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Security Sector Reform in Armenia

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Annotation

The thesis named “Security Sector Reform in Armenia” is concerned with the dynamics of the process of transformation of the security sector in the state since 1990s and the possible obstacles for the smooth process of reformation. The paper is drawn on the various reports by the international donor organizations, as well as academic literature to provide a broad theoretical basis of the concept of Security Sector Reform. The theoretical foundation gives the prospective on the contexts, elements as well as tools for the Security Sector Reform implementation in general and helps to identify the features that are relevant to the case of Armenia. Apart from the abovementioned sources, the empirical part of the thesis also draws on the number of interviews with the Armenian experts, in order to gain a deeper understanding of the issue on the ground. The paper identifies number of Security Sector Reform features that are relevant to the Armenian case and provides the further analysis of them in order to investigate the dynamics of the transformation. Finally, the research outlines the number of obstacles that challenged the process of transformation of the security sector in Armenia.
Acknowledgements

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DECLARATION:

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 34810 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 111 manuscript pages.

Tatevik Avakyan

31.07.2014
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Introduction

Before the end of the Cold War the perception of security was narrowed down to the state defense. Recently, the concept has emerged adapting to the new security environment. The result of the “widening” of security is the process of identification of new “threats” as well as new “non-traditional” security issues that were not existent in the Cold War period. Besides, the concern of the international community over such issues as poverty, armed conflicts, terrorism, failed states or regional conflicts has increased, which resulted in the emergence of new concepts, such as for instance “human security”. However, those “new” security issues are in fact not novel, but they have rather been recently “securitized”.1 The securitization of the non-traditional issues opened new perspectives for security assurance. The Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a concept that emerged in the 1990s. It became a suitable tool for the state and non-state actors to ensure security in the new post-Cold War environment.

Security Sector Reform can be implemented in the number of conditions, where it is seen as an irreplaceable tool to deal with the insecurity, namely:

1. **Democratization of the state**, which requires the transformation of the security sector institutions and improvement of oversight in order to make those bodies act according to democratic principles;

2. **Establishment of good governance practices**, which requires establishment of the rule by elected representatives, who would act in an accountable and transparent way and be free from corruption and organized crime, as well as be able to assure security for citizens;

3. **Economic development**, which needs stable and politically predictable environment, where security sector uses only necessary resources for accomplishing the needs of internal and external security assurance for the state and acts according to principles of transparency and accountability;

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4. **Internal and external conflict prevention**, which requires the effective conflict management by security sector, which would also provide justice and security to all citizens equally and become an institution for confidence building with neighboring states;

5. **Post-conflict recovery**, that is achieved through demobilization and reintegration programs, along with the unification of armed formations under a common national security structure, as well as elimination of light weapons and small arms and prevention of security service privatization;

6. **Professionalization of armed and security forces**, with clearly defined roles and functions, as well as respect of rule of law and acceptance of dominance of democratically elected authorities that would act efficiently in order to protect both state and its civilians.²

The concept has been widely operationalized since 1990s and has become a proper tool to fight the insecurity in the context of development, as well as in post-communist and post-conflict states. Armenia being a former Soviet republic has gone through a wide range of reforms in the security sector. As not only a post-authoritarian state, but also a country facing a de-facto war while gaining independence and simultaneously having the issues of unsustainable development, Armenia is a great example of how the context where the reform is implemented can influence the dynamics of security sector transformation.

**Research Question**

Armenia being an independent state for over twenty years has the process of security sector reformation underway till now. Moreover, the transformation of the security sector in Armenia has started as a simultaneous process with the independence gaining, de-facto war and the economic reorganization. Those specific features and conditions of the security sector in the state

played a crucial role in the process of the reformation. Hence, the process of SSR in case of Armenia has had its ups and downs. The main aim of the thesis is to identify the dynamics of changes of Armenian security sector as a whole as well as its sub-sectors, such as police, military and so on and so forth, while considering the specificity of the case. Thus, the research questions of the paper are following:

1. What is the dynamics of SSR in Armenia?
2. What are the greatest obstacles for the SSR processes in the state?

Additionally, in order to provide the basis to answer the main research questions, the thesis will investigate and answer additional questions regarding each sub-sector.

**Methodology**

The particular research is an instrumental case study based on the concept of Security Sector Reform implemented on the case of Armenia. The concept is of a great importance in that particular state for the process of sustainable development and further cooperation with the international organizations, including EU and NATO. Besides, the success of the reform in Armenia has a great influence on the region of South Caucasus in general and can have a positive impact on the process of stabilization.

The choice of the topic is characterized by the high interest in the issues of development, peace and security in the region of South Caucasus and Armenia in particular. Besides, there is a lack of academic literature on the topic of Security Sector Reform in that particular state, thus the topic is relatively new.

The main goal of the research is to investigate the dynamics of the reforms in the security sector in Armenia, while considering the specific nature of the state security and the region in general. Besides, it aims to identify the obstacles that the international organizations, development donors and the Armenian government have had to confront while implementing reforms.
The research is meant to be a qualitative analysis, where the independent variables are dynamics of internal institutional change, changes in the legal framework, politics, as well as changes in civil society having Security Sector Reform as a dependent variable.

Outline of the Thesis

The paper aims to provide the theoretical overview of the concept of Security Sector Reform and operationalize it on the case of the Republic of Armenia in order to identify the dynamics of transformation in the security sector in the particular state.

The first chapter gives the basic overview of the definition of the concept of Security Sector Reform and includes diverse approaches by the international organizations and the donor community, such as United Nations, OECD and DFID that provides the reader with the primary understanding of the concept.

The second chapter provides the overall theoretical framework of the Security Sector Reform, focusing on three main contexts where it can be implemented, namely the context of development assistance, post-authoritarian and post-conflict transition. Each part of the chapter provides the overview of the specific features and tools of Security Sector Reform suitable for each context. The aim of the chapter is to identify those particular features of SSR in each context that can be operationalized on the case of Armenia.

Following the second chapter, the third one aims to provide the analysis of the SSR features that has been implemented in Armenia. Using the conclusions from the second chapter regarding the SSR tools and features that are suitable for the Armenian case it aims to analyze the dynamics of the reform in each sub-sector. In addition to that the chapter investigates and points out the obstacles for the positive transformation in security sector of Armenia.

Finally, the conclusion summarizes the research and points out the main findings of it.
I. Defining Security Sector Reform

The concept of Security Sector Reform origins from two broad areas: the development donor community and the field of civil-military relations. In the development agenda the concept of SSR occurred due to the constantly mentioned important role of security sector in the process of sustainable economic development and democratization. In the field of civil-military relations it is mainly associated within the context of the transformation process of post-communist Central and Easter European states, which brought the holistic approach towards the debate. The holistic approach of SSR towards security sector identifies the importance of military related formations apart from the regular armed forces in the process of reformation. It also identifies that the role of security and security system actors is more complex than only the questions related to the civil oversight over military, for instance.³

Despite the fact that SSR has been a popular concept both among academics and practitioners in recent years it still does not have a commonly accepted definition; however the main goal of it is believed to be the reduction of the security and democratic deficits within the state.

Before identifying the further details of the SSR it is important to point out what constitutes Security Sector itself. In the relevant literature, the scholars usually identify three main groups of components: the groups with the legacy and tools to use force, mainly military forces and police; institutional bodies responsible for monitoring and managing the security sector, namely government ministries; and finally those institutions responsible for maintaining the rule of law and judiciary system, such as human rights commissions, for instance.⁴ Additionally, when the state is in phase of ongoing armed conflict security sector includes certain non-state actors as well, such as private security firms or armed opposition, as well as academia, civil society and media.

The state government is considered to be the primary actor responsible for the SSR implementation, however, in the war-torn states, it might be a transitional government or the military. Besides, the international organizations play a crucial role in assistance and advice in security sector reformation. This might include the help in constructing the civil society, as well as assistance in DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration). As a result, various development donors and international organizations developed their own approaches towards SSR.

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, for instance, describes security sector as a term which includes “structures, institutions and personnel responsible for the management, provision and oversight of security in a country. It is generally accepted that the security sector includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. Elements of the judicial sector responsible for the adjudication of cases of alleged criminal conduct and misuse of force are, in many instances, also included. Furthermore, the security sector includes actors that play a role in managing and overseeing the design and implementation of security, such as ministries, legislative bodies and civil society groups. Other non-State actors that could be considered part of the security sector include customary or informal authorities and private security services”.

The UN identifies SSR as a “process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law”. As the Security Council noted, Security Sector Reform “should be a nationally owned process that is rooted in the particular needs and conditions of the country in question”.

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5 Ibid
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in return mentions that “the “security system” includes security forces and the relevant civilian bodies and processes needed to manage them and encompasses: state institutions which have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies; judicial and penal institutions); and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, the Defense Ministry, etc.)”. Security Sector Reform is seen as a process of “transformation of the security system which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions, so that it is managed and operated in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework”.

Among other development assistants, the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) developed its own approach towards SSR. It identifies four groups of security sector elements, namely “core security actors, such as armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; gendarmeries; presidential guards, intelligence and security services (both military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defense forces, national guards, militias); security management and oversight bodies, including the executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defense, internal affairs, foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices, financial audit & planning units); and civil society organizations (civilian review boards and public complaints commissions); justice and law enforcement institutions, specifically judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems; and non-statutory security forces, such

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as liberation armies; guerrilla armies; private body-guard units; private security companies; political party militias”.

DFID states that “Security Sector Reform must account for the overall security context and address the fundamentals as well as the specifics. Effective management, transparency and accountability of the security sector are just as necessary as with any other part of the public sector. Resources need to be managed efficiently to allow the provision of security that does not threaten democracy or human rights, or undermine other development goals”. 8

The approach of international organizations and development donors towards SSR differs not only regarding the concept but features of the implementation as well. Thus, there are number of settings that each international organization requires in order to start the process of assistance.

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8 DFID. "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform”. Department for International Development. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/supportingsecurity[1].pdf
II. Contexts of Security Sector Reform

It has been mentioned above that the concept of SSR itself does not have a universal definition and in case of each state it is implemented based on individual features and conditions. However, there are usually four broad dimensions where reform might be implemented: political – democratic oversight of the society over the armed forces; economic – efficient distribution of resources; social – the assurance of physical security for the citizens; and institutional – the “professionalization of actors in the security sector.”

Besides, the majority of scholars point out three main contexts where the Security Sector Reform can and should be implemented: the SSR can be used by the international development donors to improve the development assistance; it can be also used as a tool to facilitate the practical coordination and conceptual integration of defense and security reforms in post-authoritarian states; and finally it can be used in post-conflict or so-called failed states for the peacebuilding and reconstruction processes.

1. Development Donors and Security Sector Reform

The emergence of the concept of Security Sector Reform in the context of development assistance is usually associated with the speech of former British Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short in 1998. Short identifies security sector by those bodies responsible for protecting the state and its civilians, including military, police, and intelligence as well as civilian structures. In her speech at King’s College in London she mentions that conflict prevention and post-conflict reconciliation are keys to development. Besides, Short points out that the population of developing countries and poor people in particular are the most concerned about security. It is not a secret that the majority of recent wars takes place in the developing

world and usually occurs within the state. In fact starting from the beginning of 1990s in certain developing countries the state and security sector elements have been the major source of insecurity for people. Even though certain conservatives claim that security sector should not have its place on development agenda, as it might distract agencies from their main task of reducing poverty and developing economy\textsuperscript{11}, the recent research shows that sustainable development and good governance of security sector are two interlinked phenomena. Thus, development assistance became one of the main agendas where Security Sector Reform should be and is implemented.

In her speech Clare Short identified a set of actions that should be implemented in Security Sector Reform agenda by development assistants, including provision of support to assure a proper civilian oversight over military; provision of trainings to the members of military on basic principles of human rights and humanitarian law; the existence of strong national parliament to exercise proper oversight of security apparatus; the support to the civil society to play a watchdog function over security sector elements; and finally support for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in post-conflict societies.\textsuperscript{12}

However, Ms. Short was not the first to identify the necessity of the reformation of security system.\textsuperscript{13} This issue has been frequently pointed out before, but the end of Cold War indicated the creation of new security environment with the new order for the international and regional actors, thus development donors were given a space to grow interest towards security-related issues. In fact, the debate over security sector assistance and military in particular in the Cold War period was usually overcome by donors due to specific political environment of that time.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{12} Security Sector Reform and the Elimination of Poverty: A Speech by Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London, 9 March 1999. DFID, 1999.
In the beginning of 1990s the new political reality where the international actors were supposed to indicate their place was created.

The development donors had to face certain challenges, however, the new era also opened up new opportunities: international actors had more space for their activities and had broader access to security-related cases; however, at the same time that increased the level of responsibility, as donors were expected to be largely engaged in conflict prevention as well as post-conflict reconstruction. Security Sector Reform became a tool that could allow donors to deal with the challenges of post-Cold War order, while enjoying new opportunities.

Prior the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of liberalization of Eastern Europe the security assistance was highly understood in terms of security forces and military. However, in the post-Cold War period the donors widened their approach and more security sector bodies were included into the agenda.

It is important to mention, that the “engagement” of donors in security-related issues was by and large fiscal. Thus, two main organizations involved in those fiscal initiatives were International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. 

IMF was founded in 1946 aiming to become a watchdog of macro-economic health of member states and to promote stability in international finance and monetary-exchange systems. Till 1986 IMF was mainly providing short-term economic assistance. However, soon the long-term financing policy on concessional basis through Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) allowed IMF to provide support to the poorest member countries in order to realize the fundamental economic reforms. One year later the SAF was replaced by Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF), which was financed by so-called “special contributions” from IMF member states. In order to obtain it, the recipient government was supposed to implement three year

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15 Ibid
16 Ibid
comprehensive macro-economic and structural adjustment programs, as well as to work with World Bank and IMF to prepare Policy Framework Paper which would discuss the economic and financial implementation of the program. Inter alia ESAF also included the technical assistance to recipient countries.

Since 1990s the poverty reduction and promotion of strong governance became central for IMF.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, in 1999 ESAF was transformed into Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. Later on, in 1998, the organization’s concern of the governance issues caused the voluntary creation of Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency.\textsuperscript{19}

The IMF started to widen its approach to assistance, which resulted in the blurring of lines between IMF and the World Bank and at the same time questioned the capability of the Fund to complete the tasks in development assistance and poverty reduction.

The second leader in development assistance – World Bank – was established in 1944 as an International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, aiming to assist in smooth transition from wartime economy to peacetime one. Thus, its main task was to support the reconstruction and reconciliation processes of the states by “facilitating the capital investment for productive purposes and promoting balance of payments stability as well as balanced growth in international trade”.\textsuperscript{20}

The World Bank consists of five institutions that constitute one group: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFS); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid


and the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID); that provide borrowers with capital, technical assistance as well as policy advice.\(^{21}\)

In 1980s World Bank policy was driven by the belief that market plays a central role for advancing development. However, with the end of Cold War and new emerging reality the organization has changed its approach and the end of 1990s World Bank started to point out the necessity of good governance, claiming that without sustainability in state the economic and political development is impossible. Thus, an effective state was believed to be as important as private sector in the promotion of growth and development.

The XXI century identified new tasks for the World Bank, which tried to widen its approach and adapt it to the millennium reality, by having more investment in people through health and education, protection of environment, encouragement of private business development, reforms for stable macro-economic environment, as well as to focus on such issues as social development and poverty reduction. \(^{22}\)

Even though the international community started to realize that stability and security are the necessary conditions for democratization and development, when it came to actions development donors were usually slow in SSR implementation and the resources for it were rather scarce. In fact, the direct involvement of donors in SSR is rare even nowadays and DFID is yet among those few donors that take the direct actions in that process.

DFID reports identify two fundamental “prongs” that the Security Sector Reform agenda usually requires: direct engagement with the military, security and intelligence bodies to improve technical proficiency; and the reinforcement of the civil and political management of the security

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\(^{21}\) The World Bank. Available at: www.worldbank.org/en/about

sector to improve effectiveness, transparency and accountability.\textsuperscript{23} Besides, by focusing only on one of these “prongs” which certain governmental bodies will insist on it the donor community will create an obstacle for the successful implementation of SSR, which indicates that both are equally necessary.

Another development assistant that gets involved in the reformation process, the OECD DAC, sees SSR as a tool to face security challenges of population and state through the integrated development and security system reform policy, where the role of development donors is to assist in establishment of integrated institutional processes which will allow addressing wide range of issues.

During the process of assistance to recipient governments the development donors had to face the number of obstacles, including poor governance and the lack of civil society oversight, which triggered the increase of corruption level within the state and decreased the level of effective and efficient response to the internal and external threats, eventually creating the high level of insecurity for the population.\textsuperscript{24}

One way to overcome the obstacles for donor community is launching long-term initiatives that would include the issues of promotion of good governance and civil society oversight, instead of providing the single action, which cannot resolve the problem of insecurity and wide-spread poverty in recipient governments.

However, the provision of long-term assistance should also consider other necessary conditions for successful Security Sector Reform and sustainable development. One of those conditions is the existence of local ownership in the recipient governments. Thus, the development donor community must assist in the capacity building and help recipient countries to build analytical

\textsuperscript{23} DFID. "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform”. Department for International Development. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF%7D/supportingsecurity[1].pdf

approach and understanding towards their own security issues, which will assure the creation of local vision, necessary for further security transformations.\textsuperscript{25} Unless the local ownership among recipient government is developed, the assistance and investments will have a little effect or might become counter-productive.\textsuperscript{26}

All in all, development donors are expected to provide multi-sector assistance, which might be the combination of diplomatic, legal, socio-economic, security and political instruments in order to develop proper responses to all security threats.\textsuperscript{27} In case of single-sector assistance, certain threats, such as non-military ones for instance, might be excluded from the agenda, which will have a negative effect on security assurance in a long run.

Finally to assure the existence of effective and well-functioning security system the development donor community should assist the recipient governments in handling development and security as separate but integrated areas of public action; as well as in establishing well-defined policies and make the governance of security institutions responsible for security policy stronger. In addition to that it is important to build institutional mechanisms that would be implemented under the oversight of civil society but simultaneously have enough capability to face security issues.\textsuperscript{28}

In summary, considering the contexts where the international organizations mentioned above were implementing assistance in the combination with certain themes identified in development donors’ discourse in the post-Cold War period one might outline, that the donor community was concerned with four broad groups of issues, including military expenditure; conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding; governance and public sector reform; and poverty reduction.


\textsuperscript{28} Ibid
1.1. Development Assistance and Military Expenditure

The post-Cold War period is highly characterized by the new and strong policies of development donors towards the issue of military expenditure and assistance to states overspending on military. The reduction of military spending has been on development donors agenda from the beginning of 1990s and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as two organization with sufficient resources as well as technical expertise, but with no mandate to intervene in political issues took the lead in that initiatives.

Initially World Bank and IMF addressed military expenditure as a purely fiscal issue and relied on the neo-classical economic theory, which identifies military spending as a waste of funds. 29 As a result, those development donors saw the direct connection between reduction of military spending and economic development.

As a matter of fact the general focus of IMF, for instance, is on the budget process as a whole and the organization is only concerned with the level of defense spending that somehow affects the macro-economic stability and growth caused by its impact on fiscal performance. The result is that, as “the IMF does not concern itself with the formulation of sectoral budgets, it is unable to affect the underlying institutional and human-resource weaknesses of which high levels of military spending is only a manifestation, which is unlikely to change”. 30 However, even though IMF may not inflict strict conditions on the level of structure of military spending but it surely does establish terms intended to limit overall defense spending or a certain portion of it. 31

In turn, the World Bank and its president of time Barber Conable put the issue of military spending on the same level as any other fiscal decision to find ways to bring military expenditure to the balance with development priorities. In 1991 World Bank created a Working Group on

31 Ibid
Military Expenditure. Later on in the middle of 1990s the states emerging from civil wars and governments forced by the development donors to reduce military spending began to seek assistance from World Bank in downsizing armed forces. Thus, the World Bank had to develop certain competence to support the activities of demobilization as well as reintegration of ex-combatants into the society. With the focus on demobilization, reintegration and reconciliation the issues of military spending disappeared for a while from World Bank’s agenda.

