

UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

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Diplomová práce

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Bc. Iveta Černá

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**American Cities in the Post-Industrial
Reality: Detroit and Pittsburgh**

Diplomová práce

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Abstrakt: Práce se zabývá možnostmi restrukturalizace měst amerického středozápadu, konkrétně Detroitu a Pittsburghu, v post-industriální době. Nejprve se zabývá tím, jaké důsledky pro oblast tzn. Rust-Beltu měla globalizace světové ekonomiky. Dále sleduje vliv jednotlivých federálních městských politik na starší industriální města v této oblasti. Jelikož města Detroit a Pittsburgh během deindustrializace svých ekonomik musela čelit problémům jako jsou vyliďňování, nezaměstnanost, uzavírání továren, nebo úpadek měst, úspěšnost proměny měst je v práci posuzována za pomoci komparace jejich demografického a ekonomického vývoje. Poslední dvě kapitoly práce se zabývají zhodnocením plány na obnovu v obou městech a zahrnují jak strategie městského plánování, tak plány pro ekonomickou restrukturalizaci.

Abstract: The thesis studies possibilities of restructuring of post-industrial cities by closely following and comparing the restructuring efforts of two cities located in the U.S. Midwest, Detroit and Pittsburgh. It studies the consequences of globalizing economy on the area of so-called Rust-Belt, as well as the impacts of the federal urban policies on the older industrial cities located in this area. Through deindustrialization of their economies, both Detroit and Pittsburgh suffered from similar problems, such as depopulation, unemployment, factory closure, and urban decline. Therefore to evaluate the level of success of the cities' transformation, the thesis compares their demographic and economic development. The last two chapter of the thesis provide assessment of Detroit's and Pittsburgh's transformation efforts by focusing on the urban planning and economic restructuring strategies.

Klíčová slova: Detroit, Pittsburgh, středozápad USA, postindustriální deindustrializace, ekonomická restrukturalizace, rasová segregace, Strategy 21, Detroit Renaissance, městské plánování

Keywords: Detroit, Pittsburgh, U.S. Midwest, post-industrial, deindustrialization, economic restructuring, racial segregation, Strategy 21, Detroit Renaissance, urban planning

Rozsah práce: 106,333.

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval/a samostatně a použil/a jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Prohlašuji, že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného titulu.
3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne

Iveta Černá

My thanks belongs to Kryštof Kozák, who continued to ask me the right questions, to residents of Detroit, who shared their personal stories and views about the future of the city with me, and to my friends and family, who were willing to share my enthusiasm about the story of the two cities and encouraged me in my work.

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V čem se oproti původnímu zadání změnil cíl práce?

Cíl zůstává stále stejný.

Jaké změny nastaly v časovém, teritoriálním a věcném vymezení tématu?

Jelikož se práce zabývá aktuálním tématem a situace v Detroitu se neustále vyvíjí, budu do práce muset alespoň stručně zahrnout také současný vývoj ve správě Detroitu po dosazení krizového manažera.

Jak se proměnila struktura práce (vyjádřete stručným obsahem)?

1. Úvod
2. Rozvoj těžkého průmyslu v tzv. Rust Beltu
3. Vliv deindustrializace na demografický a ekonomický vývoj Rust Beltu
4. Americký těžký průmysl v kontextu globalizované výroby
5. Detroit, město duchů – problem upadajícího industriálního centra
6. Strategie detroitké radnice a její výsledky
7. Pittsburgh jako vzor účinného městského plánování
8. Podíl občasných iniciativ a neziskových organizací na obnově města
9. Zhodnocení přístupu restrukturalizace v Detroitu a Pittsburghu
10. Závěr

Jakým vývojem prošla metodologická koncepce práce?

Hlavní část práce – komparace možností rozvoje Detroitu a Pittsburghu bude vycházet z porovnávání minulých a současných plánů rozvoje obou měst a průzkumu občasných iniciativ a neziskových organizací, které se podílejí na rozvoji města v komunitním měřítku.

Které nové prameny a sekundární literatura byly zpracovány a jak tato skutečnost ovlivnila celek práce?

1. The Detroit Future City Plan 2010. Strategický plan rozvoje města Detroit, jež vznikl během náročného procesu konzultací města s odborníky a veřejností se zabývá jak naplněním ekonomických možností města, tak využitím ploch města, které vznikají po odstranění nepotřebných budov. Jelikož DFC Plan komplexně postihuje problem a možnosti města ,bude sloužit jako měřítko úspěchu či neúspěchu minulých a současných aktivit radnice města.
2. The Origins of Urban Crises – Thomas J. Sugrue. Tato práce sleduje proměnu města během procesu rasové segregace a stěhování bělošského obyvatelstva do okrajových částí města, což vedlo k problému poměrně běžnému v amerických městech, a to k vytváření černošských ghet a postupnému chudnutí centrálních oblastí.

Charakterizujte základní proměny práce v době od zadání projektu do odevzdání tezí a pokuste se vyhodnotit, jaký pokrok na práci jste během semestru zaznamenali (v bodech):

Po prostudování nových zdrojů je jasné, že pátá kapitola (Detroit a jeho problem) se bude muset více věnovat vlivům rasové segregace. Dále bych chtěla jednotlivé kapitoly uvádět krátkými vinětami sledujícími konkrétní kulturní projevy, jež dokreslí vývoj Detroitu a Pittsburghu.

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Introduction

After decades of industrial boom, Detroit, a city which had literally been one of the America's driving forces, has in the six decades following the WWII gradually turned into a poster child of urban decline. The city played a hugely important role in shaping the United States in the 20th century. It was in the Motor City where Ford perfected his assembly line, introduced the \$5 a day wages and brought revolution not only to how people move and where they work, but also helped to create the modern blue collar middle-class. Yet, after the auto industry declined, the city which could once boast the population of nearly 2 million became known for its urban farms that have popped up in the abandoned lots, ruins photography, and high level of criminality. It has experienced white flight, black flight, and even what became known as the dead flight as people disinter their relatives to rebury them in the suburbs, where they now live.

Yet, the story of post-industrial urban decline is not unique to Detroit or the U.S. Midwest which once was the manufacturing heart of the nation. Cities and communities all around the world have been experiencing similar difficulties as the global economy entered the post-industrial era. The incredible forces such as rapid urbanization, innovations in transportation, and expansion of factory production, that spurred the growth of these cities during the industrial revolution exhausted themselves against the effects of de-industrialization. Places like the Ruhr area in Germany, Northern Moravia in the Czech Republic, Silesia in Poland, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Bilbao in Spain, and many others had been facing the difficult urban transition common to the post-industrial economy. These include the deterioration of industrial complexes, sprawl in suburban areas, social exclusion, and various forms of urban conflicts. At the same time, the industrial economy with its needs had marked the urban planning in these cities, and therefore the cities have been for some time trying to come up with revitalizing plans hoping to create urban areas that will accommodate the needs of modern post-industrial economy and become more attractive for people. And they have been doing so with various results.

Being interested in whether there exists a set of solutions that could be applied to post-industrial cities as they are struggling with the effects of deindustrialization of local economies, this thesis will focus on concrete examples of

two cities located in the now so-called Rust-Belt of the United States, Detroit and Pittsburgh. Both grew around one single industry, automotive and steel respectively, and experienced similar problems as their economies de-industrialized. The thesis thus compares similarities and differences in the restructuring process. These particular cities were chosen, because they managed the process with different results. While Detroit has become the poster child for urban decline, Pittsburgh experienced a successful revival and managed to diversify its economy.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that Pittsburgh managed to reverse its decline because of the following reasons: (1) the near fatal collapse of its main industry in the early 1980s forced the city to restructure its economy early-on in the deindustrialization process; (2) it managed to restructure its economy within the framework of a regional coalition including both central city and its suburbs, so the core city was not separated from the regional economy and this strengthened its ability to adapt to changing circumstances and (3) had a long-term comprehensive restructuring plan, which put emphasis on both economic transformation and urban revitalization. At the same time Detroit continued to face decline because it (1) remained dominated by the auto industry and its economy had been imitating the trends in this industry such as gradual decline in production; and (2) did not manage to deal with urban crisis which was instigated by the city's racial problems; and (3) never adopted a restructuring plan that would span the city in its entirety, including the metropolitan area.

To find out what forces caused the Detroit and Pittsburgh, both of which were once heavily dependent on manufacturing, to come out of deindustrialization with different results, the thesis compared the restructuralization efforts undertaken by the two cities. As the crises caused in the cities by the deindustrialization were not only economic but also urban, it was similarly important to study strategies that focused on transformation of the local economies (Strategy 21 in Pittsburgh), as well as those strategies aiming to revitalize the urban fabric of the cities (Renaissances in both cities). In order to assess what circumstances were favorable for successful urban transformation, the thesis tried to find out whether the two cities followed long-term strategies and if these strategies were based on a broad public-private coalition. To reveal what effects of the socioeconomic factors on the cities throughout the transformation and how what were the effects of the restructuring efforts in both

cities, data from the U.S. Bureau of Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics were used.

In order to explain the complex processes that contributed to the deindustrialization of U.S. Midwest and thus hurt the economies of the local cities including Detroit and Pittsburgh, the introductory chapter will first explain how the trends of globalized economy affected the region. It then focuses on the development of federal urban policies, which greatly encouraged the demographic shift to suburban areas and away from the central cities, and by increasingly focusing its support on the growth areas it also contributed to the disinvestment of public fund in the older industrial cities. This trend will then be considered from the perspective of political economy to demonstrate that disinvestment into the productive capacity of older industrial cities was partly a result of broader political forces prevailing in the United States in the post-WWII era.

The second chapter will provide an overview of the highly interconnected demographic and economic development of both Detroit and Pittsburgh and their metropolitan areas. First, it will describe how the decline of the automobile industry – first in the central city and then also in the metropolitan area – contributed to the loss of manufacturing jobs and subsequent depopulation of the central city, which thus had to deal with high level of vacancy and shrinking tax base. As the depopulation of the central city was in case of Detroit significantly enhanced by racial segregation that transformed the central city into an urban ghetto, the chapter will also discuss the development of racial relations in the city and its metropolitan area. The racial element of the urban crisis in Detroit becomes especially obvious when compared with Pittsburgh, which, although also highly segregated, did not develop a sharp racial boundary between the central city and surrounding suburbs. The second part of the chapter will follow the collapse of the steel industry in Pittsburgh and its impact of the city's demographics.

The third chapter will present possible approaches of urban planning to revitalization of the cities, assess how and with what success these were applied in Detroit and Pittsburgh, and discuss concrete urban planning efforts that were undertaken in order to reverse the consequences of the urban and economic crises in these cities.

The last chapter provides an assessment of the development of economic restructuring in Detroit and Pittsburgh regions and its outcomes. First, it focuses on Pittsburgh's Strategy 21 and the results of concrete steps undertaken within the framework of this comprehensive plan, which emerged from regional public-private cooperation. The second part of the chapter will show that economic restructuring in Detroit was halted by the city's inability to neither create a long-term plan, nor establish a working regional coalition the local governments and private sector. The final part demonstrates that the socioeconomic isolation of the central city within the Detroit metropolitan region had a negative effect on the city's restructuring process.

The concluding chapter shows that the restructuring efforts in Detroit and Pittsburgh were substantially affected by the central cities' position within their metropolitan region. The case of Pittsburgh shows that its ability to form a strong regional public-private coalition was crucial for its economic and urban revival. On the other hand, Detroit's case shows that the lack of more comprehensive restructuralization strategy, which would reflect the interests of various economic actors, did harmed the city, where redevelopment focused primarily on concentrated downtown area and did not solve neither the problems of city's vast neighborhoods, nor the city's economy.

As the Detroit's bankruptcy spurred new wave of interest in the urban transformation of the U.S. cities, there is an enormous body of literature analyzing various aspects of Detroit's decline, as well as literature focusing on comparison of management of urban decline in various urban areas affected by the deindustrialization. The most vital documents for this research were the cities' restructuring plans and academics reports analyzing various aspects of the restructuring efforts. When it comes to the assessment of the current situation in the cities, which is important for understanding the results of their transformations, current news media articles offered a detailed overview.

Scott Martelle, a former staff writer for the Los Angeles Times and the Detroit News, provides a complex overview of the development of Detroit, capturing its transformation during the industrial revolution, rise of automotive industry, and the subsequent descent of the city into a long crisis. The strength of Martelle's work

lies in his ability to put the numbers that define the economic downfall of the city into perspective of the social and urban forces that had an impact on the city.

Thomas Sugrue, who is a prominent U.S. urban historian from the University of Pennsylvania, with roots in the Detroit area, contributed to the body of works on Detroit with his seminal work in which he examines the role of race, housing and job discrimination on the decline of the city. He argues that the process of deindustrialization of Detroit started already back in the 1950s with suburbanization. In his more current work he also focuses on possibilities of urban revitalization and encourages nurturing institution and regional coalitions. Although his work is determined by the racial perspective of Detroit's problems, his detailed analyses of the evolution of the race relation in the city and its suburbs presents a convincing argument for why the racial segregation so significantly shaped the city.

Hyung Je Jo's study of the effects of regional politics on the creation of urban regimes offers a unique sociological perspective to the comparison of restructuring efforts in Detroit and Pittsburgh. By showing how the formation of coalition within urban regimes can affect various social results including income level or poverty distribution, Jo details how the inability of various economic actors in Detroit hurt the city's ability to recover from its crisis.

Primary sources included demographic data, as well as detailed reports on the trends of population and economic growth in Detroit and Pittsburgh. Newspaper articles provided interesting data comparisons, as well as current perspective the many aspects of the deindustrialization processes in the Rust-Belt and the two studied cities.

Deindustrialization and Urban Decline in Rust-Belt Cities

The region of the Northeastern and Midwestern states of the United States, now the so-called Rust Belt, historically developed as the center of the U.S. heavy industry. Because it transformed its economic production from primary to secondary activity before the end of the 19th century, Midwest had a head start on the other regions of the U.S. Its economy greatly benefited from surplus labor and the development of infrastructural network in the early 19th century, which provided it with easy access to resources as well as markets in the U.S. and abroad, and until mid-20th century, this was the dominant production region in the world.¹ The World War II, during which the region produced war machinery and thus became the “Arsenal of Democracy”, signified the peak of flourishing of industrial manufacturing in the region. In the following decades, especially since the 1970s, its share of aggregate economic activity declined dramatically.²

The region’s economic transformation was caused by a variety of factors including globalization of markets and internalization of the production processes, increased automation of the manufacturing process – which led to reduction of manufacturing jobs – and movement of the manufacturing within the United States from the Rust Belt to other parts of the country, especially the “Sun Belt,”³ which offered cheaper - and nonunion - labor, less expensive land, temperate weather, tax breaks, and other government incentives. As it brought not only a decline in output, but also in employment, wages and population, the impact of such transformation on the Rust Belt cities, particularly Detroit, Pittsburgh, Akron, Flint, Cleveland, was tremendous.⁴

¹ David R. Meyer, “Midwestern Industrialization and the American Manufacturing Belt in the Nineteenth Century,” *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (1989), 921. JSTOR.

