the Cold War due to the changing security landscape. The end of the Cold War brought about an increase in the numbers of waged non-state conflicts while the interstate conflicts were on decline (Human Security Report Project, 2012).

In the academia, recognizing that inequalities associated with structural violence (Hoivik, 1977 in Human Security Report, 2013, 44) and disasters cause greater number of deaths than physical violence and conflict (Gasper, et al., 2014), security studies, preoccupied with East-West relations and national security during the Cold War (Baldwin, 1995 p. 123), expanded their focus to issues such as social injustice, crime, epidemics or environment (Hintjens, et al., 2015 p. 7).³

Human security faced considerably smoother acceptance in the policy-making world compared to the academia. Indeed, human security was a policy-driven concept, created within the UN agencies for the purpose of influencing outcomes of the 1995 Copenhagen Social Summit (Krause, 2006 p. 3). This fact may have resulted in the continued ex-post discussions over the definition, nature and usefulness of the concept among the academics in an attempt to make sense of a complex phenomenon through

³ For discussions about the options for transformation of the field of security studies, see Haftendorn, 1991; Walt, 1991; Krause, et al., 1996 or Hintjens, et al., 2015.

defining, categorizing and setting thresholds,⁴ all awhile the agenda of international community already regularly included human security in its policies.

The UN officially adopted the human security agenda with inclusion of human security in the 1999 Millennium Declaration (Tadjbakhsh, 2007 p. 9) and beyond.⁵ Others, including the European Union, OECD or the World Bank, accepted human security in the discourses subsequently (Larzillière, 2012 p. 11).

Besides the international community, number of national governments endorsed the human security discourse. Norway, Canada and Austria, members of the Human Security Partnership (Permanent Mission of Austria to the UN, 2016), promoted human-security supported issues including the abolishment of land-mines, formation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), proliferation of small arms, abolishment of use of child soldiers, women and children in armed conflicts and respect to humanitarian and human rights law (Acharya, 2001 p. 445).

Canada established the Human Security Group focusing on research on lethal violence in and outside of armed conflict, promoting the Geneva Conventions as references of human security (Acharya, 2001 p. 445; Human Security Report Project, 2011; 2012; 2013).

Switzerland established Human Security Division under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to cover issues from humanitarian aid to transitional justice (Interview, 2016), sponsoring projects on landmine clearance, ban on the proliferation of small arms or reform of the security sector delivered through the “Maison de la paix” (IHEID, 2016).

In Asia, Japan allegedly instituted human security within the Asian tradition of cooperative and comprehensive security, stressing the importance of a community to that of an individual (Acharya, 2001 p. 449). Thailand, Canada, Switzerland, Norway

⁴ For insights on human security beyond the dominant narratives, see Hynek, 2010; Chandler, 2007; 2011; 2012.

⁵ The UN continually stressed the interconnection between security, development, human rights and other areas, quoting: “Many will regard ... the threats we identify as not really being a threat to international peace and security. Some believe that HIV/AIDS is ... not a security threat ... Or that poverty is a problem of development, not security.” (UN, 2004 p. 15); “In an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no development without security and no security without development. And both ... also depend on respect for human rights and the rule of law” (UN, 2005 p. 55).

and others joined Japan in establishing the Human Security Network (Paris, 2001; Krause, 2006).

International and national non-governmental organizations profited from human security narrative in funding opportunities for development, humanitarian and relief programs (Larzillière, 2012 p. 18). Prominent universities including Harvard University, Sciences Po or the University of British Columbia, further established programs dedicated to human security (Krause, 2006 p. 3).

The firm institutionalization of human security in the United Nations system led to establishment and justification of the concepts of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect that emerged in the 1990s and 2000s. In the discourse, both humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect were direct response to the acceptance of an individual as the epicenter of security and the redefinition of the role of a state.

Humanitarian intervention suggested that the failure of a state to provide protection to its population or should the state be the oppressor requires the international community to intervene (see for example Welsh, 2004; ICISS, 2001; Murphy, 2009; Massingham, 2009). The critique of the concept of humanitarian intervention, together with failures of international community to act in Rwanda and Bosnia, resulted in the establishment of the concept of responsibility to protect (ICISS, 2001 p. VII). The concept further placed responsibility for the protection of the population from the crimes against humanity, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide to the international community.⁶

1.1.2 Human Security under Critique

Presumed legitimization of power politics by humanitarian goals resulted in vast critique of illegitimacy of interventionism. Allegedly, humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect and human security covered power politics, led to

⁶ The concept was then institutionalized by the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that proposed concrete set of criteria under which the UN Security Council should authorize the use of force (UN, 2004), the Secretary-General's In Larger Freedom (UN, 2005) and endorsed by the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document (UN General Assembly, 2005).

marginalization of non-Western areas and biased the presentation of non-Western countries.⁷

The critics implied that human security provided an excuse for imposition of Western political institutions and liberal values (Larzillière, 2012; Richmond, 2007). Cold War interventions were replaced by those of human rights and humanitarian discourses (Hintjens, et al., 2015 p. 12). Richmond (2007 p. 473) compares humanitarianism to the imperialism of the 19th century, allegedly sharing the faith that a combination of high moral intent, military force and imposition of good government results in establishment of peace.

Critiques asserted that human security stands behind definitions of which actors cause insecurity and which promote it (Richmond, 2007 p. 464). Securitized developmental policies create biased understanding of underdeveloped societies as sources of threats and risks (Larzillière, 2012 p. 9).

The assistance provided under human security or strictly humanitarian notion is by no means apolitical and allowed the states to be engaged in external issues through provision of human security programs, or to substitute active engagement in the face of public through funding of non-governmental organizations (Terry, 2002 p. 219).

Engagement of security forces in development, disaster assistance or promotion of peace became accepted as indispensable for creating an environment in which any development can take place (Jackson, 2015 p. 14; Reveron, et al., 2011 p. 2). This resulted in targeting of the poor population as potential criminals (Bonner, 2008 p. 22).

The paradox of human security stretches even further. The states now need to take action and prevent the potential and future “risks and challenges” (Daase, 2010 p. 33) as opposed to the imminent threats faced during the Cold War, that may now include any issues from transnational terrorism to poverty. Therefore, states are forced to take on increasingly proactive strategies in order to prevent the threats before they even emerge. As a result, the state increasingly intrudes in civil rights of the citizens (Daase, 2010; Chandler, 2007). In the extension of this logic, the international community intrudes in state’s sovereign rights (Daase, 2010 p. 34) and the states

⁷ Apparently, this is suggested in the text of the Human Security Doctrine for Europe that calls on Europe to take on its collective responsibility to intervene in insecure situations outside of Europe for the “sake of security of the Europeans.” (Tadjbakhsh, 2007 p. 11).

intrude in other state's sovereign rights to protect the citizens in and outside of their territory (Ignatieff, 2008).

As a result of human security, the critics asserted, exaggeration of the post-Cold War threats and their location within the developing world (Chandler, 2008 p. 427) resulted in further reproduction of subsistence societies, institutionalizing poverty and global inequalities (Chandler, 2008 p. 10) and impoverishing those it meant to empower.

1.1.3 Human Security on a Withdrawal

Facing critiques over the legitimacy of human security-backed interventions as well as the failures of global community to ensure human security that it made itself responsible for, there was an apparent step back from the use of human security narratives in the international community during the 2000s. Perhaps with the exception of the UNOCHA or the UNDP, the term human security has been omitted from most of the current UN documents (Chandler, 2012 p. 216).

Gradually, during the first decade of the 21st Century, the narratives of responsibility of the international community for well-being of people worldwide were replaced by the narratives of capacity-building, empowerment and resilience. Instead of contesting state's sovereignty, the international community now strengthened and built the subject's sovereignty (Chandler, 2012 p. 222).

Chandler (2010 p. 7) suggests that this shift moved the international environment to a post-interventionist framework where the legitimacy of an intervention is no longer contested and normatively evaluated and where the interventions are presented as an empowering mechanism to strengthen the subjects who, through empowering and capacity-building intervention, are enabled to take responsibility for their own protection and development. Failure to achieve development and security then only results in renewed emphasis on empowerment and capacity-building of these subjects.

This allowed for an ideal escape for the international community from the responsibility for securing and developing the non-Western countries. While it was no longer possible to be held responsible, international community was able to continue

influencing internal affairs of the states subjected to the human security-inspired programs (Chandler, 2012 pp. 219-220).⁸

Reflecting on the critiques of human security-backed mechanisms and the general call for a more precise definition of human security promised in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (UN General Assembly, 2005 p. 31), the United Nations finally issued a common definition of human security and its role in 2012.

This definition of human security responded directly to the critiques of the implications of human security. While the definition embraced all people's entitlement to freedom from fear and freedom from want, it stressed that human security only has a secondary role to state security, that it is based on national ownership and local realities and that it does not pose any legal obligations to the member states. The definition specifies directly that human security cannot legitimize exercise of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect. International community can step in only on request of the state, upholding "full respect for the sovereignty of States, territorial integrity and non-interference" (UN General Assembly, 2012 p. 1-2). The UN finally specifies that while it recognizes "the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights", it turns its focus primarily on the achievement of development as a central goal in itself. As a result, the improvement of human security conditions is fully reliant on each state's willingness to secure its citizens (Shani, 2014 p. i).

The definition confirms the international community's step away from the interventionism of the 1990s and 2000s. Instead, the role of the UN is now the promotion of development, especially through achievement of Millennium Development Goals and the Sustainable Development Goals (UN General Assembly, 2012 p. 1-2). In the view of the United Nations, explicitly, human security primarily remains a tool for achievement of international development.

⁸ For Chandler, this trend was clearly demonstrated during the 2011 intervention in Libya. The intervention was not preceded by discussion over humanitarian concerns or sovereignty of Libya and the no-fly zone was presented as method of empowerment of Libyan people to secure themselves. The interveners provided no objectives or direct claims of responsibility for the outcomes (Chandler, 2012 p. 221).

1.1.4 The Role of Human Security Today

It has been mentioned that the frequency of the use of the term human security in official documents and papers as well as the programs and policies has declined in recent years (Chandler, 2012 p. 216).

Over the past two decades, human security brought focus of international community towards a number of issues that constitute today's concerns, including protection of women and children in conflict, abolishment of the use of barrel bombs and cluster munitions or regulation of small arms and light weapons (Tadjbakhsh, 2007 p. 13). The coalition of states, development agencies and non-governmental organizations, working under the human security umbrella, have achieved accomplishments such as the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Paris, 2001 p. 88), the Kimberley Process on conflict diamonds and the Ottawa Convention on landmines (Chandler, 2008 p. 432).

It can be argued that implicitly, human security has transformed into programs and policies on protection, prevention, capacity-building and empowerment. These projects undertake variety of formats ranging from peacebuilding, resilience, security sector reform to capacity-building and good governance (Chandler, 2012 p. 224). Peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and reconstruction, closely related to liberal state-building, are legitimized by human security (Richmond, 2007 p. 459; Bellamy, 2008 p. 5). Human security further promotes strengthening of institutions and mechanisms of governance (Richmond, 2007 p. 461).

Chandler (2008 p. 465) suggests that the lack of contestation or even discussion over the legitimacy and accuracy of these tools confirms the continuing impact of human security as a dominant framework of international regulation that, under the vision of prevention of conflict, continues to shape the international and national security agenda to this day.⁹

⁹ To uphold this argument with the most current international security event, this is remarkable reading the program of the International Security Forum 2016, an event that for more than 20 years brings together leading actors in the international security. The program promises debates on "The SDGs and Security: The Challenges of Implementation", "Security, Development and Peacebuilding", security sector reform or resilience and protection of development gains in fragile situations (ISF, 2015).

1.2 Armed Conflict

Before turning to the examination of association of human security with armed conflict, this section presents an overview of understanding of an armed conflict and suggests some of the existing theories of conflict causation to determine how human security could fit within existing theories.

Any categorization and creation of thresholds limits the thorough understanding of a complex reality, nevertheless a general establishment of terminology is required for operationalization of an analysis. General typology of conflict in this analysis follows the definitions of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) as the curator of conflict datasets. The UCDP defines an armed conflict as a “contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (Wallensteen, et al., 2012 p. 573).

A number of ways of conflict categorization is available, understandably, single consensual typology of war has not been agreed (Henderson, et al., 2002 p. 189). Small, Melvin and Singer (1982), accounting for the fact that “taking of human life is the primary and dominant characteristic of war” and that “war is impossible without violence” (Small, et al., 1982 pp. 205-6), categorized armed conflicts as those causing at least 25 battle-related deaths but no more than 1000 battle-related deaths in a year and wars as those resulting in at least 1000 battle-related deaths in a year (Wallensteen, et al., 2012 p. 572).

