

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut mezinárodních studií

Diplomová práce

2016

Siarhei Kastrama

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD

Institut mezinárodních studií

Siarhei Kastrama

**Framing media image of the Euromaidan
in the reports of the RIA Novosti on the
breakdown of 2013/2014**

Diplomová práce

Praha 2016

Autor práce: **Siarhei Kastrama**

Vedoucí práce: **Mgr. Karel Svoboda, Ph.D.**

Rok obhajoby: 2016

Bibliografický záznam

KASTRAMA, Sjarhei. *Framing media image of the Euromaidan in the reports of the RIA Novosti on the breakdown of 2013/2014*. Praha, 2016. 85 s. Diplomová práce (Mgr.) Univerzita Karlova, Fakulta sociálních věd, Institut Mezinárodních Studií. Katedra ruských a východoevropských studií (KRVS). Vedoucí diplomové práce Mgr. Karel Svoboda, Ph.D.

Abstrakt

Práce zkoumá mediální obraz pouličních protestů, jmenovaných Euromaidanem, ve zpravodajství ruské zpravodajské agentury RIA Novosti (РИА Новости). Časově práce je omezena vznikem Evromaidanu na konce listopadu 2013 a koncem února 2014, kdy vláda v čele s prezidentem zmizela. První část práce se zabývá teoretickými východisky, které vysvětlují přístupy k vnímání vzájemné zaležnosti mezi publikem a medií. Dále představuje stručně principy a podstatu teorií nastolování agendy a rámcování, také jsou vysvětlovány takové pojmy jak rámce a jejich funkce. V metodologické části stanovuje kritéria pro výzkum a rozsah zkoumaného materiálu. Po metodologické části následuje analytická část, která analyzuje jednotlivé rámce, jež byly vytvořeny RIA Novosti. V závěru se dospívá k srovnání teoretických předpokladů a výsledků empirického badání, jinými slovy jaké vlastnosti Evromaidanu byly vyjadřovány nejvíc.

Abstract

This thesis studies how the state owned news agency the RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) covered the protests, named Euromaidan. Timely the paper is limited with the end of November, 2013 and the end of February, 2014. The first part of the thesis

focuses on the theoretical approaches about interdependences between the audience and the media. The next chapter covers concisely the principles and the essence of agenda setting and framing, also such concepts as frames and their functions are analyzed. In the methodological part the criteria and the scope of analysis are set up. After the methodological part the analytical part goes which focuses on the separate frames, which were constructed by the RIA Novosti. In the last chapter the conclusions were made unveiling, how the theoretical inputs and empirical outputs are correlated, and which Euromaidan's attributes were transmitted the most.

Klíčová slova

RIA Novosti, Ukrajina, Evromaidan, Kyjev, Rusko, pouliční protesty, nastolování agendy, analýza rámců

Keywords

RIA Novosti, Ukraine, Euromaidan, Kiev, Russia, street protests, agenda setting, frame analysis

Rozsah práce 150737 znaků

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval/a samostatně a použil/a jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Prohlašuji, že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného titulu.
3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne 05.05.2016

Siarhei Kastrama

Poděkování

Na tomto místě bych rád poděkoval vedoucímu PhD. Karlu Svobodovi za zajímavou ideu, spravedlivý přístup a trpělivost, PhD. Luboši Švecovi a PhD. Kateřině Králové za upřímnou a přísnou kritiku na Diplomovém semináři, PhD. Emilu Aslanovi a PhD. Slavomíru Horákovi za to, že mi pomohli objevit svět Kavkazu, a za jejich pedantický přístup k práci se zdroji, svým kolegům za toleranci, příklad a každodenní pomoc během celého studia na Karlové Univerzitě.

Table of contents

BIBLIOGRAFICKÝ ZÁZNAM.....	5
PROHLÁŠENÍ.....	7
PODĚKOVÁNÍ.....	8
TABLE OF CONTENTS	1
INTRODUCTION	2
1. METHODOLOGICAL PART.....	4
1.1. THE INTERACTION OF THE MEDIA AND THE AUDIENCE.	4
1.2. SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY.	10
1.2.1. MEDIA CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY.	11
1.3. FRAMING MEDIA REALITY.	12
1.3.1. <i>Media frames. Definition and typology.</i>	13
1.3.2. <i>Frames' functions.</i>	14
1.3.3. <i>Classification of frames.</i>	14
1.3.4. <i>How do the frames work?</i>	15
2. ANALYTICAL PART.....	17
2.1. SCOPE OF RESEARCH.	17
2.1.1. <i>Research questions and hypotheses.</i>	21
2.2. FRAMING EUROMAIDAN.....	24
2.2.1. <i>Research question 1: Was the Euromaidan covered profoundly on the website of RIA Novosti?</i>	24
2.2.2. <i>Research question 2: What reasons evoked the Euromaidan?</i>	26
2.2.3. <i>Research question 3: What features did the Euromaidan possess?</i>	28
2.2.4. <i>Research question 4: Was the Euromaidan an effective solution of the issues?</i>	34
2.2.5. <i>Research question 5: Who made up the Euromaidan?</i>	35
2.2.6. <i>Research question 6: What the law enforcement withstand while curbing the Euromaidan's activities?</i>	38
2.2.7. <i>Research question 7: How did Ukrainian opposition influence on the Euromaidan?</i>	40
2.2.8. <i>Research question 8: How did the Euromaidan affect the work of Ukrainian government?</i> .	42
2.2.9. <i>Research question 9: What consequences could (did) the Euromaidan cause?</i>	45
2.2.10. <i>Research question 10: What role did Russia play during the Euromaidan unrest?</i>	50
2.2.11. <i>Research question 11: Were the Western countries involved into the protests?</i>	52
2.2.12. <i>Research question 12: What could the Euromaidan damage?</i>	56
2.2.13. <i>Research question 13: Was the Euromaidan an attempt to plot coup d'état?</i>	58
2.3. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?.....	59
CONCLUSION	63
SUMMARY	67
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	68

Introduction

The overwhelming amount of events happens every day but only some of them become known by a significant number of people. The Euromaidan, the protests in Ukraine, the uprising against Yanukovich, the Revolution end etc. are basically just different names of one set of events. The events which happened in Ukraine between November 21, 2013 and February 20, 2014 overturned Ukraine and triggered the changes across the European continent.

Its significance is beyond necessary explanation because it became the turning point in the politics in the region of Eastern Europe and bolstered changes in status quo in post-Soviet realm. The protests started from a small rally opposing the government's decision to suspend negotiations on Ukrainian-EU Association agreement, but eventually transformed into "marches of millions" which was quite a compelling protest movement. It quaked the Ukrainian society, state, economy and nation. The standoff itself was not calm and peaceful, they were fuming all of the time. The protests were not bloodless: some protesters sacrificed their lives for the sake of ideas they shared. The Euromaidan was not the only internal Ukrainian issue – it crossed Ukrainian borders and became the theme of debates in Brussels, Washington and Moscow.

Nevertheless, being a real issue in the streets of the country and the topic of international discussion, the Euromaidan was also a media issue or the topic of media battles. Despite being the phenomenon alien to the Russian internal agenda, the Euromaidan was transmitted into the internal Russian political agenda. The attention from the Russian media can not be easily evaluated, but its significant coverage can not be underestimated. Hereby, the RIA Novosti was not an exception, it was covering the protests from the very beginning till the very end.

Since the media coverage might affect the perception of the image of the Euromaidan, it is vital to assess such issues as interrelations between the media and the audiences. The current approaches should direct us to the idea, whether the way of coverage is dependent on the audience's preferences, or the media can shape the angles of preferences. If the media and the audiences are interdependent, how the media are capable to fulfill the demands of their audiences, in other words how they can attract the audience. For the sake of the research there will be analyzed theories which address the issues of retaining the audiences and shaping the preferences: agenda setting and gate-keeping. The aforementioned approaches render the ideas that the media choose the

pieces of news and then cover them in certain ways to keep the audience acute. Essentially the coverage should correspond the prejudices of the audiences in order to succeed. The crucial way to deliver the message which go in line with the preferences is to frame it, e.g. to distinguish certain attributes of the phenomenon which will discover, explain and simplify it simultaneously. Accordingly, the frames are those crucial features which the RIA Novosti identified and made salient to explain the essence of the Euromaidan. The actual frames are the essence of the study because they will allow to unveil the overall image of the Euromaidan on the pages of the RIA Novosti. On the other hand, the frames reveal the features which were considered by the editorial being important and corresponding to the audience's stereotypes. In other words it unveils the perception of the audience's pre-established views on the problem which determine the selection of manner and topics of coverage on the Euromaidan.

Hence, the frames describing the Euromaidan allow to imagine the perception of the phenomenon which the audience could elaborate under the influence of the RIA Novosti. Accordingly, the frames allow to comprehend what image could be transmitted via various audiences of the RIA Novosti. Although the RIA Novosti is the media outlet which is owned by the Russian state, we are presuming that the editorial is functioning without external meddling. Furthermore, the study does not aim to identify the correlations between the media coverage of the Euromaidan and the official Russian posture. The essential study interest is what the overall image was forged by one of the most influential and reliable media players in Post-Soviet region.

The Euromaidan's image rendered by RIA Novosti facilitates the understanding of the nature of subsequent coverage by other media which may have more efficient influence on end customer.

The correlations between the state posture, the ownership of RIA Novosti and actual coverage may be found rather speculative, but the real frames are evident for everyone, therefore, everyone can make own judgement. Accordingly, only narrative matters –and the study discovers it in order each to make own conclusion.

1. Methodological Part.

1.1. The interaction of the media and the audience.

In a modern society, the process of creating and processing information is an extremely important part of the society's life, as information does not simply familiarize the audience with the surrounding world, but often, being transmitted through the channels of the professional actors creating news, sets up the reality. Knowledge and awareness of technological progress does not only change the economic or scientific spheres of life, they also affect the other areas of life of a contemporary human being. In general, the knowledge of the outside world is an essential feature of the human being nowadays. Processing of information and creating the news by dedicated actors are even triggers and can be characterized by certain technological process (Semionova & Korsunskaja, 2010). The news reports are a part of the medial discourse. Accordingly, for the purposes of the research it is necessary to identify the key concepts that will be further used as a basis for the study: "mass communication", "medial discourse", "media", "audience", "mass media" and "frames".

Scientific interest to the process of creation and transmission of news reports, as well as the analysis of the delivery to the end recipient, were subjected to a deep analysis by various researchers, such as G. Debord, Boris Groys, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, Harold Lasswell, and others. There are different approaches to study the phenomenon of "mass communication", and below there are given the widest and the most common definitions from the dictionaries. In general, it should be said there are two essential features of the mass communication are the "distribution of information" through the "specialized" actors (Oxford dictionaries, 2016). For the purposes of the current study the structural approach will be used to analyze the mass communication. It seems that the most convenient model of the mass communication structure was offered by Harold Dwight Lasswell who defined a very simple, but at the same time complete structure of communication. Lasswell explained mass communication through the five questions: Who whom what in what way delivered information and how what effect this information message has caused (Lasswell, 1948). Accordingly, the distribution of information should be carried out according to the certain rules, can not be conducted by all actors, should be put into a certain form and trigger reaction from the audience.

Although this definition is the most comprehensive, it contains an important drawback, namely, H. Lasswell considers the audience as a passive participant or even as a passive object of information, in other words, in no way affecting the process of production and dissemination of information. It seems that the audience must be seen not simply as an object, but rather as a news consumer, who has preferences or demands for certain information. The demand, in its turn, determines the range of news prepared by means of mass communication. Taste preferences of news consumers are influenced by various factors, such as culture, education, social status, religious worldview, political choices etc., therefore, the release of certain information messages happens not just due to the occurrence of some event, but the audience's needs to be aware of certain events happening.

Speaking about the levels or degrees of reciprocal impact between the society and the media, there are three main approaches in theory. The first states the media are capable of infinite influence on the audience, because the transmitted images and thoughts are uncritically assimilated by the individuals. The second says the media indirectly impact an individual, because their influence is refracted by "transmission groups" to the final consumer. The third asserts the media do not determine the final interpretation of the events, but only set the direction of understanding of the events (Semionova & Korsunskaja, 2010).

The ideas of unlimited impact of the media on the audience appeared in 20 – 30 (Semionova & Korsunskaja, 2010) of the twentieth century, when the scholars under the influence of the media propaganda during World War I assumed, that the means of mass communication had unlimited influence on the audience. The theoretical fundamentals for the approach was an idea expressed by the behaviorists who explained human behavior through the model of "stimulus - reaction". The representatives of this school in mass communication imagined an individual who responded to the external stimuli, and whose motivation was not taken into consideration. Society, in their minds, represented as a group of unrelated individuals, who were not mediated by the complex social relationships, and, therefore, the mass media in society had a direct impact, which the individual could not oppose (Lasswell, 1948). H. Lasswell, an American political scientist, is one of the main representatives of the flow. He compared the effect on the audience with the effect of the medical injection. Media was a needle alike which was injecting a drug under skin, and because a human cannot check all the events happening in the world, but he or she simply has to trust the information, which the media delivers.

It gives incredible opportunities for the media to construct the picture of the world, because an individual owing to the lack of time and resources turns to the media and accepts the image, which has been simplified due to the stereotypization. As a result, the individual develops a simplified stereotyped images concerning the sophisticated social phenomena. The aforementioned approach to the understanding of media in the society was caused by political and military propaganda campaigns where the media were used as a very effective tool for mobilizing the masses. This approach does not fully describe the interaction of the audience and the media, because the audience is deemed to be passive and consumes information without its reevaluation. That is why it has gradually been revised and replaced by the approach of indirect media influence on the audience.

In the mid 50's of the twentieth century the approach of unlimited influence of media on the audience was replaced by the ideas of indirect influence. Its essential idea was a perception of psychological particularities of each individual and, accordingly, the different reactions to the stimuli stemming from the media. Representatives of this approach identified two basic principles, which were based on the fact that the media were not lone sources of information, and information coming from the media often was processed by so-called "opinion leaders", who could shape public opinion. The representatives of this approach noted that information was mediated not only by the opinion leaders, but also by so called "inner circle". In other words, an individual is involved in different social roles and receives information refracted by inner circle's opinion, which is full of stereotypical preferences. According to George Clapper (Zimin, 2006), the incentives, broadcasted by the media, work the most effectively when they appeal to the existing stereotypes, because human mechanisms of psychological defense select only the information that matches their prevailing views. However, these approaches of understanding the media impact were further questioned because the "opinion leaders" are not constant dominating mediator, they may disappear, may change, sometimes the media has a direct impact. Accordingly, an individual does not always receive the set of stereotypes while getting information from the media, therefore, the information is not always properly mediated and stereotyped (Klapper, 1960)

The ideas of mutual influence between the audience and the media have appeared owing to the commercialization of the media: the media are now perceived not as a means of influencing the audience, but as an institution dependent on the audience's attention, because the content of news reports began to be perceived not as a way to

influence, but as a way of retaining the audience with a particular medium. The choice between different channels of communication, reckoning the huge number of them, has become a tool of the audiences' influence on the media. A viewer, a listener or a reader is paying their time to the media, and the media, in their turn, use the audience to attract advertisers. Accordingly, the audience and the media have become interdependent. For the analysis of the media as actors, dependent on the audience, it is necessary also to consider such factors as "setting the agenda," the establishment of "the spiral of silence" and the "dependence of the effects of mass communication".

The researchers found out that most of the media are not informing about the occurrence of the events, but rather range them depending on their importance at certain time and in certain place. This assertion is particularly accurate for such type of the media as information agency or news agency, which is engaged in the collection, processing and distribution of news among other media outlets, it ranks the events according to their importance, thus, creating the agenda for the professional players in the media market. The news agencies define the range of topics that will be further covered by other media. In other words, the audience of news agencies are not only the individuals, but also the professional participants of the media market: TV, Internet portals, radio, print media, etc., which become transmitters of news for the eventual audience of individuals. Accordingly, the news report compiled by an information agency, has far more impact on the final consumer of the information, because it has larger distribution channels via the intermediary of other media.

An important theoretical element of the media and audience's interaction is the degree of smoothing of other opinions or the way in which the media is capable to suppress unpopular or unknown opinions. For a description of similar social phenomenon, the researchers developed new concept, so-called "spiral of silence" (Zubarëv, 2014). The Spiral of Silence is a concept of the relationship between mass communication, interpersonal communication and the individual's correlation own opinion with the others' ones (Griffin, 2006). Most people try to avoid the situation, where their opinion opposes the general one of the group, and, especially, when that particular individual is the only one who shares such opinion. To avoid an uncomfortable situation, people try to veil their views contradicting the majority. As it has been stated above, the media determine the agenda, and, in accordance with this idea, the prevailing opinions are an outcome of the media activities, because the views which are not broadcasted by mass media are rather a closed thread.

The degree of influence of media on the audience differs in various stages of development of the society. Such researchers as the Ball-Rokeach and De Fleur (Ball-Rokeach & De Fleur, 1976) concluded that the influence of media on society was strongest during the crises, because at such periods the level of critical thinking of the audience drops, and the ideas, the semantic structures broadcasted by the media are much easier perceived by the society. Moreover, even the media focused on certain target groups circulate the opinions which are common in the mass media. Noam Chomsky demonstrated the most common example, which is used by the media in times of crisis – the pursuit of "the search for the enemy," both real and imagined.

The media, while carrying out its basic function of information dissemination, use various sets of metaphors and images which impact the audience, establish or polish prevailing public intentions or views. Researchers define discourse as "limited by certain time frames the process of language usage, combined with pragmatic, socio-cultural, psychological and other factors, expressed by means of mass communication, taken in event-aspect, which is the effect of participating in social and cultural interaction, and reflects the mechanism of communicants' consciousness, in which all the processes and products of speech activity are intermediated with mass communication, and taken in its entirety and complexity" (Dubschich, 2014).- In general, the discourse is a special way of using language, determined by the time frame, certain set of values and in a given moment of time. Due to the fact that the discourse determined by certain time, values and thematic framework, it is often used for dynamic researching of the news texts, because the news passage is always dynamic and is perceived by the audience only in the context of the current events. Besides the news message has not only some informative function, but it is characterized by the function of impact, since the final image of an event appears in the imagination of the eventual user, at least under the influence of informational messages, which in their turn were the reports of events interpreted by means of mass information. Sometimes, these two images differ, because the media can use techniques aiming to distort the perception of the events. Examples of such techniques are described by a well-known linguist T. Van Dijk. In particular Van Dijk pointed the means which help to create the ethnic prejudice in media (van Dijk, 2016):

a) Overgeneralization. Signs of a single event or individual properties are transferred to the entire group;

b) Example. The general features of the group are transferred on a particular case.

c) Expansion. Distribution of either negative or positive attitude of one feature to the entire group.

d) Attribution. Audiences are persistently explained the "correct" interdependence of the events.

Being one of the types of social-oriented communication, the mass communication causes certain change of the social reality, thus the media within the discursive activities have a psychological impact on the audience. Discursive activity of media offers a set of guidelines and values leading the recipient of information to the necessary understanding of the reality that can determine the further individual's reaction.

As one of the types of communication, the mass communication has a very important feature, namely, it is influential communication, i.e., it always has a purpose or desired effect. The mass communication is the institutional form of communication, namely, the act of communication takes place via specialized institutions, e.g. the media. By creating a discourse or a space-time way of using the language, the media are addressing the audience, not only as an object, but yet as a subject, which share a precious commodity with them, e.g. time. The time spent on the individual representative of the media market by an individual is important for the media now, because it is a measure of the success of the media. That is exactly why the media refer to the burning topics and methods of coverage which are important for the audience. Thus, creating images in news reports, they fill them [the reports] with stereotypes known and vital to the audience. Besides, the media can broadcast the image of the event which may be different from what was originally generated within the media. To mislead the audience the media may use different techniques: overgeneralization, example, expansion and attribution, which was described by Van Dijk. The audience now receives images of events generated by the media in the desired way. It was pointed out that the media framing images and metaphors are extremely successful and have the greatest impact on the audience in times of crisis, change or instability – in general during ambiguous times for the society. Uncertainty implies to the fact that society less questions the agenda, which the media sets up, similarly, during the times of uncertainty, the degree of critical thinking in society reduces. On the other hand, the media do not point directly to the integrity of the event, and they only make the right

agenda, i.e. determine the range of events which for the media reports are vital. Accordingly, it forms a mental image of information picture integrity. The events getting more media coverage become more familiar to the public and, therefore, more valuable. The significance of the event, thus, is determined by the frequency of media coverage. However, not all the media have the same effect on the formation of the event's image because not all the media have the same degree of penetration to the final consumer. Information or news agencies are the key participants in the mass communication, affecting not only an individual as a final recipient, but other communicators, as on agenda setters, because the news agencies collect "pieces of news" and distribute them to the other channels of mass communication. The news agencies forge a circle of events, which appear to be a source for other channels of mass communication: print mass-media, television, Internet portals, radio, etc. The significance of events is established by the news agencies, because they are a source of inspiration for the other means of mass communication, who in their turn distribute received images to the own audience. In other words, the news agencies are building the array of events, which are being even more transformed further. That is exactly why it is vital to analyze the images of events that were generated by the news agencies, because it will set the root metaphors and comparisons which will be used in the future by other communication channels.