² Simeon Adler, et al. “The Decline of the U.S. Rust Belt: A Macroeconomic Analysis,” Working Papers, 2013, 1, accessed January 10, 2014, <http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/workshops/macro/TheDeclineoftheU.S.RustBelt.pdf>

³ Sun Belt is the region that comprises the southern and southeastern United States, and includes states extending from Florida to California. The region has experienced large population growth since the 1960s, which was partly caused by the affordability of air conditioning. In addition the military installments attracted new types of industries such as aerospace and defense, which helped the region’s economic growth.

⁴ Chamma Yoon, “The Decline of the Rust Belt: A Dynamic Spatial Equilibrium Analysis,” (City University of New York, 2014), 9, accessed February 19, 2014, <http://erwan.marginalq.com/HULM14s/cy.pdf>

The decentralization trends were set in motion right after the WWII, as new post-war assembly plants were built out of the traditional industrial centers, which started the process of urban deindustrialization. Most of these cities therefore underwent significant spatial reorganization of production and suburban growth leading to the impoverishment of inner cities, suffering from shrinking tax base.⁵ Since many of the Midwestern cities still struggle today with the uneven development of their inner cities compared to suburbs, to understand the roots of current problems, it is important to look at the socioeconomic, political and urban that effected the transformation of these cities in detail.

Until the 1970s, the Midwest's prosperity was based on easy access to natural resources such as iron ore and coal, providing the region with natural comparative advantage, and a good transportation infrastructure network, which opened up the region to both national and international trade. The relatively low production costs allowed the region to compete in extraction of coal and iron ore, production of materials such as steel, and mass-manufacturing of durable goods, such as cars and industrial machinery.⁶ However, the 1970s brought fundamental changes in the global economy and as the international markets rapidly integrated, foreign lower-cost commodities and products entering the markets challenged the advantages that the Midwest producers previously gained by high production, clustering of the production, and transportation networks. They were not prepared to quickly adapt their production techniques to new conditions. Simultaneously the global economy was undergoing a broader shift to a "post-industrial" service based economy and the decline of the mass-production system coincided with the disinvestment in productive capacity in the Midwest region during the 1970s and 1980s. This was a result of a number of factors – the traditional manufacturing industries relocated to "low-wage locations," particularly the Sun Belt. At the same time development of high technology industries such as aeronautics, electronics or information technology gave rise to new industrial complexes in other parts of the country, namely California, Florida and New England.⁷ Altogether these trends transformed the

⁵ William Haller, "Industrial Restructuring and Urban Change in the Pittsburgh Region: Developmental, Ecological, and Socioeconomic Trade-offs," *Ecology and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), accessed August 12, 2013, <http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss1/art13/>

⁶ Philippe Cooke, *The Rise of the Rust Belt*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 5.

⁷ These areas have easy access to shipping lines, i.e. have better access to global markets.

national economy, within which manufacturing now has less prominent role. As a consequence, the overall U.S. labor force has increased dramatically, resulting in a massive reduction in the percent of the labor force that is engaged in industry.

Though the transformation of industrial Midwest reflected deeper changes in capitalist system – a shift towards a knowledge-based economy, which brought a transformation from the Fordian assembly-line mass-production model to a more integrated model of a high-performance organization⁸ – compared to the rest of the United States, the deindustrialization has happened on a much larger scale in the Midwest.⁹ In their analysis of Rust Belt’s decline, Adler and his colleagues explain this trend by pointing to the lack of competition in the region’s labor force, outputs and markets, caused by the presence of the “close-knit oligopolists in many industries,” who until the 1980s faced very low competitive pressures, as they controlled most of the domestic market and dictated prices, as well as the presence of powerful labor unions.¹⁰ In fact, the Rust Belt was dominated by unions, which made it less attractive for existing and prospective employers. The U.S. Bureau of Statistics shows that in 1974 seven out of top 10 most unionized states were located in Midwest. While the two largest unions, United Steel workers (USW) and United Auto Workers (UAW), organized roughly two thirds of all the workers in their lines of production. As a result, the average wage in the region was higher than in other parts of the country, especially for the manufacturing workers.¹¹ Therefore it was more profitable for the manufacturing companies to relocate production to regions with cheaper labor.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁹ Adler, et al., 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹¹ Adler and colleagues state that the wages were higher in average by 10 percent over the period stretching from 1950 to 1980. *Ibid.*, 8.




Figure 1: Manufacturing Share of Total Jobs in U.S. and Midwest, 1969-2009¹²

Cooke mentions that another important aspect, which allowed the Midwest to prosper without increasing the productivity were among other things public policies emphasizing financial incentives, such as tax abatements to the manufacturing businesses, as well as other federal government’s business regulatory tools including “reduction of marginal costs of operation, regulation of business externalities and, at the State level, recruitment of branch plant firms.”¹³ In the frame of political economy Florida and Jonas describe the State intervention as an attempt to maintain the Fordist model of mass production, which was “associated with a relatively stable period of economic growth in the postwar U.S. political economy.”¹⁴

Thus, when the region was confronted with the changes of globalized economy, its competitiveness, based on clustering of industries, was challenged by the fact that local manufacturing workers’ wages were above the national average, and it was simply more expedient for the companies to relocate their production elsewhere. This was possible especially because the transportation costs plummeted

¹² Richard Florida, “The Midwest’s Manufacturing Conundrum,” *Citylab*, May 11, 2011, accessed July 1, 2014, <http://www.citylab.com/work/2012/05/midwests-manufacturing-conundrum/1920/>.

¹³ Cooke, 169.

¹⁴ Richard Florida and Andrew Jonas, “U.S. Urban Policy: The Postwar State and Capitalist Regulation,” *Antipode*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1991): 352, accessed June 2, 2014, http://creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/US_Urban_Policy.pdf.

over the course of the 20th century.¹⁵ At the same time, the companies which had been cooperating to eliminate competition by setting the prices felt no pressure to invest into modernizing their production process. Evidence can be found that various industries with majority of production based in the Rust Belt, including steel, car and rubber industries, chose not to adopt new production technologies, even though they had access to them earlier than the foreign producers.¹⁶ The system organized in such way thus not only depressed productivity growth, but, when the market opened to foreign competition and lower-cost commodities, it took the manufacturers too long to adapt.¹⁷ As a result of all of these trends, the Rust Belt was gradually losing its share on both, aggregate employment (from 43 percent in 1950 to 27 percent in 2000) and manufacturing employment (from 52 percent in 1950 to 32.5 percent in 2000) within the U.S. economy.¹⁸

In addition to the structural changes in the manufacturing sector and global economy, the future of the region was also significantly shaped by the demographic changes and by federal and state policies regulating urban development. Unlike in the 1960s, when the demographic trends, e.g. fertility and migration,¹⁹ still supported city growth, in the 1970s, the cities were confronted with outward movement of their populations.²⁰ Suburbanization had been a trend since the end of World War II; however now it was happening on much larger scale and even the older suburbs were experiencing population loss, as population expanded beyond them. Various studies²¹ show that in the four decades after 1970 many of the Rust Belt cities lost around 40 percent or more of their population. Such shrinkage brought many problems to the cities and their metropolitan areas, such as “deconcentration”, which

¹⁵ But cheap land in the suburbs and technological developments such as air conditioning, which encouraged production in the warmer parts of the country.

¹⁶ Adler et al., 27-28.

¹⁷ In case of the Pittsburgh steel production, the disinvestment into modernization proved fatal to the industry. New steel production model, developed during the 1970s and 1980s, represented a shift from large integrated plants to mini mills, which relied on electric furnace and scrap steel, as opposed to oxygen furnaces and ore steel. Within such model, Pittsburgh and other mid-west cities lost their competitive edge, as it was based mainly on geographical proximity to iron ore reserves
Haller, 1.

¹⁸ Adler, et al., 5.

¹⁹ The urban environment was largely shaped by the Second Great Migration of African-Americans, who were between 1940s and 1970s moving to the established industrial centers of North in great numbers.

²⁰ Peter A. Morrison, et al, “Recent Contributions to the Urban Policy Debate,” Santa Monica, Rand Corporation, March 1979, 6, accessed March 3, 2014, <http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2008/R2394.pdf>

²¹ For example: Hartley 2013, Jacobs 2003.

led to decline of city centers, and which was accompanied by the “selectivity of outflow.”²² The departure of the more well-off population “reinforce[d] patterns of economic and racial separation of the population,”²³ and the city cores became pockets of mainly black, older and disadvantaged populations, typically more dependent on the governmental assistance.²⁴ These are still substantial problems of many U.S. cities in 2014.

Development of the Federal Urban Policies

Since such major spatial readjustment entailed not only decentralization of population and labor, but also altering of the composition of electoral constituencies, it effected the distribution of political power between the inner cities and their suburbs, which soon reflected on the development of urban policies.²⁵ The relationship of federal and state governments to the cities entered a new phase in the 1970s and 1980s as the political forces were increasingly favoring and enforcing urban policies based on privatization and decentralization of public services. While during the two decades following the WWII, the federal government assumed most responsibility for urban problems, in the 1950s through the emphasis on the “urban renewal” programs, and, in the 1960s, through the “War on Poverty” program²⁶ – the 1970s saw the beginning of less governmental involvement. Nixon’s “New Federalism” of the 1970s relocated the responsibility for the urban problems to the state and local governments and the federal government thus stopped providing specifically targeted grants and, instead, redistributed the funds in block grants

²² The more well-off Detroiters were able to relocate to the suburbs, while the least fortunate could not afford to buy the house or mortgage and thus remained in the city center. As a result, the tax base of the inner cities was gradually shrinking, while the suburbs were economically growing, which allowed them to expand and attract even more people.

²³ *Ibid.*, 6.

²⁴ The data from the U.S. Census Bureau show that in 1970 there were 54% of Whites and 43,6% of African-American living in Detroit City out of the total population of 1,511,482, however in 2010 the proportions were only 10,6% Whites and 82,7% African-Americans out of the total population of 713,777.

U.S. Census Bureau, “Detroit city, Michigan,” State and County Quickfacts, accessed June 12, 2014, <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html>

²⁵ Florida and Jonas, 372.

²⁶ Morrison, et al., 1.

directly to states.²⁷ More importantly, the conditions for the funds to the cities included creation of “more jurisdictionally-encompassing governmental entities for metropolitan areas,”²⁸ which led to weakening of the local governments’ powers. As the new grant system reflected the distribution of political forces at the regional level, the older and distressed cities were disadvantaged in favor of the growing areas in the suburbs and in the south and west.²⁹

Moderate change came in 1978 when President Jimmy Carter introduced the first comprehensive national urban policy to guide federal policies that the United States had called *A New Partnership to Conserve America’s Communities*. In his speech to Congress he made it clear that cities have to be competitive and encouraged states to “become partners in assisting urban areas”³⁰ with strengthening their economic base.³¹ Although Carter’s urban policy shifted urban programs back toward “distressed and declining” central cities and neighborhoods – thus toward Midwestern and Northeastern cities – and the federal funding was distributed directly to local community-based groups, the larger problem of the Carter administration’s program was the worsening economy, which limited federal government’s expenditures.³² The total expenditures for highly targeted urban-oriented programs as a percent of entire federal budget peaked at 12.4% in 1978,³³ but soon after the introduction of the new urban program, it was set aside due to budgetary problems.³⁴ Simultaneously, fiscal and monetary policies of the Carter administration worked contrary to the urban policies’ objectives for they “produced escalating interest rates

²⁷ The federal government allocates block grants to states for a particular issue, however the states governments themselves identify the problems within their jurisdiction and create and manage the grant-making process.

²⁸ Florida and Jonas, 372.

²⁹ Florida and Jonas also see the political aspect of the changes in urban policies. They argue that shifting of the funds to the growth areas in the south and west, and by bypassing traditional Democratic strongholds, Nixon’s New Federalism aimed to consolidate political power for the Republican party (*Ibid.*, 362).

³⁰ Jimmy Carter, “National Urban Policy Message to the Congress,” The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30567>

³¹ Carter administration also release the first comprehensive report on the problems that the cities were at the time dealing with including economic restructuring, regional shifts in population and jobs, the concentration of poverty, and decline of the inner cities (Kingsley and Fortuny 4).

³² “A Status Report on the President’s Urban Policy,” The White House, Washington, 1978. 9, accessed March 23, 2014, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CZIC-ht165-52-u55-1978/html/CZIC-ht165-52-u55-1978.htm>

³³ The total federal budget in 1978 was \$459 billion.

“1978 U.S. Federal Budget,” *Find the Best*, accessed July 30, 2014, <http://federal-budget.findthebest.com/l/81/1978>.

³⁴ Florida and Jonas, 373.

and preferences for new investments that contributed to urban fiscal stress,³⁵ disinvestment in housing and industrial plants located in older centers, and deferral of maintenance and investment in infrastructure.”³⁶

During the Reagan administration the discussion over urban policy concentrated on the prosperity of individuals and firms, not places, and thereby continued in the trend set by Nixon’s New Federalism urban policy. Reagan’s urban policy either greatly eliminated or redirected federal spending on urban social programs.³⁷ The total federal budget for urban funds was cut by more than \$12 billion between 1980 and 1985, and its effect was most seriously felt by the urban poor as the funding for programs that helped them were severely reduced.³⁸ That such intervention was unfortunate is shown on the number of people estimated to be below the level of poverty, which increased by 9 million between 1978 and 1984. Another element of the urban program proposed by the Reagan administration, the enterprise zones, would provide tax and regulation reductions to over seventy neighborhood-based zones.³⁹ The program was based on the notion that by allowing the market forces more freedom, they would provide solution to the problems of the blighted neighborhoods and help to stop the flight of businesses from the inner cities to the suburbs. Although Reagan’s administration did not succeed in passing the federal law in support of the creation of the zones, by 1985 more than 40 states created their own enterprise zones programs⁴⁰ and the federal legislation was then finally enacted 1993 and expanded in 1997.⁴¹ Nevertheless, recent study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office came to a conclusion that the enterprise zones

³⁶ Royce Hanson. *The Evolution of National Urban Policy, 1970-1980: Lessons from the Past*. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 68.

³⁷ Florida and Jonas, 373.

³⁸ Including programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or food stamps (*Ibid.*, 374).

³⁹ These included special investment tax credits for construction and rehabilitation of housing, elimination of capital gains taxes, etc. (Glickman, 474).

⁴⁰ Don Hirasuna and Joel Michael, “Enterprise Zones: A Review of the Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence,” Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department, January 2005, accessed July 16, 2014, <http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/entzones.pdf>, 8.

⁴¹ In 2000, the New Markets Tax Credit Program was established, which provides, which invest in low-income communities.

Bruce Bartlett, “Enterprise Zones: A Bipartisan Failure,” *Fiscal Times*, January 10, 2014, accessed July 20, 2014, <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2014/01/10/Enterprise-Zones-Bipartisan-Failure>.

had no significant impact on economic and job growth in targeted areas.⁴² Part of the problem was that businesses were reluctant to relocate to inner-cities' ghettos struggling with high crime rates, and other related issues.