Considering the actors involved in the conflict, UCDP and COW distinguish between interstate, extra-state and intrastate conflicts. If a conflict occurs between two or more established states, it is marked as *interstate conflict*. If a conflict occurs between a government of a state and at least one internal opposition group without any intervention from any other state, it is considered an *intrastate conflict*.

The COW project further establishes *extra-state conflicts* between non-state group and a state fighting outside of its territory, such as colonial and imperial wars, and *internationalized internal armed conflict*, where other states intervene externally as secondary parties to the conflict (Gleditsch, et al., 2002 p. 9).

The period of 1990 to 2010 observed in the thesis was selected to cover the first twenty years after the end of the Cold War that resulted in significant changes in the predominant nature of the conflicts.

For many scholars, this change was radical enough that some argued that there remained little the new wars had in common with the wars of the past or that a new categorization of wars was necessary. Theories of “new wars” (Kaldor, 1999), “people’s wars” (Holsti, 1996) or “postmodern wars” (Grey, 1997) rose up to be followed by varied criticism. For critics, the wars of the post-bipolar period were only the old wars legitimized through the use of new discourses (Zarkov, 2015) or simply different types of the old wars (Henderson, et al., 2002 p. 165).

Whether the wars and conflicts were transformed to the degree that new categorization and a thoroughly new understanding of wars is necessary, alongside the continued discussions, there is general consensus that the end of the Cold War resulted in changes in the conflicts.

The changes were brought in by inclusion of new features, such as the use of irregular warfare, guerrilla and counterinsurgency tactics, unclear line of command, unmarked territorial limits or the use of technology such as computer-assisted weapons technology, artificial intelligence and smart weapons systems. The lines between combatants and civilians are increasingly blurred, and the “rules of the game” (Henderson, et al., 2002 pp. 165-7) not followed.¹⁰

The trends and changes in conflict and armed violence are documented by the Canadian Human Security Report Group and confirm that especially the number of high-intensity state-based conflicts has declined since the end of the Cold War, as has the deadliness of state-based conflicts, though the conflicts where the government is at least one of the parties to the conflict remain deadlier than non-state conflicts (Gleditsch, et al., 2002; Human Security Report Project, 2013 p. 49). The predominance of interstate wars of the Cold War was exceeded to a large degree by non-state wars (Human Security Report Project, 2013). The number of interstate wars

¹⁰ Interestingly, while the methods and nature of wars have transformed, Mary Kaldor (1999 p. 69) suggests that the purpose of the post-Cold War conflicts has changed much less significantly than the nature of wars and the contest remains over “seemingly traditional identities” of nation, tribe and religion.

declined while extra-territorial conflicts and wars against and between non-state actors became predominant (Henderson, et al., 2002 p. 188).

A clearly increasing trend in the numbers of non-state armed conflicts fought during the last two decades is apparent according to the reports (Human Security Report Project, 2013 p. 17). Out of these, ethnically-motivated warfare and civil wars have declined since the beginning of the 1990s (Gurr, 2000 p. 53), while majority of the non-state armed conflicts are short-lived and end within one year of the beginning of violence (Human Security Report Project, 2013 p. 97).

In face of presented trends, why have the interstate wars declined while the intrastate wars have increased? According to some, the decline in numbers of wars between two states may be a result of the changing of the role of the state in an active international community, development of international norms and enforcement of international law increasing the costs as compared to the relative benefits of war (Human Security Report Project, 2013 p. 25), as well as due to the increasing global interdependence (Cashman, 2004 p. 488)¹¹ and the role of public in oversight in politics (Human Security Report Project, 2013 p. 3).

1.2.1 On the Causes of War

Establishing the conflict-prevention mechanisms, this section provides an overview of some of the conditions that are suggested to have an impact on occurrence of conflicts as relevant to this thesis. This overview is by no means exhaustive; scholars have produced broad research on conflict causes and the debate is ongoing. I further cannot assess the accuracy of the theories here.

Understandably, no one single theory of the cause of conflict with universal validity exists. The individuality and particular conditions of every conflict make the search for causes of conflict difficult, the more so with regards to any preventive mechanisms. Multiple interacting factors are contributors and enablers of a conflict.

¹¹ Johan Galtung presented an approach to establishment of peace other than through disabling or prevention of war. He suggested that in a positive definition, peace should be a state of collaboration and cooperation between nations and other actors. Mutual dependency and interlinkages among actors make eventual non-peaceful relations undesirable (Galtung, 1969).

Further, there is also a certain degree of randomness associated with the occurrence of conflict (Cashman, 2004 pp. 477-8).

I follow systematic approach to presentation of war causes provided by Greg Cashman (2004), using five levels of analysis according to the actors who engage in war, starting from the individual level (1), through group level (2), state level (3), dyadic level (4) to the level of the international system (5).

The smallest entity in the levels of analysis is the level of an *individual* (1). The individual level is concerned with understanding of motivations of decision-makers and leaders of armed groups. The motivations of an individual may be irrational or rational. A number of studies proved that leaders may make irrational decisions due to lack of information, misperception, cognitive bias or different predisposition to take risks (Cashman, 2004 p. 112). A rational decision to engage in war may be based on calculation of costs and benefits or the expectation of a positive utility (Mesquita, 1981 in Fearon, 1995 p. 386), expectations of personal gains or a miscalculation of relative strength (Fearon, 1995 p. 379).

Group level of analysis (2) is based on the process of group decision-making designed to dissolve psychological bias of an individual. Rigorous or spiraling processes or groupthink¹² may result in an initially undesirable action (Cashman, 2004 p. 168). Beyond the decision-making processes, the characteristics and differences between ethnic, religious and other groups as well as language distinctions may be sources of discontent in individuals, transforming into a group rebellion (Gurr, 1970).¹³

Next, the *state* (3) characteristics, geography, size as well as political conditions such as the regime type, stability or nationalism may have a role (Cashman, 2004 p. 236). Countries with instable regimes or experiencing transition are more likely to engage than stable democracies or autocracies, as a result of struggle for power (Mansfield, et al., 1995 p. 5) or the incitement to violence by the new elites (Mansfield, et al., 1995 p. 19). Further, transitioning from a traditional to a modern society may dissolve the existing rules and norms against divergence and fail to regulate violent behavior before new norms are set (Murshed, 2015 p. 79). Liberal peace theories

¹² Processes of group decision-making are described in Cashman, 2004 pp. 155-168.

¹³ Ted Gurr (2000) calls these groups "ethnopolitical groups".

suggest that constitutional peace is ensured through democracy and trade (Richmond, 2007 p. 462) while the institutional peace assumes that missing structures of governance are the enabling mechanisms for a conflict (Richmond, 2007 p. 462). An effective conflict-prevention then requires establishment of these institutions (North, 1990 p. 7). Inadequate preventive mechanisms may create an environment where grievances turn into a rebellion (Murshed, 2015 p. 76; Jackson, 2015 p. 15).

According to development economists, stagnant economic growth is one of the sources of conflict (Murshed, 2015 pp. 70-76), especially the growth per capita and equal distribution of wealth to the population (Collier, 2003 p. 5; Hegre, et al., 2001).¹⁴ Population in society where income is unequally distributed may feel relatively deprived and perceive gap between the actual situation and the perceived entitlement (Gurr, 2000). Collier and Hoeffler (2004 pp. 588-9) further found that greed, rather than opportunity, is a critical enabling factor. Individuals who continue enriching themselves through access to resources and economic opportunities have no motivation to end the conflict.

The *dyadic* level of analysis (4) examines the interactions between two or more states. Unresolved territorial disputes are a common source of conflict. Dyads that experience long-term rivalry and power parity are at great risk of engagement in war (Cashman, 2004 p. 277). Lack of trust, inability to understand rival's motivations or deterrence strategies may result in preventive wars (Jervis, 1976 pp. 64-65; Carr, 1964, p. 112).

Finally, the *systemic* level (5) evaluates the impact of the nature of international system to the emergence of conflict and includes theories of anarchy, balance of power, historical-structural conditions (Waltz, 1959; Aron, 2003) or the liberal victor's peace (Richmond, 2007 p. 462). Growing differences between countries and regions, the South-North inequality and structural mechanisms, concentration of global economy in particular centers and overall militarization of economy (Zarkov, 2015 p. 123) are

¹⁴ Paul Collier (2003 p. 5) described the "conflict-poverty trap" where conflict leads to stalled economic development and low income levels that in turn prevent institutionalization that would improve the incomes.

suggested to be a source of conflict, driving the population to hold their government responsible for perceived failures (Murshed, 2015 p. 77).

Considering the variety of suggestions and examinations of causes of conflict, understandably, major disagreements over the measures most reliably predicting civil and state conflicts are in place. Some of the suggestions are more supported empirically than others. Continued rivalry between comparable neighboring states disputing over an indivisible issue such as territory have proven to be a strong risk factor (Fearon, 1995 p. 390), as has the relative size of a country, the lack of joint democracy, political transitions or economic setbacks (Cashman, 2004 pp. 479, 484). Selecting a single variable as a conflict predictor excises the complexity of enabling environmental conditions, specificity of each conflict as well as a certain degree of randomness.

1.3 Linking Human Security to Conflict

Returning to the relation of human security with conflict, in light of the discussions above, how could human security link to emergence of conflict?

The current forms of institutional capacity-building promoted by the current peace-promoting programs inspired by human security fit within the mentioned liberal institutional and civil peace theories.

Elaborating on the logic behind freedom from fear and freedom from want, two approaches emerge. Freedom from fear covers physical security and the absence of threats from conflict and violence.¹⁵ Freedom from want covers deprivation from basic human needs to opportunities. Promotion of economic development, equality, social justice and others contributes to securing these needs. Suggestions of factors contributing to emergence of conflict include unemployment (Urdal, 2004) underdevelopment, discrimination, missing preventive mechanisms (Hegre, et al., 2001), establishment of human rights and fundamental freedoms or sustainable economic and social development (Boutros-Ghali, 1992 p. 15). Some scholars assert that war is “development in reverse” (Collier, 2003 p. 33) and poverty impedes

¹⁵ Elaborating this point, measurement of human security and conflict is to a large degree covering the same phenomena. Increase in conflicts then results in increase in human insecurity as a result of human insecurity.

development (Collier, 2007; Henderson et al.; 1994; Murshed, 2015; Das, 2013). Indeed, development policies were established as a peace-promoting mechanism (Hintjens, et al., 2015 p. 9). Some practitioners and academics nevertheless argue that association of security with development is rather discursive and established through securitization of development (Larzillière, 2012) and based on little empirical evidence of causation (Chandler, 2007 p. 366).

Should indeed underdevelopment be related to emergence of conflict, there is a certain degree to which human security brings added value to the theories existing before the emergence of human security as a concept. A number of human security indicators are shared with development indicators, including maternal or child mortality rates, undernourishment or unemployment. In addition, human security brings in a variety of further indicators including homicide rates, torture allegations or proportion of health to military spending. Considering that some of the human security indicators that are shared with development indicators have been associated with emergence of conflict previously, it seems plausible that at least some of the human security indicators are empirically associated with conflict.

2. Quantitative Analysis

The quantitative analysis traces association between the emergence of conflict in a country and the country's standing on the human security indicator levels. It does so through statistical analysis of correlation of cross-country indicator data on human security and the number of conflicts.

It is understood that statistical analysis, using regression of non-sequential data, cannot prove that human security deprivation be *the cause* of conflict per se, without inclusion of multiple other predictors, testing for other causal mechanisms and verification of the results through qualitative research. Following the existing theories on conflict emergence and the assumptions of human security, this analysis *evaluates* the relevance of the underlying assumptions between human security rhetoric and the actual association of human security and conflict through analysis of real-world data. In other words, the analysis may support existing assertions or fail to find any measurable evidence to verify these assertions.

The analysis continues as follows. After transferring human security indicator data, where at least two indicators are included per each human security component (e.g. economic security, environmental security) into a common format, I draw averages and totals for the observed period between the years 1990 – 2010. Inspecting eventual collinearity of human security indicators to conflict emergence, I select the non-collinear indicators for human security, again including least two indicators per component.

Applying selected indicators, I calculate simple regressions upon the emergence of state, non-state and all conflicts, all verified through simple regressions adjusted for robust errors, in order to detect any possible association of the indicators with conflict emergence.

Following an evaluative scheme where I attempt to confirm association of human security and conflict in order to disapprove the null hypothesis that human security has no association with conflict, I select only significant predictors for multiple regression analysis, presuming that the predictors that were insignificant in simple regressions are unlikely to be significant in multiple regressions as the more

comprehensive multiple regressions decrease the number of observations in the model and increase collinearity of the predictors.¹⁶ In order to prevent the risk of inadequate selection of indicators in the multiple regression models, I calculate parallel multiple regressions including alternative indicators that are not included in the primary multiple regression to confirm that none of the alternative indicators are significant.¹⁷

Multiple regressions with at least one strong predictor per human security component upon state, non-state and all conflicts provide an insight into whether human security as a concept, composed of the indicators proposed by the Human Development Report (1994), can provide a viable predictor of conflict, or whether at least some of the segments of the concept are associated with conflicts. Selecting one indicator per component is necessary due to the limited number of observations should all of the predictors that are significant in the simple analysis be included in the model.¹⁸

Presuming that social reality is too complex to be predictable using single factors acting alone, I calculate regressions with interacting variables to test the possibility that the presence of multiple indicators may be reinforcing each other's effect only when in interaction.

