Figural Thinking: Theory and Practice

Doctoral Dissertation

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“I hereby state that I have written this dissertation on my own using only the stated, fully quoted bibliographic references and that this research has not been used in the framework of another university study program or to gain another or the same title.”
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Table of Content

Introduction

1. Acinema

2. Poetic Transgression
   2.1. Poetic Transgression I.
   2.2. Poetic Transgression II.

3. Poetic-Pictorial Transgression on Cinematic Image

4. Pictorial Transgression
   4.1. Pictorial Transgression
   4.2. Pictorial Transgression - Disseminated Red blotches: Color-event on Painting
   4.3. Pictorial Transgression on Cinematic Image

5. Cinematic Transgression on Animated Image

6. Cinematic Transgression and Autoplastic - Alloplastic Environment

7. Conclusion
**Introduction**

Most contemporary interpretations of figural theory assume that the image contains what is sought: the descriptive fullness of the image. This is a diminutive and ultimately stultifying interpretation not providing justice to image theory. Instead, I will approach the figural image as a “form that thinks”, a form that individuates itself, in contrast to a predetermined set of answers.

My application of Lyotard’s figural theory leads us to realize that the apprehension of an image is a transgressive act. Viewers use the interpretative tools of narratology, art history, literary devices, etc. to structure their perception of a given image. However, as we will see, the figural relationship to the image accounts for disruption of these modalities of interpretation and preserves latent, vibrant potentiality of meaning in the future. The transgressive characteristic of the figural presents itself through the interaction between the individual and the image. The image will modify the modes of interpretation brought to bear on the image and through the act of interpretation, destabilize the individual, as I will come to argue.

The image itself is an active, metastable phenomenon, folding various states within itself. Metastability merely implies that the figural is stable in its instability, where the observable state is a state of flux and variability. I argue that as the image is activated by the viewer and its environment, the image and viewer in their impermanent relationship undergo a process of individuation. This means that the ontological status of both the viewer and image are changed. Therefore, the metastable interaction of the viewer with the image is fundamentally a transgressive act.

The question here is: how is the the figural (applied to the image) different from other forms of image analysis? It does not work within the oppositional logic of visibility and non-visibility, it does not apply the logic of incompatibility of visibilities: rather it assumes the oppositional logic as form, that transgresses and individuates itself and invites the instability of the image.
Figural theory posits the image as an open source. The image exists at a moment of flux, between or rather in interaction with an alloplastic representation and an autoplastic appropriation. Thereby, it allows for an expanded impact on both the image and the viewer. The cohesion thus constructed occurs through a transgressive act of making. The application of figural theory is thus not one of decoding, but decoding -encoding. This specific mode of perception and interpretation initiated in Lyotard’s theory, is the center of the research in this dissertation.

The figural relationship between the materiality of the image and the viewer focuses on the reception of the viewer and his capacity to let himself be not only mimetically modeled by the image but enter into an act and process of modulation through which the image experience is constructed. The viewer thus steps out from his pre established phases and enters into regimes of reflected transformation, active self-individuation and subsequent “production of new subjectivities”[Guatarri 1995]. This means that the very image as environment allows the attainment of a peculiar intersection between alloplasticity and autoplasticity, demanding an act of self-adaptation and self-creation.

The first chapters start with Lyotard’s theory of the figural, the expansion of that theory through other thinkers and then, finally, the application of an expanded form of this theory that more aptly explores the relationship of the subject to the cinematic or moving image. This means developing an understanding of the figural that exploits cinematic transgression. There are several variations and specifications within the already established discourse of figural theory.

I argue that figural analysis is an open method and it pursues that which is heterogenous and processual, that which appears in transitional and liminal zones, and how film manifests its thinking. It is less about the image as object than it is about the activation that occurs between the image as object or environment and the subject. Cinematic criticism thus, (1.) moves from examination of static figures to stages or states of the image
as it encounters and is encountered by the subject. Cinematic criticism and theory, (2.) marks a shift from image theory to the individuations of image.¹

Our figural investigation will move from the theory of the image to the individuations of the image and finally to the mechanisms at work between the image and the viewer.

Jean-François Lyotard published *Discourse, Figure* in 1971; a stepping stone, long omitted, in the history of visual theory. In this inaugural project he presents the figural theory that can be understood as a quest for new sensibility that includes and searches for new expressivity and new subjectivity in image theories.

Lyotard’s premise is that prevailing image theories are based on binary oppositions such as discourse and figure. However, he conceives of reading and seeing, letter and line, as mutually imbricated states of the image. Just as figures are included in discursive structure (medieval illuminated text, certain types of film inter-titles, advertising graphics, the poetry of Mallarmé and cummings), visual space can in turn be materialized as existing within discursive coordinates. Seeing and reading are interactively negotiated in what Lyotard calls figural space. Visual experience demands of the viewer to be fully engaged in processes of negotiation that stem from the interaction of ambiguous forces. This negotiation will proceed, I argue, in a metastable environment. The figural thus becomes that overthrowing force, transgressive act and process, that allows for that transformative experience. It invites new sensibility where seeing and reading oscillate, nurturing each other mutually and giving rise to new perceptions.

Lyotard’s figural space describes the environment where the transgression previously mentioned takes place. He outlines three forms of transgression within the figural environment; “transgression of the object, transgression of form, and transgression of space” [Lyotard: 2011]. Lyotard claims of transgressive forms that they are the “fundamental modes of complicity that desire entertains with figurality” [276]. For him, the destabilizing force is desire in the psychoanalytical sense of the word. These modes of complicity that the subject entertains within himself, owing to his desire, evoke Simondon’s

¹ Alternatively “ fictions of images” [Siety 2009].
“regime of internal resonance” [Simondon :1992]. Lyotard emphasizes not only activity but the act itself. On the example of dreaming, he observes, “[…] in the imaginary activity itself. It is not the dream-content that fulfills desire, but the act of dreaming, of fantasizing, because the Phantasy is a transgression.” [1974: 241].