In addition, Reagan's economic policies, based on the trickle-down economics⁴³ were set to benefit only certain, primarily key Republican, constituencies, which were not located in the older cities. As Glickman points out, in addition to the fiscal policies, the new tax reduction laws had the "most important public-sector effects on cities."⁴⁴ The beneficiaries of these tax laws were firms and taxpayers in growing areas, suburbs and the Sunbelt, as firms were able to claim greater tax credits for new purchases of equipment, etc., and individuals gained more tax breaks for their higher incomes.⁴⁵ The new tax system only cemented the process of the relocation of factories from the city centers of the Northwestern cities to the growing areas in the South and suburbs – which is by some scholars regarded as "an intentional move of production facilities away from the organized labor". The process also significantly reduced the tax base of the inner cities.⁴⁶ Although, the above mentioned programs were based on the neoliberal belief that growth and decline of the U.S. cities should be regulated by markets and also by people who can decide about the future of places simply by relocating, they did more than just following the trends. Instead they reinforced the structural problems of the cities and further hurt the distressed cities.

⁴² "Revitalization Programs: Enterprise Zones, Enterprise Communities, and Renewal Communities," U.S. Government Accountability Office, March 2010, accessed July 6, 2014, <http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/96577.pdf>

⁴³ Investopedia.com provides the following definition of trickle-down theory: "An economic idea which states that decreasing marginal and capital gains tax rates - especially for corporations, investors and entrepreneurs - can stimulate production in the overall economy. According to trickle-down theory proponents, this stimulus leads to economic growth and wealth creation that benefits everyone, not just those who pay the lower tax rates."

"Trickle-down Theory," *Investopedia*, accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trickledowntheory.asp>.

⁴⁴ Glickam, 471.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.* 474

⁴⁶ Gordon in Hobor, 18.

Impact of Federal Programs on the Cities

Several studies from the late 1970s looked at the impact of changing federal programs and policies on urban development and stressed the role of the federal government in encouraging the exodus of people, as well as jobs, to the suburban areas. The Rand Corporation study conducted in 1979 concentrated on how federal programs contributed to both the decentralization of employment and concentration of the poor in inner cities. Its findings show that the rapid growth of the Sunbelt was encouraged – often inadvertently – by programs granting subsidies to the development of interstate highway system in the South, by providing employment in rapidly growing defense industry located in the South and West, as well as by instituting the Corps of Engineers waterway projects, which created easier conditions for international trade. In addition, the business tax structure traditionally favored new construction over rehabilitation and together with other regulatory activities, e.g. regulation of interstate prices of natural gas and transportation rate and route regulations, encouraged firms to relocate to places where land is cheap and expected to rise in price, typically to the suburbs or the Sunbelt.⁴⁷

Suburbanization of individual housing was subsidized by the tax treatment of homeownership, which allowed deduction of mortgage interests and local taxes from personal income taxes. The poor were, however, effectively locked in inner cities. Even with subsidies for low-cost housing they could not afford to relocate to the suburbs and were dependant on public housing, typically located in the inner cities.⁴⁸ As a consequence, U.S. cities became significantly segregated by income and thus also by race, which led to escalation of racial tensions in the late 1960s that had a great impact on their further development.

It should be noted that the authors of the report stress that the federal policies were not the major influence but a mere contributor to the changes that greatly affected the American urban life in the post-WWII era, listing other factors, such as

⁴⁷ Morrison, et al., 21.

The report lists three ways in which the tax structure encouraged this pattern: first, investment in new constructions was granted bigger deductions than investment in rehabilitation; second, the costs of new infrastructure construction was reduced by tax-free industrial development bonds; and third, investment tax credits subsidized expansion in already growing areas where most investment was undertaken.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 23.

“the market forces, rising real incomes, and changing tastes” as more important.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, it is important to realize that both socioeconomic and political forces shaped the urban areas throughout the United States.

Political economy theory considers the development and changes of urban forms in relation to the development of capitalism. Hill⁵⁰ explains that as businesses are forced by global competition to expand into multinational corporations, their needs for organization of their production and administrative facilities subsequently change, so that their networks are moved out of the central cities, where only some headquarters remain.⁵¹ Since most of the Rust Belt cities grew around the Fordist model of a city, which concentrated the mass production factories in the inner cities to maximize efficiency of work, they were not able to accommodate to the need of the businesses for more flexibility in the production.⁵² The shift of the global economy towards the service sector in industrialized countries basically meant the decline of mass-productions – and therefore industrial cities of the Rust Belt were so harshly hurt by the above mentioned trends that became so apparent in the 1970s and had in some places continued to develop until now.

Seen through an economic perspective, it would be logical to suggest that because the cities of Rust Belt were not able to adapt to the transformed global conditions and sustain their industrial and population strength, expensive efforts to help them reinvent themselves are not viable. Why should a federal government encourage people and business to relocate to failing places? Why should it pour money into saving a failing urban economy? Nevertheless, the problem of this argument is that it does not consider the government’s role in the processes that led to the “rusting” of the Midwest. The anti-urban political bias that governed the urban

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁵⁰ Hill.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵² Hobor, 20.

There are at least two reasons why inner cities ceased being the ideal place for industry. First, application of new productions techniques required that the factories be reinvented. However, as was already explained, the tax system encouraged new investment over rehabilitation, and therefore producers preferred building new factories over rebuilding the old ones in accordance to the needs of production. At the same time, the negatives of centralised production exceeded the positives, as the U.S. inner cities were increasingly experiencing conflicts over the organization of labor and strikes. Therefore, according to Gordon, the producers intentionally moved their production facilities away from organized labor.

Gordon in Hobor, 17.

policies in the second half of the 20th century was not only driven by the market-rationale. Instead, it contributed to the failure of local economies by encouraging the exodus of both people and businesses to politically favored locations. The governments assisted the undergoing trends.

What is the way out of this then? The current debate on the economic redevelopment of the failing communities often tends to consider the place-oriented programs, which were until recently prevalent in U.S. cities, wasteful and contra-productive. Urban economist Edward Glaeser argues that “expensive efforts to renew cities often do more for well-connected businesses than for the poor people living in those declining areas”⁵³ that should be governments’ primarily obligation. Therefore governments should focus on more people-oriented urban policies that do not concentrate on stopping the shrinking of population, but rather on encouraging the growth of *per capita* income. In order to do this leading urban economist, such as Glaeser and Richard Florida, argue that cities need not only to create more dense and livable cities with less regulated markets that would attract entrepreneurs and creative professionals, who in their opinion power regional economic growth, but also invest into education.⁵⁴ Concrete examples of urban planning and economic tools that the government’s can use in order to create more diverse and economically sustainable cities will be outlined in chapters 4 and 5.

⁵³ Edward Glaeser, *Triumph of the City: How Our Great Inventions Make Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier, and Happier* (London: Pan Macmillan, 2011), 65.

⁵⁴ Edward Glaeser, “Unleash the Entrepreneurs,” *City Journal*, Autumn 2011, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.city-journal.org/2011/21_4_entrepreneurs.html.
Richard Florida, “Cities and the Creative Class,” *Creative Class Group*, accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.creativeclassgroup.com/rfcgdb/articles/4%20Cities%20and%20the%20Creative%20Class.pdf>.

A Tale of Two Cities: Detroit and Pittsburgh

Detroit and Pittsburgh have undergone serious economic, social, and urban crises caused by the deindustrialization of the Midwestern region. The severity of the deindustrialization in these cities was accentuated by the fact that both of them developed around one main industry – automotive in Detroit and steel in Pittsburgh – and were thus too dependent on the industry’s performance. Nevertheless, the different paths of deindustrialization and restructuring that these cities followed resulted in very different economic and social outcomes. This chapter will provide overview of demographic and economic development of the two cities and the regions that surround them together with their spatial characteristics, which will serve as a background for further analysis of the similarities and differences in the attempts of the two cities facing the deindustrialization process.

Decline of the Motor City

In order to understand the core of the problems that the City of Detroit is currently facing, it is necessary to consider the specific history of the development of the city and its position within its Metro area. The Detroit Metro area’s economic activity has been defined by the car production since the beginning of the 20th century. Owing to the growth of automotive industry and the invention of assembly line, which enabled the development of mass production model, Detroit city, which became known as “the Motor City,” grew from a city of 300,000 inhabitants in 1900 to the fourth largest city in the U.S. by 1929, when it had more than 1.6 million inhabitants and was producing almost all cars in the United States. This was a result of its geographical location – Detroit and its surroundings were rich on iron ore, in addition the rail and water routes made it easy to ship cars to other big cities – presence of Henry Ford and other automotive innovators in the region, and culture of cross-pollination, which made it hard for distant competitors to keep up with the research done in Detroit.⁵⁵

During the WW2, the industry grew again, as it converted plants to production of tanks, planes, etc. However, new postwar automobile plants were built in

⁵⁵ Brian Palmer, “How did Detroit Become the Motor City,” *Slate*, February 29, 2012, accessed July 30, 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/02/why_are_all_the_big_american_car_companies_based_in_michigan_.html

suburban locations and by the 1970s the Big Three – Ford, Chrysler, and General Motors – have undergone the process of decentralization of production to suburbs and abroad. Detroit’s suburbs and exurbs not only offered space for automated factories that could not be any longer accommodated by the central city, but also tax incentives that the city could not afford. And the automakers built plants in other countries first in order to be closer to customers – and to subvert trade protectionism – and later to save the costs on labor by moving production especially to Mexico or Brazil.

The trend of decentralization became even more pronounced as the suburbanization of commercial and office uses followed from the 1960s on. The relocation of employment, services, and population away from the city, resulted in the loss of tax revenues in the core city and subsequent disinvestment. These trends, enhanced by very strong racial segregation, which created a well-marked line between the white suburbs and African-American central city, resulted in increasing concentration of poverty in the central city. At the same time, the so-called “edge cities” were becoming increasingly self-sufficient.

Furthermore, during the 1970s, the city and its Metro area suffered through another adverse development as the 1973 Oil embargo and subsequent rise of Japanese automakers led to 30% drop in production of cars in Detroit Metro.⁵⁶ While in 1973, the U.S. automakers produced 12,637,000 cars and trucks, two years later the total production dropped by 29 percent to 8,985,000 vehicles.⁵⁷ Thus both the city and the area lost manufacturing jobs, and the service sector increased. Following the exceptionally strong job creation and economy growth of the late 1990s, the Detroit Metro, unlike the City of Detroit, economy grew.⁵⁸ The latest setback for the Detroit Metro economy came with the financial crisis of 2008, which had an impact on global auto sales and led to bankruptcy and subsequent government rescue of GM and Chrysler, the only two U.S. auto makers still operating in the city. Although the automobile industry has managed to revive after the recession and is now thriving, it

⁵⁶ David Lepaska, “The Historical Roots of Detroit’s Ruin,” *Atlantic Cities*, March 1, 2012, accessed July 13, 2014, <http://www.theatlanticcities.com/jobs-and-economy/2012/03/historical-roots-detroits-ruin/1461/>.

⁵⁷ Scott Martelle, *Detroit: A Biography* (Chicago: Chicago Review Press, 2012), 206.

⁵⁸ “Detroit in Focus: A Profile from 200 Census,” *Brookings*, November 2003, accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2003/11/livingcities-detroit>.

left little effect on the city, because there are only two factories within the city limits and most of the Big Three operations remain out of the city.⁵⁹

The economic crisis reflected on the population of the city, which from 2008 to 2010 suffered a heavy downfall, losing over 200,000 people just in two years. The population loss means that the city has some 66,000 vacant parcels and 78,000 vacant structures, of which 38,000 are considered dangerous.⁶⁰ The devastated housing market and shrinking number of residents also mean the decline in city tax revenue. As a result of decades of regional transformation of population and restructuring of employment and production, the central city has for decades struggled with massive population loss, abandonment of property, crime, and serious economic problems, which in July 2013 drove the city into filing for Chapter 9 bankruptcy,⁶¹ as the municipal debt was estimated at \$18-20 billion, while the total operating budget in fiscal year 2012-2013 was set at \$1.1 billion.⁶²

White Flight, Black Flight, ...

Figure 1 shows the steady decline in Detroit's population in the post-WWII decades. Since the city's population was at its peak in 1950 at 1,849,568, by 2013 it lost 1,160,867 people, which represents a 63 percent decline.

⁵⁹ GM has its headquarters downtown and still operates its Poletown plant. Chrysler's headquarters are in suburban Auburn Hills, 30 miles away from the city, but has moved some offices downtown and keep its Jefferson North Assembly plant for jeep in the city. Ford is based in Dearborn and has not produced any cars in the city since 1910s.

Brad Plumer, "We Saved the Automakers. How Come That Didn't Save Detroit?" *The Washington Post*, July 19, 2013, accessed July 23, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/19/we-saved-the-automakers-how-come-that-didnt-save-detroit/>

⁶⁰ "City of Detroit: Proposal for Creditors," June 14, 2013, accessed July 1, 2014, <http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf>.

⁶¹ "The chapter of the Bankruptcy Code providing for reorganization of municipalities (which includes cities and towns, as well as villages, counties, taxing districts, municipal utilities, and school districts). The purpose of chapter 9 is to provide a financially-distressed municipality protection from its creditors while it develops and negotiates a plan for adjusting its debts. Reorganization of the debts of a municipality is typically accomplished either by extending debt maturities, reducing the amount of principal or interest, or refinancing the debt by obtaining a new loan."

"Chapter 9" in "Bankruptcy," *U.S. Courts*, accessed July 19 2014, <http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter9.aspx>.

⁶² Matt Halms, "Detroit City Council OK's \$1.12 B Budget With Severe Cuts to Firefighters, EMS, Jobs, Parks, Many Services," *Detroit Free Press*, May 25, 2012, accessed July 29, 2014, <http://www.freep.com/article/20120525/NEWS01/205250447/Detroit-City-Council-OKs-36-1-12B-budget-with-severe-cuts-to-firefighters-EMS-jobs-parks-many-services>.




Figure 2: Development of Detroit’s population, 1900 to 2013⁶³

At the same time, as Figure 3 shows, the racial composition of the city significantly altered; while in the 1950s, whites formed the majority of population, their number steeply declined over the next decades and by 1980s, there were more African-Americans than whites. Currently, the largest racial demographic in the city is the African-Americans making up 82.7 percent, which is little less than six times the national average. It is followed by the whites, making up 0.6 percent, and Hispanic or Latino, making up 7.8 percent of the population.⁶⁴




Figure 3: Development of white vs. African-American population in City of Detroit, 1920 - 2012⁶⁵

⁶³ Kofi Myler, “Detroit’s Population From 1840 to 2012 Shows High Points, Decades of Decline,” *Detroit Free Press*, July 23, 2013, accessed June 25, 2014, <http://www.freep.com/interactive/article/20130723/NEWS01/130721003/detroit-city-population>

⁶⁴ 2010 U.S. Census.

