

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Master's Thesis

2014

Alžběta Smith Kiganda

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Studies

Alžběta Smith Kiganda

**“ASEAN: Regional Security Complex or
Case of Successful Integration?”**

Master's thesis

Prague 2014

Author: Bc. Alžběta Smith Kiganda

Supervisor: PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

Academic Year: 2013/2014

Bibliographic note

SMITH KIGANDA, Alžběta. “*ASEAN: Regional Security Complex or Case of Successful Integration?*” 97 p. Master’s thesis. Charles University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institut of Political Studies. Supervisor PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D.

Abstract

The thesis analyzes the development of the security discourse in Southeast Asia namely on the ground of the ASEAN organization and in its member states. The thesis main aim is to find out whether the region of the ASEAN can be considered as the Regional Security Complex. The theoretical basis of the thesis is drawn from the theoretical concept of the Copenhagen school, specifically on researchers such as, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, who formulated the theory. The theory applicability is studied through the securitization processes elaborated on the sectoral analysis. On the military, political, economic, environmental and societal sector the thesis strives to analyze the essential securitization and desecuritization processes, attempts to name the main securitization actors, referential objects and confront them with the theory. Based on the elaboration on the current issues connected with the securitization logic the thesis describes the security dynamic in the region. At the end of analysis, the thesis evaluates the current regional setting of the ASEAN as the Regional Security Complex and gives the recommendations for its next developments.

Key words

Regional Complex Theory, ASEAN, Southeast Asia, Security, Securitization, China, Integration

Range of thesis: 35 627 words, 226 887 signs.

Abstrakt

Práce analyzuje vývoj bezpečnostního diskurzu v jihovýchodní Asii, konkrétně na půdě organizace ASEAN a v jejích členských státech. Hlavním cílem práce je zjistit, zda region ASEANu lze považovat za regionální bezpečnostní komplex. Jako teoretické východisko práce čerpá z teoretického konceptu Kodaňské školy, konkrétně výzkumníků Barryho Buzana, Oleho Wæwera a Jaapa de Wildeho, kteří teorii formulovali. Aplikabilita teorie je studována prostřednictvím sekuritizačních procesů rozpracovaných na sektorové analýze. Na vojenském, politickém, ekonomickém, environmentální a společenském sektoru práce usiluje o analýzu základní sekuritizačních a desecuritization procesů, pojmenovává hlavní sekuritizační aktéry, referenční objekty a konfrontuje je s teorií. Na základě prozkoumání aktuálních otázek spojených se sekuritizační logikou práce popisuje bezpečnostní dynamiku v regionu. Na závěr analýzy práce hodnotí aktuální formu regionálního uspořádání ASEANu jako regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu a dává doporučení pro jeho další vývoj.

Klíčová slova

Teorie regionálních bezpečnostních komplexů, ASEAN, jihovýchodní Asie, bezpečnost, sekuritizace, Čína, integrace

Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that she compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 16. 5. 2014

Bc. Alžběta Smith Kiganda

.....

Acknowledgments

First, I would like to dedicate my gratitude to PhDr. Vít Střítecký, M.Phil., Ph.D., who agreed to supervise this thesis, whose patience, intellectual feedback and kindness motivated me to finish this work in meaningful ways.

I would also like to thank PhDr. Michaela Budiman, Ph.D., for her devoted assistance while searching for the relevant stimulus and information. Her insight contributed to findings of the thesis.

Next, I would like to extend my deepest thanks to my friends and colleagues from Academia for their support and valuable advises and to Mr. Tonny Smith Kiganda, for his loving assistance in all the matters of life.

Last not least, I would like to thank to Mrs. Jiřina Popovová who always helped to fill me with enthusiasm for finishing my Master's studies.

Institute of Political Sciences
Master thesis proposal „ASEAN: Regionální bezpečnostní komplex nebo případ úspěšné integrace?“

Univerzita Karlova

Teze projektu Diplomové práce

Bezpečnostní Studia

LS 2013

Bc. Alžběta Smith Kiganda

Školitel: PhDr. Vít Strátecký, M.Phil., Ph.D

„ASEAN: Regionální bezpečnostní komplex nebo případ úspěšné integrace?“

Úvod

Státy Jihovýchodní Asie a sdružení ASEAN jsou významným strategickým regionem, který v českém bezpečnostním diskurzu zatím nezískal tak významnou pozornost, jakou by si zasloužil.

ASEAN vznikl na konci 60. let minulého století jako bezpečnostně-politická organizace, která si za svůj prvotní cíl kladla zabránit rozšíření komunismu do Jihovýchodní Asie. Region Jihovýchodní Asie má obrovský geopolitický význam, neboť se počínaje studenou válkou stal dějištěm střetů světových mocností, které zde prostřednictvím sekundárních konfliktů studené války bojovaly o moc, a od té doby jeho význam rozhodně nepoklesl. Dnes jeho důležitost můžeme primárně vnímat skrze strategické námořní trasy, zejména Malackou úžinu, která je jedním z největších transportních uzlů na světě. Přepravuje se zde jedna pětina celkového objemu ropy a jedna čtvrtina světového zboží, které proudí mezi Indickým a Tichým oceánem.

Jelikož je tento prostor úžin sužován piráctvím a častými teroristickými útoky, je udržení jeho bezpečnosti esenciálně důležité pro stabilitu globální ekonomiky. Strategičnost jeho a celého regionu můžeme také vnímat skrze pozici nárazníkových států mezi pomyslným ideologickým západním a východním mocenským pólem, kterou státy ASEANu bezpochyby zaujímají. Potenciál organizace ASEAN můžeme právě chápat skrze její vztahy se světovými mocnostmi. Nejen proto udržení bezpečnosti v regionu a v přeneseném významu i na asijském kontinentu leží z velké části na státech sdružení ASEAN a i na organizaci jako takové.

Prvním impulzem vzniku ASEANu byla ochrana členských států před sovětskou expanzí, v průběhu času se tato pozornost přesouvala k možným japonským a čínským teritoriálním a hegemonistickým tendencím a k předcházení a zabraňování konfliktů mezi samotnými členskými státy. I přesto, že dnes můžeme sledovat např. ve vztahu k Severní Koreji důležitý bezpečnostní rozměr, objevuje se rozvinutý ekonomický a integrační rozměr spolupráce států ASEANu, a to primárně na základě společné zóny volného obchodu (AFTA) a přesunu pozornosti k tzv. novým hrozbám¹. Těmi jsou ekologické hrozby, mezinárodní organizovaný zločin, šíření ZHN, terorismus atd.

¹ Tzv. Nové bezpečnostní hrozby na rozšířeném konceptu bezpečnosti představuje Kodaňská škola teoretiků mezinárodních vztahů (viz. COPRI).

Po skončení studené války se dynamika vnímání bezpečnosti zásadním způsobem změnila. Vznikly nové systémové přístupy ke zkoumání bezpečnosti, díky kterým dnes můžeme vykládat bezpečnostní pojetí a realitu mezinárodních vztahů.

Ve své diplomové práci se budu zabývat zkoumáním bezpečnosti na sektorové úrovni a na podkladě teorie regionálních bezpečnostních komplexů určím, zdali se zkoumaný region dá zařadit pod pojem regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu anebo regionální integrace již dnes dospěla do takové míry, že odstranila anarchickou povahu regionálního interstátního prostředí a ze států regionu se v mezinárodních vztazích stal unifikovaný hráč.

Nabízí se tedy dva pohledy, jak můžeme spatřovat sdružení států ASEAN: 1. jako regionální bezpečnostní komplex s neoddělitelně provázanými sekuritizačními a desekuritizačními procesy a za 2. ASEAN jako velkou regionální mezinárodní organizaci typu EU v určité fázi prohlubující se integrace.

Právě výzkum v rámci diplomové práce by měl ukázat, kterým směrem region směřuje. Práce tento ne často zkoumaný a vzdálený prostor pro české politické prostředí přiblíží a dovolí hlouběji nahlédnout do jeho vývoje za posledních padesát let. Výzkum též zodpoví otázku, jakou roli hraje sdružení v udržování bezpečnosti v regionu a jaké procesy dominují v bezpečnostní oblasti.

Tyto aspekty jsou analyzovány na podkladě teorie bezpečnostních regionálních komplexů (RIGO) představenou Kodaňskou školou a výzkumníky Barry Buzana, Jaapa De Vildeho a Oleho Wæwera, kteří se při vývoji teorie RIGO sami inspirovali regionem Jihovýchodní Asie.² Teorie RIGO byla jimi samotnými několikrát modifikována až do podoby, kdy se opírá o tvrzení říkající, že rozhodnou roli pro určení existence a dynamiky RIGO hraje právě vzájemná provázanost sekuritizačního procesu. Definice RIGO je dle nich následující: „*Skupina jednotek (států, pozn. autorky), jejichž nejvýznamnější sekuritizační a desekuritizační akty (případně oboje) jsou natolik provázané, že bezpečnostní problémy každé z nich nelze přiměřeným způsobem analyzovat či řešit odděleně*“³.

Výzkumná otázka, cíl práce

Výzkumná otázka práce je tedy následující: Je teorie regionálních bezpečnostních komplexů aplikovatelná na případ států sdružení ASEAN, potažmo

² Teoretici Kodaňské školy a přístupu RIGO vedli odbornou debatu od 80. Let 20. Století ve spojitosti s bezpečností v Asii a to zejména Jihovýchodní Asii v mezinárodním časopise Survival.

³ BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. (2005) *Bezpečnost. Nový rámeček pro analýzu*. Centrum strategických studií, Brno, s. 230.

regionu Jihovýchodní Asie, nebo integrace v regionu už dospěla do takové míry, že se z regionu stal v bezpečnostních vztazích unifikovaný hráč? Cílem práce bude najít odpověď na tuto otázku.

Aby práce mohla zodpovědět výzkumnou otázku, bude zkoumat následující faktory: vztahy přátelství a nepřátelství států v regionu, jejich vztahy s ostatními světovými mocnostmi, udržení statusu quo v regionu, aplikovatelnost kodaňských kritérií v přístupu zkoumání RIGO (viz. dále), význam organizace ASEAN ve vztahu k sekuritizačnímu procesu v regionu a provázanost členských států a ASEANu v domácí a zahraniční politice. Provázanost států a organizace bude práce zkoumat na podkladu faktorů jako zvýšeného transakcionalismu, vzniku pluralistické společnosti („political community“), přenosu politických loajalit a společenských zájmů z národních států na nově vzniklé instituce, jejichž vedlejším efektem je vznik technokratické automaticnosti.

Závěrem práce shrne zkoumanou realitu, vytyčí řadu doporučení, které by regionu mohly být prospěšné v prohloubení jak už integračního procesu, nebo v udržování bezpečnosti v rámci RIGO.

Pracovní hypotéza

Jako pracovní hypotézu H1 využiji předpoklad, že sdružení států ASEAN můžeme zkoumat jako regionální bezpečnostní komplex, jelikož provázanost bezpečnostní politik a realit jeho členů a s tím spojený sekuritizační proces, jsou samostatně neoddělitelnými jevy.

První subhypotéza H2 předpokládá, že integrace ještě nedospěla do takové fáze, aby sjednotila zahraniční a bezpečnostní politiky států sdružení. Důvodem pro to jsou rozlišné ekonomické zájmy členů, které jsou nadřazeny politickým cílům organizace, za kterými stojí nedostatek politické moci v jejich prosazení.

Metodologie a literatura

Diplomová práce zkoumá, zdali teorie RIGO může být uplatněna i pro studium dnešního regionu Jihovýchodní Asie, jež je moderním a rychle se strategicky rozvíjejícím.

Metodou práce byla zvolena interpretativní jednopřípadová studie. Ta stojí na pomezí unikátní jednopřípadové studie, která se snaží zejména prozkoumat unikátní případ a nepřikládá větší důležitost teoretickému ukotvení než empirickému případu,

s instrumentální jednopřípadovou studií, ve které konkrétní případ slouží jen pro prokázání platnosti teorie.⁴

Po úvodním vymezení zkoumaného předmětu a představení teoretického konceptu práce data získaná při výzkumu vyhodnotí deduktivním postupem – tzn., že na podkladě výzkumu konkrétního případu bude zhodnocena aplikovatelnost a slučitelnost s teorií.

Primární literatura mi poslouží především k čerpání teoretického základu teorie regionálních bezpečnostních komplexů. Teoretické ukotvení regionálních bezpečnostních komplexů budu čerpat z děl Barryho Buzana, Ole Wævera a Jaapa de Wildeho, jež tuto teorii formulovali⁵. V rámci analýzy bezpečnosti se budu věnovat i tzv. novým hrozbám, s jejichž definicí přišli představitelé Kodaňské školy (COPRI) a kteří rozšířili pojetí konceptu bezpečnosti z tradiční hard security témat vertikálním i horizontálním směrem⁶. Obecně k těmto teoriím nebylo v českém akademickém prostředí mnoho napsáno, a proto musím vycházet z cizojazyčné literatury, zejména z anglicky psané literatury a anglických překladů textů pocházejících ze Severní Evropy.

Primárním zdrojem pro empirický případ mi budou několikajazyčné oficiální dokumenty vydané sdružením ASEAN, jeho orgány a vládami členských států. Ty práci přiblíží bezpečnostní realitu v regionu a přinesou podrobnější vhled do problematiky sekurizačních a desekurizačních procesů a témat.

V rámci sekundární literatury ke studiu jednotlivých sekuritizačních procesů využiji i novinové články z cizojazyčných médií a odborných časopisů. Kritický vhled mi pomohou získat i akademické články a studie, zejména práce výzkumníků z akademických ústavů světových univerzit, zabývající se regionem Jihovýchodní Asie a studiem mezinárodní bezpečnosti. Dále budu využívat statistiky, tiskové zprávy, reporty z jednotlivých konferencí a oficiální zprávy vydávané organizací ASEAN a jejími členskými státy.

Operacionalizace

⁴ KOŠATKOVÁ, Iva. Arktida jako regionální bezpečnostní komplex (Aplikace teorie regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu na geopolitický region Arktida v rámci širší diskuse regionalistických přístupů ke studiu mezinárodní bezpečnosti). Praha, 2013. 137 s. Rigorózní práce na Fakultě sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy - Katedře mezinárodních vztahů Institutu politologických studií. Vedoucí rigorózní práce Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M.A., Ph.D.

⁵ BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost. Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Centrum strategických studií, Brno, 2005.

⁶ BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost. Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Centrum strategických studií, Brno, 2005.

Zkoumaným případem jsou státy a Jihovýchodní Asie jako členové sdružení ASEAN, které stojí na geografických a politických principech. Organizace stojí na principech, jak je uvedeno v její chartě 15 základními body, jež mohou být shrnuty do kategorií jako udržování míru a pokojné řešení konfliktů v regionu i v globálním systému, podněcování ekonomické spolupráce, odstraňování bariér společného obchodu a pohybu, zvyšování blahobytu a zmenšování sociálních rozdílů mezi jednotlivci a členskými populacemi, šíření spolupráce také v oblasti politické, kulturní, sociální, lidsko-právní otázkách a spolupráce v boji proti hrozbám všeho druhu⁷.

Proměnnými jsou poté vztahy přátelství a nepřátelství členských států, jež zasahují do všech oblastí, které definuje charta ASEAN. Důraz při výzkumu je kladen zejména na bezpečnostní rozměr vzájemných interakcí a sekuritizační proces, jež je jedním z hlavních ukazatelů teorie RIGO, na níž je výzkum postaven.

*„Základní strukturu regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu tvoří čtyři proměnné: vnější hranice regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu, anarchická struktura komplexu, polarita neboli distribuce moci uvnitř komplexu a vztahy přátelství a nepřátelství mezi jednotkami v komplexu. Pro naplnění definice regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu je klíčové, aby region splňující všechny čtyři znaky základní struktury vykazoval úzkou provázanost nejvýznamnějších sekuritizačních a desekuritizačních aktů. Je proto nutné nejprve identifikovat úspěšné sekuritizační, případně desekuritizační procesy v rámci regionu a následně zjistit všechny reakce ostatních jednotek na tento akt. Vzájemně propojená síť reakcí na všechny úspěšné případy sekuritizace, případně desekuritizace, potom představuje konstitutivní jádro regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu“.*⁸

Použitá literatura:

Primární zdroje:

ACHARYA, Amitav. *Constructing a security community in southeast Asia: ASEAN and the problem of regional order*. Oxon: Amitav Acharya, 2001. ISBN 0-203-93923-9.

⁷ ASEAN. *Charter of the association of Southeast Asia nations*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2008. ISBN 978-979-3496-62-7. Dostupné z: <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>

⁸ KOŠATKOVÁ, Iva. *Arktida jako regionální bezpečnostní komplex (Aplikace teorie regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu na geopolitický region Arktida v rámci širší diskuse regionalistických přístupů ke studiu mezinárodní bezpečnosti)*. Praha, 2013. 137 s. Rigorózní práce na Fakultě sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy - Katedře mezinárodních vztahů Institutu politologických studií. Vedoucí rigorózní práce Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M.A., Ph.D. S. 2.

ASEAN. *Charter of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2008. ISBN 978-979-3496-62-7. Dostupné z: <http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN-Charter.pdf>

BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost. Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Centrum strategických studií, 2005, Brno.

BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole. *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge University Press, 2003, Cambridge.

BUZAN, Barry. *People, States & Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Pearson Education Limited, 1991, Harlow.

BUZAN, Barry, HANSEN, Lene. *The Evolution of International Security Studies*. Cambridge University Press, 2009, Cambridge.

NARINE, Shaun. *Explaining ASEAN: regionalism in Southeast Asia*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, 239 s. ISBN 15-882-6129-8.

SEVERINO, Rodolfo. *ASEAN*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008, 111 s. ISBN 978-981-2307-507.

THAN, Mya a Carolyn GATES. *ASEAN enlargement: impacts and implications*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, 378 s. ISBN 981-230-081-3.

The ASEAN community: unblocking the roadblocks. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008, 100 s. ISBN 978-981-2308-443.

Sekundární zdroje:

ASEAN integration: A long way to go. *ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.aipasecretariat.org/asean-integration-a-long-way-to-go/>

DI CERTO, Bridget. Cambodia; ASEAN's economic unity key: minister. *ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly* [online]. 2011 [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.aipasecretariat.org/cambodia-asean%E2%80%99s-economic-unity-key-minister/>

East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way. *Oxford Journal* [online]. 2010(1) [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/57>

EMMERS, Ralf a See Seng TAN. The ASEAN Regional Forum and Preventive Diplomacy: Built to Fail?. *Asian Security* [online]. 2011, **vol. 7** (iss. 1) [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F14799855.2011.548211>

HIRO KATSUMATA. Mimetic adoption and norm diffusion: 'Western' security cooperation in Southeast Asia?. *Review of International Studies*, [online]. 2011, vol. 37 (iss. 2) [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512740903329731>

JETSCHKEA, Anja a Jürgen RÜLANDA. Decoupling rhetoric and practice: the cultural limits of ASEAN cooperation. *Asian Security*[online]. 2009, **vol. 22** (iss. 2) [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080%2F14799855.2011.548211>

JOMO, K.S. Growth with Equity in East Asia?. *DESA Working Paper* [online]. 2006(33) [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp33_2006.pdf

KAWAI, Masahiro a Ganeshan WIGNARAJA. Asian FTAs: Trends and Challenges. *ADBI Working Paper Series* [online]. 2009(144) [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.adbi.org/files/2009.08.04.wp144.asian.fta.trends.challenges.pdf>

KOŠATKOVÁ, Iva. *Arktida jako regionální bezpečnostní komplex (Aplikace teorie regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu na geopolitický region Arktida v rámci širší diskuse regionalistických přístupů ke studiu mezinárodní bezpečnosti)*. Praha, 2013. 137 s. Rigorózní práce na Fakultě sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy - Katedře mezinárodních vztahů Institutu politologických studií. Vedoucí rigorózní práce Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M.A., Ph.D.

NARINE, Shaun. Institutional Theory and Southeast Asia: The Case of ASEAN. *World Affairs*. 1998, č. 1.

PIMOLJINDA, Thanawat. *Theoretical Discussion on Regional Integration: EU-ASEAN Perspective*. 2010 [cit. 2012-02-13]. Dostupné z: http://buu.academia.edu/ThanawatPimoljinda/Papers/361690/Theoretical_Discussion_on_Regional_Integration_EU-ASEAN_Perspective

Remarks by the president of the republic of Indonesia on the occasion of the 36th anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN). ASEAN. *Association of Southeast Asia nations*[online]. 2003 [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.aseansec.org/15017.htm>

TØNNESSON, Stein. What is it that best explains the East Asian peace since 1979? A call for a research agenda. *Asian Perspective* [online]. 2009, vol. 33, (No. 1), [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n1-d.pdf>

Vietnam in 2010: Regional leadership. *Asian Survey*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011, vol. 51 (no. 1), [cit. 2012-01-16]. Dostupné z: <http://www.jstor.org/pss/10.1525/as.2011.51.1.196>

Podpis diplomanta

Podpis školitele

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION.....	19
2. METHODOLOGY OF THE RSC THEORY.....	32
2.1 THE NEW PICTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER	34
2.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONS AND TERRITORIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY	35
2.3 THE CENTRALITY OF SECURITIZATION PROCESS AND ITS COMPONENTS.....	36
2.4 THE SECURITY COMPLEXES AND THEIR STRUCTURES	38
2.5 THE RSC SECTORAL ANALYSIS	38
2.6 THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RSC.....	49
2.7 THE FINAL ANALYSIS SYNTHESIS.....	51
2.8 THE REGION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AS THE RESEARCH TOPIC OF THE RSC THEORY	52
3. THE SECURITIZATION PROCESS WITHIN THE ASEAN.....	53
3.1 THE ASEAN ESTABLISHMENT AND THE RSC THEORY	54
3.1.1 <i>The ASEAN Diplomacy</i>	56
3.2 THE REGIONAL NATIONAL STATES' SECURITIZATION	57
3.2.1 <i>The national states' securitization of the South China Sea Dispute</i>	59
3.2.2 <i>The Vietnam's invasion to Cambodia</i>	60
3.3 THE ASEAN EXCLUSIVE MEMBER INSTITUTIONS' SECURITIZATION.....	61
3.4 THE ASEAN INCLUSIVE MEMBERS INSTITUTIONS' SECURITIZATION.....	62
3.4.1 <i>The engagement of China and Japan into the ASEAN institutions</i>	63
3.4.2 <i>The ASEAN's cooperation with external partners on bilateral level</i>	66
3.4.3 <i>Concerns over the rise of China</i>	69
3.4.4 <i>Defense Securitization</i>	70
3.4.5 <i>The enlargement in the membership of the ASEAN institutions</i>	71
3.4.6 <i>The US involvement into the securitization process</i>	71
4. THE SECTORAL ANALYSIS	73
4.1 MILITARY SECTOR.....	73
4.1.1 <i>The disputes in South China Sea</i>	74
4.1.2 <i>The ASEAN defense planning</i>	76
4.1.3 <i>Terrorism</i>	78
4.1.4 <i>The Sulu crisis</i>	79
4.2 ECONOMICAL SECTOR	84
4.2.1 <i>The trade with essential economic partners</i>	88
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL SECTOR.....	89
4.3.1 <i>Typhoon Haiyan and institutional tools coping with its consequences</i>	90
4.4 SOCIETAL SECTOR	96
4.5 POLITICAL SECTOR	99
4.5.1 <i>ASEAN Community 2015:</i>	102
5. THE ANALYSIS SYNTHESIS.....	104
6. CONCLUSION.....	111
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY	115

List of abbreviations

ADMM - ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting
ADMM+ - ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting Plus
ADSOM Plus - ASEAN Defense Senior Officials' Meeting Plus
AEC - The ASEAN Economic Community
AHA Centre - ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management
APEC - 21-member Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation
APSC - ASEAN Political-Security Community
APT - ASEAN Plus Three – China, Japan, and South Korea
ARDEX-13 - ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise
ARF - ASEAN Regional Forum
ASCC - ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian States
ASO - Annual Security Outlook
CAEXPO – China – ASEAN Exposition
CAFTA - China-ASEAN Free Trade Association
COC – Code of Conduct
COPRI – Copenhagen Peace Reserch Institute
EAS - the 18-member East Asian Summit
EU – European Union
HADR- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front
PRC - People's Republic of China
RCEP - Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
RSC - Regional Security Complex
RSCT - Regional Security Complex Theory
S&ED America's Strategic and Economic Dialogue
TAC - Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
TPP - Trans-Pacific Partnership

1. Introduction

The Southeast Asia is an important strategic region, which in Czech Security Studies discourse have not yet gained the significant attention that it deserves. The region and the ASEAN were chosen as topic of the thesis to contribute into discourses of the regionalist approaches on studying the regional security, regional transformation and the so called “New regionalism”⁹. The thesis’s another aim is to present the ASEAN’s regional dynamism to the Czech auditorium which could find certain similarities of the developments in Southeast Asia with the processes that took place in Europe in last fifty years and by doing so ignite the interest in studying the region further.

The thesis topic focuses on the region of Southeast Asia, in other words on the ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian States. The thesis identifies the ASEAN with the Southeast Asian Region, since their borders are almost identical¹⁰ and all the major regional actors are members of the ASEAN. Through the ASEAN they seek for the harmonization and integration of the region under the ASEAN organization. Hence, from the thesis point of view, differing Southeast Asia from the ASEAN would be just confusing and would not bring into analysis anything useful.

To introduce the regional security dynamics, the historical and theoretical background must be taken into picture. The Southeast Asian region has enormous geopolitical importance. In the recent history, during the Cold War it became the stage for the world powers’ clashes that through the secondary conflicts of the Cold War fought there for power, and since then its importance certainly has not decreased. Today, its significance can be seen primarily through the one of the worlds’ biggest emerging markets, through the strategic partnerships with the world leading players as with China, Japan, the US and others, and through the strategic geopolitical position, thanks to this it is referred to by many as the pivot. The strategic sea routes, such as the Malacca Strait, which is one of the largest transportation hubs in the world through which the vast amount of oil and goods transported, can be found in the region the no less.