To test the robustness of the results, I include five alternative predictors of conflict other than human security indicators that are presumed to be related to emergence of conflict by the existing theories presented in the first section of the thesis. The outcomes of the analysis are presented in the results section, followed by suggestions of the implications of the findings for the understanding of the accuracy of human security as a conflict-prevention mechanism.

¹⁶ To verify, I calculate multiple regressions using the indicators insignificant in the simple regressions, nevertheless, the comprehensive multiple regressions turned impossible due to high collinearity. This can be replicated using the attached do-file section 4g.

¹⁷ The results of multiple regressions with alternative significant indicators do not remark any new significant predictor of conflict. Presented here is the model with the most significant indicators to conflict. This can be verified using the attached do-file section 4k.

¹⁸ In an attempted regression using all of the indicators, none of the indicators are significant. This regression turns out to include only 27 observations; this is available for replication using the attached do-file section 4j.

2.1 Data Description

As indicated, I use the measures proposed by the Human Development Report (1994). There are at least two measures per each human security component, based on the availability of quality data for the period of 1990 – 2010, including from the UN, the World Bank, Amnesty International and the Freedom House.

Human security indicators come mostly from the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) database. The data in the database are produced by the Inter-agency and Expert Group (IAEG) on MDG Indicators, coordinated by the United Nations Statistics Division (UN MDG). MDG indicators are measured by the organizations including the World Bank, the IMF and the OECD (UN, 2003 p. iii). For the data sources and measuring methods, see the UN (2003). Considered are the following data grouped by the component of human security the data represent.

Economic security:

1. Employment-to-population ratio in population in working age of 15–64 years;
2. Youth unemployment rate ages 15–24 divided by economically active young population;

Food security:

1. Children under 5 severely underweight as percentage of all children;
2. Proportion of population undernourished as percentage of total population;

Health security:

1. Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles;
2. Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births;
3. Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births;
4. Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births;
5. Antenatal care coverage of women giving live birth who received at least four visits by skilled health personnel;
6. HIV incidence rate (upper bound) in population aged 15 – 49;
7. Tuberculosis prevalence rate (upper bound) per 100,000 population;

Environmental security

1. Proportion of total fresh water resources withdrawn for human use;
2. Carbon dioxide emissions emitted by a country as a consequence of human activities in metric tons per capita;
3. Population using solid fuels as the primary source of domestic energy;
4. Proportion of population using improved drinking water sources;

Personal security

1. Intentional homicides per 100,000 population;
2. Ill-Treatment and Torture allegations from no allegations to systematic;

Community security

1. Slum population as the proportion of urban population;
2. Proportion of women experiencing physical or sexual violence in and out of partnership at least once in a lifetime;

3. Proportion of women experiencing physical or sexual violence in and out of partnership at least once during the last year before the survey;

Political security

1. Political rights score;
2. Civil rights score;
3. Ratio of health to military expenditure as percent of GDP.

Detailed description and sources of human security indicator data are available in the Annex 2.

Regarding the data on conflict, I consider first, the interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts that involve a government of a state as an actor on one or two sides of the conflict. These are grouped together as “state conflicts” in the analysis. Second, I consider the conflicts where none of the actors in the conflict is a government of a state. These conflicts are labelled “non-state conflicts”. An additional variable is composed from the combination of the state and non-state conflicts, labelled as an indicator “all conflicts”.

State conflict data come from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Centre for the Study of Civil Wars. The UCDP understands a state armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch, et al., 2002 p. 1).

In the analysis, each conflict is coded as 1 conflict regardless of the number of years the conflict took place (Urdal, 2004). The conflicts that started prior to the observation period but continued during the observation period are included in the analysis with regards to the continued discontent that may be fueled by unfavorable conditions the population is subjected to. The state conflict dataset focuses on armed conflicts evolving in planned manner, spontaneous violence and clashes are covered in the non-state conflict data.

The location of the conflict in the dataset indicates the location of the government that takes part in the conflict and the dataset further disregards should the conflict spill over the borders. The conflict dataset distinguishes between primary and

secondary parties to the conflict. Secondary parties are those that enter the conflict outside of their territory in support of one of the conflicting parties; these are not considered in this analysis. For more detailed description of the dataset, see Wallensteen, et al. (2012) and Gleditsch, et al. (2002).

The non-state conflict data are assembled by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Non-state conflicts are understood by the UCDP as “the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year” (Sundberg, et al., 2012 p. 2). The conflict is coded to be located in the country of the warring government disregarding the actual geographical location of the conflict. For the description of the dataset and the more detailed definition of state and non-state conflict, see Sundberg, et al., (2012) and Annex 2, respectively.

The theories on conflict causes suggest a number of conditions that result in conflict. Inclusion of these predictors controls the effects of the human security indicators on the conflict data. Depending on the availability of data, I include these following control indicators.

- . *Democracy and the level of institutionalization*, inspired by the Democratic Peace Theory that suggests that spread of democracy promotes a decline in interstate war as well as civil conflict (Hegre, et al., 2001);
- . *Political instability, state fragility and political regime characteristics*, based on the assertions that the countries that have experienced conflict before are likely to experience conflict again (Gleditsch, et al., 2002; Urdal, 2004 p. 9) and that the countries with instable regimes or undergoing a regime change are more likely to experience war (Hegre, et al., 2001; Urdal, 2004);
- . *The size of a country*, following the assertion that larger countries are more likely to engage in war than small countries (Cashman, 2004 p. 484);
- . *Economic underdevelopment* that is considered a possible direct cause of grievances resulting in conflict (Collier, 2003 p. 33).


The controlling measures, as the indicators, are averaged during the observation period. The data are used to verify predictability of conflicts based on the employed conflict data.

The data come in variety of datasets and in multiple formats. Therefore, I first merge the datasets and then calculate the averages for each observation per country for the period of 1990 – 2010.

After delimitating the float numbers to four decimal points, I recode the data into a common format. Most of the human security data come in a percentage scale of 0 – 100. Other data, such as the maternal mortality rates, come in the numbers per 100,000 population. Others, such as the civil and political rights, come in scales other than 0 – 100. To increase the readability of the results, I recode most of the continuous measures to the common scale 0 – 100. Ordinal numbers are left in the original format. There are 25 human security indicators in the beginning of the analysis, a number that is further reduced due to collinearity with regards to the association of the indicators to conflict.

The numbers of conflicts are the dependent variables in the analysis. It is important to note that the distribution of conflicts is highly unequal, which is apparent from the histograms of the distribution non-state and state conflicts in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Histograms: Distribution of Non-state Conflicts (1) and State Conflicts (2)



The distribution of observations in the dependent variable is unequal. Most countries experienced no war during the observation period while the highest number of state conflicts during the 20 years was 19 conflicts (India) and the highest number of non-state conflicts was 57 conflicts (Somalia). The results of linear regressions are

likely to show heteroscedasticity of the distribution of residual and fitted values.¹⁹ The unequal distribution of the data has to be accounted for in the robust tests of the accuracy of the analysis. Data summary tables including the mean, minimum and maximum values as well as the numbers of observations are included in the Annex 3.

The next step in the analysis is the elimination of collinearity of human security indicators. The indicators of human security should essentially measure one phenomenon of human security, and there are multiple indicators per each component of human security, such as environmental security or economic security, that essentially measure the same issue. Collinearity, the overlapping influence on the dependent variable, is therefore expected among the indicators. The result of untreated collinearity, or even multicollinearity with three or more predictors inter-correlated, would be inflation of the explained variance of the dependent variable (R-square value) and the values of the coefficients.²⁰

To check for collinearity, I test the independent variables in group of predictors based on the component they represent (i.e. economic security indicators, food security) for variance inflation factor (VIF).²¹ The following indicators are omitted due to high collinearity: infant mortality rate is dropped due to high collinearity with children under 5 mortality rates, measles vaccination rate is dropped in order to preserve maternal mortality rates in health security. In political security, civil and political rights are merged into one variable measuring both civil and political rights combined following the formula [$civpolrights = (civrights + polrights) * \frac{1}{2}$]. In community security, violence against women experienced during lifetime is dropped given the violence experienced in the period 1990 – 2010 are more relevant to the observation period of the analysis.

¹⁹ Heteroscedasticity is the circumstance in which the variability of a predicted variable is unequal across the range of values of a second variable that predicts it, meaning that the variables have large variance and may bias coefficient and robust error estimates.

²⁰ The evaluation of the relevance of assumptions behind human security does not require composition of a predicting model of conflict emergence. Similarly, the interpretation of explained variance is not essential in this analysis. I nevertheless conduct the collinearity tests to avoid biased coefficients and to indicate the predictors that are kept in the analysis to limit the total number of indicators used.

²¹ That is the indicators with score of 5 VIF and higher. In the multiple regressions further in the analysis, severe undernourishment is partly collinear in the state conflict model but is kept in the analysis (VIF 5). Collinearity diagnostics can be replicated using section 2 of the do-file attached.

2.3 Analysis

The aim of the analysis is to confirm whether there is measurable association of human security indicators and conflict emergence in an inverse relation. The analysis is initiated with simple regressions to detect possible association of human security indicators on conflict emergence. The indicators that are found significant are used further in more complex models.²²

Human security indicators used in this analysis are based on the suggestions of the Human Development Report (1994) in order to include a broad range of indicators. Each of the indicators represents the best available proxy measure. The aim of the analysis is to find indicators that may negate the null hypothesis that there is no association of human security to conflict. Therefore I attempt to find any proof of correlation of human security to conflict. The selection of the most relevant indicators is therefore inherent to the analysis. I further calculate the alternative options for indicators to confirm the accuracy of the selection of indicators.

Should human security deprivation be inversely proportional to the emergence of conflicts as presumed by the hypothesis, the independent variables should be in linear relation to dependent variables. Linear regression allows for prediction of values of dependent variable (conflict) by the values of the independent variables (human security). Simple and multiple linear regressions presume a number of assumptions about the distribution of data for the analysis to be correct. Osborne and Waters (2002) suggest that for a correct linear regression model, observations in variables should be normally distributed, there should be no skewed distribution or extreme outliers, linear relationship between dependent and independent variables should be expected, the variables should be reliably collected and the variance of errors should be assumed homoscedastic; if the assumptions are not met, the significance tests may be distorted, leading to biased coefficient estimates and biased standard error estimates (Osborne, et al., 2002 pp. 1-5).

²² This follows the presumption that should the strong predictors be found insignificant, the weak predictors are as well insignificant. This is confirmed testing alternative models and can be replicated using the attached do-file, section 4.

In practice, finding perfect dataset meeting all the assumptions of linear regression is rare (UCLA, 2016); this is valid for the datasets used in this analysis. To correct for the unequal distribution of data and the heteroscedasticity, I verify the results through robust regression methods (UCLA, 2016).

The following section starts with simple regressions before turning to multiple regressions and regressions with interacting variables, each using the significant predicting indicators from previous step. The most indicative result tables with best predictors or the regressions adjusted for robust errors where appropriate are included in the text or in the annexes. The shortcuts for the variable names in the regressions as well as in the attached dataset and do-file are described in the Annex 2, as are the values particular indicators are undertaking.

2.3.1 Simple Regressions

Simple regressions should determine the association of particular human security indicators to conflict. The simple regression table allows for comparison of the effect of various human security indicators within each human security component or human security concept as a whole, with regards to the values each of the indicators is undertaking. The association of the same indicators is calculated for the emergence of the non-state as well as the state conflicts. Besides reaching slightly different values in the coefficients of correlation and the standard errors, the same indicators of human security are significant for all three measures of conflict.

As a result, more than half of the selected human security indicators are significantly associated with the emergence of armed conflict. At least one indicator per human security component is statistically significant, with the notable exception of economic security indicators. This result confirms that there is an association of at least some of the human security components with conflict.

The levels of impact of human security indicators on the emergence of all conflicts are presented in the Table 1. The dashed lines divide the indicators based on the human security component they represent. The result tables for non-state conflicts and state conflicts are presented in the Annex 4a and Annex 4b.