1.2. Social Construction of Reality.

Speaking about the interconnection of the media and a society we concluded that the media as such were capable to influence the society either directly or indirectly. In other words the media have capacities to develop, promote and impose own vision of the ongoing or upcoming events. The researchers define such way of communication as media construction of reality when the audience comprehends the events through the prism of the editorial vision. It should be noted that the media construction of reality has being studied within the theories of social construction of reality.

The ideas of social construction of reality firstly appeared in 60-s of XX century, when the sociologists P. Berger and Luckman released the study "The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the sociology of knowledge". In this book they concluded that the society was created by human beings and it became objective reality which further formed a person. (Berger - Luckmann, 1991, 68). Hence, the founders of the theory ground the ideas on three pillars: externalization, objectification and

internalization. Externalization means that human puts efforts to create the environment around, where a person is able to express himself or herself. Objectification means that personal reality becomes objective and exists independently from individual, whereas the latter starts to accept this objective reality (internalization). The interaction requires the tool to transmit the reality between individuals that is why the scholars depict crucial element of objective reality construction, namely language and signs saying that language can become “objective repository of vast accumulations of meaning and experience, which then can be preserved in time and transmitted to the following generations. Language also typifies experiences, allowing me to subsume them under broad categories in terms of which they have meaning not only to myself but also to my fellowmen” (Berger & Luckmann, 1991). Thus, the language is a transmitter of signs which shape the reality by defining certain events or phenomena in a certain way being comprehensible only for certain group. Moreover, the language is an instrument used for depicting the same phenomena in a different way for different social groups. Though, the core idea of the aforementioned theory is that constant interaction between members of the certain social group uses special sets of signs which objectivize subjective realities. Moreover, while interacting between each other humans can distinguish the agents of influence, hence, those who will transmit certain set of signs on some phenomenon, therefore, objectivize subjective perception. One of such influential actors is media, whose perspective is being borrowed and shared by the audience.

1.2.1. Media construction of reality.

In 1994 the theorist on mass communications Denis McQuail in his book “The entire study of mass communication“ stated that the media had “significant effects” on shaping social reality. The theory of media construction of reality is based on the presumption that the media are a key player in constructing social reality. Furthermore, the processing of information by the media was defined as “mediation” (McQuail, 1999: 88). Hence, the information, which the audience receives from media, not necessarily occurs to be real, but in many ways appears to be interpretation or selection of facts. The editorials or journalists may not deliberately choose, interpret or select facts. The reasons which evoke certain coverage of events can be divided into two big groups: *ideological* and *organizational*. Obviously the ideological reasons aim to cover events according to editorial policies and views or to invoke certain feedback, feelings and moods of the audiences. The organizational factors are the ones which appear due to

daily functioning of editorials namely when certain rubrics, types of articles, reports are pegged to certain journalists which cause the certain way of coverage, grounding, values and etc. (Tuchman, 1978: 46) Broadly speaking, if the listener, watcher or reader is not eager to diversify the sources of information, he or she becomes dependent on the opinion of the source he or she prefers to follow.

The level of media influence on construction of social reality is hard to overestimate, for the time being, because current societies, in this case, the Russian one, is heavily penetrated by the different types of media outlets, especially TV and Internet¹.

1.3. Framing media reality.

As it is noted above, language is a key tool to create objective reality and the language uses a set of signs which interpret or explain the events. The media actively code information in order to be comprehensible for own audience. Moreover, while covering the events the media outlets exert their influence on the audience by simplifying or modifying the information. Needless to say, that is being done to ease understanding the phenomena or events. In 70-s the scholars paid attention to such feature of mass communications, and called it “framing”. For the first time the concept of framing was developed by American sociologist Erving Goffman, who dealt with the process how individuals perceive daily events and how they interpret environment around them. The frames, according to Goffman, are units of experience organization which lack the complexity. Accordingly, the frames are imaginative constructions which are to simplify the phenomenon (na) covered by the medium. Moreover, the simplification with frames is used to explain the essence of the events, besides, to simplify the media imply using sets of stereotypes or prejudices towards covering object. Thus, the stereotypes allot covered phenomena or events with certain attributes which are known for the audience, therefore, the essence of covered objects becomes clearer. (Goffman, 1974)

The overall concept of “framing” was developed by many scholars such as Robert Entmann, Maxwell McCombs, Tabery, Van Corp. It goes without saying, the researchers have diverse approaches to the frames per se. The first sociologist, who started connecting “frames” and media, was Robert Entman. He conceived frames being

¹ Internet penetrates almost 70 per cent of Russia’s population whose age exceeds sixteen years old (Lenta.ru, 2016).

a pathway to reveal the power of text, but not “how” the frames affect reader’s way of thinking, thus, stating that it is impossible to define how the text becomes a set of manifestoes (Entman, 1993). However, Maxwell McCombs, who elaborated and defined the concept of agenda setting, stated that the frames in context of agenda setting theory allow to distinguish the attributes of the text and the frames. And, in fact, the framing is an extension of agenda setting. Despite the framing theory has rich history of research in terms of analyzing media influence or media effects on the society, there is no common practice of usage the definition “frame”. Accordingly, the researchers sometimes mix the concepts of “frame, script, or schema. (Scheufele, 1999)

1.3.1. Media frames. Definition and typology.

The first sociologists who tried to cover all angles of frame are Gamson and Modigliani (1987) offering the following definition of the frame “ as a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events .The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue” (Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, 1987). Here the authors focus on frame as a key idea which makes the information meaningful for the audience, hence, it uses the set of signs in language aiming to explain the events. Tuchman deems frames to be organizational necessity which institutionalize the journalist routine (Tuchman, 1978). However, this more or less discloses the reasons why the media outlets frame the information it does not explain how they frame and what features the frame should obtain in order to be defined as frame but not scheme. This issue is solved by Robert Entman who developed own definition of frame based on two crucial pillars: *salience* and *selection*. According to Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993). Basically, in this definition the most important elements are covered which differ frame from schemes or scripts, namely, it is stated that media outlet cover not all events but certain which are depicted in a certain way to be more visible, memorable or important. Furthermore, Entman utters that media using frames always offer something to its audience, particularly, own moral evaluation, interpretation, probable treatment and etc.

Generally speaking, there are different views in scholar community on frames, as well as different attitudes, what is more important, in structure of a frame. However,

all of the researchers (Entman, McCombs, Gamson & Modigliani) agree on one thing - the media outlets proliferate information framing the events and phenomena, thus, are inclined to make news more comprehensible for the audience.

1.3.2. Frames' functions.

The frames are used by editorials, bloggers or journalists for different reasons and some of them were described above. However, we would systematize the functions a bit further. Firstly, the frames serve the simplifying role as for the media and for the audience. By using the framing the mass media shape own internal policies and ease communication with the audience because the news production is routinized and frames are the tools how to summarize and systemize the topics, the mood, the grounding of the news messages. For the audience the media outlets use the language and explanations which are comprehensible and correspond the perspectives. Secondly, the frames serve impelling role. The news is framed as it was stated above to give explanation or moral evaluation of piece of news, obviously, processed information about facts will evoke certain emotions from the audience. Thirdly, the frames serve correctional role. While selecting the certain aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient the media neglect other, perhaps, similarly important ones, therethrough, the media may correct or shape reality influencing the audience, correcting demands, requirements and vision of the reader, spectator or listener.

The process of framing is a natural process while producing news because the media have to go in line with the aspirations of own audiences and editorial policies. The news itself is not a pure and refined set of facts, in reality this set of facts is processed amount of information on certain events in terms of making it digestible and tasty for the audience. However, the media also impact the opinion and the mood of own audience while selecting some features of reality and interpreting them with own evaluation or remedy. The emotional component and the options, which the media propose to the audience, affect its future demands and necessities. Therefore, it is hard to define the framing process only as one way flow.

1.3.3. Classification of frames.

The father-founder of the framing analysis, Robert Entmann, counts two types of frames depending on the origins: *individual* and *media*. Individual frames according to Entman are “mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of

information” (Entman, 1993). Thus, individual frames are mental directs which determine which topics and mass media will be followed. They exhibit the preferences of a certain individual and the mass media exert their influence, hence, the mass media are to go in line with the preferences or to modify them [individual frames] in order to keep the audiences acute. Accordingly, the media should offer the imagined constructions which will be corresponding the individual’s preferences. Other researchers distinguish the frames on the principle of topics covered. In particular Shanta Iyengar defines *episodic* and *thematic*. However, the idea is the same the scholars explain that the nature of the frames will differentiate while presenting the same phenomena for different purposes. The *thematic (common)* frames are used to depict phenomena in social or collective purposes, but the *episodic (specific)* are focused on the peculiar instances. (Iyengar, 1990) The third group of scholars designate the strength of frames and, therefore, divide them into weak and strong. According to Dennis Chong and James N. Druckmann the frames could be compared and, thus, divided upon their power in competing media environment, while different narratives on the same phenomenon are being presented. A strong frame invokes to more important issues or emotions and, hence, it is more compelling. They give an example of strong and weak frames which appear while some political groups intend to hold rally with hate speech proclaimed. The hate speech entails from the idea [frame] of free speech according to supporters of the rally while the opponents have both weak and strong frames such as “rally will cause disorder and litter on streets” and “rally with hate speech threatens public order” respectively. (Chong & Druckmann, 2007).

Therefore, the target of the research is to identify the frames, which were developed, used and imposed by the RIA Novosti regarding particular phenomenon or a set of events, they are, according to the typology offered by Iyengar, are the specific or episodic ones, because they are to explain particular concept.

1.3.4. How do the frames work?

Since the media actively participate in forging social reality, accordingly, affecting individuals’ opinion, the profound scholar work on framing as a method to impact the opinions or impose someone’s ones was undertaken. The scientists define some focal modalities upon which they consider the frames shape opinion. Firstly, the frames should address the considerations which are *available* for retrieval memory, thus, the concepts should be known for the audiences. Secondly, the available

consideration causes justification and assessment only in case when it is *accessible*. The accessibility means that it [consideration] could be retrieved from long-term memory, to increase accessibility it should be chronically used. Repeated broadcasting or publishing of the frames enhance probability of the response from the audiences. Sometimes accessibility is not enough for the audiences' engagement that is why the frames should be applicable as well in terms of availability for conscious evaluation. The frame can be consciously evaluated when the audience is either strongly motivated due to different reasons for such an action, or exposed to adversarial considerations. (Eagly & Chaikin, 1993), (Higgins, King & Mavin, 1982)

Owing to the certain aforementioned modalities, which determine the success of certain coverage, in the following capitols we are to find out which perceptions the frames of the RIA Novosti were to evoke. Hence, the aforementioned components which make the considerations or frames compelling will be assessed, namely, availability, accessibility and applicability.

2. Analytical Part.

2.1. Scope of research.

The breakdown of the 2013 – 2014 brought new topics in international and regional politics which further led to the new regional order in the Eastern Europe. The protests in Ukraine sparked rapidly, developed wavily and ended bloodily. Hardly any researcher at the end of November 2013 was able to predict or assume the aftermath of the calls to come to the Independence square in Kyiv. (Chervonenko, 2013). The Euromaidan, as a nickname of the protests, appeared from the first days of standoff, and originally was used as a hashtag to simplify search on the Internet for gathering people on the Independence square in Kyiv (Hirst, 2013). Moreover, the social media, in particular, and the media as such played significant role in covering the protests. In other words, the events were profoundly covered by wide range of media outlets including the Russian ones. The struggle took place not only in streets but online as well (Barbera & Metzner, 2013). The paper is not aimed to cover the reasons and the flow of the protests, that is why the timeline of the standoff will not be explicated, but only some milestones will be dug up when it will be vital for understanding the coverage tendencies. The events on the streets may be unnecessary for comprehension, but their media interpretation is much more important, because this is the picture, which is being followed by the audience. Accordingly, the aim of the paper is to detect, unveil and release the media frames rendered to explain the Euromaidan.

As noted above, the media is a complex phenomenon: each part of it has a different audiences' share and, therefore, influence.

At first, the object of the research is state owned Russian news agency RIA Novosti (РИА Новости) which has been incorporated later into the state media holding "Rossiya Segondya" («Россия Сегодня»). The aforementioned news agency was chosen upon its influence not only amongst social media users, but also due to its essence in news making process. Firstly, the account of the RIA Novosti for last several years appeared to be one of the most cited and followed media outlets in Russian speaking segment of the Internet (Medialogija, 2015), (Volkov & Gončarov, 2014), accordingly, its frames and interpretations are able to affect the hearts and minds of the Internet users. Secondly, the RIA Novosti is a news agency, in other words it produces content being used by the professional actors of media market, hence, affects the

Russian speaking media coverage which is exceeding the territory of the Russian Federation. Thirdly, RIA Novosti is a public enterprise, therefore, it has no political deviations, thus, provides the information in accordance with the official Russia's stance.

The focal point of the research is the framing of the Euromaidan by the RIA Novosti in real time, therefore, the analyzed period starts from day one, e.g. November 21st, 2013 (Ukrainskaja pravda, 2013), (RIA Novosti, 2013) till February 20th, 2014 - when the government and the president of Ukraine disappeared, and were deposed afterwards. The research will concentrate only on framing of the street protests in Ukraine, hence, no any further events such as crises around Crimea and South-East of Ukraine.

Since the survey is aimed to define the frames, which were constructed and used by RIA Novosti for the Euromaidan events, we will use the frame analysis method which allows to discover and envisage such constructions. The source of the analytical material is a website www.ria.ru, which is owned and administered by the RIA Novosti (RIA Novosti, 2016). The research unit is unique news publication, which includes one of the lexical marker or filter: “евромайдан” (euromaidan), “протесты в Киеве” (protests in Kyiv). The technical capacities of the website allow to dig up the archive on point of the aforementioned keys presence.

The research focuses on the real time framing of the Euromaidan, therefore, the study is to be limited with the following time boundaries starting from November 21, 2013 and ending at February, 20, 2014, because these ones limit the outbreak, peak and termination of the Euromaidan in the streets of several Ukrainian cities. The dates were chosen to limit the analysis upon the real flow of events, namely, on November 21, 2013 first protesters gathered in the Independence square in Kyiv following the call in social media marked with hashtag “euromaidan”, the last day means the disappearance of almost entire government together with the president. In other words, the study is to track all the frames appeared in the RIA Novosti publications covering live the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine.

Accordingly, to extract all the massive of information the request with aforementioned key-words was compiled on the website www.ria.ru. The search

resulted in 2154² publications. However, it should be highlighted that the definition “Euromaidan” started being used by the RIA Novosti to mark the events in Ukraine only after November 25th, despite it was broadly used in western and social media. From all popped up publications all irrelevant information was excluded, for example, those which were automatically chosen by the search robot upon the key words but did not touch the topic at all³. The information represents all kinds of news: breaking news, interviews, news reports, analytical reports, debates, opinions, pictures and etc. Hence, for the evaluation wide range of actors installing the spin is scrutinized to make the frames’ patchwork which were put on the news agency agenda. Owing to the diversity of the news types and actors delivering the opinion on the Euromaidan point, the study will be focused only the contents of news, but not the background of the individuals who gave certain comment or opinion. The analysis of the contents on frames is essential for the thesis, because this was the RIA Novosti who was the channel to transmit such opinions and thoughts, and the objective of the study is to detect and envisage all the frames appeared in the news reports of the RIA Novosti.

Due to analyzing the Russian version of www.ria.ru all quotes will be translated into English below to underpin the frame. The significant scope of the material could include dubious statements and assessments, hence, to avoid misconceptions and not to provoke ambiguities, only the quotes clearly indicating the presence of certain semantic frame inside will be cited. Thus, the frame could be formed and traced upon different features, therefore, one frame will be having several attributes. Moreover, all the frames with the similar attributes to transmit will be united into groups in order to reveal different shades of the frames and make the research more structural and logical.

Interestingly, there could be noticed several tendencies. Firstly, the RIA Novosti did not translate into Russian the name of the square where the protests took place while translating other toponyms of the Ukrainian capital⁴. Despite having the equivalent in Russian “Ploshchad Nezavisimosti” (Площадь Незавимости) the editorial, for

² The results included different kinds of pieces of news which might have been published in relation of the events in Kyiv, but they did not touch the topic of the Euromaidan. This was exactly the reason why some of the articles or interviews will be not quoted or cited below to present the examples of the frames.

³ For instance the following news does not consist of any information which frames the Euromaidan, however, formally it covered the street manifestations or rallies (RIA Novosti, 2013ve)".

⁴ For the sake of simplicity and avoidance of geographical misconceptions here and after only Ukrainian versions of place-naming will be used e.g. Kyiv instead of “Kiev”, Lviv instead Lvov, Ivano-Frankivsk instead Ivano-Frankovsk and etc. All the geographical transliterations are spelled according to the provision of Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine “On harmonization of transliteration of Ukrainian language in Latin alphabet” (Postanova, 2010)

unknown reasons, pursued Russian-spelled version from Ukrainian “Maidan Nezalezhnosti” (Майдан Незалежності)” for naming Independence Square in Russian texts respectively. Secondly, the RIA Novosti broke all the information on the Euromaidan into several categories in order to simplify access. Thirdly, the intensity of reporting could be fluctuating from zero messages a day to more than 200 daily. The range of publishing depended on real development of the protests, internal and international agenda, but in any case the RIA Novosti attempted not to miss any significant developments⁵ and covered the phenomenon deeply and intensively.

The RIA Novosti tried to cover the events thoroughly from the very beginning till the very end. The news agency does its utmost to cover impartially avoiding any emotional and dubious assessments of the protests in Ukraine while reporting, however the most tangible frames of the Euromaidan could be detected when the outlet transmitted the thoughts of opinion-makers such as politicians or religious leaders. The phenomenon of Euromaidan according to the RIA Novosti is not simplified, though, its image does not lack complexity, and, furthermore, it is rather sophisticated. The Euromaidan is rendered as multifaceted issue, namely, the RIA Novosti presented such features as social basis, impact, mood, behavior, essence, interrelations or main actors of the events. Upon the analysis of the reports consisting of the key word all the frames were placed into following groups which will be displayed below in the paper as an answers to the research questions.

Concluding this part of the study it should be noted there was no task to define or detect the mood and opinion of the RIA Novosti’s coverage of Euromaidan, but the assignment was and is to catch the ideas upon which the reader or other media outlet may draw own conclusion or attitude towards the phenomenon. Therefore, the frames which were apprehended from the reports, interviews or blogs on news agency website merely render the picture of Euromaidan without giving any moral image of it, though, there will be no any attempt to evaluate the RIA Novosti’s attitude to the analyzing events. The task is to represent the multifaceted image of the Euromaidan movement which the audience could accept via the frames which the RIA Novosti forged.

⁵ However, some crucial evolvments were not covered thoroughly, but there were once mentioned only as occurred fact. Particulary, the first deaths of protesters in clashes with the law enforcement on January 19, 2014 were slightly mentioned in news reports on www.ria.ru.

2.1.1. Research questions and hypotheses.

Since the Euromaidan was totally new phenomenon for the media, there were no preliminary speculations regarding it, and, therefore, it is impossible to identify possible bias towards the Euromaidan. Accordingly, the research questions are to track possible development of the attitudes and biases expressed on the RIA Novosti's website. First of all, the Euromaidan was not only the new phenomenon to be covered, but non-internal Russian issue, thus, it is important to find out whether the Euromaidan was a substantial topic to cover on the website. Secondly, it is significant for the research to study which features were given to the Euromaidan by RIA Novosti. Thirdly, the Euromaidan was a dynamic phenomenon, though, the RIA Novosti could not miss the development of it. Fourthly, since the Euromaidan became the hot topic for politicians, the place in international politics is conceived to be significant for the research. Fifthly, being a social movement, the Euromaidan had to cause certain changes in different layers of Ukrainian society.

Research question 1: Was the Euromaidan covered profoundly on the website of RIA Novosti??

The answers to this question will reveal the entire importance of the topic in terms of editorial and the audience, respectively. This can be identified through such variables as frequency and the structuring of the information about the Euromaidan. Since the Euromaidan was covered by RIA Novosti from the beginning till the end on daily basis, the structuring of the reports on the topics will be better a indicator, because it unveils the easiness for the audience to get information about the Euromaidan.

Research question 2: What reasons evoked the Euromaidan?

Insofar the Euromaidan emerged all of a sudden, RIA Novosti made some efforts needed to expose the causes which led to the increase of the Euromaidan protests. The reasons which RIA Novosti proliferated, were to exhibit why people joined the Euromaidan and why it succeeded.

Research question 3: What features did the Euromaidan possess?

One of the most crucial questions which allows to unveil the qualitative picture of the Euromaidan through the prism of its features being the most salient according to the correspondents and interviewees of RIA Novosti. The range of features describes the Euromaidan as a social movement and how it was acting beyond. The attributes of

the Euromaidan allow to assess, which qualitative facets of the phenomenon were deemed to be crucial for the audience's assessment.

Research question 4: Was the Euromaidan an effective solution of the issues?

The Euromaidan was a response to the certain political decisions of the Ukrainian government, therefore, the demands were rather political and it became the way to pursue opposing agenda. However, it was quite an extraordinary way of political struggle that is why its eruption raised rational queries whether it was an effective and efficient way to solve Ukrainian issues.

Research question 5: Who made up the Euromaidan?