⁹ The term “New Regionalism” refers to relatively new phenomenon in the regional dynamics that was initiated after the Cold War, as the new form of globalization came to the picture. Results of the new international orders could have been seen through a rising number of the regional institutional frameworks, which the ASEAN and its structures are one of them. The ultimate stimulus the New regionalism has got through the new attitudes of international cooperation. *“The new regionalism is driven by the interaction of both state and non-state actors like multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and other interested social groups, which often form national and transnational coalitions and work together to create formal and/or informal associations.”* (Sarkar 2014)

¹⁰ East Timor, which gained its independence on Indonesia and was acknowledged as a sovereign state in 2002 by the UN, is not yet member of the ASEAN.

Managing the security in the region is essentially important for the stability of the regional and even global economy and political affairs, as the ASEAN occupies the imaginary buffer states position between ideological Western and Eastern part of world. Maintaining the security in the region and in a metaphorical sense in the Asian continent lies on the regional national states, on the ASEAN organization and no less on the external powers that thanks to their engagement create the integral part of regional picture.

The first impulse of the ASEAN establishment was to protect its members against the Soviet expansion, over time the attention has shifted to potential Chinese territorial and hegemonic tendencies and to the prevention and settlement of conflicts between the member states themselves. Today among other topics of the highest importance belongs also the economic integration that is rising in the region, primarily the future single market creation within the ASEAN goal of the ASEAN Community 2015¹¹.

The attention from the traditional security threats also shifted to the so called “New Threats”¹². These are in the case of the ASEAN especially the environmental threats and natural disasters, with them connected the poverty spreading, the intra-state conflicts, terrorism, piracy and migration flows. The shift in the attention towards the New Threats after the Cold War proves that the dynamism of the security perception nowadays has fundamentally changed.

There are two views how today ASEAN can be seen. Either as the Regional Security Complex with the inextricably interlinked processes of the securitization and desecuritization; or as the ASEAN, a major regional international organization similar the EU at some stage of deepening integration.

The region in the period of the end of the Cold War and in post-Cold War era was once identified with the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) by the theory founders Barry Buzan, Jaap De Wilde and Ole Wæver. Based on the consequences of the Cold War and because of the world powers interfering, the region has strengthened its engagement in the security community architecture that strongly contributed to its transformation into the today’s form which is the thesis research subject. The region is

¹¹ The ASEAN Community 2015 is the planned result of the ASEAN Vision 2020. The accomplishing of the Community shall bring the deeper integration within the ASEAN three pillars structure. The Community is in detail discussed in further chapters.

¹² The New Threats were formulated mainly by these authors: Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Lene Hansen, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre and Jaap de Wilde.

being constantly subjected to change, as in the case of rising pressure from China or in the light of the ongoing integration processes.¹³

The RSC theory authors originated their analysis in the Security Communities conception of Karl Deutsch. According to Deutsch the Security Community is concept of group of states which expelled the use of violence from their mutual relations.¹⁴ The Security Communities can overcome the security dilemma and the anarchy, the main concepts of realist school of thought in International Relations.

The theory of Security Communities was also used as the basis by the other researchers which have formulated the discourse of Southeast Asian Studies within the International Relations. Amitav Acharya, who dedicated his numerous researches to Southeast Asian region¹⁵, also used the framework of Security Community for his analysis. The theoretical concept enables to study the impacts of regional institutions on peaceful coexistence. According to him the institutionalization and socialization among Southeast Asian states have led to creation of the Security Community there.¹⁶

The both concepts, the Security Communities and later the RSC theory have formed an integral part of the theories on regional integration that prevail within the discourse until nowadays. Both theories understand the creation of either Security Community or the RSC as a result of social learning, hence they are believed by their authors to constitute a constructivist approach within the theoretical approaches on study of regional dynamism and regional security.

Constructivist approach brings into discourse the aspects as transactionalism, a peace solution of disputes based on transactions and interactions that are driven by the interdependence among the states. To the analysis of the research's subject is important the role of norms. They help to create a state identity and collective identities, as in case of the ASEAN. Both concepts work the with socialization assumption saying that as product of states' socialization, by the process of sharing the same norms, the collective common interests are created. Based on them the socialized states enter the Security Community.¹⁷

In this sense the thesis understands the ASEAN as the common denominator which has initiated the socialization of states in Southeast Asia region. However, as many authors

¹³ (Buzan, Wæwer 2003, 144)

¹⁴ (Deutsch 1957)

¹⁵ (Acharya 1995, 2001, 2005, 2008)

¹⁶ (Acharya 2001)

¹⁷ (Acharya 2001, 4)

said, the region is probably the most heterogeneous in the world both in terms of geography, politics, economics and culture and the region reflects this diversity.¹⁸ But thanks to seeing the facts through the optics of the intersubjective ideas, identities, culture and “we feelings”¹⁹, the above mentioned concepts play a major role in determining the regional nature of either the Security Community, the Regional Security Complex or the another setting.

The thesis does not aim to repeat the work the already has been done, but attempts to verify, whether the theories mentioned here and used in past for the explanation of the regional dynamics could be still applied. If they could be applied on the region that has transformed significantly from the time that Acharya and Buzan et al. elaborated on it.

As Acharya says, many call the ASEAN as one of the most successful regional cooperation case in developing world.²⁰ Suggesting that because major changes that were conducted in terms of the deepening cooperation and integration that was in the region powerfully ignited in all possible sectors apart of one. The missing part is sector of sovereignty and policies in sovereign areas that the states are not ready to give up.

The ASEAN was established in 1967 as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, “*which has since become a fulcrum for further community-building: the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993; ASEAN Plus Three (China, Japan, and South Korea) in 1997; the 18-member East Asian Summit in 2005; and the China-ASEAN Free Trade Association (CAFTA) in 2010 (followed by analogous FTAs between ASEAN and Korea, Japan, the U.S., India, Australia-New Zealand, and the EU). An even more inclusive parallel track was initiated with the founding of the 21-member Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989.*”²¹ The ASEAN institutions were followed with the “*higher quality*” FTA, the *Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)*, which includes the U.S. but excludes the PRC, and the *Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)*, which includes the PRC but excludes the U.S.”²² The development of the ASEAN institutions continues rapidly, as the region gains on its strategic importance.

¹⁸ (Schmidt 2004, 2)

¹⁹ (Acharya 2001, 4)

²⁰ (Acharya 2001, 5)

²¹ (Dittmer 2014, 2)

²² (Dittmer 2014, 2)

The recent ASEAN efforts go on the way of deeper integration. The ASEAN organization is the structure standing from 2012 on the ground of three pillars²³, similarly as the EU had been until the Lisbon treaty ratification. The ASEAN's ultimate goal is the creation of strongly integrated a ASEAN Community until the year 2015.²⁴

Operationalization:

As the working method of thesis analysis was chosen the instrumental case study. The method stands on the edge of the unique case study that seeks to explore a particular unique case and does not give the greater importance to the theoretical anchor than the empirical case; with the instrumental case study serving to demonstrate on a particular case the validity of the theory only.

On the background of the instrumental case study the revisited analysis of Regional Security Complex is built. As the theory's founders suggest, the theoretical approach first analyzes the current regional securitization environment, then it searches for the major securitization actors and their securitization ideas and concerns that can be in a majority of cases found already turned into the present conflicts or security issues. Consequently the empirical cases of securitization are demonstrated on the sectoral logics and the interactions among the sectors are sought as well.

The thesis employs both prescriptive and descriptive methods of observation. Prescriptive tools show, how the components of Regional Security Complex should look like according to theory and descriptive conceptual tools help to describe the empirical realities on the theoretical background.

The thesis operationalization is based on the theoretical background of the RSC analysis. The theoretical basis considers as the essential the concept of securitization: *"It is therefore (the author refers to the RSCT definition, the author's note) necessary to first identify successful securitization or desecuritization processes within the region and then find out all the other units in response to this act."*²⁵

The research questions that accompany the research are:

The main research question: **It is the theory of the Regional Security Complexes applicable to the case of the ASEAN countries, hence the region of Southeast Asia, or the integration in the region have reached to such an extent that the region**

²³ (Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009)

²⁴ (Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009)

²⁵ (Kořátková 2013, 2)

became in security relations the unified player? The main research question is accompanied by subsidiary research questions: **Can be the characteristics of the RSC identified on all the sectors of the analysis? If not, which securitization sectors do correspond with the RSC theory?**

As a working hypothesis H1 the thesis employs the prediction: **The Association of Southeast Asian States, the ASEAN can be conceptualized as a Regional Security Complex, since the link between security policies and realities of its members and the related securitization processes are mutually inseparable phenomena.** First sub-hypothesis H2 then assumes that: **The RSC characteristics can be especially applied on political sector of securitization, in which the integration has not yet reached to such a stage that it would unite the foreign and security policies of the association member states. The reasons for it are the varying economic interests of member states, which are superior to the political objectives of the organization, for which enforcement is missing the political will.**

The emphasis is also put on the time frame of studied topic. The studied topic is analyzed strictly in the presence. However if the historical aspects are influencing the securitization processes until now, they must be also included into the analysis. Whereas as is suggested the only current dynamism is the subject of study, the analysis derives the inspiration of the theory authors' findings published ten years ago, in the book "Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security".²⁶ This source is also valuable, because it enables to compare the major securitization processes that were taking place there that time and now. This evolvement advises which direction the security dynamism has taken and into which areas the thesis attention should be directed.

The RSC theory in context of its innovations is used as the thesis main theoretical concept as is in detail presented in the second chapter "**Methodology of the RSC Theory**". The chapter identifies the analytical tools provided by the theory's authors to be used in the thesis empirical analysis. As suggested above the shifted RSC analysis in a way recommended by its authors is employed.

²⁶ (Buzan, Wæwer 2003)

While applying the shifted RSC analysis the procedure is the following: The thesis first defines the units of the possible RSC of the Southeast Asia²⁷. In the classical concept as the units of the RSC were considered only states, whereas according to revised theory the members of security complex are not only the state-actors. The authors after an adjustment to the new international security order re-applied the theory on wider range of units. As the state, the company, international organization and the confederation can create the same vital part of security complex according to them.²⁸

In case of the research, not just the states of Southeast Asia, but also the ASEAN as an organization are to be included as a unit of the RSC. In the thesis case could be easily identified the areas of “spillover effects” as the authors describe them – one sector of Regional Security Complex causes the inception of another. In practice it could be a case, for example, of the securitization of the expansion and unification of economies initiated by the integrating and changing political agendas. That means that the logic of the RSC is transmitted from the political sector to the economic sector as in case of the ASEAN it could have been observed.

In case that complex does not consist just of the same type of units, the heterogeneous complex could be applied on the region of the study²⁹. Hence the thesis argues that the Southeast Asian region is not to be analyzed through the optics of the classical homogeneous RSC that was in past considered as the only type of the RSC.³⁰ The progress in the theoretical approach can be seen as the earlier prevalent theories of International Relations such as the Neorealism used to permit as the unit of international system only states.³¹

Secondly the current securitization processes are analyzed on a major scale and just after that they are demonstrated on the sectoral logic and the interactions between the sectors are taken into the analysis consideration, too. By following this method any major important relation that influences the regional dynamics should not be forgotten. At the end of the analysis the determining factors of the RSC theory are confronted with described realities.

²⁷ The description of the RSC is so far rather imaginary as the results of the analysis are not confirmed yet.

²⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005 27)


²⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005 27)

³⁰ The authors divide the RSC into homogeneous and heterogeneous. (Buzan *et al.* 2005 26)

³¹ (Waltz 1979)

For its analysis the thesis employs the basic scheme of the securitization discourse in the region:

- a. Scheme of securitization process in the ASEAN: referential actors, threats and securitization actors:



The third chapter of the thesis “The Securitization Process within the ASEAN” is dedicated to the local characteristics of the research’s topic from various perspectives as the territorial position, the identification of the institution located in the region and their goals, the exploration of influence and interests of the external powers which engage in the region. The securitization processes are analysed through all the major actors of securitization process, topics and the referential objects.

This chapter particularly identifies the main actors within the securitization process and categorize them into the national ASEAN’s member states, further the ASEAN institution while dividing them into two groups: first one consisting of institutions whose members are exclusively ASEAN member states as the ASEAN Summit, and the Institute of ASEAN Rotating Chairmanship; and into the second one consisting of institutions including besides the ASEAN member states the external counterparts that official hold membership; as the famous ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Plus Three, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting and the others.

In case of the ASEAN among the main regional referential objects can be found the national governments, the borders and territories intangibility, the markets prosperity, the ASEAN institutions stability, the citizens of the ASEAN and its identities on various levels protection, the validity of the human and political rights, of the principles of the “ASEAN Way” same as the preservation of the “Asian values”, further the states armies, thhe defense industries, the bio diversities of ASEAN environments, biodiversity of the oceans, bio-systems and the cultural and natural wealth preservation. Besides these components of the securitization processes the thesis identifies also functional actors, which are other players that influence the securitization process usually in a way of either supporting or desecuritizing the topic. In the ASEAN case, those are usually private companies with their own interests, lobby groups and the external powers such as China, the US, Japan, South Korea, the EU and the others, whose aim is to push their interests and concerns in order to interfere into the regional important issues.

The fourth chapter “The Sectoral Analysis” elaborates on each particular sector of the RSC theory. The most alarming recent threats that endanger the basic human needs, universal freedoms or the existence of state are analyzed from the perspective of the securitization by the ASEAN institutions and national sates on the sectoral levels.

Among the main securitized topics on the sectoral level belong subjects: within the political sector the thesis articulates the political rights and fundamental freedom; in military sector risks of terrorism, the interstate conflicts and conflicts with second and third³² countries are emphasized, same as the defense assistance; in environmental sector those are the consequences of global warming and national disasters on the local scale, special attention is given to the typhoon Haiyan and to the ASEAN humanitarian relief effort; in societal sectors it is the security of identity, ethnical, national and religious security, cultural diversity; and finally in economic sector it is the stability of national markets and currencies, free trade area creation, accomplishing the ASEAN Community 2015 and reducing the standards of living differences.

In practice the thesis locates the findings of securitization on the sectoral dynamics and seeks for mutual relations within the sectors. As the whole sectoral picture is drawn, it proceeds to the identification of the RSC determining factors in the final chapter.

In fifth chapter “The Analysis Synthesis” the final synthesis presents the mosaic security interactions and security regional dynamism on which basis the answers on the thesis research questions are reached. In a case that thesis’ findings do not match with the characteristics of the RSC, it attempts to find the signs of case transition from the RSC. Such changes can be evaluated on the transitional background described by the authors as well, since they assume this phase will one day occur as the integral part of the RSC evolvement.

To be able to access whether the given theory of the RSC is applicable on the case of the study, the thesis must in this stage identify all the four main determining factors of the RSC given by the theoretical concept. The main findings collected on the sectoral analysis are confronted with the determining factors, which are based on that either confirmed or refuted.

All the RSC determining factors that must be proven for successful identification with theory are:

1. The Southeast Asian units’ composition within the system and the differences between them; referral to the heterogeneous nature of the system
2. The regional states polarization
3. The friendly and hostile relations
4. The power distribution among the national states and the ASEAN within the region

³² The term “second” state refers to the other ASEAN member state, while the “third” refers to the non-

At the end the thesis evaluates the existence of the processes of securitization and desecuritization within the Southeast Asia and the security interdependence of the region's units as well.

If the four main factors determined by the dynamics of the sectors' interactions and security dynamism within the securitization processes are confirmed, then the thesis classifies the ASEAN as the Regional Security Complex. And with the identification of the regional setting the thesis concludes the analysis.

If only one or more determining factors cannot be proven the thesis proceeds to the elaboration on transformation process, guidance given by the theory authors that can easily show whether the region is transforming into another form of the regional setting. As the transitional signs in the case of ASEAN can be observed:

1. The status quo stability - preservation

Such a situation might theoretically occur while the power decomposition in the region changes significantly. From the region consisting of the relatively balanced states arise the obvious hegemony which by the accumulation of their own capacities permanently change the status quo. These hegemony supported by their hard power or by any other strong factors will be ordering the others what to do. The weaker states may possibly quite narrowly share their security interests and threats, but they will not be same and equally interconnected with those that engage in the highest hierarchical positions within the region; as the biggest threat to the region can be considered the hegemony themselves.

2. The internal transformation

The internal transformation can change the ASEAN regional nature the most likely in two situations: If the regional states for whichever reason engage in strong integration and pass some of their decisive powers over their own sovereignty to another actor from region the unified body will most likely arise which starts deciding on the behalf of all by one vote. One of the likely reasons for it can be the deep integration in the style of the EU based on the economic purposes that to the future the ASEAN pursues. The second likely reason for the internal transformation according to thesis assumptions can be the unification of the states into one strong alliance, because of collective protection and defense of its members against the mutual threat.

3. The external transformation

member.

The regional order would probably change if the ASEAN expanded its membership outside the borders of the Southeast Asian region and the importance of the territorial affiliation lost its importance. Without the regional dynamism the threats would most probably not acquire the collective character as the securitization processes were not to be so much interconnected anymore. For example if the state of Palestinian Autonomy would join the Association, one of the main securitization topics it would bring would be the lack of drinking water. Such a threat would not endanger the original ASEAN states as the vast majority of them have rich access to water resources.

4. Overlay

The transformation of the regional order is likely to take place when the regional constellation is changed and following outcomes of it are not of temporary nature. Such a situation can occur while into the region interferes significantly an external actor that will overtake the leading position in the regional dynamics or its significant part. That could happen for instance in case that China would exercise its rule over the region and its power overweighed the power of previous leading structures.

At the end of chapter the thesis answers the research questions and confirms or refutes given hypotheses and the research comes to an end. With the transformation statement the analysis is to conclude the thesis.

In the last chapter “Conclusion” the most important findings analyzed from the studied case are presented and the thesis is concluded with the projections of possible prospects for the region and the ASEAN to the future.

Literature review

The theoretical part of the thesis draws on the primary literature on the Regional Security Complexes Theory and the sectoral analysis approach. Primary the literature, written by the Copenhagen School, particularly of the trio of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, which formulated the Regional Security Complex theory, is employed. The trio of the authors also contributed significantly into the discourse of the New Threats, which were into to international theory introduced also by the Copenhagen School and the thesis with them widely operates. The concept of the New Threats was created by the extension of the security concept from traditional hard security topics vertically and horizontally. Thanks to it, the thesis employs the security analysis on large scale and besides the hard security topics the threats stemming from the environmental, societal and economic sector are included into the analysis. The

methodology of the thesis is thus built on their book “Security: New Framework for Analysis”, in which the authors have revisited their concept according to the newest assumptions.

Furthermore the inevitable component of the analysis on the theoretical background which further becomes the central part of the empirical study is the concept of “securitization” and “securitization on the sectoral level”. Both these theoretical concepts are widely introduced into the regional discourse also by the authors of the Copenhagen School, therefore even the securitization concept is explained mainly on their approaches.

The basic structures referring to the ASEAN as the Regional Security Complex as it was one analyzed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver the Book “Regions and Powers” helps to explain. Some of the theoretical anchors explained in the work are also brought into the ASEAN characteristics within the thesis analysis.

Some critical aspects that helped to extend the analytical way of thinking in the case of the ASEAN organization and its securitization processes within the region of Southeast Asia are brought by the authors, which dedicated their academic focus to Asian studies as Narine Shaun, Amitav Acharya and David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith. These authors engage heavily into the academic literature focusing on the Southeast Asia in security terms and thanks to the various theories application by them it is possible to elaborate on more theoretical approaches in studying the Southeast Asian realities. Although their researches have significantly enriched the analysis of studied topic, the thesis has assessed the method of RSC towards studying the ASEAN as the most appropriate.

For the empirical case the official documents issued by the ASEAN, its institutions and their member states’ national governments are analyzed. To study the particular securitization processes the secondary literature as the various academic works, journals, the media articles and press releases are employed. Another stream of the literature support consists of the various conferences reports, proceedings and interviews that bring into the topics the most up-to-date views. Furthermore, the information gained thanks to the personal interviews with the official representatives of the ASEAN member states helped to show the thesis a direction which it should follow in order to get to the central point of the problem.

2. Methodology of the RSC Theory

The topic of thesis is analyzed on the basis of the updated Regional Security Complex Theory, first introduced by Barry Buzan in 1983 in his book “People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations”. The theory studying the international security dynamism was first applied by Buzan on the case of South Asia and Middle East.³³

Soon after its establishment within International Relations studies it gained significant popularity that gave Buzan stimulus to widen the research area into the other parts of world. In 1988 he applied his then theory on the region of Southeast Asia that will serve as the basic background for the research.³⁴

The theory has been modified a number of times and further updated by the so called Copenhagen School of International Relations terminology. Regional Security Complexes were elaborated in detail by other researchers such as Jaap De Vilde and Ole Wæver besides Barry Buzan. In the 80’s they conducted the expert debate through international magazines, especially in the *Survival*; about the nature of Regional Security Complex Theory and Southeast Asia was used as an instrumental case.³⁵ Such a fact proves how the theory is interconnected with the object of the thesis research.

All of the authors see the theory as a centre of gravity for the securitization process and its interdependence between the states of region. They define the Regional Security Complex as “*Group of units, whose major security ideas and concerns are so intertwined that the national security problems of each of them cannot be reasonably analyzed or addressed separately*”³⁶. The definition is valid until today even after various theoretical modifications.

The theory consists of four main sub-thesis, for purposes of the thesis referred to as the determining factors, and if they are all identified on the particular case the theory of Regional Security Complex can be applied³⁷. The securitization processes and the reactions of units towards it, in the thesis case the reaction of states and the

³³ (Buzan 1991)

³⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 20)

³⁵ Theoreticians of the Copenhagen School conducted an expert debate in the international journal *Survival* on the RSC approach since the 80s of the 20th century in connection with the security in Asia, especially in Southeast Asia.

³⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 21)

³⁷ (Kořátková 2013, 1, 48)

organization, then create the net constituting the core of the complex and predefine the whole security dynamics in the region³⁸.

The authors define the previous classical theory as: *“The basic structure of the Regional Security Complex consists of four variables: the outer borders of the Regional Security Complex, the anarchic structure of the complex, the polarity or the distribution of power within the complex and the relations of friendship and enmity between the units in the complex. To meet the definition of a Regional Security Complex is the key to meeting the region’s all four characters in the basic structure showed a close relationship between the major securitization and desecuritization acts”*³⁹.

In the original theory the authors understood the security complexes in their classical form – they assessed them based on military and political power. When the theory was by the authors reformulated, they have included the role of non-state actors and other units on various sectoral levels.⁴⁰ The revised theory takes into accounts different dimensions of sectors and elaborates on whether for example an environmental sector of a complex and a political sector will always share the same borders of one complex?⁴¹

The Buzan’s main contribution to the revised theory was the expansion of sectoral concept and followed analysis elaborated into five main sectors. At the same time further was enhanced the concept of securitization developed mainly by Wæver. The progress is being seen mainly through analysis of securitization of other sectors than just military and political, which in past has shown the highest level of territorial integrity⁴².

The thesis is built on the theory of the RSC that later became a classical and one of the most widely accepted concept for studying international security within International Relations. However as the theory was further modified, the thesis mirrors in its analysis all its innovations drawn on the revised concepts introduced in the book *“Security: A New Framework for Analysis”* that was first published in 1997 and written by the same authors. Their work concludes the major findings of the Copenhagen School putting them into different components and aspects of the RSCT.

The book *“Security: A New Framework for Analysis”* was to redefine the RSCT according to new order in international system of the post-Cold-War era while the

³⁸ (Kořatkov 2013, 1, 48)

³⁹ (Buzan, Wæver 2003, Kořatkov 2013, 1-2)

⁴⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005 26)

⁴¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 26)

⁴² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 186)

decentralization and regionalism tendencies were disseminated in the international system.⁴³

The authors' overarching goal within the redefinition of the theory was to extend the knowledge of the classical security threats as the subject of the securitization to the extended agenda of the international security in the post-Cold-War study. The biggest challenge for the RSCT was the reformulation of the character of security threats - it has broadened the political and military nature also to economic, societal and environmental "sectors" on which background the New Threats were introduced and the theory must have been confronted with it.⁴⁴

2.1 The new picture of the international order

In the post-Cold-War global environment the decomposition of power changed significantly. The world had to deal with multi-polar international system that differed dramatically from long time standing bipolar system divided into two polarized blocks. The nature of the threats in the international system shifted to the so called New Threats appeared. As all the three authors argue, the importance of armed conflicts has decreased as well as the inclination towards the realist theory importantly and the renewed Regional Security Complex Theory seeks to demonstrate the best way how to study the international security⁴⁵.