Lyotard constructs the figural concept by moving from distortion, or violence performed to the binary logic, to transgression as a complicit activity. This complicity privileges active disruptive interaction between the viewer and the image and is brought to bear within the activity of viewing.

It is true that Lyotard’s book, *Discourse, Figure* does not include a single reference to moving images. However, to state that Lyotard does not think about moving images whilst developing his core figural concept would be misleading. There is a direct yet much ignored precursor to figural theory, which is the concept of acinema.

In an article, *Acinema*, preceding *Discourse, Figure*, Lyotard starts from the premise that there is no pure cinematic shot. A cinematic scene, no matter how well crafted retains the potential of an acinematic, disruptive force.

Acinema extends explicitly to the borders of intermediality: it examines various media and explores mediality and materiality through an acinematic approach, examples of which include: the status of tableau vivant, the Japanese theater Noh, and photography. Acinema expresses the suppressions of the image. From the theoretical-historical point of view, the acinematic seems to be connected with what becomes later on the figure-matrix, the enigmatic disruptive and transgressive force.

In his figural project, Lyotard abandons cinema or rather puts it aside. It seems the decision is a conscious one. The argument for his conscious exclusion of cinema from *Discourse, Figure* could be found in the fact that his direct thesis supervisor Mike Dufrenne works with explicit cinematic references within his theory. Lyotard seems to have preferred to focus on the philosophical and analytical reexamination of the image. For Lyotard the cinematic image has had for its goal, “the sacred task of making itself recognizable to the
eye” which comes with the price of “banning the intensity it carries” [350]. This “banning of intensity” is necessary for the maintenance of the earlier mentioned cinematic form.

One of the premises of acinema states that once the support of the screen is disturbed, such screen-disruption causes viewer’s subjectivity to decompose. This introduces the concept of viewer as an active subjectivity that is challenged and altered by image representation technology or materiality. The acinematic insertions, demand the viewer to switch between different registers. These insertions or inscriptions rather thus co-create what Lyotard later terms a “perceptive difference.” This could be further explored through the example of free-floating attention (Chapter 6.) and applied to what we may term floating perception. Perception is, it seems, prone to instability and disruption.2

Acinema is the tension within the cinematic image. It marks a friction, potential failure and free energy existent within the apparent stability of the cinematic and forces the viewer’s perception to fluctuate: these characteristics of free energy and fluctuation indicate the fundamental features of a metastable state. The conceptualisation of Lyotard’s acinema, is thus being formed, within a proto-metastable logic.

The saturated contact of the cinematic and acinematic that takes place within figural milieu, Fernando-Zoïla terms as “non-lieu of passage” which seems to be in perfect resonance with what Simondon terms “metastable equilibrium.” States of image thus both non-localisable and saturated with potential energetic vibrations that are thrown out of their stasis, find themselves in this metastable state that launches transformative processes.

Prevalent philosophical theories conceive the individual as a stable entity or strive to stabilize it into sustainable form. We argue for a theory that encompasses individuation, a process where the subject encounters potential states of becoming. The individuation process plays an important role in the production of new subjectivities. My theory will connect transgressive processes to those of individuation. In my theory, transgression designates an activity that not only allows the viewer to enter beyond the image, beyond or

2 Within the reception response on the very basal level, acinema establishes a perceptive difference. This perceptive difference means that the viewer is asked to switch between shots that are cinematically representational and aberrant ones: those that seem as though they should be eliminated and usually are by the director. However, we believe that a perceptive difference can be present in the image itself as well and is not exclusive to the cross-over between shots. Even a brief flash within a shot can bring the viewer beyond the threshold of the visuality.
within the Lyotardian thickness of the discourse, but to enter transformative processes of both the viewer itself and the image.

Transgression refers to act and process at the same time. The pre-transgressive stage, designates a state where viewer and image are held together by the friction of possible transgression. The pre-transgressive state is noticeable through a friction between the viewer and the image, but prior to the incorporation of the potential content of the image into the subject. The pre-transgressive state views the figural in semi-stasis. For example, a work of art without a viewer is latent, not pre-transgressive. Pre-transgression occurs within a viewing moment and ends in a tumult that reconstructs both the image and the subject in a moment of transgression, in which the image and its latent gestures are activated in a somewhat violent incorporation of meaning and environment into the subject.

The moment of transgression designates a moment of transgressive overthrow when the viewer’s subjectivity is decomposed. Such a destabilisation of the statis of the subject brings in the potential fan of production of subjectivities that the individual “brings about” by itself. As Simondon stresses, the individuating becoming(s) of the subject “is brought about by the individual itself.” [Simondon: 1992: 305].

Transgression pronounces its presence within the work of the works of art and the viewer as sketched in Lyotard’s concept of the figural. Transgression viewed from the angle of individuating processes demonstrates the active work on the viewer’s side. It can be perceived, once launched, as a communication that is mediated between the viewer and the image.

This communication has a characteristic of a negotiation, which occurs at least on three levels. Firstly, the viewer negotiates the phases within himself, that is he takes into consideration the destabilization of his subjectivity, noticing his incompatibilities within himself. Secondly, the viewer also negotiates, consciously or unconsciously the triggering-passages through which the transformation can set in. Thirdly, the viewer negotiates the phases of the image. These negotiation levels can be happening simultaneously within the individuation process. Once viewer decides for one phase, into which he shall step into,
leap into that phase will become a version that will be actualised and through which he will individuate himself.

What this means for the viewing experience is that the viewer ought to perform the capacity to fall out of step (se déphaser), so as to create new phases, new stages of individuation. The viewer thus needs to employ the capacity to constitute a “new problematic with its own metastability” [Simondon:1992:307] which in turn allows the viewer to eventuate new individuations. Within the theory of adaptation, alloplastic appropriation and autoplastic representation are crucial. Autoplastic appropriation in this case refers to creation of internal structures of the individuating subject. The alloplastic and autoplastic patterns examine the ways the viewer: falls out of step with itself, negotiates and ultimately self-inserts the new internal structures as part of the individuation process into his individuation.
1. Acinema

In this chapter we are going to trace Lyotard’s concept of acinema that he defines in contrast to the traditionally established cinematic form. Such a proper cinematic form refrains from intentional cinematic or pictorial accidents that occur in the image, making it collapse. The good unified cinematic form stands in contrast to the acinematic semi-stasis.

