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**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM IN
THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS:
GEORGIA AND AZERBAIJAN**

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Abstract

Security sector is a complex of different fields, which altogether ensure a particular country's national security, sovereignty and independence. Such security sector fields include military security, energy security, economic security, etc. For countries on the stage of transition, complex changes to their security sectors are required, which can be implemented under the form of full-scale reforms.

This problem was faced by post-Soviet states, including Georgia and Azerbaijan, in the early 1990's, after the collapse of the USSR. However, despite the obvious necessity of reforms, they were blocked in many states due to their authorities' loyalty to Russia, and its impact over the region. Due to those problems, security sector reforms in both Georgia and Azerbaijan were finally implemented only in the early 2000's.

Georgia was able to reach greater success in its reforms thanks to the full-scale approach covering all fields of national security, with a particular focus on the military sphere. In Azerbaijan, reforms were not so effective due to lack of political will to eradicate corruption, and only superficial, but not deep, changes implemented.

Abstrakt

Bezpečnostní sektor je soubor různých oblastí, které dohromady zajišťují národní bezpečnost určité země, její svrchovanost a nezávislost. Do těchto oblastí bezpečnostního sektoru patří vojenská bezpečnost, energetická bezpečnost, ekonomická bezpečnost apod. Pro zemi, která prochází transformací, je nutno zajistit kompletní změnu bezpečnostních sil. Tohoto lze docílit pomoci bezpečnostních reforem.

S tímto problémem se potkaly všechny post-sovětské země, včetně Gruzie a Ázerbájdžánu, hned po rozpadu Sovětského svazu v roce 1990. Nicméně, i přes zjevnou nutnost reforem, které nebyly zpočátku realizovány v mnoha státech v důsledku loajality státních představitelů k Rusku a jeho vlivu na jednotlivé země. Právě proto Gruzie a Ázerbájdžán realizovaly bezpečnostní reformy pouze v roce 2000.

Gruzie dosáhla většího úspěchu ve svých reformách díky rozsahu reforem pokrývajícím všechny oblasti národní bezpečnosti, se zaměřením zejména na vojenskou oblast. V Ázerbájdžánu reformy nebyly stejně efektivní jako v Gruzii z důvodu nedostatku politické vůle k vymýcení korupce. Byly realizovány pouze povrchní změny.

Klíčová slova

Ázerbájdžán

Gruzie

Reformy bezpečnostního sektoru

Srovnávací analýza

Vojenská sféra

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1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.
2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.
3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague **31.07.2014**

Gunel Mirzazada

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. Mirzazada', written in a cursive style.

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1 Introduction

The aim of this diploma thesis is to analyze security sector reforms in two South Caucasus countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan, show the successful development experience in Georgia, analyze the main differences in SSR in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and mark out the core factors influencing such differences.

The end of the Cold War not only led to transformation in the understanding of security matters, but also established the necessity of making states' power institutions adapted to the new conditions within the global security environment. Even a discussion concerning reforms of the security sector was initiated at once with the formation of the security sector concept. Thus, the adaptation process of the security sector to the current situation became an integral part of the complete issue. The issue of security sector reforms has been protracted since the beginning of its inspection in 1997 due to that reason. (Korba M., 2013, p 8)

One of the decisive impulses, that resulted therein, was the experience of the Central European and Eastern European post-communist countries. In relation to the political and societal democratization and the economic transformation, subordination of power institutions under the oncoming political authorities was shown as the overriding priority. Implementation of democratic governance and public control of the state security system was demanding a reform related to power institutions and their departure from the repressive regime instruments to standard public service instruments. Creation of an adequate legal system, establishment of new management means, introduction of relevant internal regulations, modifications of the activities content, and, not least, even reduction and restructuring of those institutions have been demanded thereby. (Karkoszka, A., 2003, p. 173)

Security problems have always been important in this region. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the importance of this region raised again. But the problems which occurred inside the countries and between them impeded the future of possible cooperation, and relations between the countries themselves and the West. That is why these countries were also involved in the SSR process. But the ways of the countries' development were quite different. Georgia's one was the most successful.

Therefore, in this diploma thesis, I would like to consider in detail the following main

question: why was Georgia more successful in SSR than Azerbaijan? In order to answer this question, I will run a thorough comparative analysis of SSR implementation in both countries.

This topic is significant for understanding the future of this region, future of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and for further predicting development of the internal situation.

Objectives

As written above, the main objective of the proposed diploma thesis is to determine security sector reform success in Georgia, and investigate the core factors influencing the lower level of SSR success in Azerbaijan.

Hypotheses

Current research on SSR in the South Caucasus will describe two different development ways of SSR in the region: on the one hand, SSR was quite successful in Georgia, but was not in Azerbaijan. There were several causes for it. This project will give an explanation of these situations.

From a brief overview of literature, I can build up two main hypotheses which will be addressed and confirmed or denied in the course of my research:

1. *Implementation of SSR in Georgia has reached such a level of efficiency due to the consequences of the so-called Rose Revolution.*
2. *The key obstacle to successful SSR implementation in Azerbaijan is misuse of international assistance.*

Those hypotheses are important to verify in order to understand the core factors influencing Georgia's and Azerbaijan's reforms in their security sector. This will help answer the question of my research, and thus fulfill the main aim of my diploma thesis.

Theories

Current research on SSR in the South Caucasus region provides several explanations for causes of development differences between the two countries chosen. The main reasons of development differences between countries can be several: historical framework of the countries' development, cultural, political differences, distinction of the army management skills, level of Soviet system habits.

The Copenhagen School approach to analysis of security has been chosen as the theoretical framework for the proposed thesis, because this approach unites both classical and non-

classical security threats. This school has widened the concept of security beyond its traditional dimension. The Copenhagen School theory can be regarded as 'widening' traditional materialist security studies by looking at security in 'new' branches such as military/state, political, social, economic, or environmental sectors. (Buzan, Waver & De Wilde 1998)

Methodology

The proposed diploma thesis will be prepared based on statistical methods and interpretations, reports of experts. The proposed research consists of four steps:

1st step: determination of security sector reforms in two South Caucasus countries: Georgia and

Azerbaijan

2nd step: identification of the causes of Georgia's successful experience

3rd step: identification of the causes of different SSR development ways in Azerbaijan

4th step: comparison of advantages in Georgia's reforms as compared with Azerbaijan

In order to conduct my research throughout the aforementioned four steps, I will use the methods of comparative analysis, research of primary and secondary bibliographic sources, logical conclusions, theoretical analysis and synthesis. For instance, I will review data available from bibliographic sources with regard to SSR in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and will perform my own analysis through comparing the particularities of reforms in both countries. I will draw my own conclusions with regard to the research question of my thesis, and will provide my own opinion concerning that issue.

Variables

Variables in this thesis will be several, because of the differences between countries.

A) Dependent Variables

Army management methods

Government openness degree

Political situation in the country

B) Independent Variables

Political framework

Historical experience of the country

Analysis

As written above, the proposed diploma thesis will be based on mixed methods.

Quantitative method will be used for the determination of the status of SSR in both countries by using **descriptive statistics**.

Qualitative method will be used to identify different ways of SSR improvement in these two cases by describing the interviews of **key informants, content analysis**.

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Introduction

The aim of this diploma thesis is to analyze security sector reforms in two South Caucasus countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan, show the successful development experience in Georgia, analyze the main differences in SSR in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and mark out the core factors influencing such differences. The main focus will be made on analysis of differences between the reforms implemented in Georgia and Azerbaijan, and the core driving factors behind them, with identification of the actual advantages and drawbacks of SSR in both states.

The end of the Cold War not only led to transformation in the understanding of security matters, but also established the necessity of making states' power institutions adapted to the new conditions within the global security environment. Even a discussion concerning reforms of the security sector was initiated at once with the formation of the security sector concept. Thus, the adaptation process of the security sector to the current situation became an integral part of the complete issue. The issue of security sector reforms has been protracted since the beginning of its inspection in 1997 due to that reason. (Korba, 2013: 8).

One of the decisive impulses, that resulted therein, was the experience of the Central European and Eastern European post-communist countries. In relation to the political and societal democratization and the economic transformation, subordination of power institutions under the oncoming political authorities was shown as the overriding priority. Implementation of democratic governance and public control of the state security system was demanding a reform related to power institutions and their departure from the repressive regime instruments to standard public service instruments. Creation of an adequate legal system, establishment of new management means, introduction of relevant internal regulations, modifications of the activities content, and, not least, even reduction and restructuring of those institutions have been demanded thereby. (Karkoszka, 2003: 173).

Security problems have always been important in this region. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the importance of this region raised again. But the problems which occurred inside the countries and between them impeded the future of possible cooperation, and

relations between the countries themselves and the West. That is why these countries were also involved in the SSR process. But the ways of the countries' development were quite different.