However, the Euromaidan appeared to be rather diverse social movement, therefore, the RIA Novosti was attempting to render its social and strata structure. The frames shaped by RIA Novosti were to expose the most influential forces which make the momentum of the unrest and push it forward.

Research question 6: What did the law enforcement withstand while curbing the Euromaidan's activities?

The political crisis related to the Euromaidan was followed by the frequent clashes between the police and protesters, therefore, the law enforcement was often presented in the reports. The role of the law enforcement can not be underestimated while covering the topic of the Euromaidan because the activities of law enforcement concerning cracking down on the protesters were widely covered and broadcasted by media. The police or internal forces scuffling with the Euromaidan supporters should bring or keep the values, and these values were about to counter the Euromaidan's. Hence, the opposing side should release other important media angles of the Euromaidan, and they are considered to be significant for the research.

Research question 7: How did the Ukrainian opposition influence the Euromaidan?

Needless to say that the opposition was visible during the Euromaidan events and its role should not be underestimated. However, was its role decisive for the Euromaidan or not? The question is developed and the answer consists in RIA Novosti's reports. Framing the role of Ukrainian opposition within the Euromaidan, RIA Novosti attempted to find the answers regarding the opposition's significance during time of unrests.

Research question 8: How did the Euromaidan affect the work of the Ukrainian government?

The standoff taking place in Ukraine might have affected the work of government institutions because the main purpose the Euromaidan was to persuade the government to fulfill its demands such as snap elections, dismissal the government, resume of association process and etc. The protesters used different technics which were inhibiting the work of government institutions and, therefore, it had to affect the government. Possible disruptions, interference or pressure on the government unleashed by the Euromaidan supporters, if they were any, should be underpinned by the media, in our case, by the RIA Novosti.

Research question 9: What consequences could (did) the Euromaidan cause?

Anyhow the Euromaidan was the social movement which was proclaimed to make Ukraine closer to Europe as its goal. It was clearly declared, but the European future for Ukraine was the only one of the outcomes. The development was foreseen to be more complex, that is why the aftermath of the Euromaidan was considered in RIA Novosti's reports more sophisticated as it might have deemed.

Research question 10: What role did Russia play during the Euromaidan unrest?

Covering the Euromaidan which was alien phenomenon for the Russian Federation RIA Novosti could not avoid unveiling Russian posture on the matter. This is especially true taking into consideration that RIA Novosti is a state owned media and it gave the floor for the opinions stemming from Russian officials who explicitly expressed official Russian vision of the protests.

Research question 11: Were the Western countries involved into the protests?

As it was aforementioned the Euromaidan became inter alia the topic of international politics. Ukraine appeared a hot spot of "geopolitical struggle" and, thus, there should be adversaries in such standoff. Hereby, the answer on the question should expose probable involvement into Euromaidan unrest in the way how it was framed by RIA Novosti.

Research question 12: What could the Euromaidan damage?

The Euromaidan was to move Ukraine further to Europe but it stalled the work of some institutions which could curb the institutions' functions. Hence, the unrest itself

could put pressure not only on the state agencies but on the population, meaning, the population could (might) be the primary sacrifice. Moreover, the Euromaidan could not be the action of people's consensus, therefore, it could threaten national coherence. How such menaces were framed in the reports of RIA Novosti is the answer of how the audience comprehended probable threats.

Research question 13: Was the Euromaidan an attempt to plot coup d'état?

The Euromaidan was to overturn government's decision to suspend association processes and, accordingly, it was aiming to make Ukraine and Europe closer. These objectives can be read even through the name of the movement, however, the implicit goals may differ. Such veiled goals may be framed in different ways and it is crucial how they were constructed in RIA Novosti's coverage.

Hence, the research questions establish the roadmap according to which the study is about to go. The main purpose is to identify what attributes appeared to be important for RIA Novosti in order to make them more salient for the audience. Saying about the importance for the audience, it should be mentioned that such attributes were to simplify the comprehension of the phenomenon, namely, the Euromaidan. Accordingly, without identifying all the attributes it will be problematic to see overall picture of the Euromaidan framed in RIA Novosti reports.

2.2. Framing Euromaidan

The actual analysis designed in the previous chapter overhauled all the pieces of news included the key words "Euromaidan" or "protests in Kyiv". The following outcome of the research will be presented in frames and sub-frames which RIA Novosti used while covering the events in Kyiv at the end of 2013 and beginning of 2014. The idea is to define and classify the characteristics which the news agency used to frame the Euromaidan. Evidently we will envisage and group all unveiled frames trying to depict all angles of Euromaidan according to RIA Novosti.

2.2.1. Research question 1: Was the Euromaidan covered profoundly on the website of RIA Novosti?

The depth of the Euromaidan events coverage could be traced within the variables which indicate the intentions to cover the phenomenon from different angles, uncover extensity of coverage and allege the Euromaidan to be important theme.

Firstly, it should be said that the Euromaidan as a news topic was covered by the RIA Novosti from day one till the last day, moreover, the attention to it was not sporadic, but well organized and systematic. For instance, for the purposes of Euromaidan coverage the website www.ria.ru was reorganized and, special chapter devoted to the protests, was introduced. The chapter was called “Euromaidan in Kyiv”, which simplified access to the news reports covering the protests. Furthermore, the Euromaidan was covered literally on the 24/7 basis, especially, it is evident on the examples of protests’ escalations⁶, when the coverage was vigorous during the whole day.

Secondly, regarding the extensity of the coverage it should be noted again the amount of the news being published during the analyzed period. All developments and escalations of the protests were documented and transmitted to the public, as it was mentioned above, sometimes, the quantity of the news exceeded two hundred per day. All in all the RIA Novosti published more than thousands news reports dedicated to the Euromaidan in three months.

Thirdly, the intensity of the coverage could be also proved via analyzing the actors whom the RIA’s editorial gave the floor. RIA Novosti attempted to deliver profound picture of the Euromaidan by letting different actors and opinion-makers to express the views. Inter alia the reader could find the vision of Russian politicians, Russian officials, human rights activists, Ukrainian officials and opposition activists, which allowed to receive more sophisticated depiction of the phenomenon.

Fourthly, the depth of coverage could be also proven by the resources allocated to cover the protests in Ukraine. Certainly, it is hard to estimate and assume the financial expenditures which the RIA Novosti pursued to keep the topic alive and attractive. However, upon the indirect signs it is obvious that the RIA’s management directed some extra resources such as human, temporal and technical in order to keep the audience alined to the topic and the coverage acute. The news reports on the protests were compiled by different journalists: correspondents, special reporters and analysts, accordingly, the news could be more diversified, and the reader could get different facets of the Euromaidan. As it is noted before, the Euromaidan was covered almost on 24/7 basis, thus, the RIA considered necessary to follow all the developments. The

⁶ The protests escalated several times, however, the most significant scuffles with law enforcement occurred on November 30th, December 1st, December 8th, December 11th of 2013 and January 19th and

special chapter of the website, being an example of technical resources spent, was to simplify research and direct the audience.

All stated above proves that the editorial of RIA Novosti perceived the Euromaidan to be a significant theme of media coverage, therefore, it was to be deeper discovered, which would allow to deliver more compelling information about the events. To discover and cover the protests the RIA undertook different approaches: special chapter on the front page www.ria.ru, different types of the news reports (breaking news, analytics, interviews, and etc.), different actors to deliver an opinion (politicians, experts, NGOs and etc.), extensive coverage on 24/7 basis. Therefore, it could be presumed that the Euromaidan was covered profoundly and deeply by the RIA, thus, such type of extensive and targeted coverage highlights setting up the agenda for the audience.

2.2.2. Research question 2: What reasons evoked the Euromaidan?

Insofar as the RIA Novosti was in avant-garde of media outlets covering the protests in Kyiv, it unveiled the reasons why the Euromaidan appeared as such. Certainly, as it derives from the name of the movement, the Euromaidan was forged as a remonstrative social response on suspension of all procedures aiming to sign the Association agreement with the European Union. The RIA Novosti always pinpoints the causes entailing Euromaidan but it comprehensively defines the reasons or facilitators of the rise of the protest activities in Ukraine. Accordingly there can be defined three main frames:

Euromaidan as a result of Yanukovich's indecisiveness;

Euromaidan as a result of law enforcement ignorance;

Euromaidan as a result of inadequate police reaction.

Aforementioned frames do emphasize that the Ukrainian government facilitated this crisis by weak and indistinctive communicating with own population, proclaiming uncertain political agenda, indecisively counter attacking protests or inadequately using force. Despite some frames may contradict one each other, but they exist simultaneously, because the RIA Novosti gave the opportunity to express opinion to different actors.

Euromaidan as a result of Yanukovich's indecisiveness.

February 18 – 20th of 2014. These dates the protests were covered on 24-hour basis, however, the latter one was omitted from RIA's attention

This is the most generic frame explaining the errors of the Ukrainian leadership during the protests implicitly or explicitly implying that Viktor Yanukovich had to undertake more decisive measures to address the issue, avoid procrastination and take the situation under control. The editorial developed this frame by interviewing opinion makers who highlighted unwillingness of Yanukovich to take action or failure to deliver the reasoning of certain political moves. The following quotes designate the indecisiveness in its pure form unfolding unwillingness to take action but choice to “sit snug” in troublesome time.

„The president Yanukovych possesses very few good alternatives, most likely, *he will try to sit snug* this popular indignation, but I think the opposition will not let him do it“. (RIA Novosti, 2013a).

“We can not say so far according to which scenario the events will develop, because the *Ukrainian leadership did not undertake any action* so far and Mister Yanukovich himself does not come on public, does not envisage any positions and intentions” (RIA Novosti, 2013b).

Another indecisive sub-frame is miscommunication with own population which caused the birth of Euromaidan itself meaning the leadership of Ukraine had to reveal the intentions to suspend negotiations and ground the decision but to veil secrecy on negotiations.

“These are nationwide protests but the exact amount of people discloses Yanukovich’s mistakes which he made while *privately discussed* and attempted to play on contradictions between Russia and the EU”... and “which (Yanukovich) tried to bargain *under the veil instead of explicitly and honestly inform population via media.*” — stated Kalashnikov to RIA Novosti” (RIA Novosti, 2013c).

Euromaidan as a result of law enforcement ignorance.

Second pillar frame in this group is indifferent law enforcement reaction on the Euromaidan, namely, slackness or indifference towards existing protests in Kyiv. The slackness of police and absence of harsh response on law breaches connived protesters to occupy buildings, dictate own conditions and pressure city authorities. Such frame is detected from the reports made by the RIA Novosti journalists on place

“The opponents of the current government of Ukraine remain on Independence Square in Kiev, *police in the city center is invisible*, the RIA Novosti’s correspondent reports from the scene.” (RIA Novosti, 2013d)

“*Security forces freed the territory* occupied by the night due to clearing the barricades. The protesters began to erect new barricades after the police withdrew” (RIA Novosti, 2013e).

Euromaidan as a result of inadequate police reaction.

The third frame connects police brutality with the rise of protests which can be clearly traced in the reports about Euromaidan. Police’s brutal crackdown prompted Ukrainians to join street protests, hence, to give Euromaidan more momentum. This frame is mainly derives from the comments of the political analysts or politicians. (RIA Novosti, 2013f).

“However, new Maidan become really *revolutionary only after the riot police detachment Berkut brutally dispersed* some hundreds of protesters at night of 30th of November, mainly youth”. (RIA Novosti, 2013 ue)

“Berkut’s⁷ nerves definitely could not stand anymore. As a result at night from Friday to Saturday the rally on maidan was *harshly dispersed*. In reality *there was no such necessity*. – stated Konstatin Zatulin” (RIA Novosti, 2013g)

Accordingly, the Ukrainian authorities behaved somehow erroneously while addressing street protests in late November 2013 what was pinpointed in the RIA Novosti’s reporting who framed the reasons of the rise of Euromaidan. Therefore, such developments in the very beginning were explained by the Ukrainian leadership deeds what, however, will be shaped a bit differently further.

2.2.3. Research question 3: What features did the Euromaidan possess?

Euromaidan as a spontaneous protest.

As it was mentioned above, the first protests erupted on a call in social media to come to the streets and express disagreement with government decision to suspend the Association agreement, likewise the calls were not coordinated by any political force or party, moreover, opposition called on rally later but the citizens accelerated the development by coming to streets right away as the suspension became real. In other words the opposition did not incite the protest and did not organize them in the very beginning, meaning the protests were rather spontaneous what the RIA Novosti highlighted and framed the Euromaidan as spontaneous event.

⁷ Berkut is special police force in the system of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine from 1992 till 2014 (Ukrainskaja pravda, 2014)

“Many facebook and twitter users were disappointed that opposition called on the rally on November 24th, instead calling for immediate reaction after scandalous decision. *Partial activists using social media coordinated actions and agreed to gather on Maidan in 22.00 (00.00 Moscow time)*. The rally became termless. (RIA Novosti, 2013j).

“On the rally, the leader of opposition party “Batskivshchina”, *Arseni Yatseniuk urged Ukrainians to support European future of Ukraine and come to huge rally on Sunday*” (RIA Novosti, 2013k)

Upon the messages of the RIA Novosti it became evident that the protests were not prepared in advance, furthermore, they had no leaders and partisan component from the very beginning, and protesters were few in numbers. It might have seemed the protests would not transform into the rallies of millions and they would extinct soon.

Euromaidan as a city routine.

Euromaidan became a part of the city life for almost three months in Kyiv, many issues were correlated with the protest itself, surely, it was depicted by the RIA Novosti. Euromaidan, however, was not described as a unique phenomenon of urban life and self-organization but rather as ongoing protests. Within this frame there were exhibited such qualities as frequency of the gatherings and internal routine of protests. The frequency attribute was used the most to characterize Euromaidan, the reports included such epithets like “traditional”, “regular”, “eighth” and here the examples how this variable was used.

“Several thousand people gathered on Sunday on Maidan Nezavisimosti in Kyiv where at *noon regular* national veche takes place” (RIA Novosti, 2013k)

Regular “national veche” which is being held this time under the motto “Solidarity against terror” started on Maidan “Nezalezhnosti” (Ploshchad’ Nezavisimosti) in Kyiv (RIA Novosti, 2013)

“*Traditional* national veche for the Sundays and first in 2014 is taking place in the centre of Kyiv (RIA Novosti, 2014a)

“Approximately ten thousand people took part *in eighth* national veche against politics of current Ukrainian government was held on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Ploshchad’ Nezavisimosti) in Kyiv” (RIA Novosti, 2014b)

From time to time the news popped up about the Euromaidan’s everyday activities of protesters and the mood which prevailed amongst the Euromaidan

followers. The internal dynamics of the protests was rendered via reporting about everyday needs, cooking or solving routine issues.

“Some protesters clean the territory, *others cook and serve breakfasts*. During the night new additional army tents were set up on Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Ploshchad’ Nezavisimosti)” (RIA Novosti, 2013n)

“The night on Maidan Nezalezhnosti *was calm, the protesters switched night swift and are preparing to next day, igniting fires, making coffee and tea*”. (RIA Novosti, 2013o)

Euromaidan as a persistent protest.

The persistence of Euromaidan is detected and traced upon such qualities as constant insisting on the demands, gatherings despite obstacles, erecting new barricades, resuming protests in certain areas and etc. The persistence does not mean violence, within this frame, though, only peaceful ways of standoff will be demonstrated. Often this explanation of Euromaidan overlaps with law enforcement passivity.

“Several *hundreds of protesters resumed picket* in front of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine building demanding government dismissal” (RIA Novosti, 2013p). Since the protests took place in winter in Ukraine the weather is definitely considered as an obstacles and the RIA Novosti pinpointed the weather being an obstacle which, however, did not hinder people to come. “*Strong snow which started in Kyiv on Monday’s evening, worsens visibility but people still gather* in Maidan Nezalezhosti and continue being on duty on barricades” (RIA Novosti, 2013q). “Ukrainian opposition *promises to block country seat of president Yanukovich, if he does not sack Azarov’s government within 48 hours*” (RIA Novosti, 2013r).

Euromaidan as a source of unverified information.

The protests in Ukraine became not only the phenomenon in urban life or widely covered event but also it transformed into the source of information which was to deliver to the public all actual reports about the protests in Kyiv. The news was delivered through different channels from social media to the addresses of opposition leaders. The perceptions about the biased information coming from Euromaidan are always unveiled in government’s press-releases denying statements of the Euromaidan leaders or in the statements of opposition leaders lacking proof. The government mainly dismisses the utterances about disappearances of protesters or probable crackdown, provocations. Hence, covering the Euromaidan, the RIA quoted Ukrainian officials to

disapprove the iterations of the Euromaidan leaders and the following examples of the messages trace the groundless accusations or guesses.

As one of the main target of information attacks Security service of Ukraine had to react acutely on the reports, here it denies the “accusations”. “Security Service of Ukraine *denied accusations of Batskivshchina MP Andrii Kozhemyakin* who stated that secret service officers could commit crimes” (RIA Novosti, 2013s). Sometimes the Minister of Justice addressed the public urging to behave within the existing legal framework and to stop proliferate “rumors”. “Minister of Justice Olena Lukash *called on opposition not to inflame* the situation *with rumors* about preparing provocations (RIA Novosti, 2013t). Besides the officials RIA Novosti reported the groundless statements of leaders of Euromaidan revealing potential provocations from law enforcement, e.g. “Ukrainian opposition considers that the authorities *prepare large scale provocation* in Kyiv from Saturday to Sunday, said the leader of Batskivshchina fraction Arsenii Yatseniuk to Radio “Svoboda”” (RIA Novosti, 2013u).

“On previous night the *information was being proliferated* that the authorities were preparing the crackdown. The Ministry of Internal affairs *denied this information*” (RIA Novosti, 2014c).

As it becomes evident, the Euromaidan elaborated the information policies attacking authorities and forcing them to respond. In other words the authorities had to defend themselves and always deny whatever allegations which were stemming from opposition statements.

Euromaidan as a nationalist protest.

The nationalist component appears with the leader of party “Svoboda” who was in charge of organizing the crowd on Euromaidan. Hence, while Oleh Tyahnibok (Svoboda’s leader) made statements concerning the Euromaidan, it was always underlined the party orientation calling it “nationalist” or “far-right”, therefore, the leader of nationalist party was speaking on behalf of the Euromaidan. Also this frame was often mentioned by many officials both Russian and Ukrainian, claiming the nationalists or far right forces prevailing on the Euromaidan.

“Leader of *nationalist party “Svoboda” Oleh Tyahnibok* demanded the president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich to sign the draft releasing all detained participants of the Euromaidan” (RIA Novosti, 2013v). The nationalist “marker” was used for riots description, namely, for the Lenin's statute demolition on Bessarabska square in Kyiv. “the Lenin’s statute near *the Bessarabska square was demolished* by the group of

unknown people in masks holding the flags *of nationalist party Svoboda*” (RIA Novosti, 2013w). As a reaction to the Lenin’s demolition some Ukrainian forces called Svoboda even pro-fascist party saying “the necessity to shot down the *pro-fascist organizations* became clearly evident today” (RIA Novosti, 2013x).

From time to time the nationalist frame overlaps with one describing the Euromaidan as radicals’ creation which will be disclosed below “*Radical nationalists* who participated in skirmishes with police in centre of Kyiv got out of hand of opposition” (RIA Novosti, 2014d). The nationalists sentiments could be also traced upon the symbolic features as historical personalities, flags, mottoes and etc. for instance, “activists of Euromaidan hanged up 2 meter portrait of one of the important founders of UPA (Ukrainian Rebel Army) *Stepan Bandera*⁸ on the Kyivrada⁹ building” (RIA Novosti, 2014e), “on neighboring flagstaff Ukrainian flag and *nationalist black-red one* are fluttering”, “unidentified individuals...drew statute flag in black and red colors (the colors of Ukrainian nationalists)” (RIA Novosti, 2013y).

Euromaidan as illegal protest.

Since the right of assembly is one of the fundamental civil liberties, it can be restricted upon certain reasons. The reasons must be justified by law and be rational. The Ukrainian authorities in dusk of the protests decided to use the opportunity to ban the protests in Kyiv for certain term. The regional administrative court took decision to ban any mass action in the centre of Kyiv till the early spring 2014, hence, all the protests in Kyiv were illegal. The assumption is that the decision to ban any rally in Kyiv was adopted according to the law and human rights principles. For the sake of the research the decision will not be assessed, but its existence as fact will be taken into consideration. Thus, illegality of the protests means their formal ban according to the court’s decision. The frame of illegality is traced from the news saying the fact of decision and the measures to implement it. For instance, the RIA Novosti at least twice directly referred to the restrictions for the protests reporting “state marshal read out the decision *about the ban to protest in the centre of the city*” (RIA Novosti, 2013z) or “regional administrative court *forbids any protest rallies* in the centre of Kyiv till March 8, 2014” (RIA Novosti, 2014f).

Euromaidan as a violent protest.

⁸ Stepan Bandera is perceived rather controversial figure in Eastern-European history due to his involvement into creation of the UPA which fought against Soviets after the WWII, moreover, some its members perpetrated ethnic cleansing in Western Ukraine.

