

Abstract

The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the first person point of view; it is necessary to be clear about the sense of our investigation: mainly if our questions are ontological questions or if they are not. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is shown as the consequence of the misunderstanding of the role of subjectivity in intentionality.

Keywords:

Consciousness, intentionality, intentional object, perception, experience, mind-body problem, objectivity, subjectivity, physicalism, phenomenal character, first person point of view, causality