Table 1: Simple Regressions: Human Security Indicators and All Conflicts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
youthunemp	-0.068 (0.0380)																	
employment		0.019 (0.0526)																
underweight			1.01*** (0.133)															
undernourish				0.17*** (0.0408)														
maternal					11.3*** (1.782)													
antenatal						-0.18*** (0.0384)												
hiv							-1.15 (1.574)											
tuberculosis								4.36** (1.514)										
waterresourc									-0.0025 (0.0039)									
carbonemiss										0.020 (0.0385)								
solidfuel											0.099*** (0.0174)							
drinkgwater												-0.23*** (0.0312)						
homicides													15.4 (39.96)					
torture														0.87*** (0.223)				
slums															0.13*** (0.0375)			
womviolence																0.29** (0.0884)		
crimpoltrngs																	1.03*** (0.229)	
healthmltr																		-0.094 (0.0925)
_cons	3.73*** (1.080)	2.11 (2.996)	-0.19 (0.829)	0.39 (0.846)	0.73 (0.782)	15.7*** (2.485)	6.77*** (1.547)	1.93* (0.830)	4.09*** (0.755)	0.25 (0.590)	0.030 (0.848)	22.2*** (2.645)	2.25*** (0.542)	-0.21 (1.291)	-0.49 (1.905)	-0.18 (1.553)	-1.27 (1.263)	-4.18*** (0.782)
N	160	171	170	165	181	118	81	194	169	42	194	192	149	148	98	71	186	161
R ²	0.015	0.00075	0.26	0.097	0.18	0.15	0.0067	0.041	0.0024	0.0028	0.15	0.22	0.0010	0.095	0.12	0.14	0.099	0.0065
adj. R ²	0.0090	-0.0052	0.25	0.092	0.18	0.15	-0.0039	0.036	-0.0035	-0.022	0.14	0.21	-0.0038	0.089	0.11	0.12	0.094	0.00021
F	3.18	0.13	58.4	17.6	40.0	21.1	0.53	8.27	0.41	0.11	32.7	52.4	0.15	15.3	12.9	10.8	20.1	1.03

Standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The simple regressions find that a number of indicators are not significantly associated with conflict. These include HIV prevalence rates, the use of total fresh water resources per country, the total of carbon emissions, proportion of health to military spending or homicide rates.²³ None of the economic security indicators, employment rates in population or youth unemployment, are significantly associated with conflict.

Attempting to determine the relative impact of the human security indicators, one could find that for example, each one percent increase of the number of severely underweight children is associated with 1.01 increase of the number of all conflicts in a country, or the increase of 0.7 non-state conflicts and increase of 0.3 state conflicts. Even more pronounced is the finding that each 1 percent increase in maternal mortality rates is associated with an increase of 11.3 in all conflicts, with the ratio of increase 3 state conflicts to 8.2 non-state conflicts.²⁴ In civil and political rights, each 1 step towards deprivation of civil and political rights on the 1 – 10 scale results in 1 conflict increase in the country, more often non-state than state conflict in the ratio of 7 to 3. Undernourishment in population, antenatal care, tuberculosis prevalence rates, the use of solid fuels, access to safe drinking water, slum population in cities and violence against women are further associated with emergence of conflict.

Looking into the effect of particular components of human security to conflict, economic security indicators do not provide any significant association. All of the food security indicators and community security indicators are correlated to emergence of conflicts, as are the health security indicators besides the HIV prevalence rates. Some of the environmental, personal and political security indicators are correlated to the emergence of conflict. These results are identical for the emergence of non-state conflict or state conflict in terms of the significance of indicators. Further, simple regressions adjusted for robust errors mark similar results in terms of significance of

²³ The insignificance of carbon dioxide emissions per capita may result from the low number of observations in the dataset. The same goes for the HIV prevalence rates where the surveys are conducted only in non-OECD countries.

²⁴ The high coefficient of maternal mortality rates to conflict is likely the result of overall large difference between the conditions in a country with high or low maternal mortality rates. Interestingly, Amartya Sen considers maternal mortality rates as the best indicator of overall underdevelopment (Sen, 1998).

the predictors although the coefficient values may differ within the levels of significance.

In summary, presented simple regressions confirm that there is a measurable association of selected human security indicators to emergence of state and non-state conflicts. This result indicates that the null hypothesis that there is no association of human security with conflict could be disapproved since some of the measures that compose human security are associated with emergence of armed conflict.

2.3.2 Multiple Regressions

Can human security as a concept be related to emergence of conflict? This section answers whether human security as a concept composed of the components proposed in the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994) is associated with emergence of armed conflict or whether only particular segments of human security are associated with conflict. I test this using a multiple variable predictive model.

It is impossible to include all of the independent variables as this would lead to low number of observations in the model, resulting in insignificance of the predictors. The predictors of human security are further expected to be collinear. To be sure, I test the model with all of the indicators that prove significant in the simple regressions to conflict. As a result, only torture is significantly associated with emergence of conflict. The non-association of other variables may be due to the number of observations the model drops to.

Given that human security indicators essentially measure the same phenomenon, I select the strongest human security components, presuming that should the strongest predictors be unrelated, the weaker predictors are as well unrelated. The indicators that are significant in the simple regressions but cannot be included in the model due to the need to keep sufficient numbers of observations, such as undernourishment in population, antenatal care, tuberculosis prevalence, the use of solid fuels and the slum population, are tested in a separate model and mark no significant results.²⁵

²⁵ This is confirmed with models using the weaker predictors. The results of multiple regressions with alternative significant indicators do not remark any significant predictor of conflict besides torture. This is available for verification using the attached do-file (section 4k).

Choosing the most significant predictor per human security component allows for composition of a strong model to confirm that human security as a concept is associated with conflict emergence. Economic security indicators are a priori not included in the model as both are insignificant.²⁶ The strongest model with one indicator per human component is presented in the Table 2.

Table 2: Multiple Regressions with One HS Indicator per HS Component to All, State and Non-state Conflicts

	(1) all conflicts	(2) state	(3) nonstate
underweight	1.05*** (0.288)	0.51*** (0.0853)	0.54* (0.264)
maternal	-3.16 (4.824)	-0.28 (1.429)	-2.88 (4.427)
drinkingwater	0.010 (0.112)	0.069* (0.0333)	-0.059 (0.103)
torture	0.83* (0.328)	0.12 (0.0972)	0.71* (0.301)
womeviolence	0.18 (0.142)	0.035 (0.0421)	0.14 (0.131)
civpolrights	-0.30 (0.512)	0.036 (0.151)	-0.33 (0.469)
_cons	-5.02 (11.59)	-7.49* (3.432)	2.47 (10.63)
<i>N</i>	63	63	63
<i>R</i> ²	0.45	0.50	0.33
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.39	0.44	0.26
<i>F</i>	7.67	9.16	4.66

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In the results, only severe underweight in children under 5 years is associated with emergence of both state and non-state conflicts. Availability of safe drinking water is associated with emergence of state conflict and the frequency of torture allegations are is associated with emergence of non-state conflict. The other indicators are insignificant.

According to the coefficients in the results, little less than two percent increase in the number of severely underweight children in the population is associated with an additional state conflict as well as a non-state conflict in a country. Each one point the country scores worse in the number of torture allegations is associated with an additional 0.71 non-state conflict.

²⁶ The same model including the economic indicators shows that the economic indicators are still insignificant and further lessens the number of observations in the model.

The plot of residual to fitted values of the seven human security indicators upon all conflicts indicates unequal distribution of the observations and may lead to biased estimations.²⁷ Assuming the risk of unlikely fit of the data used in this analysis to the assumptions of the linear regression, including the presence of significant outliers and heteroskedastic distribution of errors, a version of the model adjusted for robust errors is included in the Annex 5.²⁸ The adjusted model finds that severe underweight is a predictor of state conflicts while torture allegations are predicting of non-state conflicts. Access to safe drinking water is insignificant in both cases.

The results of the multiple regressions make it apparent that only certain sections of human security concept are possible to prove as associated to conflict, either state or non-state. This result implies that rather than the concept of human security, only some measures included under the overreaching idea of human security are related to conflict.

Interpreting the overall results of simple and multiple regressions so far, a number of indicators are associated with conflict when measured included as stand-alone measures. These include at least one indicator per human security component, notably besides the economic security component. The simple regressions indicate that there is certain interconnection of human insecurity with the emergence of conflict.

On the other hand, in the real world, it is often impossible to separate the segments of complex reality into a number of individual measures and the components of human security should remain influential in a situation where a number of factors contribute to the environment of human insecurity. Should the concept of human security be relevant for conflict prevention, most of human security indicators should remain significant when grouped together, especially given that only the strongest predictors are included. Nevertheless, the indicators fail to confirm this in multiple regressions.

²⁷ Residual versus fitted values plot of human security indicators to all conflicts makes the unequal distribution apparent. Further, plots of the effects of added variables for all of the significant human security predictors also demonstrate unequal distribution of data. These plots can be replicated using the attached dataset and do-file section 7.

²⁸ A coefficient in a regression is robust if it is reliable despite the presence of significant outliers in the data, while the standard errors of the coefficients are assumed robust if the data are heteroskedastic (further in Croux, et al., 2004), both of which are not the case in some of the predictors used in this analysis.

This finding may have two explanations that I verify consecutively. First, the conflict data used in this analysis may not be predictable. This is verified using control measures drawn from the supported theories of conflict emergence below.

Second, the effect of independent variables on the dependent variable is *additive* in multiple regressions. The reality is more complex and if multiple indicators are present in an environment, they can be enforcing the impact of each other, e.g. high undernourishment in the population together with high risk of torture and violence could together result in the frustration threshold among the population and lead to an outbreak of violence. I test the eventual impact of these two explanations in the following two sections.

2.3.3 Alternative Conflict Causes

Consideration of control variables that should be associated with conflict according to the available theory sheds light on the predictability of conflict indicators used in this analysis. Of the indicators suggested in the conflict causation theories, based on the availability of data, I include the following predictors.

1. *Degree of democracy*, measured by Vanhanen's Index of Democracy based on the degree of competition, or the smaller parties' share of the votes cast in parliamentary or presidential elections, and the degree of participation, or the percentage of the population that actually votes in elections (Vanhanen, 2000);
2. *Political instability*, measured by the number of successful, attempted, plotted, and alleged coups d'état, based on the dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace, total number per country in the observed period (Marshall, et al., 2015);
3. *State fragility*, measured by the State Fragility Index, measuring effectiveness and legitimacy in security, political, economic and social dimensions, ranking countries on the scale 0 to 25 (extreme fragility) (Marshall, et al., 2014);
4. *The size of the country*, measured by the country GDP at market prices in current US dollars, extracted from The World Bank data (The World Bank, 2016);
5. *Economic underdevelopment*, measured by the GDP per capita in current US dollars available at The World Bank database (The World Bank, 2016).

I first verify the relevance of control predictors in a model that includes all the control predictors and then I compare the strength of the control predictors to human security indicators. State fragility index is dropped due to high collinearity with the number of coups in a country during the period. The results of the regressions with control variables are in Table 3.

Table 3: Control Variables and Conflicts

	(1)	(2)	(3)
conflict	allconflicts	state0	nonstate0
democ	-0.075 (0.0424)	-0.0033 (0.0167)	-0.072* (0.0325)
coups	0.97* (0.487)	0.36** (0.119)	0.60 (0.422)
csize	0.00000018 (0.000000105)	0.000000011* (5.14e-09)	0.00000017 (0.000000104)
gdpcapita	-0.00011* (0.0000445)	-0.000029 (0.0000153)	-0.000078* (0.0000371)
_____	_____	_____	_____
_cons	3.47*** (1.237)	1.02*** (0.317)	2.45*** (1.039)
N	169	169	169
R ²	0.22	0.14	0.21
adj. R ²	0.20	0.11	0.19
F	4.95	7.58	3.56

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

The results prove that the data used for conflict measures are predictable by indicators suggested by the conflict theories. In the table, all of the control variables are associated with at least one type of conflict.

The effect of human security indicators is compared with that of the control measures in a multiple regression. When combined, only two predictors are significant: the size of a country with state-conflicts and the severe underweight in children with both state and non-state conflict. The results are presented in the Annex 6. Furthermore, in the results adjusted for robust errors, only severe underweight in children remains significant.²⁹

It is obvious that severe underweight in children, repeatedly associated with emergence of conflict throughout the analysis, is likely to be the strongest of the indicators of human insecurity used in this analysis with regards to emergence of

²⁹ The regression described but not presented here is reproducible with the included dataset and the do-file.

conflict. The results cannot confirm with absolute certainty that the other measures are not associated to conflict as their insignificance may be caused by a low number of observations. This is supported by the finding in an alternative a model where violence on women is taken out to increase the number of observations: torture becomes a significant predictor of state war next to severe underweight and country size.

Overall, the inclusion of control variables confirms predictability of conflict using the data applied in this analysis, and suggests that severe underweight in children is one of the measures of human security with possibly stronger association with conflicts than predictors proposed by existing conflict cause theories such as gross domestic product overall and per capita or the quality of established democracy.

