Abstract:
The aim of this B. A. thesis is to clarify the status of individual rights within Bentham’s philosophy. The exposition is divided into two main parts. Bentham’s critique of natural rights is discussed in the first part. Especially, his critique of declarations of natural rights issued during the French revolution is carefully analysed and assessed. Bentham uncompromisingly rejected these declaration on the ground that they were false and dangerous. Subsequently is shown to what extent there can be justification of the primacy of individual rights in relation to interference of political authority in the whole context of Bentham’s philosophical system, which is based on the principle of utility. The key concept here is that of expectation and secondary security-providing principle is particularly important. There are two contending conceptions. On the one hand we see liberal conception of individual pursuing her own happiness, on the other hand there is rationalistic idea of legislator who manipulate the whole society according to the dictate of utility. The gap could be filled if we did not understand the principle of utility as moral arithmetic capable of solving every problem. We can conclude that basic logic of Bentham’s utilitarianism is limited by significant truths about human condition and pragmatic constraints. The respect for individual (in relative terms) is by no means denied.