

## Summary

The submitted doctoral thesis is an attempt to describe the nature and of the development of Brentano's theory of judgment. This description is followed by an introduction to the further development of Brentano's theory in the work of Brentano's most distinguished students Kazimierz Twardowski (1866-1938), Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), Anton Marty (1843-1914) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). The thesis is divided into five parts:

The first part is dedicated to the explanation of Brentano's theory of judgment and starts with an interpretation of Brentano's two early books on Aristotle – *On the several senses of Being in Aristotle* (1862) and *The Psychology of Aristotle* (1867). The thesis presents Brentano's understanding of “being” in the sense of truth, his interpretation of the Aristotelian categories, his theory of parts and wholes, and his theory of intentionality and self-consciousness. Our interpretation then proceeds to Brentano's most known work, i.e. to *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), and presents the basic concept of this book, the concept of psychical phenomena. The resulting classification of psychical phenomena into three kinds introduces judgments as a kind of psychical phenomenon whose main feature consists in existential affirmation or rejection of an intentional object. The judgment therefore presupposes a presentation of its object. The particular aspects of Brentano's theory of judgment, such as quality and quantity of a judgment, and consequences of this theory for the theory of syllogism are then discussed to deepen our understanding of Brentano's position. The question of the specific objective correlate of a judgment gives us an opportunity to discern two kinds of development of Brentano's theory, the objectifying and the reductive approach, which are also intimately connected with Brentano's understanding of truth and evidence. The outline of Brentano's concept of the evidence of inner and outer perception, of the reality of the external world and of his general conceptualistic approach are given as well.

The second part of the thesis follows a development of Brentano's theory of judgment in the work of Kazimierz Twardowski. Twardowski's highly influential short study *On the Content and Object of Presentations* (1894) was an essential contribution to the further development of Brentano's theory. By noticing the ambiguity of the word “content” Twardowski was able to clearly distinguish between the psychic content of an act on account of which we intend something and the content in the sense of this intended something, i.e. content in the sense of an intended object. Remarkably, these distinctions can be linked to Twardowski's interest in the work of Bernard Bolzano.

The goal of the third part of the thesis is to describe a profound change in Brentano's theory of judgment. The pretension of the original theory to the reducibility of all subject-predicative assertions to existential judgments without any change in the meaning of the original assertions was a source of considerable difficulties. By introducing so called “double judgments” Brentano reintroduced the subject-predicative categorical structure into his theory of meaning which was to address these issues. The basis for the exposition and application of this theory is taken from the fifth article of Brentano's pupil Anton Marty *On Subjectless Sentences* (1895).

The philosophy of Alexius Meinong might be perhaps called the first heresy in the School of Brentano. A consideration of this heresy is to be found in the fourth part of this doctoral thesis. It describes the roots of Meinong's theory of judgment and connects them with the theory of relation contained in Meinong's *Hume Studien II* (1882). The distinction between ideal and real relations is thoroughly discussed as well as Meinong's later acceptance of Twardowski's content/object distinction and an important move towards embracing special objects of judgments which are called “objectives” by Meinong. Meinong introduced a systematic account of objectives in the first edition of his work *On Assumptions* (1902). The goal of this section of the thesis is to present this theory as well as the function of the psychical phenomenon of assumption in securing the intentionality of presentations and judgments. The changes in the second edition of this work from the year 1910 are also taken into account.

The last and the largest part of the thesis deals with a description of Edmund Husserl's descriptive psychology and theory of judgment. The description of Husserl's position takes into account Husserl's recently published manuscripts from the first half of the 1890s as well as two published

studies from the same period, i.e. *The Deductive Calculus and the Logic of Contents* (1891) and *Psychological Studies in the Elements of Logic* (1894), and his posthumously published and very important reaction to Twardowski in his *Intentional Objects* (1894). In these studies, Husserl develops his first critique of Brentano concerning the foundation of all judgments and volitional phenomena in presentations, and he works out his theory of intuition and applies it in the area of presentations and judgments. He also tries to develop his first conception of objective validity of states of affairs and judgments. These texts also bear witness to Husserl's interest in the issues brought up by Twardowski and his critique of objectless presentations which led to Husserl's discovery of assumptions. In many aspects Husserl's assumptions resemble Meinong's account of the phenomena of assuming.

A more systematized account of the theory of judgment was given by Husserl in his *Lecture on Logic* (1896). In it he fully embraces states of affairs as correlates of judgments and logical sentences (*logische Sätze*) as logically objective contents of judgments. In describing Husserl's lecture the thesis presents Husserl's conception of objective determinations, abstracta and predicates, the distinction between subsumption and subordination of subject to predicate and other related concepts. Most of these distinctions found their way into Husserl's *Logical Investigations* (1900-1901). In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl gave up his former conceptualism and carried on his critique of Brentano. In describing topics of each of the logical investigations the textual analysis of the difference between objectifying and non-objectifying acts is given together with an analysis of the appropriation of Bolzano's theory in Husserl's own theory of meaning which was partly inspired by his understanding of Lotze. Other concepts, such as the concept of intentional and epistemic essence, Husserl's theory of essentially occasional meanings and singular names and his concept of categorial intuition and truth are discussed as well. Apart from several critiques of Husserl's theories a list of the most important unsolved issues of Husserl's theory of meaning in the *Logical Investigations* is given at the end of the thesis. Among these, two problems are very important. The first one is the problem of simple nominal and categorial intuition and the second one concerns consequences of Husserl's theory of ideal meaning as being instantiated in the meaning-matter of objectifying acts. This last critique points out the necessity of a broader approach which introduces inter-subjective conditions of communication into Husserl's theory of meaning. The necessity of this wider perspective even in the discussion of "solitary" intentional life follows from Husserl's very own theory and is, in a sense, an epitaph to Husserl's early theory of meaning.