The reduction of military expenditure was also highlighted by the OECD member states in the post-Cold War period. In fact the period between 1987 and 1996 is characterized by the reduction of military spending among OECD members for 22%, while a group of developing countries reduced it for around 4%.32

Another concern of the donor community was the issue of states “overspending” on military. The problem with this issue is the lack of universal definition and implementation for it, i.e. what in one country is considered to be “overspending” might not be the case in another state.

In the late 90s with the increased concern of World Bank stakeholders about the lack of transparency in public expenditure and defense spending in particular in the recipient countries, the issues of military expenditure and overspending returned to the organization’s agenda as well as the donor community’s as a whole. Besides, the big amount of states provided with the budget support suffered from the disproportion between military budgets and spending for development promotion. Thus, the re-opened debate over military expenditure brought up an all-time question – “how much is enough”. One of the main problems related to that debate is the initiative of donor community to decide for recipient countries, instead of letting them to determine how much it is needed for them to spend on military.33

In addition to that, major World Bank stakeholders are entitled to indicate when the government spends “too much” on defense and stop further assistance. This causes another problem, as by not providing the recipient governments with the sufficient defense spending assistance the donors risk to create obstacles for the improvement of security sector governance. Besides, the high level of monitoring of expenditure implemented by World Bank triggers the lack of transparency in recipient governments that prefer to hide the information rather than deal with the Bank’s stakeholders’ strict rules.

Additionally, the focus of Bank on only one security sector component – namely defense – makes its assistance less effective.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, instead of being only concerned about the military resources the organizations could be equally concerned about other security sector elements and their resource allocation. As a matter of fact certain major World Bank stakeholders constitute the importance of other initiatives themselves; for instance police-reform, as well as rule of law promotion programs. Besides, the role of good governance was underlined by World Bank as a crucial element for sustainable expenditure reduction many times.

However, the World Bank is not the only donor organization that lacks efficiency. The whole development community requires the policy coordination including the issues like “overspending”. The absence of it resulted in negative response of recipient governments to the “development donor interference in internal military matters” including military expenditure and weakened their work in general.

In 2001, however, OECD DAC countries agreed that the limitation of military expenditure might not be consistent with the end of enhancing security as a foundation for development, thus strengthening of the state capacities to fulfil its duties may be helpful to maintain security and stability. This shift in the perception of security began a new era where the development was not

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid
possible without necessary security assurance and now the governance of the security spending was the main focus of development donor community.

1.2. Development Assistance, Governance and Public Sector Reform

One of the core elements of the Security Sector Reform is the promotion of good governance alongside the public sector reform. Besides, those two initiatives have been the central features of development policy after the end of Cold War.

Development theory suggests that properly functioning state institutions are crucial for the process of development. Even though, IMF and World Bank base their policy on neo-classical economic theory that is rather concerned with the size of government relative to the private sector, many other economists and scholars point out the effect of corruption on development and see the assurance of transparency and accountability of government as a solution.  

In 1990s the characteristic feature of development donors’ policy was the willingness to provide certain set of public services with the lowest possible cost, which was the result of neo-classical approach to the governance issue. In the late 1990s however the number of donors along with the World Bank, shifted their policy and increased their attention to the ways the public good was provided, rather than focusing on the cost-cutting. Specifically there were implemented certain programs aiming to reduce corruption and improve accountability and transparency in governments. Besides, the governance and public sector reform became one of the central objectives for the World Bank.

The interesting fact, however, is that the initiatives directed to the provision of good governance excluded the military force, police, ministry of defense and other security bodies from reforms till late 90s.

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The reason for the exclusion was the fear of the donors, and IMF along with the World Bank in particular, to cross the boundaries of their mandates. The number of other bilateral donors did not want to engage in initiatives not directly related to the economic assistance as well. However, the exclusion of security sector elements from governance reform does not seem logical: even though, the sovereign government is responsible for the final decision on structure and size of security forces, the international community remains responsible to question the efficiency of military related bodies.\textsuperscript{36} The main reason is the direct connection between military and other security elements, which can influence the overall assistance that development donors provide. That “connection” indicates the importance of multi-sector assistance by international community that would assure the effectiveness of the reforms in the recipient countries.

In addition to that, DFID points out certain cases, where the lack of democratic governance and civil society oversight combined with the government that is unable or unwilling to control the military and other security bodies, cause human rights abuses, as well as conditions where the absence of control over military expenditure and defense procurement cause waste of public money and increase of corruption. Thus DFID identifies its primary role as assistance in governance agenda, in order to create conditions for good governance in security sector management to assure accountability, transparency, auditing and anti-corruption. Besides the activities of department aim to support governments to meet their security needs by using the full range of resources that are available for them in order to build strategic planning capacity.

DFID itself works alongside various governmental bodies: regarding defense initiatives it relies on the assistance of MOD, while such structures as FCO or Home Office that play advisory role.\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid
\textsuperscript{37} DFID. "Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform". Department for International Development. Available at: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/supportingsecurity[1].pdf
The SSR programs assisted by DFID address two set of issues: governance quality and technical competence, meaning the openness and responsiveness between security sector institutions, the government apparatus and the public sector, and human resource capacities and the institutional structures and processes that underpin the functioning of the security sector respectively.\footnote{Ibid}

Thus, numbers of activities that are realized with the assistance of DFID include public awareness building through civil society, media, think-tanks and coalition building. DFID identifies that civil society should play an advocacy role in conflict-management and human rights issues and have a bigger participation in SSR debate, while media should be provided with training on security and defense related issues. It also encourages the states to build the networks through think tanks and develop coalitional relationship with regional state actors.

Additionally, DFID provides assistance to recipient governments in activities aiming to strengthen constitutional and legal frameworks by advising on roles and mandates, as well as by assisting in constitutional law, human rights issues to ensure the constitutional provision and assurance of them. Besides, the Department outlines the importance of civil society oversight in the SSR context and aims to support the states in civil service reform, advice civil society organizations, security think-tanks, assist in legislative procedure and so on.

Another donor organization that provides assistance mainly by non-fiscal means is OECD DAC which approaches Security Sector Reform (or Security System Reform) with the main focus on the issues related to the good governance and democratic oversight.

DAC defines three core values of SSR that require reform to be people-centered, locally-owned and based on principles of democratic control and rule of law, which will provide the freedom of fear and maximize the future stability and sustainability of SSR.\footnote{OECD. "DAC Guidelines and Reference Series: Security System Reform and Governance". \textit{OECD Publications} (2005). Available at: \url{http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf/31785288.pdf}}
Alike DFID, DAC points out the necessity of management of security system under the control of civil society and based on the principles of good governance: accountability and transparency, including “the availability of information required by policy makers; transparent and accountable decision-making by the appropriate actor(s); a comprehensive approach to public expenditure management; adoption of medium-term perspectives for decision making; and a capacity and willingness to shift priorities and reallocate resources to achieve strategic objectives”\[40\].

1.3. Development Assistance and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

In 1990s the states and the donor community had to deal with the costly consequences of the conflicts that emerged during that period, which made them rethink the importance of making a better effort to rather contribute to war prevention. The ethnic clashes and violent conflicts that took place during 90s resulted in the huge amount of reconciliation and peacebuilding operations that included various activities connected to the security sector reformation.

Among other donors, DFID identifies that FCO and MOD of the UK might provide certain assistance to the developing countries in initiatives related to the assurance of peace and stability.

Those initiatives include FCO assistance in “political support for peace agreements; assistance to promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and human rights; support for efforts to strengthen conflict prevention and peacekeeping”. MOD in return will launch initiatives for “education on the role of armed forces in democratic society; conduct of national defense reviews; development of defense policies; strengthening defense resource management; increasing accountability in defense procurement; strengthening military personnel management systems; training on human rights and democratic accountability”\[41\].

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\[40\] Ibid
In addition to that British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTS) are ready to “provide military training; advise on reorganization of the military; enhance armed forces’ understanding of, and ability to take part in, UN and regional Peace Support Operations; promote understanding and respect for human rights, and accountability within the Ministries of Defense and armed forces; and strengthen regional military co-operation and stability”\textsuperscript{42}.

It is important to mention that in the development assistance context the DDR is perceived mainly as a fiscal initiative; thus, one of the main reasons of the downsizing and reorganizing the force is its cost, in order to dedicate more money to the process of development.\textsuperscript{43} In addition to the initiatives mentioned above there is a need for certain assistance in reforming or in some cases creating the governmental bodies, including national police forces. The crucial aspect for the sustainable development is professional and non-corrupted police, which will be respected and trusted by the civilians. The development donors and the international community as whole should provide the recipient states with the needed support to realize those initiatives.

The sustainable peace and development are also dependent on the liquidation of weapons in the post-conflict territories. The use of small arms and light weapons increases the level of violence, which slows down the economic growth and creates the environment of insecurity for civilians. The liquidation of weapons might not just assure the peace for the population in certain cases it will also contribute to the process of development. For instance, the process of de-mining can have a positive effect for developing agriculture.\textsuperscript{44}

In the relevant literature the linkage between peacekeeping and development is frequently mentioned and is seen as a continuum. In reality there is a huge gap between two phenomena as the operations held in the development countries are usually short-term and the international organizations lack the time and capabilities to make them long-lasting and more efficient.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid
However, lately the international community made certain attempts to make this gap smaller, mainly by engaging in more long-term initiatives and for instance assisting states in demobilization, de-mining and disarmament activities.  

1.4. Development Assistance and Poverty Reduction

The military expenditure, post-conflict peacebuilding and the assurance of good governance are not the only matters of concern for development donors in the sphere of security sector. With the 21st century and the identification of the UN Millennium Goals, the poverty reduction became a priority for the development donors.

The World Bank identifies three primary elements for poverty reduction: accelerating economic growth; improving the distribution of income and wealth; and accelerating social development. It should be mentioned that there are certain links between poverty reduction and SSR, which includes making more resources available for poverty reduction in developing countries by reduction of military expenditure for example; better protection of individuals and society as a whole, as poor are more vulnerable and affected by violence; improve the contribution of security sector to conflict prevention and management, as open conflicts usually cause spreading of poverty; and finally greater participation of various groups in decision-making process on SSR as well as more access to justice and security. The special role has the participation of poor in particular as the most vulnerable and affected group, which will make the policies more efficient and pro-poor orientated.

It is important to mention that physical insecurity is considered by poor people to be a major concern that equals to hunger and unemployment issues. The poor often “talk about fear of attack, injury or physical abuse, often at the hands of precisely those institutions that are meant

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to protect them, or as a result of violent conflict or lawlessness”. Thus, DFID points out that “supporting poor people’s physical security is a vital part of reducing poverty”.47

The reports by DFID constantly identify the correlation and importance of the security for the sustainable development and poverty reduction. The ineffective and inefficient security sector can become a barrier for the development, reduce the level of investments and contribute to the perpetuation of poverty.48 Besides, the reduction of poverty is identified as a central goal by DFID and its involvement is guaranteed mainly in those cases where there is a probability to influence that issue.

In SSR practice DFID strategy identifies the need of dialogue between the host government and the donors, especially in the politically sensitive cases. Besides, its policy does not exclude the consultations with FCO and MOD as well as with the donor community and certain organizations, including World Bank and IMF, in particular.

In summary, it is important to mention that the successful poverty reduction is highly dependent on efficient and effective level of security in the state, especially when it comes to the fragile or conflict-affected states. Besides, security is essential for provision of health and education which are simultaneously necessary for the poverty reduction within the state.

In the state where the security is not guaranteed for the population the level of armed conflicts might emerge which will as a consequence decrease the level of infrastructure and productivity, consuming investments and increasing the unemployment. The interdependence of poverty-reduction, development and security is pointed out by certain number of scholars, who also


mention that the poverty along with low rates of economic growth prepare a ground for violence and conflict.49

1.5. Development Assistance in Armenia

In the beginning of 1990s Armenia has gone through the process of transformation of the economy. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the state resulted in the loss of traditional markets. In addition to that the de-facto war that was going on between Armenia and Azerbaijan became a huge obstacle for the positive economic transition of the state. The development donors have not been assisting Armenia financially until the ceasefire was signed, besides, the state has gained arms embargo by OSCE since 1992. The great role in that period in development assistance played the Armenian Diaspora, which has been located all over the world for decades. The fiscal and moral assistance of Diaspora was a “pushing” factor for Armenia’s economic development in the beginning of 1990s. After 1994, however, Armenia has received assistance for various initiatives, including the poverty reduction, which still constitutes an issue for some 1/3 of the Armenian population. Thus, the paper identifies the dynamics of Security Sector Reform in Armenia in the context of development assistance, focusing on the role of the Armenian Diaspora and pointing out the obstacles for positive economic transformation and sustainable development. It also focuses on the issue of poverty reduction and the dynamics of economic changes in the state from the beginning of its independence.

2. Security Sector Reform in Post-Authoritarian (Post-Communist) States

In the post-authoritarian states the Security Sector Reform is usually seen as a tool for transition to democracy. After the end of Cold War it has been widely used by diverse Central and Eastern European (CEE) as well as certain post-Soviet States as a part of public sector reform. Moreover,

in the Euro-Atlantic area the concept of Security Sector Reform was mainly associated with the reform of armed forces, defense reform and/or defense modernization and was rarely used before the end of Cold War.

In the beginning of 1990s the international community started to take into consideration the conditions of nepotism, authoritarian leadership, corruption and unaccountable security apparatus that the CEE and post-Soviet states had to live in.\(^50\) Thus, there has been a shift in the perception of Security Sector Reform, which brought various non-military topics to attention; namely, the issues of good governance, as well as efficiency and effectiveness of the reforms. The Security Sector Reform agenda started to include police reform, as well as border management and judiciary.

One specific feature of the Security Sector Reform agenda in the post-authoritarian states in CEE and former Soviet Union is the direct closeness and in many cases neighborhood with Euro-Atlantic region. Thus, the external involvement in these processes differed from ones in the development assistance context. Namely, two Euro-Atlantic organizations – NATO and EU – were able to use further membership of the transitional states as leverage to encourage the successful SSR.

During the last two decades many nations were trying to find ways to either create or fundamentally reform their security sector elements. In case of all those nations, including post-Soviet states, as well as West Balkans, the outside participation, namely by NATO and European Union, took place and played a great role.\(^51\)

What is interesting to mention, the perception of the SSR concept differs between two organizations: while NATO has more military orientated – traditional – point of view which

includes military related issues, armed forces and defense reforms, EU’s approach includes diverse non-military issues, including police, border management, refugees, etc. Thus, in order to gain membership in these two organizations the CEE and post-Soviet states had to face different groups of criteria. NATO required restraint and reduction in military sense, as well as transformation and enhancement of national security capabilities. EU in turn, required democratic mandates, and accurate performance of European standards in various fields of security, not related to military. In summary, if NATO has main focus on defense reform, EU assistance is more about internal security reform.

The necessary condition for the successful Security Sector Reform is the process of democratization that opposes the nature of authoritarian regimes and processes. Thus, implementation of SSR in the states under that kind of regimes is barely possible or extremely difficult. However, the states that are in the process of transition might have certain advantages of implementing SSR. Due to the fact that usually post-authoritarian states are based on disciplined and strict institutions and strong security elements those bodies can be successfully used in the process of democratization and SSR. There are three groups of “opportunities” that might be used by the transitional states: inclusion of disciplined and professional personnel to carrying out any top-down policy; use trained and experienced armed forces to participate in international military cooperation programs, which will both increase the level of their professionalization and democratization and contribute to the institutional dimension of SSR; and finally use the initial wave of positive energy for carrying out reforms. However, there are also the negative consequences of the regime, namely the fact that the overthrow of the former leaders and their closest people does not indicate the overthrow of the people working in military, policy, intelligence that used to serve the previous regime. Thus, the habits of

55 Ibid
authoritarian states will be still there. This can eventually lead to the adoption of certain authoritarian models of behavior of previous regime, as well as the so-called contradictory goals.

Additionally, the Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN) suggest five key areas where the South-Eastern and post-Soviet transitional states face challenges as well as certain recommendations to overcome them:

1. Citizen-State relations and democratic and civilian oversight – the process that requires a long term activities that would involve the creation of new culture and change of attitudes of both governmental institutions and civilians, where the citizens will have a say. Additionally, to achieve those results it is necessary to provide the population with certain degree of education and training to let them be able to participate in the process of security policy making and assure the proper oversight by them.

2. Corruption and organized crime – which represents the threat for the promotion of rule of law, sustainable economic development and institutional integrity. GFN suggests strengthening the transparency and accountability systems as well as to make effective vetting system and implement efficient border management.

3. Reconciliation of security sector – even though in all abovementioned states there were certain processes related to this issue, there still is a need to create ethno-politically representative security forces.

4. Private security companies – the growth of PSCs and the use of them as a supplementary tool for policy should be overcome by the states by greater regulation of them, including appropriate legislation and oversight.

5. Donor coordination – the processes of transition in all South-Eastern and post-Soviet states are held with the help of donors. There is the need of coordination which is
essential in order to avoid the duplication and assure the effectiveness of implemented reforms.  

2.1. Post-Authoritarian States, Defense Reform and Personnel Re-integration

NATO as one of the main assistants of Security Sector Reform in post-authoritarian states for a long period of time has been concentrated on the military forces. In practice the defense reform for NATO was seen as a mean to bring the military capabilities of the member states to the level where they could complete the NATO objectives.

However, the collapse of the Soviet Union influenced and changed that agenda in a certain way. Even though the issues of military capabilities remained important to NATO and the organization continued its attempts to adopt military forces of member states to diverse operational demands and incorporate new technologies, it also started to approach the defense and security reform in a broader sense. Specifically, NATO started to encourage and assist the transformation of institutions of former authoritarian states to the new ones that would fit new political order and systems in their states.

In Central and Eastern European as well as post-Soviet states this meant the displacement of former communist institutions with new democratic ones, supported by creating parliamentary bodies and encouraging the elections. Besides, the new post-Cold War era brought to NATO’s attention the importance transformation of former communist army, intelligence and the police to new independent national security elements that would be responsive to the needs of civilian population. However, as it was mentioned before, NATO still expected newly structured armies of the future member state to be able to contribute to the organization’s activities.

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OECD in turn points out the number of core steps that the states should undertake to implement the successful defense reform. Those steps include the assurance of good governance and civilian oversight over defense policy as well as encouragement of the civil society engagement with defense reform issues. Besides, the organization mentions the need to distinguish the roles between police and defense institutions for internal security and assure the development of integrated approach towards military expenditure as well as management of military capabilities. OECD as well points out the importance to create certain possibilities for the personnel leaving armed forces, giving them the opportunity for reintegration and resettlement. Finally, the organization also encourages the regional cooperation for arms control and disarmament initiatives.  

The transformation of former institutions resulted in the large number of unemployed personnel which needed to be reintegrated. The issue of reintegration which is mentioned by OECD as a key element of defense reform appeared to be even more crucial for the transitional states. The history of certain special intelligence services performance, such as KGB in USSR or Stasi in East Germany that were used as tools by communist elites in Eastern European states to establish police state had vital consequences for many post-communist nations.