The direction in the international system stopped being shown by just two world hegemonies, but the attention was transferred to the regions that have started becoming the central holders of international security and have started influencing significantly the composition of power within the global system. In this sense the Regional Security Complex Theory is especially important in studying international security, because it puts aside the national and global interests and puts emphasis on regions where both global and national interests meet and where "*the majority of relevant events take place*".⁴⁶

According to authors the method of the RSCT interconnects the study of internal order of the states, the relations between states, the relation between complexes and finally the relations between complexes and global hegemonies. That makes it a very useful tool

⁴³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 5)

⁴⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 5)

⁴⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 6)

⁴⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 24-5)

on how to study such a wide spectrum of relations and their interconnections that the regions overarch.⁴⁷

2.2 The importance of regions and territoriality in international security

The regions as the sub-units of international system have been picked as the central study objects for the theory because of the presumptions that in post-Cold War period regions will be gaining the most of power within the global system and they will become the central players in international security.⁴⁸ The authors reaffirm the general assumption of the weakening of the role of global leadership since the ideological polarity is not present anymore and the regions are most likely to solve the problems on their own. That leads to more intense and more frequent interactions among the members of region.⁴⁹

Considering the regions significance the major role in their identification plays the principle of territoriality. According to Hans Mouritzen, whose way of thinking of the states' territorial affiliation is cited by the Copenhagen school⁵⁰, the regions created on territorial principle are specific type of sub-systems, they are such regional systems that engage a specific level of the analysis.⁵¹

The territorial principle applies and impacts the other sectors studied on another level of analysis - groups of people are also territorially attached - based on their territorial preferences they influence national security and its interests are later mirrored into foreign policy and international security agenda. Relevance of mutual influence impacts most the states regionally affiliated.⁵²

The territorial principle often contributes to such a strong regional institutionalization that can bring the transformation of the SRC into another sub-unit of international system by breaking one or more basic principles of the RSC. "*Regional integration changes anarchical subsystem of states in the united and geographically more extended actor of international system, it will cause the end of security complex.*"⁵³ For the thesis

⁴⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 25)

⁴⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 18-9)

⁴⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 18-9)

⁵⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 19)

⁵¹ (Mouritzen 1995; 1997 in Buzan *et al.* 2005 19)

⁵² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 19)

⁵³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 22)

case this applies twice and the main research question is derived from such the process of New Regionalism⁵⁴.

2.3 The centrality of securitization process and its components

The central uniting line of all the security components of the complex is the process of securitization. Securitization cannot be swapped with the process of the politicization that refers to other process within political agenda.

The securitization was constructed by the Copenhagen School as the “*social construction of security*”⁵⁵, as the Michael C. Williams argues. Jef Huysmans focusing on the securitization of migration and asylum in Europe share his enthusiasm for the securitization process too: “*possibly the most thorough and continuous exploration of the significance and implications of a widening security agenda for Security Studies*”.⁵⁶

Even though the theory was many times object of the criticism, especially by Bill McSweeney, the critics of the Copenhagen School, in his work “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School” he refers to the securitization theory as being “*sociologically untenable*” and complains over moral deficit of the speech act.⁵⁷

Another criticism came within the COPRI from Lene Hansen, who criticized the absence of gender aspect within the securitization.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the securitization theory was chosen as the best determining for the RSC logic and will be applied on the thesis case.

Securitization is the process of securitizing the topics that are in the centre of various interests of influential actors in the sector. Technically the process is conducted through the speech act and the influential securitizing actor usually employs such methods that would not be probably tolerated in ordinary political practice. Desecuritization in contrary refers to the political attempt of withdrawal of the characteristics of the imminent threat as the desecuritizing actor wishes not to give or sustain the political importance of the topic that it used to have or could have.⁵⁹ C. Williams characterizes the desecuritization act as it “*involves precisely this process; a moving of issues off the*

⁵⁴ (Sarkar 2014)

⁵⁵ (Williams 2003, 2)

⁵⁶ (Huysmans 1997, 186)

⁵⁷ (McSweeney 1996; 1999)

⁵⁸ (Hansen 2000)

⁵⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 43-5)

*“security” agenda and back into the realm of public political discourse and “normal” political dispute and accommodation”*⁶⁰.

The topics to be securitized are the topics threatening the state existence or ensuring the human basic needs⁶¹. Hence securitization should include only such serious topics that directly jeopardize the survival of state or its inhabitants, the special political actions cannot be taken, even though they exceeds the regular political practices.⁶² By defining the securitized topics the thesis can assess the security dynamics of the region and it can recognize which security agendas are on the top of list. The success of the securitization can be assessed only through the reaction of an audience, whether the audience responds to the severity of securitized topic or not.⁶³

Within the process of securitization the thesis must distinguish its important components. First of all the essential players are the securitization actors (political figures, interest groups, international organization and companies etc.). They decide which referential object is in eminent existential threat and they are the movers of whole process. The referential objects are the topics of securitization, the threatened objects perceived as possible target of the security threat. Because the referential objects are perceived, they are socially constructed⁶⁴. They have the legitimate right for survival. To the thesis analysis should be also included the functional actors, who affect the security dynamism and also influence the process of policymaking and decision-making, albeit they are neither securitization actors, not referential objects.⁶⁵ Thus to the thesis case among the functional actors the companies, organizations and informal regime or groups that can be relevant to the processes within the region should be included.

According to theory distinguished are also the so called “facilitating conditions” of securitization, these conditions can be the global, regional or local nature of the threats.⁶⁶ This aspect of theory wants to underline that for complex like the ASEAN would be easier to securitize the topic of possible tsunami threat than the iceberg melting. The local nature of threat facilitates the process of securitization.

⁶⁰ (Williams 2003, 2)

⁶¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 35-37)

⁶² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 35)

⁶³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 48)

⁶⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 57)

⁶⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 48)

⁶⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 27)

2.4 The security complexes and their structures

To embody security complexes in international relation their true meaning must be understood. Security complexes are independent subsystems, analogical variants of international system, downsized anarchies that have in their disposal their own internal structures similar to those of the international system.⁶⁷ The security complexes create “*theoretical constructs into which the researcher wants to embody the reality*”.⁶⁸

Each security complex has its own “essential structure” consisting according to authors of following factors:

1. *Units’ order and differences between them*
2. *The relations of amity and enmity*
3. *The power distribution and among the system's main units*
4. *The processes of securitization and desecuritization, the security interdependence –*

In such a case the security interests will be very similar and interconnected, that does not necessary mean that the interactions among members of complex must be intense.⁶⁹

This structure is revised based on the theory modification. The classical RSCT focused only on states and its political and military power. Therefore the new actors and new sectors were incorporated into the theory. Flowingly they argue that if there is any substantial change in any component of security complex, the nature of the complex must be redefined accordingly in most cases.⁷⁰

2.5 The RSC Sectoral Analysis

The approach of studying the security on the sectoral analysis was first introduced by the trio of Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde in their initial book “People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations” and it was further developed primary by Barry Buzan in “Security: A New Framework for Analysis”. By that time the originally Copenhagen School’s concept was fostered also by the other theoreticians of international security, who significantly extended the sectors’ analysis in its depth, and the sectoral analysis became one of the central approaches in the Security Studies.

By studying the Regional Security Complexes the Copenhagen researchers aimed to elaborate on the security dynamics in the region across all sectors: political, environmental, military, economic and societal. They strived to find the center of

⁶⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 22-3)

⁶⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 24)

⁶⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 24)

⁷⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 25)

gravity in the region and define its possible trends in development of security on local, regional and global scale. That is another purpose of the theoretical concept, on the basis of deduction and deriving from the main theoretical tools applied on a particular case, the theory seeks to predict the notions of the possible outcomes of current security picture into the future.⁷¹

The division into the sectors is enhanced by the previous identification of the New Threats in the international security discourse that were defined by the COPRI, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute which encompasses the Copenhagen School as well.⁷² The term New Threats refer to the extended framework of the risks factors towards the object on the various levels of analysis⁷³. With the definition of the New Threats the referential objects were also rethought from the state-centric concept to the objects of all the levels of analysis. Based on that, the national security strategies and NATO strategies were significantly reformulated.⁷⁴

From the traditional understanding was the concept widened also on the threats that are environmental, societal and economic nature as they have started to be perceived within the security dynamics discourse by the Security Studies theoreticians. Particularly the three above mentions areas were newly established within the security analysis. During the threats reformulation, the effects of the globalization were strongly accented⁷⁵. Among the environmental threats the COPRI classified the natural disasters, spread of epidemics, poverty and famines and man made threats as the global warming and climate change, as the societal threats were understood the intra-states conflicts threatening the particular groups within the society, terrorism was articulated as the threat to human security and as the economic threats were clearly understood the economic crisis, state systems collapses, inflations etc.⁷⁶

Later, these threats were further applied by Buzan on the sovereign sectors of security analysis. Another important aspect in sectoral analysis is that the agenda studied within the sectors might be “spilling-over” into the other sectors. The authors give an example of the economic sector; in hypothetical case of deep crisis or the state collapse that could cause famines, the result of that are likely to be political crises within the political

⁷¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005)

⁷² The levels of analysis include the security on the all levels, starting from the human security and ending with the global security.

⁷⁴ (Brauch 2005, 63)

⁷⁵ (Brauch 2005, 63)

⁷⁶ (Brauch 2005, 63)

sector⁷⁷. Therefore, the overlapping interactions between sectors should not be omitted in the final analysis.

After the analysis on the level of all sectors the authors engage in the synthesis of all the sectoral characteristics and findings that give them one picture creating the whole mosaic of the security and its dynamics within the complex with careful emphasis on the important relations and interactions among the relevant sectors that also contribute to the illustration of the security reality.⁷⁸

It can seem that some sectors of analysis tend more to the characteristics of the RSC, than the others. As the theory predefines, the ideas and the worries of the most important actors within the sectors are to be analyzed and at the end put together forming the so called “constellation” a kind of node of mutual security relations.⁷⁹

As the authors of theory recommend, in the order not leave out the important interactions across the sectors, the analysis is to be conducted on following approach. First the thesis identifies the most important actors within the thesis subject of study; secondly the thesis strives to find their security concerns and derive the cases of securitization. Seemingly the most alarming cases of securitization are to be further in detail analyzed on the sectoral logic, taking into account their importance to the sector, other securitization actors within the sector and their relations to it and, the overlapping effects from/to other sectors and the sectoral relations initiated by the securitization case.

Military sector

Military sector used to be for the classical RSC together with political sector the most vital and almost all the security issues were being solved within it. After decolonization, also democratization of the majority of the world states and identification of the new treats the sector partially lost its importance. Within the regions where the armed conflict still exist as the medium of politics and International Relations, there the sector still holds its importance. For instance, in Central Europe, where the probability of an armed confrontation almost disappeared, the sector could have lost significance, but within the ASEAN the sector is still very important since the trans-border conflicts still occur there.

⁷⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 36)

⁷⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 27)

⁷⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 57)

There are three possible situations when the regional security dynamics is replaced by the global and in such cases the sector cannot be identified within the dynamism of the RSC or loses its relevance for the region.⁸⁰

1. The sector utterly loses its importance because of non-existence of military threats and all the security matters that could be concerning the region are securitized on the global level.
2. Distinctive logic of the RSC dissolves when the military technology becomes so sophisticated that the territorial distance stops playing any role. In such a case the threat becomes same imminent whether it is thousand or hundred miles distant.
3. As the third option the authors perceived the power concentration on the international scale that is exercised so intensely that the regional level basically stops existing. The authors just add that the tendencies in the international system are just opposite, the transfer of power and its dissolution goes from the global level to the international.

If any of these situations occurs the consideration about the existence of the RSC is in place. But as the authors stress, the military sector still holds its importance and on its basis is dealt vast number of security topics.⁸¹ That is why it is so important for and not just the thesis case and must be given appropriate attention.

Environmental sector

The environmental agenda is one of the most important sectors for the thesis case, since the Southeast Asian region is created by many island states that relatively often suffer from natural disasters, the sectoral theoretical background will be given sufficient space and coverage.

Within environmental sector it is hard to say whether all the environment threatening topics got and are securitized. Since the political actors decide which topic will be brought make the political agenda. So the urgency and severity of environmental matters are not the decisive factors of for their securitization.⁸²

Another challenge is that the environmental topics decided by the politicians who usually do not have a true picture about their nature. The most demanding fact about the

⁸⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 75)

⁸¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 85)

securitization of environmental problems is the time factor. They should be securitized even before they actually take place.⁸³ Sometimes because the securitization came just with the threat consequences, the environmental problems are overlaying within the regions, the environmental securities of the states are interdependent and the states must address them to sustain their own existence.⁸⁴ Based on the overlaying character, threats are being created such complexes that overcome the regional borders and getting bigger sizes. As a result of that the complexes standing on environmental sector might bigger than the RSC on other sectors.⁸⁵

Into analysis of environmental sector as many as possible of the contributing factors must be taken because of the width of the relevant topics in the environmental sector. Among them is the disruption of ecosystems, energetic problems often connected to management of disasters, population problems, food problems, economic problems and civil disputes.

All the topics connected with any of the factor can be securitized, but that does not mean that they are to be securitized all at the same time.⁸⁶ Some of them can achieve strong political attention, whereas some do not need to be perceived as imminent treat at all, since the securitization is process based on subjective preferences. The generally securitized topics should be directed towards the conservation of biosphere of whole planet level in order to preserve the current civilization standards and the local and global biosphere.⁸⁷

According to the authors the only way how to protect the society against the major threats are the fundamental changes within the society itself. Only the human civilization is responsible for the state of environment and it is only human civilization which can ignite the cooperation or conflict behavior.⁸⁸ Hence in this sector the securitization actor is clear and that it is human society, whereas the referential objects are environment and extensively it is the humans that can be threatened by the environmental collapses.

The threats that can be securitized are flowingly categorized⁸⁹:

⁸² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 89)

⁸³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 109)

⁸⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 109)

⁸⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 109)

⁸⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 91)

⁸⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 93)

⁸⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 93)

⁸⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 97)

- Threats, coming from the natural environment not ignited by humans. This category addresses natural disasters that cannot be easily prevented, so they are not securitized usually, whereas the struggle with their impacts can become the topic of securitization.
- Threats ignited by humans threatening the environmental systems and planet structures and in the result the humankind such as the emissions of greenhouse gases, on the local scale it can be the overburdening of soil. The category is the most discussed since it reaches self-destruction dimensions.
- Threats ignited by human activities but not threatening the human civilization as such. It usually refers to the exhaustion of some natural resources, that can't be replaced by some substitution (like the lack of oil, for instance) and because it does not threaten directly the civilization, it has a marginal securitization attention.

Regarding the regional dynamics in environmental securitization, the sector is quite unique because of its global outreach. Usually the threat does not correspond only with states in the region, but it has inter-regional coverage. According to Hurrell and Kingsbury who significantly elaborated on the environmental sector agenda must be into the threat addressing involved a big percentage of world states since the nature of threat are extensive and endanger people on the whole globe.⁹⁰

Comparing the globalism of the sector with the others is difficult, since for example in military sector the agenda of securitization as the nuclear weapons took long to acquire the global reach and the topic could have been brought into global level.⁹¹

There is another important logic which is the threats of global nature, can't be almost exclusively influenced only on the level of RSC. For example if the river would be massively polluted on regional level, the impact would be projected into all the region and territories where the river flows. The same model works for ozone layer, atomic plants accident. In practice it means, even if the securitization topic is of global nature, its significance is reflected on regional or local level.

The best way how to evaluate the possible threats that can be shifted in to securitization topics is the imagination of catastrophe scenario with its extents, impacts, consequences. By imagining or reviving situation such tsunami, the security actors

⁹⁰ (Hurrell, Kingsbury 1992 in Buzan *et al.* 2005, 102-3)

⁹¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 171)

easily find, what could be the biggest threat for them and which topics should be securitized. In case of tsunami it could be the fast advancement of the system of early warning. As the difficult question stays, on which sector of analysis the thesis should find its causes as the authors give the example of the Chernobyl tragedy.⁹²

The commonest problem is that the environmental challenges are commonly caused by those which do not suffer from their consequence. Sometimes the originators of the problems are even in another region and in such cases following the RSC could be difficult. Hence the thesis could get more extensive and complex pictures of security interdependence than just the region can offer.⁹³

In environmental sector the thesis can also find a large number of politicization of topics as the maritime regimes and other conventions that should not be mixed with the cases of securitization.

For successful securitization within the environmental sector according to theory the thesis should employ such a process towards the securitized topic identification:

- 1) How the possible catastrophe scenario looks like and what are its consequences in the space and time? Is the scenario interconnected with process of politicization or securitization? And from which moment it refers to an environmental security?
- 2) Who are the main actors of securitization and which ones have the right to veto? Who are the functional actors? Who has the leading and subordinate role in the process?
The actors' typology helps to determine the local, regional and global political agenda dynamism.
- 3) What is the extent of the topics independence? Is there any structural interconnection among the topics (desertification and poverty rate)? Is there any political interconnection between the topics (deforestation and economic interests)?⁹⁴

By responding the questions the thesis should get the basic picture of the regional environmental security dynamism that can serve as the ideal basis for the deeper analysis.

⁹² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 103)

⁹³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 111)

⁹⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 107-8)

In general, the solutions on environmental security were best proven on regional level on which it is most effective. The extent of the RSCs is determined on decentralized bottom up approach. On the level of the complexes it is possible to engage into the biggest variety of problems, even the smallest ones; so the logic of RSC represents the most extensive medium of mutual security interdependence.

The economic sector

While studying the economic sector of RSC it is essential to be extremely careful while distinguishing between the case of regionalism theory that is especially common for studying the economic integration and institutionalization within the regions and the case of regional security theory, in this case focused on economic sector but from the security perspective. Making such a mistake would cause mixing of the two theories that would not bring any relevant findings for the thesis case. Not only just because of it's essential to clearly state the research topic of the chapter.

The economic sector chapter focuses on the evolvement of the economic cooperation in the region that influences the security dynamics in the region, the economic cooperation topics are subjects of the securitization and on the basis of the forms of the existing economic integration the research outcomes are derived. They conclude whether the economic cooperation can be considered as the economic sector of the RST interconnected by the securitization actions nets or whether the cooperation in the sector is already beyond the logic of the RSC that the thesis could speak more about the economic regionalism.

The thesis concludes the chapter's research with identifying the regional economic institutionalization with the case of regionalism, according to authors of the RSC theory the thesis shall prove that it is based on the following: "*The regionalism can take on itself countless forms of integration of various degrees of shared identity, debt of integration and its institutionalization*".⁹⁵

The societal sector

Societal sector is strongly interconnected with the political one, but based on the theory it is a peculiar sector with overlapping coverage.⁹⁶ The borders of state and society are only rarely overlapping, that is the main reason for studying this sector due to the

⁹⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 133)

authors of the RSC theory. For the analysis the leading aspects should be those ideas and cultural habits within which is the society usually connects itself. The essential in the society studying is the *“the identity or the self-interpretation of communities or individuals, who understand themselves as the members of certain communities. These identities are not by far identical with the explicitly political organizations capable of rule despite they are often with them strongly interconnected”*.⁹⁷

The referential objects are groups of people who either create a nation or determine themselves by sharing the same religion, ethnicity or race. So the object of securitization is not the society as such but “the nation”. The term nation must not be confused with the population of state. Within the one state a number of nations can be found.⁹⁸

The concept of nation’s security should be therefore understood as the “identity security”. The situation of the social insecurity occurs when some community indicate that certain development in the society as the threat for its further existence. Such a feeling can be subjective as the concept is based on the social construction of reality.⁹⁹

Also the identity as such is the social construct, hence a lot of conflicts originate from different “we” feelings and ends with which “we” identity takes over the situation.

Among the most usual threat on this sector that can be securitized are:

- Migration
- Horizontal competition – the smaller groups must unwillingly accept the characteristics of bigger groups
- Vertical competition – forces to either more inclusive or exclusive interpretation of the own identity – regional integration or separation
- Decline in population caused by diseases, wars and natural disasters¹⁰⁰

Speaking about the connections between the societal sectors with the other sectors, the feeling of societal insecurity or danger would be growing in the relation to the other sectoral threats. These feelings are to be found on the regional level the most. Because of this interconnection, it is likely to happen that societal RSC will be identical with

⁹⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 139)

⁹⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 139)

⁹⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 140)

⁹⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 140)

¹⁰⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 141-2)

political and military RSC and will be functionally tightly intertwined. In such a case the authors give a perfect example of the ASEAN region.¹⁰¹

The political sector

The core of the political security creates the certain political order or orders and if it is challenged, it constitutes the biggest threat to the sovereignty of the states that becomes the main referential object. Among the securitized topics belonging to political sector the thesis can find threats coming from international regimes or law.¹⁰²

Political sector tends to be the most overlapping with the other sectors, as in usual very many agendas have their roots in political issues. Basically the security itself has primarily the political character, and the securitization is also political process.¹⁰³ Usually the threats found on the other sectors refer to security politically-economic, political-societal. From such realities the possible risk of the highest incoherencies of threats is on the political sector.¹⁰⁴

Into the main referential objects belong besides the state, state sovereignty, state government also political principles as the basic human and political rights. Also human being and various groups of individuals could be prime referential objects. The groups important within the securitization process should be politically powerful, pose a sufficient level of coercive power and should be engaged into certain level of institutionalization. Another category of groups can be the religious societies that have transnational character and support from their followers internationally. Nowadays with the radicalization of certain forms of Islam, some religious groups can be seen as the referential objects and securitization actor at the same time. As the referential objects the thesis can also consider “state-like” units in it different forms of quazistates or other organization, as the ASEAN is. Threats perceived on this sector are not of military nature, since the military issues because of their extensive importance gained a separate sectoral categorization.¹⁰⁵

Otherwise from the other sector the main actors of securitization are relatively clear. For the security of state speaks for its government, for the security of the ASEAN organization speak for its members and for various groups their leaders. The authors

¹⁰¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 162-3)

¹⁰² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 165)

¹⁰³ (Ayoob 1995 in Buzan *et al.* 2005, 166)

¹⁰⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 162-3)

¹⁰⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 170)

points out that in the last case sometimes the term of leader could be difficult, since some groups have more leaders and some of them declared themselves by their own decision and the others don't see them like that.¹⁰⁶

Important to understand is also the logic that securitizing actor will securitize the topics in favor of the respective referential object – so the government for instance works in favor of its state in order to strengthen its position. Furthermore, for example the threat can be challenging only the government, but the government by expanding the securitization will make it threatening to the whole state.¹⁰⁷ The same process could work for the member states of ASEAN and ASEAN itself. The threat comes to the securitization process as threatening only one state, but will come out as the threat for all.

In such processes the thesis can widely encounter the cases of political violence that take place if the government artificially mobilizes the threat over whole state just in order to strengthen its own position.¹⁰⁸

Within the regional dynamism the thesis can categorize the threats into several groups:

- 1) International threads towards the states created on the basis of their own internal fissions. This type is the most serious for small states. As outcomes derived the threat mobilization are usually bilateral or trilateral conflicts, that start from the political securitization sector and continues to the other sectors.¹⁰⁹ This threats type is very frequent and the thesis will closely analyze it on the particular case within the ASEAN.
- 2) International threats towards states based on the ideological-political matters. This threat is more frequent in other regions, but even within the ASEN the thesis could demonstrate it on case of pre-transitional Myanmar and also the thesis could look at authoritarian states like Brunei whose policies challenge the international norms and law.
- 3) Non-intentional threats from the side of other states towards states suffering from the cleavage state-nation.
- 4) Non-intentional threat towards states stirring from political-ideological disputes
- 5) The security behavior of supranational, regional integration complex and the reaction towards it. For such a case can serve the ASEAN as the international

¹⁰⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 171)

¹⁰⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 171)

¹⁰⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 171)

organization with its aim in integration of its members. The member states have joined the organization because they didn't want to stay outside the political affairs. But with deepening of its structure the integration comes more along and some states perceive it as the threat to their national sovereignty. The paradox is that the states voluntarily joined the institution but it constitutes for them in their eye the undesired outcomes.

- 6) Systematical and principle threats toward states vulnerable by state-nation cleavage.
- 7) Structural (systematical) threats towards states stemming from political-ideological disputes. The logical example within the thesis case could be the defense of the Asian values against the "western universalism" articulated mainly by China, Malaysia and Singapore.
- 8) Threats towards the transnational movements that have absolute support of their members. Today it is hard to find many others groups apart of religious. Throughout the ASEAN the thesis can apply this threat on Muslims, Hinduisms, Buddhists, Christians and the others.
- 9) Threats towards international community, order and law. In case of the ASEAN that are such threats that put risk into its basic principles etc.¹¹⁰

In case of all the groups of threats their occurrence can be frequently seen on bilateral, as in case of Malaysian – Philippine dispute over the territory in Borneo, or multilateral bases, rather than on the level of whole region. Other conflict can start with small number of conflicting parties, but with the globalization of conflict each side is joined by more players, each side grows bigger and the conflict gets on its boundaries. Furthermore, some unilaterally-global, when the state fights the global trend.¹¹¹

At the end it is important to realize that many security bind are related rather with principles than political power. And very often the principles are shaped regionally in large case of the ASEAN Way and Asian values.¹¹²

2.6 The transformation of the RSC

Further analyzing the units, the authors follow that units are subjects of all the present changes and the relations among them can be easily changed. They emphasize the

¹⁰⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 171)

¹¹⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 181-6)

¹¹¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 186-7)

question whether such changes help to strengthen the fundamental structure of a complex or to contribute towards the future transformation from security complex.

For the thesis the theoretical part describing the transformation of the RSC that enables to find the answer on the thesis research question will be essential. By confrontation of the sectoral synthesis findings and their examination with the four possible ways of transformation the thesis should be able to find the answer on the thesis research question.

Whether the RSC is coming to the transformation the thesis can assess according to theory's authors on changes of four main categories¹¹³:

1. The status quo stability - preservation

The mutual relations should produce unchanged outcomes, even though they have changed – the structure of security complex after such a change should be rather strengthened, at least not jeopardized. If the changes endanger the complex – the complex is the most likely going to transform itself.

2. The internal transformation

The internal transformation should be a result of an internal change of structure that doesn't affect the outside borders of complex. Such a transformation is most probably result of a regional integration, a substantial change in mutual relations or a significant change in power distribution or composition. If such changes mirror themselves into the external dimension, the complex is likely to transform.

3. The external transformation

The external transformation occurs when the change of a size of outside borders occurs. If the mutual relations are preserved while reducing or expanding the borders, the changes are not reflected to the nature of complex. But is very likely that adding or excluding one or more members will definitely have an impact on power distribution and on complex members' relations. Followed these processed the complex could be transformed.

4. Overlay

The overlay refers to situation when external powers intrude into the complex and by doing so significantly influence the security dynamics within the complex. However,

¹¹² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 186, 188)

¹¹³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 23)

this situation is not the same with an intervention or an interference of major powers into the complex's internal issues. If the presence of intruders is so strong that shifts the security dynamics of RSC the complex is likely to die out.