The protests in Kyiv eventually turned violent. All sides accused each other in provoking violence, however, as it was framed by the RIA Novosti the violence from the police sparked further escalation of the protests. The RIA Novosti did not aim to investigate who was the first to provoke violence, but it underlined the violence as such to be one of the characteristics of the Euromaidan. The violence was actualized by different means: covering clashes, the damage after skirmishes, the injured police officers and etc. Since there was a number of escalations of violence during protests, it was emphasized that the protesters used violence to gain objectives. The Euromaidan participants could throw Molotov cocktails, stones, chemicals, kidnapped police officer and etc., thus, this was framed as display of violence. Speaking about the means of violence, the Molotov cocktails, fireworks, wooden buttons and smoking grenades were mentioned the most “[Protesters] started throwing Molotov cocktails and smoke grenades to police officers” (RIA Novosti, 2014g). Sometimes police authorities mention “unknown chemicals” “Police got information that *rally’s participants were eager to use unknown chemical* to cause burnings of police officers” (RIA Novosti, 2014h). The audience may encounter the news concerning the damage which the protesters caused “The court restrained bank accounts from which the funds were transferred to protests’ support in Kyiv within the hearings of the Trade Union federation’s suit to *compensate the damage caused the members of Euromaidan*” (RIA Novosti, 2014i).

To summarize it is to be said the violence was unambiguously framed as being the feature of the protests, namely, violent behavior from protesters’ side. It should be noted that not all the protesters resorted to the violent actions and the leadership of the Euromaidan opposed violence as means for reach goals of Euromaidan. Furthermore, this frames overlaps with the one saying the protests became chaotic and the leaders were not capable to prescribe the rules of behavior, namely, peaceful character of interactions with law enforcement.

Euromaidan as a mirror of the Orange revolution.

The Euromaidan is not the first attempt to express the demands and gain political objectives for the last decade and some political analysts, whom the RIA Novosti interviewed, did not lost an opportunity to underline some parallels between the Euromaidan and the Orange revolutions. The interviewees pinpointed the same

⁹ “KyivRada” is an Ukrainian acronym for the Kyiv City Council (author).

technologies, leaders, the same goals of two phenomena, namely “Implemented technologies and acting leaders *remind ... the events of 2004*” (RIA Novosti, 2013aa). Another example comparing the Euromaidan with Orange revolution utters “*Events in Kyiv painfully remind “orange revolution” of 2004... protesters occupied the Kyiv State City Administration and the House of Trade Unions*” (RIA Novosti, 2013ba).

Accordingly, the Euromaidan and the Orange revolution were the links of the same chain for some meaning the organizers embarked the same methods, the same people governed the processes, nearly the same objectives were on place but for others Euromaidan was totally different movement in its essence, due to its different purposes, mobilizing forces and demands.

2.2.4. Research question 4: Was the Euromaidan an effective solution of the issues?

The next set of frames which were developed by the RIA’s editorial considers Euromaidan as an organism or entity which is characterized by certain patterns of behavior. Regarding the character of patterns the RIA depicts them mainly through the disobedience and radicalism. The below mentioned frames were extracted mainly from the interviews of the Ukrainian politicians and political analysts.

Radicals and extremists rule on Euromaidan

The following quotes underline the weaknesses of moderate opposition which was incapable of controlling the crowds and did not cope with the radicalization of the Euromaidan. Radical demands and radical deeds deterred the normalization of the standoff according to the experts and politicians, thus, they [the radicals] led the crowds and opposition to the violent dead end.

"Tonight I got information that *radically* inclined forces in approximately of 300 individuals, armed with sticks, upon the command of radically inclined politicians can use violence towards police officers” (RIA Novosti, 2013ca). “Certain *extremist inclined forces* hamper settling down political situation in Ukraine who (forces) should be excluded from forging the agenda of settling the situation, stated the Prime minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov” (RIA Novosti, 2013ea). Obviously not all protesters supported straight and sometimes radical ways of dealing with the government, therefore, the RIA Novosti depicted such a rift within the Euromaidan. Moreover, the split between radicals and moderates was underpinned with the statements saying that opposition lost control over the crowds: “...*liberal opposition lost control* on crowd

because it did not satisfy *radical demands* of its former supporters” (RIA Novosti, 2014j). Furthermore, the pattern of extremists or radicals ruling on the Euromaidan was mentioned repeatedly in connection with the seizure of administrative buildings or possession of weapons. For instance, on January 19, 2014 the RIA Novosti reported that “*Extremists smash administrative buildings, cease weapons, kill police officers and threaten military and law enforcement officers*” (RIA Novosti, 2014k).

Euromaidan as destructive way of solving problems

More generic opinion was that the Euromaidan as such was a destructive way of solving issues. It was underlined in the pieces of information that street protests were the wrong path to address the problems.

“I am sure that today all decisions *must be adopted here – in Verkhovna Rada but not on maidans (squares)*” (RIA Novosti, 2013fa). The opinion of Ukraine being divided on the question of the Euromaidan protests often popped up, namely, it was much reiterated that “while *the west of Ukraine* was on strike and set up “maidans”, *Donetsk region continued living calmly and work* for country’s good despite of any political scrapes (RIA Novosti, 2013ga)

Hence, according to the opinions which the RIA’s editorial gave the floor, the Euromaidan supporters did not seek compromises and were eager to fight the government in the streets but in the framework of state institutions. The intractability may overlap with the ones which will be described below such as “interrelations with the government”, “interrelations with law enforcement” but the crucial idea to distinguish the intractability was to depict this feature separately owing to its significance for the RIA and its experts.

2.2.5. Research question 5: Who made up the Euromaidan?

The important part of the RIA’s coverage of the protests in Ukraine was to define social classes or groups who represented the driving force of the Euromaidan. The Euromaidan was conceived as all-Ukrainian social movement, however, the RIA attempted to define the most influential stratas or characterize them according to their behavior. The crucial actors upon the RIA were students, inhabitants of western regions and criminals. The frames describing the social architecture of the protests can be traced through the whole coverage of the protests. The students became so important in sparking and supporting the protests that even the president of Ukraine met with the *representatives of student community* (RIA Novosti, 2013ha).

Students as a driving force of Euromaidan.

“*Students of National pedagogical University of Dragomanov supported the call of opposition to join the nationwide strike*” (RIA Novosti, 2013ia).

“*Approximately 500 students of Kyiv National university of Shevchenko headed to the Ministry of education and science. On the way over the protesters distributed to passersby the leaflets calling on to join Euromaidan*” (RIA Novosti, 2013ka)

Westerners as a driving force of Euromaidan.

The western regions of Ukraine are often associated to be the cradle of the Euromaidan and the Orange revolution. Within the reporting about street protests in Ukraine the trace of western regions can be easily tracked. Interestingly, the West of Ukraine is shown as a consolidated entity where the state institutions and citizens support Euromaidan openly.

“*The activists of western-Ukrainian regions of Lviv and Chernivtsi on Wednesday will head to Kyiv to support protesters on Independence Square*” (RIA Novosti, 2013la). Speaking about consensus between state officials and citizens in the west of the country because the RIA Novosti reported “*the Ivano-Frankivsk regional council deputies headed on “termless session” with protesters on “Euromaidan” in Kyiv said during the veche the secretary of Ivano-Frankivsk regional council Vasyl Skrypnychuk*” (RIA Novosti, 2013ma). The inhabitants of the western regions, namely, the Lviv region opposed the government so much that some of them being “*the activists of “Euromaidan” had been blocking the bases of “Berkut” and interior ministry troops in Lviv for two days in order to bar them of moving to Kyiv, where the skirmishes between opposition supporters and law enforcement did not stop since January, 19.*” (RIA Novosti, 2014lk). Underlining the assumed role of the western regions in endorsing the protests, the opinions of regional split surfaced in the reports, namely, it was stated that “*the action on the Independence Square in Kyiv convoked only representatives from three western regions of Ukraine, it does not represent the interests of the whole country*” (RIA Novosti, 2014l).

Euromaidan consists of criminals.

Framing the criminals as integral part of the Euromaidan, the RIA Novosti reported about crimes and law breaches which had been committed by the Euromaidan followers. The increase of reports regarding criminal deeds of the Euromaidan, obviously, was during violent scuffles with the law enforcement. The protesters were accused in riots or damaging property. “*The police opened investigation on article*

“riots” in connection of demolition of Lenin’s monument on Besarabska square in the centre of Kyiv” (RIA Novosti, 2013na)

Several reports were made covering the statements of General Prosecutor’s Office or spokesperson of Prime Minister saying that blocking of administrative buildings called the crimes such as interference into the activities of state institutions. “According to the General Prosecutor’s office “such deeds and blocking of state body work *are law violations*” (RIA Novosti, 2013oa). The Ukrainian authorities openly call the protesters being criminals because “*blocking the work of Cabinet of Ministers or other state agencies is crime*”... said the spokesperson of the Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitali Luk’yanenko” (RIA Novosti, 2013pa). The editorial stresses the criminal character of protesters’ attempts to storm the administrative buildings “Kyiv police *filed 11 criminal cases* in connection with opposition supporters’ attempts to storm the building of President’s Administration, *nine suspects were detained*” (RIA Novosti, 2013qa).

However, there were some reports unveiling the crimes inside the Euromaidan itself. For instance, “the *police saved from the lynch law individual* who was suspected by *the Euromaidan supporters* in stealing money” (RIA Novosti, 2013ra) or “criminal case was opened in connection with the stealing of things and documents in Kyiv city administration building which had been occupied by Euromaidan activists” (RIA Novosti, 2014m).

Framing the criminal component of the Euromaidan, the RIA Novosti reposted the statements of Ukrainian law enforcement and politicians who claimed that the protesters were armed. Hence, the attribute of possessing weapons pointed on two features: illegality of possessing arms and violent character of protest. This attribute is widely used while reporting the events in Kyiv. Inter alia the RIA Novosti quoted Ukrainian Ministry of Internal affairs who claimed “*that radicals during the clashes use firearms*” or the same institution reiterated that “opposition MPs arm “*self-defense detachments*” they distribute two-meter wooden sticks with metal ferrules” (RIA Novosti, 2014n).

Defining the social elements that participated in the activities related to the Euromaidan, the RIA Novosti made connections with the character of protests implying that the violence and criminal disobedience would become intrinsic features of the protests. Moreover, the instigators and facilitators of the protests were clearly named e.g. the dwellers of western regions of Ukraine. Such interrelations created perception

that Euromaidan was not the Ukraine-wide protest but conspired and inspired in the West of the country.

Insofar the Euromaidan acted in reality, it could, therefore, affect the activities of many actors around and beyond. The Euromaidan disrupted habitual name of the game, thus, it established new principles upon which the agencies or the entities behaved with the Euromaidan. Accordingly the impact which the Euromaidan had onto such actors evoked the shifts in work and the RIA Novosti attempted to depict these changes regarding the encounter with the Euromaidan. Speaking about the most affected social institutions it should be noted that the most one is law enforcement due to evident reasons such as the character of protests. Thus, the character of “interrelations” between the affected side and the Euromaidan could be comprehended through the frames depicting the differences, the impact, the involvement and contraposition.

2.2.6. Research question 6: What the law enforcement withstand while curbing the Euromaidan’s activities?

As it was noted above the law enforcement and especially the Ukrainian police was the most affected institution by the Euromaidan. For this very reason the law enforcement or “siloviki” were distinguished into separate group of frames developed and spread by the editorial. The two frames were detected during the research and they cover two main angles (aims) of police behavior: the order and the law.

Police counters Euromaidan’s turmoil.

Summarizing the facet of order the following feature was defined that “*police counters Euromaidan's turmoil*”. In accordance with the reports framing the police countering the mess, the editorial stresses on the mess or disorder as a consequence of Euromaidan supporters’ activities while erecting barricades, blockings and disrupting regular urban life. The RIA Novosti underlines in several pieces of news that this was the police who turned messed streets into the normal condition.

“From Monday’s evening and during the whole Tuesday night law enforcement *cleared blocked central city streets of protesters’ barricades* pushing people to Maidan of Nezalezhnost (Independence Square)” (RIA Novosti, 2013sa). “The law enforcement *cleared the terrain* in the street of Shelkovichnaya in Kyiv where the clashes between the radicals and the officers of spetsnaz “Berkut”” (RIA Novosti, 2014o). Whereas the police worked on establishing order and cleanness in the streets of Kyiv it did not restrict civil liberties, as the interior ministry says. “The officers of Interior Ministry

troops and spetsnaz “Berkut” *do not disperse protesters* but they provide the work of communal services in demolishing barricades and clearing traffic way of tents” (RIA Novosti, 2013ta)

Needless to say that the blocking and barricades limited the work of several state agencies which will be covered more below and the law enforcement countering the disorder and clearing the streets were turning urban life to normal as the Ukrainian authorities underlined (RIA Novosti, 2013ua).

Police’s violence as a defensive measure.

Since the very beginning the police became the key player in the Euromaidan related protests, moreover, the police violence was the key factor which was widely discussed by many stakeholders. Hardly anyone explicitly approved violence whether this was the president of Ukraine, the Ukrainian opposition or the representative of the U.S. Department of State but the explanations of the violence differed. The RIA Novosti relied chiefly on the reports of Ukrainian authorities who were transmitting the concept of “violence as a defensive measure”. Ukrainian officials acknowledged the fact of police’s brutality, brought apologies, condemned violence and promised thorough inquiry but they always stressed on that the police was provoked for violent response. Hence, the provocations from Euromaidan supporters was a reason of a violent crackdown. The violence as a defensive measure appeared some days before the actual crackdown on 01.12.2013, namely, the minister of Interior, M. Zakharchenko mentioned “I entrusted police officers and servants of spetsnaz detachment “Berkut” with a task not yield on provocations and behave staunchly. The cases which could be an exception are when they *were attacked and had to use special equipment*” (RIA Novosti, 2013va).

Utterances of violence being provoked by “*some groups of people who were behind the peaceful citizens*” (RIA Novosti, 2013 wa) state that the violence was inevitable in order to protect law and order, and anyhow the lawlessness of the violence was the object of official investigation. Furthermore, the frame was underpinned by the reports of dismissal of Kyiv police department who confessed to be the initiator of protests’ dispersal while reiterating that the violence was provoked by the Euromaidan supporters¹⁰.

¹⁰ The head of Kyiv police department, Valeriy Koryak, resigned due to the critics over the violent crackdown on the protests on the Independence square in November, 2013 (RIA Novosti, 2013 xa)

The police right to use force while protecting law and order was framed mainly upon the reports from official Ukrainian sources which openly condemned police brutality however mentioning that these were the protesters who did not obey lawful police demands and instigated the usage of force.

2.2.7. Research question 7: How did Ukrainian opposition influence on the Euromaidan?

However the Euromaidan appeared some days before the calls of the Ukrainian opposition to protest against Ukrainian government's decision to suspend the association process with the EU, the leaders of various political groups joined the protest. The most powerful opposition forces which joined the protest were "Batskivshchina", "Udar", "Svoboda". It goes without saying that despite uniting under the flags of the European integration all political forces had their own agendas and, accordingly, advocated them in the streets. The editorial of the RIA Novosti did not neglect to depict such political activities.

Tymoshenko as a leader of Euromaidan

Long before the events in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 the leader of the party "Batskivshchina", Yuliya Tymoshenko was convicted for abuse of power and sentenced to seven year imprisonment (The Telegraph, 2012). However, Yuliya Tymoshenko was persecuted on political motives rather than criminal wrongdoings according to the EU, that is why the "Tymoshenko's case" was raised during the negotiations regarding the association. Being in behind bars she remained the leader of parliament party and therefore played significant role in Ukrainian politics. In time of protests the spirit of Ms. Tymoshenko was constantly flying over the Independence Square in Kyiv and the RIA Novosti framed Tymoshenko as a leader of the protests, at least as a spiritual one. Yuliya Tymoshenko was the one who called the Ukrainians to join the protests "Yuliya Tymoshenko suggests that the chances of Ukraine for the European future were not lost yet and urges all citizens and opposition forces to continue struggle" (RIA Novosti, 2013ya) Also the RIA Novosti underlined that jailed leader of Batskivshchina introduced plans to overcome crisis¹¹ thus even being in jail Tymoshenko influenced the protests and the Euromaidan according to the RIA Novosti.

¹¹The protests were considered to last unless Ukrainian government satisfy the demands of protesters. The demands were straight and rigid: to release all political prisoners, put mister Zakharchenko and some guilty police officers under criminal investigation, government's resignation and signing the association agreement (RIA Novosti, 2013za)

Since Tymoshenko was crucial figure in the Euromaidan her life in prison was closely followed by the editorial, hence, the visits of prominent politicians to the correctional facility were reported to the audience¹². Moreover, Batskivshchina leader started hunger strike in protest of association agreement and her health became the point of national concern as a “national leader”¹³ and the Ukrainians “need her alive and healthy”.

Destructive role of opposition in Euromaidan

Since Yuliya Tymoshenko governed opposition, she introduced the plans and urged avoiding any compromises with the government, the opposition hindered the processes in crisis’ mitigation. The editorial framed destructive role of opposition and destructive role of the Euromaidan, respectively. For instance, this was opposition who called on citizens to oppose government’s decision of association process suspension urging “citizens to come on November, 24th on the rally” (RIA Novosti, 2013bb). This was also opposition MPs who use inadequate measures in parliamentary process causing Verkhovna Rada¹⁴ or other institutions’¹⁵ sessions’ disruption “MPs from opposition block with a chair the door through which the leadership of Verkhovna Rada enters to presidium” (RIA Novosti, 2013cb). The destructive role of solving the issues is evident when the RIA’s correspondents reported about behavior of the opposition in negotiation process with Yanukovich namely the Klitschko’s exit from the negotiation process which was called “*unwise*”¹⁶. Moreover, Ukrainian opposition pursued demands which disabled the Government’s capacities to address the issues adequately and thoroughly.

Hence, the opposition and its leaders, as it entails from the RIA’s, reports did not seek opportunities to find the way out from standoff, but it took the lead of the protests to earn more political dividends. It used the Euromaidan platform to advocate own political agenda and therefore the opposition’s leadership just escalated the plight. The lack of tractability and own political vision were the causes of turning the stalemate to

¹²The head of parliamentary fraction of Batskivshchina, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, was attacked in Kharkiv while visiting Yulia Tymoshenko in prison (RIA Novosti, 2014p)

¹³ The Euromaidan called on Yulia Tymoshenko to halt hunger strike because the health of national leader is a point of national concern (RIA Novosti, 2013ab)

¹⁴ Opposition disrupts parliament’s session to pursue its demands to put on the agenda: inter alia to set joint parliamentary commission aimed to probe the usage of violence by police (RIA Novosti, 2014q)

¹⁵ Opposition blocked and then disrupted the work of Kyiv city council (RIA Novosti, 2013db)

¹⁶ The head of the Council of National Security of Ukraine blamed Ukrainian opposition in igniting violence and deterring the reconciliation processes with refusal to sit behind the negotiation table (RIA Novosti, 2014r).

worse. Though, the side imposing own rules and principles not addressing the aforementioned causes can be easily blamed in deteriorating the situation.

2.2.8. Research question 8: How did the Euromaidan affect the work of Ukrainian government?

The protests related to the Euromaidan were desperate response to the government's decision to suspend association negotiations with the EU. The Euromaidan became the issue which had to be addressed, especially, when the escalations took place. Accordingly, the government was inclined to tackle the Euromaidan issue and this struggle was depicted and framed in the following models. In the following set of frames there will be defined approaches or principles upon which the Ukrainian authorities were going to solve the situation. Generally speaking, the frames explain which measures (concessions, promises or ideas) the authorities undertook to mitigate crisis aftermath and which principles they use while tackling the plight.

The RIA Novosti did not evaluate positively or negatively the usage of certain approaches, however, it did not release the foundations of them as it was in the previous set of frames concerning opposition involvement into the Euromaidan.

Ukrainian authorities seek compromises.

Uttering the principles which the authorities took into account to ease the situation inside country, the main was to find common ground, therefore the RIA Novosti framed any offers which could bring some kind of an agreement to the table and could satisfy all sides. It goes without saying that the partner in negotiations was Ukrainian opposition as it was influencing force in the Euromaidan events. Speaking about particular moves to find compromises and sign a win-win agreement, the Ukrainian officials use several approaches such as meetings with the EU officials (RIA Novosti, 2013eb) reassuring the "*European choice of Ukraine*"¹⁷, issuing statements like "*creation of commissions to implement the association agreements*" (RIA Novosti, 2013gb). The measures were undertaken to dismiss the arguments stating that Yanukouch's team failed the European path of Ukraine. The second way to ease the situation and to fulfill the demands of protesters was to thoroughly investigate the crackdown on the Euromaidan at night December 2013, 1. This component of the frame

¹⁷Viktor Yanukovich reaffirmed that Ukraine would sign association agreement during the meeting with the head of the EU diplomacy, Catherine Ashton (RIA Novosti, 2013fb).

was constructed with several reports about the real steps to find culprits in committing violent protesters' dispersal. Such messages could consist of proposals coming from Ukrainian officials to create "*trilateral group*" (RIA Novosti, 2013gb) to investigate all the circumstances¹⁸ of the police dispersal at that night or of news about real dismissals of high rank officials¹⁹ or police officers²¹ accused of involvement in plotting the crackdown. Additional measure to satisfy protesters was government's decision to release the inmates detained after the riots and consecutive Lenin's monument demolition. Even president Yanukovich had to speak out about the fates of these detainees stating that "*we should turn the page and declare amnesty*" (RIA Novosti, 2013pb). The thorough, transparent and unbiased inquiry of the crackdown was one of the key demands of the Euromaidan, and even the president of Ukraine was to go through the results of the inquest²², moreover Viktor Yanukovich stated that the police officers "*made the cup run over*" (RIA Novosti, 2013rb) and the authorities were "*unaware of such operation*" (RIA Novosti, 2013sb).