The power of those intelligence bodies was by no means equal to certain ministries at the time, besides the status of servants was much higher than in any other structure. The repressive regime kept the activities held by those intelligence agencies off the record and the whole performance of them was characterized by certain secrecy. That features of the regime and the little limitations that those agencies have led to the lack of authority of law. In this kind of environment the differentiation between crime and law enforcement eventually became difficult.  

Thus, when the downfall of communism occurred and the security sector was

supposed to transform and adapt to the new political reality, ex-secret servicemen were making attempts to enter and influence the authorities as well as mass media through corruption and slander. Besides, as a consequence of communist heritage the security staff was able to remain highly involved in economy, thus the economy of transitional period was highly characterized by participation of certain security agents in financial and business operations.\textsuperscript{60} The consequence of such activities is widespread corruption and uncontrolled power of particular security servants. As the reform of security sector aims to assure the transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of the system, during the transition it is necessary to redefine the position of security apparatus in the new hierarchy of power.

The former Soviet Union states in addition to everything mentioned above also had to face the suddenness of the collapse of the communist state and the following rapid privatization and redistribution of property. Without having a strong institutions that would assure security in democratic state the nations had to face the so-called “wild capitalism” which in case of post-Soviet states resulted in criminalized economy.\textsuperscript{61}

Robberies, street violence and burglary, were quite characteristic for the newly emerging post-Soviet states. Besides, the ethnic conflicts in some regions, such as South Caucasus for instance were only increasing tensions. The former Soviet republics lacked effective national systems to assure proper protection of civilians and conflict resolution. Additionally, the state monopoly over violence disappeared almost overnight, thus there was a great amount of unemployed personal from the previous regime. The conditions of 1990s in the post-Soviet space created the opportunities for the individuals to perceive security as a “product”/good that might be provided for certain amount of money.\textsuperscript{62} This contributed to the creation of private security companies (PSC), that were rapidly expanding due to enormous amount of professional personnel that was

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid
newly unemployed as a result of downsizing of armed forces and reformation of the security elements after the collapse of USSR.

Soon, the period of “stabilization” in the region was about to come, where the state gained greater capacity to control and regulate the private security industry as the ruling elite saw certain potential for using the machinery of the state to strengthen its position. Thus, during time the PSCs became less valued and criminal elements that were existent among those structures were excluded from protection industry.

However, it would be naive to think that this contributed to the promotion of rule of law in the post-Soviet space. The entire justice system was not working properly and even till now most of the former Soviet states have it corrupted. This meant that the improved control over private security sector did not lead to the process of democratic governance and civilian oversight assurance. Instead, now the elites were able to benefit from the control of PSCs and even use security as leverage if needed.63

In the countries of Commonwealth Independent States (CIS) the attitude of corrupted officials of putting the private gain before the duty blurred the line between private and public sectors. Even though the CIS states underwent economic liberalization in 1990s, the process was too rapid unlike it was in case of Western democracies, thus the processes that took place in post-Soviet area could be rather called “commercialization” of security, not “privatization”.64 One of the main issues is the lack of democratic control and civilian oversight as the population is too busy making ends meet and the ruling elite takes an advantage of it. Even though certain states made attempts to integrate in structures like NATO and EU, the topic of democratic governance usually lacked from the Security Sector Reform agenda in CIS space.

63 Ibid
64 Ibid
2.2. Post-Authoritarian States, Democratization and Good Governance

The process of democratization and promotion of good governance are the necessary conditions for the successful Security Sector Reform assurance. Additionally, there is a need to implement the public sector reform as a whole to make sure that the governmental institutions work according to principles of democracy and good governance. OECD points out main steps that should be undertaken for the democratic control and civilian oversight assurance: development of democratic accountability of multi-level oversight; assurance of the independence of oversight bodies; strengthening of mechanisms for internal oversight of security institutions; development of the capacity of parliaments to perform oversight; and the encouragement and contribution to the strengthening of the civil society role as a watchdog of security institutions.65

The external involvement and assistance in these processes is crucial, especially in case of CEE and certain post-Soviet states that faced the communist regime and its consequences, as they are destined to face obstacles on the way of public and especially Security Sector Reform.

The characteristic features of communist and Soviet states were the centralized rule and closeness. In these conditions the population was de facto excluded from the processes of decision making in public sector, including security system. Thus, the political transition as well as unresolved or in some places ongoing conflicts caused the wide spread corruption and organized criminality, which in turn disrupted the sense of safety and trust towards the government. Another problem characteristic for South and East European states in the transitional period is the existence of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and their constant circulation in those areas, which is a cause of insecurity for civilians. Besides, the issue increases

the criminal capabilities, which in turn prevents the economic development and contributes to the increase of tensions in the regions.  

The European Union as an assistant of CEE and post-Soviet states in SSR is involved in various Security Sector Reform initiatives, including police reform, military and civilian aspects of crisis management, promotion of rule of law, etc. Even though EU indirectly has constantly refer to the importance of good governance promotion, mainly in three broad areas where the organization performs – promotion of democracy, development cooperation, security policy – there is a lack of comprehensive policy framework for its implementation.

European Union’s main activities related to SSR include “enlargement policy, the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), development cooperation and external assistance, conflict prevention, civilian and military crisis management as well as justice and home affairs (JHA)”. The important fact is that, EU enlargement policy even though indirectly put the issues of security sector governance in agenda of the organization. The accession criteria accepted by the European Union for the further enlargement and also known as Copenhagen criteria indicate that there are certain conditions that all future member states should meet in order to become a part of EU. Those criteria are:

1. Political – assured stability of institutional bodies guaranteeing the rule of law, democracy, human rights assurance;

2. Economic – proper market economy and the capacity for competitiveness and market force;

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68 Ibid
3. Administrative (institutional) – ability to effectively implement the obligations of membership.\textsuperscript{69}

Security sector governance even though never directly mentioned, without any doubt was yet another compulsory precondition for the further membership, which was expressed in bilateral agreements that were indicating the need to improve specific security sector areas, namely police and border management. Besides, the civilian control over armed forces became a requirement for closer association with the European Union. In fact, the “EU is de facto using a comprehensive notion of security sector governance in its enlargement policy with the armed forces being dealt with under the first Copenhagen criterion (democratic institutions) while police forces, border guards and the judiciary are reviewed under the JHA chapter of the \textit{acquis communautaire} which is part of the third Copenhagen criterion”.\textsuperscript{70}

Regarding human rights and democratization initiatives, the EU created EIDHR in 1994 to work in cooperation with NGOs and international organizations. The critique towards it, both internal and external, indicated the lack of common strategic vision and blurred priorities of EIDHR. However, the activity of the initiative have certain impact on promotion of security sector governance, mainly through judicial reform, policing, the fight against organized crime, the struggle against torture, impunity and so on and so forth.

Another sphere where EU has an impact on SSR implementation is the neighborhood policy. It is important to mention that it varies from one group of “neighbors” to another: while the majority of South-East European states have the eligibility to gain EU membership, the former Soviet Union states in South Caucasus do not have that privilege which in turn is sometimes decisive in their will to implement effective and efficient politico-economic reforms, especially in security sector. Additionally, if certain South-Eastern states like Bulgaria and Romania as the candidate

\textsuperscript{69} European Union."Accession Criteria". Available at: 

states at the time succeeded to pass the threshold of democratic governance, it was twice difficult for post-communist West Balkan states, where the post-authoritarian heritage became an obstacle on the way to democratization.

European Union launched various programs to assist the transition in West Balkans. There might be mentioned EU Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) where the states are involved as well as Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) which allow West Balkans to tie to the European Union in the condition of meeting further politico-economic requirements.\textsuperscript{71} As the experience of Croatia showed the conclusion of SAAs practically leads to the membership in EU. The organization has a great interest in the region and provides both financial and political support. Fiscal methods are implemented through the program of Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) that provided around € 4.65 million in the period between 2002 and 2006 for West Balkan region. The political assistance is carried through certain series of initiatives, such as EU-West Balkans Forum which takes place since 2003.\textsuperscript{72} Besides the SAPS implements various activities to assure the transition in the region, including annual country reports on issues like rule of law, independence of judiciary, democratic control over armed forces, anticorruption measures monitoring.

The South Caucasian states, such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are involved in both NATO and EU initiatives; namely Partnership for Peace (PfP) by NATO and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The states are also negotiating over Association Agreements with EU. However, in case of both organizations, unlike the situation with West Balkans, the membership is not available for those states at the moment, thus the willingness to perform democratic reforms in security sector is limited in the region.

The lack of the process of democratization of security elements possesses the obstacle for the successful transition for those states. The main problem is that during decades those security


\textsuperscript{72} Ibid
elements used to be the protectors of the regime and source of threat and fear to civilians, while now they were supposed to serve the society. Besides, even though it has been two decades since the authoritarian regimes in many of those countries have been overthrown the heritage they have remains an obstacle on the way to democratization processes. Namely, the vast majority of post-communist states, except for Germany, built their security bodies on the basis of the former authoritarian ones, using existing personnel, capabilities and structures. The main disadvantage of that policy is that security institutions being highly hierarchical and faithful to traditions are usually difficult to change, which eventually results in the unsuccessful transformation of certain security bodies.\textsuperscript{73}

Thus, the necessary condition for successful transition of the state that suffers from internal and external threats is the effective, as well as responsive security institutions that would be different from the previous ones and would be “compatible with a law-based, democratic and representative system of government for an ethnically and religiously diverse nation going through a very difficult social and economic transformation”.\textsuperscript{74}

In short, the success of the reform relies to the strong constitutional and legal framework that would conduct the national security policy and command military, intelligence and police, while those elements in turn should work alongside the principles of good governance and at the same time have a proper civilian staffing and oversight. Finally, the last but not least important element for the transition is the completely reformed or re-orientated leadership, which would allow to replace the old habits of the regime and as a result fight the high level of corruption, brutalities and so on and so forth.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{73} Ibid
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid
2.3. Post-Authoritarian States, Police Reform and Border Management

The important feature of the SSR in case of certain post-authoritarian states is the guaranteed and effective integrated border management (IBM). It is important to mention that assurance of secure borders should include the cooperation of not only border agencies, but other relevant bodies as well.\textsuperscript{76} The efficient IBM not only guarantees the safety of the civilians but it also prevents the organized crime, possibility of terrorism and trafficking, which are essential for the regional stability and prevents from cross-border corruption and criminality. OECD mentions certain issues that are essential for border management. Namely those are the assurance of national border management strategy according to principles of democratic control; promotion of integrity and reduction of corruption; building the capacity to fight organized crime, terrorism and trafficking; improve the cooperation between various national institutions connected to border management, as well as promote the cross-border cooperation to protect human rights across borders.\textsuperscript{77}

The European Union, among other initiatives to assist the transitional states, is involved in certain IBM initiatives as well. For instance, in West Balkans it supports integrated border management against transitional threats through its CARDS program. It also tries to pay greater attention to border management and issues of migration and asylum seeking in West Balkans through its Stabilization and Association Process. Border management is essential not only for the security of transitional states, such as West Balkans, but the whole regions, and EU in this case, themselves.\textsuperscript{78} For instance, the lack of competent border agencies and equipment as well as corruption in the West Balkan region causes illegal immigration as well as smuggling. Besides, the lack of common regional policy regarding visas, asylum seeking as well as mechanism of sharing the important data overburdens the situation in Balkans even more. In sum, the overall


lack of coordination between both Balkan states and international assistants creates obstacles for the successful transition.

The implementation of IBM is by far not the only initiative that is necessary for the successful transition. Another important step that should be undertaken is the reformation of police. Continuing speaking about the region of West Balkans, it is important to mention that the police reform in that particular region should be specifically outlined. One of the main reasons is that former Yugoslavian republics as many other post-communist states have the memory of police protecting the regime and controlling population, usually by possessing threat to them.79 In addition, West Balkans also had the history of police involvement in the violent conflicts and ethnic cleansing during the clashes in the region during the 1990s. Thus, the reform of police can be considered the priority issue for the region of West Balkans. However, in order for police reform to be successful there is a need to address the broader criminal justice system. It might be done through its key components such as rule of law, which would assure the existence of independent and non-corrupted judiciary.80 The EU makes certain recommendations to reform the legal and institutional arrangements through SAP. It also monitors the policing field, including the nations’ adoption of 2001 Code of Police Ethics, as well as establishment of police as public service and assurance of police accountability.

The police reform in post-authoritarian context as such should be implemented within the framework of rule of law and the human rights promotion. According to OECD the post-authoritarian states usually have the memory of policemen serving the regime rather than the population. Thus, in post authoritarian states the police should be civil and accountable to both people and parliament. Once again the role and place of police and military should be distinguished and differentiated. Besides, the greater attention should be put to activities dedicated to promote the partnership and trust between civilians and police in order to prevent

79 Ibid
80 Ibid
the crime and assure the safety. The policemen in turn should be provided with sufficient activities, including training and education in order to develop the personnel and their practices as well as certain activities to improve the structure and strategic management capacity and practices. The process of de-politization of the police should be implemented as well, where the political influence should be removed from the police sector.81

Most of the Eastern-Europeans countries in the beginning of 1990s held the number of actions to achieve that aim by de-politization of security sector through “refinement” of the staff and by liquidation of political police. Additionally, the states tried to focus more on internal and external anti-crime policy and start the process of disassociation of security sector from the Soviet/Russian one and establishing professional relationship with similar services in democratic states. The states also aimed to assure legitimacy of security forces and eliminate secrecy by providing the principles of good governance and civil society oversight. Besides, the Eastern-European nations now were striving to integrate their security sectors into NATO and EU security systems.82 Almost all states succeeded in the process of de-politization of security sector; however, the lustration of communist staff which was necessary for the transition of the system did not reach the “medium government levels” in many South-East European states.83 Even though the states managed to replace security personnel which led to the positive changes in intelligence and police structures and their performance, the lack of lustration of the former communist staff led to the high-level of political/criminal nexus.

2.4.Post-Authoritarian States, SSR and Transitional Justice

The concept of SSR in post-authoritarian states is sometimes linked to the transitional justice, where the latest is seen as a part of the reform. The phenomenon of Security Sector Reform is

83 Ibid
interlinked with transitional justice – the concept which is usually misunderstood or misinterpreted. Transitional justice is defined by the United Nations as a combination of “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation”\textsuperscript{84}. Transitional justice which is also called Dealing with the Past (DwP) and SSR usually work alongside, however they interact rarely. However, the inclusion of the issues of transitional justice to the SSR agenda and vice-versa can be beneficial for scholars and practitioners. Namely, considering the fact that DwP is understood not only in terms of dealing with the abuses that already occurred but making attempts to prevent their reoccurrence, transitional justice is dependent on SSR on certain level. DwP usually is involved in initiatives like peacebuilding, DDR, legislative reforms, economic development, where the institutional reforms, including SSR, is crucial for the success.\textsuperscript{85} In turn Security Sector Reform practitioners can benefit from closer examination of normative framework and practice of DwP in order to gain more knowledge and implement the reforms more effectively in societies emerging from authoritarian rule. The further success of the reforms is highly dependent on dealing with the abuses that used to occur in the post-authoritarian states. Thus, SSR should work with three main groups of measures of dealing with those abuses: by promoting inclusion and making SSR people-centered and locally owned, which can be achieved by reacceptance and reintegration of victims and marginalized groups to political community as well as encouragement of their participation in SSR processes, establishment of victim-centered security bodies and empowerment of those groups as citizens; strengthen accountability by showing no tolerance to any sort of future abuses and assure accountability both formally (internal accountability – ethnic codes, internal discipline and external oversight – parliamentary oversight, judicial review, etc.) and informally (provided by media, human rights organizations, NGO activities); enhance


legitimacy by building targeted measures that can help to enhance the legitimacy of security institutions and make it easier to overcome the crisis of trust. In summary, even though DwP and SSR address similar historical issues and some of the same political challenges and sometimes target same institutions, they eventually apply different approaches to deal with those issues. However, instead of competing the practitioners in both spheres can benefit from each other through cooperation.

2.5. Armenia as a Post-Authoritarian State

Armenia has been a part of the USSR until gaining independence in 1991. The security sector of the Soviet Armenia was much alike other fourteen republics. Since 1991 Armenia has gone through a number of reforms and transformations. Additionally, certain security bodies had to be created as they lacked in the republic previously. Thus, the Armenian Armed Forces as well as the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia were created from the scratch. Regarding the issue of reintegration, Armenia had no choice but to use the former Soviet military officers to help in training the soldiers and building the defense sector due to on-going de-facto war. The long-lasting authoritarian regime had its influence on the citizens and their perception of the government. Thus, the process of democratization and the promotion of good governance, which is assisted by various international organizations, is an on-going process till nowadays. Besides, the authoritarian regime drew a negative image of the police which is an issue even in contemporary independent Armenia. The mistrust towards the police and the conditions of newly independent state also contributed to the creation of various PSCs that have increased in number and operate widely in Armenia nowadays. Finally, the beginning of 1990s for Armenia also was the beginning of the era of isolation and blocked borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey that continues till now. Thus, the paper investigates the dynamics of various changes and reforms of post-authoritarian Armenia in the sphere of military and defense, police and PSCs, intelligence.

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86 Ibid
and border management; it also provides an overview of certain initiatives to promote democratic governance and rule of law.

3. Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict States

The majority of SSR-related activities initiated by the international community during the last twenty years are related to the post-conflict context and implemented in countries engaged in activities directed to rebuild the state.\(^{87}\)

The beginning of 1990s is characterized by the large amount of inter- and intra-state conflicts. The majority of states emerging from conflict are usually left with disfunctioning security apparatus, which needs to be either reconstructed or in some cases created from the scratch. Even though the post-conflict environment is usually perceived to be challenging for the success of the SSR, the conditions of fragile state might not only possess challenges, but also create certain opportunities.

The difficulties of SSR possessed by post-conflict environment are the weak governmental institutions, as well as fragile ethno-political situation and high influence of military or non-military security forces. In addition to that there is an issue of privatization and internationalization of security sector, which causes additional challenges. The post-conflict environment usually creates opportunities for high involvement of armed non-state actors with their own political ambitions and economic shares, as well as PMCs with their own stake in post-conflict peacebuilding. The presence and the influence of those non-state actors and their usual exclusion from the initiatives to stabilize the situation on the ground along with the typically weak civil society eventually cause the poor governance of security sector, which possesses additional challenges for the further reform and the process of peacebuilding as a whole.\(^{88}\)


\(^{88}\) Ibid
However, the fragility of the states simultaneously creates certain positive basis for the SSR: the post-conflict peacebuilding usually involves external assistance, thus there are certain resources available that might be used to reconstruct the security sector; besides, the post-conflict environment causes the high receptiveness of the external support for reform by local population and sometimes leadership, even when it comes to the sensitive topics, such as security sector.\(^{89}\)

In general the international involvement plays a great role in peacebuilding. In fact, in the post-conflict societies the first impulse for Security Sector Reform is usually made by external actors, even though they might not be the primary bodies in the further reform implementation.\(^{90}\) In addition to that, the international bodies, that mostly act under UN auspices can form transitional government and provide long-term assistance to the conflict affected nations. However, it should be mentioned, that even though the involvement of external assistants causes certain positive changes, there are negative consequences as well: the long-term intervention might result in slow development of new national security apparatus and possess certain challenges for creation of local ownership and result in lack of local capacity.\(^{91}\)

There are various approaches to SSR in post-conflict initiatives that require certain steps for the success. One is the actor-centered approach which requires the following activities:

1. “Presence of both domestic and external security bodies that can provide security;
2. Effective oversight mechanisms;
3. Adequate consideration of the specific characteristics, procedures, interactions of security sector by intervening actors;
4. Confidence of population in the ability of security forces to provide security;

\(^{89}\) Ibid
5. Proper attention to the legacies of past conflicts in order to avoid their possible reoccurrence”.  