⁶⁵ Gary Sands, Laura A. Reese, and Mark Skidmore, “Detroit’s Bankruptcy Settlement Will Not Solve the City’s Problem,” *The London School of Economics and Political Science*, accessed June 15, 2014,

The statistics for Metro Detroit for the same period suggest that majority of the population that left the central city was accommodated by the city's suburbs. The population of Metro Detroit grew most intensively in the 1950s and 1960s – that is at the same time the City of Detroit was losing most people – and currently it is estimated at 4,292,060. Unlike the central city, the largest racial demographic in the suburbs is, however, whites, making up 70.1 percent and African-Americans constitute only 22.8 percents of the Metro's population.⁶⁶ This reflects the more general trend of U.S. cities, where African-Americans live in the historical central cities, while whites are accommodated by the newer suburbs. Nevertheless, according to the 2010 Census, Detroit's was with regard to the black-white dissimilarity score the most segregated metropolitan area in the country (see figure 4).⁶⁷

[.http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/03/10/detroits-bankruptcy-settlement-will-not-solve-the-citys-problems/](http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/03/10/detroits-bankruptcy-settlement-will-not-solve-the-citys-problems/).

⁶⁶ U.S. Census 2010.

⁶⁷ The 2011 research was based on measuring the Index of Dissimilarity, which captures the degree to which two groups are evenly spread among census tracts in a given city. Evenness is defined with respect to the racial composition of the city as a whole. With values ranging from 0 to 100, D gives the percentage of one group who would have to move to achieve an even residential pattern - one where every tract replicates the group composition of the city. A value of 60 or above is considered very high.

John R. Logan and Brian J. Stults, "The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from 2010 Census," U.S. 2010 Project, March 24, 2011, accessed July 16, 2014, <http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf>.




Figure 4: Map of race and ethnicity distribution in Detroit, 2010⁶⁸

Note: red dots show whites, the blue is African-American, and the orange is Hispanic. The city limits on the map are basically defined by blue color, except for a small Hispanic corner in the Southwest.

The data from the latest U.S. Census show that the “white flight,” which started in the 1960s, was recently followed by “black middle-class flight,” essentially leaving behind a city dominated by people who are caught up in poverty and cannot move out.⁶⁹ In the decade concluding in 2010, Detroit experienced the biggest loss of black residents in its history – 185,393 out of the total of 237,500 residents who left the city during this decade. Most of them were accommodated by the five counties that surround Wayne county, with Detroit as its center. However, the census data show that even the suburbs have been dealing with population loss.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Erik Fisher, “Race and Ethnicity 2010: Detroit,” Flickr Commons, accessed June 16, 2013, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/5560488484/in/set-72157626354149574>.

⁶⁹ Scott Martelle, *Detroit: A Biography*, Chicago Review Press, Chicago (2012), 247.

⁷⁰ Katherine Q. Seelye, “Detroit Census Confirms Dissertation Like No Other,” *International New York Times*, March 22, 2011, accessed October 18, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/23/us/23detroit.html>.

Creation of an Urban Ghetto: Race and Detroit Urban Development

As the situation of race relations between the central city and its suburbs has strongly influenced the ability of Detroit to cope with the urban crisis, it is important to outline the history of race relations in the city, where racial segregation isolated the central city and turned it into an urban ghetto.

The African-American population of Detroit dramatically increased during the Great Migration. Nevertheless, as blacks were coming from the South to the northern industrial cities, the city's whites fought what they called "Negro invasion" with housing discrimination. This included physical attacks on the black families "usually the first or second to move into all-white neighborhoods,"⁷¹ different treatment by real estate agents, who tried to flock the blacks into specific areas, or issuing covenants specifying that houses in particular area could not be leased or sold to non-white residents.⁷² As soon as a black resident was to break through the color line, the white neighborhoods lost on value. When the U.S. Supreme Court established the restrictive use of covenants unconstitutional in the 1948 *Shelley v. Kramer* case, and later in 1954 in the *Brown v. Board of Education* ruled the segregation unlawful, the whites realized that they could not racially regulate their neighborhoods and fled to suburbs. As Thomas Sugrue, the author of "The Origins of Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit," explains, there were number of conditions that made it close to impossible for blacks to follow this exodus until 1970s. For example, until 1960s when the federal antidiscrimination laws were passed, blacks could not benefit from the subsidies through the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration, which in the meantime helped many whites to move to their own houses in the suburbs. The color line, which became symbolized by the wall built alongside the Eight mile, was also maintained by the refusal of private sector to give blacks mortgages and by red lining, a practice of denying jobs and services, in this case to blacks, in racially determined areas. Thus qualified black homeowners still found it hard to receive a mortgage in affordable all-white neighborhood. Later on, real estate agents used "steering," in which they directed whites to white

⁷¹ Thomas Sugrue, "A Dream Still Deferred," *New York Times*, March 26, 2011, accessed May 20, 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/opinion/27Sugrue.html>.

⁷² Sugrue, *The Origins of Urban Crisis*, 181

communities and offered housing in the minority places to blacks.⁷³ The segregation continued even in the post-civil rights era, as the whites always moved as soon as a neighborhood was becoming racially mixed.

These trends in housing segregation were further intensified by the violent racial riots. In 1943, the riot happened “at the time of increasing black and white competition for jobs and housing.”⁷⁴ After martial law was declared, 2500 federal troops were sent to the city to deal with the violence, during which 35 people died. Again in 1967, four-day long violence paralyzed the city. The riot was started by police raid of an illegal bar and subsequent arrest of 86 blacks. However, according to Sugrue, the violence was spurred because the blacks long felt harassed by the authorities and continued to be discriminated in spite of the Civil rights laws. The persistent segregation and lack of resources trapped most blacks in the city, which was declining and losing jobs and had thus little jobs to offer to them. Therefore, many of the blacks, especially black youth, were experiencing economic displacement.⁷⁵ In addition, by 1967, the unfortunate city investment into housing and infrastructure had displaced over 170,000 black residents, as thousands of low-income housing units were destroyed under the Detroit urban renewal programs, which were part of „slum“ clearance initiative.⁷⁶ The riot, during which parts of city were looted and burnt down, over 7,000 people were arrested, and 43 people died, accelerated the exodus of mostly white people from the central city and further exacerbated the concentration of disadvantaged groups in the central city.

Although the city has recently experienced black suburbanization, Sugrue points out that blacks are not moving to all the suburbs equally. As a result of the persistent discrimination, they are mostly able to move to the poorer suburbs bordering the city, which were hurt by the failing metropolitan economy in the 2000s and have been undergoing the second wave of white flight.⁷⁷

⁷³ Sugrue, *New York Times*.

⁷⁴ Sugrue, *The Origins of Urban Crisis*, 260

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 262.

⁷⁶ “Is Ed Glaeser Wrong About Detroit,” *Rustwire.com*, April 9, 2013, accessed June 30, 2013, <http://rustwire.com/2013/04/09/is-ed-glaeser-wrong-about-detroit/>.

⁷⁷ Sugrue, *New York Times*.

Pittsburgh Loses It Steel and Diversifies

Pittsburgh, the former “Steel City,” enjoyed the biggest population and economic growth during the industrial boom at the end of 19th and beginning of 20th century when the coal, oil, and steel industries offered many employment opportunities. It benefited from its position within the transportation networks and as “the western end of Pennsylvania’s main line, the canal and rail network that connected Philadelphia to the frontier,”⁷⁸ and became an important industrial base quite early on in the industrialization process. The city gained largest percentages of new residents during the 1880s and then again in 1900s when its booming economy attracted 212,289 people. Nevertheless, the population began to slip after it reached its peak in the 1950s, and between 1960 and 2000 Pittsburgh lost more than half of its population. At the same time, because Pittsburgh’s economy developed as a part of the steel production region with large-scale integrated factories and was highly dependent on single industry, it was harshly hurt by the collapse of the steel industry in the early 1980s, when Japanese, Korean, and European producers, who rebuilt their industries, flooded the market with cheaper products. The trend in steel toward recycling-intensive industry, caused by the advancements in technology, which turned the ore-based production typical for the region into an obsolete production method, hurt the big steelmakers in the Pittsburgh region even more, as it was not able to face the competition of smaller, nonunion “mini-mills,” that were built abroad.⁷⁹

With hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs lost after the steel industry imploded – only between 1976 to 1986, Pittsburgh region lost over 100,000 manufacturing jobs⁸⁰ – Pittsburgh did not have any other choice, but to diversify its economy. Already in 1980s the city began a development plan that transferred state funds to local universities, in order to finance technological research. Alongside, it started focusing on health care industry and the institutions of higher education, or “eds and meds” and investing in high-end metal production and high-tech industries.⁸¹ Although the transformation was not easy, and the city was as late as 2003 declared “financially distressed,” owing to the economical refocusing and good

⁷⁸ Edward Glaeser, “Revenge of the Rust Belt,” *Economix*, February 3, 2009, accessed July 28, 2014, <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/revenge-of-the-rust-belt/>.

⁷⁹ Haller

⁸⁰ Haller.

⁸¹ The restructuring efforts will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

urban planning, as well as early-on city employees layoffs and reduction of its pension plans, Pittsburgh has seen stabilization of its economy and was able to revitalize its urban fabric and by doing so make the place more attractive for people and businesses.⁸²

Although Pittsburgh also had to deal with decentralization of production and population, unlike Detroit, it benefited from its limiting geography. Being set on the confluence of Monongahela and Allegheny rivers and surrounded by mountains, the city developed a compact downtown area and its suburbs could not spread as far as Detroit's, which made the redevelopment of the city easier.⁸³

Shrinking of Pittsburgh

The City of Pittsburgh also suffered from massive depopulation. After a peak in the 1950, when the city accommodated 676,806 people, in the following six decades the city's population shrunk dramatically by more than half to 305,704 people that lived within the city border at the time of the 2010 U.S. Census.⁸⁴ However, the 2013 estimate shows that the shrinking of population was reversed and Pittsburgh actually added 152 residents.⁸⁵ Although the number might seem insignificant, closer look at the demographic trends show that it reflects actual reversal of the decades of shrinkage. This is well demonstrated by the fact that the out-migration, which was a leading-factor of depopulation during the 1980s and 1990s slowed down after the turn of the 21st century and most of the depopulation was caused by natural decline.⁸⁶

⁸² Ghosh Palash, "A Tale of Three Cities: Detroit, Toronto, and Pittsburgh In A Post-Industrialized World," *International Business Times*, October 9, 2013, accessed July 18, 2014, <http://www.ibtimes.com/tale-three-cities-detroit-toronto-pittsburgh-post-industrialized-world-1417742>.

⁸³ Bill Saporito, "Pittsburgh's Lessons For Detroit," *Time*, July 19, 2013, accessed July 25, 2013, <http://nation.time.com/2013/07/19/pittsburghs-lessons-for-detroit/>.

⁸⁴ 2010 U.S. Census.

⁸⁵ Gary Rotstein, "Pittsburgh's Population Moves Upwards -- by 152," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, May 23, 2013, accessed July 28, 2014, http://www.post-gazette.com/hp_mobile/2013/05/23/Pittsburgh-population-moves-upward-by-152/stories/201305230230.

⁸⁶ Deaths outnumbering births.

Moreover, both of these trends were becoming less important by the end of the decade leading to 2010.⁸⁷




Figure 5: Development of population in Pittsburgh city⁸⁸

The racial composition of Pittsburgh is more diverse than Detroit's with the following distribution of racial demographics: 64.8 percent white, 25.8 percent African-American, 4.4 percent Asian, and 2.3 percent Latino or Hispanic.⁸⁹ Although the segregation line is not as clearly defined as in Detroit, racial distribution of the city's residents is not even,⁹⁰ and as Figure 6 shows, black people are concentrated in only a few areas.

⁸⁷ Jim Futrell, "Forbes: "Comeback City" Pittsburgh Reverses Population Decline," *Imagine Pittsburgh*, March 7, 2010, accessed July 20, 2014, <http://imaginepittsburgh.com/now/forbes-comeback-city-pittsburgh/11106/>.

⁸⁸ "Sunday Forum: Who Needs More People?" *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, July 5, 2009, accessed July 21, 2014? <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2009/07/05/Sunday-Forum-Who-needs-more-people/stories/200907050239>.

⁸⁹ 2010 U.S. Census.

⁹⁰ According to a 2011 study of 2010 Census data by professors John Logan and Brian Stults of Brown and Florida State University, Pittsburgh's black-white dissimilarity score is 63.1.




Figure 6: Map of race and ethnicity distribution in Pittsburgh, 2010⁹¹

Note: the red dots show whites, blues is black, orange is Hispanic, green is Asian, and yellow is other.

The growth of Pittsburgh Metro area in the 1950s and 1960s also reflected the postwar suburbanization trend, as well as the steep decline in the central city population, but, unlike in Detroit, it stopped between the 1970s and 2000s, when the greater Pittsburgh was losing population. Although the Metro, with a population estimated at 2,360,733 residents in 2013, is in the long-term one of the nation's least diverse areas, with 86.7 percent white, 8 percent African-American, 2 percent Asian, and 1 percent Hispanic,⁹² this did not result from such violent racial history as in Detroit. In conclusion, since there does not exist such a huge disproportion between the racial composition of the central city and its suburbs, blacks and other minorities are not cut off from the labor market.

⁹¹ Erik Firsher, "Race and Ethnicity: Pittsburgh," Flickr Commons, accessed June 20, 2013, <https://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/5560488484/in/set-72157626354149574>.

⁹² Rotstein.

Economic Differences between Detroit and Pittsburgh

Table 1 shows, that even though both Detroit and Pittsburgh were once highly depended on manufacturing and more specifically on one main industry, automobiles and steel respectively, the service sector is now dominant in the employment composition of both Detroit MSA⁹³ and Pittsburgh MSA,⁹⁴ accounting for roughly the same percentage of the total employment, 74 percent in Detroit and 76.3 percent in Pittsburgh.

Year	Detroit MSA			Pittsburgh MSA			United States	
	Manufacturing	Transportation	Service	Manufacturing	Metal	Service	Manufacturing	Service
1960	40.5	18.6	46.9	36.5	18.9	48.5	27.1	54.3
1970	37.5	17.2	53.3	31.7	14.5	56.9	25.9	58.1
1980	31.5	15.7	60.0	25.9	11.1	63.1	22.4	62.4
1990	24.8	11.5	66.2	15.0	4.2	74.3	17.7	68
2000	22.6	9.8	68.3	13.4	3.8	76.9	14.2	72.4
2012	12.2	4.2*	74	7.7	1.0	76.3	12.6	80

* Percentage of employment in "Transportation" in Detroit in 2012 is not available. Therefore this table shows the numbers for 2011.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010; and Brookings Institution, 2011

Table 1: Employment by Composition by Industry, Detroit, Pittsburgh, U.S., 1960-2012⁹⁵

Nonetheless, the data shows that deindustrialization in these two regions was happening at a different pace – while in 1960, metal industry in Pittsburgh and automobile industry in Detroit employed roughly the same percentage of the local labor force, by 1990 employment in steel in Pittsburgh, with 4.2 percent, had a much weaker role in the total employment than automobile industry employment in Detroit, where it still accounted for more than 10 percent.

The same pattern can also be observed from the data describing the decrease in the manufacturing sector employment in both metropolitan areas. Although service sector employment grew in both regions, its proportion in Pittsburgh has already since 1980 increased above national average until 2000, while in Detroit it

⁹³ Detroit-Warren-Livonia region.