The topic of this thesis deals with analysis of security sector reforms in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Such reforms were implemented in both states in conditions of economic decline and political turbulence, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The newly formed states had to form their own paradigms of domestic policies and foreign relations, and for this purpose, creation of a solid security sector was crucial. The situation was very delicate for both states, as their authorities remained to a large extent dependent on third-party countries which were trying to impose their conditions for the purpose of gaining larger control over Georgia and Azerbaijan. Due to this, implementation of full-scale security sector reforms only became possible in the early 2000's.

Georgia and Azerbaijan used absolutely different SSR models, and the results reached by them obviously differed. This was predefined not only by the differences in SSR, but also by the economic conditions and political situation in each of the countries. In the long run, Georgia's reforms proved themselves to be more effective.

Therefore, in this diploma thesis, I would like to consider in detail the following main question: why was Georgia more successful in SSR than Azerbaijan? In order to answer this question, I will run a thorough comparative analysis of SSR implementation in both countries.

This topic is significant for understanding the future of this region, future of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and for further predicting development of the internal situation.

2 Definition and theoretical background of SSR

2.1 *National security: core theoretical aspects*

The current state of international relations is characterized by domination of the globalization phenomenon. Globalization means integration of countries around the world in the fields of economy, politics and culture. This process is inherent of the today's stage of international relations development, and is obviously imposed by the objective conditions consisting in the countries' will to reach prosperity through mutually beneficial cooperation.

However, globalization also has negative aspects, which are represented by the fact that countries tend to be more vulnerable to external factors causing loss of their economic independence, and thus political sovereignty. This is predetermined by more powerful states' larger opportunities to impose their will, and gain higher benefits from international cooperation (Yeatman and Zolkos, 2010: 3).

In such conditions, states have an ever-high need in reinforcing their security in order to protect themselves against any aggressive actions (not only military, but also economic, financial, social, geopolitical, etc.) of other international relations actors. Without protecting the national identity and political sovereignty, countries would become more likely to partially or even fully lose their sovereign powers in the international arena.

Here, the concept of national security arises. It is worth understanding this theoretical concept in order to run a thorough research within the framework of my thesis.

There is no single definition of national security in scientific literature, as different researchers tend to have different approaches to this theoretical concept. However, generally, two main approaches to constructing this issue can be pointed out. The broad approach assumes that national security encompasses a wide range of different fields: military security, economic security, energy security, environmental security, and so on. In order to preserve independence in the international arena, states need to guarantee a high level of security in all the aforementioned spheres, as this is the only possible way to ensure complete protection of national interests. The narrower approach considers national security purely as military security, i.e. in terms of the security sector. However, the second

approach is applied more rarely, and doesn't explain all the aspects of such a complex phenomenon as national security (Caparini, Fluri and Molnár, 2006: 11-13).

In addition to the theoretical construction of the national security concept, there are different approaches to understanding the role and mechanisms of granting national security, its consequences for the states' activities on the international level. These approaches are classified into national securities theories, four of which can be stated as dominant: realism, pluralism, Marxism, and social constructivism (Neack, 2007: 29).

Realists see states as the only essential actors in the international arena, and therefore analyze national security from the perspective of interaction between states in the course of their international relations. Realists argue that states acting in the international arena only seek satisfaction of their own needs, regardless of any ethical or moral concepts. In this respect, states are similar to individuals, whose actions are guided by their own will to have larger benefits in some fields. In such conditions, collisions between states are unavoidable, and therefore wars occur for economic goods, geopolitical domination, or other benefits. The national security issue is resolved through seeking a balance of power. I.e. a particular state's level of national security and further needs in its reinforcement are largely predefined by other states' level of economic and military might, and probability of aggressive actions against this particular state in an attempt to gain domination over it (Cordner, Das and Cordner, 2009: 45-49).

In contrast to realists, pluralists argue that the field of international relations includes many other influential actors in addition to nation-states. First of all, those are international organizations and institutions whose level of importance in the world, and scope of powers are constantly rising. Taking into account this fact, national security can no longer be predefined just by the balance of power between states. There are numerous international agreements in the field of security, and international organizations acting in this field have their own security policies, which have to be respected by most states of the world making part of such international institutions. Therefore, their national security to a large extent depends on their interaction with all the actors in the international arena, and goes far beyond ordinary borders of interstate relations (Gow and Zverzhanovski, 2013: 7-8).

The Marxist paradigm of national security regards this theoretical concept from quite a different perspective. Proponents of this approach tend to believe, that all conflicts on the international scale are provoked by confrontations between two main social classes, capitalists and proletarians, rather than by tensions between states seeking to fulfill their egoistic goals regardless of the means to be used. Capitalists exploit proletarians not only within particular states, but also in international relations, trying to impose their will to weaker and less developed countries, thus gaining domination on the global scale. Therefore, national security of a particular country should be based on resistance to the capitalists reigning within the country, which should be overthrown, and then to foreign capitalists wishing to spread their influence. Ideally, national sectors of proletarian countries should in the long run converge in order to be able to withstand the threat of foreign exploiters (Picciotto and Weaving, 2006: 34-36).

Theories within the paradigm of social constructivism tend to consider national security as security against threats represented mainly by global issues, and not by other countries seeking spreading their global domination. According to the scholars supporting this theoretical approach, threats such as global warming or spread of HIV/AIDS around the globe can lead to peril of all states, and therefore are the most urgent in terms of their security. Thus, national security of states should primarily be aimed at overcoming those adverse conditions, otherwise it can in the long run become absolutely useless at all (Brinkerhoff, 2007: 45).

Despite the obviously different theoretical approaches, many schools believe national security to be one of the core tasks of any state's activities. For the purpose of this thesis, I will analyze the security sector concept in its broad understanding.

In the next section of my thesis, I would like to focus more on the role of the security sector in ensuring state sovereignty and independence.

2.2 Security sector and its role

Security sector is a particular state's field of internal policies and activities aimed at preserving its national security against both internal and external threats (Barak and

Sheffer, 2009: 6). Thus, it is obvious that a state's security sector covers all of its activities in any domains, which are carried out for the purpose of granting political sovereignty and economic stability.

The security sector concept is very complex, and includes many different directions of activities, therefore, its role should be analyzed in terms of such particular activities, in order to mark out the most essential factors predetermining the necessity to develop and strengthen it.

Military security has historically been the first form of national security. Starting from formation of the first nation-states, when the level of international economic relations was incomparably low, and no significant social interaction was observed in the international scale, all relations between states mainly developed based on their military levers of tension. More powerful countries sought invading weaker actors in order to form large empires. With development of international economic relations, new mechanisms of impact started emerging. Military invasion was no longer the only way to impose one's conditions to other states. Instead of using direct force against opponents, it became actually possible to suppress them economically, for instance through blocking supplies of some goods, or through making their economies much dependent on some resources. However, up until the mid-XX century, military methods to achieve domination on the worldwide scale remained essential, and reached their peak in the outbreak of the two world wars. Only after the world wars, when the global community understood that such large-scale conflicts in the international arena would inevitably lead to peril of humanity, application of military means on the global level started being actively constrained, namely through international arrangements and regulations (Bryden, Caparini and Marenin, 2006: 21-23).

Against the threat of military intervention from other states, security sector emerged in nation-states. It consisted of internal policies aimed at granting military security. States formed their own armies, organized their training, provision with supplies, developed plans of military operations, constructed fortifications, and so on. All this was made for the purpose of protecting national borders against external invaders. With development of new technologies, modernization of the military sector started developing at a much more rapid

pace thanks to new weapons, equipment, etc. (Ekengren and Simons, 2013: 155-156).

As of today, even despite the fact that states tend to seek larger cooperation with no military means applied, military security remains one of the main factors constraining escalation of any international conflicts. This is mainly due to the fact that military might shows readiness to resist to any potential aggressor's actions. Furthermore, in the current conditions, the military sector is very important for preventing and liquidating terrorist attacks. The role of military security can't be underestimated, and this is why countries tend to interact in this domain on the regional level (Yeatman and Zolkos, 2010: 66-67).

Political security is another important element of the security sector. It is mainly about preserving the current social order. Political security within a particular state stands for ensuring political stability in the country, and forming long-term policies to be followed in the international field. Political stability within the state is very important for its overall national security, as lack of such stability can potentially lead to deterioration of the basic foundations of society, and therefore to loss of any national interests as such. At the same time, long-term policies with regard to the foreign vectors of development are required in order to establish strong relations with foreign partners, define the key allies on the international level, and so on. If the overall political course remains stable, state security tends to be much higher (Neack, 2007: 89-90).

Economic security can today be considered as one of the crucial elements of national security. Economic security stands for stability of states in their level of economic development, provision with all the resources necessary to ensure a high level of social welfare and the overall functioning of the economy. The role of economic security becomes even higher in conditions of globalization, when economic interconnections between countries are very close, and more developed countries tend to use their economic might as a lever of tension on weaker states. Taking into consideration the current impact of transnational corporations, economic resources of which are often higher than of some independent states, economic security becomes especially important, as it allows financing all activities, providing people with state support, developing plans for the future, etc. (Schnabel and Farr, 2012: 13).