The state-centered approach in return indicates that in post-conflict states there is usually lack of rule of law and democracy which causes the destroyed statal, social and civil infrastructures. Thus, the important element of SSR in this context is the re-establishment of state monopoly of security. Additionally, in post-conflict states the top priority is the physical security provision, which is difficult to reach on the territory of the whole state. Besides, unlike other SSR contexts the post-conflict one requires certain actions prior the legitimization of the processes. Thus, in post-conflict states the initiatives related to security sector reconstruction take place in parallel with the activities directed to assure physical security. Besides, during the peacebuilding operations the international actors provide the physical security and simultaneously, they sometimes hold certain functions of government, which causes the delays in process of security local ownership and holding credible elections.

As a matter of fact the whole reconstruction of security sector in post-conflict states is usually a continuation of peacebuilding operations, thus it is dominated by donor countries which assures the presence of strong military and weak civil elements. Thus, the SSR related actions are directed to more military related changes by prioritizing the defense capacity building projects and so on and so forth.

In order not to cause delays in the reformation of security sector and contribute to the fast recovery of the states, from the state-centered approach “donor countries need to follow the same basic principles as they do in non-conflict environments:

1. Their analysis of what has to be done in the security sector needs to be based on a comprehensive understanding of its characteristics, procedures and interactions.

2. They need to be able to ensure that the security forces – whether they are domestic or foreign – can provide the necessary security.

3. They need to ensure that the population has confidence in the actions of the security forces, for if this is lacking they will not be able to operate efficiently and will fail in their mission to provide security.

4. As part of this process, they need to engage local authorities as soon as practically possible.94

To summarize, Security Sector Reform in post-conflict societies can be distinguished from two other contexts due to its high dependence on the dealing with past and addressing the legacies of conflicts. Thus, the important elements of SSR that should be implemented in that particular context require downsizing armed forces; reintegration of former combatants; cleaning of landmines; implemented actions to stop proliferation of SALW; promotion of rule of law; transitional justice; and anti-trafficking initiatives. Those components are crucial for the post-conflict context while some of them might not be that important in two other settings.95

3.1. DDR in Post-Conflict States

After the end of the conflict, one of the first steps implemented in the state are related to the downsizing of armed forces. Those initiatives are related not only to the end of hostilities, but they are also triggered by the costliness of the armed forces.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is the term that is used to describe the action dedicated to force downsizing and reintegration of former combatants into the post-conflict environment and making them a part of civil society, which might be done by certain initiatives, including financial support, provision of civilian occupation or certain training.

94 Ibid
DDR is usually seen as a key to post-conflict stability and a tool to contribute to the long-term peacebuilding. Besides, it assures the reduced likelihood for the reoccurrence of the conflict. The international actors assisting in DDR in post-conflict states put the peace assurance first, which is identified as a good policy by certain actors. However, this causes the little consideration of other security issues which are equally important in post-conflict environment. Thus, DDR might not only contribute to peace and stability, but also on some level create the basis for insecurity.  

The positive consequences of a successful DDR are usually mentioned in the relevant literature; however, the cases when the initiatives related to that are implemented purely also exist.

Reintegration is one of the most problematic and at the same time the most crucial element of DDR. The failed reintegration might cause the insecurity in post-conflict states. The primary result of low levels of integration is the increase of criminal activity in the state. The reintegration is the most underfunded feature of DDR and as the funds are mainly received from the donor assistance budgets they are “slow and flow”, which worsens the situation.

The issue of reintegration is by all means economic. The reason why ex-combatants are getting involved in the criminal activities is the lack of possibilities created to them. The main aim of formal combatants is to find an employer and have certain income.

The defense and military forces can have a great impact by contributing to the processes of reintegration: “first of all because the military personnel are already registered and qualifications of soldiers are known by the armed forces which makes the process of reintegration facilitation easier; secondly, it can have certain effect on job satisfaction when soldiers know that their institution is preparing its members for a later civilian life; finally, unsuccessful reintegration can

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have major security implications. Security sector organizations are thus doing themselves a favor by helping soldiers to prepare for civilian life”.  

Certain scholars see the phenomena of SSR and DDR as separate ones even though linked in a certain way. There are particular elements of SSR mentioned in the peace agreements in post-conflict situations related to DDR, namely, the size and composition of forces, as well as funding needs of security sector and role of security sector institutions. The immediate decisions after the end of conflict are usually made by the former warring actors and international institutions, including those willing to provide donor assistance in the future. Usually, the main concern of the stakeholders involved is linked to the post war stabilization and activities linked to it. Even though it would be better to realize the initiatives of SSR before DDR, it is nearly impossible in the immediate post-war environment where the provision of physical security and the assurance of the barriers for reoccurrence of the conflict are seen as priority issues. In summary, the linkage between DDR and SSR can be seen in the influence that the first phenomenon has on the second one by setting initial force size, selecting demobilized combatants and structures, which affects the security situation as a whole and is a part of crime and further conflict prevention.  

As it has been mentioned, in theory SSR should be implemented first, however the peacebuilding initiatives prioritize the downsizing and reintegration initiatives that are part of DDR. It is also important to consider the provision of good governance which is crucial for post-conflict states. However, usually in the fragile environment there is a clash of interests between stakeholders, mainly those in military bodies and civilians, along with the international donors, which possess challenges for the security sector governance. And finally, the challenge that is inevitably faced in SSR as well as DDR is the lack of coordination among all stakeholders, including interstate ones and donor/assistant community.  

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97 Ibid  
98 Ibid  
99 Ibid
OECD also identifies the importance of maximizing the linkage between DDR and SSR; and point out certain important issues for it:

1. **Sequencing** – while downsizing the armed forces it should be taken into consideration what kind of impact it might have on ability to reform security sector; besides, the initiatives of reintegration and the level of willingness of ex-combatants to be a part of civilian population as well, as civilians’ willingness to accept them will influence security sector as well. Even though in the immediate post-war environment it is difficult to implement all range of Security Sector Reforms, it is important not to underestimate their role for the long-term peacebuilding process.

2. **Restructuring security forces and clarifying roles** – this involves the initiatives of downsizing of armed forces as well as certain cases of integration of former combatants into police or PSCs. However, the distinction between policy and military should be taken into consideration. In fact, the important goal for both DDR and SSR is to distinguish role and functions of two bodies, as during the wartime the line between them is blurred. Finally, while restricting forces it is necessary to assure gender and ethnic representation for the further positive developments.

3. **Preventing security vacuum** – it is important to implement SSR and DDR in parallel to avoid security vacuum creation, which endangers transition and contributes to the possible reoccurrence of the conflict. Ideally, it is necessary to provide security while military and armed forces are being downsized. This can be done by non-state actors and law enforcement agencies. However, in reality all those bodies try to benefit from the fragility of situation.

4. **Consensus and identification of security personnel** – the challenge for post-conflict states is possessed by uncontrolled and unidentified number and functions of security personnel, which causes inability to exercise the institutional control over security sector. Thus, there is a certain need for consensus and identification program, which will provide
necessary data on security personnel by registering and verifying identities of security agencies’ members.\textsuperscript{100}

\subsection*{3.2. Eliminating SALW and Demining in Post-Conflict States}

The important initiatives in post-conflict states are linked to programs to control the spread of small arms and light weapons. Those initiatives have certain contribution to strengthening governance and capacity, which are important for the successful Security Sector Reform.

OECD suggests that SALW programs can create a ground for SSR. The linkage between SALW and SSR is similar to DDR and the Security Sector Reform.

It is important to remember that the people would be more unlikely to give up their weapons before their security and safety is assured. Certain cases proved that the police reform has a positive effect on population’s will to give up the weaponry. Besides, nowadays SALW programs majority is linked to development programs. The international organizations also try to provide population with certain development aid in return to weaponry by building schools, hospitals, etc. These processes have positive impact on society’s community mobilization as well as reinforcement of links with wider development and peacebuilding. The important initiatives that should be undertaken also include the security of military stockpiles, due to the fact that the majority of weapons in post-conflict societies are either stolen or sold from military stockpiles or police. This initiative also indicates the strong linkage between SALW and SSR programs.\textsuperscript{101}

Another challenge for the successful transition in post-conflict environment is the evidence of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), which represents long-term threats for social, economic and environmental development in the state. The landmines prevent the population from the proper use of soil and are a barrier for the easy access to water. They also affect the


\textsuperscript{101} Ibid
flow of people, goods and services. In particular, the refugees and initially displaced people are
less likely to return to the territories where the landmines and unexploded ordnance are not
reduced or destroyed. Besides, it is an obstacle for the humanitarian assistance programs. Except
for the physical threat that the landmines represent themselves, they might be also used by
certain groups, such as insurgents, rebels, criminals, that are characteristic for post-conflict
environment.

In order to prevent the fatal consequences of the landmines, the mine action, aiming to reduce
social, economic and environmental impact of mines and unexploded ordnance, should be
implemented immediately in the post-conflict environment.102

“Humanitarian mine action comprises a diverse range of activities focused on mitigating the
impact of landmines and ordnance. The defining feature of humanitarian mine action is its focus
on benefiting affected civilian communities.”103

The main goal of mine action is to reduce deaths and attract more refugees and displaced persons
back home as well as rebuild economy and infrastructures, by providing jobs. Mine action also
aims to make the land safer for the civilians, considering the fact that the landmines are not only
directed to combat the enemy, but also spread the fear among population. Thus, there are five
mine action components that should be implemented to fight the insecurity caused by landmines:
mine risk education, aiming to increase the awareness and cause behavioral change to decrease
the amount of injuries; humanitarian demining, aiming to implement activities to remove
landmines; victim assistance, by providing aid, comfort and support to the people affected;
stockpile destruction, resulting in physical demolishment of national stockpile of anti-personnel
mines; and advocacy, directed to support the removal of landmines.

Peacebuilding, Lit, 171.
103 Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies and Landmine Action. ”Peacebuilding and Humanitarian Mine
Action: Strategic Possibilities and Local Practicalities”. (2009) Available at:
There are various stakeholders involved in mine action, including national, subnational and international ones. All three groups of stakeholders are supposed to fit the governance criteria, including accountability, transparency and democratic participation. The international assistance especially by actors of UN system plays a crucial role, however the knowledge on the ground is very important thus the cooperation with certain national actors can have positive result. The willingness of former parties involved in conflict to destroy or reveal the location of landmines can lead not only to the clearance of the territory, but also to confidence-building.

Another step that might have positive consequences for the further peacebuilding is the inclusion of mine action to the peace agreements which results in obligation of formal combating parties to provide information on mine-laying. The general linkage of mine action and peacebuilding is certainly acknowledged, however poorly developed. The main problem is the lack of knowledge on the ground and the unfamiliarity of external actors to local contexts which usually leads to the tensions and attracts the corrupt and self-interested actors.

Thus, one should keep in mind that mine action being one of the main tools for post-conflict peacebuilding if implemented correctly leads to certain security benefits and assures confidence-building, but if conducted poorly, the initial goals might be overlooked and the consequence might be the increase of tensions.

Finally, the most effectively mine action is implemented by integration into other post-conflict peacebuilding tasks, and SALW and DDR in particular.\textsuperscript{104}

3.3. Anti-Trafficking Initiatives in Post-Conflict States

The fragile and weak states are the threat not only for their own population but for the international security itself. The occurrence of conflict triggers, such security problems as smuggling of SALW, drugs and trafficking of human beings.

“Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines Trafficking in Persons as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.\textsuperscript{105}

One of the main obstacles to fight trafficking is the lack of proper legislation among decent amount of states. Trafficking shares certain features with slavery, forced removal, etc. However, the difference is that victims in this case usually cooperate with traffickers and the whole procedure is made using legal documents. The chain of actions is so long, that it is usually difficult to determine when exactly the process begins.\textsuperscript{106}

This causes certain problem in prosecution as well, as usually only the acts of violence and detention are being criminalized, while the rest of the “chain”, including transportation, transfer and so on and so forth are not usually included.

In many countries human trafficking is not even considered to be a separate category of crime and the criminal law in those countries does not include distinct offence of trafficking in human beings. Thus, human trafficking is prosecuted under different laws, or not prosecuted at all. In addition it is usually integrated in such crimes as smuggling or prostitution; however it constitutes the distinct crime causing human rights violations. As a result, the law penalty for


trafficking is usually relatively low and in certain cases it is limited to smuggling and prostitution, thus the victims of domestic of factory labor for instance are not protected.  

One of the problems why the issues of trafficking are being overlooked is its being a political issue connected to migration and labor policies. In order to fight trafficking, it is extremely difficult to mobilize the necessary political will in all states. In fact, one of the main documents on anti-trafficking – Palermo Protocol – has been ratified only by 114 states.

In addition to all challenges mentioned above in post-conflict states the security sector elements as well as peacekeepers are believed to increase the demand for trafficking of women and children. During 1990s Kosovo war, the Bosnian women’s organizations reported that around 90 per cent of the women and girls in local brothels have been brought from abroad and the 50 per cent of visitors are the foreigners.

Even though the situation in Balkans improved the international community should still be concerned with the issue of human trafficking.

NATO adopted zero tolerance policy towards military personnel possibly attracting or supporting human trafficking. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations worked on policy paper on the issue in 2004. The international community should consider the fact that international personnel creates certain demand for trafficking and implement activities that would increase the awareness, accountability and support for anti-trafficking initiatives and assure no exploitation of trafficked person. The training of personnel will also contribute to that process. Besides, the investigation of personnel involved in trafficking in every state, including the criminal prosecution, is necessary in order to end the problem.

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109 Ibid
110 Ibid
3.4. Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict States

Transitional justice was already mentioned as an important tool in certain cases of post-authoritarian states for transition. However, it is far more important and crucial for the states emerging from conflicts, where it is a major tool for the reconciliation process. The elements of transitional justice in this particular context, such as criminal prosecution of perpetrators, truth-seeking measures, reparations to victims, reconciliation programs as well as institutional reform are all tools that not only assure transition, but also help to prevent to possible reoccurrence of the conflict.

In certain cases of post-conflict states where SSR is implemented the stakeholders have justice-sensitive approach, which aims to transfer the abusive security system into one respecting human rights. Those issues simultaneously are central to transitional justice.

The exclusion of the possible reoccurrence of conflict is a central aim for both SSR and transitional justice mechanisms. Thus, OECD identifies three main issues that should be considered in order to avoid the possible reoccurrence of tensions:

1. *Integrity* – the crucial step that should be undertaken in order to prevent reoccurrence of conflict is to develop security system’s capacity and assure its integrity, which can be done by structural reforms discouraging abuses, as well as by increasing the responsiveness of security system.

2. *Legitimacy* – it is necessary to build civic trust towards security system which was weakened by the conflict; even though integrity-building has positive impact on it there should be other measures undertaken as well, including verbal and symbolic measures, such as building memorials, apologizing, endorsing democratic norms, etc.; the assurance of wide representation in security institutions is also an important issue that should not be overlooked.
3. **Empowerment** – the encouragement of citizens to consider their role as an integral component of the justice system, including their rights, responsibilities and needs that justice institutions should serve is yet another important step that should be undertaken; this can be done through public campaigns, identification of security and justice needs through surveys, training civil society and media to monitor security system, etc.\(^{111}\)

In addition to that, it should be mentioned that the international organizations assisting in the transitional justice should take into consideration the uniqueness of each case and understand that even though there are certain similarities between the post-conflict states, each of them needs a specific approach. Besides, there are three main criteria that should be assured in the post-conflict states using transitional justice mechanisms with the international assistance: the existence of local ownership throughout the processes; before recommending or establishing one of the mechanisms of transitional justice the international community should make an assessment on needs in order to choose the most convenient option in the particular case; the international community should make several options available for a particular country, including both commissions and trials, that would not exclude one another, but would rather be implemented in a complementary manner.\(^{112}\)

Among the whole wide range of transitional justice mechanism the truth commissions, local trials and traditional mechanism are the tools that assure the promotion of local ownership, which is essential for the success of the reconciliation process as well as SSR. Thus, those can be considered to be the most convenient mechanisms for the post-conflict setting. However, it is also important to keep in mind that in certain cases there is a distinction between national and

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individual reconciliation process, thus, there might be a need to use not a single mechanism of transitional justice but rather a combination of them to address the abuses of the past.\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{3.5. Rule of Law in Post-Conflict States}

Rule of law (RoL) is one of the central elements of stable, well governed, democratic society. After being first used by USAID in Latin America, the programs aiming to promote the RoL started to be implemented by various international actors, including UN, World Bank, OSCE, and EU. All those actors have their own approaches and implement their own activities regarding RoL programs.

The multiplicity of existing framework and approaches along with the lack of consensus regarding aims, mechanisms and activities, cause certain challenges for post-conflict states to implement RoL reforms. Two main challenges are the lack of coordination and lack of common agreement on the goals of the reform. Besides, one thing that unifies all the approaches by various actors is the existence of so-called “standard assistance menu”, that ignores the differences between states where RoL programs are implemented and is based on mostly technical approach. This includes the professionalization of legal services as well as reform of justice and security institutions. Instead, the assistants might have used a holistic approach which would be more effective for long-term peacebuilding and promotion of RoL that would recognize the dependency on political and social efforts as well as aim to cause political and social change.\textsuperscript{114}

There are two main understandings of RoL that can be outlined: broad approach that is based on end-state concept is a long-term initiative with strategic outcome and vision as starting point, identifying the necessity of activities aiming to reach outcomes, including functioning police, promotion of RoL by security and justice institutions, as well as assurance of human rights,\textsuperscript{115}

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid
gender equality, and democratization; reductionist approach that is focused on institutional aspects of security and justice system prioritizes the building of central institutions of justice system, focusing on activities and output, which constitutes not a long-term strategy and includes broad range of actors involved aiming to promote social change.

The main correlation between RoL and SSR is the strife to achieve social economic development, political representation and participation as well as security and public order, RoL and respect of human rights in post-conflict societies. Two phenomena are highly interdependent and mutually beneficial for the peacebuilding. It is important to keep in mind that physical security assurance is crucial for the post-conflict societies, for the long-term strategy the “normative rights-based framework grounded in principles of good security governance and the rule of law characterizes security and safety”. By assuring safe and secure environment and promoting good governance, SSR builds ground for RoL and other peacebuilding activities. In turn, RoL is crucial for safety and security of individuals, as it contributes to integrity and safety and provides mechanisms to protect civilians and by using non-violent conflict resolution methods prevent the reoccurrence of conflict. In this case the success of RoL program has a direct influence on the whole process of peacebuilding.115

3.6. Armenia as a Post-Conflict State

It has been already mention that Armenia has gone through de-facto war with Azerbaijan in the beginning of 1990s. In 1994 the ceasefire was signed, however, the conflict between two states is considered to be not solved, but rather “frozen”. Thus, there are specific features of post-conflict context of Security Sector Reform that are relevant to Armenia. Particularly those are the initiatives aiming to eliminate the SALW and implement demining. The beginning of 1990s was characterized by high number of SALW circulating in Armenia, which possessed the threat for the internal security of the state. Besides, the bordering territories of the state have mine fields

115 Ibid
that have not been demined completely till nowadays. Even though the conflict is not completely solved, the situation in Armenia is relatively stable now. Thus, the circulation of SALW along with the existing mine fields possess physical as well as developmental threat to the state and its citizens. The paper aims to point out the initiatives that were undertaken by the government in order to overcome those issues and create opportunities for the sustainable development and peace.
III. Security Sector Reform in Armenia

The region of South Caucasus has historically been a stage for competing interest of Eastern and Western powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the process of gaining independence for Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were supplemented by a large number of ethnic clashes in the region. Each of these states chose its path towards statehood and sovereignty, which resulted in the division of the region. Armenia being a “landlocked and energy-dependent country and having a disruption of traditional trade and energy links” became the most vulnerable among the South Caucasian states. In addition to that Armenia had to go through de-facto war with Azerbaijan which resulted in the blockade of the borders between two countries, as well as between Armenia and Turkey. These not only assured the further economic isolation of the state, but also prevented it from the participation in nearly all projects aiming to promote regional integration and development, and “most notably the Baku-Tbilisi-Çeyhan oil pipeline”.