Dominique Chateau, French theoretician of the philosophy of cinema, in connection with Lyotard's philosophical trajectory notes that, “The body of work (l’œuvre) of Jean-François Lyotard does not crystallize as that of Derrida's into one single label.” [Chateau: 2006:]. Chateau aims to suggest that Lyotard's work resists being subsumed under one single philosophical current which renders the work of scholars more complex.

In this chapter, we are going to depart from Lyotard’s concept of “acinema.” Lyotard defines acinema as anti-cinematic. Anti-cinematic in this case does not mean the negation of the cinematic. Instead, it defines all that which could not be included in the filmic texture so as to preserve the order and proper cinematic form. The acinematic is what goes against previously defined conventions of the cinematic.

Chateau observes, “The text on acinema departs from the idea that, “cinematograph is inscription of movement” [Lyotard:1973: 357] that contemporary cinema (cinema courant) introduces order [into this inscription] (in the syntactic and political sense) and thus a selection that eliminates all accident.” [Chateau 2006:126].

The accident thus eliminated Lyotard defines as all that is “the fortuitous (le frotuit), the careless (le sale), the blurred (le trouble), the suspect (le louche), the badly framed, the precarious (le bancal), the badly shot (le mal tiré).” [Lyotard, 1973: In.: Chateau 2006:126] All that is likely to collapse, to cause a disruption, ought to be taken out so as to preserve a culturally valuable and viable cinematic form.

3Chateau points to the fact that as one can ascribe deconstruction as a conceptual umbrella-term to Derrida, Lyotard’s conceptual trajectory follows a non-linear, non-unifiable and thus vaster field. Chateau’s statement is correct for Lyotard’s field extends from concepts as diverse as acinema, figural, sublime and so on.
Jean-Louis Déotte calls these eliminated parts “false movements.” [Déotte :2010:1] The wrong or out of tune movements are those where “the blurred, the badly framed,” the accident inscribed, gets excluded from the final unified cinematic form. According to Jean-Louis Déotte, it is the “surfacing of libido” (surgissement of libido)\(^4\) that manifests itself through these disruptive movements. [Déotte :2010].

Subsequently, he puts in psychoanalytical analogy, the good unified cinematic forms, comparing them to the illusion of “the unified body” (first experienced in an infant's development state). This deception of unification is extrapolated onto society and cinema. Following the Kleinian concept he notes, “Otherwise, for a child as for the social body, there is but the heterogenous, there is but disruption, there is just the incomparable. There is, following M. Klein, but “anxiety of dismemberment” of the proper body.” [Déotte 2010:1].\(^5\)

The acinema exacerbates such anxiety of dismemberment and this is why any indication that could trigger it off needs to be excluded. It needs to be excluded for once viewer confronted with the disruptive image, it evokes the dismemberment of the proper body. Such a feeling of a dismemberment would result in viewer seeking new practices so as to even temporarily unify the disruptive image.

For such a dismemberment applied on the cinematic form holds true for multiplicities that may resurface and thus fragment the viewing experience. Déotte explores the political economy of libido as well. He remarks, “When the “society” makes a probe of dismemberment, the desire of dividing up at the risk of tearing (déchirement) of the stasis turns over in desire of reconstitution of asocial-political body unified by the fact of naming

\(^4\)The French term surgissement is being translated on the linguistic scale as appearance, emergence, surfacing, arising. It is a term that French thinkers tend to use so as to accentuate an eruption that comes within philosophy of an event. Dubois employs this term to emerge (surgir) whereas for the emergence of event he opts for the term radiance (éclat) so as to express this sudden appearance.

\(^5\)J.-L. Déotte adds that the topic of the non-unification is implicit within Lyotard’s concept for he was a member of the Socialism or Barbarism movement. Déotte attaches, “The topic, the one of the originary (originaire) non-unification of the libidinal body developed by Freud in his “Three essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” (multiplicity of erotogenous zones, partial drives; modes of satisfaction etc.) is common to Lacanians as well as to the members of Socialism or Barbarism (Castoriadis, Lefort, Lyotard, Morin, etc.).” [2010:1].
(imposition) of body One: ego-crate (Stalin or Hitler).” [Déotte: 2010:1].  

Applied on acinema this suggests once the form falls out of its stasis, it becomes temporarily non-unifiable. The role of the imposed good form - by director, society, or cinematic convention - comes in place with the often non-negotiable, dictatorial, imposed reconstitution-unity. The resisting unification, acinematic semi-stasis, a disconcerting dismemberment, thus urgently calls for the role of reconstitution. However, these two desires, of tearing and reconstituting, co-operate within the political libidinal and cinematic economy.

Further, Déotte maintains,“Lyotard reminds that Freud has never dissociated the drives of life and the drives of death and that it is not the repetition, as one often believes, that distinguishes them. If the drives of life and death are entangled one can never dissociate them (otherwise than theoretically), in that case one holds there the formula of event. There will be event (de l’èvenement) for all that which will return, will bind almost indissolubly the same and the other. So then event is eros and thanatos, that which one can arrest by knowledge (the same) and that which eludes (the other)\(^6\) and falls into oblivion (Léthé).” [Déotte: 2010:5].

Therefore, the undesirable scenes, which Lyotard calls “scenes from elsewhere” [Lyotard: 1994: 54] are the ones that manifest the presence of the other (or the uncanny). Such a scene, unclassifiable, coming from elsewhere, becomes an “undecidable scene.” [Lyotard: 1994: 54]. A scene, a “strictly aesthetic sign that is valued for itself (valoir pour soi)” or “a sign inseparable from affect.”[Déotte:2010: 3]. The acinematic scenes are therefore scenes where the drives, eros and thanatos, are bound undecidedly, intricately intertwined with affect, folding singly in the potential of event eruption. Therefore, it is the Montaignesque swing and sway of the world that funnels down into the scenes charged with untenable intensities.