2.3.4 Interactions of Human Security Indicators

As implied above, the effect of human security indicators in multiple regressions is additive and does not assume any enforcing effect between the variables or the option that a presence of particular conditions is required to create an enabling environment where the predictors are impactful on the emergence of conflict.

Therefore I test whether an interacting effect between human security indicators can increase the effect of the indicators or pull in the indicators that showed no significant effect alone.

An interaction occurs when an independent variable has a different effect on the outcome depending on the values of another independent variable. Interactions should be included every time there is a suspicion that the effect of predictors depends on the environment or the institutional setting (Brambor et al., 2005).

The format of the regression constituted of one interactive term is the following,

$$y = \alpha + \beta_1 * v_1 + \beta_2 * v_2 + \beta_3 * v_1 * v_2$$

The model adds to a basic linear model the combination of variable 1 and variable 2 ($v_1 * v_2$) the resulting coefficient of their effect (β_3).

Correct inclusion of interaction terms in a regression requires following these basic rules: inclusion of all of the constitutive terms, verification of non-collinearity, correct calculation of marginal effects and correct calculation of standard errors

(Brambor, et al., 2005 pp. 3-11). The inclusion of interactions into this analysis aims to test whether there is an increasing impact of variables when interacting with other variables. Calculation of particular marginal effects of coefficients and standard errors of the interactive terms is not required by this analysis.³⁰

Taking into account that generally, interactions are difficult to detect in small or moderately sized data sets because the confidence intervals are too wide to present any significance, I only calculate simple interactive models with two constitutive variables and their interaction. As suggested by Brambor et al. (2005 p. 8), all the constitutive terms are included despite of the resulting high collinearity.

I consider variables that are associated to conflict in the simple regressions in order to make the analysis feasible. These are severe underweight in children, undernourishment in population, maternal mortality rates, antenatal care, tuberculosis prevalence, use of solid fuels, access to clean water, torture, slum population, violence against women and civil and political rights.

The results of the effect of interactions on state conflict are presented in Table 4. The table includes only interactive models where interactions are significant and none of the other combinations mark measurable results to state conflicts. Due to the number of interactions tested on the non-state conflicts and the resulting size of the tables, the results for non-state conflicts are presented in the Annex 7.

³⁰ Interpretation of the effect of particular variables in the interactions follows the key: for the effect of variable 1: $y = \alpha + \beta_2 \cdot v_2 + (\beta_1 + \beta_3 \cdot v_2) \cdot v_1$. For the effect of variable 2: $y = \alpha + \beta_1 \cdot v_1 + (\beta_2 + \beta_3 \cdot v_1) \cdot v_2$.

Table 4: Interaction Effects of Human Security Indicators to State Conflict

State Conflict	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
underweight	0.18*	0.13					
	(0.0760)	(0.088)					
mater	-1.89		6.329**				
	(1.233)		(2.24)				
c.underweight#c.mater	0.29*						
	(0.135)						
torture		0.11					
		(0.0817)					
c. underweight #c.torture		0.033*					
		(0.0145)					
drinkingw			0.00653	0.028			-0.077*
			(0.0186)	(0.027)			(0.0316)
c.mater#c.drinkingw			-0.0555**				
			(0.033)				
civpolrights				1.13**	-0.079	0.072	
				(0.357)	(0.191)	(0.0895)	
c.civpolrights#c.drinkingw				-0.011**			
				(0.004)			
slum					-0.014		
					(0.0244)		
c.civpolrights#c.slum					0.0088*		
					(0.0042)		
solidfuel						-0.011	
						(0.0134)	
c.civpolrights#c.solidfuel						0.0054*	
						(0.0021)	
antenatalcare							-0.13**
							(0.0415)
c.drinkingw#c.antenatalcare							0.0011*
							(0.0005)
_cons	0.48	-0.22	0.0389	-2.41	0.40	0.23	9.93***
	(0.296)	(0.470)	(1.716)	(2.498)	(0.845)	(0.440)	(2.145)
N	163	141	179	183	96	186	117
R ²	0.28	0.36	0.18	0.19	0.21	0.19	0.25
adj. R ²	0.27	0.34	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.17	0.23
F	20.8	25.2	12.8	14.2	8.02	13.8	12.3

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Reading the results, maternal mortality has multiplicative effect on conflict when combined with severe underweight in children, as does the access to antenatal care together with lacking access to drinking water, or the number of underweight children together with the numbers of torture allegations that explain more than a third of the total variance in state conflict.³¹

Comparing state and non-state conflicts, non-state conflicts are associated with larger number of interacting variables. As opposed to state conflict, in non-state conflict, severe underweight has a multiplicative effect in combination with access to

³¹ Note that the effects of main variables cannot be taken into account during the interpretation of significant interactions, even if the main variables are significant; their interpretation would be misleading due to collinearity with the interaction term. Reminding that the effect of independent variables does not confirm causal mechanisms, interaction of maternal mortality rates and severe underweight may as well be the effect of a conflict or a result of factors outside of this analysis.

drinking water, civil and political rights or the use of solid fuels. Further, torture allegations have increasing effect in combination with maternal mortality, access to drinking water, violence on women, the use of solid fuels or tuberculosis prevalence. The access to safe drinking water has multiplicative effect with undernourishment and the use of solid fuels. Finally, antenatal care has multiplicative effect with deprived civil and political rights and the use of solid fuels.

Overall, the interacting combinations of indicators confirm that some of the indicators that are not significantly associated with conflict on their own may have an impact on the association with conflict in combination with other indicators in an enabling environment.

The result of the inclusion of interaction variables in the analysis suggests that the failure of many human security indicators or human security as a whole to prove association to conflict may signify that certain conditions are required for human security to be associated with emergence of conflict.

Human insecurity is therefore an unlikely sole predictor of conflict in a complex environment where numbers of interacting factors lead to an outbreak of a conflict. Evidently, number of other conditions associated with emergence of war, among them possibly some of the conditions suggested by the existing theories of war causes, are required. Safeguarding and improving the conditions of human security is therefore unlikely to stand as a conflict-prevention mechanism on its own.

2.4 Results of the Analysis

The quantitative analysis aimed to shed light on the relevance of human security as a predictor of conflict. It selected the broad definition of human security suggested in the 1994 Human Development Report (UNDP) and employed the data on human security based on the suggestions of indicators provided by the report where the indicators grouped under seven human security components covered both freedom from fear and freedom from want elements of human security. It searched for relation of these components to state and non-state conflict for the first twenty years of the post-Cold War period.

The initial analysis using simple regression confirmed that some of the human security indicators are indeed associated with conflict emergence in a country. At least one indicator was found associated with conflict in each of the human security components with the exception of the component of economic security. Since a number of indicators of human security are common or shared with other fields such as development economics, e.g. maternal mortality rates, while other indicators have been suggested by existing theories on conflict causes, e.g. impoverishment, the confirmation of association of some of the measures cannot ensure that human security brings an added value with regards to peace promotion and prevention of conflicts as a concept.

The following step in the analysis therefore examined the possibility of relevance of human security as a whole to the emergence of conflict. It determined the strongest predictors of human security, making sure to include all human security components, noting that economic security was omitted a priori but carrying on the analysis in spite of this fact as future research using alternative measures of economic security may negate this finding. The strongest determinants were then tested in a complex additive model upon state, non-state and all conflicts, finding that human security as a whole was unlikely to prove association to conflict emergence.

The following steps in the analysis confirmed this finding. While the conflict measures were proved valid using control variables drawn from the existing theories, the interactions between human security indicators increased the effect of some of the indicators but could not ensure that the failure to confirm human security as a concept associated with conflict emergence was caused by inadequate combinations of indicators in additive models and further did not succeed in bringing in economic security as a viable predictor dependent on environmental conditions of insecurity to be impactful on emergence of conflict.

Some of the findings provide valuable and surprising insights into the mechanisms behind human insecurity and conflict emergence. Interestingly, when standing alone, precisely the same human security indicators indicated association to state conflict *and* non-state conflict. The relationship was stronger for most indicators when determining the correlation with non-state conflict as opposed to state conflict.

Actually, more than half of the stand-alone indicators marked association of conflict. When grouped together or interacting, one indicator was sometimes relevant for both types of conflict but more often it was relevant for either state or non-state conflict. The strength of the correlations depended on the method applied but the significance of association of some of the variables, notably the measure of severe underweight in children and to the lesser extent the frequency of torture allegations, remained significant across the tested methods.

As a result, the analysis proved that some of the human security components are measurably associated to conflict emergence, but at the same time the analysis failed to prove the hypothesis, i.e., while some of the components of human security mark an indirectly proportional relation to conflict, human security as a concept does not confirm the overall presumptions of its relation to conflict.

The presented findings are quite robust, accounting for eventual collinearity and heteroscedasticity and tested by multiple verification methods.

Responding to the questions this research was determined to answer, based on the findings of this analysis, human security in the format of the accepted concept cannot be confirmed here as a policy-relevant tool, nor can it be set aside and written off as a discursive tool based on false assumptions and disconnected from reality.

Statistical findings in this scope cannot confirm causal mechanisms, especially as the interrelation between human security and conflict is predetermined to be endogenous based on the nature of the studied phenomenon. The analysis nevertheless indicates some of the human security components that are related to state and non-state conflict, for example severe underweight in children or frequency of torture allegations, that should be taken into account when monitoring the environments where these indicators score poorly, establishing closer focus and increased attention to the high-risk areas to detect early an eventual impending outbreak of conflict and to advocate for support of preventive mechanisms through tailored and relevant programs and policies.

2.4.1 Limitations of the Analysis

Establishing potential limitations of presented findings is essential in any analysis, here, the limitations stem from the factors associated with quantitative methods in general as well as the application of the method in this analysis with regards to the questions the analysis aimed to examine.

First, generally, the use of quantitative methods in peace and conflict research forces the researcher to create and accept artificial labels and thresholds to make sense of complex reality that would be otherwise impossible to study on such scale, leaving behind nuanced and case-specific details. Using quantitative method in peace and conflict research, I remit to the existing definitions and thresholds of my variables in study of complex situation, such as the actors of conflict and their characteristics, the minimum thresholds taken into account or the methods in which phenomena in social reality are labelled and organized. In general, statistical methods are further unlikely to provide satisfactory proof of causal mechanisms and rely heavily on existing theories to attempt to support or disapprove. Further, statistical methods are reliant on correctness of sampled data and limited by the presence of missing or interpolated data.

More specifically to this analysis, the risks to the accuracy of findings are related to the choice of indicators and the datasets to represent these indicators, among others. The indicators included in the analysis are the closest proxies of human security indicators suggested by the definition in the Human Development Report (UNDP, 1994). Inclusion of different indicators, or overall different definition of human security that would include more components, may have yielded different results. Further, the analysis uses averages and totals for the observation period which may lead to imprecisions and disable the traceability of consecutiveness of human insecurity and conflict emergence.

The data measure the indicators on a cross-country scale. A more nuanced, sub-regional or regional analysis would enable control of hypothetical cases where human insecurity is significant in one part of a country but the conflict occurs in another part of the country. With regards to the conflict dataset, the location of the conflict does not reflect the geographical location of the conflict but the governmental party to the

conflict. While this risk is irrelevant to most of the conflicts, it may create inaccuracies for some of the measures.

Natural continuation of the presented findings is then the response to some of these limitations, including alternation of tested definition of human security, choice of further indicators, application of time-series analysis or the use of mixed research methods to support the accuracy of the findings. Further option would be to determine the thresholds in values in each relevant indicator to mark crucial levels when human insecurity is associated with a conflict.

The increasing effect of some of the indicators when interacting with other indicators confirmed that presence of other factors may be essential in creating an enabling environment where human insecurity is associated with conflict emergence. Follow-up to the analysis could therefore use a combination of human security indicators in more complex and more comprehensive interactive regressions, possibly using the indicators that were left out of the analysis in the beginning due to collinearity to explain the interrelations and mutual impact of particular human security indicators.

Extending the analysis beyond human security, further conditions may create the enabling environment. For example, some of the control variables when interacting with human security conditions may provide the enabling environment increasing the impact of human insecurity on conflict. These conditions may stretch well beyond those suggested by the existing theories. The potential discovery of these conditions, while extremely rewarding, would require a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach.

3. Implications, Suggestions and Conclusions

Human security has been influencing the agenda of international community and the policies of a number of states ever since the concept of human security had been formulated and accepted by the United Nations the mid-1990s. The frequency of the use of the term “human security” in the discussions and within the narratives of the programs has been increasing steadily, before it dropped significantly around 2010 (Krause, 2014 p. 82) due to the international community’s refocus away from human security. Today, it is increasingly difficult to come across the term within the policy-making circles and outside of specific academic or governmental environments.

Nevertheless, implying that human security exists solely within the limits of the use of the term would be misleading. Human security represents a set of ideas, narratives and assumptions that are able to take on many forms specific to the actor who endorses it.