Energy security is a particular field of security connected with availability of energy

resources, and the necessity to ensure their efficient use. This national security domain is crucial, as energy resources are indispensable for any branch's functioning. No industrial activities are possible without energy resources, just as is the case with social welfare. Countries that do not have sufficient energy resources need to seek foreign suppliers. In case if no diversification is reached, there will be a situation where the entire state's economic stability and thus political sovereignty will be threatened due to possible interruption or stoppage of supplies (Ryan, 2011: 123).

Environmental security stands for states' security against the threats of adverse environmental conditions. Such threats are predetermined by natural phenomena, and often go beyond the field of particular states' or even the global community's control. For instance, such adverse global environmental issues include desertification of lands, lack of potable water, ozone layer destruction, and so on. States need to undertake effective measures to overcome environmental issues, as they pose under a considerable threat the population, through deterioration of the conditions of living (Caparini, Fluri and Molnár, 2006: 140-144).

All the branches of the security sector are very important for ensuring a high level of national security against both domestic and external threats, and only their combined efficient development can in the long run help achieve the aforementioned goal.

Different security sector branches can be developed individually, focusing on specific aspects of ensuring national security. For instance, different governmental agencies can be responsible for increasing the overall level of a particular country's security in different spheres, by implementing different sets of activities. Such activities may include improvement of the legal base, modernization of armed forces' military equipment, diversification of energy supplies, adoption of maximum permissible levels of different emissions, and so on. However, the most efficient way to increase the overall level of national security is to ensure coherent improvement of all branches of national security, as each one of them plays an essential role in guaranteeing a particular country's security in all respects.

However, development of the security sector should be constant. If this sector becomes obsolete in any respect, security sector reforms are needed.

In the next section of my work, I would like to consider more in detail the theoretical concept of security sector reform.

2.3 Theoretical concept of SSR

The concept of security sector reform (also widely known as SSR) first emerged with the collapse of the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union in the early 1990's. The process of formation of new states on the territory of the ex-USSR was complicated due to the fact that such countries in fact had to completely reshape their vectors of development, all their previous ties with partners were broken. In such conditions, they were both economically and politically very weak against internal and external threats, and had to quickly undertake measures to completely modernize their security sector, so that it would meet the requirements of the time, which had drastically changed. In those circumstances, well-thought and deep reforms were needed, which would cover all the aspects of the national security domain. Those processes were described in scientific literature as SSR, which term has thereafter been widely used for describing similar processes in countries around the globe (Vidalis, 2006: 85-86).

In today's scientific bibliographic sources, many different definitions of the SSR concept can be found. Their wide number is mostly due to the different theoretical approaches to national security interpretation used by researchers as the basis for their studies. However, SSR generally signifies the process of reformation or reconstruction of a state's security sector. Security sector reforms are applied when the security sector is no longer well-functioning, and cannot ensure security of the particular state and its people. The main aim of SSR is to carry out reforms which would guarantee efficient security and justice services within the state, without any discrimination of human rights (Law, 2007: 32-33).

As SSR is a complex concept, many different tools can be used to implement it in practice. Such tools mainly include various types of reforms carried out in different domains of the security sector or national services in this field. For instance, those reforms can be defense, police, intelligence, justice and penal reforms (Chanaa, 2002: 56).

Defense reforms are those carried out in the defense sector and aimed at eliminating its drawbacks, reshaping its operating activities, implementing major modernizations of the existing state of things. Defense reforms may also include reformation of the state's armed forces, decrease or increase in their number, changes to the structure of their formation, changes to the principles of recruitment, and so on. Police reforms include steps and measures implemented in order to improve the legal framework of police activities and change its actual structure. Legal improvements can include changes to the powers and functions of police structures, principles of interaction with other law enforcement agencies, and so on. Also, police reforms can include changes to the territorial structure of administrations, requirements to testing and re-testing of employees, etc. Intelligence reforms cover the state's intelligence structures, i.e. governmental agencies responsible for gathering, analyzing and interpreting information in support of national security provision. Intelligence reforms can include changes to the methods of such agencies' activities, requirements to the agents employed, principles of interaction with other governmental agencies and law enforcement bodies (Spence and Fluri, 2008: 31-38).

Justice reforms stand for reforms in a state's judiciary sector. They generally include a wide range of changes to regulatory acts aimed at improving the functioning of courts, and their impartiality in judicial processes. Such reforms often include transition from the inquisitorial to the adversarial system, changes to the hierarchy of courts, codification of law, changes to mandatory requirements to judges, for instance, minimum and maximum service age, changes to the appointment procedure, etc. Penal reforms are reforms made in order to improve the penal system. They are mainly aimed at improving the conditions of containment in prisons, changing the number and geographical locations of prisons within the country, etc. (Nill, 2011: 9-10).

However, security sector reforms are not strictly limited to the ones described above. They can also include reforms with regard to organizations, institutions or officials engaged in the process of management, development and supervision of measures related to national security, such as governmental agencies, civil society organizations, ombudspersons, human rights commissions, and so on. In this case, the main ultimate goal is to ensure not only security of the state as such against external threats, but also of the population against the adverse conditions of the current activities of such persons or

institutions due to drawbacks in legislation or other reasons (Born and Schnabel, 2010: 40-42).

Security sector reforms mainly stand for large-scale measures undertaken to improve the state of national security, grant stability within the state, and preservation of its sovereignty against any possible threats. As such goals are very complex and hard to reach, in order to be efficient, SSR are generally implemented in all the respective fields, and not in individual domains. This is important, since all the fields of national security are tightly interconnected, and changes to one such field require changes to all the other fields as well. If such actions weren't undertaken, there would be an imbalance in regulatory acts governing different aspects of the security sector, and the overall success of reforms would be posed under threat (Fluri, 2003: 193).

Having investigated the core theoretical aspects of security sector reforms, in the next section of my thesis, I would like to focus on the factors that predefine the need for SSR.

2.4 Need for SSR

The reasons motivating countries to carry out reforms of their security sector can obviously be tracked from the very definition of SSR. Such reasons are predetermined by conditions of dysfunctional security sector, unable to guarantee security of the state or its population (Bryden and Hänggi, 2004: 36).

However, such reasons, i.e. dysfunctions of the security sector, can be provoked by different factors, and in different circumstances. Such factors are to a large extent dependent on external forces beyond the state's control, and also on internal adverse conditions of its development. This can be explained by the fact that the condition of the security sector can be deteriorated due to either inefficient internal policies and measures undertaken by the government, or adverse external conditions or actions of other actors of the international arena in an attempt to gain higher domination on the global scale. For example, ineffective management of domestic resources, adoption of laws suppressing human rights, measures leading to deterioration of the armed forces' might, corrupted

judicial system, etc. can be named among the internal factors provoking dysfunctions of the security sector. At the same time, the latter can also be affected by adverse conditions independent of any particular international actors' will, for instance, by natural disasters, cataclysms, etc. They can deteriorate the state's economic or social condition, thus reducing its level of security. Finally, acts of other states aimed at granting larger geopolitical expansion can also impair the security sector's condition. For example, such actions can include military attacks, economic embargoes or blockades, stoppage of supplies of strategic resources, and so on. All this vastly impairs the security sector, and the latter can no longer fulfill its aim to ensure the security of the state and its population. Thus, reforms of the sector are sharply needed in order to restore or establish its effective functioning (Meharg and Arnusch, 2010: 73-76).

Developed and developing countries have quite a different level of political and economic stability, and different resources to fund development of the security sector. Due to this, their needs for reforming the security sector also differ quite much. However, in order to analyze the reforms aimed at improving national security, researchers classify another vast group of countries, whose needs for reformation of the security sector are very specific. Those are the so-called post-conflict countries (Edmunds and Germann, 2003: 18).

In scientific literature, the term "social security reform" generally tends not to be applied to developed countries. This is mainly due to the fact that developed states do not need complex reforms, but rather require institutional improvements. Reforms in such countries are essentially aimed at increasing oversight and improving management and operational procedures. A major issue of relevance has lately been the one of gender-based violence, which is inherent of developed states, and is largely regarded as a major threat to national security in general (Picciotto and Weaving, 2006: 100-101).

Developing countries' main characteristic is that they undergo the process of transition from the existing political system to a new one, with all the ensuing consequences: breakage of the old administrative mechanisms, need to create a new legal framework and define the mechanisms of its implementation, necessity to reshape the approaches to both internal governance and international relations. However, for the purpose of research in the field of SSR, the group of developing countries doesn't include

those states, where violent long-term conflict has occurred (Dokos, 2007: 80-83). Therefore, in developing countries, the reason to carry out reforms of the security sector is predefined by the need to improve the national security sector in order for it to be better adapted to the new conditions of development, and to be able to withstand any adverse developments both within the country and on the part of foreign actors in the international arena. In such an environment, security sector reforms are run for the purpose of reforming security institutions within the country or reorganizing them, eliminating non-statutory formations, and implementing the principles of democracy in the security sector. Often, SSR are needed to establish governmental agencies' transparent accountability principles, mechanisms and procedures, overcome mistrust of the population of the security sector (Cawthra and Luckham, 2003: 102-105).