Déotte explains that, “As one is not anymore in the economy of representation, it is necessary that the depicted scenes, painted or filmed, extend themselves through an action/

\(^6\)Échapper refers to the English equivalent of to elude, to slip (cf. Freudian slip).

\(^7\) The preposition de in the case of inseparable de l’ affect can be translated as inseparable from or of affect.
passion.” [Déotte: 2010: 4]. He then accentuates that the cooperation of such an action/passion that mediates affect, lies at core of acinema. Thereafter he adds that, “This filmed movement that communicates affect (de l’ affect) and not representations of a thing or of image: this is what had been expected from acinema.” [Déotte 2010:4]. What Déotte names action/passion, is an environment similar to one through which unconsciousness works.

As we shall examine in Chapter 6., extrapolated onto the philosophy of meta-stability, advanced degree of figural, it is an environment that favours and triggers individuation processes and addresses adaptative auto- and alloplasticities. (Chap.6). The cinematic form finds itself unbalanced in oscillation between and within extreme poles, immobility and agitation. This spanned oscillating stasis that covers the interaction of both poles, functions in a manner similar to the mutually intertwined drives. Such functioning is anticipated to be enacted in specific abstract painting (Rothko, Delauney, Newman), and the traditional Japanese theater Noh. In the Noh theater the oscillating interaction within extreme poles is mediated in subtle nuances of gestures.

Similar economy of image appears in pinhole photography. For the very principle of pinhole photography is that the pinhole absorbs all evens that pass by during a certain duration of time (it can reach up to one hour or half a day). This means such a time span absorbs “the fortuitous, the blurred and the badly framed.” Subsequently the result can ensue ghostly landscapes, these scenes from elsewhere. American photographer Craig Barber depicts such phantasmic landscapes. In one photographic shot from Rural America photo-series,8 we see the middle of an image that assimilates a blurred out scrambled zone. This acinematic zone relates a mixture of too overexposed a light9 in combination with short-sequence of moving bodies of workers. Such a scrambled stasis disbalances the image yet it equips it with the acinematic affect. It evokes an eruption of an unpredictable event that disturbs the image.

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8 Craig Barber, Sites Unseen: Rural America http://www.craigbarber.com/rural/

9 As the photo is taken in the open space, with no possibility to influence the light or speed, the overexposure may be due to the time of the day. It may have been taken at noon, during a lunch break of the workers for instance.
Sarah Coleman observes such a distortion that for her translates into scale of different affects, “Using a variety of pinhole cameras, Barber adds a sense of quiet, gentle tranquility and melancholy to his images.”\(^{10}\) This is achieved through the patient technique that requires almost a “Zen-like mindfulness.” Barber reviews his creative practice, “With pinhole, you work in a completely different way than you would with any camera that has a viewfinder, […]. You have to slow way down, and accept that you can’t control everything. It’s a process that holds a great sense of wonderment for me.” [Coleman: 2002-2014].

As demonstrated, acinema signalizes that peculiar oscillation between agitation and immobility. We find this in the gestures in tableau vivant or in Rothko's paintings where “minute thrills [...] hem the contact regions adjoining chromatic sands” [Lyotard :1973]. What is being played out through the minute thrills is an oscillation as a vital intensity,\(^{11}\) that resists a totalizing force of libidinal normalization and furthermore refrains from belonging to either pole of immobility or agitation. Acinema as such an oscillation, vibrating vital intensity, unbars the individuating processes of both the image and the viewer.

Departing from Lyotard's example, it is clear that acinema holds within the indissociable tension that is a carrier of both, immobility and agitation. This holds true for Déotte who reclaims Lyotard's example and draws an observation that acinema embodies “both (à la fois)” or at the same time “immobility and extreme movement.” [Déotte : 2010:5].

Such a double enactment of immobility and extreme agitation can be found in one scene in James Joyce’s Ulysses. An extract from Joyce’s Ulysses\(^{12}\) presents an illustration of a staged space presenting immobile and active performance at once, within one scene. Déotte takes up Lyotard's reference of pyrotechnics and brings to notice a different facet of the example. Namely, Déotte quotes, “Nausicaa, the beach scene of Gerty's strip


\(^{11}\) cf. Chapter 6., process of individuation.

tease in front of silent Bloom with the fireworks as the visual and resounding background.” [Déotte 2010: 4]. He continues: “It is evident, to reread Joyce's pages, that the scene is not a simulacrum of jouissance, but gives rise to (*donne lieu à*)\(^{13}\) as Lyotard writes modestly, a “kinesic movement” (*mouvement kinésique*) binding immobility and extreme movement in(to) “shaking of the world (*ébranlement du monde*), an expression that strongly delighted Lyotard, just as the sway of the world (*le branle du monde*) according to Montaigne.” [Déotte 2010: 4].\(^{14}\)

The moment in which immobility and agitation coalesce, marks an event. This indicates in fact that playground site where figural space takes shape (Chapter 5). Such a figural space is later referenced in Paul Klee’s statement on visibility, as entailed in the concept of the in-between-world (*entre-monde, Zwischenwelt*).\(^{15}\)

Déotte is accurate in his statement that in acinematic economy, immobility and agitation are both being put in motion. Chateau and Durafour do not get entirely to the conceptual core of Lyotard's acinematic-figural project. In this study on acinema, Chateau remains within the philosophical-aesthetic framework. He is neither stepping out nor radically reaching beyond the pertinent yet basal academic reading. Thereupon the conceptual core of Lyotard’s psychoanalytical base remains omitted. Chateau does not address this decisive base as ingrained in acinematic as well as in the figural project.

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\(^{13}\)The French expression *donner lieu à* literally signifies to give place to. In our case this means that the scene as depicted by Joyce, despite being a carrier of intensities, already puts a certain *mise en scène* in place. To attribute a specific place means to locate as well, and such limit presupposes a selection (cf. Lyotard on deictic space 1974, Déotte on selection and *mise en scène* 2010).