⁹⁴ Pittsburgh MSA includes the following seven counties: Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette, Washington and Westmoreland.

⁹⁵ U.S. Census of Bureau, <http://www.census.gov/>.

has continued to grow below the national levels over the whole period. Simultaneously, Detroit manufacturing employment until recently remained above the U.S. levels. This poses a problem for Detroit, because its economy continues to be affected by the development of the automotive industry, which is dependent on the global market forces, such as price of oil, and so on

The contrasting trends in the main industries of Detroit and Pittsburgh are an effect of the near-death collapse of the steel industry in Pittsburgh in the 1970s and 1980s and subsequent industrial decline accompanied by dramatic job losses. Just in the decade starting in 1970, Pittsburgh region lost about 50,000 manufacturing jobs and from 1980 to 1984, another 90,000 manufacturing jobs vanished.⁹⁶ By 2000, roughly 80 percent of the city's peak steel workforce, which constituted 90,000 jobs, was gone, and in 2012 only around 7000 or 1 percent of the jobs were left.⁹⁷ Small number of the dislocated steel workers was retrained under publicly funded programs by the early 1990s, however majority of them had to deal with joblessness and devastated job market.⁹⁸

On the contrary, in Detroit, job losses in automotive industry were also significant, with all but two auto makers having left the city, but due to presence of many automotive suppliers in the Detroit MSA, the importance of the automotive industry in the region stayed relatively high. While in 1978, the auto industry directly employed more than 250,000 workers in the region, and by 2009, that number had decreased to just 75,000 – with the industry's recent revival the employment remains around 100,000 today.⁹⁹

As this chapter outlined, both places shared the experience of many Rust Belt cities – losing great amount of people, who mostly disappeared into sprawling

⁹⁶ Alex Smith, "Strategy 21: Public and Private Cooperation in 21st Century Pittsburgh," *Pittsburgh Moving Forward*, accessed May 10, 2014, <http://pittsburghmovingforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Public-and-Private-Cooperation-in-21st-Century-Pittsburgh.pdf>.

⁹⁷ David J. Lynch, "Pittsburgh's Heart of Steel Still Beats Amidst Transformed City," *USA Today*, September 29, 2009, accessed June 12, 2014, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/2009-09-21-us-steel-pittsburgh_N.htm.

⁹⁸ Robert W. Bednarzik and Joseph Szalanski, "An Examination of the Work History of Pittsburgh Steelworkers, Who Were Displaced and Received Publicly-Funded Retraining in the Early 1980s," *IZA*, March 2010, accessed July 2, 2014, <http://ftp.iza.org/dp6429.pdf>.

⁹⁹ Tom Walsh, "Detroit Goes Bust As Auto Industry Booms, And Here's Why," *Detroit Free Press*, July 28, 2013, accessed July 2, 2014, <http://www.freep.com/article/20130728/COL06/307280070/Tom-Walsh-GM-Ford-Chrysler-Detroit-bankruptcy>.

suburbs. What sets them apart though is the spatial distribution of various racial demographics. The nearly impermeable racial border in Detroit clearly contributed to further depopulation and impoverishment of the central city, which remained cut off from the white, middle-class, and relatively prosperous suburbs. In contrast, Pittsburgh racial history never got as violent as Detroit's so as to form a black permanent underclass. Although Pittsburgh is highly segregated, pockets of African-Americans communities are spread throughout several parts of the city and are thus not spatially isolated from jobs and services. The difference was also determined by the size of the black population in both cities. While Pittsburgh received influx of southern blacks during the Great Migration period, even at its peak in the 1970s and 1980s, its black population constitutes for just a little more than a quarter of the total.¹⁰⁰ As Martelle, the author of a recent history book on Detroit, emphasizes, "Pittsburgh has never suffered the kind of neighborhood-shifting violence that has marked Detroit's racial history, or the mass white flight that drained Detroit beginning in the 1950s."¹⁰¹ Similarly, it has not had to deal with such high levels of unemployment and poverty as Detroit city, where the unemployment rate dramatically increased from 6.3 percent in 2000 to 23.4 percent in 2010 and then slightly decreased to 18.3 percent in 2012.¹⁰² Pittsburgh's unemployment rate in April 2012 was at 6.4 percent, which is under both the national and state level.¹⁰³ At the same time about 15 percent of Pittsburgh's families and one in five residents lived under poverty line in 2009, while in Detroit it was more than 28 percent families and one in three residents. This problematic distribution of racial demographics and socioeconomic categories in Detroit, unlike in Pittsburgh as chapter 5 will show, significantly influenced formation of regional coalitions between the city and its regions, which was becoming increasingly more important in the process of restructuring of local economies.

¹⁰⁰ Martelle, 245.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 245.

¹⁰² "Detroit Proposal for Creditors," *City of Detroit*, June 14, 2013, accessed July 20, 2014, <http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/0/docs/EM/Reports/City%20of%20Detroit%20Proposal%20for%20Creditors1.pdf>.

¹⁰³ "City of Pittsburgh Annual Financial Report," *City of Pittsburgh*, December 31, 2012, accessed July 2, 2014, http://apps.pittsburghpa.gov/co/Popular_Annual_Financial_Report_for_Fiscal_Year_2012.pdf, 5.

Possible Approaches to Revitalization of Rust-Belt Urban Centers in Post-Industrial Reality

As the previous chapters outlined, the processes of deindustrialization led to urban decline in both Detroit and Pittsburgh. Having to deal with population loss, suburbanization, abandonment of buildings, crisis in the real-estate market, or poverty concentration, urban planning became a crucial part of the “shrinking cities” attempts to revitalize and restructure themselves. After all, as the physical transformation of the Rust Belt cities has always been interconnected with local industries,¹⁰⁴ urban planning and in many cases the lack thereof played a crucial role in the processes of urban transformation in the region in the first place. Alongside job creation and economic stabilization plans, which will be more closely addressed in chapter 5, urban renewal became an important part of the “shrinking cities” struggle to attract and keep people and businesses and to create higher density, which once played an important role in the growth of Rust-Belt cities.¹⁰⁵ Various researches show that higher density is vital for urban economy, because it, for example, allows higher degree of specialization, encourages knowledge spillover, reduces transportation times and costs, enhances competition, and creates efficiencies of scale.¹⁰⁶ This chapter will introduce several urban planning approaches to the revitalization of U.S. cities, including development of downtown through large projects, transit-oriented development, and “growth without growth,” and show how these were applied in Detroit and Pittsburgh.

Large Downtown Development Projects

Historically, bigger cities focused on big and expensive downtown renewal projects financed by public-private partnerships, which were expected to support the economic viability of central business districts (CBDs). These projects included construction of new office complexes, which were thought to attract businesses by

¹⁰⁴ After all, the nationwide urbanization was spurred by the Industrial revolution because industrial cities offered high factory wages and the opportunities for more varied lifestyles.

¹⁰⁵ For example the pre-WWII Detroit is considered a textbook example of a city, where urban spillovers contributed to its role as a creative and innovative industrial hub of entrepreneurs.

¹⁰⁶ Colin Buchanan et al., “The Economic Impact of High Density Development and Tall Buildings In Central Business District,” *British Property Federation*, September 2008, accessed July 25, 2014, http://www.ctbuh.org/Portals/0/People/WorkingGroups/Legal/LegalWG_BPF_Report.pdf.

increasing the capacity, and the special activity generator (SAG) strategy of downtown development. This strategy is based on the idea that “large facilities that generate special activity such as stadiums, arenas, convention centers, and aquariums” can spur the influx of a critical mass of people and thus lead to redevelopment within the district driven by the public sector’s investment into new infrastructure and urban design improvements.¹⁰⁷ This strategy enjoyed popularity in many American town halls, but as Chapin, who studied the impacts of the SAG strategy in Cleveland and Baltimore, comments: “the construction boom of the 1990s has continued despite the clear finding that in terms of jobs created and taxes generated, these facilities represent very poor investment.”¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, his research shows that these projects provide only “limited opportunities for catalyzing urban redevelopment” and the benefits of such projects for the district do not always match the tremendous costs of building such structures, largely paid for by public dollars.¹⁰⁹

The negotiated conditions for the planned construction of a new Detroit Red Wings hockey arena can illustrate how and with what expectations the public-private partnership works in large downtown development projects. The total project of a new \$450 million hockey arena, which is expected to secure a \$200 million spin-off development of residential, entertainment, retail, and office buildings, is to encompass 45 blocks. The arena is additionally expected to generate nearly \$16 million a year in new city income tax revenue, including \$8.6 million from the three-year construction period and \$7.2 million over 30 years for the estimated 440 new permanent jobs. However, the City of Detroit’s contribution to the project will be substantial; not only will the city cover 58% of the construction costs,¹¹⁰ but in April 2014 the Detroit City Council also agreed to transfer 39 vacant public parcels located

¹⁰⁷ Timothy S. Chapin, “Sports Facilities as Urban Redevelopment Catalysts: Baltimore’s Camden Yard and Cleveland’s Gateway,” *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 70.2 (2004), accessed May 8, 2014, [http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/48fc5ad035ef5f7b882578e7005f7d66/e9e4f2ed094eee898825793600641064/\\$FILE/SportsFacilities1.pdf](http://www.cdfa.net/cdfa/cdfaweb.nsf/48fc5ad035ef5f7b882578e7005f7d66/e9e4f2ed094eee898825793600641064/$FILE/SportsFacilities1.pdf), 194.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 194

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 207

¹¹⁰ The public investment will not come from the city’s general fund, but by way of tax increment financing (TIF).

just outside of the downtown area to the Detroit Downtown Development¹¹¹ authority for \$1.¹¹² The rest of the construction costs will be covered by the Red Wings' owner Mike Ilitch's Olympia Development, however, Red Wings will not have to pay the city shares of their future tickets, merchandise, and parking revenues, as was the case with the old arena.¹¹³

Considering the current economic state of the City of Detroit, which was still run by the bankruptcy emergency manager at the time the deal was negotiated, and the decades of research showing that sports facilities do not attract enough private investment to subsequent area development, the project seems to be a financial gamble driven by the city's desperate attempt to redevelop substantial areas of vacant land. This argument can be supported by Chapin's research, which shows that while before the 1990s, proponents of stadium development emphasized "the indirect economic benefits of the new facility," the current development rationale is based on district redevelopment.¹¹⁴ Moreover, the fact that the current Red Wings arena was built in 1979 with total costs of \$57 million under a similar scheme is a prime example of the inefficacy and unsustainability of such projects.

The Renaissances of Pittsburgh and Detroit

Interestingly, during the 1970s and 1980s both Pittsburgh and Detroit embraced large downtown renewal projects that had the word "Renaissance" in their titles as a strategy for dealing with the flight of businesses and people. Still, the Renaissances were evolving under different circumstances in the two cities. Pittsburgh's Renaissance II could have benefited from the legacy of the postwar Renaissance I, which focused on redevelopment of the Golden Triangle – a downtown located area that previously housed railroad warehouses and tracks and was now left with vacant lots, rundown houses and litter. More importantly, it also benefited from the

¹¹¹ The project is a joint venture between companies controlled by Red Wings owner Mike Ilitch and the Detroit Downtown Development Authority, an agency that promotes development through tax breaks and other incentives.

¹¹² Joe Guillen and J.C. Reindl, "Detroit Council Votes Today on Arena Deal; Ilitches to Get Land for \$1," *Detroit Free Press*, 4 February 2014, accessed 16 July 2014, <http://www.freep.com/article/20140204/NEWS01/302040024/detroit-red-wings-new-stadium-deal-vote-today>.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Chapin, 195.

established ties between local community leaders that constituted the Allegheny Conference.¹¹⁵ The redevelopment effort, begun in 1977 under Mayor Richard Caliguiri, who restored the public-private partnership, established the Mayor's Development Council and instructed the city's departments to cooperate with developers.¹¹⁶ As a result, Renaissance II, in contrast to the first Renaissance which focused solely on downtown redevelopment, impacted a wider area around the Golden Triangle while involving greater leadership of local government. For example construction of PPG Place, the ambitious complex of office buildings, would not be possible without city's involvement in using the eminent domain to tear down blighted property. These strategies "attracted private investors, shepherded development projects through governmental steps, leveraged public funds, and generally nurtured continued downtown redevelopment."¹¹⁷ During the period that ended with the recession of the late 1980s, many projects were completed, including a new convention center, a light-rail transit line, several massive hotel and office building projects, a cultural district along the Allegheny River, and other developments.¹¹⁸

The success of Pittsburgh's downtown redevelopment was enhanced by the incorporation of cultural development. Already in the early 1980s the Pittsburgh Cultural Trust initiated the transformation of the decaying warehouse and commercial district, located north of the city's business district, into the Pittsburgh Cultural District. This development supported the viability of other projects built during the second Renaissance by animating the area. The district currently encompasses a number of theaters, galleries, art schools, and other major arts institutions, as well as commercial-use and office buildings and the convention center. Although the use of the cultural district as a tool of urban revitalization could constitute a separate subchapter, it is included in this section for two reasons: first, because its development was used as a complementary strategy to other downtown

¹¹⁵ Edward K. Muller, "Downtown Pittsburgh: Renaissance and Renewal," in Kevin J. Patrick and Joseph L. Scarpaci, Jr., *A Geographic Perspective of Pittsburgh and the Alleghenies: From Precambrian to Post-Industrial* (Washington: Association of American Geographers, 2000), 8-9, <http://upress.pitt.edu/htmlSourceFiles/pdfs/9780822942825exr.pdf>.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 13-15.

revitalization efforts in Pittsburgh; and second, to show that similar activities were missing in Detroit.¹¹⁹

The Detroit “Renaissance” was quite different both in scope and character. The Detroit Renaissance Center – mix of hotel, office, and retail uses – was Detroit businesses’ response to the race riots of 1967.¹²⁰ It was intended as a scheme to catalyze new investment in Detroit and to “create a built environment in downtown Detroit that was comparable to the malls and office parks offered by the suburbs.”¹²¹ The project was a heavily subsidized public-private initiative, started and financed mainly by the Detroit Renaissance, Inc., which was initiated by Henry Ford II and comprised of fifty-two investors from business, including all Detroit-based American automobile companies.¹²² Although the Renaissance Center did not manage to revive the area and spur further business development because the project was never connected to the city by bridges or further residential and cultural development due to worsening economy, after General Motors relocated its headquarters to the Renaissance Center in mid-1990s the company significantly contributed to the Detroit International Riverfront project, which focused on conservancy of the nearby river bank, which is now amply used by Detroiters for recreation.

In 1977 under Mayor Coleman Young,¹²³ the city produced a more comprehensive plan called “Moving Detroit Forward,” which proposed that \$2.5 billion of federal development funds should be allocated to the city.¹²⁴ Not many of the planned projects materialized though, partly because the city’s planning department was marginalized in the process of revitalization due to the stronger position of a public-private body called the Detroit Economic Growth Corporation into which the Mayor appointed mainly people from Detroit Renaissance, Inc. This indicates why the corporate-centered planning prevailed during Mayor Young’s

¹¹⁹ Although Detroit has a *Cultural Center Historic District*, it is not located in downtown, but in midtown. It consists only of three buildings designed in the first half of the 20th century.