Armenia had rather been internally united and stable unlike its neighbors that had to face the civil war. However, the abovementioned factors played a crucial role in defining security sector and national security policy of Armenia. Frankly speaking the “frozen” conflict with Azerbaijan and the Soviet heritage of the state had huge impact on the Armenian policy, both economic and political.

Despite the difficulties that the state has gone through, there has been wide range of the reforms in the security sector. It will be too utopian to consider them all as a successful experience; however, ignoring the certain changes would be unwise as well. The theoretical framework provided in the previous chapter helps to indicate that it is difficult to differentiate whether only one particular context of SSR is relevant to Armenia and it is rather accurate to have a complex perception of it. Thus, the further analysis aims to indicate the dynamics of SSR in Armenia by

117 Ibid
sector and its specific features, mainly focusing on development assistance and poverty reduction initiatives; reforms in military and defense; police and PSCs; democratic governance and rule of law issues; as well as intelligence; border management; demining and elimination of SALW.

1. Development Assistance and Poverty Reduction

In the beginning of 1990s Armenia had to face the combination of challenges that would influence the economic situation in the country, including the consequences of the earthquake of 1988, the loss of traditional markets after the collapse of the Soviet Union, along with the de-facto war with Azerbaijan and following blockade of the borders. These conditions made the transitional period for Armenian economy even more difficult.\textsuperscript{118}

The main force that pushed Armenia forward during that period of time was the Armenian Diaspora which is historically located around the world. The Diaspora was also a so-called push-factor for the further economic reforms and democratic change.

Considering all the weaknesses of Armenia as a transitional country and having the additional factors mentioned above, Diaspora can be perceived as a significant and decisive “institution” that helped the state to recover its economy on some level and get on the way to sustainable development.

The assistance of Diaspora played the major role especially during the beginning of 1990s that were the most difficult years of the transitional period for Armenia. Armenian Diaspora was the main generator of the international support in the development, funding and implementation of humanitarian aid programs, along with the mobilization of private transfers to Armenia during the whole 1990s’. Armenian Diaspora by no means has been a crucial source for the economic, social and political development of the state. However, it is important to mention that while the

humanitarian contribution by the Diaspora is huge, the participation in economic life of the state is rather limited, including the low level of investment and business participation.\(^{119}\)

In addition to that certain scholars claim that “the humanitarian aid received from the Diaspora has not as much contributed to meeting social requirement as to establishing clans and promoting the centralization of economic potential, the development of monopolies and the polarization of the society”\(^{120}\).

Armenian Diaspora can be divided to “old” and “new” one. The “old” Diaspora originates from the Western Armenia and constitutes from the descendants of Armenian Genocide survivors. The “new” Diaspora in turn constitutes from the migrants that left Armenia in 1988-1990s and later on due to the difficult economic conditions in the state with intention to financially support their families. There is a huge identity gap between those two groups.

The “old” Armenian Diaspora has a strong political identity, mainly representing ideas through the Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaktsutyun (ARFD). The Dashnaks had to face the repression during the Soviet times due to their call for re-establishment of Greater Armenia and in a way aggressive attitude. The party was legalized in 90s. The Dashnaks while supporting Armenia in the beginning of 1990s had strong political position regarding the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as regarding the further diplomatic relationship between Armenia and Turkey. In 1994 the Dashnaks were banned by the Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan due to strong suspicion of their linkage to the secret organization called “Dro” responsible for a number of political assassinations in Armenia and believed to have a significant number of weaponry.\(^{121}\) The controversy of positions between the government and Diaspora eventually resulted in the decrease of financial support, as the

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participation of Diaspora was highly dependent upon the political realities.\textsuperscript{122} The ban however was removed in 1998, when “ARFD has become a member of the ruling coalition in the National Assembly”.\textsuperscript{123}

Unlike the “old” Diaspora the “new” one does not have strong political perception of the homeland. The migrants that are mainly located in Russia and other post-Soviet states invest double the size of “old” Diaspora investments in Armenia. One of the reasons is believed to be the personal connection to the “homeland”, where the migrants left relatives and friends, while the “old” Diaspora has rather symbolic understanding of it.\textsuperscript{124} Thus, the “new” Diaspora by no means has rather “economic” perception of Armenia and continues to have high level investments in the state.

It is also important to mention that Armenia lacked the international assistance in the beginning of 1990s. Due to ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan the IMF and World Bank were offering assistance only in case of the cessation of hostilities. Thus, up to 1994 Armenia did not get assistance from those two organizations. When the ceasefire was signed however Armenia adopted the structural reform program with the assistance of the IMF and World Bank and started to implement the series of activities aiming to assure “macroeconomic stability, market-oriented reforms, closely adhering to orthodox adjustment strategy recommended by international financial institutions, which was justified by the necessity to attract foreign investments and catalyze economic growth”\textsuperscript{125}. These activities eventually contributed to the overall improvement of the macroeconomic situation in the state.

However, the problems in the microeconomic level remain unsolved. Thus, even though Armenia managed to implement major market-oriented reforms there is still much to do on the

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid
microeconomic level. This is believed to be a result of the communist heritage, which is common for all post-Soviet states, where the powerful elite gained the privileges and additional resources from the transitional period.

The overall assessment of the Armenian economy through the two decades of independence shows however, the huge transformation. The reforms along with the external inflows of capital created the market-oriented environment. Among the most successful development results in Armenia one might distinguish:

1. **Improvement of rural “Lifeline” roads**, that assured the reconnection of isolated communities in rural areas to the urban centers;

2. **Reformation of energy sector**, that included the second generation energy reforms, focused on the use of safe, affordable and renewable energy generation;

3. **Improvement of access to water**, that aimed to improve the quality, efficiency and reliability of water supply service for the capital, while the International Development Association (IDA) has supported the government of Armenia in projects aimed to provide safe and stable water as well as to reduce of environmental pollution.

4. **Modernization of healthcare**, that increased the number of Armenians having better access to modernized facilities and quality healthcare provided by re-trained physicians and nurses.

5. **Improving agriculture through irrigation** that improved the life of farmers thanks to investments and support of World Bank.¹²⁶

However, the process of the economic development in Armenia had its ups and downs since independence. Even though “Armenia registered strong economic growth after 1995, with

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double-digit GDP growth rates every year from 2002 to 2007" the global economic crisis had huge impact on the further level of development in the state.

In 2003 Armenian Government approved the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the period until 2015, which became the first long-term program for socio-economic development since independence, having the main aim to reduce the material poverty as well as implement initiatives to fight the income inequality in the country.

Until recently the amount of poor in Armenia constituted the half of the population that had low level of participation in socio-economic and political life of the state. These trends pose a challenge for the further development of the state and society. Thus, the PRSP was aimed at: “maintenance of the present human potential and its further development; reduction of the human poverty expressions; improvement of the population health, reproduction potential and welfare level, including increase of the accessibility level of the general education and health service quality; reduction of infant and maternal mortality rate; improvement of the quality and accessibility of drinking water and other primary services”. In order to achieve those objectives, Armenian government along with the donor community had to strive to achieve the rapid and sustainable economic development, while implementing targeted social and income policy on the poor and modernizing the governmental system.

It is important to mention that by 2003-2006 Armenia has achieved certain progress, which was characterized by rapid economic growth and resulted in the unprecedented increase of salaries and at the same time caused the rapid poverty reduction. “In 2005 it decreased to 29.8%, in 2006 to 26.5%. As of the extreme poverty, it decreased to 4.6% and 4.1% respectively”. Considering the country’s economic growth and the financial resources available for disposal, it was believed that in 2018 the “poverty threshold would be equal to the minimal consumption basket (MCB).

127 Global EDGE. “Armenia: Economy”. Michigan State University. Available at: http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/armenia/economy
According to the program goals, the poverty level assessed on the MCB basis in 2021 would make 11.4%, of which the extreme poverty level would make 1.9%.” 129

However, Armenia was affected by the financial crisis and the deep recession of the economy at 14.1% in 2009130, which affected the level of rural and urban poverty, having the rate increased from 27.6% in 2008 to 35% in 2011. In order to support poor the Government implemented programs “through targeted social expenditures and pension increases, and as growth picks up the number of people living in poverty is expected to fall”.131

By the year 2012 there was a certain level of GDP growth, while the poverty rate decreased in comparison with the 2011 having 32.4%. However, those changes do not constitute the overall success in the poverty reduction in Armenia and are not sufficient for reaching the level of 2008. “In 2012, almost every third person – that is 32.4% of the population – was poor, among them 13.5% were very poor, and 2.8% were extremely poor”132, which is still higher than in 2008.

It is also important to mention that the programs aiming at poverty reduction in the capital and rural areas differ. Frankly speaking the initiatives outside the capital are fiscally dependent on transfers and remittances from Armenians working outside, which is likely to decrease due to the global economic slowdown. Besides, the UNDAF data shows that the poverty rates are higher in the rural areas – mazser – that are either under the high risk of earthquakes or have unfavorable conditions for agriculture and lack of infrastructure, or located on the bordering territories. It is important to mention that “around 36 percent of the population live in rural areas and are engaged in subsistence agriculture and have income levels far below the per capita average for

129 Ibid
the country”. At the same time, those living in the small or medium towns have to face the limited opportunities for employment and the lack of new investment, which caused only marginal decrease of poverty level. All in all, the regional context within Armenia is decisive and thus there is a need to focus on reducing regional disparities.

1.1. Summary

During the last two decades the most successful period for economic development and poverty reduction in Armenia was from 2002-2008, when the state experienced the rapid growth of the GDP and lowest level of poverty. Prior 1994, Armenia had to face a number of obstacles for assuring the positive transformation of economy, namely the loss of traditional markets simultaneous to the de-facto war and the lack of fiscal assistance from donor community resulting from it. The high dependence on the Diaspora is yet another obstacle that should be mentioned. Even though the Diaspora helped Armenian economy to recover, it had rarely invested within the state, which basically resulted in the decrease of interest of the international community, while increasing the level of mistrust towards the market of the state. After 2008, the main obstacle became a global economic crisis and decreased amount of the Diaspora’s support, resulting in the high level of poverty and slowing down the process of development. Besides, alike many post-Soviet states Armenia struggles with the strong political elite which controls the micro-economy of the state and causes the challenges for the average citizens to succeed in the sector.

2. Defense and Military Reform in Armenia

Prior gaining independence Armenia was one of the fifteen republics constituting the USSR and alike the rest of them lacked the national army. Thus, the creation of Armenian Armed Forces (AAF) is associated with the process of the Armenian statehood creation itself.


134 Ibid
That process can be divided into three main stages that are outlined by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia (MOD RA):

1. **February 1988 – May 1992** – the period of independence and Karabakh movement, where the security of people in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh became a central objective for the newly created state and caused the increase of tensions between Armenians and Azerbaijani people.

2. **June 1992 – May 1994** – the independent Republic of Armenia along with Nagorno-Karabakh Republic started the creation of national army, while being in a de-facto war against Azerbaijan.

3. **1994 – until nowadays** – “the stage of national army and its sustainable development, buildup and officers’ qualification enhancement”. After the ceasefire, the main efforts of Armenian authorities were directed to the creation of regular army and supplementary units.

It is important to mention that the first stage was characterized by widespread patriotism. What is the universal understanding of armed forces, usually associated with people in military uniforms, parades and so on and so forth, simply lacked in that period on the territory of Armenia. However, the idea of national army was recreated by the civilians that were trying to fulfil their objectives of gaining independence and bring justice to people in Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. Namely, around 80 separately operating detachments constituted what could be considered to be a de-facto “army”. The “army” was consistent mainly of volunteers that were armed with the weapons from “paramilitary establishments, anti-hail stations and schools’ military training rooms”.

In 1990s Armenia gained independence and had the first elected president, which created a ground to form a national army. In 1991 the government established the State Defense

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136 Ibid
Committee and in December the chairman of the Committee - Vazgen Sargsyan – was appointed to be the first minister of defense of the newly independent Republic of Armenia.

The further actions towards creation of the proper MOD along with the national army included the process of releasing the Ministry of Interior’s militia commandant regiment, special regiment as well as civil defense regiment commissariat to the Ministry of Defense in 1992 that also made basis for the later creation of Defense Ministry’s staff with headquarters and units.

The important fact that should be mentioned is that Armenian leadership took over Armenia’s part of the Soviet army on contractual base instead of taking them through seizure. According to the MOD this prevented the privatization of armament by individuals and groups. In addition to that, it allowed using the limited equipment available at the time efficiently. It is also mentioned that “thanks to the decision a part of Russian troops remained in Armenia gradually developing into military base and later became an important component our national security”. 137

Even though the process of Armenian Armed Forces formation was in progress in that period of time the de-facto “army” was in a state of war against Azerbaijan. The leadership of Armenia was dedicating all possible founds to the frontline; however, simultaneously, certain initiatives to build new institutions were undertaken as well. Even though Armenian army had to face the lack of equipment and supply, the bigger problem was the lack of high-qualified officers. Thus, the Ministry of Defense launched certain campaigns aiming to include the former Soviet officers in Armenian armed forces, even though the big percentage of them was already resigned.

The year of 1992 was full of important initiatives that helped building Armenian army, including the creation of the legal ground as well as administrative bodies; establishment of the home front and disarmament services; creation of specialized units and troops along with administrative bodies; formation of first border units; and finally enlargement and development of the units.

137 Ibid
Simultaneously, the de-facto war actions continued, where the Republic of Armenia had various losses. However, in 1992 Vazgen Manukyan, who was among Armenian National Movement leaders, became a defense minister and managed to enlarge the funding for the army and made possibilities to overcome the further losses for the state.

At the same time the leadership of the state started to seek the cooperation with the international community. Armenia joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which was later renamed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1992. The Council was created in 1991 and aimed to build a security platform for the better partnership between the countries in post-Cold War era. Thus, Armenia seeking its place in the new security environment and willing to increase the level of cooperation with the international community joined the initiative.

Two years later, in 1994 “Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani defense ministers signed a cease-fire agreement in Moscow”, which marked the second stage completion of Armed Forces creation.

The third stage, which continues till nowadays is mainly characterized by military exercises and activities aiming to improve the flexibility and dislocation ability of the troops. The great attention is paid not only on practical but to theoretical knowledge as well.

It is important to mention that the temporary peace after signing the ceasefire allowed Armenian military to focus on the efforts to build the army as well as to deal with the internal problems of the state, which included various activities connected to army structure, legislative matters, etc.

Due to the fact that Armenian at the time consisted of former volunteers the first steps undertaken in the process of defense building were connected to the training of the military specialists. Thus, the Ministry created the center where the officers gained an opportunity to

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140 Ibid
upgrade their qualifications, which has already been attended by 1500 officers. Another initiative was the establishment of the aviation college, which later became the Military Aviation Institute. Besides, the Yerevan State Medical University, which has a faculty of military medicine, trains over a thousand military doctors for the armed forces annually. Certain initiatives are also undertaken to train the officers abroad, mainly in Greece and Russia.

The new generation of Armenian military officers that now hold positions of majors, colonels, however, was educated in the Vazgen Sargsyan Military Institute which is the main military institute in Armenia. In addition to that the cooperation with various international organizations, leading in the sphere of defense, including NATO, OSCE, EU, creates opportunities for training. Besides, the number of bilateral agreements with US, Germany and Russia for instance create more opportunities for further training. It is important to mention that MOD pays great attention to the military education and considers it to be one of the priorities of the ministry and NATO is the leading organization that supports Armenia in that sphere.141

The Ministry of Defense claims that the long-lasting efforts had a positive impact on the improved qualification as well as discipline in the armed forces. Besides, ever though there was a huge amount of officers that began their carrier in the Soviet Army their number in the MOD of today is relatively low.

Nowadays, the central objectives of the Armenian Armed Forces include protection of the Nation’s independence and territorial integrity; prevention of aggression against the state and an appropriate respond to it; participation in activities aiming to prevent “emergency situations, minimize and eliminate their consequences, including search and rescue and damage-reconstruction operations, as well as other similar activities carried out by the state civil authorities”; implementation of international commitments; maintenance of international as well

as regional peace and stability; and finally assistance of diverse governmental bodies and public institutions in ensuring the security and well-being of the citizens.\textsuperscript{142}

Besides, since 1994 Armenia makes attempts to deepen and broaden the partnership with NATO by joining the Partnership for Peace Program, which constitutes the individual partnership of Euro-Atlantic partner countries with the Alliance and allows the cooperation in various fields, including “defense-related work, defense reform, defense policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and training, military-to-military cooperation and exercises, civil emergency planning and disaster response, and cooperation on science and environmental issues”\textsuperscript{143}.

In addition to that Armenia sets out the reform plans in its Individual Action Plan (IPAP), which is jointly agreed for the period of two years. Armenia signed the third and most recent IPAP in 2011. The main objectives of IPAP include the strengthening of the dialogue between NATO and Armenia, without having intentions of the state to join the Alliance, as well as support for the further defense reforms and the process of democratization. Through IPAP Armenia does not simply cooperate with the Alliance in the sphere of defense “but it is in regular consultation with the Allies on political and security issues, including relations with neighbors, democratic standards, rule of law, counter-terrorism and the fight against corruption. As part of the IPAP, NATO agrees to support Armenia in achieving its reform goals by providing focused advice and assistance”.\textsuperscript{144}

In addition to that, Armenia also started to contribute to certain NATO-led operations in order to increase its impact in international peacekeeping and peacemaking missions.\textsuperscript{145} Since 2004, Armenia has been contributing troops to the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Currently, it contributes one infantry platoon of 35 personnel to KFOR. Since 2009, Armenia has also been contributing


\textsuperscript{143} NATO. \textquotedblleft The Partnership for Peace programme\textquotedblright. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm

\textsuperscript{144} NATO. \textquotedblleft NATO’s relations with Armenia\textquotedblright. Available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48893.htm

\textsuperscript{145} Ibid
forces to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Currently it provides three platoons to ISAF. With the deployment of 80 additional personnel in mid-June 2011, Armenia increased its contribution to ISAF from 40 to 120. An additional five infantry trainers deployed to Afghanistan in July 2011”. 146

“NATO is supportive of the wide-ranging democratic and institutional reform process underway in Armenia. In the area of defense and Security Sector Reform, NATO and individual Allies have considerable expertise that Armenia can draw upon. A key priority for Armenia is to ensure democratic control of the armed forces. Armenia’s participation in Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building initiative is reinforcing these efforts. The MOD completed its Strategic Defense Review (SDR) based on its Strategic Documents while continuing to improve its defense planning and budgeting system and the development of the Peacekeeping Brigade. The MOD has made good progress in strengthening civilian control and in engaging more with civil society”. 147

The core facts that are outlined in the recent SDR point out that Armenian Defense Policy aims to support the state’s Military Doctrine148, which in turn constitutes that the AAF are considered to be the primary national source for assuring security, stability and balance of power in the South Caucasus. Besides, “Armenia will therefore promote the combat readiness, modernization of equipment, and high combat and moral standards of its Armed Forces under democratic control”. 149 Thus, the main aim of Defense policy of Armenia is to strengthen the political, economic and military potential of the state through centralized and purposeful management.