Post-conflict countries are those states that have been involved in a protracted conflict, which is now over. Due to the long state of conflict, such countries can be characterized by destroyed or degraded political institutions and a high level of insecurity (Smith-Höhn, 2010: 80-83). In this case, the need for SSR is quite obvious, as the state needs to regain its national security impaired by the conflict, and enhance public security through rebuilding effective institutions involved in the field of security provision. In post-conflict societies, security sector reforms are seen as indispensable for preventing any possible recurrence of conflict, thus creating a basis for the subsequent prosperous development (Schnabel and Ehrhart, 2005: 121-122).

So, as we can see, needs for SSR in developing, post-conflict and developed societies differ much due to a number of external and internal preconditions shaping the reasons for SSR implementation. However, in the long run, security sector reforms in all countries are aimed at ensuring a high level of national security against any possible threats to the state and its population.

Just as the motivation factors, ways of SSR implementation can differ much. In the next section of my thesis, I would like to pay particular attention to different approaches to SSR.

2.5 Different approaches to SSR

Implementation of security sector reforms requires a large number of measures to be undertaken in different fields of national security. Such reforms can have different degrees of coverage, and different tools applied for their practical implementation. Taking into account this fact, it becomes quite obvious that approaches to SSR applied by different states can be absolutely different (Caparini, 2010: 61-63).

In scientific literature, the issue of approaches to security sector reforms is very important both in terms of theoretical studies and investigation of the practical means of reform implementation. Based on the empirical data available, researchers tend to classify two main approaches to SSR: gradualist and radical. Those two approaches mainly differ in terms of delays applied to carry out the reforms, and the scope of coverage of such reforms. Each state chooses its own approach to security sector reforms proceeding from the resources available, evaluating the level of desired changes, assessing the possible outcomes, and choosing the own scenario of national security improvement. Also, the impact of foreign actors can't be neglected, as they often impose some conditions to be fulfilled, which cannot be neglected when shaping the directions and volumes of reforms (Bryden and Caparini, 2007: 111-114).

The gradualist approach to SSR assumes that all reforms in the state should be carried out gradually, i.e. on a step-by-step basis. In such conditions, no abrupt changes are acceptable, and all reforms need to be run thoroughly, regardless of the time it may take. Proponents of this approach argue that it is the most efficient method for developing and post-conflict states, as due to their economic condition, such countries most often do not have enough resources to implement any major changes to the security sector at once. Therefore, gradual reforms allow equally allocating and distributing resources throughout the period of their implementation. This gives an opportunity to prepare detailed planning of reforms, and find sources for their funding. Also, this allows efficiently tracking drawbacks and effectively eliminating them (Lee, 2008: 147-149).

The gradualist approach also has two sub-directions. It can be implemented either through gradual implementation of reforms in all the security sector fields, or through reformation of each field one after another. The first option is usually applied in practice, as

the second one is actually either impossible or very hard to implement, and doesn't allow efficiently coordinating reforms in all fields, as the security sector's branches are very closely interconnected (Chanaa, 2002: 306-307).

The radical approach to SSR opposes itself to the gradualist approach. The radical concept of SSR assumes that all reforms of the social security sector should be implemented within the shortest time intervals possible, with breakage of the existing obsolete system, and quick transition to a new, more effective framework. The radical approach also assumes that reforms should cover the entire security sector in all its aspects, otherwise they would be inefficient. The main advantage of this approach lies in the fact that, after the quick implementation of reforms, the state rapidly receives a new framework shaping its existence, and can carry out all its activities under the newly formed security paradigm. However, the approach also has significant drawbacks. For instance, countries having overcome major conflicts and suffering from their detrimental consequences, just as developing countries without significant resources available, are often unable to carry out comprehensive reforms within short delays, as they require large amounts of funds to be invested (Jackson and Albrecht, 2011: 135-138).

In practice, gradual security sector reforms are usually implemented, as they allow ensuring security sector stability for the long-term period, and a high level of national security for the state and its population (Brinkerhoff, 2007: 60).

In the next section of my work, I would like to consider more in detail the stages of security sector reforms.

2.6 *Stages of SSR*

As the gradualist approach is most often used in security sector reforms, SSR are generally implemented on a stage-by-stage basis, and different phases of reforms can be marked out. Thus, researchers argue that SSR can generally be divided into the following key stages: elaboration of reforms, adoption of new legislation, implementation of reforms, and follow-up (Lee, 2008: 48-49).

The first stage of SSR requires thorough elaboration of all reforms to be run by the

state for the purpose of strengthening its security sector. Here, it is important to define the scope of reforms to be carried out, their final destination, methods and ways of their implementation, criteria for evaluation of their fulfillment, agencies responsible for their effective governance, and so on. I.e. this SSR step actually covers the preparatory stage to the reformation process, where all the preliminary measures need to be undertaken in order for reforms to be easily and quickly implemented on the next stages (Meharg and Arnusch, 2010: 226).

The next stage stands for developing a full-fledged legal framework for implementing all the reforms envisaged on the stage of their elaboration. This is absolutely indispensable for making all reforms possible. First of all, on this stage, changes are made to the existing regulatory acts governing different fields of the security sector. Such changes and amendments are aimed at preparing the legal basis for all the reforms to be implemented. Without preliminary modification of the existing legislation and adoption of new regulatory acts, it would be impossible to practically implement all the reforms. As the latter change the existing political structures within the state, they obviously touch upon other spheres of human lives, which should also be governed in another way, consistently with the new conditions. That's why the stage of new legislation adoption is so crucial for SSR implementation (Gow and Zverzhanovski, 2013: 14).

On the following stage, reforms envisaged are implemented in practice. This includes all the processes required for reforms to become effective: legislative implementation of SSR, institutional and organizational changes. In contrast to the previous stage, on this step, changes to legislation are already directly connected with reforms in the security sector, and not with preparation of the legal framework for their subsequent implementation. Legislative changes on this stage include a wide number of steps aimed at improving the current situation with the security sector, and strengthening national security through modifying the mechanisms of its protection. Institutional changes stand for all modification of the existing structure of bodies responsible for guaranteeing national security, either directly or indirectly. They are important, as new bodies or structures of their interrelations are in the long run created. Organizational changes are implemented in order to change the organization of processes impacting the security sector within the state (Law, 2007: 90).

The stage of follow-up stands for evaluation of changes implemented, and detection of drawbacks in all fields. Here, adjustments are made in order to eliminate any negative phenomena, and implement the reforms to the full extent (Dokos, 2007: 38).

Thus, based on the theoretical findings of my analysis, several core variables can be derived, which will further be used in my practical analysis in this thesis. Dependent variables include the main factors which were under control of Georgia and Azerbaijan, respectively, when planning and implementing security sector reforms. Namely, those are army management methods (they will be evaluated in practical analysis as the then current situation and changes implemented within the framework of management of armed forces, their successful application in particular conditions, and improvement in the context of increase in combat effectiveness of the army), government openness degree (orientation on foreign third parties when implementing security sector reforms, consideration of foreign experience, involvement of foreign investment), and political situation in the country (vector of domestic policies and foreign relations, political dependence and dependence of governmental decisions and actions on third parties). Independent variables will include objectively existing factors beyond the countries' control, namely political framework (i.e. the overall political situation existing in the region), and historical experience of the respective countries (i.e. the way passed before the stage of SSR implementation, and its impact on the success of reforms).

Having analyzed the core theoretical concepts of SSR, in the next chapter of my thesis, I would like to proceed directly to analysis of SSR processes in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

3 Azerbaijan and Georgia before SSR

3.1 Political and economical situation as the main precondition for SSR

The necessity to reform the security sector was recognized by the authorities of Georgia and Azerbaijan shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This was predefined by several key reasons, which later shaped the vectors of security reforms in those countries. However, reforms themselves started only over a decade later.

With the collapse of the USSR, ex-Soviet republics found themselves in a situation when they had to completely rebuild their political systems, and redefine both domestic and foreign policies. There was no longer any single centralized government regulating all spheres of the republics' life, and they became independent in their decisions, having gained geopolitical sovereignty (Isgandarova, 2006: 120).

However, in contrast to the expectations, after the collapse of the Union, many post-Soviet countries still couldn't bring down their authoritarian regimes, which continued ruling the republics, in fact only pursuing the political lines which had originated in the USSR. Moreover, as there was no single controlling center, and the markets of those countries started actively being liberalized, their leaders wished to take advantage of the situation, which gave birth to a significant level of corruption. Azerbaijan and Georgia were not exclusions from that list. Despite the fact that their new authorities proclaimed a new political and economic course toward liberalization, both republics in fact got bogged down in corruption (Oskanian, 2013: 59-62).