2.7 The final analysis synthesis

The authors understand a whole Regional Security Complex as “*the certain constellations of security ideas and concerns and particular cases of the securitization then represent the novel points between which it is possible to draw the relationships lines and map out the structure of the complex*”.¹¹⁴

While making the final analysis, the accompanying questions that the thesis should strive to answers are: Based on securitization within different sectors it is possible to identify the characteristics of the RSC within these sectors? If yes, these are RSC's overlaying with the RSC logic in other sectors?¹¹⁵

The main problem challenging the analysis on sectoral level is the separation of sectors one from another that must be overcome in order to successfully draw the whole picture of the regional security dynamism analysis. The theory authors say that the sectoral dialectics should be understood “*as clearly analytical tools, as the magnifying glasses of different shapes, through which we observe the same problems from different perspectives*”.¹¹⁶ To connect the analyzed sectors, the researchers suggest following steps:

- The sectors should mirrored a way of “sent it” to the particular actors in the form of various kinds of security problems¹¹⁷
- Apart of the focus on particular sectors the focus must be given to overlapping interactions across the sectors – they say to focus on any case of mutual interaction
- The overlapping relations should be further analyzed by studying the means of mutual interconnections
- The links can be then analyzed on 10 dynamic models of relations with the 5 securitization sectors
- Based on this model the thesis should be able to get the whole scheme of the empirical analysis from which the finding can be derived¹¹⁸

¹¹⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 67)

¹¹⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 189)

¹¹⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 195)

¹¹⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 195)

The authors consequently add that the analysis based on the identification of securitization on the sectors is not the only possible way of approaching the problem. Also the shifted approach can be used. This process should minimize the risk of omitting some important aspects not belonging particularly into any sector hence any important factor could be forgotten and left out from this reason. In this case a suggested proceeding is:

- 1) Identification of the securitization as the phenomenon in the region
- 2) Statement of regional units, the actors of securitization, but also units that constitute the referential objects
- 3) Draft of the model of the units' mutual relations that make the security complex
- 4) Within the logic of securitization analyze all the possible "unit after unit, conflict after conflict"
- 5) As the result from the constellation of main actors security ideas and concerns the thesis should get a whole picture of the security regional complex

As the thesis already mentioned in the methodology before, at the end of analysis as the thesis puts together all the findings proven on sectoral level into such a mosaic that should be able to identify or disprove the thesis case with all the factors given by the theory.

2.8 The region of Southeast Asia as the research topic of the RSC theory

The theory of the RSC was chosen as the most appropriate for the analysis of security dynamism among the member states of the ASEAN and in the region of Southeast Asia. The theory enables researchers to study the specifics of particular region at the time where globalization is all around present, but the regional level consequently does not lose any importance in comparison with the global¹¹⁹.

The ASEAN has a lot of regional specifics shaping the regional security mechanisms that cannot be universally recognized by other theories of large extent that do not take this argument into consideration. Further, other theories in International Relations focusing on regions do not include the tools for explaining of processes significance in environmental, economic, societal and other sectors at the same time that are for the thesis purposes essential.

¹¹⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 193-4)

¹¹⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 190)

The authors assume that in case of regions the environmental sector will be fully represented in securitization process, whereas the economic sectors securitization could be less because of its global nature. Even though according to theory the military and political sectors securitization should be traditionally be the strongest¹²⁰, however just the thesis case decides which sectors are more important over the others for the security dynamism in the region.

The subject of the thesis research is the region of the Southeast Asia or in the other words the Association of Southeast Asian States, the ASEAN that once according to the authors has created the RSC. From the perspective of International Relations the thesis can categorize the object on the level of analysis as the international subsystem “region”. The region is interconnected by high number of mutual interactions and by certain level interdependence of its members – the units.¹²¹

The authors in the past referred to the region of the ASEAN described as the Regional Security Complex that matched with the classical conception of regional complex theory. The aimed purpose of thesis is to prove whether the ASEAN still fits into the theory even after the theory was rethought and the ASEAN has moved forward to regional integration and institutionalization and it si near to reach its ultimate goal of “the ASEAN community 2015”¹²².

3. The Securitization Process within the ASEAN

In this chapter the thesis strives for the identification and presentation of the region as the basis for the later Regional Security Complex application; for the key actors of the securitization process; aims to name and explain the major securitization topics in a way that they could be further applied to the sectors of the analysis. Within the regional security dynamism presentation, the referential objects are introduced. Into the analysis the facilitating conditions for securitization are elaborated.

Further the chapter identifies the main securitization actors and classifies them into the three categories: The regional national states’ securitization, the securitization actors within the ASEAN groupings which are either exclusive just for the ASEAN members states and then inclusive also for the out-regional actors that engage into the ASEAN

¹²⁰ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 192)

¹²¹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 14-15)

¹²² (Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009)

meetings so significantly that they cannot be left out from the securitization actors' classification.

Within all the three categories the functional actors which by their activities directly or indirectly influence the securitization process should be taken into account. As functional actors are in most cases by thesis considered the influential external hegemon states.

Within the next chapter, the data eligible for the analysis on the sectoral level identified in this chapter are used.

3.1 The ASEAN establishment and the RSC theory

In the time of the ASEAN foundation, nobody exactly knew what the ASEAN function in the future will be like and at same time, nobody really knew what to expect. The authors David Martin Jones, Associate Professor at School of Political Science and International Studies, University of Queensland and M.L.R. Smith from Department of War Studies, University of London which study the ASEAN and its position in the International Relations for years, compares its establishment in Asian perspective with the "Gorbymania" in Europe connected with the new Russian presidential elections after the collapse of the USSR. They think about the ASEAN and its foundation that it was the same unexpected as the fall of the "Iron Curtain" itself.¹²³

Jones and Smith ascribe as one of the main ASEAN's function, maintaining Indonesia and its conflict potential; that time as probably the strongest player in the region, at the bay. Further, the regional dynamics has changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. There were two ways how Southeast Asia can be seen: firstly, as the carrier of the former Soviet Union and current socialist China and Vietnam ideological legacy, or as the region oriented rather on pro-Western Japan and the US. The ASEAN's foundation was designed ideally to support the second current. However, the both authors argue that there is big difference between "insiders and outsiders" in perception of the ASEAN. They claim that the insiders see the delusion of the organization, its aimed purposes and the detachment of the member states.¹²⁴

According to the thesis hypothesis just the ASEAN organization should be the main player who determines the regional security dynamics and connects its member states

¹²³ (Smith Jones 2006)

¹²⁴ (Smith Jones 2006, 144)

into mutually interlinked net of interactions that constitutes the core of the Southeast Asian security complex.

At this point the thesis encounters two different schools of thought, hence it attempts of the widest analysis possible to include all important facts and insights that determine the functional region's picture on the basis of the RSC logic.

As suggested within the ASEAN the thesis assumes the possible categorization of its member states on the bipolar axis –some represent the ideological “Eastern” pole, which is socialist with less democratic tools in governance as in case of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos; some of the states go more on “Western” path attempting for more democratic way of governance as in case of the Philippines, Indonesia and the others¹²⁵; and the rest of them stands somewhere on the axis between the two poles.

The ideological structure can be still considered as bipolar and demonstrates the status quo in the region. The status quo is important to be kept for the region's functioning as the RSC. The status quo is also to keep the balance of power within the RSC, proving another major characteristic of the RSC.

As Smith and Jones discuss in case of the ASEAN the status quo is maintained and based on the consensus-driven decisions among the member states on the ground of the ASEAN.¹²⁶ Further they argue that the ASEAN is endorsed by other states for its unique diplomacy, economic growth, non-confrontational strategies that are on large scale based on inter-personal relations.¹²⁷ These principles the thesis can consider as the referential objects within the political sector of the securitization.

The ASEAN is to be endorsed as a core for other multilateral regional bodies, shall become the cornerstone of the Asia - Pacific¹²⁸ regional management process, shall facilitate the regional cooperation, and shall assist in building of the regional identity and a new global community¹²⁹. All these functions attributed to it should give it a fruitful soil to be a powerful securitization actor.

Nevertheless Smith and Jones oppose with saying that the organization is ineffective and does not currently seemed to be important because its political and economic

¹²⁵ But that does not mean that these states have achieved the advanced democratic governing as in Europe, for example.

¹²⁶ (Smith Jones 2006, 144)

¹²⁷ (Smith Jones 2006, 145)

¹²⁸ The definition includes the countries of Asia and Pacific region. The definition used by Asia - Pacific Center for Security Studies even the further countries, which lie at the Pacific shores. ASIA-PACIFIC (Center For Security Studies 2014)

¹²⁹ (Smith Jones 2006, 144)

power, but rather as the “*force for fashioning an integrated East Asia region*”¹³⁰. Assuming they are right in their assumption, even while taking into account the role given to the ASEAN by them, the organization would be still having the strong securitization voice since it unites its members into a strong voice. Furthermore, the authors say that the organization still have the potential for change, because after the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997-8 the ASEAN states have engaged in structural reforms that could as a result remake the ASEAN in an effective body.¹³¹

The perception of the ASEAN has also changed with the spreading of the constructivist debate. For the authors, the new regionalism in Southeast Asia referring to current ASEAN structure has begun emerging through controversies and debates. The collective identity built on the top of the process is one of the today’s components of the status quo in the region.¹³² For the ASEAN, hence, not only the regional integration is topic of securitization, but building of the collective identity as well.

Further Smith and Jones expand the logic of the RSC on the whole region of East Asia that constitutes another alternative development in the complex that the thesis must elaborate on within the current analysis. According to them: “*East Asian region is so closely connected in political, social, economic and ecological terms that is impossible to consider one state’s fate independently from another*”¹³³. This statement clearly supports the logic of the RSC, but definitely is not sufficient for the judgment at this point of analysis.

3.1.1 The ASEAN Diplomacy

For the securitization process in the ASEAN the unique role is played by the specific style of diplomacy conducted on the ground of its institutions. The diplomatic processes structurally predefine which topics are to climb on the top of the securitization agenda and what could obstruct them from getting there, as it could be the consensus-based principle, for example.

The ASEAN does not stand on strong institutional grounds in style of the EU. Rather it was built on diplomacy stemming from the shared norms: “*the operationalization into*

¹³⁰ (Smith Jones 2006, 145)

¹³¹ (Smith Jones 2006, 145)

¹³² (Smith Jones 2006, 153)

¹³³ (Smith Jones 2006, 153)

*the framework of the regional interactions, based on the high level of discreteness, informality, pragmatism, expediency and non-confrontational style”.*¹³⁴

Further it is necessary to understand the ASEAN Way of conducting diplomacy, as it is further discussed in following chapter.

3.2 The regional national states' securitization

The national interests of the ASEAN member states are not always the same as of the ASEAN organization. The fragmentation of the interests could undermine the ASEAN strength, unity, hence the ability of the organization to function effectively. The securitized topics coming up from the level of national states are plenty, and the ASEAN's role in it is to unify or coordinate them into such a phase for them not be contradictory.

There are several ideological streams within the ASEAN constituting from the national states and each of them supports more or less the securitization in various areas.

For the national states it is through their engagement in the ASEAN the most important gaining of a bigger bargaining power and collective strength as the bloc. Economically, they are, thanks to it the faster expansion and entering the global markets. But at the same time they are more vulnerable due to their interconnections and interdependencies in case of economic recession. Going along with the enhanced peace and stability inside the region the attractiveness of the FDIs arises either.

The member states further seek for an enhancement of the process of community building, which helps to diminish the mutual tensions, further for the strengthening of personal ties, meeting of states on regular basis, cooperation of NGOs realizing the policies of community building etc. All these factors according to member states contribute to the economic growth.

As suggested, among the national states is securitized a success of the intra-organizational cooperation, supported by the ASEAN Way diplomacy. The whole ASEAN Way process consisting of the style of decisions-making based on consultations and consensus reaching is highly securitized, since based on it any state cannot be forced to do anything what it does not want to do. Processes based on the ASEAN Way consider the positions on the lowest common denominator that can be agreed on, or it is agreed on disagreement and the national states go their separate ways. The ASEAN Way is so much preferred, because the national states are still in process of a nation-

¹³⁴ (Smith Jones 2006, 200)

building and in that stage they are not willing to sacrifice any level of their sovereignty.¹³⁵

In economic terms, the widest trade liberalism possible is strongly pushed by Singapore. Malaysia and the other states oppositely support the economic assistance into the states economies that would create from them an ideological imagined defensible fortress.¹³⁶ Furthermore, Vietnam and other member states strongly push for the ASEAN Economic Community creation¹³⁷, whose achieving is among the most securitized topics on level of the whole ASEAN organization.

As one of the most common political topic of securitization to be easiest agreed upon, is the non-intervention of the external players into the sovereign issues of the national states. The ASEAN members agreed on that the outside states' interventions were the most often cause of conflict; hence they must be excluded from the internal issues. As the biggest threat in this sense are perceived the insurgences sponsored by China.¹³⁸

However this goal is not shared by all regional states and it happened to be a topic of disagreement. The most concerned over the external powers intrusion was Indonesia, the only state whose outside security does not depend on alliances with outside western powers, as it is the most prevailing in case of the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. Furthermore, all of these states expressed their hope in moderating the conflicts with neighboring states thanks to the ASEAN and reduce their dependence on external powers, but at the same time all of them refused to give up the outside protection. Even though, their abandonment was one of the main ASEAN establishing premises. After all these states managed to include the foreign military bases in the ASEAN Charter like temporary.¹³⁹

Whereas, Indonesia did not have guarantor of security, the other states namely Singapore were concerned over her rising power. That declares that the differing power of the member states is also perceived by them as a threat. The withdrawal of foreign bases was among the member states assignments and one of the ASEAN's priorities, but without a time frame.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ (Shaun 1998, 202)

¹³⁶ (Smith, Jones 2006, 153)

¹³⁷ (Chauhan, 2013)

¹³⁸ (Shaun 1998, 196)

¹³⁹ (Shaun 1998, 197)

¹⁴⁰ (Shaun 1998, 198)

Going deeper into the political topics, all the members support the securitization of terrorism by which the continent is widely plagued. The referential objects are the states and their inhabitants with their basic needs, same as the groups of people within the societies as the Islamist religious groups. These groups could suffer from terrorist activities accusations with which they do not have anything common.

3.2.1 The national states' securitization of the South China Sea Dispute

The national governments go further in terms of securitization to detailed topics such as the South China Sea Disputes. This dispute is undoubtedly on the high securitization agenda since it includes directly almost a majority of Southeast Asian states as Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines and the others¹⁴¹.

The problem for the ASEAN can be that even within this dispute the positions of its members are not united as their national interests differ. Thailand is the most obvious example, several times she has proven, that she could withdraw from the ASEAN if her membership will not be beneficial for her anymore¹⁴². Thailand stands exactly between China and the ASEAN when it comes to her priorities within her foreign policies. In 2012 Thai Prime Minister Y. Shinawatra declared: *“Regarding the disputes in South China Sea, Thailand understands China’s concerns over the issue.”*¹⁴³ Cambodia also backed China in this case as *“Cambodia is the major recipient of Chinese aid, loans and investments, supported China’s position that disputes over the South China Sea are bilateral and therefore should not appear on an ASEAN joint statement.”*¹⁴⁴ On the other hand, Vietnam in order to oppose China, offered the offshore oil blocks located in her EEZ to foreign companies to benefit from it to demonstrate that even if China claims it, Vietnam can do whatever she wants.¹⁴⁵ In case of Vietnam, the dispute with China is the most prioritized topic of securitization within the political sector, urged on the ASEAN ground and within the whole regional security architecture.¹⁴⁶

As the referential objects in this case are considered to be the nation states' territorial integrities, their accesses to the maritime EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zones)¹⁴⁷ and

¹⁴¹ (Chung 2013, 820)

¹⁴² (Shaun 1998, 207)

¹⁴³ (Chung 2013, 820)

¹⁴⁴ (Ghosh 2012 in Chung 2013, 820)

¹⁴⁵ (Chung 2013, 820)

¹⁴⁶ (Chauhan 2013)

¹⁴⁷ (Chung 2013, 820)

extensively their economic performances, since within the EEZ's are found the large mineral reservoirs that the states benefit from.

3.2.2 The Vietnam's invasion to Cambodia

The ASEAN member states also have shown that they can oppositely put aside their own interests and give preference to the ASEAN ones. Giving example of such situation the thesis considers the position of Indonesia after the Vietnam-Cambodia crisis. After Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978 to overthrow the regime of the Red Khmers¹⁴⁸, Vietnam broke some of the most essential standing principles of the ASEAN organization. By her membership, Vietnam has bound herself to adherence of the principles of non-interference to sovereign issues of another country, principle of peaceful conflict settlement etc. For long time after the invasion, the dispute was on the top of the ASEAN securitization agenda and for the ASEAN it was probably the biggest test in managing regional security so far. For following 12 years the ASEAN had been trying to push out Vietnam from Cambodia mostly by diplomatic means. The ASEAN conducted dual track policies; and it was still keeping the ties with Vietnam outside the grounds of the ASEAN that evoked the disputes among its member states over the internal ASEAN policies¹⁴⁹

Thanks to this crisis the ASEAN got the reputation of a strong international actor and its member states initiated the cooperation on such a level that was never achieved before. The situation also showed the limits of the intra-ASEAN cooperation and it is likely that such success in the same regional constellation and under the same regional circumstances will not be repeated. In this conflict China has proven to be the biggest actor in managing regional security thanks to her influence. China had held the opposite attitude to the situation than the ASEAN. At this phase Indonesia significantly showed her solidarity with the ASEAN and she prioritized the ASEAN's collective policies over her own ones and stepped aside from the ties with China, even though they were beneficial for her. The opposite attitudes demonstrated Singapore and Thailand¹⁵⁰. Thailand claimed if the ASEAN did not support Thai interests, Thailand could probably

¹⁴⁸ (Herman 2008)

¹⁴⁹ (Shaun 1998, 205)

¹⁵⁰ (Rungswasdisab 2014)

leave the organization¹⁵¹. Because the ASEAN was not able to persuade Vietnam to capitulate and China, Thailand and other countries were pushing so strongly on it, the whole situation has influenced all the ASEAN member states. None of them could have actually followed its own economic interests with Vietnam; however they willingly subordinated their strategies in accordance to the ASEAN's proceedings. The final word in the crisis's solution had the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) showing to be extremely important and successful as on its basis the ASEAN together with China and the US thanks to diplomatic pressure made Vietnam to leave Cambodia.¹⁵²

3.3 The ASEAN exclusive member institutions' securitization

In this subchapter the thesis focuses on those ASEAN institutionalized groupings, which by their nature do not allow any other states apart of the ASEAN members to become their part. Such institutional exclusiveness allows states to create strategies on which trajectories they want the ASEAN to go regardless the positions of the external partners. The ASEAN organization can then easily represent their attitudes united into one strong voice.

The subchapter focuses on the securitization articulated by institutions as: The ASEAN Summit – the supreme policy-making body, the ASEAN Coordinating Council comprised of foreign ministers; the ASEAN Community Council which embodied the three bodies according the ASEAN pillar structure: ASEAN Political-Security Community Council, ASEAN Economic Community Council, ASEAN Socio-Culture Community Council; further the Secretary General of ASEAN and ASEAN Secretariat; the Committee of permanent representatives to ASEAN etc.¹⁵³

The overarching topic of securitization that is creates the ASEAN internal discourse already from the time of its establishment is the maintaining security of member states challenged by the internal and external factors. There are five main documents adopted on the ASEAN security until 1998; however there is not united strategy how to approach the security issues. The member states were not able to find an agreement on

¹⁵¹ The Vietnam-Cambodia War had direct implications for Thailand, as Thailand provided Cambodian Red Khmers opposition shelter on Thai territory, supplied them with weaponry and was insisting on legality of Red Khmer rule over Cambodia. Since conflict was therefore inflicting the Thai territory, the Thai government understood the Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia as direct threat to Thai national sovereignty. China shared the same views on situation that has brought the Thai-Chinese rapprochement. (Rungswasdisab 2014)

¹⁵² (Shaun 1998, 208)

¹⁵³ (ASEAN Charter 2008, 10 – 17)

it so far and the ASEAN's Chart explicitly says that states must follow the concept of noninterference to one's sovereignty.¹⁵⁴

Based on that the founding principles of the ASEAN are top prioritized, at the same time securitized by the exclusive ASEAN institutions. Besides the principle of noninterference to one's sovereignty the member states in the ASEAN Charter bound themselves to adhere others like: respect for independence, territorial integrity, equality, national identity, enhancing regional peace, security and prosperity, reliance on peaceful conflicts settlement, adherence the rule of law, good governance, the principles of democracy and constitutional governance, respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights protection and upholding the United Nations Charter and international law among others.¹⁵⁵ These topics are to be understood as the referential objects and the securitization actors are the exclusive ASEAN institutions.

The ASEAN exclusive members' institutions current ultimate goal is the creation of the ASEAN Community by 2015. This goal serves as the umbrella to many component goals which are connected with certain tools. The planned ASEAN Community 2015 is in detail discussed further in the thesis.

3.4 The ASEAN inclusive members institutions' securitization

From the all the ASEAN gatherings the inclusive bodies in which China, Japan and South Korea hold a membership, are the most important for the Eastern and the Southeast Asian institutional architecture. Among other influential actors that exercise their influence and interests in the region belong no less the US, India, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and the EU.

For the thesis case is essential the security dynamics as shown on the institutions as the APT, the ARF, the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADMM+), the EAS, the APT, the TPP and others.

The grouping ASEAN Plus three is believed to become an embryo of East Asia Regional organization. The nature of body embraces the Asian partners and gives the status of outsider to all other countries as Australia, New Zealand, and the US etc. The trend given by the grouping rejects the US supremacy in the region and rather focuses on the new extended agenda of regionalism – inclusive whole East Asia.¹⁵⁶ Such a new

¹⁵⁴ (Shaun 1998, 198)

¹⁵⁵ (ASEAN Charter 2008, 6–7)

¹⁵⁶ (Smith, Martin Jones 2006, 153)

regional constellation is understood to be topic of the securitization within the body and the other bodies of the ASEAN. The referential object in this case is the exclusivity of membership within the region.

The new dynamism in expanding the inclusive ASEAN bodies overshadow little bit the original groupings as the ARF, that believed by many has become more like the “talk-shop” among the members and no real actions are produced on its ground. Others say that ARF still fulfils its function residing in creating the interactions between states, embracing the mutual relations among its member states that arise from the gatherings on regular basis. The ARF is until now perceived as important institution by the US through which she still exercises her influence.¹⁵⁷

The ARF consists of 27 states¹⁵⁸ and was aimed to become a broader security forum that aims to use diplomacy developed in the ASEAN to apply on the Asia - Pacific region. It was aimed to defuse the potential conflicts before they will actually happen thanks to developing social interactions among the states. The ARF was designed as the wide forum in which the ASEAN claims the proprietary law to decide which topics will be discussed, giving a very convenient floor for pushing through the topics securitized by the ASEAN. Such an undertaking has brought the resentment from other states.¹⁵⁹

The potential in the ARF was seen as that the ASEAN can bring all the big powers together, however they “*must recognize its intermediary role*”. On the other hand at the same time trying to confront great powers to the ASEAN agenda can rather undermine the position of the ARF.¹⁶⁰ Partly because of that, the other inclusive institutions are nowadays prioritized by their members to attract their focus and influence instead.

3.4.1 The engagement of China and Japan into the ASEAN institutions

Among the most important players in the ASEAN groupings from outside the ASEAN are China and Japan. To be able to understand in deepthe their role and importance for the securitization process within the region, their engagement in the ASEAN must be analyzed in detail. Following subchapter elaborates on the inclusive ASEAN

¹⁵⁷ (Simon 2013)

¹⁵⁸ The current participants of the ARF are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Vietnam. (ASEAN Regional Forum 2014)

¹⁵⁹ (Shaun 1998, 209)

¹⁶⁰ (Shaun 1998, 209)

institutions, their functions connected with the securitization in the region, and the role of two major external actors – China and Japan in the whole mosaic of regional security interests and interactions.

The subchapter begins with the development of Chinese-Japanese relations in regard to their engagement in the ASEAN institutions. Further it goes deeper into the ASEAN inclusive organizations' architecture, and concludes with the identification of main securitization topics, actors and referential objects.

The thesis operates with the terms of “inclusiveness” and “exclusiveness” of memberships in the ASEAN various groupings. These terms are not quoted from any official terminology, but they are used only for the purposes of the thesis. By the “inclusive membership” is meant such type of membership that is also available for the ASEAN non-regular members. The “exclusive membership” refers oppositely just to those state, who are the regular ASEANs members and no any other body can apply for this type of membership.