In order to achieve that goal the Defense System will be reformed aiming to establish more “flexible and modern Armed Forces based on fundamental principles of democratic and civilian

146 Ibid
control”. Besides, contemporary standards of defense planning and management will be developed, that are able to ensure the effective military security of the Republic of Armenia and to protect the fundamental values of national security” 150.

The SDR also constitutes that the MOD of Armenia has been reformed in the framework of the report. The aim of the reforms is to facilitate more effective defense management, planning, organizing, direction and control, in the areas of “defense policy formulation and planning; international military cooperation; military education; human resource management; material resource management; equipping, modernization and acquisition; financial resource management; defense industry; and public relations and information counteraction” 151.

Finally, Armenia is willing to remain a stable contributor to international security. However, Armenia does not limit its security cooperation to NATO only. In fact in 2007 at the session of National Security Council at the RA President presented the National Security Strategy (NSS), which constitutes the national policy system aiming to assure both state and individual security, sustainable peace and development as well as maintenance of the Armenian identity, was approved. Among other fundamental values mentioned in the NSS, such as independence, protection of the state and its population, preservation of national identity and assurance of prosperity, the importance of peace and international cooperation was pointed out.

The document outlines the core components of the Armenian military as well as political security that include: strategic bilateral partnership with Russia, focusing on defense and technical military cooperation; participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); bilateral military cooperation enhancement, with the US and Greece in particular; cooperation with NATO; engagement in various international security organizations and their activities, such as OSCE which would guarantee the transparency and openness of arms control regimes.

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150 Ibid
151 Ibid
The bilateral partnership with Russia and the membership in CSTO are viewed as an important component of Armenian security. The membership in CSTO provides the privileged condition for the supply of military equipment to the member states which constitutes a key priority for Armenia. Besides, Armenia sees the cooperation with CSTO as a tool for the effective military cooperation with member states and the opportunity to exchange the information as well as address the common international security threats, including trafficking and terrorism.

Additionally, Armenia is a member state of various international organizations, including UN, OSCE, CIS, etc. It also has a close cooperation with the European structures, and the European Union (EU) above all.152 Armenia wants to have its say in the international security, thought the framework of “OSCE, CSTO, NATO and other UN Security Council mandated missions and international forces. It is anticipated to continue the development of expeditionary forces of the AAF in the framework of CSTO and NATO/PfP”.153

Among other modernizations and reforms, the important step undertaken by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia is the inclusion of the civilian segment in the structure of the ministry. Since 2008-2009 the Special Civil Service which consists of the civilian staff has reached over 300 employees that work in diverse departments of MOD, from Military Industry to Finance. There are no civilians involved in the work of General Staff; however the possibility of the further inclusion is not excluded.

In addition to that the MOD created the mechanism for civilian oversight by establishing Public Council, which became a bridge between civilians and the ministry. The Council consists of civilians, including scientists, doctors or university professors. The aim of the Council is to

discuss the problematic issues relevant to MOD and AAF and present certain recommendations to the ministry and the Minister himself.¹⁵⁴

During recent years, along with the series of reforms implemented in the ministry, the leadership of MOD also became more open and responsive and during the last decade achieved certain progress in transparency and accountability.

2.1. Summary

The beginning of 1990s was characterized by the creation of military and defense bodies that were not existent in the Soviet Armenia, namely the armed forces and the Defense Ministry. Until the ceasefire was signed Armenia was rather busy with the de-facto war with Azerbaijan instead of proper transformation/creation of military and defense institutions, as well as reintegration of former Soviet officers according to principles of democratic governance. The ongoing conflict became a huge obstacle for the smooth transition in this sphere as well. Namely, the military and defense bodies were being created rapidly without proper coordination and assistance. As it has been mentioned above the “army” was constituent of volunteers and right until the ceasefire was signed it lacked the proper training or military education. The de-facto war also influenced the process of the Soviet officers’ reintegration, as they had to be rapidly involved in the process of decision-making and training of the volunteers. Thus, prior the ceasefire, the greatest obstacle was the on-going conflict with Azerbaijan and its consequences, such as the lack of resources, military education, and proper training for ex-Soviet officers. The period after 1994 however is characterized by high level cooperation with the international organizations, such as NATO, and frequent reforms and modernizations in the MOD and AAF. The great amount of attention is being paid on training and education since then. Additionally, the Ministry succeeded in reduction of the employees with “Soviet” background on certain level. Besides, since 2004 Armenia became a contributor of international peacekeeping by providing

soldiers in KFOR and ISAF. The cooperation with the international security and defense guarantors as well as the contribution to peacebuilding and peacekeeping have a positive influence on the image of Armenia among the international community. In addition to that, the perception of the civilians of MOD has by no means changed recently due to the higher level of responsiveness as well as creation of civilian oversight mechanisms by the ministry. However, despite all the positive changes, the further reform of security sector in Armenia is highly dependent and challenged by the “frozen” conflict with Azerbaijan and its consequences, which remains the greatest obstacle for the state.

3. Police Reform in Armenia

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the on-going de-facto war between Armenia and Azerbaijan triggered changes in various security system structures. The Ministry of the Internal Affairs (MIA) of Armenia was one of the institutions where diverse changes took place.

The new fragile environment that was existent in Armenia required rapid and lossless reconstruction of the internal institutions of the state along with the creation of legislation which was in fact absent in Armenia.

In addition to that as in certain other post-Soviet States including Russia, Armenia suffered from the blurred line between criminal world and police, which resulted in the further mistrust of civilians towards the structure. Fortunately, the police chief at the time – Vano Siradeghyan in 1990s prevented the wave of criminalization in Armenia.\(^{155}\) However, the level of mistrust towards the police by the population remained very low.

The process of MIA reconstruction included various initiatives, such as the creation of a separate department for combating the drug trafficking, which later was included into the restructured department for fight against organized crime. In addition to that in November of 1992 Armenia

\(^{155}\) Personal Interview with Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, Paris, France, 2014
gained membership in Interpol and approved the Interpol National Central Bureau regulations and structure in order to cooperate with the international community and deal with the new security threats.

Besides, MIA undertook the initiatives aiming to increase the cooperation between the ministry, media and civilians that included the creation of media center. In 1992 it was reorganized into a Public Relations and Information Department.

All in all the changes in the structure of internal security bodies aimed to make them more flexible, productive and coordinated. The initiatives, including illegal arms seizure, armed gang disarmament, restoration of public order, combined with structural, staffing and logistical changes constituted the successes in the fight against crime, increasing the authority of the MIA system and confirming the correctness of the structural and operational reforms.

The MIA was restructured several times during the 1990s’: in 1996 it was unified with the Ministry of National Security and in 1999 separated from it again.

However, the main changes in the structure started to take place since April of 2001, when the new law on the Police of Republic of Armenia was passed which not only created the basis for the further replacement of MIA with the Police but also became an axis around which the formation of police legislation was realized. The main objective of the reforms was the formation of new values and strategies for the police.156

In December of 2002, the Ministry was finally “downgraded to an adjunct body to the government and renamed the Police of Republic of Armenia”157.

Since 2001 Armenia has launched various activities in the OSCE framework to reform the police by making it more accountable and suitable for the contemporary security environment.

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156 Police of the Republic of Armenia. “The Independence and the Police” (2011) Available at: http://www.police.am/about-the-police/%D5%BA%D5%A1%D5%BF%D5%B4%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%A9%D5%B5%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%B6/independence-and-police.html
The OSCE report in 2006, for instance, indicates that among other activities Armenia was assisted in renovation of the Center for Induction Training, which provided the Police with modern facilities and allowed to assure the teaching of democratic policing.\footnote{OSCE. “Annual Report of the Secretary General on Police-Related Activities in 2006”. Available at: \url{http://www.osce.org/spmu/26128?download=true}}

Despite the fact the authorities as well as certain OSCE representatives indicated the positive changes in the Police sector in Armenia, the level of mistrust of civilians towards the structure remained low. One of the reasons for it is the actual similarity of the Armenian police to the structure that was existent in the USSR. Even though, Armenia after gaining independence launched various initiatives it in fact copied the structure and as a result recreated the image of the militia that was present in the Soviet state. Thus, the level of mistrust towards police did not decrease.\footnote{Civilnet. “Trust: Key to Police Reform”. Interview with David l’Anson. (2014) Available at: \url{http://civilnet.am/david-l%E2%80%99anson-policing-the-police-armenia-osce/}} In addition to that, the Police remains “highly militarized organization, as suggested by the ranking system, which is more or less identical to that within the army. It is still home to a large number of well-armed interior troops, which are run in a very similar fashion to the standard military units”\footnote{Avagyan, Gagik, and Duncan Hiscock. Security sector reform in Armenia. Saferworld, 2005.}. In 2008 the level of mistrust towards the police became even lower after the violent clashes between the police and civilians took place. The protests that were organized after the presidential elections resulted in the series of violations with vital consequences for the state and civilians. According to Human Rights Watch Report in 2010 “ten people were killed, including two security officials and eight protestors, while only four police officers have been convicted of excessive use of force in December 2009 and were sentenced to three years; however they were amnestied immediately and now are only barred from working in law enforcement”.\footnote{Human Rights Watch. “World Report 2011: Armenia”. Available at: \url{http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/armenia}} Simultaneously around 50 civilians, as well as opposition leaders, were prosecuted, some of
them were even sentenced, even though in 2009 many of them were released a year later by presidential pardon.

“In a March 2010 report analyzing the post-March 2008 trials, the OSCE called on authorities to, among other things, comprehensively investigate allegations of ill-treatment and ban in court evidence obtained through ill-treatment”\(^\text{162}\).

OSCE also launched certain initiatives to realize so-called “community policing”. Those initiatives also included the diversification of the police, mainly by creating more opportunities for the female representatives to be integrated in the Community Policing Units. Besides, the initiative also includes the activities aiming to increase the cooperation between civilians and the police as well as contribute to the public awareness.\(^\text{163}\)

The OSCE representatives claim that since 2008 there were definite positive changes in the Armenian Police.\(^\text{164}\) Especially the big efforts are made to contribute to police education. However, the curriculum is new and some time is needed for the better results. Among positive changes the increased level of communicativeness, as well as professionalism and the high level engagement with the civilians are outlined. However, those are not the only changes that should occur in the Police. One of the main issues that should be addressed is the development of the ability to deal professionally with the provocation, as certain protestors and political activists are believed to be provocative. Thus, the police should be able to deal with these situations professionally, without using force, while keeping in mind its main function.\(^\text{165}\)

In 2011 Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan presented the program of reform proposals that aimed to rebrand the image of the state. As until recently Armenian policemen were accused in corruption and nepotism, which was believed to be tolerated by the government and perceived by

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\(^{162}\) Ibid


\(^{165}\) Ibid
it as tools that can be used against political opposition, those initiatives included police reforms and appointment of new police chief – Vladimir Gasparyan.

The interesting feature of the reforms in Armenia, that should be mentioned, is their “personalization” rather than “institutionalization”, which basically means that the positive changes that occurred in the police structure after the appointment of the new police chief are not caused by the positive institutional changes, but are rather the result of the appointment of the particular person and Vladimir Gasparyan in particular in this case.\textsuperscript{166}

The police reforms in Armenia can be divided into two main groups of components: initiatives aiming to improve technical and material issues of policing, including training, equipment as well as salaries; and administrative restructuring, that includes creation of new units and reorganization of the highway police. However, the reforms lacked the initiatives of dismissal of corrupt officials which would be a more extreme form of action.\textsuperscript{167}

Regarding technical and material issues, Armenia made various efforts, including the purchase of new cars, equipped with the needed technological tools, as well as the change of the uniforms. Besides, in order to decrease the level of corruption the salaries of policemen have been raised from average $100-150 to $600-900.

The major target of the reforms has been the highway police which have been known for accepting bribes. As a matter of fact, the issue of corruption on one point became socially acceptable, where in the conditions of poverty, the state shifted “certain material responsibility to the community”; where the civilians are expected to “financially support” the policemen. “This expectation has turned into a certain kind of moral economy, by which individuals voluntarily pay bribes out of a sense of social solidarity and altruism. The failure to pay bribes is thus turned

\textsuperscript{166} Personal Interview with Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, Paris, France, 2014

into a source of shame, and police officers readily employ normative rhetoric to extract payment.”

In order to prevent further bribery, it was decided to decrease the level of interaction between citizens and highway policemen. For that matter there was number of surveillance cameras installed throughout the capital of Armenia – Yerevan as well as number of road speedometers. Besides, highway police is required to patrol from their cars and fines are payable not directly to them but though the banks. However, the consequences of those changes instead of assuring the increase of trust among civilians rather had the opposite effect. First of all it should be mentioned that the speedometers and cameras that are all over Yerevan are owned by the private company – Security Dream Co. Ltd. The public does not have the access to any kind of agreement between the company and Armenian authorities, and the information regarding the ownership of it simply does not exist, which causes the number of rumors and contributes to the increase of mistrust towards the police system. Besides, the fines that are paid through the bank are so high that certain civilians mentioned that they would prefer bribing policemen. Thus, the bribery and corruption instead of being eliminated were rather transformed and became legal and payable to state institutions.

However, the technological improvements had certain positive consequences as well, including the decrease of the level of corruption in the passport office and bodies responsible for the driving license examination. The positive changes can be mainly characterized by the computerization of the process, which causes the decrease of the interaction with police officers.

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170 Personal Interview with Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, Paris, France, 2014
171 Ibid
Among the latest positive achievements of the Police is the creation of so-called “Angels Battalion” which aims not only to assure the protection of public order, but also plays an educational role for the civilians and strives to change the negative attitude towards police itself.\textsuperscript{172} The “Angels” have a special police uniform, they do not carry firearms and the notable part of them constitutes of female policemen, which assures the gender representation. Besides, the recent perception of the battalion by civilians is rather positive, which creates certain ground for the further changes of the police image.

To summarize, it should be mentioned that in Armenia the police reforms even though were state-dominated were not completely insulated from civil society. They resulted in the improvement of technical capacity of police there still has been little progress towards improving accountability ad transparency. Besides, the lack of personnel dismissal stops Armenia from rapid changes in decreasing the level of corruption present among police officers.

In addition to that the mistrust of population towards police has vital consequences for the whole state, including the issue of migration that recently became topical again. Certain civilians claim that the feeling of being “cheated” as well as the high level of corruption and mistrust towards police and justice system contribute to their will to leave the country\textsuperscript{173}.

\textbf{3.1. Summary}

The Police of the Republic of Armenia have gone through the number of transformations since the state gained independence. The most significant changes took place since 2001, which resulted in the number of reforms and a strong cooperation with OSCE in the process of creation of community policing. The major change has been the transformation of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Police. The initiative aimed to eliminate the image of Soviet militia and create a new body that will be positively perceived by the population. However, the structure of the


\textsuperscript{173} Personal Interview with Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, Paris, France, 2014
Armenian Police and its elements on certain level remind the Soviet militia, which causes the great mistrust of the population. The military-like Police repeatedly violated the human rights and performed non-professionally since the state gained independence which caused the distrustful attitude of the population. In addition to non-professionalism it is important to mention the high level of corruption that has become a part of the culture. The combination of those two elements is a greatest obstacle for the security sector transformation in Armenia. The government, however, attempted to overcome these issues, and since 2011 implemented the number of reforms and changes, including the appointment of new police Chief, creation of new battalions, as well as technological advancing. The new “Angels” battalion has been succeeding to bring some positive attitude towards policemen, while the technological advancing has decreased the level of interaction between citizens and highway policemen and thus influenced the level of corruption. However, the number of Armenian citizens prefer bribery over official fee payment; besides, the attitude of “calling on the neighbor” is absent in Armenia. These are by no means the specific cultural features characteristic for the Armenian society and at the same time the obstacles for the further positive transformation of the security sector.

4. Private Security Companies in Armenia

Even though the Ministry of Defense made certain attempts to stop the privatization of security by reintegration of the former combatants into the Armenian Armed Forces, the Private Security Companies still were existent in 1990s in Armenia.

The PSCs in Armenia are all nationally owned, however they cooperate regarding technical and training issues with such countries as Russia, Canada, UK, etc.

The first two of them were created in 1992 and aimed to protect the US Embassy and US Peace Corps Office in Armenia. However, later on in 1995 the official registration of PSCs began and thus, the number of the companies increased.
The expansion was even higher by 2000, when the clients of PSCs started to be not only diplomatic missions and international organizations, but the whole range of entrepreneurs. Besides, occasionally, certain small entities, such as supermarkets, schools or universities were using the services offered by PSCs.

The services provided by the companies included “manned static and patrol security, rapid response, close protection services (i.e. body guarding), cargo security escort, debt recovery, detective services and technical protection such as the installation of security hard- and software (e.g. electronic surveillance and alarm systems)”.

The reason why PSCs became so popular in Armenia are due to the flexible price for the offered services, that by some are believed to be lower than the prices of Police State Protective Service (PSPS). Some consumers of PSCs state that not only the price is lower, but the quality of offered services is better, while the PSPS representatives claim the opposite and point out that the only reason why private companies are more popular is the opportunity to negotiate the price.

The increase of PSCs and their factual replacement of PSPS functions in certain areas can eventually cause the competition between two institutions, even though “PSCs are only allowed to own and use civil weapons in Armenia as defined by Article 3 of the RA Law on Weapons”. Thus they are “limited to weapons such as gas pistols, stun guns, batons and electric shockers”.

Even though competition between PSCs and PSPS can become a serious issue, there is another problem connected to the private companies that can have more vital consequences. The private security sector is completely unregulated. The PSCs register as regular Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) without taking into account the consequences and risk that they might pose to the public security. There are no limits for any individual to establish PSC in Armenia.

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175 Ibid
nowadays, even if they do not have the appropriate qualification for that matter. “According to the RA police, the RA Ministry of Justice has the right to check whether PSCs are fully registered. However, in case of illegal conduct the Ministry cannot order companies to cease operating since no specific regulatory legislation exists for the private security sector. The only other source of existing regulation is self-regulation by PSCs. All companies interviewed claim to possess an established internal code of conduct which all employees must adhere to. However, since no national private security association or union exists that develops and oversees the implementation of industry standards it is impossible to verify whether PSCs truly follow the rules they set for themselves”\textsuperscript{176}.

Besides, the PSCs usually do not have a universal criterion for the employees; even though they usually must have the national military service completed which is believed to be an indicator of physical and mental health. Another issue is the lack of possibilities to check the employees’ background. The only possible option available to PSCs is the official letter from the police claiming that the employee does not have a criminal record. However due to the complexity of the process, the PSCs currently do not usually check the background of low level personnel, but rather those involved in provision of security to diplomatic missions.

\textbf{4.1. Summary}

The increase of the level of PSCs is on certain level connected to the mistrust towards the Police. The choice of the population of private companies over PSPS caused an easy access to privatization of security. The PSCs and their increased number after 1995 possess a threat for the internal human security in Armenia. It is important to keep in mind that the lack of regulation, as well as non-professional attitude towards the issue of security provision, combined with the unchecked background of the PSCs employees can become an additional obstacle for the smooth Security Sector Reform in Armenia.