Promising the transparent probe and condemning violence, the authorities intended to distance themselves from the violent action of the police, thus, to present themselves as credible guarantors of peace and stability. Indeed the Euromaidan was a sensitive issue inside the country. It irritated the authorities and created instability which the government had to deal carefully with, to make the steps which would not harm any position. All these measures were to find common ground necessary for further talks with adversary opposition forces that were considered orchestrating the Euromaidan. The negotiations were to find solution of the stalemate in which Ukrainian political elites appeared to be at that time.

Ukrainian authorities support negotiations.

The concept of reciprocal concessions which could be reached via direct negotiations between all stakeholders was declared and offered by the Ukrainian officials implying that the government was eager to find mutually beneficial solution.

¹⁸The minister of Interior of Ukraine was interrogated by the General Prosecutor's Office to set up all the circumstances of the crackdown on the protests (RIA Novosti, 2013ib)

¹⁹ The General Prosecutor's Office reported the head of Kyiv city administration would be sacked (RIA Novosti, 2013mb).

²⁰ The spokesperson of Ukrainian Ministry of Justice uttered that three high rank officials would be put under investigation in connection with the violent crackdown on protests (RIA Novosti, 2013nb).

²¹ The silloviki who were involved into the protests' dispersal will be dismissed according to the former Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk (RIA Novosti, 2013ob).

²² Ukrainian president promised to make certain decisions upon the results of official probe according to the head of Regions party's fraction in parliament (RIA Novosti, 2-13qb).

Moreover, the claims regarding the negotiations come not only from executive branch but also from the parliamentary faction of the ruling Party of Regions²³. However, the idea of round table appeared not in the cabinets of incumbent government officials but was released by the first Ukrainian president Leonid Kravchuk²⁴. The President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich uttered that “in his opinion such *round table will be able to become the platform for understanding*” (RIA Novosti, 2013vb). Hence, the reports, unveiling the readiness of the Ukrainian government to hold direct negotiations with the opposition, reveal their willingness to talk to each other face to face and therefore to deal with crisis together with the opponents which would facilitate faster crisis’ resolution.

Opposition offers government radical remedies.

Notwithstanding the ruling elites were offering the compromise exits from the plight, the opposition forces and the Euromaidan insisted on more radical remedies. The crisis was on the stage where interim decisions did not answer the main questions such as political accountability of the officials and who was responsible for the actions of the law enforcement. This could be an answer why such interim or compromise decisions were not supported by the opposition. The political battles over government’s acceptance or denial of the remedies were witnessed by the correspondents of the RIA’s editorial. The opposition, as it was mentioned in previous chapter, behaved unconstructively when it disrupted the parliament’s sessions, blocked administration buildings and etc. At meantime some independent MPs released their own vision on crisis’ remedies and inter alia there were three crucial around which harsh debates occurred²⁵.

Firstly, the protesters in the streets demanded to sack the Cabinet, and this call was underpinned by the opposition leaders and opinion-makers in Ukraine. For instance, ex-president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, in interview to the RIA Novosti, stated that “if the government reckoned this situation and resigned, and the president accepted this decision, which corresponded the situation, the people would understand it” (RIA Novosti, 2013xb) Moreover, the opposition leaders were reiterating that even

²³ The head of the Party of Regions’ faction in Verkhovna Rada claimed that the party was ready to start negotiations with the opposition to settle the crisis (RIA Novosti, 2013tb)

²⁴ The round table was offered and called by the first Ukrainian president, Leonid Kravchuk, who uttered that the participation of incumbent Ukrainian leader had not been perceived, but depending on the situation the president could join it, if it would facilitate the solution (RIA Novosti, 2013ub).

the resignation of the Minister of Interior Affairs and forging the interim government would mitigate the degrees of tensions²⁶. Retreat from the positions was made even by the prime minister, who said to have the ideas to reshuffle the Cabinet²⁷. Besides, the restart of government, the Euromaidan leaders were insisting on the snap elections and constitutional amendments as a remedies of the crisis. The introduction of the aforementioned demands, despite they were pegged to each other, was inconsistent. Firstly, the deputy head of Batskivshchina uttered “it is *possible to exit from the crisis* only by holding *snap parliamentary and presidential elections*” (RIA Novosti, 2013ac). The connection between these remedies entailed from the Euromaidan demands including the necessity to return the Constitution of 2004 which had different form of rule. Naturally, the officials opposed this kind of proposals and the speaker of Verkhovna Rada, Volodymir Rybak said that “there are no legal grounds for snap elections” (RIA Novosti, 2013bc). Furthermore, the opposition attempted to push non-confidence vote in parliament in order to hold snap elections but that failed.

Evidently, the adversaries did all the best to push their demands forward, e.g. Ukrainian government intended to avoid further escalations and confrontation via introducing reciprocally beneficial ways to solve the issues, but the opposition did stand for hardly feasible “snap elections strategy”. However, the frames, which were forged and widely transmitted by the RIA Novosti, envisaged this battle of agendas as a struggle for power, mainly, but not as the implementation of the people’s demands. The trace and the roots of the opposition demands are hardly distinguishable from the messages of the RIA Novosti, but it is obvious, that the constant reminding about them overshadowed the work of parliament and government at that time.

2.2.9. Research question 9: What consequences could (did) the Euromaidan cause?

Obviously, if the phenomenon was to be tackled by the leadership of the country it had huge impact on the state, society and economy of Ukraine and needless to say that

²⁵ A group of MPs with former speaker Volodymir Litvin signed the bill upon which Azarov’s government had to resign, Ukraine should immediately resume negotiations with Russia and at meantime sign agreement with the EU on visa free travels for the Ukrainians (RIA Novosti, 2013wb)

²⁶ Yuriy Lutsenko suggested that transition government would be the best option to overcome the crisis because it would allow the opposition and ruling elites to find common ground while the interim government was managing everyday issues of Ukraine and was preparing snap elections (RIA Novosti, 2013yb).

²⁷ Mykola Azarov released plans to reshuffle the government in the beginning of the 2014th (RIA Novosti, 2013zb)

the Euromaidan, as a social phenomenon, touched many layers of Ukrainian society and state. Its interference into Ukrainian was hard to underestimate, that is why its aftermath could not be neglected or avoided by the media. The RIA Novosti is no exception in this case because the subject of the Euromaidan was extremely important for the audience of the RIA Novosti. Since the Euromaidan was Ukraine-wide phenomenon, it should have traced through the different spheres of Ukrainian life. Insofar the Euromaidan was crucial topic to cover for the RIA Novosti, its influence the certain spheres of Ukrainian life had to be framed in a certain ways to be better understood by the audience.

It goes without saying that the RIA Novosti had no objective to define all the layers and spheres which were impacted by the Euromaidan, but it framed the most significant for its own audiences. Insofar the Euromaidan could be interesting for the audience of the RIA only from selected angles, though, the aftermath on them was specified and covered the most. Consequently, the reader of the RIA Novosti could notice the outcome of the Euromaidan on the following spheres of Ukrainian life: communal services issues, social divisions, political split and Eastern-Crimean issue.

Euromaidan as a cause of communal disorder.

To frame the Euromaidan as a cause of mess and disorder, the RIA Novosti used the various attributes, which discover and describe that before the Euromaidan such undesirable issues did not happen. The first such attribute is shortcomings of certain goods such as cash in ATMs, paper glasses and goods in stores around the Independence square, for instance, the RIA reported at 01.12.2013 that “On Maidan in Kyiv the ATMs ran out of cash and shops ran out of goods” (RIA Novosti, 2013cc).

The second attribute was connected to closure of certain institutions or agencies owing to the Euromaidan. Inter alia the RIA Novosti mentioned the shops and boutiques which were closed because the marketers feared of “*cracking down on the Euromaidan*” (RIA Novosti, 2013dc). Thus, the Euromaidan indirectly evoked the decrease of security certainty amongst business actors. Direct impact on order situation can be traced in reports informing the blockings of government’s buildings which entailed into government’s work disruption. The spokesperson, who was quoted, by the RIA Novosti stated “it’s far from certain that all the attendants will get into” (RIA Novosti, 2013ec). Even the opposition forces acknowledged that the disruption of government’s work created inconveniences for the Kyiv inhabitants.²⁸ Moreover, according to the reports

²⁸ Klitschko’s party “Udar” brought apologies for government’s neighborhood blockade (RIA Novosti, 2013fe)

from the RIA's website, the Euromaidan was causing the disruptions of schooling process and some schools with a certain proximity to "*the street actions*"²⁹ had to adjust to the status quo and "*will be getting homework via internet*" (RIA Novosti, 2013gc)

The third facet of this frame is that the Euromaidan entailed excessive amount of garbage in the streets of Kyiv after its activities³⁰, furthermore, the activists of the Euromaidan "*beat the participants of peaceful rally "For clean Kyiv"*" (RIA Novosti, 2014t), thus, the Euromaidan not only caused the trash in the streets of Ukrainian capital but also instigated hatred towards people who were trying to make Kyiv cleaner.

Fourthly, the Euromaidan was causing the public transport issues, especially, the underground. Needless to say that dysfunction in subway work evokes the inconveniences for citizens, especially, when the metro is one of the key means of transportation in the city having more than two million inhabitants. The pieces of news covering the stories about metro stations closure near the Euromaidan due to "*the allegations of bomb planting*"³¹ were frequent. It should be noted that metro was not the only means of transportation^{32,33} which work was sporadically disrupted during the times of Euromaidan.

The Euromaidan became a part of urban landscape and certainly it could disrupt, break and disturb some elements of city life, and such disturbances were distinguished to frame the impact which the Euromaidan had. Accordingly, the protesters were interrupting the city lifelines, and the rules which, therefore, could be inconvenient, uncomfortable and even dangerous³⁴

Euromaidan as a divisive movement.

The roots of the protest in Ukraine at that time go to the suspension of the association agreement process, however the reasons of the government's decision to halt negotiations were disclosed to the population indistinctly. Surely, there could or should have been supporters of such government's move, and, therefore, they could have been

²⁹ Some schools located in the Kyiv city had to transfer to distance studying owing to street protests (RIA Novosti, 2013gc).

³⁰ Community services had to clean up the streets of extra rubbish caused by the protests (RIA Novosti, 2013hc).

³¹ Several news reports covering metro stations' work disruption in close proximity of the Euromaidan appeared on the website from time to time. (RIA Novosti, 2013ic and 2013jc)

³² All railway stations in Kyiv were closed on December 11, 2013 due to the reports of possible bomb planting (RIA Novosti, 2013kc)

³³ On December 11, 2013 the personnel and passengers were evacuated from two Kyiv airports because of probable terrorist attacks (RIA Novosti, 2013lc)

³⁴ Ministry of public health urges the Euromaidan supporters not to disrupt the work of the city emergency services (RIA Novosti, 2013mc).

rather discontent with the eruption of the unrest in big Ukrainian cities especially when such protests would bring more instability to different spheres of Ukrainian life.

Building the narrative of the Euromaidan being the movement or protest which divides nation the RIA Novosti distinguished several characteristics pinpointing the presence of opposition to the Euromaidan.

Firstly, the RIA shared opinions of political analysts or politicians stating that “the protests in Kyiv do *not represent the moods of the whole society*” (Leonid Slutskiy – the head of Gosduma department for affairs with the CIS) (RIA Novosti, 2013oc). Another example depicting the angle says “the government *relies on the majority* of the population of Ukraine” (RIA Novosti, 2013pc). Furthermore, according to the Ukrainian Prime minister quoted by the RIA Novosti only thirty per cent supported the Association agreement (RIA Novosti, 2013qc). Sometimes to set up this paradigm the RIA Novosti proliferated the statements of “social activists” and “ordinary citizens” who expressed support to the government’s refusal of signing the Association accord³⁵.

Secondly, the pattern of divisions is noticed in covering counter-protests across Ukraine. The protests were mostly “to express support of Ukrainian government” and they were held mainly in Eastern³⁶ and Southern parts of Ukraine³⁷ including Crimea³⁸³⁹. The venues for the counter-Euromaidan protests were often chosen near the places where the Euromaidan took place⁴⁰⁴¹. Sometimes even the views of Euromaidan evoked violent response from the adversaries⁴². Hence, using the motives of “antimaidan”, as they were called, foster the perception of political situation in Ukraine as being a bit tense.

Thirdly, while framing the Euromaidan as divisive movement, the RIA Novosti published multiply on the topic about the rejection of the Euromaidan by political elites in the East of the country. The local parliaments called sessions in connection with the

³⁵ RIA Novosti reports about mails and declarations made by several representatives of civil society and NGOs, namely, the organizations “Roditel'skiy Komitet” (Parents’ Committee) and the Union of organizations of Ukrainian invalids”, which endorsed government’s decision to suspend negotiations with the EU on association agreement (RIA Novosti, 2013nc).

³⁶ Two rivalrous (pro and against government) rallies took place in Kharkiv on January 12, 2014 (RIA Novosti, 2013u)

³⁷ Rally of fifteen thousand participants in support of Viktor Yanukovich took place in Donetsk (RIA Novosti, 2013re)

³⁸ Pro-Yanukovich rally was held in Crimean city of Simferopol (RIA Novosti, 2013rc)

³⁹ <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981356883.html>

⁴⁰ Pro-government supporters hold rally in front of Verkhovna Rada whereas the Euromaidan rally took place nearby (RIA Novosti, 2013sc).

⁴¹ Pro- and antigovernment rallies were held in Odesa on the same venue (RIA Novosti, 2013tc)

events in Kyiv to express concern about the future of Ukraine⁴³. The rejection could appear in “*condemnation of the Euromaidan activities in Kyiv*” as it happened in Kharkiv, where the deputies of local council expressed their opinion in official statement⁴⁴ and city council banned all rallies due to the “*influenza outbreak*” (RIA Novosti, 2013xe). The editorial of the news agency covered profoundly such deeds and statements of the local councils.

All the reports about such sessions in the East of Ukraine contained one important component calling on Viktor Yanukovich to act more decisively in relation to the protests in Kyiv^{45,46}. As an opposition to the aforementioned calls one remarkable thing should be uttered, and this was Yanukovich’s statement on probable criminal investigation for separatist calls in the West of Ukraine meaning the support of Euromaidan by regional councils⁴⁷. The actions of some western municipalities, namely, Ivano-Frankivsk regional council, which refused to follow official policies of the central government and openly endorsed the Euromaidan, revealed certain governance’s disorder between regional and central powers.

Fourthly, the most significant angle of this frame was the statements revealing that Ukraine was on the edge of split due to the Euromaidan. The Euromaidan was not merely supported by all the Ukrainians and that is why it aggravated the grievances existing in the Ukrainian society. The idea that the Euromaidan was causing the national split underlined by many policy-makers such as the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church⁴⁸, different Russian analysts and the Ukrainian President⁴⁹. Moreover, the RIA Novosti initiated the special reports with the topic of possible “*civil war*” because of the tensions evoked by the Euromaidan, and the positive resolution of the crisis seems to be unfeasible according to the RIA’s correspondents⁵⁰ saying that “even some

⁴² Unidentified individuals demolished tent camp of the Euromaidan supporters in Odesa (RIA Novosti, 2013uc).

⁴³ Luhansk regional council convoked deputies to discuss current situation in the country (RIA Novosti, 2013vc).

⁴⁴ Kharkiv council condemned the deeds of the Euromaidan supporters (RIA Novosti, 2013wc).

⁴⁵ Crimea regional council called on Yanukovich to undertake decisive measures and restore law and order in the country (RIA Novosti, 2013 xc).

⁴⁶ Donetsk regional council urged president Yanukovich to take situation in Kyiv under control (RIA Novosti, 2013yc)

⁴⁷ Ukrainian president warned the leaders of Western Ukrainian regional municipalities to be prosecuted for the calls of secession from Ukraine (RIA Novosti, 2013zc).

⁴⁸ Patriarch Kirill considers the protests in Kyiv to threaten integrity of Ukraine (RIA Novosti, 2014v).

⁴⁹ Ukrainian president urged all Ukrainians to halt tensions and find consensus (RIA Novosti, 2013ad)

⁵⁰ Ukrainian society was deeply entrenched, and harsh rhetoric was used, however, no conflict was foreseen to be feasible, according to the RIA Novosti’s expert Vadim Dubnov, who concluded that no one would fight for the president Yanukovich (RIA Novosti, 2013bd)

revolutionaries use such arguments: if it goes further, *there will be a split of the country with a civil war*” (RIA Novosti, 2013bd).

As it became evident, the aftermath of the Euromaidan was not as positive as the enthusiasm which the protesters joined it with. The protest as such irritated the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine where the populations and the elites were inclined to fix the Euromaidan issue not with concessions but with more decisive deeds or measures. The rallies supporting incumbent government were held on more massive scale than the Euromaidan ones, furthermore, there were rallies where the protesters demanded more integration with Moscow. Obviously such confrontation was framed as a consequence of the Euromaidan and the outputs of the tensions were not promising according to the medium. The country’s split or civil war were foreseen as a possible outcome of the political stalemate.

2.2.10. Research question 10: What role did Russia play during the Euromaidan unrest?

Not a surprise, that by being a news agency owned by Russian state, the RIA Novosti could not avoid framing the place of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian crisis. To frame the role of Russia, the RIA Novosti interviewed and briefed quite few Russian politicians of different partisan shades, therefore, it transmitted the attitudes to the Euromaidan from Russian political elites. The opinions expressed were to construct the picture of more or less generic moods about the events in Ukraine.

Speaking about the facets of the image of Russia being the facilitator of normalization in Ukraine, the RIA covered such positive features as noninterference of Russia into internal Ukrainian affairs or Russia being a **guarantor** of stability in Ukraine. On the other hand, following the news from RIA’s website certain revelations claiming the anti-Russian character of the Euromaidan could appear.

Russia does not meddle into internal Ukrainian affairs.

Shaping the pillar of non-involvement of Russia into Ukrainian internal affair, the RIA quoted mainly Russian politicians who could explicitly say as a head of party “Fair Russia” Sergei Mironov reiterated in the interview “we are not going *to meddle into internal affairs sovereign state...*” (RIA Novosti, 2013cd). Another example the aforementioned frame can be trace in the following quote made by the Prime Minister of Russia Dmitriy Medvedev who stated “This is *internal business of Ukraine*, although it is, certainly, very important that there will be stability and order” (RIA Novosti,

2013dd). Hence, the Russian Federation according to the Russian officials was not keen on interfering and taking one side but it was also clearly underlined that Russia was interested in stable Ukraine. Additionally, the RIA was giving the floor for the Russian officials who were blaming West in the “harsh influence” on Ukrainian government, therefore, the West was intervening into internal policies which Russia did not⁵¹. Accordingly, the Russian Federation adopted unbiased approaches towards all sides in this standoff unlike the Western countries “whose *politicians address the Maidan*” and “*walk in among the people on the Maidan*” (RIA Novosti, 2013ed).

The turbulent environment appealed to possible intermediaries who were able to bring sides to a mutually respected and beneficial decision. In this respect, the medium shaped the posture of Russia having been cooperative and unambiguous. The speakers whom the RIA Novosti was giving the floor were pinpointing the readiness to do their utmost to hinder further confrontation and to foster reconciliation, for instance, the Duma’s MPs were ready to take off to Kyiv in order to assist adversaries in finding common ground⁵².

Euromaidan as anti-Russian project.

The Euromaidan appeared from nowhere and it was so unexpected that it entailed suspicions about its nature. Hereby, the suspicions were related with the character whom it was subordinated, who financed it, who forged and etc. Normally, unknown phenomena cause more questions and not the answers, but in the case of the Euromaidan the assumptions about the Euromaidan’s orchestration and orientation rapidly came to a surface. Indeed, the RIA started to shape the orientation of the movement and protests from their very beginning, and surprisingly or not many concluded that the Euromaidan was anti-Russian project. Accordingly, the frame of anti-Russian character of the Euromaidan was to explain its behavior and attitudes. The cornerstone of the frame follows simple logics consisting of two attributes.

Firstly, since the Euromaidan erupted due to the government’s decision to suspend negotiations with the EU regarding the Association agreement, it, therefore, supported the association with the EU. The Eastern partnership scheme, in its turn, was

⁵¹ The Vice Prime-Minister of Russia, Igor Shuvalov, uttered that Russia was more flexible towards Ukraine, and it was ready to negotiate with Ukraine in different formats whereas the EU was more rigid and had more harsh measures and demands (RIA Novosti, 2013fd).

⁵² Russian MPs stated they were ready and eager to touch down in Kyiv if it would facilitate the way out of the crisis (RIA Novosti, 2013w).

“to tear off Ukraine for Eurasian integration processes” (RIA Novosti, 2013we) or “to involve Ukraine into the NATO”⁵³.