Both Japan and China actively and competitively do engage in the ASEAN institutions. Japan engagement could be considered as the attempt to dilute Chinese influence in regional frameworks in order to deny its overall leadership in Southeast Asia, plus the attempt to contain Chinese influence to the region by the alliance-weaving.¹⁶¹

Such developments are obvious proofs of the animosity in Sino-Japanese mutual relations and it refers to Japan un-forgiveness for the Chinese actions in the past. Japan also thanks to the tight cooperation with the US in its defense strategy was being seen for long time as important actor within the ASEAN involvement. Thus, China was trying to go along with Japan. Nonetheless Japan lost its influence on China by Chinese rise in 2004. Therefore Japan from 2005 holds the strategy of the engaging China in the ASEAN institutions in order to just have her besides and be able to oversee her activities.¹⁶²

Considering the latest evolution of the ASEAN inclusive institutionalized groupings and their functional effectiveness, the obvious decrease is to be noted, as the number of member states increases. Even the Chinese and Japanese preferences on the groupings' architecture are different – China would appreciate fewer members in economic groupings such as the EAS and the APT, while Japan would prefer fewer members in political institutions as the ARF, and the ADMM+. The reason is as the major

¹⁶¹ (Chung 2013, 802)

consequence of the ASEAN Plus arrangements become a numbers game since 2005, they compete over South Korean support.¹⁶³

Furthermore, Chien Peng Chung, the specialist on the East Asian studies of Lingnan University in Hong Kong, argues that China through its engagements in the ASEAN institutions pursues its own interests. Japan and the ASEAN states hoped that through China's engagement into the ASEAN structures can be reduced the Chinese military build-up. The reason for such an assumption is following, if China would be better aware of other states military capabilities that she learnt about through the engagement into the ASEAN, she would not struggle so hard in raising her capacities for her survival.¹⁶⁴

Chung further argues that China's involvement could be beneficial for the final resettlement of the South China Sea Dispute. But China instead widely engages in the position of the desecuritization of the conflict because she is aware that any internalization or securitization effort could probably result in her defeat. The securitization of the dispute is by the other states aimed for many reasons, mainly because of its impacts on maritime freedom.¹⁶⁵ Repeatedly, from 1995 up to 2004 the conflict has been brought to the ARF and its working groups. However Japan didn't manage to get itself into these specialized working groups and because of that raised its pessimism about the ARF work efficacy.¹⁶⁶

The ARF for the long time used to serve as the most significant forum, at which all the ASEAN members were meeting the world leading actors on the regular basis. The ARF was evolving almost from the same date back in the history as the ASEAN itself. The first phase of its development was the confidence-building between its members that not always could have been accomplished. Because of the conflicting issues that its members were sharing, explains why at some negotiations could not have been attended by both China and Japan at the same time.¹⁶⁷ The second stage of development was the preventive diplomacy involvement. At this stage China got concerned over Taiwan issue and later about the South China Sea dispute not to be regionalized and securitized by superpowers involved into the ARF. The ARF strived for the agreement including all

¹⁶² (Chung 2013, 802)

¹⁶³ (Chung 2013, 802)

¹⁶⁴ (Chung 2013, 803)

¹⁶⁵ (Chung 2013, 803)

¹⁶⁶ (Chung 2013, 804)

¹⁶⁷ (Chung 2013, 805)

the affected parties in the South China Sea Dispute, but any document that would be truly effective have not been signed.¹⁶⁸

In general, China and Japan use the ground of the ARF as a ground for the competition over power and for the expressions of mutual animosity. Taking into account the securitization process, Chinese and Japanese competitive behavior causes the securitization of topics directed against the competitor.

Furthermore, the mutual relations of China and Japan became the object of securitization within the ASEAN itself, because their animosity could significantly jeopardize the cooperation's achievements. Hence there were attempts to overcome these disagreements, but they did not accomplish much. The increased communication between China and Japan on the ground of the ARF did not result even into a better understanding of each other, but exactly to opposite.¹⁶⁹

Further, it seems that Japan is strongly interested in deepening the ASEAN institutionalization if the ARF in current form is not being successful in aiming at major topics. The institutionalization that would function effectively, hence Japan perceives her own function in the ASEAN institutions seriously. Lately Japan was calling for the establishment of the ARF permanent body and in 2004 the member states decided on creation of the ARF Unit, similar to the ASEAN Secretariat.¹⁷⁰ The institutional quality and effectiveness deepening is without any doubts one of the most securitized topics by the ASEAN members themselves in last 10 years.

3.4.2 The ASEAN's cooperation with external partners on bilateral level

Another way how the big world powers still more often cooperate with the ASEAN and try to push for their interests is the interaction on bilateral level. It also could seem that the big powers regard the ASEAN more seriously when it comes to cooperation on level of the ASEAN plus One institutional design.¹⁷¹

Within the bilateral relationship of the ASEAN and China the economic areas of cooperation are clearly securitized at the highest level. The current Chinese president declared *“that China and the ASEAN should share the common destiny - “shall forge a*

¹⁶⁸ (Chung 2013, 804)

¹⁶⁹ (Chung 2013, 804)

¹⁷⁰ (Chung 2013, 804-5)

¹⁷¹ (Chung 2010, 11)

*“community of common destiny” and “maritime Silk Road of the 21st century” expanding China-ASEAN trade to US\$1 trillion by 2020.”*¹⁷²

China focuses on the cooperation at the level of creation of the free trade area with all the ASEAN countries. The so called CAFTA, the aimed FTA between ASEAN and China was created by 2010.¹⁷³ For the ASEAN China is also seen as the most important economic partner, who regionally and globally grows the fastest and to the ASEAN can bring a lot of economic advancement. Hence China is seen as the partner no. 1, no matter how difficult the accommodation with her internal policies and externally oriented disagreements could be, hence the bilateral strategy has the green light.¹⁷⁴

Within the securitization process referring to the regional economic transformations, the basic referential object is the creation of the single ASEAN’s market and its connection to the Chinese market. The stability of national economies that could be by the Chinese disruption of cooperation strongly affected remains the undouble component of the securitized topics as well.

With Japan the cooperation is also conducted on the bilateral level; however it lacks the tangible actions. With Japan the signed ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the partnership dealing with non-traditional threats. The Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-tradition Threats was also closed with China as big progress in the field of managing the regional security on the bilateral level¹⁷⁵.

In recent developments, based on the signed strategic partnerships the *“non-military domestic or cross border threats to regime survival are more likely to be of concern to these governments than traditional military threats”*¹⁷⁶. Such threats threaten all the ASEAN member states in the same way – it cannot be said that the security of one state is less challenged than the others are at the same time. Within the field of non-traditional threat China also sees as the main security threats terrorism, transnational crime, natural disasters and the ASEAN’s countries share the similar view. Plus they even securitize domestic insurgencies and borders defense within the field of non-traditional threats.

Such development in the field of non-traditional threats clearly indicates the slight shift from traditional military and security topics as the almost unique subject of

¹⁷² (Dittmer 2014, 9)

¹⁷³ (Xinhua 2010)

¹⁷⁴ (CCTV Online 2013)

¹⁷⁵ (Chung 2013, 810)

¹⁷⁶ (Chung 2013, 811)

securitization. Giving the importance to non-traditional security threats as the global warming, terrorism, non-states actors proves that the securitizing actors admit their existence. Judging based on the thesis analysis it is a big step forward.

Further, nowadays thanks to the Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and the ASEAN's TAC signed with both China and Japan on the basis on the ASEAN's bilateral diplomacy, China is considered as the largest partner of the ASEAN. Nowadays, even for long time securitized topic of military cooperation is realized between the ASEAN and China, since China has proposed to the ASEAN the mutual military consultations.¹⁷⁷

Both China and the ASEAN have sympathy for similar principles in diplomacy, which makes the agreement on the bilateral level easier. They are "politically challengeable", but both have the growing capacities. Both of them strongly insist on the policy of non-interference into the intra-states affairs, embracement regimes' sovereignty and depending economic growth in exchange of political systems legitimacy. These topics can be clearly identified as the main securitization formulations during the whole ASEAN's evolvement and diplomacy progresses until now.¹⁷⁸

In contrary, Japan is exactly the opposite case in its embraced values and desired securitization topics. Because Japanese focus on the grounds of the ASEAN goes in different direction and puts on the peak of securitization the human security agenda preferring the security of citizens over the governments. In contrary, the ASEAN used to desecuritize the agenda of human security for long times. That is also why the Japan involvement is not so strongly prioritized within the ASEAN structures.¹⁷⁹

The securitization agenda of the human security is being slightly shaped nowadays even within the ASEAN's field of interest and the universal human rights gained a political importance. Furthermore, the research has encountered, that the perception of the universal human rights in Southeast Asia is not exactly the same as in the "Western" part of the world. For instance, many differences, sometime extremes, in this perception are caused by the religious nature of state regimes.¹⁸⁰ However, the agenda of universal human rights is after all being securitized in last years by the ASEAN; and Japan

¹⁷⁷ (Chung 2013, 812)

¹⁷⁸ (Chung 2013, 811)

¹⁷⁹ (Chung 2013, 811)

¹⁸⁰ (Haaretz 2014)

significantly contributed into this effort. Nevertheless some of components of the human rights as formulated by the UN¹⁸¹ are being desecuritized.¹⁸²

From the establishment of the ASEAN institutions that include members from outside the region, Japan and China are mutually the biggest competitors in the struggle for power, influence and acquiring of strategic partners. Because of all so far mentioned Japan strongly dislikes the deep Chinese involvement within the ASEAN and their partnership on strategic issues perceive as the attempt of limitation of its own engagement into the ASEAN's structures. Furthermore Japan, the US and other pro-western strategic partners emphasize the enlarging membership in the ASEAN institutions and groupings. They securitize the institutions widening for USA, Australia, New Zealand, India and other countries.¹⁸³

Based on the power decomposition, the extended ASEAN strategic community is more polarized. China also entered TAC in 2004, one year after its creation. The China – ASEAN strategic partnership brought to the ASEAN's countries even more intense mutual ties, since it started to be administrated trough the one year cycle summit. Thanks to the meetings on regular basis the annual gatherings of high representatives have brought stronger cooperation not just within the strategic partnership, but also within the ASEAN-China FTA among the others.¹⁸⁴

China through the nurturing of cooperation with the ASEAN institutions that not directly include USA follows her aimed attempts for mitigation of the U.S. involvement in the region of East Asia and she pushed for the transformation of the APT into the EAS. China securitizes the creation of the new institution within the ASEAN where she could exercise even more her influence and through her involvement she securitizes the reduction of the US engagement in the region.¹⁸⁵

3.4.3 Concerns over the rise of China

Establishment of the East Asian Summit (EAS) enhanced Japanese feelings of necessity of joining the multilateral forum where it could be counterbalancing China, especially if the other East Asian countries fearing the Chinese raising dominance could join the forum as well. *“The EAS declaration called for an “open, inclusive, transparent, and*

¹⁸¹ (Dougherty 2011)

¹⁸² (Chung 2013, 811)

¹⁸³ (Chung 2013, 811)

¹⁸⁴ (Chung 2013, 812)

¹⁸⁵ (Chung 2013, 812)

externally-oriented” regionalism”.¹⁸⁶ The fear of Chinese rise persists to be evident also among the other ASEAN members – for example Indonesia and Singapore.¹⁸⁷

Japan was pushing for wide membership in the EAS based on universal political values as the adherence of human rights and democratic principles, and China refused it. Paradoxically, it became another issue that brought China and the majority of the ASEAN member states together against Japan. The human rights issues, however securitized within the ASEAN, are still splitting the ASEAN countries apart, since for some of them is it still too sensitive topic.¹⁸⁸

Through engagement of other countries into the EAS Japan was hoping for the prevention of the isolation of the regional politics and for the enclosing of the region to non-Asian powers that especially USA feared so much.¹⁸⁹ Reentering the Asian community is not important for Japan not just because of the economic inclusion, but mainly the close partnership remains for Japan the highest priority after her long exclusion based on the historical reasons.¹⁹⁰

To demonstrate Japanese desires through her involvement in the Southeast Asian groupings, she seeks for the diversification of her defense strategy. Japan has no capacities to guarantee herself the defense and until now she relies on the defense guarantee of the US. With the US withdrawal from Southeast Asia, Japan starts to feel insecure and searches for the alternative options of collective defense.¹⁹¹

3.4.4 Defense Securitization

Based on regional institutional evolution dynamics, the thesis identifies the other major topic of securitization in the region, which is the collective defense creation and defense guarantee.¹⁹² Regarding the defense, the ASEAN still focuses on the US guarantees and welcomes a tighter connection to the US. Oppositely the ASEAN leaves the other countries that it feels the need to be vigilant about, like Russia, outside the institutions of the common ground and establishes with them the diplomatic ties on bilateral level. That could be the most probably the reason why the US was in 2011 included into the EAS and Russia was not.

¹⁸⁶ (Chung 2013, 812)

¹⁸⁷ (Chung 2013, 813)

¹⁸⁸ (Chung 2013, 814)

¹⁸⁹ (Chung 2013, 814)

¹⁹⁰ (Chung 2013, 815)

¹⁹¹ (Singh, 2008)

¹⁹² (Sokolsky 2001)

3.4.5 The enlargement in the membership of the ASEAN institutions

China was stressing that with the EAS enlargement any cooperation would be more difficult since the consensus will have to be found among more members. The enlargement of the EAS meant for the ASEAN important changes of direction in trends of managing the regional security. One of them was that China then started to discuss the regional issues only on bilateral or mini-lateral level.¹⁹³ Even if the ASEAN countries do not like such arrangements they cannot afford to oppose them and get in a dispute with China.

China wishes for the regional integration to be accomplished in Southeast Asia and also in East Asia. Because then China could gain the influence arising from her local involvement over the extremely strategically important regions. Especially the economic integration is prioritized. Moreover China prefers to accomplish her interests namely by setting rules in Southeast Asia, on the ground where the US could not challenge her heavily. At the same time China cannot afford to get herself into direct trouble with the US, which is why she is being taking advantages of her affiliation to the ASEAN.¹⁹⁴

3.4.6 The US involvement into the securitization process

Sharing the borders with the ASEAN members is not the only reason, why to engage in regional developments. All the major world powers follow their interests in Southeast Asia and their involvement in regional organizations gives them access to it. Hence the world's hegemons participate in functioning of the ASEAN institutions even if the territorial proximity is not the reason, as in case of USA.

Currently the US is "rebalancing" her posture towards Southeast Asia. The term rebalancing refers to major strategic position in the US diplomacy, when the US is transferring its capacities into other places in Asia and in the world. The US attention in the region is namely distracted by her focus and involvement in Middle East, Iran, and Persian Gulf recently. The change in the strategy is even more striking as the Southeast Asia was considered as the Pivot of the US geopolitical strategy standing from 2011.¹⁹⁵ Thus there are too many oversee commitments for the US to sustain her primary role in Asia - Pacific. It might happen that her position would be there marginal, but hardly

¹⁹³ Minilateral level refers to an interaction with small number of counterparts – 3, 4, etc.

¹⁹⁴ (Chung 2013, 816)

¹⁹⁵ (Tow 2014, 13)

diminishes. The US continuously supports the ASEAN Community building and promotes the TPP trade initiative.¹⁹⁶

The US approaches towards Southeast Asia could seem to be quite ambivalent. The ASEAN representatives were significantly surprised, when president Obama twice did not attend the very important ASEAN's assemblies in 2013 and the concerns about the US engagement in the region have arisen. On the other hand *“the deepening of America's Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) with China also illustrated this intent of greater overall U.S. regional involvement”* in the region.¹⁹⁷

The ASEAN members apart of China see the biggest importance of the US involvement because of the maritime issues and the defense protection of many of the ASEAN members as it was by the US guaranteed.

The maritime involvement is priority indeed for the US as well. The US pursues her goal in interconnecting the maritime area surrounding the region: *“U.S. officials emphasized the imperative of strategically linking Southeast Asia with the Indian Ocean to form a critical maritime theater of operations; they stated that by 2020, 60% of U.S. naval assets would be deployed in the ‘Indo-Pacific.’”*¹⁹⁸ With her strategy correspond the treaties signed between the US and her strategic partners as the Comprehensive Partnership along with the 2011 Joint Vision Statement for the Thai-U.S. Defense Alliance, the Washington Declaration on Defense Cooperation with New Zealand signed in 2012, the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with Myanmar signed in 2013, the U.S.-Vietnam Comprehensive Partnership signed in 2013 and the U.S.-India Joint Declaration on Defense Cooperation signed in 2013. Among these treaties is also included the deployment of the first of four U.S. Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore in March 2013, the rotation of U.S. Marine Air Ground Task Force units to Darwin in Australia and substantial increases in U.S. military assistance to and intelligence coordination with the Philippines.¹⁹⁹

Based on the attention given to the maritime cooperation, the emphasis on containing the Chinese influence in/over Southeast Asian region and her involvement in the ASEAN's institutions is not given the top priority anymore.²⁰⁰ However the US goals

¹⁹⁶ (Tow 2014, 13)

¹⁹⁷ (Tow 2014, 13)

¹⁹⁸ (Tow 2014, 19)

¹⁹⁹ (Tow 2014, 20)

²⁰⁰ (Kelly 2014)

and evolvement of strategy in the ASEANs issues can be easily changed. The outcomes in the US foreign policies' strategies of the recent extensive visit of president Obama in Southeast Asia are to be expected.

Hence, among the highly securitized topics of the US involvement is to be found the institutionalization of maritime cooperation in Indian Ocean, including the dominant employment of the US maritime forces and for time being maintaining the status quo in the region.²⁰¹

4. The Sectoral Analysis

In previous chapter the thesis sought for an analysis of the major securitization actors within the region, for the topics that they securitize. In the this chapter the thesis strives for the identification of them on the sectoral logic, same as for the formulation of the inter- sectoral relations and interconnections, and finally, the thesis aims to apply the securitization process on the various sectors of analysis by taking into picture the functional actors and facilitating conditions on the basis of dialectics of the RSC. The mosaic of securitization actors' mutual relations and interconnections gives us a better understanding of security dynamism in the region, on which basis the analysis in next chapter demonstrates the possible applicability of the RSCT.

4.1 Military sector

The region of the ASEAN is the case, where the Cold War had been strongly influencing the security dynamics and this reality has not changed even after its end²⁰². The world leading hegemons have not lost their interests there after the collapse of the bipolar world order and they still exercise their influence by interfering into the regional issues. Their engagement limits the regional independence in determining the developments of the regional security issues until now.

The military sector is in the case of the ASEAN still very important because not all the states of the region have achieved the democratization on a large scale and the importance of having the strong armies have not decreased. In majority of the ASEAN countries the army has effects also on business by creating the secure trade environment; it helps to enforce the law and order, thus the protective function over the territory is far not the only one. In last years the civil societies and social movements on regional level have arisen, hence even there the armies are being playing the important

²⁰¹ (Lou 2013)

roles. The examples of could be the coups in the Philippines or in other countries, where the political stability of the regions is questioned.²⁰³ The classical army's protective function over the territorial integrity is securitized in cases of the interference of the outside hegemony like China, for instance in the cases like the territorial disputes in South China Sea.²⁰⁴

Even though the region was in the times of the Cold War accompanied with the increased number of security interests, conflicts, outside interventions and many cases of securitization, the development of the securitization is today ambivalent. The end of the Cold War brought the important change in the security dynamics within the ASEAN, the local conflicts more or less disappeared and the security cooperation within the regional was significantly increased.²⁰⁵

With the evolvement of the security cooperation the process of desecuritization has deepened as well. Some topics are being obstructed from securitization like the North Korea and its nuclear programme. Southeast Asia plus Japan do not want to make a threat form her since it could cut of the economic cooperation and trade in the region. The situation clearly contributes to spillover effect within the complex, where the political sector transmits the securitization and the RSC dynamism to economic sector.²⁰⁶

On this situation the logic of the RSC can be conveniently demonstrated: The referential objects in the above mentioned case is the maintenance of economic cooperation. The desecuritizing actor is the ASEAN Organization, and the functional actor is Japan which same as the Japan does not wish to make a security threat from the North Korea. Because of that Japan push through her engagement in the ASEAN and at the same time on the bilateral level of mutual relations for not giving the importance to the North Korean case. The facilitating condition for the desecuritization of the case is the ongoing successful economic cooperation that is aimed by the all to not be interrupted.

4.1.1 The disputes in South China Sea

Another important topic of the securitization referring to a particular case is the territorial dispute with the strongest external player interfering in the region – China. One reason why the ASEAN is in the last years so focused on the building of strong

²⁰² (Buzan, Wæwer 2003, 144)

²⁰³ (Schmidt 2004, 15)

²⁰⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 77)

²⁰⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 80)

system of the regional security cooperation especially with regards to China is the partial withdrawal of the US and its army.²⁰⁷

The South China Sea Disputes over various islands as the Spatleys, Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands, Shelves, and the Scarborough Shoal still takes place. The dispute which was initiated in 1994 and continues until now is quite unique, taking into consideration the fact that the ASEAN as an organization stands on the principles of peaceful and non-violent disputes' settlement and at the same time more than half of its members are engaged in the open military conflict.²⁰⁸

There are more of the disputing topics within the conflict, among the most recent ones are the Chinese dispute with the other ASEAN states over the Diaoyu / Senkaku Islands and gas fields in the South China Sea that gained a lot of attention on the ASEAN's grouping platforms.²⁰⁹

China consequently strongly insists on that the internal issues as the conflict in South East China Sea will not be brought on a ground of the ASEAN. China reasoned it that the dispute is not held between the ASEAN organization and China, but between China and the sovereign claimants that are members of the ASEAN. She also made herself clear that she is not willing to establish any special maritime regime derived from it.²¹⁰

In 2002 was with China signed the Code of Conduct of Parties in South China Sea (COC), the only document aiming managing the states' behavior. But shortly after its declaration it was taken back based on the pressure coming from the Chinese side.²¹¹

Further the *"discussions then bogged down over conflicting territorial claims, culminating in a China-ASEAN meeting in 2012 that adjourned sans communique"*²¹². That situation was for the ASEAN critical as this ASEAN summit was the historically first that was closed without issuing the communique with common stances and agreements. The topic again gained on the securitization and *"yet, ASEAN and China finally agreed to resume 'consultations' (not negotiations) this year (year 2013, the author's note), coinciding with PRC revival of its 'smile' campaign with visits to several Southeast Asian countries by Premier Li Keqiang."*²¹³

²⁰⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 80)

²⁰⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 81)

²⁰⁸ (Smith, Jones 2006, 155)

²⁰⁹ (Chung 2013, 803)

²¹⁰ (Chung 2013, 815)

²¹¹ (Chung 2013, 804)

²¹² (Dittmer 2014, 3)

²¹³ (Dittmer 2014, 3)

Following her further interests and cooperating with the ASEAN tighter and exclusively on bilateral level, *“China has also rejoined talks with ASEAN to forge a binding COC for the South China Sea. China’s neighbors can only support such gestures, finding themselves in economic relations with the giant to the north that are very much in their economic interest.”*²¹⁴

Notwithstanding all the efforts for peaceful settlement in the South China Sea, the situation in 2013 between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough exacerbated. The US responded by stepping to Subic Bay from the position of being deep allies of the Philippines with which she has defense commitments. Furthermore, the US is nowadays considering the extension of the protection of the Philippines.²¹⁵ The Philippines brought the conflict to UN ground and by doing so China was shocked. As a consequence of the conflict the Philippines refused their attendance at the ASEAN-China summit the CAEXPO, even though the Philippines were supposed to be designated as “country of honor” for the occasion. As the result of the situation Philippine businessman blamed their country for losing business because of the conflict. The mutual animosity was clear also at Chinese side, when Chinese president refused to meet his Philippine counterpart.²¹⁶

The Philippine understood the dispute as direct threat to her territorial integrity, as the conflict affected exclusively West Philippine Sea. Currently, in Philippine perspective the Chinese territorial demands are seen as the biggest threat to Philippine sovereignty, hence China is being sued on an international ground by Philippine currently.

4.1.2 The ASEAN defense planning

The other important spots in military sector cover the ASEAN national states defense strategies and the ASEAN organization’s own strategies to be employed in case of direct military threat. On the grounds of the ASEAN, the ARF plans a common defense strategy by the Annual Security Outlook (ASO) within its confidence building measures. The publication issued by the ARF includes all the White defense papers from the ASEAN member states governments. Only China does not provide accurate information or none, she either skips their submission, especially on defense budgets and defense policies. Nowadays the ARF publication is widened to simplified format in

²¹⁴ (Dittmer 2014, 9)

²¹⁵ (Seidel 2014, 70)

which the states should notify everything about their defense strategies, expenditures and policies, albeit such submissions are unfortunately still voluntary.²¹⁷

Based on these ASEAN policies, the defense securitization topics are more than clear: these are the defense-data sharing and their transparency and accuracy, especially in cases of major powers that could present a more serious threat to the ASEAN states.

To be able to address the securitized topic and have more effective tools on managing the regional security and the defense planning the ASEAN member countries have established groupings as the ADMM, and later ADMM+ – including the ASEAN partnership countries. The platform was in 2007 designed as “*the highest ministerial defense and security consultative and cooperative mechanism in ASEAN, and that it shall report directly to the ASEAN heads of government*”.²¹⁸

The ADMM+ body is perceived as the successor of the ADMM, whereas created from the ASEAN member states plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, USA and Russia and their defense ministers, it has become mostly the ASEAN and China endeavor. In general, thus the weaker ASEAN states than China redoubled their “*efforts to arrive at the principles, priorities, structure and procedures ... to engage the defense establishments of other powers*”.²¹⁹

In 2009 the body first agreed on empowering the first common military assets on humanitarian and disaster reliefs purposes same, as for the cooperation on non-traditional security threats.²²⁰

Humanitarian and other non-traditional security issues are the securitized topics that bring all the ASEAN states together.

The ASEAN members through their engagement in the political sector gain the power in military sector as well. On the ground of the ADMM+, where any important state with interests in the region cannot miss, China tries to desecuritize the South China Sea conflict. As the focus of the other members on the ground of the forum is given to other traditional military nature issues, and they try to bring up the hot topics that could destabilize the region, as the North Korean nuclear programme, for example.

On the ground of the ADMM+ the latest tool for bringing up the decisions was the establishment of the narrower group the ASEAN Defense Senior Officials’ Meeting

²¹⁶ (Seidel 2014, 64)

²¹⁷ (Chung 2013, 804-5)

²¹⁸ (Chung 2013, 816)

²¹⁹ (Chung 2013, 817)

²²⁰ (Chung 2013, 817)

Plus (ADSOM Plus) in order to make common decisions and launch specific working groups.²²¹

In all the ASEAN groupings is clear attempt in managing the regional security and in shaping the regional security dynamics, but the question is whether too many institutional agreements do not rather duplicate their work and whether they do not bring more chaos into the possible resolutions of the already existing problems.