\(^{14}\)The full citation of Montaigne reads followingly: “The world is but a perennial swing and sway. Everything in it is forever swaying: the earth, the rocks of the Caucasus, the pyramids of Egypt” (3. 2. 804). Michel de Montaigne, In.: *Perpetual Motion: Transforming Shapes in the Renaissance from da Vinci to Montaigne*, Michel Jeanneret, Sub-chapter Mobile Cartography, The John Hopkins University Press, 2001, p. 70.

Equally, Durafour does remark with insight what Chateau insinuates and Cassetti omits. Acinema, Jean-Michel Durafour reasons “inscribes itself (s’inscrit) chronologically in the framework of reflexion (cadre) about aesthetics thus dominated by the operator (l’opérateur) of the figural.” [Durafour 2012: 414].

He explains, “In the L’acinema article the word “figural” does not appear in many ways, yet, it is well the cinematic figural that is the matter (dont il s’agit) through the characterization of a drive-based cinema (cinema pulsionel) led to (assimilé) the part the most disfigurative, the most opposed (opposée) to the combinations and glaciations of the capital, the most energetic and extravagant one (dépênsière) of the experimental cinema (“the suspect, the badly framed, the precarious, the badly shot”). [Durafour 2012: 414].

Durafour is correct in stating that acinema presents a drive-based cinema. But once that is stated, it is relevant to draw conceptual consequences from that. He however does not elaborate this drive-based groundwork as entailed both in acinematic and figural frameworks. However he does deserve credit for highlighting the often misleading position acinema has been assigned to, as in being reduced singly to the extravagant or experimental cinema stream.

Chateau is correct in his claim that the conceptual novelty of the figural is being put aside (mise en réserve) and rather just evoked. Lyotard is indeed cautious, to stress the conceptual cinematic novelty, and remains silent about the fact that acinema could be or is indeed overtly a carrier of that cinematic figural novelty. Chateau notes that at heart of such a novelty stands the refusal of functionality and libidinal normalization, “Acinema is

16 Chateau claims that the figural focuses on the irrepresentable part of the image, that implies putting aside the factual framework of representation. “[...] but the conceptual novelty of the figural is as it were put aside; it is simply evoked, when author advances that his problem is not that what and how of the representation, “but expulsion or the foreclosure of all that is judged irrepresentable, because non-recurrent.” [Lyotard : 1973: 362, In.: Chateau : 2006: 127].


19 Lyotard’s interest in experimental cinema may have lain at heart of the misconception of aligning acinema with experimental cinema. The reason for that can be found in the fact that: “ At the same time, Lyoatrd acquaints himself with experimental cinematographic practice, especially with the group L’Autre Scène”. [Durafour 2012: 412]. In addition, Lyotard himself is author of experimental films Mao Gillette 1974, black and white, L’Autre Scène,1969-1972, http://www.cinedoc.org/htm/collection/videosite.asp
precisely cinema that refuses the domination of functionality upon action for free (*action gratuite*), for the pleasure, and more precisely, that refuses the *libidinal normalization*. [1973 : 364 In: Chateau : 2006 : 126].

Chateau further addresses that acinema is that “that concretizes, for example, the mise en scène, that has for its goal “to brand” (*marquer*) the double limit: an external limit between the reality and playing area (“une aire de jeu”) (1973: 363), and an internal limit, frame (*cadre*) where all the movements are assembled, unified, reduced to the same norm, to the same value (364).” [Chateau : 2006 : 126].

What Chateau describes is in line with Déotte’ s investigation of mise en scène, staging and off-stage scene (*hors scène*), as that which is off-sight. However, we argue, in line with Lyotard whose theoretical-analytical background repose on D.Winnicott' s concept (Chapter 5.), the playing area is not confined to the one side of the frame. It appertains to both. As Chateau puts it, “So as to counter this normalization, so as to reintegrate in the film that which the normality expels, so as to involve the irrepresentable in the representation, acinema can adopt (*emprunter*) two directions.” Following the line of Lyotard's text, Chateau extracts these two directions “immobility and excess of movement” (for example, tableau vivant and its contrary lyric exaltation. One thinks of Godard's Passion (1982) for the tableau vivant, of Carmelo Bene for the lyric exaltation. But Lyotard in his article makes rather an allusion to contemporary painting and to experimental cinema.”[Chateau: 2006: 126].

Chateau's example of Godard's tableau vivant, places tableau vivant into a more complex context. Tableau vivant here ceases to be a representant of “painting’s flatness” [Peucker 2003:295] and establishes to offer a *relief*, to say it in the dreamwork’ vocabulary.

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*Marquer* refers to its English equivalent as *to underline, mark*. In this case the limit thus marked is a signature of the set designer or director. Therefore we opt for the term translated as *to brand*.

Brigitte Peucker defines filmic tableau vivant as follows, “Tableau Vivant is a meeting point of several modes of representation, constituting a palimpsest or textual overlay simultaneously evocative of painting, drama, and sculpture. As the staging of well-known paintings by human performers who hold a pose, it involves the “embodiment” of the inanimate image. In other words, tableau vivant translates painting's flatness, its two dimensionality, into the three-dimensional.” [Peucker :2003:295].

Peucker further offers an expanded understanding of tableau vivant, “Elaborating, then, on the idea of tableau vivant as a lens that focuses intermediality, [...]; the discussion is not confined to the stricter definition of tableau vivant as a moment of arrested action that interrupts the flow of images in cinema. Rather, it concentrates on the cinematic reenactment of painting treated as the nodal point of several representational modes, as a means of textual layering that produces a suggestive semantic resonance.” [2003: 295].

As demonstrated, Peucker takes out tableau vivant from the context of the embodied “living picture,” placing it into a context of a “cinematic reenactment.” Peucker stresses the status of expanded tableau vivant that shapes “nodal point of several representational modes.” Such a conceptual grasp of the tableau counters normalization that is it invites the interplay of both drives. Therefore, as a nodal point arresting redolent resonance, tableau vivant functions as a place of mediation of these two drives and thus partly induces the “irrepresentable in the representation.” Subsequently such an expanded notion goes beyond just an “arrested action that interrupts the flow,” further bringing about figural qualities.

