

## **Abstract**

**This Master thesis deals with the Sino-American cooperation during the Six-Party Talks between 2003 and 2009 and it aims to analyze both the main interests and objectives, with which the US and China came in the negotiations, and the problematic issues between the US and China, most critically complicating a progress in the negotiations. Although both countries cordially declared common interest in denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, their real order of priorities within the Talks greatly differed. Contrary to the United States, China prioritized stability of the region to its denuclearization and was trying very hard to moderate the harsh US approach towards the DPRK's nuclear activities. In this way, it was, however, practically impossible to effectively force the North to abandon its nuclear program, which was something unconditionally demanded by the United States. What is more, the long-lasting political and strategic alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang considerably complicated the problem. In consequence, any statements or resolutions, which were adopted during the Talks, lacked sufficient strength and did not force North Korea to start dismantlement of its nuclear program. Thus, the US-China cooperation was not very fruitful. Based on these findings, the thesis concludes that the primary obstacle to reach the objective of the Talks was Washington's uncompromising stance and the fact that the US dramatically misjudged Beijing's position towards the nuclear issue and the DPRK. It failed to realize that China considers the North's stability its strategically and vitally important priority, therefore it was counterproductive for it to pressure Kim's regime to the degree, to which Washington had wished.**