¹²⁰ Chapter number 4 will mention the race riots in more detail.

¹²¹ Francisco Disiderio, “A Catalyst for Downtown: Detroit’s Renaissance Center,” *Michigan Historical Review*, 35.1 (2009), 83, <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/25652152?uid=3737856&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104019230521>.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 98.

¹²³ Coleman Young was the city’s first African-American mayor, who stayed in the office for five terms from 1974 to 1994.

¹²⁴ John McCarthy, “Revitalization of the Core City: the Case of Detroit,” *Cities*, 14.1 (1997), 4.

twenty-year long tenure.¹²⁵ Nonetheless, several large projects including the Joe Louis Arena were finished during this period. Furthermore, investment in sports stadiums continued even in the last decade of the 20th century, when the Renaissance Center was extended and two new sports stadiums, Comerica Park and Ford Field, opened, and as was mentioned above, the city recently approved demolition of the Joe Louis Arena and construction of the new Detroit Red Wings hockey arena. Unfortunately, so far, these downtown redevelopment projects had not been hugely successful in stopping the draining of people and businesses, possibly because they did not include development that would connect them with the rest of the area.

In the recent years, however, Detroit's downtown has been receiving lots of private investment, especially from huge moguls, such as Dan Gilbert, the CEO of Quicken Loans, largest online mortgage retailer, who moved the company's headquarters to Detroit in 2010. Since then Gilbert's real estate company, Bedrock Real Estate Services, bought more than 40 properties in the downtown area, investing more than \$1.5 billion by early 2014 and has played a major role in reshaping downtown Detroit by renovating properties, building apartment, and more importantly recruiting new business.¹²⁶

Transit Oriented Development

Another tool of urban planning that can enhance the economic development of the cities is the transit-oriented development (TOD), which promotes the building of areas of mixed residential and commercial use designed to maximize access to public transport in order to create "sense of place and social cohesion." To a large extent, transit-oriented development connects to the ideas of New Urbanism, which is a trend in urbanism that developed in the 1980s in reaction to post-WWII trends, such as auto-centric suburban development and with the turn of the century became mainstream of U.S. urbanism.¹²⁷ TOD similarly promotes creation and restoration of

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹²⁶ Tim Alberta, "Is Dan Gilbert Detroit's New Superhero?" *National Journal*, accessed July 17, 2014, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/next-economy/america-360/is-dan-gilbert-detroit-s-new-superhero-20140227>.

¹²⁷ In 1993, the newly established Congress for the New Urbanism released its charter, which opened with the following: "[the Congress] views disinvestment in central cities, the spread of placeless sprawl, increasing separation by race and income, environmental deterioration, loss of agricultural

compact, mixed-used, walkable cities and if implemented well, it can not only encourage new residential and commercial developments and retail activities, but unlike the highway-oriented development, which is demanding on space, can also raise the property values of adjacent properties.¹²⁸ For many Rust Belt cities currently dealing with population loss and facing the problems of uneven population distribution, TOD might create higher density in locations connected by the transportation network

However, such development, based on creating neighborhoods that are easily accessible by public transport, was not pursued in Rust Belt cities until recently, because many economies of the region were at least partly involved in the auto industry, and most of the cities in the region thus developed auto-centric designs. Cruz, who studied the potential impact of TOD on Rust Belt cities, notes that “cities within the Rust Belt are at an inherent disadvantage when it comes to TOD, as many of them have little transit aside from the typical city bus service.”¹²⁹ His overview of transit system in eight Rust Belt cities shows that the majority of these cities are currently in planning or proposing stages of the more varied TOD system.¹³⁰ In addition, out of the seven available transit system options – bus rapid transit, streetcars and trolleys, monorails, light rail transit, heavy rail transit, commuter rail transit, and AMTRAK – Pittsburgh and Detroit have so far each implemented only one – light rail and bus rapid transit respectively.¹³¹

lands and wilderness, and the erosion of society’s built heritage as one interrelated community-building challenge.” In practice, New Urbanism argues for the restoration of central cities, creation of traditional neighborhoods with diverse population and economy, balanced development of housing and jobs, designing spaces within walkable distances, and transit-oriented development.

“Charter of the New Urbanism,” Congress for the New Urbanism, accessed July 8, 2014, <http://www.cnu.org/charter>.

¹²⁸ John C. Cruz, *Transit Oriented Development for the Rust Belt Cities*, Detroit, Wayne State University, 2012, 8, <http://cdn.urbanistdispatch.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/cruz-masters-essay-final-draft.pdf>.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹³¹ To explain the differences between various types of rail: Monorail is typically elevated single rail line, Light Rail uses the same rolling stock as tram, but operates on its own track and operate as multiple unit train, Heavy Rail can mean subway or elevated rail, and AMTRAK is publicly funded national railroad service.

Waiting for TOD

Work on Pittsburgh's light-rail transit line, including a short downtown subway line that eliminated the complex traffic situation in the Golden Triangle,¹³² started during the Renaissance II period in 1981; its first part was opened in 1984. The system today comprises routes on 42 km of track.¹³³ Although other TOD systems have not been implemented yet, the recent report of the Center for Transit-Oriented Development points out that Allegheny County, with Pittsburgh at its center, "has a competitive advantage when it comes to achieving successful TOD, because many communities were built around walking, as well as streetcars and rail lines and are therefore transit-oriented."¹³⁴

In comparison, Detroit's public transportation is much more limited because the city was never able to secure funding for a rail system and the regional bus rapid system deteriorated over past decades hand in hand with the city's fiscal problems.¹³⁵ The "Motor City" was built around infrastructure for cars, and this trend was even intensified in the second half of the 20th century, when the development of suburbs demanded large investments into the highway system. Such highways divided once-functional, even if not necessarily thriving, neighborhoods throughout the city and dislocated local communities. Moreover, lack of reliable transportation that would serve a wider area within the city and connect the central city with suburbs also deprived central city residents of the access to suburban jobs, which only enhanced the exclusion of African-Americans from the employment network.¹³⁶ Detroit and its suburbs are currently served by two distinct and dysfunctional systems that do not necessarily coordinate and make it thus hard to commute between central city and suburb. The only other urban renewal investment into transportation system running in the city was the People Mover, a 4.7 km long, single-direction elevated line that is

¹³² Muller, "Downtown Pittsburgh," 13.

¹³³ "Pittsburgh," *Urban Rail*, accessed July 8, 2014, <http://www.urbanrail.net/am/pitt/pittsburgh.htm>.

¹³⁴ Muller, 14.

¹³⁵ Cruz, 5.

¹³⁶ Detroit Department of Transportation (DDOT) buses primarily serve the city while Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) buses serve the suburbs and the two do not necessarily coordinate and have problems with running late. In addition, as for SMART, individual suburban municipalities in the Detroit Metro have the right to opt out of the service, so there exist places that remain unconnected. Transit Cooperative Research Program, *The Use of Small Buses in Transit Service* (Washington D.C., Transport Research Board, 2002), 28.

automated and serves only the downtown, which was too short and served only a limited area. Nonetheless, the city is currently planning a construction of a 3.3 mile¹³⁷ long M1 streetcar route along Woodward Avenue, connecting downtown with midtown, which might in the future become a foundation for expansion of the streetcar network.¹³⁸

To conclude, neither Pittsburgh, nor Detroit have created a sufficient transportation system, the light-rail train in Pittsburgh, however, operates in various parts of the city and thus provides an alternative to individual car transportation. On the contrary, the very inadequate public transportation network in Detroit further intensified the great divide between the central city and its suburbs by limiting the commuters' options.

The Most Un-American Idea, "Growth without Growth"¹³⁹

While the previous two options focused on building new infrastructure to enhance cities' viability, the current academic debate in urban planning suggests that the revitalization of post-industrial cities needs to be accompanied by right-sizing of cities. The debate evolves around the idea that the cities which lost many of their residents when the manufacturing left and have to deal with an undermined tax base can actually embrace shrinking and make themselves better and more self-sufficient and sustainable by "bringing their level of infrastructure and housing into line with their smaller population."¹⁴⁰ But many claim that embracing the shrinking strategy is un-American, as the U.S. society has historically embraced creation of new development over conservation of old places. As Jennifer Bradley of Brookings Institution pointed out in the *New York Times* debate on "The Incredible Shrinking

¹³⁷ 3.3 miles equals to 5.3 kilometers.

¹³⁸ "Station Stops," *M1-Rail*, accessed July 7, 2014, <http://m-1rail.com/streetcar-line/station-stops/>.

¹³⁹ The subheading refers to Paul D. Gottlieb's paper for The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy titled "Growth Without Growth: An Alternative Economic Development Goal for Metropolitan Areas," in which he presents the thesis that population growth is not an appropriate indicator of economic wealth of metropolitan areas. Paul D. Gottlieb, "Growth without Growth: An Alternative Economic Development Goal for Metropolitan Areas," *Brookings Institution*, 2002, accessed 14 March 2014, <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2002/2/useconomics%20gottlieb/gottlieb.pdf>.

¹⁴⁰ Richard Florida, "How Not to Save a City," in "The Incredible Shrinking City," *New York Times*, 1 June, 2011, accessed July 6, 2014, <http://m-1rail.com/streetcar-line/station-stops/>.

City,” “physical growth has been a powerful American narrative, embodied in huge public expenditures from the Louisiana Purchase to the Interstate Highway System and mortgage interest deduction.” However, the U.S. mindset regarding the growth of cities has been changing.¹⁴¹ A growing number of areas in the U.S.¹⁴² have at least partly succeeded in implementing strategies that lead to the strengthening of economic viability and livability of neighborhoods, and managed to implement programs dealing with abandoned properties – be they demolition of vacant houses or letting vast areas revert to nature or urban farming. Urban planners are therefore becoming more confident about the approach of downsizing cities, and local policy and planning decisions are finally reflecting these strategies in stabilizing plans.¹⁴³

In 2010, Mayor Dave Bing suggested downsizing Detroit to a limited number of different population centers in a controversial plan which would leave one third of Detroit’s land area without any city services. Although the plan never materialized, the recent detailed study by the Detroit Blight Removal Task Force¹⁴⁴ on the city’s blight recommends to quickly tear “down 40,000 dilapidated buildings, demolish or restore tens of thousands more, and clear thousands of trash-packed lots.”¹⁴⁵ As the Task Force not only prepared guidelines for blight removal intervention strategies in specific neighborhoods of Detroit, but also managed to establish cooperation with the State and the private sector in addressing the necessary steps, it seems that with new leadership and an experience of undergoing bankruptcy, the city is now ready to re-envision its future shape.¹⁴⁶ ¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the reality is that abandonment within

¹⁴¹ Jennifer Bradley, “Promoting Ungrowth,” in “The Incredible Shrinking City,” *New York Times*, 1 June, 2011, accessed July 6, 2014, <http://m-1rail.com/streetcar-line/station-stops/>.

¹⁴² The Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan was finished in 2005 and between 2006 and 2013 the city demolished 2,566 structures.

Daniel Denvir, “Defending Youngstown: One City’s Struggle to Shrink and Flourish,” *City Lab*, 31 January 2013, accessed 14 July 2014, <http://www.citylab.com/politics/2013/01/defending-youngstown-one-citys-struggle-shrink-and-flourish/4485/>.

¹⁴³ In addition to Detroit, downsizing plans were introduced in Flint, Rochester, Saginaw, and other cities.

¹⁴⁴ The creation of the Detroit Removal Task Force was convened shortly after in September 2013. The Obama Administration announced a \$300 million federal effort focused on working with the city to address key areas of importance, including blight removal, public works, and public safety. “Detroit Blight Removal Task Force Report,” *Detroit Blight Removal Task Force Report*, accessed 3 July 2014, <http://report.timetoendblight.org/>.

¹⁴⁵ Monica Davey, “Detroit Urged to Tear Down 40,000 Buildings,” *New York Times*, 27 May 2014, accessed 6 July, 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/us/detroit-task-force-says-blight-cleanup-will-cost-850-million.html>.

¹⁴⁶ “Detroit Blight Removal Task Force Report.

the inner city is closely tied to another big urban planning problem of Detroit: the growth of suburbs. Although Detroit can be seen as the “shrinking city,” as the population within city limits declined drastically from 1,670,144 in 1970 to 713,777 in 2010, a look at the development of population of metropolitan Detroit¹⁴⁸ shows that as a result of the suburbs growing in the same period at the rate of 27 percent, the population of the metropolitan area is stable. Therefore it is equally important for the future development of Detroit that the Detroit Future City Plan was released in 2013. This comprehensive plan presents concrete strategies for redevelopment in specific neighborhoods and areas, and in line with the downsizing theory, suggests that the population should be consolidated in selected, more easily serviced locations to sustain growth within the inner city and create denser neighborhoods of mixed-use character.¹⁴⁹ The plan should serve as a long-term strategy suggestion for development of the city, however, is not enforced by the city.

Pittsburgh similarly had to face both blight and suburban sprawl. But owing to the tradition of long-term planning and early-on adoption of policies dealing with the urban consequences of deindustrialization, the city is often cited as a positive example of a shrinking city.¹⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, early cleanup of industrial and abandoned land and its transformation toward new residential, commercial, retail, and public uses is regarded as a large part of the city’s successful transformation. In the case of Pittsburgh, these revitalization efforts were also initiated by the city hall under the leadership of Mayor Tom Murphy,¹⁵¹ who developed strategic public-private partnership and secured money for the revitalization of 1000 acres of industrial land. Efforts were accelerated under Mayor Luke Ravenstahl, who enlarged the budget for demolition of abandoned parcels. In addition, mayor Ravenstahl created a program “to mow down overgrown lots, clearing the way for

¹⁴⁷ In June 2014, the Task Force released a report on which it worked with Mayor Mike Duggan and one of the biggest investors, Dan Gilbert of Quicken Loans. Mayor Duggan subsequently announced the plan to tear down 70,500 blighted residential structures in the city over the course of next five years, claiming that the city already has \$456 million of the \$850 million needed to pursue the plan. Lester Graham, “Detroit’s Mayor Duggan’s Blight Elimination Effort,” *Michigan Radio*, 24 June, 2014, accessed 6 July, 2014, <http://michiganradio.org/post/detroit-mayor-duggans-blight-elimination-effort>.

¹⁴⁸ The population of metropolitan Detroit – which includes not only the inner city but also its immediate suburbs – lost only 4 percent of its 1970 population of 4,490,902 residents.

¹⁴⁹ *Detroit Future City Plan*, accessed July 6, 2014, <http://detroitfuturecity.com/>.

¹⁵⁰ “Smaller is More Beautiful,” *The Economist*, 22 October, 2011, accessed 5 June, 2014, <http://www.economist.com/node/21533417>.