4.1.3 Terrorism

The terrorism is probably the most important topic for the military and political sector to analyze. According to Smith and Jones, there was a security delusion in the ASEAN's affairs over the harmony and stability in the past. Because of that there was not the sufficient attention to international threats and very little awareness was dedicated towards the radical militant Islamist threat.²²²

The breakthrough in the perception of the international terrorist threat was brought by the bombings in Bali in 2002. Before the bombing the regional intelligence was poor and strengthening threat of the growing Al Queda and Jemaah Islamiah were, according to the authors, strongly disregarded. As the wide topic of securitization, the terrorism came just after the Bali incident.²²³

Moreover, Smith and Jones claim that terrorism used to be rather desecuritized and for Southeast Asia it was as not existing at all in the region.

This constellation has contributed the political elites, which were scared over the political consequences of admitting the presence of terrorist activities. Therefore, the emphasis was rather put on the preventive diplomacy and confidence building activities. Politically the emphasis was instead put for instance on the bilateral conflicts among the ASEAN members, some of them were not settled even until now.²²⁴

According to the authors the nature of the ASEAN states is in many cases still authoritarian and the rise of terrorism on their own territory took them by surprise. Another contributing factor to the terrorist-confrontation avoidance was the style of diplomacy and the nature of consensus building process within the ASEAN. As the ASEAN strong voices were focusing on the importance of the economic growth and all

²²¹ (Chung 2013, 816)

²²² (Smith, Jones 2006, 196)

²²³ (Smith, Jones 2006, 196)

²²⁴ (Smith, Jones 2006, 196 - 198)

the members were following, the terrorist threat was overlooked. All the members were blinded by celebrating the success of development and regional stability.²²⁵

With the growing terrorist threat the situation has shifted rapidly and nowadays it is according to authors perceived as the major threat and topic of the securitization. Terrorism is currently a serious problem, especially for Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines and the others and all of them embrace the ideological program of political and social change in order to evolve effective measures to fight the security threat.²²⁶

In other words the securitization of the terrorist threat is articulated by the number of the securitization actors as the member states governments, the ASEAN diplomacy bodies and its institutions etc. The securitization is further supported by the facilitating conditions such as the pressure of the Western hemisphere's fight with terrorism on global scale.

4.1.4 The Sulu crisis

Political sector gives also the example of desecuritization. The recent developments of "Sulu Crisis" on the Borneo Island have revived the old dispute. The particular territory to which the crisis is attached belongs formally to Malaysian state. However, at the same time the territory is being claimed by the Sulu tribe with its Sultan. The Sulu tribe lives partly in Malaysia and mainly in the south of the Philippines. Recently the Sulu people living in the Philippines claimed for the territory and have started a locally based armed dispute.

Furthermore, the irredentism attempts in Sabah²²⁷ are impossible to discuss as the official territory claim by Philippine Republic. As the Philippine government declared forty years ago after a massacre taking place there, Philippine will not claim the Sultanate anymore.²²⁸

Since the Sabah's developments are quite recent, the thesis on its background demonstrates the particular case of desecuritization within the political sector and also discusses the security interactions among the ASEAN Member states. By drawing on their basis the security dynamism within the sector can be well illustrated.

²²⁵ (Smith, Jones 2006, 198)

²²⁶ (Smith, Jones 2006, 199)

²²⁷ Sabah is one of the official Malaysian states in the Borneo Island.

²²⁸ (Deinla 2013)

The Sulu sultanate in Sulu archipelago within Malaysian Sabah state, on the Mindanao Island, the village Lahad Datu seized followers of Sulu sultan from the Philippines. After several weeks Malaysian troops retook the territory and more than 70 people died in conflict.²²⁹ The conflict is also interrelated with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)²³⁰ with which the Philippine government is in dispute and the Philippine's government hasn't succeeded anyhow to end the Sulu armed conflict. The MILF tries to declare the independence of south province of Sulu; during the fights with Philippine army more than 200 people lost their lives. Conflict also produced a large number of internally displaced people.²³¹

There are views that the both Sulu and MILF conflicts are partially ignited by the stances of Philippine government, which does not recognize the large political authority of the MILF, which is traditionally rooted in the Philippine society. The people associated with the MILF were among the first ones to be considered the biggest fighters for independence of Bengsamoro province of the Philippines from 1970's.²³²

If the Sulu people would live only in Malaysian territory, the dispute would be just of the intra-state nature and would belong exclusively within the Malaysian sovereign issues to deal with. Thanks to the affiliation of the Sulu tribe to the Philippine, the ongoing conflict acquired the inter-state character. Hence, both countries, Philippine and Malaysia are involved and the ASEAN should not stay away of the conflict as well. The conflict is embedded into the regional security dynamics that is necessary to understand in order to learn the conflict possible implications' significance, as the recent Sabah conflict could just exacerbate the unrest.

Moreover, if Sabah and Sulu Sultanate in state of Sabah impose the no free borders movement of people as it is threatened, the line of work migration will be disrupted. There are thousands of people working in Sabah mines and in other industry that could become an engine for a much bigger conflict. Also, the ethnical communities of Sabah and Sulu are deeply interconnected. In case of their disruption the ethnical motivated conflicts can arise. All these factors are for the ASEAN important to considerate, since

²²⁹ (Sidel 2013, 68)

²³⁰ MILF refers to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front which is located in Southern Philippines and strives for the independence of the Bangsamoro region of Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago and other nearby island. The organization is militant nature and has networks to terrorist organizations.

²³¹ (Sidel 2013, 64)

²³² (Sidel 2013, 68)

the topics of migration and economic immigration is already on high political agenda and securitization.

Even though, within the ASEAN Charter the thesis can find the central role of the organization in managing the security in Southeast Asia, the conflict in Sabah has been so far just overseen. Any signs of the ASEAN's engagement have not taken place yet. Furthermore, the ASEAN did not give any official response to conflict even though the UN called for its peaceful settlement. Also Indonesia as the neighboring country has been calling for the resolution to the ASEAN that time chairing country Brunei. The other ASEAN countries have not been willing to express themselves in this matter, which just correspond with the concept of desecuritization as they do not want to give the topic a political importance.²³³

After some time, the negotiations with Sulu tribe representatives took place in Kuala Lumpur. There were good prospects for setting the transition arrangements, but no accord on power sharing in Southern Philippines, that key to crises solution, was reached. The continuing delay with the further negotiations because of that just left the doubts about the whole peace process.²³⁴

Such a security constellation has further implications. Even if the ASEAN countries have bound themselves to peaceful settlement of conflicts, this conflict violated the agreement²³⁵. Moreover, there was no response from the ASEAN demanding the settlement of the situation. Such a situation could therefore imply the possible precedent for the future.

There are two possible views how to look into the situation:

*“There is no willingness among member countries to ‘regionalize’ the conflict and a preference is for treating it purely as an internal security matter primarily for Malaysia. In this way, the principle of non-interference on sovereignty is maintained. The fact however that the conflict involves cross-border actions and personalities from Malaysia and the Philippines lies its characterization as an ‘internal’ matter”*²³⁶. The second optics through the conflict is viewed is: *“This is also indicative of an evolving pattern following the failure to reach a consensus on the South China last year, and the muted statements of ASEAN involving the skirmishes between Thai and Cambodian forces at*

²³³ (Deinla 2013)

²³⁴ (Seidel 2013, 68 – 69)

²³⁵ (ASEAN Charter 2008)

the Preah Vihear temple in 2011.” The statement refers to the assumption that the ASEAN’s role in managing internal conflicts is rather not-engaging.

For the thesis purposes the reference to the characteristic of the RSC is made. Within the constellation of the security actors, the signs of polarity, non-existence of the decisive higher authority, and the inter-linkages among the region’s national states in terms of the situation– at least in the cases of Malaysia, Philippine and Indonesia, are to be identified.

The security constellation refers by all signs to the case of the desecuritization. All the ASEAN member states and organization itself are aware of the situation, but nobody from them wants to enter into the armed conflict that can be easily spread out based on the interference of the other states and because of their security interdependencies.

The desecuritization process lies on non-response of the ASEAN and its other members to it. Basically if there is not any actor who would by the speech act attribute the situation to the regional conflict category, the conflict does not exist in the mutual relations and the regional reality. The risk can constitute the disregard of the conflict, which from the latent phase can be shifted into the direct regional security threat in the future.²³⁷

Even the ASEAN standing on its principles rather chose the desecuritization of the problem, because it does not pose any effective mechanism in the place on how to address the inter-states conflicts caused by the non-state actors. In the ASEAN security architecture such a powerful role to non-state actors wasn’t ascribed and thus the consensus of its member states on non-addressing such situations and rather being silent is expected.

In the case of this particular crisis the Sultan – the intra-state actor, who is leader of the Sulu minority, cannot be recognized as anybody who might fit under the ASEAN conflicts solution mechanism. Otherwise the Sultan would be understood as state actor, which, would predefine his claim for the territory sovereignty.

The ASEAN official response is that according to its self-declaration as the “*intergovernmental organization*” is that it does not have in its disposal a mechanism for dealing with individual groups of non-state nature. Also giving the importance to such groups implies the recognition of their existence.²³⁸

²³⁶ (Deinla 2013)

²³⁷ (Deinla 2013)

²³⁸ (Deinla 2013)

Judging from the behavior of the regional security architecture actors, the desecutization of the situation and passing it over to the political agenda of the only state as the issue of internal security exclusively, is another strategy how to collectively and coordinately deal with the issue until the states' governments regard the matter as the official bilateral issue of foreign policies.

The ongoing desecuritization of the topic does not necessarily mean that the matter is not important for the involved states at the same time, but it implies that the state did not chose the securitization of the problem as the mutual threat as an appropriate strategy, how to approach the problem. Because while securitizing it, thanks to the intertwined security agendas of all the member states, the issue would become threat for all.

The question remains, whether the ASEAN did according its establishing principles while desecuritizing the dispute because one among the ASEAN building principles was to sustain peace in the post-colonial period. The article's author Imelda Deinla from the Australian National University further notes that the ASEAN's ability to influence the security in the region was highly questioned by this crisis and its principal position of the "centrality" is seriously challenged as well.²³⁹

To summarize the Sabah conflict, it is necessary to take into account that conflicts like these and their neglect just creates precedence for the "policy of avoidance" in future²⁴⁰. Because of that the desecuritization processes can be a dangerous weapon for the ASEAN stability as the possible RSC. The credibility of the ASEAN at the international arena could be strongly weakened, especially, since its members did not succeed to hold a common position towards the conflict. Such situations put in question the achievements as the ASEAN's ability to manage the regional security, as it applies it cannot be considered as the higher security authority within the region. Such a fact corresponds to the RSC theory.

On the other hand the situation can also bring out the feeling that the integration aimed to be deepened by the ASEAN technocrats is not the some type of the integration that is aimed by the ASEAN nations and especially those ones finding themselves in the

²³⁹ (Deinla 2013)

²⁴⁰ (Deinla 2013)

middle of conflict²⁴¹. The aimed integration within the RSC logic is perceived by some and by the others, as the integration into strong inter-governmental organization.

The Sabah crisis also points out the important raise of the non-state actors in regional security environment. The non-state actors must become to be considered as the one of the major topics for securitization. Their non-existence within the ASEAN formal security agenda is highly alarming. It seems that the only way for today's ASEAN to approach their importance would be considering the sultans' forces as terrorists to which the ASEAN have sufficient capacities for securitization and fighting with them²⁴², after the strategy of terrorism desecuritization has shown to be ineffective. Nevertheless, that is hardly a solution on the systematic level. Such a solution must come at a first place from within the political sector.

4.2 Economical sector

At the end of 80's of 20th century the economical regionalism was the principal sector into which states within the regions began to join, after the example of the EU as one of the deepest integrated institution with a single market in the world. According to the example of the EU the new regional institutionalized integrations have been initiated to grow in the terms of regional dynamics. For the thesis the cases of interests are mainly the ASEAN FTAs and the APEC as well.²⁴³

According to the thesis research, neither the region of Southeast Asia nor the ASEAN have reached such a level of the economic integration as the EU did. The highest level of regional economic cooperation shall be achieved by the fulfilling the so called "ASEAN Community 2015" in year 2015, connecting all the ASEAN countries FTAs into the one single market.²⁴⁴ Furthermore the authors of the RSC theory speak about the region of Southeast Asia as creating the part of East Asia and as about a mystery in terms of the economic integration. Citing them literally: "*based on the statement of some it lacks the formal signs of economic regionalism at all (and it is vulnerable, though) or due to others is seen as the indigenous informal, transnational model of regional cooperation*".²⁴⁵

The reasons for the securitization of the regionalization of economic integration can be the attempts of reducing poverty, bringing the regional states into the comparable

²⁴¹ (Deinla 2013)

²⁴² (Deinla 2013)

²⁴³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 132)

²⁴⁴ (Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009)

economic development and well-being, for instance by conducting the Keynesian economic approach. The states in the integrated environment within the region can easier cooperate, conduct mutual trade in competitive environment and raise the prosperity of all, especially when they do not need to pay for the poor neighbors around. Such an environment should significantly contribute to managing global economic liberalism.²⁴⁶

The integration in the economic areas helps the states to establish efficient cooperative system with the big powers that interfere into the region. The interference of world hegemony is perceived as a disruption of security dynamics, but once such interference gains the institutionalism frames, all the states of integrated region could from such cooperation rather benefit than lose.²⁴⁷ In case of the ASEAN this premise was countlessly proved on mutual relations with China, Japan and the US.

In this case the special role for such proceeding play the so called “Growth triangles” that refer to the regional models of trade and investments. The authors of the RSC theory define them as triangles *“attempting for the integration of production across compatible, near to each other allocated sources of capital, labor and material”*²⁴⁸. Local undertakings of this type are then perceived as the top-down approach to the centralized threats brought by the globalization, stemming mainly from the political sector. The regional cooperative economic mechanisms could contribute to the protection of regional complexes in an economic nature from the global crises. Even if such cases happen, the region has its own mechanisms how to cope with it and protect itself thanks to its function within the established institutionalized structures.²⁴⁹

In case of the ASEAN the protection from global crises thanks to the regional mechanisms could be seen through the sanctity of regional system. In the period of the Global Economic Crisis in 2008 that has affected the whole Western world; the ASEAN states remained much fewer touched and recovered rapidly fast²⁵⁰. Furthermore, the rapid growth of Asian states contributed significantly to fight the consequences of crisis on a global scale.²⁵¹

²⁴⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 133)

²⁴⁶ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 134)

²⁴⁷ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 133)

²⁴⁸ (Ariff 1996, 4 in Buzan *et al.* 2005, 134)

²⁴⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 134)

²⁵⁰ (Lipsky 2009)

²⁵¹ (Drysdale 2012)

Other reason for the integration of the regional economic sector is the economic power consolidation. While securitizing the global security and economic topics the regionally integrated unit acquires stronger voice at the international community forum and is able to challenge the higher global competition in economic terms.²⁵²

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde also in their book “Security: A New Framework for Analysis” justify the existence of cooperative tools working on securitized topics within the complexes because of the major importance of transnational ties and the attention towards the values of national development.²⁵³ As they also conclude their assessments of economic sectors of the RSCs they say that the increasing differences among the regional actors and their economic interdependences could more likely lead to higher probability of the regionalization. Among one of the possible reasons for it might be their effort for creating the superpower.²⁵⁴ These assumptions work for the thesis case and the hypothesis that the diverse states with plenty of common inter-linkages as the members of the ASEAN have are more likely to cooperate and interact within the Regional Security Complex.

Firstly it is useful to say why the regional institutions matter and who gave them the political legitimacy. The importance of regional institutions arose from the failure of world leading institutions as the WB, IMF, and WTO rule over the whole world. The regional networks are successful because they address directly the regional needs from the closest proximity possible.²⁵⁵

Another matter relevant to the economic sector needs to considerate is that the Southeast Asian region is probably the most heterogeneous in the world in terms of geography, politics, economics and culture. *“Its countries have no common heritage, are split between various modes of political regimes at different stages of growth, and are adverse to leadership by any single country.”*²⁵⁶ The Southeast Asia reflects this diversity by all the political ways and the question is, whether it is wise to form a new exclusive trade group as a single market planned within the ASEAN Community in an

²⁵² (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 134)

²⁵³ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 135)

²⁵⁴ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 135)

²⁵⁵ (Schmidt 2004, 1)

²⁵⁶ (Schmidt 2004, 5)

exclusive closed regionalism? Or does the so called “unity in diversity concept” in the ASEAN literally mean that national interests prevail even within the collective terms?²⁵⁷ The ASEAN integration schemes do not refer to the integration based on “*closed or discriminatory trading bloc*”, but it is rather a way for individual countries on the common ground to cooperate, to increase their international competitiveness and to integrate into the world economy.

The ultimate objective of the ASEAN’s regionalism in the economic terms is to increase the region’s competitive edge as a production base geared toward the global market. The ASEAN’s integration is also a mean to create an enlarged regional market for attracting the inflows of trade and investment.²⁵⁸

Thus, it is not surprising that the rationale of ASEAN integration is not primarily to pursue a rising share of intra-regional trade in its total trade, but rather to develop the free flow of goods and mobilization of investment intra-ASEAN. As a consequence, it facilitates a further degree of market integration, as the result the ASEAN would be increasingly attractive as an area of trade and investment in the global economy. This is the meaning of the open regional integration approach adopted by the ASEAN that is embodied into the securitized process of arising political, societal and economic ASEAN Community 2015.²⁵⁹

In the past, during the Asian Economic Crisis in 1997-8 both the ASEAN and the APEC have shown to be incapable of solving the regional economic crisis’s consequences from the position of intergovernmental regional organizations. “*The absence of regional formal institutional mechanisms for extensive policy coordination, forced even senior officials, such as the Prime Minister of Singapore Goh Chok Tong, to declare in 1999 that “ASEAN as a group is being seen as helpless and worse, disunited ...in our summits in 1997 and 1998, we failed to convince the outside world that ASEAN was tackling the crisis with determination and decisiveness to regain its high [regional] growth”*”²⁶⁰. Rodolfo Severino, the 10th Secretary General of ASEAN, went as far as to state that “*the frustration and bewilderment over the sudden reversal of fortunes have*

²⁵⁷ (Schmidt 2004, 2)

²⁵⁸ (Schmidt 2004, 3)

²⁵⁹ (Schmidt 2004, 3)

²⁶⁰ (Schmidt 2004, 11)

led many, including some in Southeast Asia itself, to raise questions about ASEAN's effectiveness and utility and about the validity of the very idea of ASEAN"²⁶¹.

Because of that there is need for restoring the confidence, the urgency of the new impetus, the in-confidence that is contributed to socio-political upheavals.²⁶² Through the ASEAN and its member states the new impetus in greater regional grouping is found that comes along with the East Asia Summit and its tighter attachment to the ASEAN Community 2015, can just enhance the process.

4.2.1 The trade with essential economic partners

The ASEAN is dependent on trade with Japan, Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and its investments. *“Achieving economic influence can be applied to explain the motivation behind the Japanese government's strategic use of foreign economic policy as well as certain aspects of the bilateral relationship. ASEAN's policymakers are receptive to Japanese economic assistance in the form of aid, grants and technological cooperation of any kind - a situation which creates an unequal “partnership”.*²⁶³

The argument that the features explaining high economic growth of the ASEAN countries can be attributed mainly to the role of the domestic state, and not the ASEAN per say, or its subsequent free trade area the AFTA is not a new one. It might even be claimed that seen from Southeast Asia, the most appropriate answer on the regionalization of the world economy is the strengthening of state capacities and capabilities.²⁶⁴ As it is clear that the ASEAN member states have achieved their economic prosperity thanks to their own effort, the role of the ASEAN is now to even raise the levels of growth of each member to the same level, assists in the poverty eradication, attract investments, create a secure trading area without the barriers limitations and enhance the economic prosperity of the region in general. These goals are nowadays the hottest topics of the securitization within its economic sector.

This sub-chapter shows that the region is on the path towards economic integration, the questions of the level of effectiveness of the integrated structures remains. The important finding in the chapter shows that the arising case of regionalism is the result

²⁶¹ (Severino in Schmidt 2004, 11)

²⁶² (Schmidt 2004, 3)

²⁶³ (Schmidt 2004, 5)

²⁶⁴ (Schmidt 2004, 6)

of the securitization of the globalization topics that have brought numerous risks. Thus, the region and its community act as the Regional Security Complex towards the aimed product of the regional cooperation that is paradoxically the forming case of unified economic institutional integration. Such integration could be likely achieved only by the transformation of the RSC.

The globally most powerful actors like the EU, the US, China and Japan seek for the economic influence in the region and the competition among them is high.²⁶⁵ The national states try to protect their economies from the influx of the cheap goods from these countries and the threat of growing protectionism in economies on national and regional level has been articulated.²⁶⁶ The primary strongly securitized goal within the economic sector is the creation of single market that could compete with the world's biggest competitors, and at the same time is it the deep incorporation of the trade with the world's leading powers into the emerging regional market.

4.3 Environmental sector

Among the important environmental threats that gained certain level of securitization, outspoken by usually not directly affected states and their governments, but rather by the independent interest groups or external state actors, are the topics threatening the bio-systems like deforestation, the limitations of biodiversity and various kinds' extinction. In the Southeast Asian terms, the securitization of the environment protection arose thanks to an increasing number of palm-oil plantations built on the deforested areas among others²⁶⁷.

Another topic that is securitized by environmental vigilant political subjects is the ongoing process of dying out of the sea corals. Such threat is common for all the ASEAN states which are surrounded by sea.²⁶⁸

Furthermore, within the environmental sector of Southeast Asia the ongoing securitization of the so called "Water Regional Security Complex" on the river Mekong that involves Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and Laos can be observed. The securitization process is interlinked by the threats of floods, insufficient irrigation

²⁶⁵ (Schmidt 2004, 4)

²⁶⁶ (Schmidt 2004, 5)

²⁶⁷ (Drollette 2013)

²⁶⁸ (ARC Centre of Excellence in Coral Reef Studies 2010)

process and need for building up of water plants. The security of the all areas surrounding the river is strongly interdependent.²⁶⁹

The highest level of securitization the most probably achieved the threats that are imminent or current nature and threaten seriously a large territory and their consequences persist for long.

4.3.1 Typhoon Haiyan and institutional tools coping with its consequences

Recently, the most serious impacts undoubtedly caused the typhoon Haiyan that seriously damaged the Philippines. The typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda has brought an extensive internal crisis, when more than 6000 people died and displaced over the 3 million. The foreign help came very quickly, whereas the help from local government is believed to be not sufficient.²⁷⁰

The threat of typhoon did not need to receive the significant level of the securitization; because the threat that was brought by it was a vast and an imminent. The consequences coming out of the situation were clear and disastrous; therefore the speech act process was not even in need. To the threat was attributed the huge official attention on all the levels and the ASEAN's countries and institutions engaged into the mechanisms, that is to be imposed at the place in case of similar threat in future.

On the case of typhoon Haiyan it can be elaborated on description, how the security processes derived from securitization work and which are the interactions between the sectors. For the future it can be postulated, that if the region encounters any similar problem it deploys the strategy to cope with it as in this case; the strategy may be enriched of some possible innovations. However this assumption is relevant only until the region will keep its security structure and dynamism and will not be transferred into another form of the regional order.

First of all assessed should be into what extent the ASEAN has right or is obliged to directly interfere into the internal issues of its member states. According to the ASEAN Charter issued in 2007 in Singapore, in Article I, Paragraph 8 the member states bound themselves to: *“To respond effectively, in accordance with the principle of comprehensive security, to all forms of threats, transnational crimes and trans boundary challenges”*²⁷¹. In previous paragraph (6) the member states declared their

²⁶⁹ (Ohlsson 1995, in Buzan *et al.* 2005, 109)

²⁷⁰ (Sidel 2013, 70)

²⁷¹ (ASEAN Charter 2008, 4)

adherence to “*Alleviate poverty and narrow the development gap within the ASEAN through mutual assistance and cooperation*”²⁷². This argument is especially valid in an impoverished environment, where the affected people suffer from the disaster consequences and seek for assistance. Without cooperation the development in affected areas is to be seriously endangered for long time.

Jeffrey Wright, a research associate in the International Institutions and Global Governance Program of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York²⁷³, has conducted the research on the Typhoon Haiyan’s implications for the ASEAN. Wright argues that the ASEAN has right to address any security issue in the region, therefore it is basically considered as the central actor within the region. However the ASEAN does not pose a sufficient political will and resources to be truly effective in its strategy²⁷⁴.

*“The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) carries a mandate to respond “to all forms of [security] threats.” But it lacks the political will and resources to fulfill its Charter obligations. Indeed, ASEAN’s role in the Philippines has been limited to basic information-sharing functions. Prior to Haiyan making landfall, the Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance—ASEAN’s disaster management unit—monitored the storm’s movements and deployed logistics personnel to Manila and Tacloban to help coordinate relief efforts with national authorities. Now in the typhoon’s aftermath, ASEAN lies in the shadows altogether, wielding neither the power nor funds to play a substantial part in the humanitarian response.”*²⁷⁵

Further Wright discusses that because the ASEAN did not provide sufficient amounts of funds on the relief, it mainly took the steps when the typhoon was coming, not after, the crisis management is much more unlikely to be done soon. Wright also says that the member states cannot afford to depend on generosity of other states in case of natural disasters. According to him, there must be either international or regional effective and sufficient mechanism.²⁷⁶ This argument stands especially while one state is affected by any disaster, the others within the region will be also impacted by the disaster consequences and implications.