In the past, human security visions majorly contributed to shaping of the focus of international agenda towards issues such as human rights and humanitarian principles, awareness about environmental changes, proliferation of arms or trends in armed violence (Gasper, et al., 2014), resulting in new funding opportunities (King, et al., 2002 p. 4) and creating new “human security” programs (Larzillière, 2012 pp. 18-19). The scope of the implications of human security contributed to shaping the agenda of international community (Chandler, 2012 p. 224) and continues to do so today.

Regardless of the fact that the frequency of the use of the term has declined, the influence of human security stretches well beyond the narratives. The narratives of human security have transformed into the rhetoric of empowerment, capacity-building, local and country ownership (Chandler, 2007 p. 373) and resilience (Chandler, 2012), promoting the same ideas of focus on the well-being of a human that are ultimately enforceable and enabled through an intervention leading to this empowerment. The scope of the impact of human security-inspired narratives is documented in the differences in frameworks of programs carried on by the international community before and after the endorsement of human security agenda, with regards to the inclusion of activities on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, promotion of

police reform, emphasis on the implementation of the UN resolution on women and peacebuilding or promotion of protection of civilians and vulnerable groups (Krause, 2014 p. 83) within the aims of peace promotion and prevention of conflicts.

Human security today continues to shape programs and policies developed and implemented by the international community and other actors. Given the continued commitment to funding and implementation of such programs, there is both the potential to improve number of conditions on the ground as well as the risk of adverse effects of these programs,³² stemming from deficiency of evidence of an adequate fit of the programs for conflict prevention.

With regards to these facts, it is remarkable that a mere presumption of existence of a link between human security and conflict, unsupported by empirical evidence, has influenced the global agenda and resulted in a variety of operations on such massive scale. How could such a poorly examined mixture of ideas and visions influence the way the international community and various other actors think, communicate and act?

I suggest that simply writing off human security as a method of promotion of liberal peace or tool of power politics cannot provide satisfactory explanation of the degree to which human security established itself on the international scene. The ideas of human security are accepted and promoted by variety of actors from academics to practitioners. The actors who include human security into their discourse formulate their own understanding of the concept, matching it to their pre-existing visions and respective operating spaces. Through the repetitive use of the term among these individuals, the concept becomes recognized and accepted, eventually becoming an uncontested truth valid in a particular organization or an environment.

The initial narrative becomes common “a priori form of knowledge” (Russell, 2014) that relies on the intuition rather than experience based on the assumptions and realities of a particular environment. This process results in establishment of a kind of

³² These risks include for example promotion of security sector reform or structural adjustment policies in a state that continually faces threats, or contrarily, strengthening a state where no mechanisms to prevent eventual wrongdoings of this state are in place (Krause, 2014 p. 89). It also allows for focus on security and development of an individual instead of tackling structural conditions that lead to the insecurity in the first place (Chandler, 2007 p. 377).

group knowledge, granted, commonsense and undisputed within the community (Dijk, et al., 2005 p. 729), to the point some would describe it (human security) as an “ideology” (Richmond, 2007 p. 477). As a result, the discourse becomes reality, universal, almost axiomatic, truth, and continues to further shape this reality through “naming [that] reproduces reality in different ways” (Hintjens, et al., 2015 p. 17).

The establishment of human security followed this pattern. Based on the ideas of security of a human, human security was pronounced and accepted within the policy-making world, discussed by the academics, applied by practitioners and recognized by the security subjects before it stepped back, only to be replaced by new narratives that were built upon previous ideas but brought in a sense of novelty. It is the current narratives of local ownership, capacity-building and resilience (Chandler, 2007 p. 373) that replaced the narratives of human security.

For these very reasons, assessing human security renders limited results when focused on the nature and the definition of the concept rather than perceptions of human security as a set of fluid ideas³³ that undertakes various forms in a context- and actor-specific manner.³⁴

Coming back to the assessment of the acceptance of human security as a conflict-prevention tool in the policy-making domain, the fact that the establishment of human security programmes followed a heuristic compilation of assumptions led to direction of enormous volumes of funds (Larzillière, 2012; Krause, 2006) towards programs with unpredictable outcomes.³⁵ Critical, fact-based examination of reliability of the assumptions behind these programmes could improve the direction of funds and the overall accuracy of the outcomes.

In the case of the use of human security and its role in prevention of conflict, the relation has not been confirmed empirically here or elsewhere. Nevertheless, the analysis presented in this thesis proves that some areas of human security may be related to conflict; a first step towards assessing potential causal mechanisms. This fact

³³ Chandler suggests human security has a “free floating nature” (Chandler, 2007 p. 379).

³⁴ For examination of enabling forces leading to establishment of human security in particular environments, see Daase, 2010; Hynek, 2010.

³⁵ For example, Larzillière (2012 p. 18) documents that as a result of connecting security and development in the post-conflict environments, there is an increasing discrepancy between the implemented programs and the actual needs of the population.

confirms added value of continued debates on the ideas brought in by human security. Rather than the striving for top-down attempts to find the use of a ready-made concept or operationalization of an existing definition, I suggest to take an inductive approach to reconstructing human security as a workable concept in the scope of conflict prevention. From the point of view of prevention of conflicts, there is little value added in the attempts for redefinition of the concept of human security, but rather in precision and selection of relevant tools human security offers, that is within the approach to security focused on an individual, *the security of a human*.

Should human security become a workable concept for design and implementation of programs directed towards prevention of conflicts, thorough investigation into the enabling mechanisms and effects of changes of human security across societies is essential.

Some of the areas to examine further in relation to conflict prevention are suggested by the findings of the presented analysis. The indicators of severe underweight in children and torture allegations have both shown strong association to emergence of conflicts, state or non-state, throughout the analysis. Number of other indicators marked strong association with emergence of conflict in certain conditions, among these health security, civil and political rights or violence against women. These areas could represent a starting point for marking high-risk areas designed for increased attention and focus of early warning tools as well as articulation of a more nuanced format of human security programs and policies to make efficient use of the available funds.

It is evident that a large amount of follow-up work is required to establish improved processes of construction of more adequate programs that aim to prevent conflict. In this sense, the findings of this thesis constitute rather an initial confirmation of the potential benefits of such improvements.

Ending on this note, the suggestions for further research into the refinement of a workable concept of human security in the policy-making world are only natural.

First area of focus would be the establishment of deeper understanding of mechanisms behind the popular narratives through critical academic approaches, that,

despite presumed by some as irrelevant to the policy-making world (Owen, 2008), could have the potential of improvement of the process of formation of policies ultimately applied in the real world. As such, this thesis proves that merging the academic and policy-making approaches may be beneficial for the impact of the policies. A genealogic examination of enabling forces standing behind the establishment of the successors of human security, especially the current narratives of capacity-building and resilience, and confirmation of their association with human security through discourse analysis in order to understand the mechanisms upon which they are built could uncover the nets and systems of exchanges among the international community and within other actors in international security.

In the light of a broad range of areas that require assistance, the funds directed towards unfounded peace-promoting programs could find better use if constructed on accurate information. The degree of the unsuitability of selected programs and the options for better use of the funds could be examined in particular cases where the pledged funds yielded undesirable results. The attention should be given to examination of relevance of other proposed areas of human security that have a relation to emergence of conflict. Overall, the follow-up process to this thesis could contribute to the ultimate aim of creation of well-informed programs and policies that, to the best possible degree, contribute to prevention of conflicts and promotion of long-lasting peaceful relations.

Summary

The diploma thesis examined the relevance of the assumptions concerning the relationship of human insecurity and the emergence of conflict. It provided an alternative approach to understanding human security beyond the prevailing discussions focused on normative judgements on the nature, legitimacy or applicability of the concept of human security and contested the influential narratives and ideas of human security that result in implementation of broad range of programs and policies aimed at prevention of conflict by the international community.

As a result of the analysis, some of the areas of human security, representing rather a random set of indicators instead of human security as a ready-made concept, are confirmed to be linked to emergence of conflict. Given that some parts of human security are indeed associated with conflict, this allows for reconceptualization of human security with regards to conflict prevention using an alternative approach, potentially starting with the examination and eventual inclusion of some of the areas herewith confirmed to be related to conflict emergence.

Finally, the thesis suggests surpassing the prevailing preoccupation with the use and application of the concept and instead accentuates inductive approach to formulating evidence-based programs and policies aimed at prevention of conflicts as to ensure the best possible fit of the programs as well as the use of available funds.

Overall, this thesis contributes to challenging of the predominant narratives in international security and proves that inclusion of fact-based examination of programs and projects beyond uncontested and possibly unfounded assumptions improves the understanding of the degree the programs are relevant with regards to their aims and as a result, has the potential to improve the outcomes of these policies and programs towards reaching the results they are designed to deliver.

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Annex 1: List of Indicators with Measures and Short Names (table)

Issue	Short Name	Description of a Variable	Recoded Values
Economic security	eavg	Employment-to-population ratio, both sexes, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (100 = full employment)
	yuavg	Youth unemployment rate, aged 15-24, both sexes	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = full employment)
Food security	suavg	Children under 5 severely underweight, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (100 = all underweight)
	undavg	Population undernourished, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (100= all undernourished)
Health security	meavg	Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (100 = all immunized)
	infavg	Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no mortality)
	childavg	Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no mortality)
	materavg	Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no mortality)
	antenatal4	Antenatal care coverage, at least four visits, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no antenatal visits)
	hivavg	HIV incidence rate, 15-49 years old, percentage (upper bound)	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no HIV incidence)
	tuberavg	Tuberculosis prevalence rate per 100,000 population (upper bound)	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no tuberculosis)
Environmental security	wateravg	Proportion of total water resources used, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (100 = all resources used)
	carbonavg	Carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), metric tons of CO2 per capita (UNFCCC)	Total metric tons per year per capita (0 = no pollution)
	solidavg	Population using solid fuels, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no use of solid fuels)
	drinkingavg	Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no use of improved water resources)
Personal security	homicidavg	Intentional homicides, per 100,000 people	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no homicides per 100 population)
	tortureavg	Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Country-Year Allegations Data, ordinal	Scale 1-10; 0 = None, 1 = Infrequent; Some; Frequent; Widespread; 5 = Systematic
Community security	slumavg	Slum population as percentage of urban, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no slum population)
	wviolence-lifetimeavg	Proportion of women experiencing physical or sexual violence, in and out of intimate partnership, at least once in lifetime, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no experience of violence)
	wviolence-lasty	Proportion of women experiencing physical or sexual violence, in and out of intimate partnership, at least once in during the last year, percentage	Percentage; 0-100 (0 = no experience of violence)
Political security	polrights	Political rights, ordinal	Scale 1 – 7 (1 = the most political rights)
	civrights	Civil rights, ordinal	Scale 1 – 7 (1 = the most civil rights)
	civpolrights	Civil and political rights combined, ordinal	Scale 1 – 7 (1 = the most civil and political rights)
	healthmilit	Ratio of health to military expenditure, as percent of GDP	Ratio; (1 = the highest preference of military over health spending)
Conflict	nonstate0	Number of non-state conflicts occurring in the period 1990 – 2010 in a country	Total
	state0	Number of conflicts where at least one actor was state party in the period 1990 – 2010 in a country	Total
	allconflicts	Number of non-state conflicts and conflicts with at least one actor a state party occurring in the period 1990 – 2010	Total
Control Predictors	democ	Vanhanen's Index of Democracy	Score 0 – 43 (0 = non-democratic)
	coups	Number of attempted, successful coups in a country	Total ranging 0 – 11
	sfi	State Fragility Index	Score 0 – 25 (0 = stable countries)
	csize	Country size measured by total average GDP at market prices in USD per 1990-2010	Total GDP divided by 100000
	gdpcapita	GDP per capita in current US average 1990-2010	Total GDP per capita

Annex 2: Description of the Data Sources and Measures (list)

Human Security Indicators

1.1 Employment-to-population ratio

Indicator covers the proportion of population in working age of 15–64 years old, both sexes. Employment is engagement in an economic activity during a specified reference period, including in all production of goods and services for pay or profit or for use by own household. (UN, 2003 p. 86)

1.2 Youth unemployment rate

Unemployment the number of unemployed people ages 15–24, both sexes, divided by the labor force, or the economically active portion of population, of the same age group. Unemployed people are all those who are not employed during a specified reference period but are available for work and have taken concrete steps to seek paid employment or self-employment. Employment is defined as in the previous indicator. (UN, 2003 p. 79)

2.1 Children under 5 severely underweight

Prevalence of underweight children is the percentage of children under five years old whose weight for age is less than minus two standard deviations from the median for the international reference population, adopted by the World Health Organization for international use. (UN, 2003 p. 4)

2.2 Proportion of the population below minimum level of dietary energy consumption

The proportion is the percentage of population whose food intake falls below the minimum level of dietary energy requirements, or the undernourishment. (UN, 2003 p. 9)

3.1 Proportion of 1 year-old children immunized against measles

The proportion is the percentage of children ages 12-23 months who have received at least one dose of measles vaccine. (UN, 2003 p. 29)

3.2 Infant mortality rate (0-1 year)

The rate is defined as the number of infant deaths before reaching 1 year of age. (UN, 2003 p. 28)

3.3 Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births

The mortality rate for children under five years old is the probability of a born child dying before reaching the age of five if subject to current age-specific mortality rates. Age-specific mortality rates are calculated from data on births and deaths. (UN, 2003 pp. 25-26)

3.4 Maternal Mortality Ratio

Maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die from any cause related to or aggravated by pregnancy or its management (excluding accidental or incidental causes) during pregnancy and childbirth or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy, irrespective of the duration and site of the pregnancy, per 100,000 live births. The 10th revision of the International Classification of Diseases makes provision for including late maternal deaths occurring between six weeks and one year after childbirth. (UN, 2003 p. 31)

3.5 Antenatal care coverage with at least four visits

Measures percentage of women aged 15 – 49 years old giving live birth who received at least four visits by skilled health personnel before giving birth, calculated as proportion total number of women giving birth (UN MDG, 2012 p. T 5.5).