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid
5. Democratic Governance and Rule of Law in Armenia

After gaining independence Armenia had to face not only the de-facto war with Azerbaijan, but also the further transportation blockade, being left only with Georgian and Iranian borders open. Along with energy crisis, all those factors contributed to the collapse of the Armenia’s economy in the beginning of 1990s. Even though the economy has begun to recover in certain way in the mid-90s, the borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey remain closed. Besides, the decline in living standards in the newly independent country along with the economic restructuring increased the level of political apathy and mistrust. Since presidential elections in 1995 Armenian opposition questions the legitimacy of president, parliament as well as constitution. In addition to that, the high level of corruption and lack of responsiveness of Armenian government increases the level of mistrust. The clash between police and the opposition supports in 2008 mentioned above has yet became another event that draw the population further from the authorities.

However, the civil society in Armenia has mistrust not only towards government, but rather towards the political system as a whole, including the opposition, which mainly shares the value system with the government. Besides, the low level of human rights provision, including the constant violations taking place in all institutions, including army, along with the non-efficient reforms and difficult socio-economic conditions contribute to the increase of mistrust towards the authorities.

The accountability of media can be questioned as well. In certain way it became a tool for campaigning and competition between various political parties and individuals. Thus, there is a lack of accurate information. In addition to that the image of governmental institutions and reforms implemented by them on national television differs from the reality, which only increases the level of mistrust towards authorities.

178 Personal Interview with Narek Samsonyan, The Chairman at Civil Consciousness NGO, Yerevan, Armenia, 2014
Even though Armenian civil society has certainly become stronger and more demanding during recent years, which caused certain positive changes in the democratization process as well as increased the level of transparency, accountability and responsiveness of the government, there is still much left to do. \(^{179}\) Thus, the international organizations and development donors assist Armenia in various activities aiming to promote the principles of democratic governance and rule of law and thus increase the level of transparency, accountability and responsiveness of the Armenian government.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) being one of the donors contributing to the activities in that field usually points to the lack of checks and balances in Armenian reality, as well as deficit of application of rule of law. Even though it is mentioned that the law is usually well developed, it is however poorly implemented. Besides, the level of engagement of citizens in political process is relatively low, which leads to the low level of trust towards the government. \(^{180}\)

Civil society in Armenia is highly dependent on donor community, while media lacks resources and diversity. The principles of governance in Armenia from the USAID viewpoint are based on the consensus between ruling elites. Thus, the main aim of the programs implemented by the donor is to increase the level of interaction between citizens and government. This will result in effective policymaking and reform implementation, as well as contribute to the capacity building of civil society and assure the access of civilians to the independent sources of information. \(^{181}\)

There are various programs implemented by USAID in Armenia that aim to increase the level of good governance. One of the programs is the Civil Society/Local Government Support Program (CSLGSP), a Counterpart International project implemented with the support of USAID. The program began in 2010 with the main goal to increase “the level of informed and effective civic

\(^{179}\) Ibid
\(^{181}\) Ibid
activism at the local and national levels, along with more participatory, decentralized, efficient and responsive local governance that supports the democratic process”. Another program is Support to the Armenian National Assembly Program (SANAP), which includes the technical assistance as well as works with Armenian Parliamentary staff and committees in order to increase the level of accountability and responsiveness which will result in improvement of internal legislative procedures and institutional checks and balances. Finally, there is The Election Monitoring Program, which was implemented in 2012 Parliamentary and 2013 Presidential Elections. The Program not only aims to provide objective and non-biased reports on the election administration voting processes, voters’ lists and the political atmosphere, but it also plays an educational role for those voting for the first time “through mock elections and monitors elected bodies’ activities after elections”.

Another international organization that provides assistance regarding democracy and governance to Armenia is UNDP. According to the organization Armenian governance system does not assure proper access and options of meaningful participation of citizens on both local and national level. Besides, people’s attitude towards participation in public life is ignorant as they do not believe to influence the situation in the state. There is a little trust towards justice system and the level of corruption contributes to the level of mistrust among population. The NGOs are limited in providing space for open and respectful debate for public discourse.

Even though the organization mentions the existence of basic freedom of expression, it also states that the whole country is rather “partially free”.

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184 Ibid

185 UNDP. “Democratic Governance: Armenia”. Available at: http://www.am.undp.org/content/armenia/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/in_depth/
Besides, the human rights situation is rather poor. The citizens are not well informed about their civil rights, laws are not always enforced and courts are not always impartial. Besides, the gender issues are still relevant to Armenia, where women are less likely to get a job and are more likely to receive lower salary.

Among the latest events that indicate the violations of human rights in Armenia was a peaceful protest in December of 2013 caused by the discontent connected to the possible accession of the state to The Eurasian Customs Union. During the protest over 120 civilians were apprehended. While being in police station the civilians were not informed about their rights which is a regular practice in all democratic states, instead they were given a piece of paper when they were released with the list of their rights. Thus, formally Armenia fits to the democratic standards and is respectful to human rights; the practice however shows that the old Soviet mentality is still relevant to the Armenian reality\textsuperscript{186}.

The programs assisted by UNPD include the policy advisory provision to the authorities in human rights, democratization, justice, liberty, security and so on and so forth; implementation of regulatory framework in public sector with other development donors; advocacy of gender equality in local governance; and promotion of youth issues in the national development agenda as well as engagement with youngsters all across Armenia\textsuperscript{187}.

Another promoter of good governance and rule of law in Armenia is the EU. The legal framework of EU-Armenia relations is based on Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed in 1996 and European Neighborhood Policy designed in 2004. Nowadays, Armenia cooperates with EU mainly through Eastern Partnership program, which has two dimensions: bilateral and multilateral. The bilateral dimension suggests that Armenia is supposed to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union on political dialogue, foreign and security policy; justice, freedom and security; economic and sectoral cooperation; and Deep and Comprehensive Free

\textsuperscript{186} Personal Interview with Narek Samsonyan, The Chairman at Civil Consciousness NGO, Yerevan, Armenia, 2014
\textsuperscript{187} UNDP. “Democratic Governance: Armenia”. Available at: http://www.am.undp.org/content/armenia/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/in_depth/
Trade Agreement, negotiated separately. On multilateral level, the Eastern Partnership program suggests four platforms: democracy, good governance, stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; contacts between people.\textsuperscript{188} The closer cooperation and partnership with the European Union could contribute to the promotion of European values and help promotion of democratization process and good governance.

The most recent initiative launched and funded by the organization is the “Support to Democratic Governance in Armenia” project, which is implemented by the British Council along with its implementing partners CDPF, Grant Thornton and Thomson Foundation. The project started in March 2014 and is meant to last eight months. The main aim of the project is to strengthen democracy and good governance in Armenia by supporting civil society and democratic institutions, as well as by increasing the awareness of the population on the relations between EU and Armenia. The final objective of the program is to bring Armenia closer to the European Union and its values and standards. The components of the project include support in establishment and implementation of regulatory reforms aiming to assure financial sustainability of civil society organizations and increase their ability in engagement in entrepreneurship activities; the increase of engagement of civil society in the legal reform, as well as monitoring of it, to carry out social entrepreneurship and other financial activities for better involvement in political analysis and active citizenship; enhance capacity and professionalism of media in order to make it free, diverse and have it promoting good governance, accountability; “to raise awareness on the civil society developments and their engagement in the promotion and implementation of political reforms in Armenia. Increase awareness and visibility among the public on the EU support related to this”.\textsuperscript{189}

Another European structure that assists Armenia in the governance-related initiatives is the Council of Europe. The state gained its membership in the organization in 2001 and since then

\textsuperscript{188} Grigoryan, Hasmik. "Democracy in Armenia. EU's Eastern Partnership as a Supportive Tool Towards Democracy". (2013) Available at: \url{http://www.acgrc.am/paper,%20democracy%20in%20Armenia.pdf}

\textsuperscript{189} Panorama. Opening event of project “Support to Democratic Governance in Armenia”. (2014) Available at: \url{http://www.panorama.am/en/society/2014/06/02/eu-armenia/}
the main areas of cooperation are related to the issues of democratization, human rights, rule of law and governance. In 2011 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) passed the resolution 1837 that addressed the events that took place in March of 2008 in Armenia. The resolution welcomed the efforts of the government in conducting police, judiciary and other reforms and attempts to decrease the level of structural deficits that resulted in the 2008 actions. Among the latest initiatives launched between Council of Europe and Armenia is the Action Plan 2012-2014, which aims to promote the “judicial, penitentiary and educational reforms, as well as freedom of the media and protection of the children’s rights, to strengthen local democracy and to improve the electoral code and practice”.

The external assistance is crucial for the democratization and rule of law promotion in Armenia. Even though formally Armenia is engaged in the majority initiatives that promote human rights and democratization processes, however, they do not always have an effective outcome when it comes to practice. Thus, one thing that the international organizations and assistants can do is to engage in initiatives directed to the targeted problem solving. The European structures that promote democratic values by no means have had a great influence and advanced the process of democratization in the state, however, it has been much more formal work done, while the actual problems are not really dealt. Besides, the practice shows that the cooperation of the external institutions with the local NGOs and civil society has greater positive impact on the process of democratization, even though the funds spent on that initiatives are relatively low.

Besides, the additional challenges should be also considered. The presence of Russia in the region and its integration on any level is considered by certain representatives of civil society as an obstacle for the positive process of democratization in Armenia. Besides, various Russian

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193 Personal Interview with Narek Samsonyan, The Chairman at Civil Consciousness NGO, Yerevan, Armenia, 2014
funded NGOs are engaged in activities that have no contribution for the process of the state’s development. They are rather underestimating the importance of statehood and sovereignty.

Thus, to summarize, the external, European assistance, is crucial for the assurance of the promotion of democracy in Armenia. However, another important issue is the promotion of civil consciousness within the state, which will push the civil society to implement the oversight. Among other mechanisms, the peaceful disobedience is more relative to the Armenian reality. One of the latest campaigns launched according to the principles of that mechanism was directed to the rise in transportation prices, particularly the mini-buses. The various peaceful demonstrations as well as carpooling initiatives, along with the reluctance of the mini-bus drivers to charge the citizens with the new raised price eventually made the government to change the decision and reduce the ticket fee. “This campaign shows the impact that a grassroots movement can have. With no prior organization and financial resource concerned citizens rallied around a common goal and took effective action”. Thus, along with the external assistance the internal processes have huge influence on the democratic processes in Armenia as well.

5.1. Summary

Since 2000s the international organizations assist Armenia in various initiatives aiming to increase the level of democratic governance and promote rule of law. While the important impact of such organizations as USAID, EU or UNDP has been mentioned above, there are certain obstacles that possess challenges for the successful democratization of Armenia. Frankly speaking, the lack of coordination among international community and the few targeted initiatives result is slow changes in the process of democratization. Another obstacle is the de-jure participation of Armenia in various initiatives aiming to promote the principles of democracy and human rights and de-facto violation of them. The government of Armenia experiences the mistrust of civilians caused by its “violent” and non-democratic attitude. The

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194 Ibid
clashes in 2008 are a great example of the practical violation of human rights and principles of good governance by the Armenian government. In addition to the obstacles possessed by the Armenian government, one might also distinguish the negative influence of the wide range of NGOs financed by the Russian Federation combined with the general Russian rhetoric in the region and in the Armenian state in particular. The organizations mainly spread the Soviet-alike values, instead of promoting the principles of democratic governance and appreciation of sovereignty, which is yet another obstacle for the successful transformation of the former communist state – Armenia. However, if prior 2008 the civilians had rather poor civil consciousness and low level of influence, the recent years showed that the development of proper oversight mechanisms creates the possibilities to influence the government and its decisions. Here, one might refer to the abovementioned method of peaceful disobedience and its recent practice regarding the mini-bus fee increase. Thus, even though there are various challenged for the successful democratization, the civil society since 2008 has developed and advanced.

6. Intelligence and Border Management in Armenia

Prior to 1991 Armenia as other non-Russian republics in USSR had regional office of KGB. After gaining independence the state had to go through certain changes in the sphere of national security and intelligence organizations.

According to certain sources, the KGB in Armenia 1991-1993 was partially responsible for maintaining national security and played a huge role in disarming militias and negotiating the return of hostages during the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.196

In December of 1991 KGB agency in Armenia was renamed into the State Administration of National Security of the Republic of Armenia. Later on in 1995 it was renamed again into


The head of the organization is appointed by the president of the Republic of Armenia, while there is a lack of accurate information regarding the re-integration process of the former KGB employees. However, the certain percentage of them was integrated in the NSS. Namely the director of the National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia Gorik Hakobyan took KGB courses in the USSR. Since 1969 he held various positions in Armenian regional office of KGB and later on in the State Administration of National Security of the Republic of Armenia.\footnote{National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia. “NSS Today”. Available at: http://www.nss.am/index.php/ru/nss-today/leadership}

Besides, certain National Security Service employees perceive themselves as the KGB officers, without taking into consideration the repressive and abusive order of that organization.\footnote{Aravot. “The National Security Service (NSS) of Armenia Officers Have Remained KGB Officers” (2012). Available at: http://en.aravot.am/2012/10/20/158741/}

The main task of the National Security Service nowadays is to assure national security, as well as to implement certain intelligence activities, and border control.\footnote{United States Department of State. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011: Armenia". Available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186536.pdf} The core problems of NSS however are related to the lack of “sufficient training, resources, and established procedures to prevent incidents of abuse”.\footnote{Ibid}

The National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia is the main responsible body for the border management policy elaboration in the state. The Border Guards Troops that perform under the authority of the National Security Service have a Border Control detachment responsible for border management and control, including administration of the passport check at the borders; processing applications for asylum submitted on the borders; prevention of crime and illegal immigration; and management of the Border Management Information
However, the issuance of visas on the borders is the responsibility of the department of Passports and Visas which is within the structure of the Police.

It has been mentioned above that the borders between Armenia and Turkey, as well as Azerbaijan are blocked. Thus, there can be distinguished 14 border crossing control points in Armenia, including 7 land borders checking points and 5 airports. “Border guards subject to the National Security Service patrol Armenia’s borders with Georgia and Azerbaijan, while Russian Federal Border Guards Troops in accordance with the “Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the Declaration on the Collaboration towards the 21st Century” of December 29, 1991, continue to monitor Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran”.

In addition to the national services providing border management Armenia as well receives assistance from the international organizations. In particular the International Organization of Migration (IOM) has assisted Armenia in border management reform and implements various activities in regard to expand the assistance activities. Among the current projects of IOM and Armenia that are financially assisted by US Government and IOM 1035 Facility, there is a “Training Curriculum for the Training Center of the Border Control Detachment of Border Guards Troops” launched under National Security Service of RA in 2010, which includes training courses for border guards. Besides, IOM plays an advisory role, thus in 2012 it provided technical advice to the establishment of border plenipotentiaries in Armenia, including their training. “IOM also built the capacities of the Police’s Division of Combating Illegal Migration, which operates under the General Department for Combating Organized Crime, and is charged with the factions of preventing, combating, detecting illegal migration from and through Armenia”. It also expanded and established the Network of Border Management Information


\[203\] Ibid


System in RA in order to establish the “information system via a centralized data storage, retrieval and analysis that will provide information on traveler flows, asylum seekers, irregular migrants, human trafficking and unaccompanied minors, and will monitor the data against watch lists”.

Another initiative is the “Supporting to the Integrated Border Management Systems in the South Caucasus (SCIBM)” project launched by UNDP in Armenia and funded by the European Union. Since 2007 the SCIBM provides the South Caucasian states with the assistance to implement the beneficial model of IBM in the region.

“The overall objective of the program is to enhance inter-agency, bilateral and regional cooperation between the South Caucasus countries, EU member states and other international stakeholders and to facilitate the movement of legitimate persons and goods across borders, at the same time maintaining their security and high level of protection against any illegal activity”.

In 2010 with the assistance of SCIBM Armenia developed and adopted the “Border Security and State Border Integrated Management Strategy of the Republic of Armenia”, which outlined the ambition of Armenia to effectively manage its borders, while keeping them safe and ensuring trade and transit facilitation. Along with that SCIBM provided assistance to NSS in the preparation of an Action Plan on Ensuring Border Security and Integrated State Border Management (2011-2015), which includes wide range of areas that should be improved, including legislation, inter-agency cooperation, training and equipment provision for border crossing points between Armenian and Georgian border. In addition to that many activities of IBM Strategy Action Plan are aiming to promote trade and transit through border management.

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207 UNDP. “Towards open, but secure borders in the South Caucasus” Available at: http://www.undp.org/content/brussels/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/successstories/towards-open--but-secure-borders-in-the-south-caucasus/
Thus, the reforms in the sphere of border management will influence and contribute to the promotion of economic development in the state.208

Since 2010 Armenia “proved its interest in implementing IBM within its national structures. The National Security Council has been assigned with the task of coordinating the work of border-related agencies for the drafting of the national Border Security and Integrated Border Management Strategy and the IBM Action Plan as well as of supervising the implementation thereof. A lot remains to be done though, as in terms of coordination/cooperation within/among the agencies, but also in terms of training, procedures, etc.”209

### 6.1. Summary

During the de-facto war with Azerbaijan the intelligence agencies of Armenia provided the service of militias’ disarmament and negotiation over the return of hostages. Since 1995 however, the intelligence agencies were transformed into a Ministry of National security, thus, the main goal was changed and the priority was the assurance of Armenia’s security. The further transformation took place in 2002, when the ministry was renamed to National Security Service and became responsible for the border management initiatives. NSS is highly cooperating with various organizations, including IOM and EU. Even though the “frozen” conflict and blocked borders influence the principles and the methods of border management (allowing the existence of Russian border guards on the Armenian-Turkish border, for instance), Armenia has rather been successful in the initiatives related to the IBM. However, the overall intelligence bodies in the post-communist Armenia have had certain challenges in the process of transformation. First of all, the number of former Soviet KGB officers employed in NSS that share the communist-time values are challenging to transition of these bodies to the democratic ones. The bigger challenge however is their perception of themselves as KGB officers, which contradicts the

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208 Ibid

principles of democratic governance that are essential for the successful reform of the security sector.

7. Demining and Elimination of SALW in Armenia

After signing ceasefire in 1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the army engineers examined around 1000 square kilometers of border territories in Armenia where the warfare was held in order to identify the minefields and dangerous sites, using all the available documentation as well as information provided by local residents. Armenian government managed to eliminate around 80,000 landmines.

Armenia has not signed the International Conventions of Land Mines, even though it supports Ottawa Convention on use, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines. The main reason to refrain from signing the conventions are the consequences that would result in disadvantaged position of the state, as the Azerbaijani government has not signed the conventions either. “For similar reasons the Protocol II on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other devices has not been signed by Armenia”\(^\text{210}\). However, the government of Armenia provides the annual report to the UN Secretary General voluntarily in order to contribute to the global mine action.

The lack of financial resources kept the process of the Mine Action in Armenia on hold for a long time. Up to 2011 the Mine Action program was developed under the Armed Forces, until Armenian Government made productive steps in order to make the program more civil as well as to establish national ownership over the issue.

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In the beginning of 2011 the “Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise” (CHDE) was established. It is a civil, state non-commercial organization that approved its Charter by the Decree N 143 adopted on 17 February 2011.\textsuperscript{211}

The international community have not been involved in humanitarian mine action projects in Armenia since 2005 to 2012. However, in 2012 the US State Department provided financial support to conduct the Non-Technical Survey (NTS) project with the assistance of Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) to the CHDE in Armenia\textsuperscript{212}. The Survey indicated that landmines and UXO exist in four Armenian regions, namely in Tavoush, Gegharkunik, Vayots Dzor and Syunik, having in total around 42 impacted communities and more than 34.000 people impacted. The majority of the impacted communities are located in the border of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

It is important to mention that the landmines and UXOs have not been placed after the ceasefire. However, even though the number of mine accidents is rare they still take place on the territory of Armenia and the civilians in affected areas still suffer from the consequences of the emplaced mines and UXOs.\textsuperscript{213}

The landmine issues in Armenia have certain consequences related to the development context, as they constitute an obstacle for the further development of agriculture as well as tourism on the affected territories. Besides, the funds provided to affected communities are usually spent on demining and UXO elimination.