The uncertainties brought by the Haiyan typhoon have again raised the questions about the role of the ASEAN as such and its role in managing of the regional security and

²⁷² (ASEAN Charter 2008, 4)

²⁷³ (Wright 2013)

²⁷⁴ (Wright 2013)

²⁷⁵ (Wright 2013)

²⁷⁶ (Wright 2013)

security within the broader Asian architecture. Wright also elaborates on question concerning the ASEAN in context of Haiyan disaster: “*How does ASEAN best leverage the competencies of its partners and allies? Can the organization improve its capacity to respond to emerging threats?*”²⁷⁷

The above mentioned raised questions initiated the conference on “*Rising Regionalism: Trends in Southeast and (Wider) Asia*”²⁷⁸, which brought interesting findings into the discourse. In the matter of the ASEAN and its competences concluded with: “*ASEAN's effectiveness suffers at the hands of a weak secretariat and consensus decision-making... The regional organization has lofty ambitions for deepening integration in Southeast Asia, aiming to complete the single market by 2015. Though achieving this goal and making progress in other areas of the ASEAN Community, namely the political-security and socio-cultural pillars, will prove extraordinarily difficult without moving toward some form of majority voting and empowering the secretariat with greater resources.*”²⁷⁹

It refers to that the Secretariat needs the bigger competences and funding and the particular decision making procedures in member states must be established on the basis of implementing and enforcing the collective decisions and policies, otherwise it could be the most probably very difficult to achieve the goals on the pillars on politics-security and socio-cultural dimension given by the ASEAN Community 2015 among all member states.²⁸⁰

Towards the position of the ASEAN in Southeast and East Asia the outcomes reached at the conference speak the following. The ASEAN should first focus on its exclusive institutional bodies and establishment of the FTA; and secondly on those inclusive bodies whose strong members could jeopardize the success and integrity of the ASEAN's own institutions. “*A changing strategic environment threatens the integrity of ASEAN's centrality: As China continues to amass strength and the United States rebalances toward Asia, ASEAN must promote unity from within its ranks if it intends to manage dynamism in the region. The juxtaposition of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership—two overlapping regional free trade agreements—may threaten the integrity of ASEAN, particularly if*

²⁷⁷ (Wright 2013)

²⁷⁸ Conference was co-organized by Council on Foreign Relations and Centre for Strategic Studies (Jakarta).

²⁷⁹ (Wright 2013)

²⁸⁰ (Wright 2013)

the TPP is able to grow its membership with Southeast Asian nations. Consolidating the ASEAN Economic Community will represent an important step to navigating the future of regional trade.”²⁸¹

The conference contributed mainly on the account of the ASEAN’s standardized procedures towards environmental disasters and other health risks; saying that: “...in Southeast Asia, countries have concentrated efforts on national rather than multilateral solutions, undermining regional security. ASEAN should use its extensive intergovernmental forums to identify regional health deficiencies as a prelude to further cooperation.”²⁸² That being said that the securitization on the whole ASEAN’s level towards addressing the natural disasters is not sufficient. Especially in case of the natural risks, the threats that can be caused by them are securitized well, but the common approaches towards dealing with them and their impacts, are not. As the author suggests, the ASEAN must develop its multilateral diplomacy and unite its members in their procedures towards such threats.²⁸³ Also, while doing so, referring to the thesis research, the ASEAN should make sure that all the member states adopt the same protocols in common proceedings, otherwise the organization will not accomplish its goals and its attempts in tackling the threats will not be effective.

While the crisis became imminent the ASEAN engaged in following steps: “*The ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management [AHA Center] provided immediate help along with the ASEAN Secretariat, the Committee of Permanent Representatives, the Defense Attaches, and ASEAN Dialogue Partners convened at the AHA Center in Jakarta*”.²⁸⁴ That clearly says that the organization did respond to securitized topic in real time. Further the executive director of AHA Centre said: “*Faisal said this is the time for ASEAN members to work together in the spirit of ASEAN’s solidarity in mobilizing assets and resources to provide support to the government and people of the Philippines in this critical moment*”. “*As mandated by the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response, the AHA Center serves as the regional hub for disaster risk monitoring and analysis, and a coordination engine to ensure ASEAN’s fast and collective response to disasters within the region.*”²⁸⁵

²⁸¹ (Wright 2013)

²⁸² (Wright 2013)

²⁸³ (Wright 2013)

²⁸⁴ (Cordero, Sumayao 2013)

²⁸⁵ (Cordero, Sumayao 2013)

Another source towards the ASEANs crisis management adds that there were serious rehearsals for such situations, on which basis the common strategy and proceedings towards the natural disasters were incorporated in the ASEAN's structures. *"Vietnamese government, together with the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on disaster management (AHA Centre) successfully organised the ASEAN Disaster Emergency Response Simulation Exercise (ARDEX-13) in Hanoi's Bavi district. The four-day civilian-military exercise, the largest in ASEAN, was last held in 2008 in Rayong, Thailand"*.²⁸⁶ Such steps were aimed to create the one body as the AHA Centre which would manage disaster relief effort, but such an institution still clearly lacks the capacities.

The ASEAN was further engaging in the effort of deepening its readiness towards the natural disasters and the threats brought by them that were further securitized on the ASEAN's ground and in its major documents. *"2013 alone, there were four major regional exercises conducted in ASEAN, such as ARDEX-13 and the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting (ADMM+), which previously in 2010 had already agreed on five areas of practical cooperation to pursue (maritime security, counter-terrorism, disaster management, peacekeeping operations and military medicine). These exercises and formation of themed task forces demonstrated ASEAN's commitment to develop standby mechanisms and assess its efficiency in utilizing ASEAN's military assets and capacities in HADR"*.

During the immediate Haiyan crisis, the author Lee Khiam Jin, who is the head of the Corporate Affairs and Programme Division, the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre) says there was no day when the AHA personnel would not be present assisting in managing the crisis on the field. *"Emergency response to such a large scale natural disaster is a test of the efficacy of ASEAN's mechanism. All the ASEAN member states contributed to the disaster-affected people in the Philippines with relief supplies, cash and medical personnel either through the AHA Centre or a bilateral initiative"*.²⁸⁷

The ASEAN clearly attempts to find an effective solution how to tackle the situation that affected one member state, but thanks to the member states interdependence and collective feelings of solidarity are to be engaged all. Because the ASEAN could not

²⁸⁶ (Jin 2014)

have located crisis management the sufficient funds, the member states assisted on bilateral level. Malaysia provided help of 1million US dollars in cash for victims another 1 million US dollars in supplies and aid. Indonesia did similar, provided the help in same amount. Singapore donated 40 000 USD. Vietnam donated 100 000 USD²⁸⁸. Also other members of the ARF like Japan, South Korea, Australia, the US, the EU and the others significantly helped with the funding of the alleviation efforts.²⁸⁹

Almost all the ASEAN members provided help and support - showing the relations of amity and the awareness of the security interconnections. Also because if one state fights serious humanitarian crisis, the followed influx of refugees could endanger the neighboring ones and that would bring another security issues, for instance.

There are clearly still challenges ahead of the ASEAN: *“Although ASEAN’s combined relief assistance was less than the international society’s pledge, ASEAN member states have demonstrated solidarity when it comes to disaster emergency response.”*²⁹⁰ The delivery of development assistance for major issues had to be done by the UN, though.

Within the securitization process, the ASEAN has succeeded to spread the Haiyan threat and its possible consequences among its members and it pushed the topic to the peak their of political agendas; the problems occurred during the addressing the disaster at the place, when the ASEAN tools showed to be un-effective and insufficient considering the institutional framework and mainly the lack of funding for the relevant steps to be taken.

As the ASEAN Political and Security Blueprint says within its *“A Cohesive, Peaceful, and Resilient Region with Shared Responsibility”* in its paragraph B.5: *“Strengthen ASEAN Cooperation on Disaster Management and Emergency Response”*, further in paragraph B.6 *“Effective and Timely Response to Urgent Issues or Crisis Situations affecting ASEAN”* suggests actions like: *“Convene special meetings at the Leader’s or Ministerial levels in the event of crisis or emergency situations affecting ASEAN, and develop arrangements to address such situations in a timely manner.”*²⁹¹ However, in this statement is not given any emphasis on direct assistance in time of crisis or any specification on the funding to be allocated for these purposes.

²⁸⁷ (Jin 2014)

²⁸⁸ (Cordero, Sumayao 2013)

²⁸⁹ (Cordero, Sumayao 2013)

²⁹⁰ (Jin 2014)

²⁹¹ (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2009, 14)

Wright correctly implies that it is not easy within the ASEAN principles' boundaries to make member states pay for the others through the ASEAN, since the funding allocation corresponds to their internal policies that according to ASEAN Charter²⁹² cannot be directly interfered by the ASEAN and anybody else. The incoherencies proven within the ASEAN strategy in tackling the crisis are caused by the historical principles of non-interference and sovereignty policies that for the igniting the ASEAN's effectiveness should be their erosion considered by the ASEAN's collective decisions as the uniting organization.

The ASEAN remains sidelined in collective decisions, because of its colonial past and strong member states nationalism created recently. The member states are not yet ready to adjust to the ASEAN's needs. In such a case the biggest prevailing problem of the institutional weakness will remain.²⁹³

To conclude the lectures given by the Haiyan crisis Lee Khiam Jin points out that the ASEAN must develop a bigger media support that would attract to its actions and can also bring new donors from within the ASEAN states to the ASEAN disaster structures. By doing so, the ASEAN can gain true and important position in disaster management. Similarly, the new geospatial system should not be omitted. The **ASEAN WebEOC**²⁹⁴ for risk management was introduced and should be taken more into play in such situations.²⁹⁵

4.4 Societal sector

In case of the ASEAN the thesis encounters two identities' securitizations: as in case of the first one the threat is seen through endangering the so called Asian values that are widely discussed on the global, continental Asian, at the same time on regional level. The Asian values, that some of them are authoritarian nature, securitized by East and Southeast Asia; among the main securitizing actors within the ASEAN's region Malaysia and Singapore can be found. On the contrary the Western values are therefore the most challenged by such Asian countries, usually of authoritarian nature, which systems work effectively and are based on the ideological Western opposites.²⁹⁶

²⁹² (ASEAN Charter 2008, 6-7)

²⁹³ (Wright 2013)

²⁹⁴ ASEAN WebEOC is software customized for ASEAN to enable smooth communication and seamless information sharing between AHA Centre and National Disaster Management Organizations of ASEAN Member States.

²⁹⁵ (Jin 2014)

²⁹⁶ (Steiner 2005, 2-3)

The second identity's securitization is strongly coming from the ASEAN states and refers to the ASEAN Way, to the official principles on which the association stands and which are different from the Western norms and often criticized because of their ineffectiveness^{297 298}.

Within the Southeast Asia thanks to its diversity it is possible to possibly find all the societal cleavages and their buffering zones which then become the topics of the securitization.

One of the securitization that goes across all the sectors including societal sector is the fear from the expansion of external hegemony, which in the region exercise their power. Chinese influence and dictate is feared by the various societies. They fear of being possibly forced to accept some of China's values as their own. This feeling is connected with China's expansionary tendencies in the South China Sea.²⁹⁹ Furthermore in many countries there is even a latent anti-Chinese sentiment which in the case of Indonesia, for example, exploded into looting, violence, deaths and a mass exodus of ethnic Chinese.³⁰⁰

At the same time on the societal level is the image of "Big China" in favor with the Southeast Asian states, because China can bring the great progress for all civilizations as she has been done in history. The threat of China's superiority is thus bit ambivalent. Another virtue that was given to China by the Southeast Asian states is her protectionism functions against the undesirable influences coming from the West.

Speaking about the Western influence, which is also not exactly in a favor "*an indigenous solution as anti-American sentiments are growing in the region - as such the IMF and the World Bank is blamed for putting gasoline on the fire - a situation which does not imply prospects for the adoption of American-style governance and economic systems*".³⁰¹

Another topic of securitization in the region is the raising radicalism within the societies, especially Muslim. With the spread of radical thoughts enhanced by the

²⁹⁷ (Smith, Jones 2006)

²⁹⁸ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 157)

²⁹⁹ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 157)

³⁰⁰ (Schmidt 2004, 17)

³⁰¹ (Schmidt 2004, 18-19)

dissemination of the debate on terrorism after the invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq³⁰², the ethnic and religious fundamentalism is replacing pluralism; and might change prospects for inter-regional attempts of governance in the near future. Showing the case of Indonesia and Malaysia, that are prime examples, the accountability and transparency of regimes were highly challenged recently.³⁰³ As prove of it can serve the often occurrence of demonstrations and riots fighting for the political rights and universal freedoms. Again Malaysia³⁰⁴ and Indonesia³⁰⁵ can serve as the right example, where the public society mobilizes itself in fight for it.

As stated by the ASEAN Political - Security Community Blueprint, the article A names the ASEAN political priority as “*A rules-based Community of Shared Values and Norms*”. Within the article’s securitization process it appeals on the states with the “*contributing to the building of a peaceful, democratic, tolerant, participatory and transparent community in Southeast Asia. Further it says, such accomplishments can be achieved through the shaping and sharing of norms*”.³⁰⁶

In many ASEAN states, the transition of regimes has not been accomplished yet, especially when it comes to the civil societies. Their positions within the SEAN’s states are not very strong so far and the democratic components are often replaced by the institutions of religious nature. As stressed by the ASEAN Vision 2020, the developments in societal sectors should be strongly enhanced and further embraced by adherence of the principles of good governance, following the human rights and fundamental freedoms³⁰⁷.

Universal human rights and fundamental freedoms as they are understood by the Charter of United Nations, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, are securitized on the level of the ASEAN organization.³⁰⁸ That even says the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights should be promoting them equally in all the ASEAN countries, however at the same time says that the respect must be given to “*the regional context, bearing in mind national and regional particularities and mutual respect for different historical, cultural*

³⁰² (44th Strategy for Peace Conference, 2003)

³⁰³ (Schmidt 2004, 18)

³⁰⁴ (The Economist 2011)

³⁰⁵ (Human Rights Council, 2012)

³⁰⁶ (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2009, 2 – 3)

³⁰⁷ (ASEAN Vision 2020 1997)

³⁰⁸ (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2009)

and religious backgrounds, and taking into account the balance between rights and responsibilities”³⁰⁹

The ASEAN’s principles on human rights protection and promotion remain again within the ASEAN Way of thinking and its ambiguity. It advises the member states on their promotion, but alongside says that if they are incompatible with the local traditions, the protection does not necessarily need to be enforced. Being said that in particular, the gay laws are not going to be necessarily pursued with some few exceptions, for instance³¹⁰. The ASEAN further particularly securitizes the women and children protection laws, migrant workers protection and supports the civil society organizations.³¹¹

Interesting about this case of securitization is that, that even within the securitization of human rights protection, the desecuritized components of securitized topics are to be found.

In order to achieve a greater societal security, all the societal minorities shall be granted with their rights. As the other multiethnic groupings or states experiences sooner or later, the multicultural, radically-plural model of society is sine qua non for a peaceful coexistence. And for the ASEAN with its number of religions, ethnical and cultural minorities, it should be thought thoroughly.

4.5 Political sector

The political sector is probably the widest from all of the sectors within the sectoral analysis. It includes all the securitized matters in political terms that affect the ASEAN’s institutions, member states governments, their political systems and norms. As mentioned before the topics of the securitization within the political sector are all-encompassing and overlapping with other sectors.

Further this subchapter addresses the issues important for the process of conducting policy, decision making within the political agenda and focuses on the political actors and politically prominent topics that engage the central position of the political interest.

The balance of power in the region is one of the most important matters and the possible interference in to the national states’ internal issues by world hegemons is strongly securitized as a major threat. China and Japan are important centers of what Katzenstein

³⁰⁹ (ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights 2009, 4)

³¹⁰ (The Economist 2013)

³¹¹ (ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint 2009, 5)

terms as the “Asian Regionalism”³¹², but also counterweights the influence of the United States. Whereas the regional governance is still weak, its strengthening along with the ASEAN evolvement is one of the top priorities in the ASEAN Vision 2020. Especially within the political sector a lot of issues are subjects of constructivist conception as the regimes’ natures vary significantly. *“In terms of intersubjective meanings and identities the elite in the region has with few exceptions endorsed developmental paternalism as the norm and value which should provide political-cultural exceptionalism, excuse and explanation for the fact that repression and outlawing of alternative discourses have been the actual policy no matter the type of regime or governance be it democratic or authoritarian... Regarding the implications of the above on possibilities of formal and informal governance and especially linking the issues to trade/investment and welfare/security are plenty and complex and raise a number of issues including economic stability, social cohesion, poverty alleviation, food security and unemployment.”*³¹³

The central topic that accompanies the thesis throughout all the sectors of analysis is the role and function of ASEAN, who was given the function of the securitization actor over its member states. The ASEAN members have become more interconnected and interdependent thanks to their meetings and cooperation on the regular basis. According to Acharya, *“the purpose of the ASEAN was at the first sight the reduction of mutual conflicts among the member states and building certain united face towards the fight with the common communist threat. At the same extent should the organization contribute to maintaining intrastate stability of each member country”*.³¹⁴

Until nowadays, however, the ASEAN has not developed any effective mechanism how to cope with the threats that goes beyond the states’ territorial integrity. The ASEAN works as the forum where the member states meet and thanks to their interactions initiated at the gatherings the biggest numbers of securitizations are produced. Precisely

³¹² *“Asian regionalism is explored from the perspective that regions do not just exist as material objects in the world, but also as social and cognitive constructs that are rooted in political practice. With specific reference to Asia and the financial crisis of 1997, the following themes are explored: 1. The effects of the international environment on regions can lead to a relatively open (as in the 1990s) or closed (as in the 1930s) type of regionalism. 2. Regions can be peaceful and rich, or war-prone and poor. 3. Regions can experience processes of enlargement and set standards for a growing number of polities (as is true of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union), or suffer from retraction (as appears possible for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in the wake of the Asian financial crisis).”* (Katzenstein 2000)

³¹³ (Schmidt 2004, 1)

³¹⁴ (Acharya 1992 in Buzan et al. 2005, 172)

it can be argued that the ASEAN is the main actor of securitization within the region, but the tools given to the organization enhance the securitization on large scale itself.

In interconnection between the economic and political sector it is important to mention that steps towards the regional integration bring certain level of liberalization, not just in the economic but also political system.³¹⁵ For the member states of the ASEAN is this dimension of regional dynamism important sign of possibly upcoming change on bigger scale since the challenges of democratic transformation are highly prioritized, especially in case of Myanmar³¹⁶, the Philippines³¹⁷, Malaysia³¹⁸ and the others.

According to Schmidt, fellow of the Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR) at Aalborg University: *“The Cold War rhetoric should be reversed and political parties with a social democratic and/or left wing bias allowed - not only in order to give working classes, migrants and other marginalized groups and strata a real alternative in the form of political representation, but also to give access to a growing and increasingly militant NGO community a choice and an articulated political voice which might impact national and subsequently regional governance.”*³¹⁹

Furthermore, Lowell Dittmer, professor of Institute of East Asian Studies, US Berkeley, argues the democratic transition of the ASEAN states regimes are not so forth-going, as it could seem: *“The forward march of democracy, some variant of which has been adopted by a majority of the states of South and Southeast Asia, has been less than perfect protest and “democratic fatigue” as democracy is according to locals inadequate.”*³²⁰ He reminds the protests in Malaysia because of the over-represented rural areas, elections frauds, in Cambodia the protests against the former prime minister, in Thailand the upheavals against current political leaders and military coup. The ASEAN preferring the bilateral negotiations, nonintervention in such a constellation cannot do much towards the democratic transitions.³²¹

Dittmer sees the major obstacle to democratic transitions fact as the authoritarian governments they are very economically successful and in their way they bribe their own people to accommodate themselves with the regime. As the ASEAN region is

³¹⁵ (Buzan *et al.* 2005, 135)

³¹⁶ (The World Bank, 2014)

³¹⁷ (Seidel 2013)

³¹⁸ (Slater 2012)

³¹⁹ (Schmidt 2004, 17)

³²⁰ (Dittmer 2014, 10)

³²¹ (Dittmer 2014, 10)

economically integrated, in the way it was never before; it is hard to split one's issues from others'. Even when the democratic transitions were promised by regimes' leaders and these promises were never fulfilled, the authoritarian regimes are resilient.³²²

Furthermore, there is un-preferential elite's approach to labor issues, common for all the member states that should be subjected to transition as well with the creation of the ASEAN Community 2015. According to Schmidt: *"This also implies a radical rupture in the elite's approach to the role of labor unions, which might enable the negotiation of a new social contract - i.e. as the old statist corporatism is disappearing it remains to be seen what will replace it."*³²³

4.5.1 ASEAN Community 2015:

The ultimate overarching ASEAN's goal that goes through all the sectors is the creation of the ASEAN Community 2015 by the year 2015. Such reform of the ASEAN's structure should bring the deeper integration and harmonization of the diverse ASEAN's members and their state systems. A reaching of the goals set by primary political aim is the main topic of the ASEAN within the political sector. The topic becomes even more imminent, as the year 2015 is approaching.

Big changes are expected on all the sectors and the main effort should apply on the qualitative depth of the ASEAN procedures and institutional frameworks and its actions. The sign for the first big step towards change can be considered as Myanmar's Chairmanship of the ASEAN in the year 2014³²⁴.

The ASEAN Community 2015 is as a result of the strategy called the ASEAN Vision 2020 to reform the ASEAN into the deeper integrated organization, standing on three pillar structure, with possibly the biggest change as the creation of the ASEAN single market. Towards this goal was issued a Roadmap for the ASEAN Community 2009 – 2015, which should culminate in 2015 by creation of the ASEAN Community by accomplishing the three Community pillars agendas specified in the Blueprints.

Citing the Roadmap, the ASEAN members bound themselves to follow it in order to accomplish The ASEAN Community 2015 goal: *"RECOGNISING the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which seeks to bring the ASEAN Vision2020 into reality by setting the goal of building an ASEAN Community by 2020 comprising three pillars, namely political-security community, economic community and socio-cultural*

³²² (Dittmer 2014, 10)

³²³ (Schmidt 2004, 17)

community, all of which are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region; INSPIRED by the spirit of a new ASEAN, as symbolized by the ASEAN Charter, we reaffirm our commitment to accelerating the establishment of the ASEAN Community, comprising the aforementioned three pillars, by 5 years to 2015, as agreed in Cebu, the Philippines in 2007”.³²⁵

The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) refers to peaceful and harmonic Southeast Asian environment, in which the member states share the collective responsibility for the comprehensive security. Within this Community the states are intent on solving their mutual disagreements exclusively by the peaceful way. The Community still guarantees the all member states their right of sovereignty and non-interference into internal issues, same as the right for their own foreign policies. The states by endorsing the Community also agreed on the condition of interdependence of the national, regional and global securities, hence they will not step mutually upon the armed conflict and neither with the third party.

The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) speaks about the final stage of integration within the economic sector, which result is the highly competitive single market fully incorporated into the world economy. The single market idea goes even beyond just economic integration, but refers to whole region integration in the style of the EU.³²⁶ The Economic Community is securitized to be a continuation of the AFTA in deeper stage, all the tariffs with few exceptions on mutual trade should disappear and the liberation of trade should reach the final stage. Hence, the national markets are expected to massively open themselves. The Community plan also includes the development gap elimination and deep alleviation of poverty. Politically is necessary to be prepared for such changes and their impacts.³²⁷

To the final the ASEAN Socio – Cultural Community (ASCC), the human development is addressed. The ultimate goal within the people orientated community is the increase of standard of living as the “*ASEAN member-states are expected to invest heavily on its people’s education, training, science and technology development, job generation, and social protection*”. Within the Community the ASEAN regional identity should be

³²⁴ (Brandon 2004)

³²⁵ (Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009)

³²⁶ (Rappler 2014)

³²⁷ (Rappler 2014)

widely accepted among people. Towards this goals should assist the visa free-regimes and massive people's exchange programs.³²⁸

In this chapter the thesis formulated the most striking cases of the securitization of the ASEAN's region that were demonstrated on the sectoral level. In the final chapter, all the major finding will be subjected to the final synthesis. The sectoral characteristics will be sought in form of the RSC determining factors identification. If the determining factors are not to be identified, the thesis follows with the short analysis of possible region transformation from the former RSC to another form of the regional setting.

5. The Analysis Synthesis

In this chapter the thesis synthetizes the major findings analyzed in the two previous chapters. The chapter focuses on the units of the RSC in order to decide whether the case of the ASEAN can be considered as the RSC or not. The ASEAN's units were in previous chapters analyzed through their security ideas, preferences and concerns, through the security management dynamism and through the securitization processes that take place within them. On the securitization processes are demonstrated the units' relations and interactions. From the perspective of the securitization, the main securitization and functional actors, the referential objects and the facilitating conditions were analyzed to show the position of the units within the system.

The chapter synthesizes relevant findings by applying them on the factors, which in theory constitute the Regional Security Complex. After confronting the RSC factors with the thesis' findings, the thesis gives the final answers on question raised from the confrontation of the theory with the empirical case. The methodological question is following: Based on securitization within different sectors it is possible to identify the characteristics of the RSC within these sectors? If yes, is the RSC's overlaying on the RSC logic in other sectors?

Furthermore, if the RSC determining factors are not be confirmed, the thesis will analyze the signs and changes that could lead to the transition of a former RSC as the ASEAN was once considered to be, into another regional setting. The thesis would consider in such a case, as the result of synthesis the finding, whether the analyzed case matches with the characteristics of the RSC or not.

³²⁸ (Rappler 2014)

At the end of the synthesis the answers are given on the research questions and the initial hypotheses are either confirmed or refuted. All the major conclusions are once more presented in the following Conclusion, in which they are expressed related to major closing remarks and recommendations.

As the thesis drafted in the theoretical part, the RSC determining factors to be proven for successful identification with theory are following:

- 1. The Southeast Asian units' composition within the system and the differences between them; referral to the heterogeneous nature of the system.**

The units' layout within the ASEAN region is definitely heterogeneous as the units of the system can be understood by either the national states, or the ASEAN organization. Moreover, the ASEAN organization's structure is so extensive, that the particular ASEAN institutions can play the role of the independent unit as well. According to their nature, as suggested in instrumental part of the thesis, they could be divided into the two groups: the exclusive and inclusive institutional structures. This division is seen by research as the securitization interests of these two groups differs. The first group of institutions is driven exclusively by the interest of national states or the interest of the ASEAN organization as such. None another player interferes into the formulation of their priorities. In contrary, the inclusive organization and their securitized topics are the result of dialog between the ASEAN regular members, the ASEAN institutions, and the third parties that are members of particular groupings. Among the third parties belong the powerful external states like China, the US, Japan and the others, and also international organizations like the EU. In the reality the topics of securitization produced at the ground of inclusive institutions are the outcomes of struggle over the power position into a grouping and whoever wins has the power of pushing through the agenda aimed to be securitized.