¹⁵¹ In office from 1994 to 2006.

urban farms, gardens, and small parks, while allowing local residents to buy the cleared lots around them.”¹⁵² Nevertheless, as Richard Florida, who sees the success of Pittsburgh as a result of the bottom-up community based effort, rather than the result of top-down policies, points out, “The city’s real turnaround was driven by community groups and citizen-led initiatives,” because such projects played a crucial role in “stabilizing and strengthening neighborhoods, building green, and spurring development of the waterfront and redevelopment around the universities.”¹⁵³

As this chapter shows, both Pittsburgh and Detroit faced similar problems and followed trends of urban revitalization that were also applied in other cities of the Rust Belt. But in a long-term view, Pittsburgh’s urban planning was more consistent and complex. Since revitalization of the city with its “brownfields” was a part of broader plan to create “New Pittsburgh” based on economic restructuring toward services and high tech industries – which the city supported by creation of favorable conditions, such as tax abatements, and investment into construction of research facilities – it, as the next chapters will show, significantly helped the city to transform from worn-out factory town to modern hub for health care, technology, and education.

On the other hand, the vastness of Detroit and lack of city-wide urban planning halted the city’s transformation. Thus, ironically, the city that once attracted people with the promise of high-paying factory jobs and the benefits of the middle class, including ownership of a family house, now pays the debt for allowing too many people enjoy these benefits. As a result of de-concentrated low-rise development, the city has to deal with problems of low density, which became especially pronounced after the huge exodus of people from the inner city beginning in the second half of the 20th century. Therefore, even though investment into downtown redevelopment might have spurred some economic activity, without addressing the problems of the city’s neighborhoods which account for the majority of the city’s 140 square miles – including both infrastructural and social problems – Detroit’s revitalization strategies could have never been sufficient in stopping people from leaving.

¹⁵² Tony Dokoupil, “How Pittsburgh Is Managing Population Loss,” *Newsweek*, 14 March 2010, accessed 15 July 2014, <http://www.newsweek.com/how-pittsburgh-managing-population-loss-76973>.

¹⁵³ Richard Florida, “How to Revitalize Rust Belt Cities,” *Urbanophile*, 8 June 2010, accessed 1 June 2014, <http://www.urbanophile.com/2010/06/08/richard-florida-how-to-revitalize-rust-belt-cities/>.

Economic Transformation and Restructuring Efforts

Urban planning can make cities more livable and definitely plays an important role in the cities' attempts to reinvent themselves in the post-industrial era and attract people and businesses, but such efforts must go hand in hand with economic transformation. Before analyzing concrete economic restructuring efforts Detroit and Pittsburgh undertook as their economies were de-industrializing in the manufacturing sector (and facing related urban and social problems), it is necessary to outline the scope of the economic transformation in both of the cities and their metropolitan areas.

Possibilities of Restructuring: Assessment of Pittsburgh's Strategy 21

As industrial manufacturing, the historic base of the cities' economies, crumbled, both Detroit and Pittsburgh adopted different regional economic restructuring strategies in order to fight the negative effects of the economic and social damage.

Pittsburgh's advantage was that quite early on in the deindustrialization process, it developed a tradition of public-private partnership to respond to the economic problems of the region.¹⁵⁴ The city's elite leaders established the Allegheny Conference on Community Development (ACCD) already in the 1940s in response to the first signs of the economic and environmental problems caused by the manufacturing industry. The ACCD then led the city's first Renaissance, whose aim was to revitalize the downtown area in order to attract more businesses. But the important legacy of this redevelopment program, which lasted until the 1970s, was that the region's leadership understood that the economy would in the future not be based solely on manufacturing industry.¹⁵⁵ Thus, as it became evident in the early 1980s that the decline of the steel industry in Pittsburgh was irreversible, most business leaders accepted more easily that the region's economy had to diversify and began embracing the trend towards a service-centered economy.¹⁵⁶ In his analysis of Pittsburgh's regional coalition formation, Jo emphasizes that although significant disagreement between the manufacturing and service sectors about the direction of restructuring in the region had existed to begin with, the conflicts were reduced by

¹⁵⁴ Jo, 12

¹⁵⁵ 103

¹⁵⁶ Yo 13

the swiftness of the steel industry's collapse, and so the "New Pittsburgh" strategy prevailed.¹⁵⁷

In line with the acceptance of diversification, the ACCD, in coalition with local government, including Mayor Robert Caliguari, and private entities represented by University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University, prepared a plan called "Strategy 21: Pittsburgh/Allegheny Economic Development Strategy," which proposed a number of projects throughout the Pittsburgh regions to drive regional restructuring toward a service-centered and high-tech economy.¹⁵⁸ As the Strategy 21 became the foundation for Pittsburgh's local redevelopment program Renaissance III, which reflected the move toward "New Pittsburgh" and contributed to successful transformation of the region, it will be analyzed more closely in this chapter.

The four primary goals of the plan were:

- (1) to reinforce the region's traditional economic base as a center for the metals industry and an international corporate headquarters;
- (2) to convert underutilized land, facilities, and labor force components to new uses, especially those involving advanced technology;
- (3) to enhance the region's quality of life, thereby attracting new residents and increasing tourism; and
- (4) to expand opportunities for women, minorities, and the structurally unemployed.¹⁵⁹

In order to fulfill these goals, the plan targeted specific project areas, which were to benefit the whole region. These included: the greater Pittsburgh International Airport Area, Allegheny region, the Monongahela River Valley, transportation, and advanced university research.¹⁶⁰ Thus rather than trying to bail out the existing manufacturing industry, Strategy 21 proposed investment in long-term development focusing on future fields such as high-tech manufacturing, and health care system innovations, while also putting emphasis on providing the region with adequate

¹⁵⁷ Smith, 13.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁵⁹ *Strategy 21: Pittsburgh/Allegheny Economic Development Strategy to Begin the 21 Century* (Pittsburgh: June 1985), accessed May 10, 2014, <http://www.briem.com/files/strategy21.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

infrastructure. The plan was carried out with the financial support of the local business leaders, however, as the business sector was after the 1980s not left in a good financial position, particular projects were financed through a combination of local and state funds, private investment, and federal grants.

A state funded study suggested by the strategic plan which assessed the reasons leading to the industry's collapsed was a starting point for the revitalization of the local manufacturing industry. Its findings showed that "capital investment within the industry was low, labor costs were too high, given existing production methods, local taxes were also too high, and technological improvements within the industry were necessary to make companies economically stable again."¹⁶¹ In addition, it analyzed which metal factories had the best potential to become competitive internationally and should thus receive support in possible conversion. The study subsequently served as a foundation for granting existing industries public-generated subsidies and technology, allowing the companies to replace labor-intensive processes with new production methods. The majority of such help was aimed at the Monongahela Valley, which plight of the manufacturing industry hurt the most.

A number of proposed projects combined the revitalization of brownfield sites with the creation of new R&D facilities. A prime example of a successful project is the Pittsburgh Technology Center (PTC), located near downtown Pittsburgh, which received \$25.3 million in public investment and \$79 million in private investment. The PTC opened in the early 1990s and soon attracted important institutions such as the University of Pittsburgh Biotechnology Center and the Carnegie Mellon University robotics institute.¹⁶² According to the plans expectation, the center was to generate 1,100 new jobs and the PTC was just 100 jobs short of fulfilling the estimate in 2007. In addition, its tenants repaid public investment into the center within 12 years of its opening. More importantly, by supporting the development of cutting-edge research and development, the PTC encouraged the formation of new tech-based firms.

¹⁶¹ Smith, 6.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 7.

Redevelopment of the Homestead Steel Works industrial site into a waterfront commercial and residential district is also an interesting example of successful transformation of a brownfield into a thriving area generating millions in tax revenue. In addition, following community efforts, the project fueled further local development, as a portion of these taxes are used to support local merchants through low-interest loans.¹⁶³

The transportation development projects planned by Strategy 21 included construction of a southern expressway connecting the city of Pittsburgh with the airport area, as well as numerous expansions and renovations of existing routes and expressways throughout the Monongahela Valley. All of the construction projects were completed and improved the connection between central Pittsburgh and outside areas.¹⁶⁴ Although

The expansion of the Pittsburgh airport's terminals, which was intended to make the whole region accessible to prospective new residents and businesses, was thus the only infrastructure project that did not generate the estimated long-term benefits of 18,000 new jobs and increased air traffic. Although the amount of total passenger traffic peaked in late 1990s as the suggested improvements were completed – which indicates partial success of the Strategy 21 proposal – airport traffic actually decreased significantly by the late 2000s.¹⁶⁵ However, since the region managed to prosper even without the increased passenger traffic, it throws a doubt on whether the expansion of airport was not necessary for enhancement of local economy.

It is apparent that the above mentioned projects, most of which turned out to be successful, contributed to the redevelopment of the region. Nonetheless, investment into high-quality education and research is what most substantially stimulated the transformation of Pittsburgh's economy, as it not only generated new jobs, but also strengthened the region's role in the cutting-edge technology industry. Besides the Pittsburgh Technology Center, which originated from the initiative of the local universities and private organizations, Strategy 21 also proposed and initiated the construction of Hamersville University of Pittsburgh Advanced Research Center,

¹⁶³ Smith, 8.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹⁶⁵

Super Computing Center,¹⁶⁶ Biotechnology Manufacturing Center, CMU’s Software Engineering Institute, and National Center for Robotics in Manufacturing. As a result of many of these projects that helped the public University of Pittsburgh and private Carnegie Mellon University turn into modern hubs for research and establish ties between businesses, education and health services. These, so-called “eds and meds” became cornerstone sector of Pittsburgh’s economy.

In his 2012 analysis of the impact of Strategy 21 on the Pittsburgh region, Smith stresses the strategy’s role in stabilizing local industries that were suffering from high labor costs through public and private investment and sector research in the 1990s. This was possible mainly because “investments in technology and the adoption of newly researched production methods made local industrial producers competitive in national and international markets.”¹⁶⁷ Therefore, instead of going through total collapse, the local metal industry adopted itself to the modern market, and even though it will never regain its former production capacity, the metals industry remains part of the local economy. The success of the manufacturing industry in the region is a result of changes that the industry undergone based on the recommendation of the strategy and therefore it was important that the regional public-private coalition already in the mid-1980s agreed that revitalization of the industry is vital for the region’s economy.

Pittsburgh Region Largest Employers		
1	University of Pittsburgh Medical Center	43 000
2	U.S. Government	18 328
3	Commonwealth of Pennsylvania	13 298
4	University of Pittsburgh	12 116
5	Giant Eagle	11 119
6	West Penn Alleghany Health Systems	9 998
7	BNY Mellon Corp.	7 600
8	Allegheny County	6 728
9	Westinghouse Electric Co.	5 600
10	Highmark Inc.	5 400
11	United States Steel Corp.	5 000

Table 2: Pittsburgh Region Largest Employers 2013¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ The Super Computing Center was from a large part funded by federal government.

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¹⁶⁸ “Slideshow: Pittsburgh Region’s Top Employers,” *Pittsburgh Business Times*, July 12, 2013, accessed July 12, 2014, <http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/slideshow/2013/07/12/largest-pittsburgh-area-employers.html>.

Strategy 21 also mostly succeeded in fulfilling its other goals. Conversion of land and facilities was typically performed through specific redevelopment projects that were expected to bring economic benefit. However, due to the costs of conversion, many sites still remain underutilized. Unfortunately, despite investments into higher education, much of the region's labor force remains unfit to fill the newly created jobs, because of the lack of "large-scale retraining programs."¹⁶⁹ As this problem affects the African-Americans more than the rest of the region's population, the fourth goal of the strategy has also not yet been fully realized. As a result of the urban revitalization throughout the region and good governance, Pittsburgh has also managed to change its image nationally and internationally, which reflects is demonstrated by the city's high ranking in various lists of the most livable cities released by magazines such as *Forbes* or the *Economist*.¹⁷⁰

To weight up the benefits of Strategy 21, both Smith and Jo emphasize the importance of two conditions that contributed to the successful revitalization of Pittsburgh: strong and stable leadership of the private sector and creation of a regional public-private coalition that proposed a unique collection of policies and legislation that affected the whole region. Smith further explains that the division of tasks between public and private actors is necessary as the former have the authority and power to facilitate change through legislation and policy, while the latter can focus on the details of projects and shape them to the needs of the future users. At the same time, by considering and coordinating the needs of various economic actors, the efforts of a regional public-private coalition led to a balanced development between the central city and its suburbs, which contributed to the stabilization not only of the regional but also of the central city economy.¹⁷¹

As a result of a collaborative economic strategy that built on Pittsburgh's mature industrial base and supported creation of service-centered industries – and which, of course, extended beyond Strategy 21 – many manufacturing jobs were replaced by high-end jobs in education, medicine, computer sciences, and finance.

¹⁶⁹ Smith,12.

¹⁷⁰ Francesca Levy, "America's Most Livable Cities," *Forbes*, April 29, 2010, accessed July 18, 2014, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/29/cities-livable-pittsburgh-lifestyle-real-estate-top-ten-jobs-crime-income.html>.

¹⁷¹ Jo 14

Although some jobs were never replaced and some were replaced by low-paying jobs in hotels and restaurants (see Table 3), Pittsburgh managed to diversify its economy.

Pittsburgh's recent history: All jobs not equal²²		
	Job change 2001-2008	Annual salary 2008
Manufacturing	- 15,199	\$57,335
Leisure and Hospitality	+ 3,459	\$20,029
Accommodation and Food Services	+ 3,198	\$14,938

Table 3: Pittsburgh's recent history: All jobs not equal¹⁷²

It is important to note that despite the successful rebuilding of the economy around universities, hospitals, high-tech industry, and finance, Pittsburgh has been experiencing fiscal troubles. In 2003, the city was in crisis and entered Commonwealth of Pennsylvania oversight after declaring that it was financially distressed under Act 47, which allowed it to restructure its debt.¹⁷³ In order to turn Pittsburgh's finances around, city officials cut around 13 percent of its workforce and undertook steps such as taxing companies' payrolls and temporarily freezing wages.¹⁷⁴ These actions helped to stabilize the city budget; however, a recent report showed that the city is facing an operating deficit next year due to its pension obligations.

Detroit's Fragmented Regional Restructuring

In contrast, restructuring in Detroit was defined by the inability of local entities to form a regional coalition, therefore the region's economy transformed without a clear widely embraced strategy, and this is reflected on the current economic instability of the central city, which remains unconnected to its suburbs. Even though the Big Three automakers were initially involved in the downtown redevelopment efforts, as they relocated most of their production into the suburbs and other regions, they lost

¹⁷² Erik Lotke, et al., "Pittsburgh: The Rest of the Story," *Institute for America's Future*, accessed July 20, 2014, <http://ourfuture.org/files/pittsburgh-rest-of-the-story.pdf>.

¹⁷³ http://www.city.pittsburgh.pa.us/council/assets/04_ACT47Plan-Je11.pdf

¹⁷⁴ <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-13/pittsburgh-rebirth-tainted-as-pension-fuels-deficit-muni-credit.html>

their interest in regional restructuring and no other private organization managed to assume the leadership role and form a broad governing coalition to solve the problems of the regional economy, as was the case in Pittsburgh.

