

## **Abstract**

Critical realism acknowledges epistemic relativism, which means faith, that our knowledge is not definite, complete and that it's not pure mirror of reality. It however refuses critical relativism, which claims, that we cannot choose more adequate description of reality between two or more competing descriptions. In order to reflect an extent and character of our knowledge, first we have to reveal ontological status of *things*, which are subject of our investigation – in case of natural science as well as in social science – which implies fundamental refuse of the thesis about correspondence between descriptions of *things* and their substantial existence. In order to approach knowledge about real essence of things, we cannot confine on our experiences of events, which are products of co-operation of particular generative mechanisms and causal relations. For that reason higher degree of abstraction and theory-grounded knowledge is necessary. Our theories about generative mechanisms can be than on the basis of empirical investigation temporarily verified, partly falsified or modified; but always with recognition, that our experience is only an experience of variable manifest appearances, which are conditioned with higher structural ordering. Foregoing thesis represents connection between natural and social sciences. Following text also discusses many differences and as well as what these differences mean for social-scientific exploration.