The differences among the unit are more than self-evident. Even though all the units united under the umbrella of ASEAN share the same interest in the membership in the organization, their national characteristics, interests and the securitization cases are various, and sometimes even contradictory. It is almost admirable that such diverse units can be members of one organization which into some extent articulates their collective goals.

The units, speaking about national states, even if they differ from each other just slightly – they share the common culture, religion, history, language and territorial affiliation, their interests can be so much contradictory or same that they resulted into the armed conflict. As suggested, the units' variety is in many cases predetermined by the cultural, religious and historical specifics or traditions.

There are several levels of the units' interests, some of them are national, some of them local, regional and even global nature. Some of the region's units share and collectively securitize some of them definitely not. However, the units are all interconnected and their interests, security realities and thus securitization processes cannot be seen separately. The consequences of the cases of securitization are felt the most probably by all of them, by some of them less and by some of them more, partly thanks to the intensity of their membership involvement in the ASEAN. At the same time it is necessary to understand that by any of these steps the units, in this case states, they did not give up any stage of their sovereignty in favor of their membership in the collective organization.

In recent years their interdependence is being systematically deepened and it is most likely that the interconnection of the securitization processes will be just increasing. The adequate proofs of that can serve the community building tools like the FTA or single market creation, the collective defense planning or the collective identity building etc.

All the ongoing processes within the heterogeneous region take place inside the region and its external borders, and no matter how much heterogeneous the units of the region are, they all belong into the region thanks to their territorial affinity. The outside players with no regards how much engage in the regional developments, cannot be therefore considered as the region's units. Thus the region is strongly circumscribed by its outside borders.

2., 3. The regional states polarization and their friendly and hostile relations.

As suggested above, the units and especially states are polarized as they can be found on the axis of the right and left orientation, according to the political orientation of the ruling regimes. The polarity of the regime usually predefines the relations of amity and enmity among the states. It is highly un-probable that strongly socialist state like Vietnam, for example, will be a close friend to Indonesia or the Philippines, which both try to go on the path of the Western model of democracy. Other reason for the relations of amity or enmity among the units is the conflicts' potential. Some of the conflicts

already took place, some are still present or were diminished and sometimes they still let know about themselves from the latent phase. To be particular, the South China Sea Dispute is being splitting the countries for long years already and most probably will do so in the future too. Also there are often bilateral disagreements which shape the states' relations on bilateral level, as it could be seen for instance on the case of Malaysia – the Philippines through the Sulu conflict.

Furthermore the strong affiliation to an external actor which poses the threat to the others can be also reason for the unfriendly mutual relations.

After all mentioned, it can seem to be miracle that the states with so many conflicting interests and mutual issues can be at the same time acting like partners, as they declare, and be uniting themselves into one organization that is to be just deepening their integration. Can this even work? One could wonder. In seems in the ASEAN Way, it could after all.

4. The power distribution among the national states and the ASEAN within the region.

Power is distributed based on the capacities in the units' disposal. Those that generate the vast GDP as Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and others are logically more powerful than those still fighting with the identification of developmental state status. The economic growth does not need to be the denominator for power distribution as the gap between units is still large. Although the countries like Lao or Cambodia have a huge GDP growth, they cannot cope so easily with countries like Indonesia, Malaysia or Singapore whose economies are large, even though the GDP growth in case of the latter two would be much lower.

Also the military capacities indicate the power composition of the states. However, the states in the ASEAN region are not the case, as they do not pose sufficient capacities for self-defense, with few exceptions as in case of Indonesia. The other units must rely on the protection guaranteed by the others.

The units of the region are equal as there is so far no single higher authority that would order the region's members what to do. As some might see a higher authority in the ASEAN organization, that unites its members – the states of the region, its hierarchical position is not true. The character of the organization is still intergovernmental, it has no power and authority over its members to be enforcing over them the collective policies and make decisions on their behalf, so far. All the member states did not give up any

level of their national sovereignty and they still do have their autonomous foreign, security and defense policies.

Another chapter of the story would be what these states plan for the future. As the ASEAN Community 2015 plans for the upcoming future, the domestic policies of its members should be unified and some of their powers and competencies shall be true transmitted on the level of the ASEAN organization. These processes are, however, the matter of the future and they are not topics of the thesis' research.

Up to now also any of the external players have not managed to gain a systematical power that would be of the decisive character over the units of system. Speaking about the most powerful actors engaging in the region like China, the US, Japan and the others, nobody has acquired the legal authority in overtaking of some of the sovereign decisions of the units. Their influence is mainly exercised through their interference into the securitization processes, but that does not give them a superior position in the regional logic. That being said any higher authority than the units itself do not exist in the region and therefore, the anarchical nature is the one that can be considered in the regional terms.

The processes of securitization and desecuritization within the Southeast Asia and the security interdependence of the region's units.

A large part of the thesis is dedicated to the processes of securitization, desecuritization and units' interdependence. The units enter on large scale into the securitization processes, same as the desecuritization, which are mutually interconnected as the security realities of the individual units are extensively interdependent.

The thesis' research was able to name the most significant cases of securitization and desecuritization. Among them undoubtedly are the South China Sea Dispute and the ASEAN single market creation.

Demonstrating on the first case, almost a half of the regions units are engaged in securitization process, and the one other actor – China strongly fights for the desecuritization. If one of the securitizing actor steps out from the securitization, the immediacy and the severity of the threat will just grow and the other securitizing actors will have to engage harder into the securitization, because of gap left by one of the actor.

Showing it practically on the case of the South China Sea Dispute the process would be as follows: the securitization of the case is strong since behind it stands more of the

actors and on the contrary one strong actor at the same time strives for the desecuritization of the whole topic by influencing all the sorts of the other actors; while one actor withdraws from the securitization process the pressure gets lower and threat for the referential objects, in this case the integrity of states' sovereignties and the intangibility of the EEZ's, decreases. Because the pressure of the securitizing actors will be minus one lower, the desecuritizing actor is more likely to win in its effort, unless the remaining securitizing actors manage to increase the securitization power by their heavier engagement or by the including of new securitization actor(s). In reality, if in the case is engaged in by more than one actor, the change of behavior of one will influence all the rest.

The securitization processes are plenty and they are deeply interdependent throughout the whole system of units within all the sectors. As demonstrated above, the securitization processes based on their depth cannot be easily, in short time perspective, reversed.

By identifying all the determining factors of the characteristic of the RSC's, the thesis identifies the case of the ASEAN region with the RSC as well. Responses to the methodological questions are: *Based on securitization within different sectors it is possible to identify the characteristics of the RSC within these sectors?* **Yes, based on the analysis on all the sectoral levels it is possible to identify the characteristics of the RSC within these sectors of the ASEAN case.**

Furthermore, the thesis answers the initial research questions: *It is the theory of Regional Security Complexes applicable to the case of the ASEAN countries, hence the region of Southeast Asia, or the integration in the region have reached to such an extent that the region became in security relations the unified player?* **The Regional Security Complex Theory is indeed applicable on the ASEAN's region which shares almost the same borders with Southeast Asian region. The research on the case confirmed all the characteristics of the Regional Security Complex Theory as it was formulated and revisited by the Copenhagen School. The integration process is taking place in the region in large scale, but rather on horizontal level than vertical, and the depth of the integration is not sufficient that the integration processes would overweight the nature of the Regional Security Complex.**

Can be the characteristics of the RSC identified on all the sectors of the analysis? If not, which securitization sectors do correspond with the RSC theory? The thesis identifies the characteristics of the RSC's on all the sectors of the analysis, moreover these RSC's overlay with the RSC's in other sectors and some of them overlay on the sectors of the other regions' RSCs, namely to the region of East Asia as in case of political, military, economic and environmental sectors. Based on that it could be even suggested that the ASEAN's RSC overlays on the East Asia RSC, hence they could be perceived by some as the only one RSC.

As a working hypothesis H1 the thesis employed the prediction that *“The Association of Southeast Asian States, the ASEAN can be conceptualized as a Regional Security Complex, since the link between security policies and realities of its members and the related securitization processes are mutually inseparable phenomena”*. **This hypothesis is definitely confirmed in all its extent.**

First sub-hypothesis H2 then assumed that *“The RSC characteristics can be especially applied on political sector of securitization, in which the integration has not yet reached to such a stage that it would unite the foreign and security policies of the association member states. The reasons for it are the varying economic interests of member states, which are superior to the political objectives of the organization, for which enforcement is missing the political will. The thesis proven based on its research that the characteristics of the RSC can be applied on all the sectors, therefore political sector is not any prioritized in terms of the RSC characteristics. Furthermore, the thesis has proven that the economic interests of the states are essential, but not necessarily superior to political objectives. Sometimes this assumption is truly valid, but the research has encountered the cases when political interests were given priority over the economic interests. In many cases the economic interests of member states do vary, but on the contrary considering the ultimate goals of the states, they usually share the same ones. Finally the thesis proves that for some of the political interests there is not sufficient will for their enforcing, however some received through the securitization process a sufficient will and political pressure to be pushed through. Based on that, the sub-hypothesis is rather refuted, because only some of its assumptions were proven to be true.*

In this chapter, the thesis identified an analyzed case with the all the determining characteristics of the Regional Security Complex. Because of that there is not any further need to proceed to the analysis of possible transition. Therefore, the identification of the ASEAN with the transformation signs is not to be conducted.

6. Conclusion

The aim of the thesis was to analyze, whether it is possible to identify the case of the ASEAN with the RSC logic. The studied case was subjected to detailed analysis and the answers to the research questions were found and proven based on the research findings.

The thesis in five chapters elaborated on the theoretical background and on the empirical evidences of the particular case. The revisited Regional Security Complex Theory introduced into the discourse of Security Studies by the Copenhagen School was used as the theoretical basis. The case of the ASEAN was firstly studied through the detailed elaboration on the securitization processes within the region in the third chapter of the thesis. The securitization and desecuritization processes were in detail analyzed on the three types of securitization actors: the national states, the exclusive members' ASEAN institutions and the inclusive members' ASEAN institutions. Further the identified cases of the securitization were demonstrated on the sectoral logic. The particular sectors as military, political, economic, environmental and societal presented the securitization cases decomposed to the securitization actors, the functional actors, the facilitating conditions and the referential objects. Furthermore, the analysis attempted to search for the securitization relations across the sectors and for the relations amongst the sectors as such.

The thesis final chapter synthetized the main findings and confronted the analyzed case with the determining characteristics of the theory. By so doing the thesis identified the ASEAN's case with all the characteristics of the Regional Security Complex Theory and confirmed the case as the Regional Security Complex on all the sectors. Moreover, the thesis research showed that the particular sectors are overlaying with the sectors of another complex, in the thesis case with the complex of East Asia. Hence, the ASEAN RSC can be considered to be interconnected with the East Asia RSC, at least through the majority of sectors.

Another consequent stream of regional order that the ASEAN follows to the future is the ongoing intense integration process. The effort in integrating of all the ASEAN member states is significant, it is largely securitized on the political sector, but the integration does not reach yet the necessary qualitative outreach to the RSC transition. That is why the region in current setting can be best classified as the Regional Security Complex, but in the time perspective of few years this classification might not be possible anymore. The form of the ASEAN functioning shall especially be changed by the accomplishing of the ASEAN Community 2015. The ultimate goal of the ASEAN Community 2015 is widely securitized mainly on political, economic, societal and military sector and in the future it should include the transitional changes on all the sectors.

The possible transformation of the ASEAN shall not mean any less intense interdependence of the ASEAN states, but moreover the interdependent states' security realities could be connected by the integrating bodies into one of the style of the EU.

So far the ASEAN can be considered as the RSC, because the full integration is hindered by the de-facilitating conditions which do not enable it to fully evolve in the region. If the ongoing successful integration is the true aim of the ASEAN member states, they could consider whether it would not be beneficial towards it to give up some of sovereign policies that states conduct. Because of a fear of states from the loss of the independence, stemming from the colonization period, could constrain the successful integration process accomplishment.

The ASEAN member states should firstly determine deep within themselves whether all of them are willing to share so much in common within the integrated structures with all of their counterparts from the complex, as some of them have still open disputes, even wage armed conflicts. If they desire that, they shall engage in viable actions on how to solve the current disagreements same as the conflicts in latent phase that are many in the region. Otherwise without their solutions, the successful integration could become even bigger issue to their national interests to accommodate with as it is suggested in the thesis. At the end, the complex units should utterly decide on which path they want to walk and do everything for its successful paving.

The year 2015 is going to be big year for the ASEAN as the envisioned ASEAN Community 2015 shall be finally materialized. But how it will look like in reality is just up to its members and their ability to work together. If they manage to fulfil their promised goal, they will bring into the International Relations something significant to

study and be inspired by: the new collective identity of sovereign states that was created by the institutionally initiated socialization among them. And that could be a truly unique achievement since almost all similar regional settings have achieved that by the opposite process – the states thanks to their relations of amity and the common identity have united themselves under the one organization; but in case of Southeast Asia, the ASEAN might succeed in uniting those, whose used not to have any collective feelings et all.

Summary

The thesis topic is the applicability of the Regional Complex Theory as it was formulated by the Copenhagen school with the case of the ASEAN and its member states within the region of Southeast Asia. The research attempted to analyze with which type of regional settings the ASEAN in the light of current developments can be characterize. The analysis was conducted through the identification of the security processes in the region, by the presentation of the essential security actors in the region and through the detailed analysis of the securitization processes. The securitization processes were further studied on the sectorial logic. Based on the sectorial interactions on the various level of analysis the research was able to confirm all the determining characteristics of the Regional Security Complex formulated by the theory with the case of the ASEAN. As the final remarks thesis highlights the recommendations for the future ASEAN evolvement.

7. Bibliography

ACHARYA, Amitav, SENG Tan See. *Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: Reconciling National Interest With Regional Order*. Armonk: ME Sharpe, 2004. 264 pages.

ACHARYA, Amitav. *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. Oxon: Amitav Acharya, 2001. 234 pages. ISBN 0-203-93923-9.

ACHARYA, Amitav, STUBBS, Richard. *New Challenges for ASEAN: Emerging Policy Issues*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995. 224 pages.

ACHARYA, Amitav. Regionalism and Regime Security in the Third World Comparing the Origins of the ASEAN and the GCC. *Journal of Peace Research*. 2000, Vol. 37, pp. 275-299. In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

ACHARYA, Amitav, STUBBS, Richard. *Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: Emerging Debates*. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 134 pages.

ARC CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE IN CORAL REEF STUDIES. Worst coral death strikes at Southeast Asia. *ScienceDaily* [online]. October 21, 2010. . Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from [www: <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/10/101020091903.htm>](http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/10/101020091903.htm).

ASEAN. *ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights*. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat. 2009.

ASEAN. *ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint*. Jakarta: The ASEAN Secretariat. 2009.

ASEAN. *Charter of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations*. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2008. ISBN 978-979-3496-62-7.

ASEAN. *The ASEAN Vision 2020*. Kuala Lumpur: ASEAN Secretariat [online]. December 15, 1997. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-vision-2020>>.

ARIFF, Mohammed. *Institutionalization of Economic Cooperation the Asia-Pacific Region with the Special Reference to APEC*. Dokkyo International Review, 9, pp. 177 – 192. In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM. About The ASEAN Regional Forum. *ASEAN Regional Forum* [online]. 2011. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/about.html>>.

ASIA-PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES. Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region. *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies* [online]. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.apcss.org/about-2/ap-countries/>>.

AYOOB, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995, 216 pages. In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

BRANDON, John J. ASEAN Chairmanship Offers Opportunity for Myanmar. *Weekly Insight and Analysis in Asia* [online]. January 8, 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/01/08/asean-chairmanship-offers-opportunity-for-myanmar/>>.

BRAUCH, Hans Günter. Concepts of Security Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks. *United Nations University. Institute for Environment and Human Security* [online]. 2005. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.ehs.unu.edu/article/read/72>>.

BUZAN, Barry. *People, States & Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 1991, 250 pages.

BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 564 pages.

CCTV Online. China becomes ASEAN's biggest trade partner. *China Central Television* [online]. 2014. July 23, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://english.cntv.cn/program/newshour/20130723/103631.shtml> >.

CHAUHAN, Sadhavi. Vietnam's role in ASEAN. *East Asia Forum*. October 23, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/23/vietnams-role-in-asean/>>.

CHUNG, Chien-Peng. China and Japan in "ASEAN Plus" Multilateral Arrangements: Raining on the Other Guy's Parade. *Asian Survey*, September/October 2013, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 801 - 824.

DEINLA, Imelda. ASEAN non-interference and the Sabah conflict. *New Mandala* [online]. March 22, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2013/03/22/asean-non-interference-and-the-sabah-conflict/>>.

DITTMER, Lowell. Asia in 2013: Peace and Prosperity amid Rising Tension. A Survey of Asia in 2013, *Asian Survey*, January/February 2014, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 1-11.

DEUTSCH, Karl Wolfgang. *Political community and the North Atlantic area: international organization in the light of historical experience*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957. 228 pages.

DOUGHERTY, Jill. U.N. council passes gay rights resolution. *CNN* [online]. 2014. June 17, 2011. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/europe/06/17/un.lgbt.rights/>>.

DROLETTE, Daniel. A Plague of Deforestation Sweeps Across Southeast Asia [online]. *Yale University*. 2008 – 2013. MAY 20, 2013. Accessible from www: <http://e360.yale.edu/feature/a_plague_of_deforestation_sweeps_across_southeast_asia/2652/>.

DRYSDALE, Peter. Can Asia Help Power the Global Recovery? Think Tank 20: New Challenges for the Global Economy, New Uncertainties for the G-20 [online]. 2012. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/reports/2012/6/think%20tank%2020/tt20_drysdale_asia>.

HAARETZ. UN protests as Brunei gears up to allow stoning of gays. *Haaretz Daily Newspaper Ltd.* [online]. April 17, 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.haaretz.com/news/world/1.586095>>.

HANSEN, Lene. The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, June 2000, Vol. 29, pp 285-306.

HERMAN, Edward S. Aggression Rights and Wrongs: Vietnam in Cambodia; the United States in Iraq. *Global Research* [online]. August 18, 2008. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.globalresearch.ca/aggression-rights-and-wrongs-vietnam-in-cambodia-the-united-states-in-iraq/9863>>.

HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL. INDONESIA: The Indonesian Government must take action to address serious violations of the freedoms of assembly and expression in the Papuan provinces. *Asian Human Rights Commission* [online]. 2012. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.humanrights.asia/countries/indonesia/news/alrc-news/human-rights-council/hrc20/ALRC-CWS-20-08-2012>>.

HURRELL, Andrew, KINGSBURY, Benedict. *The International Politics of the Environmental – Actors, Interests and Institutions*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 492 pages. In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

HUYSMANS, Jef. Revisiting Copenhagen, or, About the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe. *European Journal of International Relations*. 1997, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 488–506.

JIN, Lee Khiam. Asean's response to Typhoon Haiyan. *Penang Monthly* [online]. March 4, 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from [www: <http://penangmonthly.com/aseans-response-to-typhoon-haiyan/>](http://penangmonthly.com/aseans-response-to-typhoon-haiyan/).

JONES, David Martin, SMITH, M. L. R. *ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006. 269 pages. ISBN 978847200860.

KATZENSTEIN, Peter J. Regionalism and Asia. *New Political Economy*. Abingdon, November 2000, Vol. 5, Iss. 3, 17 pages.

KELLY, Tom. Maritime Security, Sea Power and Trade. Remarks. *The U.S. State* [online]. March 25, 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from [www: <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2014/223921.htm>](http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2014/223921.htm).

KOŠATKOVÁ, Iva. *Arktida jako regionální bezpečnostní komplex (Aplikace teorie regionálního bezpečnostního komplexu na geopolitický region Arktida v rámci širší diskuse regionalistických přístupů ke studiu mezinárodní bezpečnosti)*. Praha, 2013. 137 pages. Rigorous thesis at the Faculty of Social Sciences - Department of International Relations Institute of Political Studies. Supervisor: Mgr. Tomáš Weiss, M. A., Ph.D.

LIPSKY, John. Asia, the Financial Crisis, and Global Economic Governance. *International Monetary Fund* [online]. October 20, 2009.

Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from [www: <https://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/102009.htm>](http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2009/102009.htm).

LOU, Chunhao. Power politics in the Indian Ocean: don't exaggerate the China threat. *East Asia Forum* [online]. October 24, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from [www: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-the-indian-ocean-dont-exaggerate-the-china-threat/>](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/10/24/power-politics-in-the-indian-ocean-dont-exaggerate-the-china-threat/).

MCSWEENEY, Bill. Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School. *Review of International Studies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, January 1996, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 81-93.

MCSWEENEY, Bill. *Security, Identity and Interests*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 239 pages.

MOURITZEN, Hans. *A Fallacy of IR Theory: Reflection On a Collective Repression, unpublished manuscript*. Copenhagen. Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1995.

In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

MOURITZEN, Hans. *Kenneth Waltz: A Critical Rationalist Between International Politics and Foreign Policy*, In Iver B. Neumann, Ole Waever (eds.), *The Future of International Relations, Masters in the Making?* London: Routledge, 66-89 pages. In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

OHLSSON, Leif. *Hydropolitics: Conflicts over Water as a Development Constraint*. London, Zed Books, 1995, 230 pages. In BUZAN, Barry, WÆVER, Ole, DE WILDE, Jaap. *Bezpečnost: Nový rámec pro analýzu*. Brno: Centrum strategických studií, 2005, 267 pages.

RAPPLER. A united region: The ASEAN Community 2015. *Rappler* [online]. 2014. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.rappler.com/world/specials/47239-asean-community-2015-overview>>.

RUNGSWASDISAB, Puangthong. Thailand's Response to the Cambodian Genocide. *Yale University* [online]. 2011. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <http://www.yale.edu/cgp/thailand_response.html>.

SARKAR, Debashis. Old vs New Regionalism. *Academia.edu* [online]. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://klyuniv.academia.edu/debashissarkar/Papers>>.

SCHMIDT, Johannes Dragsbaek. *Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia*. Denmark: Aalborg University, Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR), 2004. 29 pages. ISSN 0904-8154.

SHAUN, Narine. ASEAN and the Management of Regional Security. *Pacific Affairs*. University of British Columbia, 1998, Vol. 71, No. 2, pp. 195-214.

SIDEL, John T. The Philippines in 2013: Disappointment, Disgrace, Disaster. *Asian Survey: A Survey of Asia in 2013*. January/February 2014, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 64-70.

SINGH, Bhanu. Major Powers and the Security of Southeast Asia. *Strategic Analysis*. 2000, Volume 24, Issue 2, pages 315-342.

SIMON, Sheldon W. The ASEAN Regional Forum: Beyond the Talk Shop? *The National Bureau for Asian Research* [online]. July, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://klyuniv.academia.edu/debashissarkar/Papers>>.

SLATER, Dan. Southeast Asia: Strong-State Democratization in Malaysia and Singapore. *Journal of Democracy* [online]. April 2012, Vol. 23, Iss. 2, 14 pages.

Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<<http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/article/southeast-asia-strong-state-democratization-malaysia-and-singapore#sthash.zuzszpwl.dpuf>>.

SOKOLSKY, Richard et al. The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy Toward China. *Rand Corporation* [online]. 1994 - 2014. 2001. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1170/MR1170.ch5.pdf>.

STEINER, Kerstin. 'Asian Values': Challenging the paradigms of international human rights? *Berlin Roundtables on Transnationality: Reframing Human Rights* [online]. 2005. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: < http://www.irmgard-coninx-stiftung.de/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/archive/030%2520Steiner.pdf >.

SUMAYAO, Carlo, CORDERO, Jean Magdaraog. Typhoon Haiyan: ASEAN provides relief to Philippines. *Asia Pacific Defense Forum* [online]. November 18, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/online/features/2013/11/18/philippines-asean-react>.

THE ASEAN SECRETARIAT. Roadmap for an ASEAN Community. *The ASEAN Secretariat* [online]. 2009. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<<http://www.aseansec.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/RoadmapASEANCommunity-2.pdf>>.

THE ECONOMIST. Fifty shades of pink. *The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014* [online]. July 6, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<<http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21580526-some-countries-consider-gay-marriage-elsewhere-attitudes-harden-fifty-shades-pink>>.

THE ECONOMIST. Political demonstration in Malaysia. Crackdown in KL. *The Economist Newspaper Limited 2014* [online]. July 11, 2011. Accessed May

12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<<http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2011/07/political-demonstration-malaysia>>.

THE WORLD BANK. Emerging Myanmar Aims to Catch Up to Its Neighbors. *The World Bank Group* 2014 [online]. January 26, 2014. Accessible from www:
<<http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/01/26/emerging-myanmar-aims-catch-up-neighbors>>.

TOW, William T. The United States and Asia in 2013: From Primacy to Marginalization? *Asian Survey: A Survey of Asia in 2013*. January/February 2014, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp. 12-21.

WILLIAMS, Michael C. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly*. Wales: University of Wales – Aberystwyth, 2003, No. 47, p. 511–531.

WRIGHT, Jeffrey. Wherefore Art Thou ASEAN? Typhoon Haiyan's Teachable Moment. *Council on Foreign Relations* [online]. 2014. November 20, 2013. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <<http://www.cfr.org/philippines/wherefore-art-thou-asean-typhoon-haiyans-teachable-moment/p31920>>.

XINHUA. China-ASEAN free trade area starts operation. *Xinhua News Agency* [online]. 2009. January 11, 2010. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/01/content_12739017.htm>.

44th Strategy for Peace Conference. Nontraditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia. *The Stanley Foundation* [online]. October 16 - 18, 2003. Accessed May 12, 2014. Accessible from www:
<<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/archive/SPC03Cpb.pdf>>.