3.6 HIV incidence rate in 15-49 years old

The incidence rate is the percentage of population of 15 – 49 years old whose blood samples test positive for HIV, upper bound. (UN MDG, 2012 p. T 6.1).

3.6 Tuberculosis prevalence rate

The rate is the upper-bound number of cases of tuberculosis cases confirmed bacteriologically by a clinician, per 100000 persons. (UN, 2003 p. 47)

4.1 Proportion of total water resources used

The proportion is the amount of ground and surface fresh water withdrawn for human use by agriculture, municipalities and industries as percentage of total renewable water resources in a country. (UN MDG, 2012 p. T 7.5).

4.2 Carbon dioxide emissions per capita

Indicator measures total amount of CO₂ emitted by a country as a consequence of human activities, divided by the population of the country, based on national emission inventories gathered by the UNFCCC. (UN, 2003 p. 55)

4.3 Population using solid fuels

Indicator measures the percentage of population using coal and biomass including wood, charcoal, crop residues and dung as the primary source of domestic energy for cooking and heating. (UN, 2003 p. 57)

4.4 Proportion of the population using improved drinking water sources

Indicator measures the percentage of population with access to an improved water source in both urban and rural settings from sustainable sources, such as piped water, public tap, borehole or pump, protected well, protected spring or rainwater. (UN, 2003 p. 50)

5.1 Intentional Homicide Rates

Intentional Homicide Rates data come from World Bank dataset (The World Bank, 2016). It indicates number of intentional homicides per 100,000 persons. The indicator measures unlawful, purposely committed homicides as a result of domestic disputes, interpersonal violence, violent conflicts over land resources, intergang violence over turf or control, and predatory violence and killing by armed groups (The World Bank, 2016).

5.2 Ill-Treatment and Torture

The data come from the Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) Data Collection Project and measures allegations of government ill-treatment and torture made by Amnesty International from 1995 to 2005 (Conrad, et al., 2013 p. 199). It uses ordinal measures where the allegations are numbered 0 = none; 1 = infrequent; 2 = some; 3 = frequent; 4 = widespread and 5 = systematic (Conrad, et al., 2013 p. 202).

6.1 Slum population as percentage of urban, percentage

MDGs data on the proportion of urban population living in conditions lacking one or more of the basic services including improved water, improved sanitation, durable housing, sufficient living area or security of tenure (UN MDG, 2012 p. T 7.10).

6.2 Proportion of women experiencing physical or sexual violence

The indicator comes from UN Stats on Gender Issues and expresses the proportion of women aged 15 – 49 who experienced, in the last year of measurement, sexual or physical violence committed from intimate partner and outside (UN, 2015).

7.1 Political Rights and Civil Liberties

Annual comparative assessment of political rights and civil liberties is conducted by Freedom House's Freedom in the World report. The report ranks countries on 1 – 7 point scale where 1 = most freedom based on the measures from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including: free vote in legitimate elections; free participation in political process; accountable representatives; exercise of freedoms of expression and belief; free association and assembly; access to equitable system of rule of law; social and economic freedoms, including equal access to economic opportunities and the right to hold private property (Freedom House, 2015).

7.2 Ratio of health to military expenditure as percent of GDP

The ratio expresses the comparable government spending on health and military as percent of GDP. The data are derived from two World Bank datasets on Military Spending as Percentage of GDP and Health Spending as percentage of GDP. Total health expenditure is the sum of public and private health expenditure (The World Bank, 2016). Military expenditures include all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces; defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and equipped for military operations; and military space activities (The World Bank, 2016).

Conflict Data

An armed conflict is defined by the UCDP as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” (Gleditsch, et al., 2002 p. 1)

The related definitions are the following:

- a. *Use of armed force* is the use of arms of any material in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year
- b. *Party* is a government of a state or any opposition organization or alliance of organizations. At least one of the primary parties of the conflict is the government of a state or the party controlling the capital of a state;
- c. *Opposition organization* is any formally organized non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility;
- d. *The dyads* include both intrastate conflicts where both conflicting parties are governments of state and extra-systemic conflicts where the opposing party includes at least one opposition organization;
- e. *State* is an internationally recognized sovereign government controlling a specific territory or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory;
- f. *Incompatibility* are the stated general incompatible positions over government, such as the type of political system, the replacement of central government or the change of its composition; or territory including its status, control, secession or autonomy.

(Gleditsch, et al., 2002 pp. 2-3)

Non-state conflict is defined as the “the use of armed force between two organized armed groups, neither of which is the government of a state, which results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.” (Sundberg, et al., 2012 p. 2).

For the purpose of the definition on non-state conflict, it is understood;

- a. *Use of armed force* is the use of arms of any material in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year
- b. *Organized groups* consist of formally or informally organized groups; any non-governmental group of people having or not having announced a name for their group and using armed force against another similarly formally organized group or wherever there is a clear pattern of violent incidents that are connected and in which groups use armed force against the other;
- c. *State* is either an internationally recognized or unrecognized sovereign government controlling a specified territory, or an internationally unrecognized government controlling a specified territory whose sovereignty is not disputed by another internationally recognized sovereign government previously controlling the same territory;
- d. *Government* is understood the party controlling the capital of the state.

(Sundberg, et al., 2012 p. 2)

Annex 3: Summary Tables (table)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
meaavg	194	81.4431	15.87715	27.61905	99
eavg	171	55.75245	11.81987	23.1	84.9
yuavg	160	18.74323	12.26623	.7	63.4
uavg	162	18.78648	23.55821	0	86.2
suavg	170	4.070949	4.764664	0	20.56667
undavg	165	15.81803	13.42025	5	57.75
infavg	195	3.898017	3.336931	.3280952	13.94095
childavg	195	5.628779	5.5672	.4180952	22.78286
materavg	181	.2650276	.3508598	.0042	1.94
antenatal1~g	143	83.9844	17.69614	25.8	100
antenatal4~g	118	60.01515	24.49751	6.3	99.5
hivavg	81	.5207231	.8387569	0	3.852857
tuberavg	194	.3543133	.4192109	.0059476	2.073905
wateravg	169	46.48235	190.8326	0	1675
carbonavg	42	9.104082	4.386764	3.261905	24.43333
solidavg	194	34.57732	34.46327	5	95
drinkingavg	192	82.77497	18.58216	25.44444	100
homicideavg	149	.0077353	.0111905	0	.0687178
tortureavg	148	4.884651	3.095881	0	10
slumavg	98	42.3998	28.05667	0	97
wviolence1~g	82	32.64634	13.74857	6.8	76.8
wviolence1~y	71	13.40563	11.43365	1	55.8
polrigh~2010	186	4.884793	3.075247	1.428571	10
civrigh~2010	186	4.623656	2.597447	1.428571	10
civpolrights	186	4.754224	2.791711	1.428571	10
healthmilit	161	4.372692	7.255044	.1531563	69.76076
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
allconflicts	196	3.433673	8.943165	0	64
state0	196	1.214286	2.622389	0	19
nonstate0	196	2.219388	7.370616	0	57
Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
democ	182	14.52039	12.29301	0	42.73
coups	195	1.215385	2.253238	0	11
sfi	165	13.05855	44.12162	0	570.1392
csize	182	3082166	1.26e+07	811.7789	1.12e+08
gdpcapita	188	8888.053	15111.22	162.0712	110662.8

Annex 4a: Simple Regressions: HS Indicators to Non-state Conflict (table)

Nonstate	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
yuavg	-0.045 (0.0298)																	
evavg		0.018 (0.0426)																
suavg			0.71** (0.115)															
undavg				0.10** (0.0328)														
matavg					8.24** (1.507)													
antenat-g						-0.12** (0.0331)												
hivavg							-0.51 (1.351)											
tuberavg								2.90* (1.258)										
wateravg									-0.0018 (0.0032)									
carbonavg										0.015 (0.0232)								
solidavg											0.074** (0.0146)							
drnkavg												-0.17** (0.0262)						
homicid-g													30.0 (26.99)					
tortureavg														0.60** (0.183)				
slumavg															0.095** (0.0324)			
wviolavg																0.23** (0.0741)		
civpoln-s																	0.72 (0.192)	
healthm-t																		-0.058 (0.0743)
cons	2.32** (0.823)	1.01 (2.427)	-0.34 (0.719)	0.26 (0.679)	0.22 (0.661)	10.8** (2.146)	4.45** (1.328)	1.22 (0.689)	2.65** (0.626)	0.011 (0.234)	-0.31 (0.710)	16.7** (2.218)	1.12** (0.366)	-0.39 (1.055)	-0.38 (1.644)	-0.51 (1.302)	-1.08 (1.059)	-0.058 (0.0743)
N	160	171	170	165	181	118	81	194	169	42	194	192	149	148	98	71	186	161
R ²	0.012	0.0011	0.19	0.058	0.14	0.11	0.0018	0.027	0.0020	0.0097	0.12	0.19	0.0083	0.068	0.082	0.12	0.071	0.0038
adj. R ²	0.0057	-0.0048	0.18	0.052	0.14	0.098	-0.011	0.022	-0.0040	-0.015	0.11	0.19	0.0016	0.062	0.072	0.11	0.066	-0.0025
F	2.32	0.18	38.4	10.1	29.9	13.7	0.14	5.30	0.33	0.39	25.8	44.4	1.24	10.7	8.54	9.25	14.0	0.60

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Annex 4b: Simple Regressions: HS Indicators to State Conflict (table)

State	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
yuavg	-0.022 (0.0125)																	
evavg		0.00048 (0.0168)																
suavg			0.30** (0.0384)															
undavg				0.067*** (0.0148)														
wateravg					3.02** (0.530)													
autenat~g						-0.053*** (0.0101)												
hivavg							-0.64 (0.426)											
tuberavg								1.46** (0.441)										
wateravg									-0.00063 (0.0011)									
carbon~g										0.0051 (0.0367)								
solidavg											0.026*** (0.0052)							
drinkingavg												-0.051*** (0.0096)						
homicid~g													-14.7 (18.72)					
tortureavg														0.28*** (0.0737)				
slumavg															0.040** (0.0101)			
wviolenc~y																0.066* (0.0283)		
crvpoltrig~s																	0.51*** (0.0669)	
health~t																		-0.036 (0.0303)
_cons	1.41*** (0.367)	1.10 (0.957)	0.15 (0.240)	0.19 (0.306)	0.51* (0.233)	4.86*** (0.656)	2.32** (0.419)	0.71** (0.242)	1.44*** (0.220)	0.24 (0.370)	0.34 (0.253)	5.30*** (0.816)	1.13*** (0.254)	0.18 (0.426)	-0.11 (0.513)	0.33 (0.497)	-0.19 (0.369)	1.38*** (0.257)
N	160	171	170	165	181	118	81	194	169	42	194	192	149	148	98	71	186	161
R ²	0.013	0.000005	0.27	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.028	0.054	0.0019	0.00047	0.11	0.13	0.0042	0.088	0.14	0.072	0.10	0.0089
adj. R ²	0.0068	-0.0059	0.26	0.11	0.15	0.19	0.016	0.049	-0.0041	-0.025	0.11	0.13	-0.0026	0.081	0.13	0.059	0.099	0.0027
F	3.20	0.00081	61.5	20.6	32.5	27.9	2.27	11.0	0.32	0.019	24.1	28.6	0.61	14.0	15.8	5.39	21.3	1.43

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Annex 5: Multiple Regressions Adjusted for Robust Errors (table)

Table: Multiple Regressions of 1 HS Indicator per HS Component upon All Conflicts, State Conflicts and Non-state Conflicts adjusted for Robust Errors