In the Soviet Union, all the republics making part of it had tightly interconnected economies. Industrial production within the Union was largely based on mutual cooperation, with different stages of such production implemented in different countries. In times of the USSR, this scheme was quite effective, as it allowed uniting all countries' efforts on the way toward reaching the target indicators established within the framework of centralized planning. Furthermore, this allowed quite effectively using geographical, economic and natural peculiarities of each Soviet republic, taking into consideration the raw materials available on each particular territory, its climatic conditions, and so on. On the subsequent stages, all products were distributed between the member states of the

Union, and thus demand was satisfied across the USSR (Aydın, 2011: 207-210).

Almost the same situation could be observed in the defense sector of post-Soviet countries, namely of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thus, production of all military equipment and machinery in the Soviet Union was gradually implemented in different republics, with the key role of military producers being played by Ukraine and Russia. All the equipment and machinery produced were thereafter allocated to armies of the republics based on their current needs, which were also assessed from the single all-Soviet center. All other security and law enforcement agencies were also governed by the single legislation adopted across the USSR (Haas, Tibold and Cillessen, 2006: 33-34).

However, as the Soviet Union collapsed, all those ties on the level of republics were destroyed. Although the post-Soviet countries continued intensive trade and cooperation between them, the borders between the countries were no longer opened, and resources and products now had to be bought at market prices. In such circumstances, the authorities of the new independent post-Soviet states understood that they had to completely revamp their economies, focusing on maximum self-sufficient production allowing to ensure not only a stable market situation, but also a high level of geopolitical security. Otherwise, the newly formed countries on the post-Soviet space risked to lose their own stability and prospects for the subsequent development, falling under the influence of more powerful states pursuing their own economic and geopolitical goals in the region (Jafalian, 2013: 56)

Particular role in those conditions had to be paid to the sector of security, as it had been the backbone of existence of the Soviet Union, but was much deteriorated with the collapse of the superpower. The necessity of reforms in the social security sector was dictated by both political and economic factors. On the one hand, Georgia and Azerbaijan remained under a very high influence of Russia in all respects, and therefore the republics needed to preserve their geopolitical sovereignty, in order not to become Russia's raw-material appendages. Moreover, both states had the so-called hot spots of conflicts on their territory, which were largely heated by external players after the collapse of the USSR. In Azerbaijan, that was Nagorno-Karabakh, while Georgia had two rebellious provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In such conditions, both states required a powerful security sector in order to preserve their geographical unity, together with sovereignty. The

economic condition of both states was also largely dependent on the security sector, as in the new conditions of market economy, their markets became to a great extent liberalized, which imposed great threats from more powerful foreign geopolitical players (Dwan and Pavliuk, 2000: 107-109).

Thus, having analyzed the preconditions for SSR in Azerbaijan and Georgia, in the next section of my thesis, I would like to focus more in detail on the countries' historical development prior to their security sector reforms.

3.2 Historical development before SSR

Despite their declaration already in the early 1990's, security sector reforms in Azerbaijan and Georgia in fact only started simultaneously in 2004. This was due to the high level of corruption in both states, and the ruling elite's wish to take most from the new economic conditions formed. In such circumstances, no real attention was paid to the security sector, and it remained very weak throughout this time.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the first steps undertaken by the authorities of Azerbaijan and Armenia were aimed at restoring the independence of their domestic industrial sector. Moreover, as the countries formally rejected centralized planning, they initiated reforms destined to liberalize their national economies. Privatization of ownership was one of the key directions in domestic policies implemented by the ruling elite of Azerbaijan and Georgia. At this, those processes were to a great extent non-transparent, which already gave birth to corruption on the highest level of power (German, 2012: 61-64).

In Azerbaijan, reforms started from liberalization of the energy market, with a large involvement of foreign investors. In 1994, the so-called Contract of the Century was signed between the state of Azerbaijan and powerful international corporations running their activities in the oil-and-gas sector. The main aim of this contract was to modernize the oil production sector, and the oil-and-gas transportation infrastructure of Azerbaijan. The state's authorities believed energy resources to be the backbone of Azerbaijan's economic stability and geopolitical sovereignty for the future, and therefore wished to boost this

sphere, but due to the lack of own resources, Azerbaijan was forced to seek assistance from major foreign corporations. Other reforms were run in the field of heavy machinery production and agriculture, where private capital was also allowed in order to raise productivity, and ensure competitiveness on the international market (Oskanian, 2013: 223).

The year 1994 was also remarkable for Azerbaijan, as it was the year when the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh War with Armenia ended. The long-lasting conflict caused many casualties among both the civilian population of Azerbaijan and its armed forces. The war ruined the weak economy of Azerbaijan, and the state was subject to influence of a number of major regional players such as Turkey or Iran. Thanks to signature of the so-called Bishkek Protocol in 1994, Azerbaijan and Armenia entered into a ceasefire agreement which was aimed at putting an end to hostilities. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan de facto lost its province of Nagorno-Karabakh due to separatist movements therein, the international community recognized Azerbaijan's sovereignty over the region, and the authorities of the state got a clear evidence of the need of massive reforms in the security sector in order to withstand all possible third-party influence, and be able to struggle against Armenia's possible aggression.

In Georgia, reforms implemented after the collapse of the USSR were mainly aimed at promoting the tourist sector, and liberalizing the domestic market for foreign trade operations with Western partners. The Georgian authorities didn't focus on raising significant capital investments from foreign countries, but rather attempted to promote domestic production through enlarged cooperation with other states. Georgia wished to become deeper integrated in the international community, as the country's authorities saw it to be a good way for quickly exiting recession and modernizing the national economy by adapting it to globally renowned best practices and standards (Karagiannis, 2002: 53-54).

Common circumstances in both Azerbaijan and Georgia prior to implementation of security sector reforms included presence of hot spots on their territories. The wars in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia showed that Azerbaijan and Georgia needed to revamp their defense sector, and that the external threat for their geopolitical stability was quite high. Even despite the fact that the abovementioned disputed territories

had quite feeble rebellious armies, the regular forces of Azerbaijan and Georgia were unable to defeat them. Moreover, the entire security system showed its instability, and obviously required reforms (Haas, Tibold and Cillessen, 2006: 165).

However, this was not the only reason for Azerbaijan and Georgia to implement security sector reforms. Both states were important goals of major foreign geopolitical players, as they were ex-Soviet republics. The Russian Federation wished to preserve its influence in the region and continue controlling post-Soviet states' activities in all aspects. At the same time, Western states saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity to spread their own interests in the region. Also, there was another particularly important detail in the geopolitical processes in South Caucasus. The region was rich in oil and gas, and therefore many third-party states were interested in submitting South Caucasian states under their direct control.

In the next chapter of my thesis, I would like to consider in detail the security sector reforms implemented in Georgia.

4 SSR in Georgia

Security sector reforms in Georgia started only in 2004, under the presidency of Mikheil Saakashvili, after the well-known events commonly referred to as the Rose Revolution. This was mainly due to changes in Georgia's foreign political course, and military aspirations of the state. Thus, right after his ascension to power, Saakashvili proclaimed the country's new course toward integration with the European Union, and adherence to NATO. Taking into account the presence of Russian armed forces on the territory of Georgia, those steps were negatively perceived by the Russian authorities, and Georgia was subject to threats related to restriction of economic cooperation, and imposition of other sanctions by Russia. Therefore, the state required immediate reforms in the security sector, in order to preserve itself from any possible actions of Russia for the purpose of restoring its influence over the territory of the country (Geistlinger, 2008: 175-178).

Prior to this, under the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze, the only official strategic guideline adopted in the field of national security had been the Military Doctrine of 1999. However, it rather focused on the general principles which should be basic for implementation of reforms in the security sector, however it didn't describe at all what actions should be undertaken by the country's authorities for the purpose of reaching higher geopolitical stability. Moreover, it didn't take into account the threat imposed by the armed forces of Russia in the region (Volten and Tashev, 2007: 66-67).

Within the framework of SSR in Georgia, a new doctrine was adopted for governing all measures undertaken for the purpose of implementing reforms. It was called the Georgian National Security Concept. In addition to the general principles explaining the ways of implementation of reforms, this document stated new goals such as restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity, completion of transition, establishment of civil accord, and preservation of Georgia's national identity. Other documents regulating reforms of the security sector in Georgia included Individual Partnership Action Plan signed with NATO (2004), and the European Union's European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan (2006) (Hille, 2010: 307).

Significant changes affected the defense sector and armed forces of Georgia. In the

period from 2004 to 2007, i.e. during the active phase of security sector reforms, the Defense Ministry of Georgia was headed by a civilian whose main responsibility was to implement political regulation of the defense sphere. As of 2007, according to the official statistical data provided by Georgia's competent bodies, 85% of the Defense Ministry's employees were civilians. Thus, the degree of civilian control significantly increased in the national security sector (Cornell and Starr, 2009: 81-82).