Secondly, the Euromaidan had become real owing to hostile activities of “anti-Russian forces”. According to the head of “Rossotrudnichestvo” (The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation) Konstantin Kosachev, Euromaidan is a result of “consolidation of anti-Russian world” (RIA Novosti, 2014x) Moreover, the forces who oppose Russian policies actively participated in the Euromaidan as it was in reports concerning Belarusian⁵⁴ and Georgian opposition⁵⁵.

For all intents and purposes the Euromaidan became a case in point of anti-Russian phenomenon. The correspondents of RIA manipulated with the mottoes of the Euromaidan and the jokes which were widespread amongst the Euromaidan supporters⁵⁶. Unequivocally the Euromaidan despite being a complex phenomenon was simplified to frame it as an anti-Russian issue.

2.2.11. Research question 11: Were the Western countries involved into the protests?

Insofar Ukraine became the object of “geopolitical struggle”, the contenders were defined, which appeared to be the Russian Federation and the West. Conceivably, the strife over Ukraine should have had another side that challenges Russian dominance in Ukraine. Hereby, the forces, which were casting doubts on the spheres of influence in the CIS, were clearly defined as pro-western or just the West. The West is imagined via several variables which shape the particular frames in connection with its involvement into Ukrainian internal affairs; support and influence on the Euromaidan.

West puts pressure on Ukrainian government

The lack of impartiality was shaped by the editorial of the RIA Novosti using different components but, mainly, there had been the diplomatic statements of western foreign offices. Although, there were quite few official interventions from various Western states, they were characterized by particular diplomatic language. Needless to

⁵³ The Russians consider Ukrainian membership in the NATO as menacing factor to country’s security (VCIOM, 2014).

⁵⁴ Belarusian opposition intended to hold rally in south-eastern Belarusian city of Homel to express support of the Euromaidan (RIA Novosti, 2013gd).

⁵⁵ Georgian opposition party the „Georgian Dream“ which was founded and supported by Mikheil Saakashvili took part in the Euromaidan (RIA Novosti, 2013hd)

say that the diplomacy has certain ways of expressing position which define the mood of discontent or satisfaction and, therefore, sometimes it can be evaluated differently by the audience, who is not familiar of such singularities. For this very reason no diplomatic statements expressing the position, which can be misunderstood or interpreted equivocally, were used in this research to distinguish the angle of this frame. In other words, the pressure stemming from official assertions should be explicit and not dubious.

The pressure on Ukrainian government was framed via the variables which described the consequences which Ukrainian authorities would encounter in connection with the response to the Euromaidan. The outcome of erroneous tactics adopted by Ukrainian authorities could vary. For instance, the RIA Novosti reported about negative implications for Ukraine which western governments⁵⁷ were to introduce due to the violent crackdown on the protesters. However, some officials did encounter negative consequences as revoking US entry visas⁵⁸. Second facet of the frame was biased attitude to Ukrainian authorities from western governments and political institutions, namely, almost all reports, coming from the EU or the U.S. leadership, blamed Ukrainian authorities in using violence against the Euromaidan, For example, the RIA Novosti reposted Martin Shulz's tweet where he condemned the violence "against peaceful demonstrators" (RIA Novosti, 2013kd). Moreover, such leaders as Jose Manuel Barroso⁵⁹, Anders Fogh Rasmussen were urging Ukrainian authorities to respect human rights and avoid using violence⁶⁰, furthermore, the USA declared⁶¹ the human rights to be a cornerstone of the relations between countries. The third angle framing the western pressure on Ukraine due to its policies towards the Euromaidan were the statements of Russian politicians about the western interference into the internal Ukrainian affairs. Russian Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev asserted that the trips of certain western leaders to the venues where "*unauthorized events take place*"

⁵⁶ RIA Novosti's observer recalls the jokes and banners heard and seen on the square where the Euromaidan supporters gathered, namely their anti-Moscow essence (RIA Novosti, 2013id)

⁵⁷ Foreign ministers of EU member-states were about to discuss possible imposition of sanctions on Ukraine due to the violent crackdown on the Euromaidan (RIA Novosti, 2013jd)

⁵⁸ The USA revoked entry visas for those who were involved into violent dispersal of the Euromaidan (RIA Novosti, 2014y).

⁵⁹ The head of European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso urged Ukrainian authorities to respect the right for peaceful gatherings (RIA Novosti, 2013ld)

⁶⁰ The General Secretary of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, called on Ukrainian authorities to respect human rights and freedoms (RIA Novosti, 2013md).

⁶¹ The relations between the USA and Ukraine depend on Kyiv's commitment to respect human rights and freedoms (RIA Novosti, 2013nd).

could be considered as “*interference into the affairs of sovereign state*” (RIA Novosti, 2013se). Once the RIA Novosti made material based on the tweet of head of the International committee of Gosduma Aleksey Pushkov in which he defined Ukraine being a “semicolony”⁶² of the USA. The deputy minister of the Russian Ministry of foreign affairs characterized American recommendations to be “*demands defined with severity*”.

Hence, according to the Russian politicians, who were quoted by the RIA Novosti profoundly, the West was keen on continuing to pressure Ukrainian government in order to “*tear off*” Ukraine from the Russian sphere of influence. The West, as it was evident from the RIA’s reports, was putting screw on Ukraine via different methods: by denouncing diplomatically police violence, by calling on Ukrainian authorities to keep on the commitments in the sphere of human rights protection, by blaming mainly Ukrainian authorities in usage of violence and etc. Remarkably, the Russian officials underline that such recommendations and calls meddled into internal affairs and lacked the impartiality, because the protesters were cleaned from any wrongdoings. Although the editorial was focused on framing the western role in the Euromaidan, sometimes the reports of the European government’s condemning violence coming from the Euromaidan supporters popped up⁶³.

West supports Euromaidan

Naturally, the perception of West supporting the Euromaidan could appear as a continuation of the previous frame. Although, these frames are interconnected and sometimes interdependent, they are fully separate because they describe it a bit differently. Shaping this feature of the Euromaidan RIA addressed the relations between the Euromaidan and western politicians in which the latter carried out different kinds of support from sympathy and symbolic deeds to direct endorsement.

Amongst the actors who expressed any kind of support to the Euromaidan there were the USA (in various versions), Poland (different political players), Croatia, Lithuania, the EU parliament, Germany and France.

Though, the degrees of western support of the Euromaidan differed and depended on the status and environment in which the support was expressed. Anyhow the rank sometimes did not determine the way of expressing support.

⁶²The Head of International Committee of Gosduma Pushkov suggests that the USA communicates with Ukraine like with semicolony (RIA Novosti, 2013od).

Official meetings. Official meetings with Ukrainian politicians were pinpointed by the editorial of the RIA Novosti as a way of support. It should be noted that such kind of support could happen on different levels either with the US State Secretary Kerry in Munich or hotel in Kyiv. However, the status of the opposition's counterparts determined the agendas. The heads of foreign ministries from several countries (France⁶⁴, the USA⁶⁵, Poland⁶⁶) were negotiating with Ukrainian opposition to halt crisis. However, these meetings could be considered rather as a support not as a possible way out because they increased the significance of the opposition and sometimes western leaders avoided the meetings with the authorities. Moreover, several political forces like Polish Party of "Law and Justice" openly stated it would "*endorse everything what lead Ukraine to Europe, to support and strengthen of democracy*" (RIA Novosti, 2013sd).

Symbolic acts. The symbolism was to draw attention, raise awareness or to boost morale of the protesters. The deed could be implemented in different ways: in addresses of the really as the senators of the USA did⁶⁷ or it could be distribution of the gloves as the Lithuanian Foreign minister did⁶⁸, or in a simple walk around the Independence Square like the Foreign Ministers of Croatia⁶⁹ and Germany⁷⁰ did. Furthermore, the symbolic acts supporting the Euromaidan could take place outside Ukrainian capital as it happened in the European parliament where any individual could take photo with placate saying "*Solidarity with Ukraine*" (RIA Novosti, 2013zd). However, such actions were harshly denounced by the Ukrainian and the Russian governments. Such deeds "*encourage people on maidan for the protests*" (RIA Novosti, 2013ae) and the latter called them "*non-amicable*" (RIA Novosti, 2013be).

Official statements. Some key players owing to its influence on the policymaking inside the European Parliament decided to choose the official statement

⁶³Spokesperson of the German government reiterated that the rioters discredited the demands of opposition (RIA Novosti, 2014z)

⁶⁴ French Foreign Minister did not consider the protests in Kyiv as an attempt of coup d'état (RIA Novosti, 2013pd).

⁶⁵The aid of the US State Secretary met Ukrainian authorities and opposition leaders in Kyiv (RIA Novosti, 2013qd)

⁶⁶ The head of Poland's Foreign office met with opposition leaders in Kyiv (RIA Novosti, 2013rd)

⁶⁷ American senators addressed the „people's viche“ in Kyiv within the visit to Ukraine (RIA Novosti, 2013td)

⁶⁸ Klitschko and the head of Lithuanian Foreign ministry met in Kyiv, visited the Euromaidan camp and distributed gloves to the protesters (RIA Novosti, 2013ud).

⁶⁹Croatian Foreign Minister walked around the Euromaidan and did not notice any aggression (RIA Novosti, 2013vd).

⁷⁰German Foreign Minister walked around the Euromaidan (RIA Novosti, 2013wd).

as a way to support the Euromaidan. The forces in the parliament which sympathized the Euromaidan were quite diverse and from the most powerful group, “the European Peoples’ party”⁷¹, to the less powerful, “Alliance of liberals and democrats for Europe”. The latter one even sent special mission to Ukraine to express solidarity with protesters, thus, they combined symbolic act with the clear political stance on the issue⁷².

Accordingly, the West expressed its sympathy and support with the protesters in Kyiv in various kinds of support herewith as RIA Novosti rendered the support was to endorse the aspirations of Ukrainians to join European family and such support irritated Ukraine and more significantly Russia.

2.2.12. Research question 12: What could the Euromaidan damage?

The eruption of the protests in Ukraine severely shook stability inside Ukraine from all sides. The Euromaidan definitely made political situation in the country more fluctuant, it became not only the issue of national but also international scale. Moreover, as it was analyzed above, the Euromaidan according to the RIA Novosti’s reports could cause difficulties for the country, thus, it could be considered as a possible menace to a certain spheres of Ukrainian life. Interestingly, the RIA Novosti framed only three security features to which the Euromaidan threatened, namely the focus was stressed only the facets of economic security and European integration.

Euromaidan as a threat for Ukrainian economy

Certainly, any instability may cause troublesome development in the economy but the Euromaidan as a threat to the economy was framed with two attributes, one of which was not connected with turbulences in the economy per se. The initial reason of the protests was suspension of Association process with the EU, and the argument, which was spread on the pages of the media website, was that the accord on the Association was not beneficial for the Ukrainian economy and in general Ukraine was weak side⁷³ of the agreement. Hence, all the protests which supported the idea of resume of the negotiations in fact supported the idea of Ukrainian economy weak

⁷¹The most powerful force in the European parliament openly supported the protests in Kyiv (RIA Novosti, 2013xd).

⁷²Alliance of liberals and democrats for Europe sends the mission to Ukraine to meet social activists, oppositionists in order to express solidarity with the protesters (RIA Novosti, 2014aa)

⁷³ Mykola Azarov claimed Ukraine had not been ready for the association on offered terms (RIA Novosti, 2013yd).

havoc. This attribute was repeatedly used by the experts⁷⁴ and Ukrainian officials⁷⁵ who stated that the only reasons of suspending the Association process were economic ones, furthermore, the European partners were imposing⁷⁶ such onerous deal with no compensation packages⁷⁷.

The second attribute of the Euromaidan menacing Ukrainian economy was real financial losses due to the ongoing protests. The losses were to happen due to blocking of the government buildings, what in their turn inhibited the work of the state agencies responsible for crucial social welfare payments and economic decisions⁷⁸. The protests slowed GDP growth, caused production decrease⁷⁹. Remarkably, the media also rendered some indications of the Euromaidan threatening the economy, for instance, according to the RIA Novosti, the demand for foreign currency increased due to the protests⁸⁰. Some experts calculated the estimated losses caused by the Euromaidan activities and they were estimated to be approximately two million US dollars⁸¹.

Hereby the frame of Euromaidan's threat to Ukrainian economy was composed of the variables unveiling the demands being harmful for the Ukrainian economy and the real losses defined by the Ukrainian officials. In any case, the protests were leading to economic hardships for Ukraine, which was overwhelmingly understood by the Ukrainians⁸².

Euromaidan as a threat to European integration.

Notwithstanding the Euromaidan followers intended to accelerate the process of European integration, the deeds stated otherwise according to the perception which was constructed by RIA Novosti. The main pillar of this assertion was that the protests

⁷⁴ Small and medium enterprises in Ukraine will not benefit from the Association with the EU (RIA Novosti, 2013te)

⁷⁵ Ukrainian Prime-Minister, Mykola Azarov, claimed that existing agreement would make Ukraine a bankrupt (RIA Novosti, 2013ce).

⁷⁶ Ukrainian Foreign minister blamed the EU of imposing onerous deal to Ukraine (RIA Novosti, 2013de).

⁷⁷The Vice-Prime Minister claimed that Ukraine had not received any signals of probable losses compensation (RIA Novosti, 2013ee)

⁷⁸ Blockade of administrative buildings tore down crucial economic decisions according to Ukrainian Prime minister, Mykola Azarov (RIA Novosti, 2013ge).

⁷⁹The first Vice Prime Minister asserted that protests caused the slowdown of Ukrainian GDP and decrease of economic production (RIA Novosti, 2013fe).

⁸⁰ Owing to the Euromaidan protests the demand on foreign currency hiked in Ukraine (RIA Novosti, 2013he).

⁸¹ Kyiv city administration estimated the losses over the Euromaidan to be approximately 1.75 million US dollars (RIA Novosti, 2014ba).

⁸²More than a half of Ukrainians expect negative impact on economy due to the protests in Ukraine (RIA Novosti, 2013ie).

themselves limited the work of state institutions responsible for the negotiations⁸³. Therefore, that was the Euromaidan who was accountable for the stalemate in negotiations because the officials could not prepare for the talks with the European counterparts.

Needless to say, the Euromaidan threatened social cohesion and public security as it became evident on clashes with the law enforcement. This angle was not covered in this chapter because it was not clearly defined as a social and economic threat in the RIA's news. Moreover, the audience could have encountered another angle of social safety, namely, the Euromaidan threatened the public health. According to the officials who were quoted by the RIA Novosti, the Euromaidan bolstered the spread of virus diseases⁸⁴ or the reports about the cases tuberculosis⁸⁵ amongst the protesters. Accordingly, the Euromaidan menaced not only the economic or public security layer but it indirectly caused the issues in public health and social stability.

2.2.13. Research question 13: Was the Euromaidan an attempt to plot coup d'état?

Insofar this Euromaidan's feature was different from the others and cannot be included in any of the groups. It creates a separate one which consists of the only frame. The frame is distinguishable because it explains the methods and the real objective combined. Furthermore, it is not implied in the news articles, but it is openly, precisely and fully defined in such a way, that is why it is deemed to separate it from overlapping frame comparing the Euromaidan with the Orange revolution or the one calling the Euromaidan as a violent protest. In other words to pick up the frame it was not required to define the attributes of the coup d'état as they are sudden, illegal and violent seizure of power (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016) as it was widely and unambiguously repeated in the reports.

Although, the frame was widely used as an objective of the Euromaidan but sometimes the motives of the preparing the plot against the government might have varied. The first idea was that the Euromaidan was a tool for the western countries to overthrow Russia oriented government and to involve Ukraine into western orbit. Such

⁸³ The Euromaidan blocked Verkhovna Rada, and, therefore, deterred the integration processes with the EU (RIA Novosti, 2013je).

⁸⁴ Kyiv authorities warned population that mass gatherings might have caused the outbreak of virus diseases (RIA Novosti, 2013ke).

⁸⁵ The case of tuberculosis was detected within the Euromaidan camp (RIA Novosti, 2013).

perception prevailed amongst Russian politicians who, like the aforementioned Aleksey Pushkov, asserted “the EU took course *on overthrowing incumbent leadership of Ukraine with the help of “Orange Maidan”*” (RIA Novosti, 2013me) Similar position was formulated the head of the Russian Liberal Democratic party, Vladimir Zhirinovski stating that “*mass protests and riots are an attempt of coup d’état*” and that is why Yanukovich should cease any contacts between opposition and the West. (RIA Novosti, 2013ne). The second perception excluded external influence on the Euromaidan to overthrow the government. The latter dominated amongst Ukrainian ruling elites, who were blaming the opposition in veiling European integration to be cover for actual fight for power in the country. The ruling Party of Regions stated the opposition commit acts which can “*be defined as coup d’état*” (RIA Novosti, 2013 oe) Moreover, ruling elites accused opposition e.g. the Euromaidan in plotting a coup due to its stubbornness⁸⁶. Moreover, the assertion that the Euromaidan was an attempt to depose the incumbent government was underpinned by the reports of the police having opened criminal cases on coup d’état charges⁸⁷.

Obviously, there were different narratives between Russian and Ukrainian political establishment in genuine reasons of the Euromaidan, at least when the representatives expressed justification openly. As it was mentioned above, the Russian politicians blamed Ukrainian authorities in soft approaches against the protests, which only facilitated the increase of protest activities. Occasionally or not, but the Ukrainian officials heard such signals and adopted in the middle of January, 2014 new bills stiffening the accountability as it was called on the RIA’s website for the “coup d’état”⁸⁸, and therefore such legislation “outlawed the Euromaidan”. How did the outlawed Euromaidan react on such legislation is widely known.

2.3. What does it all mean?

The flow of information in contemporary world is extremely intensive and somehow it can be chaotic, this was the case with the coverage of the Euromaidan, meaning, social media transformed the scheme where the media was the only one source of information. Today any individual possessing device with internet access

⁸⁶ The Party of Regions uttered that the Tymosheko’s statement to refuse talks with government was a call to coup d’état (RIA Novosti, 2013pe)

⁸⁷ Ukrainian law enforcement opened inquiry in connection of plotting coup d’état (RIA Novosti, 2013qe)

could be the source of information. Despite the fact that for the time being almost anyone could transmit the news, the professional players still will remain on place. The “professional players” turn gather, process and distribute news, because the work of journalist is characterized by certain set of standards aiming to make the news nonbiased and factual. These two features make journalism alive despite huge pressure from social media, and, especially, the news agencies have to obey the principles of fair journalism because they create content not only for the eventual customer, reader, but also for the other media. In other words, the news agencies are the sources of information for the professional news processors and distributors, hence, they influence the journalists that is why the news agencies intend to be on edge of the events to be able to cover as thoroughly as possible.

The Euromaidan was no exception for the news agencies and journalists, therefore it was covered from the very beginning till the very end. The correspondents of the RIA Novosti reported on the Euromaidan’s activities on daily basis and extensively covered the events, in times of escalations the amount of messages could exceed a hundred. However, there can be distinguished some features of the coverage which indicate the political crisis in Ukraine was important for the media and the audience. Firstly, the editorial of the RIA Novosti’s website launched special section for the Euromaidan which could be easily accessed and where all the information was accumulated. Hence, the pathway for the reader to access the information was simplified and the information was structured. Secondly, the information about the Euromaidan was renewed on 24/7 basis, thus, the followers could easily track live development of events. Thirdly, the correspondents of the RIA Novosti did their best to cover all presumed facets of the phenomenon, though, the audience could better comprehend the phenomenon through the RIA’s eyes. Hence, the frequency and the depth of media coverage can indicate on the importance of the Euromaidan as a media object. Such frequency and depth also can be analyzed through the principles of agenda setting and gatekeeping when the significance of the topics are determined by the editorial’s policies and views and therefore the topics are being developed and extensively covered afterwards.

⁸⁸ Verkhovna Rada voted for restricting legislation regarding mass gatherings and free assembly which banned the Euromaidan protests and according to the RIA Novosti prevented Ukrainian state from coup d’état (RIA Novosti, 2014ca).

Interestingly, the editorial while covering the protests gave the floor mainly for the experts and politicians expressing the position of the official Kyiv. They could be Ukrainian officials or Russian political analysts, but the one feature united them and this was the explicit support of the Kyiv's policies. Another curious fact coming to a surface is that the opposition and the Euromaidan were juxtaposed according to the frames spread by the RIA Novosti. Accordingly, the Euromaidan was the transformation of opposition's struggle for power in the country, furthermore, this was the opposition who was guilty in the instability launching the protests. In fact this was misconception because the Euromaidan erupted before opposition calls to come to the streets, this was the opposition who was "coordinating" the activities with the crowd and this was the crowd who did not follow the calls of the opposition during the skirmishes with the police. Otherwise the Euromaidan was anything but the opposition's product of political struggle because this was the opposition, who had to adjust to the new reality and accept the rules which the crowd established.

It goes without saying that the audience of the RIA Novosti could easily create overall picture of the Euromaidan using the frames constructed by the news agency. As it was aforementioned the frames served the purpose which they were constructed for: to facilitate the comprehension of the phenomenon, in this case the Euromaidan. The picture might have been simplified, might have lacked the complexity, might have avoided some features, but the main idea was to help the audience to swallow the issue. Even though based on the RIA's frames, the Euromaidan was rather complicated concept according to the presented attributes.