	(1) allconflicts	(2) state0	(3) nonstate0
suavg	1.05** (0.355)	0.51* (0.236)	0.54 (0.316)
materavg	-3.16 (4.166)	-0.28 (1.798)	-2.88 (4.235)
drinkingavg	0.010 (0.130)	0.069 (0.0437)	-0.059 (0.126)
tortureavg	0.83* (0.356)	0.12 (0.0828)	0.71* (0.338)
wviolencelasty	0.18 (0.229)	0.035 (0.0445)	0.14 (0.212)
civpolrights	-0.30 (0.379)	0.036 (0.132)	-0.33 (0.348)
_cons	-5.02 (12.89)	-7.49 (4.427)	2.47 (12.55)
N	63	63	63
R ²	0.45	0.50	0.33
adj. R ²	0.39	0.44	0.26
F	4.68	5.18	2.65

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Annex 6: Control Variables and Human Security Measures to Conflict

Table: Control Variables and Human Security Measures to Conflict

	(1) allconflicts	(2) state0	(3) nonstate0
democ	0.075 (0.152)	0.024 (0.0481)	0.052 (0.142)
coups	0.18 (0.632)	0.28 (0.199)	-0.10 (0.589)
csize	0.00000016** (5.01e-08)	-5.4e-09 (1.58e-08)	0.00000016** (4.67e-08)
gdpcapita	-0.000045 (0.0000988)	-0.000010 (0.0000312)	-0.000035 (0.0000920)
underweight	1.19*** (0.276)	0.57*** (0.0872)	0.62* (0.257)
maternal	-5.66 (4.737)	-1.17 (1.495)	-4.48 (4.412)
drinkingwater	-0.023 (0.118)	0.065 (0.0372)	-0.088 (0.110)
torture	0.37 (0.353)	0.12 (0.112)	0.26 (0.329)
womenviolence	0.31* (0.145)	0.063 (0.0459)	0.24 (0.135)
civpolrights	-0.20 (0.728)	-0.052 (0.230)	-0.15 (0.678)
_cons	-3.91 (11.37)	-7.59* (3.589)	3.68 (10.59)
<i>N</i>	60	60	60
<i>R</i> ²	0.61	0.59	0.51
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.53	0.51	0.41
<i>F</i>	7.67	7.11	5.18

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Annex 7: Interaction Regressions to Non-state Conflicts (table)

Nonstate Conflict	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	
suavg	2.10*** (0.490)	0.032 (0.227)	-0.50 (0.321)	0.016 (0.331)							
drinkingavg	0.030 (0.0538)				-0.046 (0.0499)						
c.suavg#c.drinkingavg	-0.022*** (0.00633)										
tortureavg		0.10 (0.211)				0.18 (0.210)					
c.suavg#c.tortureavg		0.11** (0.0374)									
civpolrights			-0.28 (0.261)					-0.073 (0.231)			
c.suavg#c.civpolrights			0.20*** (0.0502)								
solidavg				-0.031 (0.0281)						0.22** (0.0663)	
c.suavg#c.solidavg				0.011* (0.00470)							
materavg					25508.5*** (6028.4)	-1980.8 (3262.0)	17816.9** (5667.3)	-7626.6 (4576.3)	6349.2*** (1534.3)		
c.materavg#c.drinkingavg					-371.1*** (89.93)						
c.materavg#c.tortureavg						1649.6** (569.5)					
antenatal4avg							0.016 (0.0549)			0.047 (0.0638)	
c.materavg#c.antenatal4avg							-237.2* (97.59)				
c.materavg#c.civpolrights								2469.4*** (673.7)			
wateravg									-0.0062* (0.00306)		
c.materavg#c.wateravg									456.7*** (84.60)		
c.solidavg#c.antenatal4avg										-0.0028** (0.00101)	
_cons	-2.43 (4.901)	-0.51 (1.214)	1.02 (1.268)	0.69 (0.953)	5.51 (4.605)	-0.15 (1.195)	-0.036 (4.030)	0.76 (1.189)	-0.24 (0.710)	-2.96 (4.765)	
N	166	141	165	168	179	148	113	175	166	116	
R ²	0.28	0.29	0.28	0.22	0.26	0.22	0.18	0.23	0.27	0.19	
adj. R ²	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.21	0.25	0.20	0.16	0.22	0.26	0.17	
F	20.7	18.6	20.4	15.7	20.7	13.6	8.15	17.3	19.9	8.86	
Nonstate Conflict	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)
tortureavg	3.47*** (0.847)	-0.21 (0.442)	0.10 (0.232)	0.29 (0.233)							
drinkingavg	0.025 (0.0521)				0.11 (0.0727)				-0.064 (0.0496)	-0.46*** (0.0973)	0.020 (0.0735)
c.tortureavg#c.drinkingavg	-0.035*** (0.00983)										
wviolencelasty		-0.25 (0.189)									
c.tortureavg#c.wviolencelasty		0.081** (0.0288)									
solidavg			-0.0063 (0.0286)					-0.063 (0.0374)			0.27** (0.0863)
c.tortureavg#c.solidavg			0.014** (0.00497)								
tuberavg				-3.16 (2.728)							
c.tortureavg#c.tuberavg				1.10* (0.529)							
civpolrights					4.04*** (0.960)	3.38** (1.046)	-0.29 (0.615)	-0.17 (0.250)			
c.civpolrights#c.drinkingavg					-0.045*** (0.0108)						
antenatal4avg						0.16 (0.100)				-0.48*** (0.128)	
c.civpolrights#c.antenatal4avg						-0.042** (0.0145)					
slumavg							-0.074 (0.0788)				
c.civpolrights#c.slumavg							0.028* (0.0136)				
c.civpolrights#c.solidavg								0.022*** (0.00596)			
undavg									0.25 (0.142)		
c.drinkingavg#c.undavg									-0.0037* (0.00181)		
c.drinkingavg#c.antenatal4avg										0.0057*** (0.00162)	
c.drinkingavg#c.solidavg											-0.0033** (0.00100)
_cons	-2.84 (4.529)	1.30 (2.459)	-0.40 (1.327)	0.27 (1.311)	-9.25 (6.722)	-11.8 (7.405)	1.33 (2.726)	0.85 (1.227)	7.49 (4.601)	39.4*** (6.598)	-1.01 (6.913)
N	148	64	148	148	183	115	96	186	162	117	191
R ²	0.26	0.34	0.22	0.11	0.27	0.19	0.14	0.20	0.16	0.26	0.23
adj. R ²	0.25	0.31	0.20	0.088	0.25	0.17	0.12	0.19	0.15	0.24	0.22
F	17.1	10.4	13.3	5.76	21.7	8.65	5.16	15.4	10.2	13.5	18.9

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

<p style="text-align: center;">Institute of Political Studies Project of the Master's Thesis</p>
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7.6.2013

PREDICTING CONFLICTS VIA MATERNAL MORTALITY? Human Security
Deprivation and the Emergence of Armed Conflicts

1. Research Question

In 1994, the UNDP Human Development report voiced out yet another neologism broadening the understanding of security, shifting it from a mere state survival to a security of an individual facing variety of threats beyond physical. In the 1994 report, “recognizing that the reasons for conflict and war today are often rooted in poverty, social injustice and environmental degradation”, the UNDP demanded that the United Nations step up in efforts in preventive diplomacy through “preventive development initiatives” (UNDP, 1994: 38) so that “even the people in rich countries are more secure” (UN, 2004). In other words, the deprivation of human security may result in international insecurity and conflicts. Subsequently, adopting the concept, the development agenda steps up from a social cohesion policy to a conflict prevention mechanism, ensuring international security and order.

Once an established norm, human security has represented both a theme for academic debates and a foundation of policies. On the academic level, the traditional understanding of security based on state survival in the international system is being contested with the human security that broadened and refocused the concept in order to encompass an individual within a state. While the state still bears the primary responsibility to ensure security of its respective citizens, failure to do so transfers this responsibility to international community to protect the individuals. On the policy-making level, providing a narrative linkage of security with development agenda, human security encourages and in particular cases provides the narrative *raison d'être* for humanitarian and development initiatives, preventive actions and interventions.

As the neologism increasingly stands behind actual production of policies (at least on the rhetorical level) and results in reshaping of the reality in the present and likely as well as in the future, it is now more urgent than ever to examine the gravity of the link between the deprivation of human security and the emergence of armed conflicts, especially those with international outreach.

The purpose of this thesis is therefore to examine precisely this. Taking actual data on the emergence of armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War until recent, I will focus on the seven areas of human security as defined by the UNDP 1994 report, including economic, political, health, food, personal, community and personal security. I will examine their relation to armed conflicts with regard to possible endogeneity of the two, provided the data allow. This analysis will shed light on the relevance of human security as a policy-making tool. Depending on the outcome of the analysis, the correlation between human security (HS) measures and emergence of international armed conflicts will be either proven (i) irrelevant, (ii) partly relevant or (iii) relevant.

Each of these options results in wide implications if supported by the analysis. First, if there is no correlation between HS deprivation and armed conflicts found, the link is (i) irrelevant. In this case, HS may be understood as a narrative concept either created or

used in order to serve particular actor's purposes. These range from allocation of resources from security to humanitarian sector to reasoning of power politics. Second, if there is correlation found solely in the conflicts characterized or caused by international interventions based on refusal to disregard human security deprivations, the link is (ii) partly relevant. Here, human security may possibly be the cause of international conflicts, a self-fulfilling prophecy creating what it reckons to prevent.

Yet, finally, the link may be found (iii) relevant. Given the emergence of conflicts is strongly correlated to specific levels of HS deprivation, the causality may be further examined. Based on the results, increased likelihood for particular components of human security or particular combinations of these components resulting in conflict may be found. In this case, the analysis has a potential to determine particular conditions that increase the likelihood of emergence of a conflict. Given the still limited mechanisms of early warning for international as well as civil wars, human security measures may have a potential to add to the early warning abilities of international actors.

2. Methodology & Operationalization

The analysis will examine the correlation between the relative HS deprivation and the emergence of armed conflict with international outreach. While a large body of literature has been focusing on the link between security and development, it has been doing so in regards to the roots and the emergence of the concept, its normative links to development or its policy-making implications. To my knowledge, no other work has yet examined the link between HS and international conflicts through empirical quantitative analysis based on comprehensive, rather than single case, examination.

The HS indicators serve as independent variables likely regressed upon the conflict emergence as the dependent variable. In order to quantify social reality, thresholds for human security measures and armed conflicts need to be set according to common practices for both the (i) HS and (ii) conflict indicators.

Regarding the (i) HS indicators, despite the lack of unified definition of human security and its potential comprehensiveness (despite recent pressures to narrow and operationalize the concept), the 1994 UNDP report definition is generally considered the founding document of human security discourse and remains the most cited. Its definition will thus provide measures for relative deprivation of human security in this analysis. According to the report, there are seven areas of individual security, with specific measures for each outlined in the report.

First, health security is measured by presence of selected diseases, health spending per capita and maternal mortality measures. Food security is ensured by relative access to food and measured by undernourishment rates. Economic security is measured by the rates of formal to informal employment, stability of wages and homelessness rates. Environmental security is measured by deforestation-induced droughts and water scarcity. Community security stems from ethnic tensions and gender inequality. Personal security is threatened by crime and street violence, drug use, child abuse and suicide rates. Finally, political security is measured by human rights violations, political repression and ratio of military to social government spending. The data on particular indicators are available online in the databases of the UN (particularly the Millennium Development Project data), the World Bank, the IMF and the websites of developmental initiatives such as the Human Development project.

Regarding the (ii) conflict indicators, the intra-state wars, international interventions and internal wars with international outreach will be considered. The purpose of the thesis is to examine the international outreach of human security deprivation, eliminating internal clashes such as ethnic tensions or political violence with no international outreach. The data on violent conflicts are available at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) database and the Uppsala University data program.

Overall, the empirical examination and data analysis provides a fact-based explanation of the phenomenon of human security. Depending on the results, the neologism of human security may be confirmed as a discursive concept supporting particular agendas or even presented as a self-fulfilling prophecy. On the other hand, given the limited range of reliable early warning mechanisms, the possible existing correlation between human security deprivation and conflict emergence may serve as one of the early warning mechanisms for international conflicts using the already available indicators. This way, discovering correlative or causal links between the indicators of human security and the armed conflicts has a potential to increase the international community's ability to monitor in-risk areas, respond early with preventive action and, as a consequence, to have an impact on the future course of events.

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4. Preliminary Structure

Introduction

Part I: Human Security Norm and New Conflicts

Part II: Components of Human Security as Related to Conflicts

Part III: Quantitative Analysis

a. Individual 7 Indicators of Human Security and Conflict

b. Combination of the Indicators and Conflict

Part IV: Results, one of three outcomes:

a. HS and Prediction of International Conflict

b. HS and Prediction of Other Types of Conflict

c. No Relation of HS to Prediction of Conflicts

Part V: Implications

Conclusion