In addition to restructuring of the Defense Ministry's civil office and the Joint Staff under the NATO guidelines and standards, recruitment to the armed forces and their composition also changed. Thus, for instance, possibility to avoid mandatory military service for a specially dedicated fee was restricted. An essential focus was made on short-term training of people who haven't passed any training in the regular army within the framework of Georgia's National Guard. Also, programs used for training in higher education institutions with a military focus were changed from Turkish to British ones. Foreign specialists from Germany and the United States were invited for the purpose of giving trainings to recruits. A new disciplinary code was adopted in coordination with non-governmental organizations acting for protection of human rights. Salaries to professional recruits were significantly increased. The main aim of those measures was to motivate people to enter the Georgian army (Iskandaryan, 2008: 414-419).

The Army Development Fund was formed as a non-commercial fund aimed for supervising distribution and allocation of funds raised for the armed forces' needs through private donations. Such donations were largely promoted in society, as the authorities stressed on the importance of Georgia's national security for private businesses and the social sector. Therefore, the newly created fund was aimed to help eliminate any possible frauds and corruption in the field of army funding. Moreover, the amounts of funds allocated to the armed forces through Georgia's state budget significantly grew as well. Thus, in 2003, they amounted to a few dozen million lari, while in 2007, when the greatest part of reforms were already implemented, this figure made up over one billion lari. Funds allocated to the armed forces through the state budget were mainly directed to modernization of the technical base of the Georgian armed forces, and purchase of new equipment from NATO countries (Bertsch, Craft, Jones and Beck, 2013: 177-184).

The Interior Ministry was perceived by the authorities of Georgia as one of the main sources of corruption in the national security sector. The number of the Interior Ministry's staff decreased from 53,000 to nearly 22,000 employees in the period from 2003 to 2005. Thanks to this, Georgia spared significant funds, which were redirected to training programs for servicemen under the Ministry's auspices. The interior troops which had been subordinated to the Interior Ministry were transferred to the Defense Ministry. To the contrary, the Border Guard Department became part of the Interior Ministry. The patrol police was created as a separate service for regulating traffic and resolving emergency situations. Also, the so-called neighborhood police was established for the purpose of resolving any dispute situations between neighbors. Great attention was devoted to development of special forces used for various operations within the state (Amirova, 2010: 111-116).

Major changes were run in the penitentiary system of Georgia. The main reason for it was due to the fact that criminal groups within the country were gaining great influence, and they were tightly interconnected with criminal formations coordinating their actions right from prisons. Within this framework, the staff of penitentiary institutions was greatly changed, and security measures implemented were considerably reinforced (Jafalian, 2013: 394).

Also, within the framework of security sector reforms in Georgia, an absolutely new service was formed for the purpose of running intelligence and investigation activities. It was called the Special Service of Foreign Intelligence, and was provided with operational and analytical functions. A particularly important detail is that its head was appointed from representatives of the non-governmental sector. The Special Service of State Guards was now responsible for protection of top officials, instead of strategic facilities of Georgia, as it had been under the presidency of Shevardnadze (Karagiannis, 2002: 256-258).

The number of employees of the Prosecutor's Office was reduced by a third, and the number of its territorial units also greatly decreased. After large-scale measures implemented for eliminating corruption in the Prosecutor's Office system, this agency played a major role in development of new legislation aimed at combating crime and racketeering. Also, the Finance Ministry's Revenues Service was established for the

purpose of running operative and investigatory activities over allocation of funds in the national security sector (German, 2012: 188-189).

Finally, important measures were undertaken in order to ensure civilian control in the security sector. Thus, not only civilians became chiefs of many security agencies, but also dialogue and cooperation between governmental bodies and non-governmental organizations was created. This also gave birth to a large discussion in society, whose representatives took part in elaboration of the new security sector principles (Iskandaryan, 2008: 260).

Thus, having analyzed the security sector reforms implemented in Georgia in the period from 2004 to 2007, in the next chapter of this thesis, I would like to consider SSR implemented in Azerbaijan.

5 SSR in Azerbaijan

In Azerbaijan, reforms in the security sector started in 2004, with adoption of the “Law on National Security of the Republic of Azerbaijan”. This law was the starting point for implementation of a number of reforms in the defense sector of the country, and in other specialized agencies responsible for Azerbaijan’s national security. Similarly to Georgia, under the presidency of Heydar Aliyev, no particular role was paid to reforms of the security sector. Moreover, the country had no single doctrine governing the military sphere and the security sector. Although the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh was quite topical for the country, its authorities preferred to regard it as a frozen conflict, and therefore national integrity was not officially promoted as the main goal in the security sector. However, when Ilham Aliyev came to power in 2003, he stressed on the necessity to ensure territorial integrity and geopolitical sovereignty of Azerbaijan, for which purpose large-scale reforms were obviously required (Geistlinger, 2008: 244-248).

The most large-scale reforms affected the defense sector of Azerbaijan. First of all, the level of funding of national armed forces drastically increased. This was mainly ensured thanks to the grown revenues from exports of oil. The statistics show that, in the period from 1992 to 2003, expenses from the state budget of Azerbaijan on the national defense sector amounted to 125-135 million US dollars. In 2006, that figure already made up 660 million US dollars, and in 2008 – 1.85 billion US dollars. Thus, the total expenditures on the defense sector amounted to almost 14% of Azerbaijan’s gross domestic product. The main directions of expenses within this framework included increase in the level of salaries for servicemen, large modernization of equipment and armament of the country, and purchase of new military units from NATO countries and Russia (Jafalian, 2013: 331-335).

In the course of such changes implemented in the defense sector, Azerbaijan actively increased cooperation with NATO. In general, it is worth mentioning that Azerbaijan had historically been one of the first post-Soviet states to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. Thanks to enlargement of relations between the Alliance and the country, their cooperation now touched upon a wide variety of spheres, namely democratic supervision of armed forces, civil emergency planning, trade in military products, peace support operations, scientific research in the field of security technologies,

and so on. All the security sector reforms implemented by the Azerbaijani authorities in the period from 2004 to 2008 were brought in compliance with the guidelines and rules imposed by NATO (Volten and Tashev, 2007: 188-193).

Training programs for the Azerbaijani army were to a large extent updated taking into account the requirements of NATO. Moreover, NATO officers started being actively involved in the process of training, for the purpose of ensuring application of the most up-to-date principles in and approaches to training of recruits. A particularly important role was played by instructors from Turkey (Hille, 2010: 155).

The State Border Service (SBS) of Azerbaijan was fundamentally transformed from a military institution to a law enforcement agency. Reforms in this field were aimed at reinforcing the Service's technical capacities, and improving human resource management implemented within the agency. Furthermore, legislation was developed for the purpose of introducing civilian control to the Service and the security sector in general. This was made in order to allow civilians holding high positions and performing extensive functions in terms of supervision of security bodies' activities. However, those laws haven't still been implemented, due to which control of society over the sector remains very low in Azerbaijan (Iskandaryan, 2008: 163-165).

In 2005, the Defense Industry Ministry was established. Its main purpose was to plan national production of military equipment based on the real needs of the sector, resources and raw materials available in Azerbaijan, and unique products to be purchased from foreign partners. Thanks to the activities of this governmental body, Azerbaijan was able to reach an agreement with Turkey for production of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as small caliber artillery guns. Also, agreements were concluded with Ukraine and Pakistan to build a plant for production of tanks and other armored vehicles near Baku (Bertsch, Craft, Jones and Beck, 2013: 236-244).

Reforms were also implemented in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan. Thus, the total number of personnel in the ministry's departments was significantly reduced. Moreover, the structure of the Ministry was also to a large extent simplified through reduction of the total number of agencies, bodies and services acting within it. The main purpose of doing so was to eliminate corruption, which was at a very high level in the

Ministry. Moreover, thanks to reduction of the number staff, salaries of policemen started being increased. The main purpose of such increase was to raise popularity of the police among people, and attract the younger part of the population to become engaged in the activities of law enforcement agencies (German, 2012: 199-202).

However, despite the declared targets, reforms of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were to a large extent ineffective. The state's authorities had initially planned to eliminate all superfluous structures within the Ministry, or unite them, in order not to spread resources over a great number of agencies carrying out almost the same functions. However, in the long run, the structure of Azerbaijan's Ministry of Internal Affairs still remained much complicated, and as of today, it still includes many departments whose functions often intersect (Amirova, 2010: 219-221).

The justice system of Azerbaijan was largely reformed under the respective law of 2006, which assumed significant improvements in the sector. Such improvements included ease of citizens' access to courts, elimination of corruption from the part of elected judges, establishment of new courts in Azerbaijan's regions, and so on. Terms of service and powers of judges were also reviewed, and the overall justice system was aimed to be brought in compliance with the best practices of the European Union. However, in practice, corruption wasn't defeated, as is testified from numerous polls and rankings, and the reforms ultimately became not so efficient (Karagiannis, 2002: 365-366).