In addition to that the consequences possess threat to various aspects of human security besides the physical security itself. Frankly speaking the communities living on mine-affected territories are usually isolated and socially excluded, having poor infrastructure. Besides, the population on

\textsuperscript{211} “Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise” SNCO. “Overview”. Available at: \url{http://www.chde.am/index_en.htm}


\textsuperscript{213} Ibid
affected territories complains about the lack of agricultural land. “In many cases, however, agricultural land to which landmines and UXO are hampering access forms part of the restricted military zones. The local communities may not normally think of these areas as accessible to their economic pursuits”. Thus, the greater effort should be made in order clear the agricultural territories. Besides, the proper Mine Risk Education is needed in order to prevent the further mine accidents.

The CHDE aims to implement activities directed to demining, identifying and eliminating the UXOs in Armenia as well as developing programs for the “utilization, destruction and conservation of expired or non-effective arms and ammunition, production of military importance”; as well as providing expertise on the identity of goods of military importance imported, exported or transferred through Armenia.

In addition to that the center is planning to implement the number of following activities: “conducting landmine impact survey, identification of contaminated areas, and marking; conducting technical survey, and defining minefields; and implementing mine clearance activities”. The existence of landmines and UXOs is not the only costly consequence for the development and sustainability as well as human security in Armenia. The beginning of 1990s and the de-facto war caused the widespread circulation of SALW on the territory of the state. After the ceasefire Armenia made certain attempts to deal with that issue.

According to certain sources Armenia, being in a situation of armed conflict with Azerbaijan, purchased the numbers of SALW from Russia and other post-Soviet republics. The illegal transfer of arms from Russia to Armenia is believed to be worth up to $1 billion.

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214 Ibid
215 “Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise” SNCO. “Overview”. Available at: [http://www.chde.am/index_en.htm](http://www.chde.am/index_en.htm)
Armenia however made the number of attempts to prevent the further circulation of SALW in the state, while considering the explosive nature of the region. In 2001 during the United Nations Conference on the “Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects” Armenian representatives pointed out the intention of the state to combat the proliferation of small arms as a priority for national security. Even though after gaining independence Armenia had to face the large number of paramilitary groups formed during that period of time, the state leadership made attempts to effectively disarm them and integrate either in the army structures or the civil society. These actions were seen as the way to establish the state control over SALW in Armenia. The state adopted the “Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons”. In addition to that Armenia welcomed the adoption of OSCE Document of Small Arms and Light Weapons and expressed its will to make certain attempts to reduce the licit trafficking as well as spread of SALW in Armenia. In 2003 Armenia made concrete steps towards elimination of SALW circulation by entering into force the Governmental Decision on the “Rules and Procedures of the Licensing of the Production of Arms in the Republic of Armenia”, which allowed implementing the proper and stricter oversight in the sphere.

The Government implements strict control over the possession, manufacturing and trading of SALW in Armenia and the official position of the state representatives indicates the existence of accurate records of the numbers of combat, civilian and service weapons. The circulation of unmarked SALW in Armenia is forbidden by law. In addition to that Armenian representatives point out the importance of civilian education as well as increasing the level of awareness, which are believed to be important tools to combat the illicit circulation of SALW.\footnote{Aghajanian, Dziunik. “Statement at the Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the UN Program of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects” United Nations (2005). Available at: http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2005/memberstates-pdf/Armenia.pdf}

Since 2001 Armenia made important attempts to increase the efficiency of the efforts to combat the illicit trade of SALW by adopting new laws and regulation to implement a proper oversight.
in the field and declare the state control the possession, manufacturing and trading of SALW on its territory. In addition to that the charges “introduced in the Criminal Code expanded its scope by directly addressing criminal offenses on illegal manufacture, possession, stockpiling, acquisition, sales, transportation and theft of arms and ammunition or explosives, and defining criminal offences on inaccurate stockpiling of arms or negligence thereof”\textsuperscript{218}.

Besides Armenia cooperates with the international organizations to fight against illegal trafficking of SALW, namely with OSCE and CSTO.

7.1. Summary

Since mid-90s Armenia has implemented various initiatives aiming to eliminate the SALW and demine the affected territories. It is important to mention that the landmines have not been placed since ceasefire. Even though since 1994 there have been certain initiatives to decrease the level of landmines, certain territories and the bordering provinces in particular are still surrounded by mine fields. Besides, Armenia has not signed the International Conventions of Land Mines – all due to the “frozen” conflict with Azerbaijan and the possibility of the reoccurrence of de-facto war. The unresolved conflict is an obstacle for the complete demining of the territory. In addition to that by 2011 Armenia lacked the proper resources for the mine action and related activities as well as the overall international assistance, which was challenging for the process of demining. Even though there have been positive changes, such as the decrease of the number of explosions, the people living on the territories affected by landmines struggle with the lack of recourses that are necessary for sustainable development. Thus, the existence of landmines is a great obstacle for the successful economic development and human security as well, that are essential for the positive transformation of the security sector in general. The circulation of SALW in turn has been decreased comparing with the beginning of 1990s.

According to the reports given to the United Nations, since 2001, Armenia has a strong position against illicit trade in SALW and in order to avoid the illegal circulation of it within the state the sector is controlled by the government.

8. General Findings

Armenia has started the reformation of its security sector over twenty years ago. The beginning of 1990s can be considered to be the most challenging for the process of the transformation of security sector overall and its specific features. The earthquake of 1988 and the suddenness of the USSR collapse left Armenia economically unstable and fragile. The ongoing conflict with the neighboring Azerbaijan, and the blockade of the border between two states, as well as with Turkey made Armenia even more vulnerable.

The de-facto war with Azerbaijan became one of the greatest obstacles for the successful transformation of the security sector in Armenia. Even though the ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, the unresolvedness of the conflict has its impact on the security sector as well as national security policy of Armenia till nowadays.

Due to the ongoing conflict Armenia did not managed to implement successful transformation of the communist elements in the security sector in the beginning of 1990s. Besides, number of former militia employees, along with KGB and military officers are recently employed by various defense and security institutions. The conditions of de-facto war caused the rapidness of security-related bodies’ creation and/or transformation. The result was the adaption of former communist structure and in certain ways attitude that influence the sector till nowadays. The similarity of Armenian security bodies and their attitudes to the communist ones resulted in mistrust towards the political system and security sector by civilians.

It has been frequently mentioned above that the success of Security Sector Reform is dependent on the level of democratic governance and civilian oversight within the state. Thus, another
challenge for Armenia is the lack of practical initiatives aiming to increase the level of
democratic governance and human rights promotion, which questions the level of transparency,
accountability and responsiveness of the Armenian government. The low level of democratic
governance and civilian oversight are great obstacles for the further positive modifications in the
security sector in Armenia. Even though after 2008, there have been positive changes in the
security sector and the government in particular resulting from the advancing of civil society,
which managed to develop certain mechanisms to increase the oversight, there is still much to be
done.

In addition to that, the close relationship of Armenia with the former communist Russia,
contribute to the slow process of democratization. The propaganda by the Russian financed
NGOs along with the state’s rhetoric is challenging the openness of the state and civilians to
adopt the democratic values. Besides, the Armenian foreign and security policy, including the
intention to join the Eurasian Customs Union as well as close cooperation with Russia and CSTO
in the sphere of defense have their impact not only on the process of democratization, but on the
overall process of security sector reformation.

The position of Russia in the region has great influence on security sector of all South Caucasian
state, and Armenia in particular. Not only it challenges the process of democratization and good
governance promotion, but on certain level it contributes to the increase of tensions between
Armenia and Azerbaijan, and as a result the continuation of the “frozen” conflict, which as it has
been mentioned above is a great obstacle for the success of SSR in Armenia. It is believed that
Russia being a co-chair country of OSCE Minsk Group on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
settlement is also the main supplier of arms to Azerbaijan. In addition to that Russia militarizes
the region by arming itself on the military base that it has in Armenia, thus combining peacekeeping and militarization.\textsuperscript{219}

It is important to mention that the elements of Armenian security sector are interlinked and thus the successful transformation of one of them has a positive impact on the others, as well as vice-versa. The analysis showed that the dynamics of the transformation of security sector in Armenia differs by sub-sector. Thus, if in the sphere of military and defense the government along with the international assistants has had great progress due to the big amount of implemented initiatives, the issue of demining and the resulting from it issue of development has not been dealt as properly for instance. The overall level of human security, both physical and economic, is relatively low, having four provinces affected by landmines and 1/3 of population suffering from poverty, which possess a great challenge for the sustainable development and smooth process of security sector reformation as such.

It can be assumed that Armenian government and the international community lack the coordinated and complex approach to the security sector reformation that would affect not only one particular sub-sector but would have an impact on the general security sector transformation. Besides, the majority of assistance programs are implemented between international community and the government, while other state actors, including media and civil society, are usually overlooked.

Importantly, reformation of the security sector and the assistance by donor community and international organizations helped Armenian macro-economy to recover. Since 1995 and up to 2008 Armenia experienced fast economic growth thank to the number of reforms. However, the strong position of political elite and their control of micro-economic market make the sustainable development challenging and create obstacles for the population to fight the unemployment and poverty on the ground. In addition to that the overall issue of corruption, that is existent on

\textsuperscript{219} Shahnazarian, David. “Russia: the Major Destabilizing Factor and a Major Threat in the Region” (2014). Available at: \url{http://ru.1in.am/1053822.html}
diverse levels, contributes to the negative attitude of the population towards the government and political system and as a result creates obstacles for the success of the reforms and changes. Besides, the cultural specificity of Armenian population which perceives bribery as an ordinary phenomenon makes attempts of the international organizations, such as OSCE for instance, to reform the security sector less efficient.

In summary, it can be assumed that the successful transformation and reform of the security sector elements is highly dependent on the complex approach to the issue. The obstacles, for the SSR in Armenia are mainly linked to the “frozen” conflict with Azerbaijan as well as strong Soviet heritage. However, those two issues caused diverse sub-obstacles that make the process of SSR in Armenia even more challenging. The transformation of Armenian security sector had its ups and downs and cannot be considered as a stable or static process. The period between 1995 and 2008 can be considered to be the process of sustainable development and changes, while the period before 1994 was the most challenging and unstable for Armenia. Since 2008 Armenia is going through the number of reforms and transformations that have positively impact the overall process of SSR. However, certain sub-sectors are still overlooked from the reformation agenda. The perception of the security sector as a complex phenomenon and the intention to deal with the obstacles in all sub-sectors will have a great impact for the further success of the Security Sector Reform in Armenia.
Conclusion

Based on the reports and official documents of the international donor community and organizations as well as Armenian Government, this paper aimed to provide the overview of the process of Security Sector Reform on the case of Armenia. The analysis was based on the theoretical frameworks of the concept of SSR utilized in such organizations as OECD, DFID, World Bank, IMF, and UN. Three main contexts along with their elements were investigated in the first part of the paper which set the analytical basis for the empirical research.

The concept of SSR is adapted to each and every case where it is implemented in order to meet the specific challenges of the context. The processes of development as well as post-authoritarian and post-conflict transition are all relevant to the case of Armenia. Moreover, all those transformations took place simultaneously in the state, having specific security sector elements affected by it. Thus, it was important to differentiate the particular features of SSR that are relevant to the case of Armenia.

The paper investigates the sphere of military and defense, police and PSCs, intelligence and border management, as well as refers to issues of poverty reduction, democratic governance and rule of law, demining and elimination of SALW. These elements of security sector are of a great importance in case of Armenia. Even though the number of other SSR features is relevant to the case, such as the issue of trafficking for instance, the paper does not aim to focus on all of them and rather investigates the particular issues that are believed to be of greater importance regarding reformation of security sector. Besides, in order to have a deeper understanding of the reforms and processes ongoing in military and defense, police as well as issues of governance and rule of law, it has been decided to interview the experts in the sphere.

The operationalization of the concept on the Armenian case indicated unstableness of the dynamics of SSR in Armenia. While in the beginning of 1994, the state experienced rapid and on certain level inefficient creation and/or transformation of the security sector elements
characterized by the lack of assistance and fiscal deficit, later on it made number of more measured attempts to implement reforms under the international guidance.

Armenia cooperates with the guarantors of international peace and security, including NATO and EU; and not only tries to fight the level of insecurity within the state, but also contributes to the international peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

However, number of obstacles slow down the process of transformation of the security sector in the state. Among the greatest obstacles the unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan and the strong Soviet heritage should be mentioned. The “frozen” conflict influences the process of decision-making of the Armenian security-related bodies and the government and challenges the further transformation. Thus, for instance, the issue of demining cannot be completely resolved due to the fear of possible conflict reoccurrence, which also affects the further process of sustainable peace and development. Regarding the Soviet heritage, one might point out that due to the high level presence of Russia in the region and in Armenia in particular, the communist values and attitudes do not fade, but rather strengthen on certain level.

Armenia, except for the external obstacles, has also various internal challenges for the successful transition. The lack of transparency, accountability and responsiveness of the government combined with the high level of corruption decrease the level of trust among civilians. The low level of democratic governance and de-facto violation of human rights are yet another challenging circumstance for Armenia.

Despite, the obstacles, however, the positive changes have taken place during the last twenty years in Armenia. The society has developed the civil consciousness and started to be more demanding. As a result, the government has started to change its attitude, which caused the creation of various oversight mechanisms in the security sector, such as the creation of Public Council by MOD or the rapid response to the 2013 peaceful demonstrations. Another example is the creation of new battalions by the Police to change the perception of “policemen” in Armenia.
In conclusion, even though after 2008 the sustainable economic growth along with the transformation of the security sector slowed down one should point out that the number of positive changes took place in Armenia despite the obstacles. However, the findings show that there is still much to be done. Thus, the international community along with the Armenian government has to develop a complex perception of the SSR in the state which will guarantee the inclusion and transformation of all security sector elements.
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**Interviews**

1. Personal Interview with Tigran Harutyunyan, The International Relations Expert, The Ministry of

2. Personal Interview with Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow at The Centre for Independent Social Research in St. Petersburg, Paris, France, 2014

3. Personal Interview with Narek Samsonyan, The Chairman at Civil Consciousness NGO, Yerevan, Armenia, 2014
Security Sector Reform in Armenia

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FROM: Tatevik Avakyan, International Security Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague

DATE: December 22, 2013

SUBJECT: Diploma thesis project
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1. Introduction

The South Caucasian region gained huge geo-political importance during the last decades. Many world powers, particularly NATO, EU, Russia, US, Turkey and Iran are competing for the influence in the region. While Georgia and Azerbaijan are enjoying quite close cooperation with the Western world, especially in the military and security spheres, Armenia remains the closest ally of Russia and has quite good relationship with Iran. The specificity of the region causes the interdependence of the events in those three states especially when it comes to the security sector. In the beginning of 90’s, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia gained independence, they basically had to build the nation states from scratch, accompanied by the unsustainability in social-economic and political terms. Some contemporary scholars also claim that a country which has only recently become a sovereign state will be likely to have underdeveloped civil society, judicial, legislative and civil management institutions, with the possible exception of an over-strong executive, as well as statutory security forces that are under-regulated or weak in comparison with both criminal groups and private security operations (David Law, 2004). The situation in the region was even tenser, because of the involvement of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.

Those two events had crucial consequences for Armenia as a “newborn” state in many spheres and were the cause of assuring unsustainability in the security sector in particular. The Security Sector Reform became an important feature for the state to assure its further development. We will try to identify the challenges that Armenia had in completion of the reforms in security sector and the dynamics of it. We will also try to point out whether there were or are some barriers for it and if there is a chance for success.
2. The Objectives

The thesis aims to affect three main targets:

a. International organizations
b. Armenian government
c. Civil society in the country

The goal is to pay attention of the international community on the importance of its contribution to the fulfillment of Security Sector reform in Armenia, however considering the specific nature of the state and the region; to call on the Armenian government to the constructive changes in the security sector and establish the clear national security concept; to draw attention of the civil society to the security sector issues and increase the interest.

3. Subject Significance and Motivation

Security sector reform is an important feature for Armenia to continue the state development and provide the further cooperation with the Western world. Besides, it has a significant importance for the region. First of all the changes in security sector in Armenia will definitely influence two other South Caucasian countries – Georgia and Azerbaijan. It can positively influence the process of stabilization of the situation in the South Caucasus. The choice of topic is due to the high interest in the security issues in the South Caucasian region and the will for the further realization of the potential in Armenia. Besides, there are not many academic writings dedicated to the SSR in Armenia, so the topic is quite new.
4. Theory

The core theory that the research is based on is the Security Sector Reform concept, which emerged in the beginning of 1990’s. It is a relatively ambiguous concept, which refers to a plethora of issues and activities related to the reform of the elements of the public sector charged with the provision of external and internal security. There is no internationally agreed definition of SS, but the general principles of SSR are widely accepted. These may be grouped into four broad categories:

- Strengthening democratic control over security institutions, by the state and civil society (including improving policy development and implementation and expenditure management)
- Professionalization of the security forces
- Demilitarization and peace-building
- Strengthening the rule of law (Heiner Hänggi, 2004).

The research aims to implement the SSR concept on the example of Armenia, where the main subjects for reformation are the following: armed and police forces; oversight and executive bodies; legislative bodies; jurisdictional bodies.

5. Research questions

There are two main research questions that the diploma thesis aims to answer:

- What is the dynamic of Security Sector Reform in Armenia?
- What are the greatest obstacles that the state has to face?
6. Methodology

The diploma thesis is meant to be a qualitative research with the use of interpretive techniques and analysis.

Variables:

- The independent variables – dynamics of internal institutional change; dynamics of changes in the legal framework; dynamics of political change; dynamics of changes in civil society.
- The dependent variables – Security Sector Reform.

In regard of the dynamic of changes in Armenia we should mention that we will mainly focus on very little changes in Armed Forces and Ministry of Defence perception in the “after war” period; changes of status of the Ministry of Interior and eventually the replacement of it and establishment of the Police of Republic of Armenia; the unclear status of National Security Council; the establishment of new Constitution in 1995 and the following restructuring of the Parliament into National Assembly; changes in the sector of justice; the activation of the non-formal security actors, such as civil society; the emerging role of NGOs and media; etc. The dynamics of above mentioned changes caused the need in the Security Sector Reform implementation in Armenia.

The diploma thesis will be divided into two main parts.

The first part will contain the theoretical framework of the Security Sector Reform concept, while the second part will be dedicated to the implementation and concept testing of the SSR on the example of Armenia.
• The first part of the diploma thesis is going to be more interpretive and descriptive. It will be mainly based on the Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi’s “Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector” (2004), Heiner Hänggi and Theodor Winkler’s “Challenges of Security Sector Governance” (2003), and Herbert Wulf’s “Security Sector Reform in Developing and Transitional Countries” (2004), which will help to assure the theoretical framework. Besides, for the accurate theoretical picture, the research will also contain the analysis of UN Secretary-General Reports on the Security Sector Reform, such as “Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform” (2008).

• The second part of the diploma thesis will be based on the Gagik Avagyan and Duncan Hiscock “Security sector reform in Armenia” (2005) report. Besides, it will contain certain interviews with the experts in the South Caucasian region and its security sector. The interviewers will be Richard Giragossian – the founding director of Regional Studies Center (RSC) based in Yerevan, Armenia and Gayane Novikova – the founding director of SPECTRUM Center for Strategic Analysis based in Yerevan, Armenia.
7. Appendix I: Bibliography


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