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23 For cinematic tableau vivant in conjunction with textual overlay and role of gestures in Klossowski’s work, see Raoul Ruiz, The Hypothesis of The Stolen Painting/ L’Hypothèse du tableau volé, 1979.

What is of interest for Lyotard's as well as Déotte's figural analysis is the role of a figural-cinematic operator. It is this operator that renders the arrested action to move on its edges and through such a movement comes to communicate vital intensity, affect.

The instance of tableau vivant, as intermedial nodal point, combines early cinema technique with the painterly visuality. It shapes flatness into three dimensional corporeality, paving way for the pictorial to acquire another expressiveness. Painting thus staged, presents a new corporeal-affected embodiment which may serve as a site of time dilatation. It thus represents a viable background for exploring intermediality, internodal adaptative techniques, of both the image-actors and viewers. Nonetheless, the example of tableau vivant does manifest, partially, the double-sided border of the inner and outer limit, immobility and agitation, the border that is here effaced. The tableau vivant, literarily the living picture, demonstrates the staging that brings painting to life. This pushed further in figural terms would mean that such an aliveness in elusive representation, resurfaces through a sudden appearance (a flash, Dubois 2004, a flicker, Massumi 2011) that inhabits and resurges from figural space.

As a result, tableau vivant serves as a partially succinct example that shows characteristic features of cinematic figural as a proto-metastable environment - kinesic movement, suspended in destabilization and dismemberement body, internodal adaptation. It defines environment where the stasis is a fragile state with the constant potential of the stasis' overthrow. Instability of such an environment nurtures the unleashing of free markers which favour creation of events. Acinema in contrast to established cinematic stasis underwrites such a level of constant destabilizing force, where the overthrow of its own equilibrium is in vivid potential. It indicates the proto-metastable environment in which the processes of appropriation and adaptation take place. Henceforth tableau vivant embodies a staged installation that interacts alloplastically with the environment in which it is set. It also undergoes changes autoplastically (actors get tired, gestures wear of).
Lyonate's reflexion on new cinema shows us his quest for a different path that would allow him to grasp the contemporary visual shiftings. Jean-Michel Durafour comments upon these shifts, “But this radical cinema is not the nerve of Lyotardian reflexion on cinema, as the later texts will come to underline – “Idée d’un film souverain” 1995-, while Lyotard turns away from the figural, as a result of several shiftings (déplacements) within his general philosophy, and incidentally aesthetic [...].” [Durafour: 2012: 414]. One value of the shiftings that pertains is the radical rejection to define acinema in terms of figurality. As that would mean already to describe it within mechanisms incompatible with cinemastic inner architecture. Durafour confirms, “Perhaps one could see here, already, the reason of rejection to define acinema in terms of figurality (figuralité).” [Durafour: 2012: 414].

In the framework of Lyotard's philosophy of film, Jean-Michel Durafour underscores the role of experimentation present in acinema and extrapolates toward the figural theory and figurative invention. He reasserts the statement that Lyotard's thinking about film does not limit itself to the experimental cinema, as is commonly believed. He also stresses that figural space is not a privative space, as acinema is not a privative experimental reverse side of cinema. Acinema, the cinematic figural is a space charged with events.

In contrast to the traditional aesthetic of form, Lyotard introduces a distinct potential for figurative intervention into the cinema thinking. Durafour also stresses that, “From “Acinema”, it is immobilisation “clearly distributed on the representative axe,” that is of Lyotard’s preference. The adjective could surprise in the figural context. On the contrary, it signals that in art the (figural) experimentation cannot correspond to all of film (au tout du film) for – an idea borrowed from politics – sovereignty is not compatible with totality. In this respect, Lyotard opens his thinking about cinema (pensée du cinéma) to the understanding of figurative invention of films, not limiting himself exclusively to experimental cinema, in which the question of matter (la matière, the “anesthetic” (l'anesthésic), the anesthetizing (anesthésiant), the disconcerting (le déroutant), distinct from the traditional aesthetic of form, so little theorized by the cinema
thinkers, plays an axial role.” [Durafour: 2012: 414].

 Nonetheless, Durafour misses the crucial point of Lyotard’s core argument. That is, that in real acinematic figural instantiations, both movements, the inner and outer, the lyric abstraction and extreme movement, are being vibrated at once in the visual pictorial and cinematic matter (Rothko). For he states that, “Lyotard distinguishes two modalities, on both sides of the “libidinal normalisation” imposed by the industry on the cinematographic movements (hence the privative prefix): the extreme agitation of cinema “lyric abstract” (Eggling, Richter), extreme immobilisation of “tableau vivant” (Warhol).” [Durafour 2012: 412].

 Since the acinematic figural instantiations appear at heart of the inner and outer border, such a nodal interaction will resurface other imbrications, including intermedial imbrications. This cinematic figural novelty, inherent in acinema, asserts as well, the irreductibility of seeing to reading and implies their mutual imbrication. Durafour notices that figural thinking encapsulates the treatment “of the irreductibility of the visible to readable, that which is not signifable, communicable, verifiable, encodable but explodes (fulgure) through(out) the image (à travers) as an always singular and heteromorph imprint (empreinte) of the desire.” [Durafour 2013: 414].

 The figural does thus function as an operator, that which resists encoding. It is an

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25 Durafour extends his interpretation of Lyotard’s approach, “In art, as the cinema, where the cinephotographed thing is so present, so “in front” (si en avant) the usual mimesis becomes suspect, implodes; the forms of imagination are maltreated. This brutality has for its name precisely the sublime, that Lyotard takes up from Kant later and extends as far as art, and assumes (revêt) from the angels of the cinematographic possibilities for the matter (the other of the form) one of its forms the most unusual ones (insolite).” In.: (eds.) A. de Baecque, Philippe Chevalier, Quadrigie/PUF, 2012, 414-415, the term elaborated by Jean-Michel Durafour, p. 414-415

26 In such a conception where mimetic coordinates implode, and where anything communicable and encodable explodes, the question of an image that is recalcitrant comes in. Certain figural theories interpret the pictorial and cinematic figural as image that resists. I would however argue that it is the matter not only of an image that eludes but moreover an image and imagery that absorbs within itself possible visualities. Cf. Stéphanie Katz, *L’écran, de l’icône au virtuel. La résistance de l’infigurable*. L’Harmattan, Ouverture Philosophique, Chapter: *L’image récalcitrante*, 2004.
operator that can manifest itself through a presence of a flicker-quality.  