Reforms of the Prosecutor's Office and the penitentiary system of Azerbaijan were rather of a sporadic nature. They were not deep or complex, and in fact were reduced to decrease in the number of staff employed, and consequently, to increase in the average level of wages. However, no effective measures aimed at eliminating corruption were implemented, and Azerbaijan's Prosecutor's Office and penitentiary system remained to a large extent corrupted in their activities. Moreover, as of today, their structure is also largely considered to be ineffective, as it is too complex, without any objective reasons for such a state of things (Hille, 2010: 301-302).

Overall, it should be stated that, despite the fact that security sector reforms of Azerbaijan were well elaborated, and were even reflected in the strategic directions officially followed by the state within the framework of its domestic policies and foreign

relations, in the long run, they remained on paper in many cases. Implementation of such reforms was often blocked on the level of high officials due to the very high level of corruption. On the other hand, the political will of Azerbaijan's authorities in implementation of those reforms was quite weak (Nuriyev, 2007: 196-198).

Having analyzed the course and results of implementation of reforms in the national security sector of Azerbaijan, in the next chapter of my thesis, I would like to focus on the current situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan, evaluate and compare it.

6 Current situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan - comparing and evaluating

The active phase of security sector reforms in Georgia and Azerbaijan actually ended in 2007-2008, and effectiveness of the practical implementation of those reforms has since then been predefined by a number of both internal and external factors, which affected those systems quite hard.

In Georgia, the security sector reforms implemented by the country's authorities were in the long run quite effective. In the period from 2010 to 2013, the level of state expenditures on the defense sector against the state's gross domestic product amounted to 4.5%. Reforms of the Interior Ministry led to dismissal of over 75,000 of employees of this governmental body. As of today, this number only makes up 26,000 persons. The new structure of law enforcement agencies implemented in the state prior to 2008 still exists as of today, and meets quite well the goals set by the authorities of Georgia. Moreover, reforms in the penitentiary, judiciary and other systems were also effective, as the overall level of corruption was much reduced, which is now evidenced by different international corruption rankings (Bertsch, Craft, Jones and Beck, 2013: 278-279).

However, implementation of security sector reforms in Georgia was much deteriorated by the 2008 Russian-Georgian War. Those hostilities made Georgia drastically increase its expenses on the armed forces, due to which the balance in allocation of funds to all spheres of the national security sector was shaken. Moreover, Georgia finally lost all ties with its republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, due to which the country had to reshape its internal policies. Furthermore, due to the constant threat of Russia's invasion, Georgia has to constantly invest substantial amounts of money in re-equipment of its armed forces. This is obviously one of the key funding directions within the framework of social security reforms, but, on the other hand, due to this, the country is unable to significantly raise the wages of its professional recruits, due to dispersion of funds (Cornell and Starr, 2009: 152-155).

Azerbaijan's security sector reforms covered a wide range of spheres constituting the backbone of the state's national security. As of 2013, state expenditures on the defense

sector amounted to nearly 3 billion US dollars, while in 2008, that figure had only made up 1.85 billion US dollars. The average wages of the Azerbaijani armed forces' members also significantly grew. Moreover, a number of significant and large-scale projects were implemented in the field of the defense sector with foreign partners. Major modernization programs were run in cooperation with NATO countries, thanks to which Azerbaijan already has quite a well modernized army, with new or revamped equipment. Some mutual programs in the field of production of military equipment are currently implemented with different CIS countries, namely Russia and Ukraine (Balayev, 2013: 240-243).

However, as of today, the situation in the defense sector of Azerbaijan is not as perfect as it may seem. Namely, this is due to the high level of corruption. Namely, according to analysts, large-scale corruption schemes are currently applied in the field of purchases of ammunitions and food for the armed forces. Contractors carrying out such operations are allegedly connected with some of the state's higher officials, due to which the budget constantly loses substantial amounts of funds (Herd and Moroney, 2013: 126-127).

Reforms of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Prosecutor's Office, the judiciary system, and other similar law enforcement agencies and systems in Azerbaijan were far less effective. Thus, the number of departments of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the number of their employees were significantly reduced. The same can be said about the other law enforcement agencies of the country. However, those results were far from being complete. Thus, the structure of those agencies remained very complex, and corruption within them wasn't abolished at all, which had initially been the main goal of such reforms (Ismailzade and Howard, 2012: 274-276).

If we compare the results of social security reforms in Azerbaijan and Georgia, it is worth mentioning that SSR in both states had some common points and preconditions. Thus, both states were formed as a result of collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Due to this, their domestic sectors, including the sector of defense and security, remained severed from other countries which had previously been their key strategic partners. Second, both countries implemented their reforms in the period from 2003-2004 to 2007-2008, which was connected with ascension to power of new political leaders, and the subsequent change

in their foreign political course, namely from large dependence on Russia to greater cooperation with Western partners. In Georgia, those changes were connected with the Rose Revolution, and the complete re-orientation of the state's foreign policy under Mikhail Saakashvili. In Azerbaijan, that was rather partial liberalization of international relations, with no rupture of ties with Russia, under the presidency of Ilham Aliyev. Finally, both states have hot spots on their territories, namely Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), and South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Georgia) (Herd and Moroney, 2013: 263-269).

Reforms implemented in the defense sector were obviously quite effective Georgia, while less efficient in Azerbaijan. The two states were in the long run able to raise their military power, modernize the military equipment currently available, arrange production and purchases of new equipment required for ensuring a high level of defense capacities. Wages to soldiers were also substantially raised in both states. However, in Georgia, the overall level of corruption in the defense sector was significantly lowered, and, to the contrary, the level of transparency increased. In Azerbaijan, corruption in the military sector is still unallowably high, and the country has never been able to significantly reduce it. Moreover, the structure of paramilitary formations was successfully changed in Georgia, with all such formations now being subordinated to the Defense Ministry of the country, while in Azerbaijan, they still are governed by different institutions, including the Defense Ministry and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. On the one hand, this leads to a high level of corruption. On the other hand, this also decreases the efficiency of management, and creates tensions within the security sector (Balayev, 2013: 268-278).

Reforms of the Ministries of Internal Affairs were obviously much more effective in Georgia. In contrast to Azerbaijan, the authorities of Georgia were able to elaborate a well-thought structure of law enforcement agencies within the state. Despite the fact that their number is still quite high, Georgia was able to significantly reduce the number of staff employed, and quite clearly assign different functions to different bodies. Thanks to this, they have quite a clear management and subordination structure, and act as autonomous formations reporting only to the central Ministry. This ultimately allowed reducing corruption in this field, and providing reliable performance of their functions by the respective bodies within the state. To the contrary, Azerbaijan's reforms in this field to a great extent remained only formal. They were officially declared and stipulated in the

legislation, but their practical implementation was actually reduced to decrease in the number of staff. Corruption remained nearly at the same level, and therefore it can be mentioned that the reforms didn't reach their initial results (Bertsch, Craft, Jones and Beck, 2013: 183-191).

Reforms in the field of other agencies such as the Prosecutor's Office or the penitentiary system also faced the same difficulties in Azerbaijan. Reforms in practice only allowed to reduce the number of staff employed, but the actual situation with corruption remained nearly the same, and moreover, no overall improvement in such agencies' activities were observed. To the contrary, Georgia reached much higher results in this respect in the period from 2004 to 2008, and its respective agencies were considerably improved, namely in terms of segregation of their functions, and reduction of the overall level of corruption (Amirova, 2010: 300-303).

So, based on the results of my comparative analysis, I believe it to be obvious that Georgia's security sector reforms were much more effective than the same reforms implemented in Azerbaijan. Those results can be observed in all respects: overall performance, structural improvement, provision of transparency, and elimination of corruption.

This fits well the framework of dependent and independent variables derived in the previous sections of this thesis. Georgia and Azerbaijan had almost the same independent variables, i.e. factors beyond their control which affected security sector reforms, as the political framework in the region was the same for both countries, and their previous historical development was quite similar. At the same time, Georgia was able to reach better results in dependent variables, which is proven by the findings of my practical analysis. Georgia focused on cooperation with foreign partners for effectively modernizing its security sector, and showed great government openness on the way toward implementation of reforms covering all aspects of the security sector. In contrast to Georgia, Azerbaijan didn't wish to become involved in international security cooperation, and rather remained much dependent on Russia as its more powerful neighbor. Therefore, security sector reforms weren't put in the core of Azerbaijan's sovereign existence by the country's authorities. Finally, Georgia effectively reformed army management methods, which was

not reached by Azerbaijan.

In the next section of my thesis, I would like to draw conclusions with regard to my analysis.

Conclusion

As of today, globalization is the predominant trend in international relations. Due to globalization, economies and political systems of different states become tightly interconnected, and individual countries can no longer function separately from each other. This is an objective tendency in the world, and it is much promoted by large international corporations, which run their activities around the globe, and often make national economies dependent on them. Such multinational companies seek to expand their customer bases, and increase their shares on the global market. Their activities are often aggressive, and they neglect the interests of recipient countries. In addition to the economic sphere, geopolitical influence of powerful states also raises. All this imposes significant threats to political sovereignty and economic stability of smaller or less powerful states, and here, we deal with the concept of national security.