Although the RIA Novosti profoundly covered the phenomenon, it, however, omitted some hot events occurred in time of protests, and these were mainly deaths of protesters of gun shots. As it was mentioned above this approach in media sciences is called the "spiral of silence", in other words, the media intentionally omits some facts about events to forge own media vision of the concept, in this case the Euromaidan. Therefore, the audience was not able to get overall picture of the events but only its simplified media reflection which may be shaped to evoke certain comprehension of the events.

In simple terms according to the RIA Novosti, the Euromaidan was "illegal opposition movement consisting mainly of dwellers of western Ukraine, which was supported by the West and was threatening the indivisibility of the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian economy, was aiming to plot coup d'état and tear apart Ukraine from

Russia”. Not surprisingly, that such an illation could be made upon the most salient attributes which the RIA Novosti distinguished in its coverage of the events related to the Euromaidan in Ukraine.

Conclusion

The Euromaidan appeared as an earthquake which destroyed all the shaky constructions leaving only the solid ones. Like the earthquake it was barely predictable and, therefore, it was almost impossible to be ready for it. And just like the earthquake it attacked first, and those attacked had to tackle with the consequences. In this particular case, the attacked were the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian president. Accordingly, the Ukrainian authorities always responded to the fierce offensive tactics of the Euromaidan, sometimes effectively, sometimes only adding more fuel to the fire. The point is that the Euromaidan crossed the frontiers of Ukraine and become an international issue. Due to the different factors it was debated far across Ukrainian capital, moreover, it became the political issue forcing international politics to come to the Ukrainian capital.

Acquiring huge political significance, the Euromaidan could not be neglected by the media. Accordingly, it was widely covered by different media outlets both inside Ukraine and beyond. The study was to analyze the coverage by the Russian state news agency, the RIA Novosti (Rossiya Segodnya currently). The news agency was appealing as it was unveiled in the theoretical part because it was influential for two information consumers: the media and an eventual individual. Thus, its significance in media market, especially in the Russian speaking segment, could not be underestimated; moreover, the RIA Novosti had the highest amount of followers in social media. The theoretical part of the study highlighted the interrelations between the audience and the media, therefore, this was not one-way communication, because the audience somehow determined the contents of the media. That happens due to the commercialization of the media, in other words, the audience paid their time to the media, and the media had to broadcast or publish the information attractive for the audience. However, the media was still capable to shape the interests of its followers in certain ways, one of them was the “agenda setting”, in other words, the media outlet determines the topics which would be interesting for the audience. However, the choice of the topics meant little without certain way of coverage, though, the interest had to be fed by the information about chosen topics. This media approach was called “gate-keeping”, namely, the phenomenon should be covered, otherwise, the attention of the audience will be shifted. Anyway, almost any phenomenon and set of events are complex. Therefore, keeping the

audience on the topic required clarifying its importance. The explanations had to correspond the expectations of the audience, therefore, they had to find common ground with the intrinsic prejudices and stereotypes. Thus, the media had to “frame” certain topics in order to be better comprehended by the audience. Framing means to give define some attributes, make them salient and evoke certain emotional or moral feedback for the phenomenon upon the salient attributes, namely, the salience had to correspond the prejudices to simplify the complexity of the phenomenon, and evoke certain moral evaluation about the events, in this case the Euromaidan.

The objective of the study was to detect the vestiges of the theories in the RIA Novosti’s coverage of the “Euromaidan”. The Euromaidan was totally an alien phenomenon for the Russian society because it took place outside the Russian borders. Its demand directly did not denounce Russia or its citizens, its objectives did not relate any real internal Russian issues and etc. However, on the example of the RIA Novosti’s attention it could be stated that it had overwhelming media significance which, in its turn, created much more proximity for the audience. By familiarizing the readers with the phenomenon, the editorial acted as the medium who sets the agenda for the audience, thus, the Euromaidan was widely covered from the very beginning of the sporadic students’ rally on the Independence square. Moreover, to retain the audience on the topic it had to be extensively covered which was truly happening. Namely, the www.ria.ru’s administration covered the events on 24/7 basis till the end of the uprising in late February, 2014. The second feature indicating about the gate-keeping was special way of structuring of the information on the website, particularly, there was created a special systematized sector named “The Euromaidan in Kyiv”, “Unrests in Kyiv” which facilitated the speed of access to information. As it was noted above the information was updated on daily basis, thus, the follower could easily receive the freshest news on the topic from the first page of www.ria.ru. Moreover, the editorial of RIA Novosti allocated huge amount of resources for the Euromaidan coverage, peculiarly, the protests in Ukraine were covered by the huge team of RIA’s journalists. Needless to say that the restructuring of the website, sending correspondents, cameramen, photographers required allocation of additional funds in order to cover with the intended degree of extensiveness. Accordingly, the extensiveness of coverage, the structuring of information, the amount of resources spent indicate the explicit “gatekeeping” approaches to cover the Euromaidan.

Subsequently, the Euromaidan was a complex concept which the editorial tried to render within the media coverage, while the complexity for the audience could inhibit the understanding of the protests. That was the reason why the Euromaidan deconstructed certain features which subsequently became the salient attributes of it. Accordingly, the RIA Novosti was explaining the uprising addressed certain facets of the protests upon which the frames were shaped. The frames defined the phenomenon and appealed to known prejudices and stereotypes, to evoke certain moral evaluation. Hence, the frames, which the RIA Novosti attempted to render the Euromaidan through, were to draw the overall picture of the unrest and standoff. Obviously, the editorial did not aim to directly establish hostile attitude towards the protests and the protesters, but it was to invoke to certain stereotypes which had negative connotation in the Russian speaking society. That could be easily traced in the example of the frame defining the Euromaidan as a proxy of the West aiming to tear off Ukraine from so called “Russian world”, or on the dwellers of the Western regions of Ukraine as a driving force, or the one implying the Euromaidan being “nationalist protest” and etc.

Furthermore, upon the analyzed news reports concerning the Euromaidan, the conclusion can be made about the speakers whom the RIA’s editorial was giving the word. The interviewees could be divided into four big groups: individuals affiliated with the Russian state, the Ukrainian officials, the Ukrainian opposition representatives and others. Although the speakers represented wide range of political views, the vast majority of opinions were given by the representatives of the first two groups who naturally expressed Russian and Ukrainian official positions, respectively. The latter tactics essentially could evoke certain reaction from the audience towards the Euromaidan. Was it made intentionally or not? The question still remains without an answer.

Since the Euromaidan was covered extensively from different angles by the RIA Novosti, it deems, that it is possible to construct overall image of the Euromaidan relying on the frames given above. Firstly, speaking about the nature of the Euromaidan, it should be said, that it was artificial phenomenon which had no ground and reasons to erupt, furthermore, it was instigated and facilitated by the West. Secondly, the Euromaidan was not an independent oppositional movement but rather a proxy of West aiming to “tear off Ukraine” from Russia. Thirdly, being an artificial proxy of the West it, therefore, did not represented the interests of all Ukrainians, but rather it represented the western regions of Ukraine, who was the driving force of the protests. Fourthly,

insofar, the Euromaidan did not represent consensus vision of Ukrainian future for all Ukrainians, it might have divided the nation. Fifthly, dividing a diverse nation on such crucial political segments the Euromaidan in the future may cause civil conflict and result in country's split. Accordingly, on the pages of the RIA Novosti the reader could imagine the near future of the Ukrainian state caused by internal and external tensions due to the Euromaidan's eruption.

The Euromaidan exploded unforeseeably, smashed the existing rules of the game and rebooted the political life of the whole Europe at that time. It became cornerstone of the behavior between the state and the society, the opposition and the society, Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine and the West, Russia and the West. In fact, it was something more than an attempt to plot coup d'état and tear off Ukraine from so called "Russian World", because the social protest could not be just coup d'état attempt when it had such influential voice on the international arena. What happened after that is another story, but the Euromaidan definitely determined it.

Summary

The thesis studied media image of the Euromaidan being shaped in the news reports of the RIA Novosti. The RIA Novosti avoided manipulating facts, instead it intended to cover the phenomenon and represent the image which reflected reality somehow. As a matter of fact, the image of the Euromaidan is presented as a sophisticated multifaceted concept. Contemporary approaches in media research uncover different methods, how to present desirable image of the events and phenomena, at meantime, not falsifying information.

Framing the image of the Euromaidan meant that the RIA Novosti had extracted some attributes of the phenomenon and made them more salient to evoke certain evaluation. The attributes were to explain the Euromaidan, therefore, they should address familiar stereotypes or themes, because, only in this case, the audience would comprehend topic's essence, on one hand, and, on the other hand, the editorial could shape the phenomenon in a certain way.

Having analyzed the frames, which the RIA Novosti shaped, it should be underlined that the audience was to be focused on the following Euromaidan's angles: the reasons, the features, the social structure, the relationships with several political actors, its place in "geopolitical" struggle, and coup d'état narrative. Accordingly, the Euromaidan was rather complex issue with different components, although, it was represented partially, clear roots of the bias could not be traced owing to having screened only open sources. Moreover, the thesis did not aim to unveil reasons of certain coverage, but it was to disclose the attributes, which corresponded the audience's aspirations or stereotypes.

The attributes direct the audience to comprehend the Euromaidan being "artificial western proxy consisting of western Ukrainians, nationalists and youngsters, which aimed to tear off Ukraine from the Russian orbit by plotting a coup, could divide country, and possibly lead to a civil conflict inside Ukraine". Hence, the RIA Novosti addressing these attributes envisaged hopes and fears of its audience.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Internet sources

RIA Novosti 2013a. "Politologi o evromaidane: "situacija predrevolucionnaja ". December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981167129.html#ixzz3shr1djFS>.

RIA Novosti 2013b. "Eksperty: Janukovič ostanetsia u vlasti, no šansov na pereizbranije, malo". December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981250061.html#ixzz3shtHaXXC>.

RIA Novosti 2013c. "Ekspert: majdan voynik iz-za kělějnogo rešenija voprosa o evrointegracii" December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981244714.html#ixzz3shyOSwmL>.

RIA Novosti 2013d. „Protestujuščije ostajutsia na majdaně v Kyjevě, miliciji v centre ne vidno“ December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981068391.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013e. „Avtobusy s silovikami pokinuli ploščad' Něžavisimosti v Kyjevě“. December 11, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983385437.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013f. „Eksperty v RF nazvali ošibkoj priměnenije sily k děmonstrantam v Kijevě“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981213393.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013g. „Politolog: akciji storonnikov evrointegraciji Ukrajiny běšperspektivny“. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/politics/20131202/981253706.html#ixzz3shti9ycc>.

RIA Novosti 2013h. „Azarov: massovyje akciji na Ukrajině priniali něupravljajemyj charakter“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981346741.html#ixzz3snFCFXRB>.

RIA Novosti 2013i. „Oppozicija: snos pamiatnika Lěninu ně byl sankcionirovan Majdanom“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982807429.html#ixzz3snPfd57X>.

RIA Novosti 2013j. Vystupajuščije za evrointegraciju naměřeny běssročno protestovat v Kijevě. November 22, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131122/978893662.html#ixzz3snWZZgsi>.

RIA Novosti 2013k. „V Kijevě prodolžajut protestovat' storonniki evrointegracii Ukrajinu“. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131122/979097353.html#ixzz3ssj7QFze>.

RIA Novosti 2013l. „„Narodnoje včě“ vnov'prochodit na Majdaně v Kijevě. December 22, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131222/985728825.html#ixzz3ssvke1NM>.

RIA Novosti 2013m. „„Narodnoje včě“ vnov'sobralo v centre Kijeva poriadka 10 tysiač čelovėk“. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131229/987108370.html#ixzz3sswexRUJ>.

RIA Novosti 2013n. „Něskoľko sotěn čelovėk prodolžajut akciju na Majdaně v Kijevě“. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131207/982614112.html#ixzz3sst7ilDW>.

RIA Novosti 2013o. „Mitingujuščije ustanavlivajut novuju scenu na Majdaně v Kijevě“. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131223/985858052.html#ixzz3sswUKRvq>.

RIA Novosti 2013p. „Sotni demonstrantov vozobnovili pikēt v Kijevě u zdanija pravitel'stva“. December 05, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982054212.html#ixzz3stJgB9So>.

RIA Novosti 2013q. „Miting na Majdaně v Kijevě prodolžajetsia, něsmotria na sněgopad“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983019227.html#ixzz3stJoM4oZ>.

RIA Novosti 2013r. „Děmonstranty v Kijvě pošli k administracii prezidenta i zdaniju kabmina“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982778360.html#ixzz3stKMtfAp>.

RIA Novosti 2013s. „SBU oprověrgla obviněnija v pričastnosti k vozmožnym teraktam v Kijevě“. December 15, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131215/984226814.html#ixzz3syUYPm74>.

RIA Novosti 2013t. Glava Minjusta Ukrajinu prizyvajet ně nagnětat' obstanovku sluchami. December 13, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984039903.html#ixzz3syUj6kEk>.

RIA Novosti 2013u. „Ukrajinskaja opozicija ožidajet provokacii v Kijevě na vychodnyh“. December 13, 2013 (u). Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/983859792.html#ixzz3syUsaGNk>.

RIA Novosti 2013v. „Liděř „Svobody“ prizval amnistirovat' učastnikov „evromajdana““. December 22, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131222/985734763.html#ixzz3sz5nCIHi>.

RIA Novosti 2013w. „Děmonstranty sněšli pamiatnik Lěninu vozlě Bessarabskoj ploščadi“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982800984.html#ixzz3sz6DRU5X>.

RIA Novosti 2013x. „Kompartija Ukrajiny vozmuščena snosom pamiatnika Lěninu v Kijevě“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982804946.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013y. Oppozicioněry v Kijevě podniali flag ES u gorodskoj administracii. December 05, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982181552.html#ixzz3sz62NCuA>

RIA Novosti 2013z. „Spěcnaz pribyl na Majdan, pristav začitala řešenije vlastěj o zaprěťe akcij“ December 10, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983304036.html#ixzz3szjYuMLw>.

RIA Novosti 2013aa. „Protěšt storonnikov evrointegracii Ukrajiny prodolžajetsia“. November 25, 2013 (aa). Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131125/979610592.html#ixzz3t0dKVAAAn>.

RIA Novosti 2013ba. „Miatěžnyj Kijev: ulica nastupajet, vlast' v nokdauně“. December 01, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/981025949.html#ixzz3t0dh9imJ>.

RIA Novosti 2013ca. „MVD Ukrajiny opasajetsia provokacij v chodě massovyčh akcij“. December 01, 2013 (ca). Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/980970827.html#ixzz3xgy4lGMR>.

RIA Novosti 2013ea. „Prěmjer Ukrajiny: situaciju nado urěgulirovat' bėž učastija ekstrēmistov“. December 05, 2013 (ea). Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982140888.html#ixzz3xgylHU7n>.

RIA Novosti 2013fa. „Děputat praviasčej Partii rěgionov prizval ně dopustit' raskola Ukrajiny“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/politics/20131208/982772413.html#ixzz3xhJ9bwg0>.

RIA Novosti 2013ga. „Děputaty Doněckogo oblsověta prizvali oppoziciju svěrnut' „evromajdan““. December 26, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131226/986680322.html#ixzz3xhK72jHy>.

RIA Novosti 2013ha. „Janukovič předložil objavit' amnistiju dlia zaděržannych učastnikov akcii“. December 13, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/983972332.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ia. „Studěnty pěduniversita imeni Dragomanova v Kijevě objavili zabastovku“. December 03 (ia), 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981517202.html#ixzz3xhjXsrPR>.

RIA Novosti 2013ka. „Studěnty kijevskogo universitěta naměřeny trěbovat' otstavki ministra“. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981874204.html#ixzz3xhjzMVT3>.

RIA Novosti 2013la. „Aktivisty iz zapadnych oblastej otpravljajutsia na „evromajdan““ December 11, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983469858.html#ixzz3xhr1hSGb>.

RIA Novosti 2013ma. Děputaty Ivano-Frankovskogo oblsověta vyjechali v Kijev". December 11, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983482098.html#ixzz3xhrN3rKv>.

RIA Novosti 2013na. „Milicija zavěla ugovnoje dělo po faktu snosa pamiatnika Lěninu v Kijevě“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982814902.html#ixzz3xi92igYf>.

RIA Novosti 2013oa. „Mitingujuščije pytajutsia provocirovat' sotrudnikov genprokuratury Ukrajinu“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/982931128.html#ixzz3xi9HIxUd>.

RIA Novosti 2013pa. „Press-služba Azarova: blokirovanie raboty gosučrežděnij – přěstuplěnije“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981542809.html#ixzz3xi9ne8ed>.

RIA Novosti 2013qa. „Děviat' zaděržannych v Kijevě podozřevajutsia v tiažkich přěstuplěnijach“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981392920.html#ixzz3xi9ZH4o8>.

RIA Novosti 2013ra. Ugolovnoje dělo vozbužděno po faktu kraži v kijevskoj goradministracii". December 14, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984098647.html#ixzz3xi9vHfqM>.

RIA Novosti 2013sa. „Kabmin“ Ukrajinij vozobnovil rabotu v obyčnom režimě“. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131210/983158434.html#ixzz3yAnOLMcU>.

RIA Novosti 2013ta. Kijevskaja milicija zajavila, čto oběspěčivajet rabotu po uborkě ploščadi. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983313265.html#ixzz3yAnbhYkP>.

RIA Novosti 2013ua. „Kabmin Ukrajinij vozobnovil rabotu v obyčnom režimě“. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131210/983158434.html#ixzz3yAnOLMcU>.

RIA Novosti 2013va. „Noč v centre Kijeva, gdě prodolžajetsia „evromajdan“ prošla spokojno“. November 26, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131126/979717613.html#ixzz3yBSsOsio>.

RIA Novosti 2013wa. “Gěnpokurator Ukrajinij o razgoně Majdana: liudi nachodilis'tam zakonno”. December 01, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/980952574.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013xa. "Glava kijevskoj milicii podal v otsavku posle razgona „evromajdana“. December 01, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/980962492.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ya. "Timošenko prizyvajet ukrajincev i opoziciju borot'sia za evropejskij šans". November 22, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131122/979021264.html#ixzz3yHhJp4xq>.

RIA Novosti 2013za. „Batktivščina opublikovala plan protestov na Ukrajině“. December 05, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982267437.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ab. "Majdan v Kijeve prizval Timošenko překratit' golodovku". December 04, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981985811.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013bb. „Opozicija Ukrajiny prizyvajet graždan vyjti na akciju protěsta“. November 21, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131121/978769377.html#ixzz3yI3DsyyE>.

RIA Novosti 2013cb. „Opozicija snova sryvajet rabotu parlaměnta Ukrajiny“. December 17, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131217/984715465.html#ixzz3yI4isfPP>.

RIA Novosti 2013db. „Ukrajinksaja opozicija sorvala zasědanije Kijevsověta“. December 24, 2013 (db). Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131224/986109325.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013eb. „Kijev i ES chotiat vosstanovit' dověrije čerez konkretnyje šagi“. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981803015.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013fb. „Janukovič v bēšedě s Ešton podtvěrdil kurs Ukrajiny na evrointegraciju“. December 11, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983476036.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013gb. „Arbuzov poručil podgotovit' dokuměnt po implementacii soglašēnija s ES“. December 05, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982204935.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013hb. „Vlasti Ukrajiny gotovy sozdat' triochstoronniuju gruppu po sobytijam v Kiejvě“. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982571352.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ib. „Glava MVD Ukrajiny dal pokazanija prokuraturě“. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982508627.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013mb. „GP Ukrajiny prosit odstranit glavu goradministracii Kijeva ot dolžnosti“. December 14, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984099504.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013nb. „Tri činovnika stanut figurantami diela o razgoně Majdana“. December 13, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/984037565.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ob. „Silovikov, pričastnyh k izbijeniju mitingovavšich v Kiejvě, odstraniat“. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131210/983227406.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013pb. „Janukovič předložil objavit' amnistiju dlia zaděržannyh učastnikov akcij“. December 13, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/983972332.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013qb. „Janukovič izučit výsledky rasledovanija razgona „evromajdana““. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982438828.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013rb. “Janukovič: pravoochraniteli: “pěreǵnuli palku” pri razgone akcii”. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981360934.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013sb. „Azarov: vlasti ne znali o planach po silovomu razgonu „evromajdana““. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981362490.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013tb. “Ukrajinskaja praviasščaja partija gotova k pěreǵovoram s oppozicijej”. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982440972.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ub. “Kravčuk: oščenacionalnyj „kruglyj stol“ vnov’soberioticsia v Kijevě”. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131210/983242655.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013vb. „Mnogije raspoložennyje na Majdaně veščevyje magazíny zakryvajutsia“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983019689.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013wb. “Děputaty naměřeny prosit’ Janukoviča otpravit’ pravitel’stvo v otstavku”. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981792586.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013xb. „Eks-prezident Ukrainy sčitajet, čto kabminu nado bylo podat’ v otstavku“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981631346.html#ixzz3yT2NO6Ky>.

RIA Novosti 2013yb. „Ukrajine neobchodimo přechodnoje praviteľstvo, sčitajet eks-glava MVD“. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982550171.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013zb. „Prěmjer Ukrajiny mozet inicirovat' kadrovyje rotacii v janvarě“. December 17, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131217/984598701.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ac. „Batkivščina: Ukrajina vyjdet' iz krizisa tol'ko čerez dosročnyje vybory“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981284665.html#ixzz3yTLXaWRy>.