Chateau compares the conceptual tactics of Lyotard's figural project in *Discourse, figure* with acinema. Yet, in his examination he still remains partially indebted to the binary structural logic (order-disorder, meaning-force, perception-comprehension). He does posit the essential role of the libidinal transgression, however does not elaborate its full function of such a vital disruptive force, and subsequently the environment, related to Lyotard's figural space.

In his comparative observation he mentions, “Just as for acinema he (Lyotard, tn.) distinguishes the ordering (*mise en ordre*) of movement and the possible implied disorders through the libidinal transgression, he distinguishes here (in *Discourse, figure* tn.) the discursive, that is the place of the rationality of meaning (*sens*), of its *mise en ordre*, that whole “coming” (*avenement*) is first a perception, before any comprehension, that is a force before being a meaning, that presents itself as sudden appearance (*surgissement*) before it starts functioning.” [Chateau: 2006: 127].

Nonetheless, Chateau makes a remark that captures a pertinent characteristic of the acinematic-figural concept, “The figural is at the same time the visible in the nascent state (*à l' état naissant*), not yet delimited, evanescent, explosive, the visible as that which it presents itself before any representation, any semantic sanction, the visible still, in what it entails in itself, in the constitutive capacity, the invisible.” [2006 : 127-128].

This means the constitutive capacity of the figural explodes the visible. Such an explosion signals the manifestation of the “always singular and heteromorph imprint of desire.” [Durafour 2013 : 414].

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This sudden appearance disfigures the figuration, for it releases the saturated (semantic or other) overlay, and therefore it frees the charged intensities. Chateau affirms, “Just as acinema implies metamorphosis of movement that liberates it from the mise en scène, figural art, that seeks or reaches the figural “beauty” implies a metamorphosis of the figuration that liberates it (the figuration) from perspectivists or other ordering (mises en ordre).” [Chateau : 2006 :128].

Such a figurative liberation unties discourse from previous prearranged engagements. Acinematic events thus reveal the function of “aberrant movements.” [Lyotard, 1974]. These aberrant movements stray away the viewer’s eye from the good cinematic composition. These movements under the activated effect of the “intense glare” [Lyotard :1993], “intense event [Lyotard :2006] that erupts within the image cause the viewer to “look away.” [Lyotard :1993]. Such manifested distortions within the image force the viewer to hold within his viewing experience both libidinal drives, taking on the tension. Thereafter, acinematic events as carriers of intensity cause viewer’s perceptive dispersion, or later floating perception. (Chap.6).

The dispersive character of acinematic events leads the viewer’s eye away from the established cinematic stasis. Such a leading-away can result in two possible effects: it could deflect the viewer out of the narrative via a total break from the narrativistic structure or it can solidify the narrative through providing a perspective break for the viewer, whereas the earlier being characteristic of dispersion. The perceptive dispersion stands in contrast to fixed visual cohesion. This cohesion is guaranteed by a narrative plot that the film director normally pursues, and according to Lyotard’s hypothesis, this is prioritized so as to keep within the confines of libidinal normalization. Visual dispersion demands the viewer to work with multiple points of view. Such a visual technique also tests the viewer’s capacity to employ innovative approaches to unrecognizable visual patterns.

28 The verb atteindre means to affect as well.

Claudine Eizykman, Lyotard’s direct student, who continued his figural line of thought (La Jouissance-Cinéma, 1975) confirms the acinema’s and figural’s dispersive feature. To Antonio Costa’s insistent question of pinning down the acinema-figural core, Eizykman responded that acinema as figural is “that which disperses the constituted unity […] and will produce traces of innovation.” Therefore, once the viewer finds himself in such a state of visual dispersion, this dispersion demands of the viewer to switch between acts of looking, or to acquire a new stance, a new disposition from which to approach the visual. Such a defined dispersion, as a switch between acts of looking, equally a switch between adaptive attitudes, perceptive aptitudes, demands viewer’s negotiation.

Such an understanding of image redefines the status of the image. Moreover, it reframes the status of affect as libidinal intensity that is for Lyotard material. In relation to the cinematic acinema and figural theory, Jacques Aumont and Michel Marie state that “Lyotard elaborates at this time an “ontology of the event”: reality made out of unpredictable events rather than structured regularities (in opposition to structuralism): these events ought to be interpreted but they will never be as such completely nor adequately, [for] there is always a remainder.” They add, “Lyotard qualifies these [events] as “libidinal intensities” and “affects,” which he sees as the manifestation of the primary drives as postulated by Freud. But affect, for Lyotard, is material: a sound, a colour, a caress, all that has the capacity to take on this form or arouse a desire. Acinema is an attempt to come near cinematic (filmique) representations according to this perspective, by interpreting them as such events, and by that, seeking to understand, not the told story anymore (l’ histoire racontée) but the affects that it can arouse.”

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32 Affecter is being translated as (1.) to affect and as (2.) to take on (this and this form). cf. French-English Dictionary www.wordreference.com. I take into account both semantic options whereas in this case my translation opts for the latter.
Aumont/Marie’s observation about the figural remainder always present in events bears analogy to Déotte's assertion that regards the return of the other as the remaining other, that always slips away. Within such an established ontology of event the remainder is formed as the other that puts in motion the free energies, allowing them to recirculate in image’s platform.

Since events are by Lyotard defined as intensities they appertain to the domain of libidinal economy and not to economy of representation as we have mentioned. Within such an economy intensities are being communicated indirectly. These intensities take on themselves various forms and are carriers of affects. Therefore, an intensity can take upon itself material shape of sound, colour or tactile contact.\textsuperscript{34}

The space that is being freed through such dispersive operation, including libidinal economy and figural operator, is a space in nascent state. It is also space that releases energy. This liberating of energy is shaped in the operational psychoanalytical logic of the work of counter-movement, as something which escapes, blocks (\textit{déjouer}).\textsuperscript{35} Liberated perceptions for instance have to laboriously plough through a barrier of frustration of energies.