In the scientific literature, there is currently no single definition of national security. In general, that concept can be regarded in two aspects. In the narrow sense, national security is identified with the defense sector of a particular state. In the broad sense, national security includes a wide range of sectors such as geopolitical security, economic security, military security, energy security, and so on. All those fields are closely interconnected, and can never be regarded separately. Deterioration of any of them leads to decrease in the overall security of a particular state.

Geopolitical security assumes political sovereignty and independence of a particular state, its ability to withstand the negative influence of other states following their own economic, political or other interests in the international arena. Economic security means powerful development of a particular country's national economy, productivity and modernization of its different branches, high level of the population's employment, and so on, i.e. all those factors which help ensure solid grounds for economic prosperity, welfare of the population, and allocation of resources to different sectors of national economic and other activities. Military security stands for a country's ability to defend its territory against any possible foreign interventions. This ability includes modernization of the armed forces, use of hi-tech military equipment, machinery and weapons, development of national defense doctrines, implementation of intelligence activities, etc. Energy security means a

country's provision with energy resources, uninterrupted electricity supplies to the population and industrial enterprises, etc. Environmental security stands for protection of environment and creation of safe living conditions for the population. All those security sector branches are key in ensuring a particular state's security in the international arena against any possible negative influence of third-party countries.

There are different theoretical approaches to national security. The most popular among such approaches are the currents of realism, pluralism, Marxism, and constructivism. Realists tend to analyze international relations as interaction between different states seeking to increase their geopolitical influence, thus acting only in their own interests. Therefore, national security here depends only on the actions of each particular state. Pluralists add another key player on the international arena – international organizations and institutions – which, according to them, shape the security sectors of individual countries. According to pluralists, international organizations and institutions help form the international institutional environment, and build up a common legal framework for interaction between all states. Marxists tend to regard national security within the framework of class struggle between capitalists and socialists, and formation of common security within polar camps. Proponents of Marxism argue that development of the international community is inherently connected with such struggle which moves all nations forward. However, according to Marxists, all states belong to either of the camps, and therefore different camps rather tend to struggle than to cooperate. Finally, constructivists perceive national security as a set of measures, actions and mechanisms aimed at overcoming negative effects provoked by some conditions of a global nature, which are beyond the control of individual states. Different theories propose different approaches to international relations and the security sector of individual countries, having their advantages and drawbacks, but they are all essential for understanding the processes of security provision on the national level, and build-up of powerful security sector.

The concept of security sector reforms first emerged in the scientific literature in the 1990's. It described the measures implemented by post-Soviet countries for the purpose of maintaining and further raising their national security in all aspects. Those countries obviously required such fundamental changes, as, after the collapse of the USSR, they found themselves in a situation when the former ties that had previously existed between

them were destroyed. The newly formed states were forced to seek alternative variants of development, and ensure their military, geopolitical and economic independence on their own. Security sector reforms in the ex-Soviet states were also preconditioned by the fact that the post-Soviet space became an arena where interests of both Russia as the successor of the USSR and the Western world collided. In such conditions, in order to preserve their sovereignty, political independence and national identity, such countries were forced to implement full-scale security sector reforms.

Deep reforms in the national security sector of different post-Soviet countries assumed reformation of the armed forces, the police, and other law enforcement agencies, the penitentiary system, the justice system, and so on, i.e. all those spheres which impacted the overall level of national security. This was common for all those countries, however their approaches to security sector reforms differed. Thus, some countries preferred to implement the reforms gradually, on a step-by-step basis, during relatively long periods of time, while others followed the path of quick, shock-type reforms implemented within short period of time.

Overall, regardless of their duration, security sector reforms are generally implemented in several key stages: elaboration of reforms, adoption of new legislation, implementation of reforms, and follow-up. At the first stage, the general scope of reforms, methods and ways of their respective implementation, expected results, etc. are defined. At the second stage, the respective country's national legislation is amended in order to conform to the goals and aims set within the framework of particular security sector reforms, and in order to make it possible to reach the highest results when implementing them. At the third stage, reforms are implemented in the energy, military, political, social, economic, environmental and other sectors. Finally, at the fourth stage, results of reforms are evaluated, and the required improvements are made in order to reach the initial goals and aims set. All those steps are made consequentially, and the measures undertaken in their course cover the entire range of issues related to improvement of national security.

In the practical part of the thesis, I have analyzed the examples of security sector reforms implemented in Azerbaijan and Georgia. Those countries had many points in common which predefined the need to run fundamental reforms in the sector of their

national security. Thus, both Georgia and Azerbaijan reshaped their vectors of foreign relations toward deeper cooperation with Western partners, they had hot spots (Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, respectively) on their territories, and their defense sector was significantly deteriorated as a result of collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Azerbaijan's situation was even worse, as the country had a long-lasting war conflict with Armenia over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-1994. Also, both Azerbaijan and Armenia had to quickly implement full-scale security sector reforms in order not to fall under control of the world's major superpowers for which the region of South Caucasus was one of the main spheres of interest.

Reforms of the security sector started in Georgia in 2004, after the so-called Rose Revolution. In Azerbaijan, they started at the same time, with ascension to power of Ilham Aliyev. The active phase of security sector reforms ended in 2007-2008. Such reforms covered all sectors of both countries dealing with national security. Delay in implementation of reforms in both Azerbaijan and Armenia was caused by the fact that, right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, both states remained under a heavy influence of Russia, and their activities performed in order to increase the overall level of national security were to a large extent prevented by the Russian Federation which sought preserving its impact on the post-Soviet space.

Reforms of the defense sector were run in both countries. Georgia and Azerbaijan were able to significantly modernize their armies, ensure purchases of new equipment from NATO countries, and development of domestic production of the respective military equipment and machinery. Moreover, both states were able to increase the level of their armed forces' professional training, and substantially raise the amounts of wages paid to the members of regular forces. However, Azerbaijan was unable to eliminate corruption in the defense sector, which still persists in the country, while Georgia showed great results in struggle against this phenomenon. In Georgia, thanks to a more transparent system and mechanisms of reforms, the country's authorities were in the long run able to revamp the national military forces, improve the structure of the police, reform the system of relations between different governmental agencies responsible for national security, and so on. Azerbaijan's results were much more limited, and in many cases only meant superficial changes, without any deep improvements reached.

Within the framework of reforms of law enforcement agencies, the main efforts were directed to improve the structure of such agencies, and eradicate corruption in them. Georgia was able to reach this goal, as the state's authorities in the long run created an efficient structure of such competent bodies, with a clear distinction and segregation of functions, at the same time significantly reducing the number of staff employed. Moreover, the country was able to significantly decrease the level of corruption in such agencies. Azerbaijan, to the contrary, was unable to implement the reforms declared in full. The country changed the structure of its law enforcement agencies, however, as of today, their functions often intersect, which gives birth both to corruption and destabilization of the national security sector. Therefore, it can obviously be stated that Georgia's results in security sector reforms proved themselves to be much more efficient than the ones reached by Azerbaijan.

In the course of my research, I have tested the hypotheses stated at the beginning of the thesis.

The first hypothesis has been confirmed. Indeed, the main mechanism which started implementation of security sector reforms in Georgia was the so-called Rose Revolution. Prior to it, the state didn't have any comprehensive security doctrine. Russian armed forces present on its territories were perceived as something ordinary, and the regime of President Shevardnadze didn't pay any attention to the necessity of deep structural reforms which would allow ensuring a high level of national security for Georgia. Mikheil Saakashvili came to power as a result of events commonly referred to as the Rose Revolution, during which the people of Georgia showed its will to live in a liberalized and democratic country. As President Saakashvili changed Georgia's foreign political course toward focus on integration with the European Union and adherence to NATO, relations with Russia worsened, and the latter started actively using all levers available in order to preserve its impact over Georgia, including by heating tensions in the two rebellious Georgian republics – South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Therefore, Saakashvili was forced to quickly and fundamentally reform the national security sector of Georgia in order to withstand all external threats. So, obviously, it was the Rose Revolution that boosted SSR in Georgia.

The second hypothesis has been disapproved. Misuse of international assistance is

not the key obstacle on the way toward reformation of Azerbaijan's security sector. The country was historically one of the first post-Soviet states to start active cooperation with NATO. As of today, the state's authorities even hold negotiations on association with the European Union. Even though this cooperation is not very rapidly developing, still, the country has quite strong ties with its international partners, and their help was actively used on the stage of security sector reforms. To the contrary, the key obstacles on the way to their effective implementation are represented by the high level of corruption in Azerbaijan, and the weak position of the central authorities in terms of such reforms.

Thus, I believe that the aim of my research has been fulfilled, and its goals have been reached.

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