RIA Novosti 2013bc. „Glava Rada: zákonných osnovanij dlia dosročnykh parlamentskich vyborov“. December 16, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131216/984418725.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013cc. „Na Majdana v Kijevě zakončilis' děngi v bankomatach i produkty v kafe“. December 01, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/981029466.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013dc. „Mnogije raspoložennyje na Majdaně veščevyje magaziny zakryvajutsia“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983019689.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ec. „Čast' sotrudnikov kabineta ministrov Ukrajiny smogli popast' na rabotu“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/982910947.html#ixzz3yY9KBliy>.

RIA Novosti 2013fc. „Partija Kličko izvinilas' za blokirovanije praviteľstvěnnogo kvartala“. December 08, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/982837046.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013gc. „Riad škol v Kijevě naladili distancionnoje obučenije iz-za volněnij“. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981909757.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013hc. „Kommunaľščiki vyvoziat musor, ostavšijsia ot razobrannyh barrikad“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983044569.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ic. „Dvie stancii mětro v Kijevě snova zakryty iz-za soobščenij o bombě“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131210/983068168.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013jc. „Vozobnovľena rabota dvuch centrálních stancij kijevsogo mětropolitena“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983046383.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013kc. „Něizvěstnyj soobščil o minirovanii želėznodorožnyh vokzalov v Kyjevě“. December 11, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983490321.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013lc. „Passažirov i pěrsenal evakuirjut iz dvuch aeroportov Kijeva“. December 11, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983488998.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013mc. „Minzdrav prosit mitingujuščich ně měšať rabotě skoroj pomoščii“. December 08, 2013 (mc). Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982800621.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013nc. „Oščestvėnnoť Ukrajinu prosit pěrmjera ne spěšit' s asociacijej s ES“. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982478405.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013oc. „Sluckij: akcija protěsta v Kijevě ně otařazjet nastrojelij vsiego obščestva“. November 22, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131122/978987538.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013pc. „Azarov: Ukrajinskaja vlast opirajetsia na boľšinstvo nasěljěnja“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981588790.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013qc. „Azarov: narod podděřivajet rěčenije o priostanovkě asociaccii s ES“. December 11, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131211/983395294.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013rc. „Žitěli Kryma provodiat miting v poddieržku Janukoviča v Simferopolě“. December 15, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131215/984194793.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013sc. „Storonniki praviasčej Partii regionov miting v Kijeve“. December 09, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983023036.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013tc. „Dva mitinga sobralis'v Oděssě na Dumskoj ploščadi“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981328613.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013uc. „V Oděssě sněsli palatočnyj gorodok storonnikov evrointegracii“. November 25, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131125/979452946.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013vc. „Luganskij oblsovět chočet sozvat' sjezd děputatov po situacii v straně“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981315761.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013wc. „Charkovskij oblsovět osudil dějstvija storonnikov evrointegracii“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981302920.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013xc. “Parlament Kryma prizyvajet Janukoviča navěsti poriadok v straně” December 02, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981266751.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013yc. “Doněckij oblsovět potreboval ot Janukoviča vziat situaciju pod kontrol” December 02, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981350895.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013zc. "Глава Украины предупредил об ответственности за призывы к сепаратизму." РИА Новости. December 26, 2013 (zc). Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131226/986661690.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ad. „Janukovič prizval sootěčesvěnnikov překratit protivostojanije“ December 13, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/984006010.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013bd. „Možet li Majdan zakončitsia graždanskoj vojnoj“. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/ocherki/20131210/983252136.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013cd. “Frakcii GD podděržat prizyv k Zapadu ně okazyvat davlěnije na Ukrajinu“. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/politics/20131210/983131439.html#ixzz3yqDZkrz0>.

RIA Novosti 2013dd. „Mědvěděv o situacii n Ukrajině: eto vnutrěnněje dělo, no poriadok važen“. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981863945.html#ixzz3yqFZjNAn>.

RIA Novosti 2013ed. „Krěml' podtvěrdil poziciju něvměšatělstva vo vnutřěnnije děla Ukrajiny“ December 17, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131217/984729749.html#ixzz3yqeRNegM>.

RIA Novosti 2013fd. „Šuvalov“ Rossija gotova k přěřegovoram s Ukrajoj v liubom formatě“ December 11, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/economy/20131212/983568818.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013gd. „Bělorusskaja opozicija gotovit akcii v podděržku „evromajdana““ December 03, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981499671.html>

RIA Novosti 2013hd. „Gruzinskaja opozicija učastvujet v „evromajdaně“ v Kijevě“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981508656.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013jd. „Glavy MID stran ES mogut obsudit prizyv k sankcijam protiv Ukrajiny“. December 13, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/983925644.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013id. „Ukrajina běz Vilnusa, ili Pridiot li Janukovič na Majdan“ . November 28, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/ocherki/20131128/980363944.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013kd. „Glava Evroparlamenta osudil priměněnije sily protiv mitingujuščich v Kijevě“. December 01, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/980948983.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ld. „Barrozu prizval vlasti Ukrajiny uvažat' prava liudiej na sobranija“ December 02, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981329721.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013md. „Rassmussen prizyvajet vsie storony na Ukrajině vozdržat'sia ot nasilija“. January 01, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981055485.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013nd. „Otnošenija Ukrajiny i SŠA zavisiat ot sobliudženija Kijevom svobod graždan“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981380850.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013od. “Puškov sčitajet, čto SŠA obščajutsia s Ukrajinoj kak s polukolonijej”. December 14, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984080947.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013pd. „Pariž ne sčitajet popytkoj gospěřevorota vystuplěnija opozicii v Kijevě“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981499163.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013qd. „Pomoščnik gossěkrětaria SŠA vstrětitsia s vlastiami i opozicijej“ December 05, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982112940.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013rd. “Glava MID Polši vstretilsia v Kijevě s liděrami ukrajinskou opozicii” December 05, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982260024.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013sd. „Liděř pol'skoj partii „Zákon i spravedlivost“ Kačinskij jedět v Kijev““ December 01, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131201/980900466.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013td. „Aměrikanskije sěnatory vystupili na „narodnom věče“ v Kijevě“ December 15, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131215/984215161.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ud. „Glava MID Litvy vstretilsia s Kličko i razdal mitingujuščim pėrčatki“ December 14, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984128217.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013yd. “Glava MID Chorvatii, posietivšaja Majdan, ne oščutila tam napriažionnosti”. December 05, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982214519.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013wd. „Glava MID Germanii prišiol na kijejskij majdan vměště s oppozionerami“. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981974754.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013xd. Kliuchevaja frakcija EP otkryto poddieržala učastnikov mitingov na Ukrajině“. December 02, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981380294.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013yd. „Azarov podpišet soglašenije s ES, polučiv vygodnyje uslovija“. December 20, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131221/985561099.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013zd. „Simvoličeskaja akcija solidarnosti s Ukrajinoj prošla v Evroparlamentě“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131203/981603192.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ae. “Glava MID Ukrainy prizval Evropu ně podbadrivat’ protěstujuščich v Kijevě“. December 05, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982096672.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013be. „Mědvěděv: Ukrajina dolžna sama rešat’ svoji problěmy, a ně drugije strany“. December 06, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982398155.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ce. „Ukrajina ně dolžna byt' pridatkom Evropy, zajavil přemjer“. December 14, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984093136.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013de. „Evromajdan vrědit intěřsam gosudarstva, zajavil glava MID Ukrajiny“ December 13, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131214/984039761.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ee. „Bojko: Ukrajina ždiot ot ES čiotkogo signala o priedostavlienii pomošči“ December 06, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131206/982543416.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013fe. „Arbuzov prosit mitingujuščich studentov Ukrajiny vozobnovit' učiobu“ December 05, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982212448.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ge. Azarov“ vyplaty pěnsij pod ugrozoi iz-za blokirovanija organov vlasti " December 02, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981352457.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013he. „Na Ukrajině iz-za protěstov vyros spros na skupku inostrannoi valiuty“ December 12, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131212/983612429.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013je. “Azarov: blokirovanije Rady měšajet podgotovkě k evrointegracii” December 05, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131205/982154885.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ie. “Polovina ukrajincev priedvidit posledstvija „evromajdana““. December 30, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131230/987384271.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ke. "Vlasti Kijeva předupřezdajut ib opasnosti epidemii iz-za masových akcij". December 07, 2013 (ke). Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131207/982642514.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013le. "Odin čelovek s Majdana gospitalizirovan s podozreniem na tuberkulioz" December 09, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131209/983007727.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013me. „Pushkov: ES chotěl by sviernnut' Janukoviča s pomoošč'ju „oranževogo majdana““. December 15, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131215/984215815.html#ixzz3zD4qt5Xh>.

RIA Novosti 2013ne. „Žirinovskij sčitajet, čto Janukoviču sledujet vvodit' na Ukrajině ČP“ December 02, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131202/981304090.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013oe. „Partija regionov obvinila opoziciju v podgotovkě převorota na Ukrajině“. December 03, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981719806.html>.

RIA Novosti 2012pe. „Partija regionov rascenila obraščenije Timošenko kak prizyv k převorotu“ December 08, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982791171.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013qe. „Riad ukrajinskich politikov podozřevajutsia v popytkě zachvata vlasti“ December 08, 2013. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131208/982792159.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013re. „Okolo 15 tysiač provodiat v Doněckě miting v poddřžku Janukoviča“ December 04, 2013. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131204/981884750.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013se. „Mědvědév: inostrannyje politiki grubo vměšivajutsia v děla Ukrajiny“ December 13, 2013. Accessed March 26, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131213/983987426.html#ixzz3z24YJMFu>.

RIA Novosti 2013te. „Naskol'ko evrointegracija vygodna riadovym ukrajincam“ November 28, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/analytics/20131128/980409519.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013ue. “Ukrajina. Jesli eto revoliucija, to kuda ona vėdiot” December 02, 2013. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/analytics/20131202/981242045.html#ixzz3shssuzmB>.

RIA Novosti 2013ve. “Ukrajina počtila pamiat' žertv goloda 1930-ch godov minutnoj molčanija“ December 02, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131123/979219384.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013we. “GD prizvala zapadnyh politikov ně davit' na Ukrajinu. December 10, 2013. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131210/983230764.html>.

RIA Novosti 2013xe. Soratniki Timošenko ně smogut jejo navestiť v boľnice iz-za karantėna“. November 25, 2013. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20131125/979558340.html>.

Primary sources 2014

RIA Novosti 2014a. „Pėrvoje v 2014 godu narodnoje vėče prochodit v centre Kijeva“ January 12, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140112/988788591.html#ixzz3sswnAXvb>.

RIA Novosti 2014b. „V narodnom vėče v Kijevė priniali 10 tysiač čelovėk“. January 19, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140119/990032409.html#ixzz3ssxaakZG>.

RIA Novosti 2014c. „Ožidajemo mitingujušćimi šturma „evromajdana“ v Kijevě ně projzošo“ January 16, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140116/989512165.html#ixzz3syaE3c3a>.

RIA Novosti 2014d. „Politolog: dějstvija nacionalistov mogut privěsti k raskolu Ukrajiny“. January 21, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140121/990439548.html#ixzz3sz5VGBAM>.

RIA Novosti 2014e. „Portrět Bandery vyvěsili protěstujušćije na zdanii Kijevsověta“. January 14, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140114/989204278.html#ixzz3sz5fGe35>.

RIA Novosti 2014f. „Sud zaprětil provědinije akcij v centre Kijeva do 8 marta“. January 15, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140115/989380182.html#ixzz3szvPYyKe>.

RIA Novosti 2014h. „MVD Ukrajiny objasnilo, počemu „Běrkut“ pěřěšiol k aktivnym dějstvijam“. January 22, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140122/990598528.html#ixzz3t0Px2Bx6>.

RIA Novosti 2014i. „SMI: arěstovany sčeta organizacij, sobiravšich děngi na „evromajdan““. January 22, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140122/990691264.html#ixzz3t0QE0Fd8>

RIA Novosti 2014j. „Ekspert“: liberály potěriali kontrol' nad radikalami” January 21, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140121/990494678.html#ixzz3xgziw7Gh>.

RIA Novosti 2014k. „Ukrajinskaja opozicija vooružajetsia, armija pěkduprěždajet“. January 19, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140219/995887464.html#ixzz3xhIC2zeS>.

RIA Novosti 2014l. „Akcija na Majdaně ně otařžajet intěřesy, strany, zajavil přěmjer Ukrajinu“ January 21, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140121/990505663.html#ixzz3xhs0Ndui>.

RIA Novosti 2014lk. „MVD Ukrainy: okolo dvuch tysiač čelověk blokirujut voinskije časti vo Ľvově“. January 21, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140121/990488124.html#ixzz3xhrr663S>.

RIA Novosti 2014m. „Učastnikov „evromajdana“ v Kijevě zaděřžali za samosud“. January 10, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140210/994100945.html#ixzz3xi8CDDU2>.

RIA Novosti 2014n. „Radikaly v Kijevě mogut byť vooruženy ogniestriel'nym oružijem“ January 18, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140218/995541759.html#ixzz3xi8iCLW0>.

RIA Novosti 2014o. „Ulica v Kijevě, gđě šli stolknověnija silovikov i radikalov, rasčiščena“ January 18, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140218/995573386.html#ixzz3yAq1q8tK>.

RIA Novosti 2014p. "Liděra frakciji „Batkivščina oblili zelionkoj v Charkově“. February 12, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140212/994572859.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014q. "Ukrajinskaja opozicija blokirujet tribunu i přezidium Věrchovnoj Rady" January 14, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140114/989105041.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014r. „Vlasti Ukrainy prosiat opoziciju přěkratit stolknověnija“ January 21, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140121/990494281.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014s. „Ogoň, voda i brusčatka: itogi narodnogo včë v Kijevë“. January 20, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140120/990216652.html#ixzz3t0Qnd8fF>.

RIA Novosti 2014t. „MVD provëriajet soobščeniye ob izbijeniji učastnikov mirnoj akcii v Kijevë“. February 15, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140215/995054852.html#ixzz3yAoGswFe>.

RIA Novosti 2014u. „Storonniki i protivniki vlastëj mitingujut v Charkovë“. January 12, 2014. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140112/988803534.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014v. „Patriarch Kirill vidit v sobytijach na Ukrajinë ugrozu razdëlëniya nacji“. January 07, 2014. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140107/988147929.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014w. „Priedstaviteli Gosdumy gotovy při nëobchodimosti pojechať v Kijev“. January 22, 2014. Accessed March 21, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140122/990720694.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014x. „Kosačiov“ sobytija na Ukrajinë govoriat o razobščionnosti „russkogo mira“. January 29, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140129/991981347.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014y. „Gosdëp SŠA annuliroval vizeny ukrajincev, pričastnykh k razgonu majdana“. January 22, 2014 (y). Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140122/990634061.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014z. „FRG: učastniki bësporiadkov v Kijevë diskreditirujut trëbovanija oppozicii“. January 20, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140120/990222633.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014aa. „Představiteli Evrosojuza jedut na Ukrajinu so specmissijej.“. January 20, 2014 (aa). Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140220/995974731.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014ba. „Ubytki ot „evromajdana“ mogut sostavit' \$1,75 mln“. January 21, 2014. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140121/990421838.html>.

RIA Novosti 2014ca. „Evromajdan vně zákona: Rada zaščitila Ukrajinu ot přěvorota“. January 17, 2014 Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://ria.ru/world/20140118/989894343.html>.

RIA Novosti 2016. “MIA “Rossija Segodnia” | RIA Novosti”. April 20, 2016. Accessed April 20, 2016. <http://ria.ru/docs/about/index.html>.

Secondary sources

Books

Ball-Rokeach S.J., and DeFleur M.L. "A Dependency Model of Mass-Media Effects." *Communication Research*, January 1976, 3-21.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Reprint ed. Vol. 256. 0140135480, 9780140135480. London: Penguin Books, 1991.

Eagly, Alice Hendrickson., and Shelly Chaiken. *The Psychology of Attitudes*. Vol. 794. Series 0155000977. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1993. (131, 329)

Goffman, E.: *Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 1974.

Griffin, Emory A. *A First Look at Communication Theory*. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2006.

p. 372-382

Klapper, J.T. "The Effects of Mass Communication." 1960. New York. Free press accessed from webpage March 23, 2016 <http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~tecas/syllabi2/adv382jfall2002/readings/sev14c.pdf>

Lasswell H.D. *The Structure and Function of Communication in Society// The Communication of Ideas*. Edited by Bryson. New York, 1948.

MCQUAIL, Denis. Úvod do teorie masové komunikace. Vyd. 4. rozš. a přeprac. Praha: Portál, 2009. 639 s. ISBN 978-807-3675-745.

Semionova B. A., and Korsunskaja B. M. *Kontent Analiz SMI: problémy i opyt priměnenija*. Edited by Mansurov A. V. Vol. 324. ISBN 978-5-89697-188-7. Moskva: PAH, 2010.

Articles in magazines

Chong, D., and J. N. Druckman. "Framing Theory." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2007, 103-26.

Dubskich A.I. „Mass-mediaľnyj diskurs: oprědělěnije, charakteristiki, priznaki“. *Věstnik Južno-Ural'skogo gosudarstvěnnogo universitět. Sěrija: Lingvistika. Vypusk № 1 / tom 11*, 2014.

Entman, Robert M. "Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm." *Journal of Communication*, April 1993, 51-58.

Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. "The changing culture of affirmative action". *Research in political sociology*, 3(2), 1987, 137-177.

Iyengar, Shanto. "Framing Responsibility for Political Issues: The Case of Poverty." *Political Behavior*, March 1990, 19-40.

Kitzinger, J.: Framing and Frame Analysis in Devereux, E. (ed.): *Media Studies: Key Issues and Debates*, London, Sage 2007. S. 134-135

Scheufele, Dietram A. "Framing As a Theory of Media Effects." *Journal of Communication*, March 1999, 103-122.

Teun, Van Dijk. "Mediating Racism "The Role of the Media in the Reproduction of Racism." Website of Teun A. Van Dijk. Accessed March 23, 2016. <http://www.discourses.org/OldArticles/MediatingRacism.pdf>.

Tory, E., Gillian King, and G. H. Mavin. "Individual Construct Accessibility and Subjective Impressions and Recall." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, July 1982, 35-47.

Tuchman, Gaye. *Making News: A Study in the Construction of Reality*. Illustrated ed. Vol. 244. 0029329302, 9780029329306. New York: Free Press, 1978.

Zimin M.A. „Effektivnost' mědiatizirovannoj kommunikacii v izbiratělnom processe: teoretičeskije modeli i elektoral'naja praktika“ " *Politěmatičeskij sětėvoj elėktronnyj naučnyj žurnal Kubanskogo gosudarstvėnnogo agrarnogo univėritėta*, 2006. Vypusk № 20

Zubarėv D.J. „Obščestvėnnoje mnėnija: diskussii o dėfinicii“. „Armija i obščestvo“, March 2014.

Online sources

Barberá, Pablo, and Megan Metzger. "How Ukrainian Protestors Are Using Twitter and Facebook." *Washington Post*. December 04, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2013/12/04/strategic-use-of-facebook-and-twitter-in-ukrainian-protests/>.

Chervonenko, Vitali. "Ukraine's EU Options 'still Open' - BBC News." *BBC News*. November 25, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25087160>.

Hirst, Michael. "European Square: Hashtag of Ukraine Protest - BBC News." BBC News. November 22, 2013. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-25050141>.

Lenta.ru „Ananlitiki podsčitali číslo poľzovatěľej interneta v Rossii“. Lenta.ru. January 28, 2016. Accessed March 17, 2016. <https://lenta.ru/news/2016/01/28/survey/>

"Kompanija "Medialogija"". SMI v socmedia - II kvartal 2015. 2015. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://www.mlg.ru/company/pr/3692/>.

The Telegraph. "Ukraine Court Upholds Yulia Tymoshenko Conviction." The Telegraph. August 29, 2012. Accessed March 20, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/9505553/Ukraine-court-upholds-Yulia-Tymoshenko-conviction.html>.

Ukrainskaja pravda. "Arsen Avakov": „Běrkuta boľše nět“. February 26, 2014. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/avakov/530d234197fa3/>.

VCIOM. "Пресс-выпуск." Пресс-выпуск №2545. March 26, 2014. Accessed March 22, 2016. <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236>.

Volkov Denis, and Gončarov Stěpan. "Rossijskij media landšaft těľviděnije 17.06.2014 přessa..." Lěvada-Centr. Analitičeskij Centr Jurija Lěvady ". June 17, 2014. Accessed March 17, 2016. <http://lageneralista.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Российский-медиа-ландшафт-телевидение-пресса-Интернет.pdf>.

Dictionaries

Oxford Dictionaries. "Chaotic: Learner's Dictionary." Oxford Dictionaries. Accessed March 19, 2016. <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/chaotic>.

Legal documents

Postanova Kabiněta Ministriv Ukrajinvy vid 27 sičnia 2010 N 55 Kyjiv. “ Pro vporiadkuvannia transliteraciji ukrajins’koho alfabitu latiniceju” Accessed March 23, 2016 <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/55-2010-%D0%BF/conv?test=4/UMfPEGznhhwME.ZiKNA0AIHI4m6s80msh8Ie6>