Some business leadership coalitions were formed in reaction to Detroit's economic downfall, but the problem was that they pursued their own economic interests and lacked a common vision for the region. Problems were further enhanced by the gap in racial gap between the central city and its suburbs. One such coalitions is the Detroit Renaissance formed in 1970 by Henry Ford II, which represented the Big Three and other old manufacturing companies. Detroit Regional Chamber was influenced mainly by the service-based industries. In addition, organizations such as the New Detroit and the Detroit Economic Development Corporation, further fragmented the spectrum as they represented primarily the interest of the black elite.¹⁷⁵

As was mentioned in chapter 4, public-private partnership for downtown development existed during the 1970s, when the city under Mayor Coleman Young supported the initiative of the Detroit Renaissance. Eventually, Mayor Young built close working ties with the corporate leaders, which led to construction of two new auto plants within the central city. However, as Jo puts it, "the political autonomy based on racial segregation in the central city did not force Mayor Young to cooperate with suburban governments."¹⁷⁶ In addition, the community-based organizations were until relatively recently unable to countervail the strong downtown business establishment and therefore most of the redevelopment efforts were limited to downtown area and were not very successful in spurring further growth. This is one of the reasons why Detroit maintained a regionally fractured economy that developed unevenly and remained dominated by the automotive industry.¹⁷⁷

The importance of the automotive industry for the local employment has decreased by more than a half since its peak five decades ago, albeit with the federal government's 2009 bailout, automobile industry continues to dominate the region

¹⁷⁵ Jo, 17.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 17.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 18.

(see Table 4). Nevertheless, although lacking a comprehensive restructuring strategy, Detroit needed to face the deindustrialization and diversify its economy.

Detroit Metro Largest Employers 2013, 2011				
	Company/Organization	2013	Company/Organization	2011
1	Ford Motor Co.	43,977	Ford Motor Co.	38,000
2	University of Michigan	29,551	University of Michigan	27,145
3	Chrysler Group LLC	29,006	General Motors Corp.	25,903
4	General Motors Co.	26,843	Henry Ford Health System	18,385
5	U.S. Government	18,600	Chrysler, LLC	18,255
6	Henry Ford Health System	17,831	U.S. Government	18,197
7	CHE Trinity Health	14,062	William Beaumont Hospitals	14,495
8	Detroit Medical Center	13,458	Detroit Public Schools	13,039
9	Beaumont Health System	13,134	St. John Providence Health System	12,865
10	St. John Providence Health System	12,002	CHE Trinity Health	12,588

Table 4 Detroit Metro Largest Employers 2013, 2011¹⁷⁸

Note: The enormous growth of car company jobs was possible mainly because the automakers were able reopen factories closed during the recent economic recession, once they – with help of the federal bailout – recovered from the recession.

Various sectors have been undergoing diversification in attempt to not only modernize the existing production but also to create segments of production that would be specific for the metro (for example by focusing the car industry on green technologies). First of all, the auto industry focused on turning Metro Detroit to a center of information technology in order to modernize their production with an in-car entertainment technology. The job creation in the technology sector in 2011 was so fast that some reports called Metro Detroit “the fastest-expanding region in the

¹⁷⁸ “Largest Metro Detroit Employers,” *Crain’s Detroit Business*, September 15, 2013, accessed June 2, 2014, <http://www.craindetroit.com/article/20130915/LIST/130919935/largest-metro-detroit-employers>.

country.”¹⁷⁹ Also related to the changes that the automobile and developed manufacturing industries have been undergoing is a trend toward the clean economy, which led to the growing “share of jobs in electric vehicles and battery technology.”¹⁸⁰ Another long-term trend toward diversification can be seen in the rise of education and health care industry in the metro area represented by Wayne State University, the College for Creative Studies, the Detroit Medical Center and Henry Ford Hospital, some of which, as Table 3 shows have become the top employers in the Metro Detroit. Already since the late 1990s, Metro Detroit – and specifically the Wayne State University – is a part of a Michigan Life Sciences Corridor, which brought new investment into biotechnology and subsequent rise in job openings.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, expansion of Detroit’s main health care complex near Wayne State University and the growth of the university itself, as the list of major employers of the City of Detroit indicates, turned the “eds and meds” into an important sector of the city’s economy as well.

Principal Employers of the City of Detroit	Employees	Rank	% of Total City Employment
Detroit Public Schools	13,750	1	1.6%
City of Detroit	13,187	2	1.5%
Detroit Medical Center	10,499	3	1.2%
Henry Ford Health System	8,502	4	1.0%
U.S. government	6,335	5	0.7%
Wayne State University	5,019	6	0.6%
State of Michigan	4,910	7	0.6%
General Motors Co.	4,652	8	0.5%
Chrysler Group L.L.C.	4,517	9	0.5%
U.S. Postal Service	4,106	10	0.5%

Copied from the City of Detroit’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report



Table 4: Principal Employers of the City of Detroit, 2010¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Ryan Flinn and Jeff Green, “Detroit Auto, Tech Firms Woo Silicon Valley Talent,” March 24, 2011, accessed June 28, 2014, <http://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Detroit-auto-tech-firms-woo-Silicon-Valley-talent-2388370.php>.

¹⁸⁰ “Michigan Economic Condition Assessment: Detroit and Grand Rapids,” *Brookings Institution*, accessed May 8, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2012/2/23%20michigan%20economy/02_23_michigan_detroit_grandrapids.pdf.

¹⁸¹ “Metro Detroit, Michigan Ranks High in Biotech VC Rankings,” *Metro Media*, December 17, 2009, accessed May 8, 2014, <http://www.metromodemedia.com/innovationnews/biotechvcrankingmetrodetroit0139.aspx>.

¹⁸² James M. Hohman, “How Bad Is Detroit’s Detroitification?” *Michigan Capitol Confidential*, January 21, 2011, accessed June 30, 2014, <http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/14382>.

Nevertheless, as a result of the uneven restructuring of the greater Detroit region, there exists a profound difference in long-term economic performance of its core city and surrounding suburbs, which can be demonstrated by the following statistics. At the last Census in 2010, the City of Detroit had higher unemployment (22.7 percent) than the whole region (13 percent). Median household income in 2012 was \$25,193 in the city, but 49,923 in the whole metropolitan area.¹⁸³ This is a huge difference compared to the economic data describing the distribution of economic power in Pittsburgh and its suburbs. As the data from May 2014 in Pittsburgh show unemployment level in the metro (5.3 percent) and the city (5.7 percent)¹⁸⁴ is almost the same and the difference in median household income is not so dramatic as in Detroit: \$39,884 in the city and \$50,489 in the metropolitan area.¹⁸⁵

Amidst the city's financial crisis which escalated into filing for chapter 9 bankruptcy, the City of Detroit under Mayor Dave Bing, in cooperation with Ford and Kresge foundations, began looking for a solution that would stabilize Detroit's economy and keep people in the city. Together they launched the Detroit Works project to develop a long-term vision for the redevelopment of the city. The project eventually generated a long-term planning initiative and produced a blueprint for how to improve Detroit's urban fabric and economy. The Detroit Future City Plan, which was put together by the city government, private sector, and local non-profit organizations suggested short-term and long-term improvements in the following areas: economic growth, land use, city systems, neighborhoods, and building assets. These include number of innovative strategies, such as greening the city's vacant lots through urban farming, and concentration of resources into economically healthier neighborhoods of the city. The economic growth section of the plan then focuses on creating work opportunities within the city limits by creating more urban density through bolstering existing economic corridors in the city. Subsequently, in early 2014 the Detroit Economic Growth Corp. began hiring

¹⁸³ Amanda Noss, "Household Income 2012: American Community Survey Brief," *United States Census Bureau*, September 2013, accessed May 9, 2014, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr12-02.pdf>.

¹⁸⁴ Unemployment Rates For Metropolitan Areas: June 2014," *Bureau of Labor Statistics*, accessed July 2, 2014, <http://www.bls.gov/web/metro/laummtrk.htm>.

¹⁸⁵ Ann Belster, "Pittsburgh's Median Family Income Rises," *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, September 19, 2013, accessed July 30, 2014, <http://www.post-gazette.com/business/businessnews/2013/09/19/Pittsburgh-s-median-family-income-rises/stories/201309190300>.

urban planners who should start putting together pilot initiatives stemming from the plan. It remains to be seen whether the Detroit Future City Plan will be able to revitalize and stabilize the city. Nonetheless, some critics already see its weakness in focusing solely on the city itself and not taking regional solutions into account.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁶ John Gallagher, "Detroit Future City To Unveil Its 2014 Priorities For Remaking City, February 19, 2014, accessed June 15, 2014, <http://www.freep.com/article/20140219/BUSINESS06/302200021/Detroit-Future-City-Greening-blue-aquaculture>.

Conclusion

This paper studies possibilities of transformation of cities once heavily dependent on manufacturing in a post-industrial era by closely following and comparing the restructuring efforts of Detroit and Pittsburgh. These two cities, located in the Midwest of the United States, a former industrial heartland of the United States, grew around a monoculture industry, which made them especially vulnerable to the vanishing of industrial economy in the post-WWII period. Through deindustrialization of their economies, both Detroit and Pittsburgh suffered from similar problems, such as depopulation, unemployment, factory closure, and urban decline, yet six decades after the problems started to show, the City of Detroit filed for municipal bankruptcy and continues to face high unemployment, enormous draining of population, and urban blight, while Pittsburgh is showing a lot of resilience, after it managed to diversify its economy and it seems also stabilize its population. The question is what did Detroit and Pittsburgh did differently?

The study of the effects of deindustrialization on the Rust-Belt city explains that unto a certain level, both Detroit and Pittsburgh were deeply hurt by the long-accumulating structural problems of the U.S. industrial economy, which did not withstand the pressures of globalizing of economy in the second part of the 20th century. Similarly, they were both affected by the trends of U.S. federal urban policies, which disfavored the older industrial cities as they supported growing places in suburbs and other regions within the United States. It might thus seem that when their main industries collapsed in the 1970s and the two cities had to come up with restructuralization strategies, they were at the same starting line. Nevertheless, closer observation of how the two cities developed within their metropolitan areas show, that the crisis in Detroit is not only a result of industrial decline, but more importantly urban decline, which was instigated by decades of racial segregation within the Detroit metro.

Comparison of the distribution of various demographics and economic prosperity between the two cities and their regions show that in Pittsburgh, the central city and suburbs create a relatively balanced urban region, while following decades of racial conflict and white flight, Detroit's central city has been racially and economically segregated from its suburbs. This distinction reflected on the abilities

of the two cities to create regional coalitions that would lead the restructuring efforts. In Pittsburgh, regional public-private coalition was formed already in the mid-1980s. This coalition embraced a shared strategy for Pittsburgh's transformation, Strategy 21, which called for a more diversified economy based on higher education, health services, and finance, but also for reinventing the regions manufacturing capacities toward high-tech production. In summary, it can be said that strong and stable leadership of the private sector and creation of regional public-private coalition that proposed a unique collection of policies and legislation that affected the whole region was crucial for the success of Pittsburgh's transformation. On the other hand, similar coalition was never formed in Detroit region, mainly because of the high level of racial polarization between the central city and its suburbs, which were defined by different political constituencies. Thus restructuring of Detroit's economy was never based on a comprehensive plan, which would guide the efforts of various economic actors within the urban region.

In addition, the timing of the economic restructuring also substantially determined the success of the efforts in the two cities. Pittsburgh's Strategy 21 was developed early-on in the deindustrialization process, because the steel industry collapsed very quickly. Detroit's automotive industry, on the other hand was able to revive after the initial shock in the 1970s and although never returned to its original production capacity, it remained an important sector of the local economy. Therefore, the economic restructuring in Detroit was happening on a slower pace.

The urban planning aspect of the city's post-industrial transformation of the two cities was also quite determining. While in Pittsburgh, urban transformation substantially reflected the aims of the restructuring plan and encompassed downtown development, revitalization of industrial sites, and revitalization of neighborhoods throughout the regions, Detroit's urban planning efforts were highly limited to the redevelopment of its downtown during the period of Detroit Renaissance, which was a result of the corporate-centered public-private coalition that formed in the city during the 1970s.

To conclude, the transformation of Detroit and Pittsburgh was not only largely shaped by the deindustrialization of the U.S. economy, but substantially also, by the development of the two cities within their regions. This influenced their

ability to form working coalitions that would reflect the needs of diverse economic actors present in the city, as well as to create a restructuring strategy, which would address the problems of the cities caused by both industrial and urban crises.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1 Employment by Composition by Industry, Detroit, Pittsburgh, U.S., 1960-2012 Source: U.S. Census of Bureau. <http://www.census.gov/>.

Table 2 Pittsburgh Region Largest Employers 2013 Source: “Slideshow: Pittsburgh Region’s Top Employers.” *Pittsburgh Business Times*, July 12, 2013. Accessed July 12, 2014. <http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/slideshow/2013/07/12/largest-pittsburgh-area-employers.html>.

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Table 4 Detroit Metro Largest Employers 2013, 2011 Source: “Largest Metro Detroit Employers.” *Crain’s Detroit Business*, September 15, 2013. Accessed June 2, 2014. <http://www.craindetroit.com/article/20130915/LIST/130919935/largest-metro-detroit-employers>.

Table 5 Source: Hohman, James M.. "How Bad Is Detroit's Detroitification?" *Michigan Capitol Confidential*, January 21, 2011. Accessed June 30, 2014, <http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/14382>.

Figure 1 Manufacturing Share of Total Jobs in U.S. and Midwest, 1969- 2009
Source: Richard Florida, "The Midwest's Manufacturing Conundrum," *Citylab*, May 11, 2011, accessed July 1, 2014, <http://www.citylab.com/work/2012/05/midwests-manufacturing-conundrum/1920/>.

Figure 2 Development of Detroit's Population, 1900 to 2013 Source: Myler, Kofi. "Detroit's Population From 1840 to 2012 Shows High Points, Decades of Decline." *Detroit Free Press*, July 23, 2013. Accessed June 25, 2014. <http://www.freep.com/interactive/article/20130723/NEWS01/130721003/detroit-city-population>.

Figure 3 Development of white vs. African-American population in City of Detroit, 1920 – 2012 Source: Sands, Gary, Reese, Laura A., and Skidmore, Mark. "Detroit's Bankruptcy Settlement Will Not Solve the City's Problem." *The London School of Economics and Political Science*. Accessed June 15, 2014. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/03/10/detroits-bankruptcy-settlement-will-not-solve-the-citys-problems/>.

Figure 4 Map of race and ethnicity distribution in Detroit, 2010 Source: Fisher, Erik. "Race and Ethnicity 2010: Detroit." Flickr Commons. Accessed June 16, 2013. <https://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/5560488484/in/set-72157626354149574>.

Figure 5 Development of population in Pittsburgh city Source: "Sunday Forum: Who Needs More People?" *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, July 5, 2009. Accessed July 21, 2014. <http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2009/07/05/Sunday-Forum-Who-needs-more-people/stories/200907050239>.

Figure 6 Map of race and ethnicity distribution in Pittsburgh, 2010 Source: Firsher, Erik. "Race and Ethnicity: Pittsburgh." Flickr Commons. Accessed June 20, 2013. <https://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/5560488484/in/set-72157626354149574>.