In such a space authorizing liberated perceptions, colour can acquire dynamic malleable qualities of material intensity and can work as a liberated color-affect. Such intensity can be disruptive, and varied. Colours assembled in such a manner, that is, into and as events, once put in motion, colours then resist didactic chromatism and give way to “widened chromatism” of pictorial language [Deleuze/Guattari, 2009 :98].

Space in nascent state henceforth defines a space to be constructed or a space to be dilated. Such a space-to-come demonstrates space of discrepancy, imbalance and variance: characteristics of figural space. (Chapter 2).

For Lyotard color, is a carrier of a material or physical intensity. It can mark an


\textsuperscript{35} [Lyotard 1973: 353-354].
event that is charged with affects. In his research on psychoanalytical economy and


economy of writing, we encounter an explanation directly related to colour. Lyotard’s


concept emancipates color as a liberated intensity, a disparity with the potential to

(re-)establish or disrupt new chromatic and thus perceptive scale as well. Lyotard

pronounces followingly, “Disparities, not oppositions. Learning to be set in motion by this,

by a blue adjoining a blue, by two brilliances of the same white being dissimulated

according to the angle of vision, beyond all loquacity and all didactic


On the example of abstract painting, Lyotard demonstrates the fact that what the

viewer witnesses and experiences in the viewing experience is not allied to the register of

oppositions. In the case of Rothko's abstract creation, the viewer finds himself

unbalanced, confronted with dissimulated disparities, which he struggles to hold together

in an unified form. In an act of dissemblance they reveal the visible in a nascent state, a

new sensibility. The visually strategic motion that is launched “by a blue adjoining a blue”

announces a new motion where colour embodies a passage of intensity. This passage can

further individuate itself into concrete motions (Chapter.6). The intensities as unbound

forces that resist temporal syntheses, are bound to displace themselves and appear in

unpredicted instantaneous irruptions. These intensities considerably partake on

strengthening the visual dispersion.


This means that it is exactly here that acinema proves itself as co-vacillation of both

drives. Ian Hamilton Grant specifies the qualities of intensities, “Lyotard considers

intensities as unbound excitations of force which are characterized by their displaceability,

their instantaneity and their resistance to the temporal syntheses of memory.” [Grant: 1993:


36 [Lyotard, originally formulated in 1974., that is after the first version of Discourse, figure in 1971. English

version,1993, Libidinal Economy, 246].


37 Here the painting ceases to be a representational mise-en scène, and instead gives way to libidinal set-up. In

such a set-up, in the classical psychoanalytical drive theory, the image offers little that is recognizable, returns

or is consumable. Jean-François Lyotard, Driftworks 1984, Assassination of Experience by Painting-Monory


38 A different kind of dissimulated disparities can be found in the pictorial figuration of Fra Angelico’s


Grant’s position on intensities as unbound excitations reconfirms the status of visual dispersion as presented by Eizykman.

In his early writings when reviewing abstract painting Lyotard evokes some examples. He mentions, “It is on the contrary the chromatically marked support-skin (the canvas, the medium, the pigments) that is set in motion: not only because it no longer effaces itself behind what it represents (while in fact it represents nothing), but also because the apparent immobility, insignificant for the eye that doesn't enjoy it, of the assemblages of points, lines, planes and colours is precisely what motivates desire. Here we are closest to what we are looking at or the instantiation of intensity in the theoretical text, immobile mobility, Klee, Delaunay, Newman, Rothko, Guiffrey, deceitful immobilizers, create movement by very small disparities of colour, lines, etc.” [Lyotard :1993: 245-246].

In his early writings the acinematic demand is reconfirmed on the pictorial level through the studies of abstract painting. On the cinematic level, Lyotard cites the example of John G. Avildsen’s film Joe (1970).

Two film sequences pertinently emphasize Lyotard’s acinematic argument. The short fight film sequence stands as the example of extreme movement, whereas the final scene of the shooting spree of the hippie community supports the argument of extreme immobilization. In the film sequence of the fight scene between Melissa’s father and her hippie boyfriend we witness an extreme movement. This movement manifests itself as extreme agitation, in other words a disruptive intensity. When the father beats up the boyfriend, the movement is accelerated and simultaneously aligned with the shrieking sound. The motion thus distorted, modulates itself whereby in one stroke each beating is coupled with a sound-beat, leaving a blood trace of the rhythmic violence.

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These instances, orchestrated together, create video-like clotted over-layers of such an extreme agitation. This stirring of the image results in a blurred movement, with the visual colour trace that itself becomes semi-mobile. This scene recalls Francis Bacon’s bodies as when through deformation they undergo changes (Chapter 4).

The final scene of Avildsen’s film represents the extreme immobility. In this scene Melissa’s father and his friend determine to clean the hippie community residing in the house. During such a shooting spree the father accidentally shoots his own daughter from the back. As he walks out of the house, with the gun in his hand, a girl is running toward the front of the screen. Subsequently she turns 45 degrees, as if to see or as if to give the last look to the shooter. Afterwards, she freezes in the frame. Yet what the viewer sees as she turns back facing her father, is a large red stain on her jacket.

Lyotard firmly states that it is only the eye motivated by desire that can trigger the disruptive and innovative look that shapes visual space in nascent state. Such a perceptive attitude can trigger movements in color fields, record the effusive minute thrills and resolve individuated affects.

As we have seen, the premise of a cleaned, ordered cinema was to “ban all intensity” so as to preserve a good viable cinematic form. The claim and value of such a form lies in the fact that it can “make oneself recognizable to the [viewer’s] eye” [Lyotard: 350]. However, once the instantiations of intensity released, acinema and figural encourage “all accident.” They invite intensities as unbound excitations, that reinforce creation of affects to be materialized even if as brief ignition flickers. Once put in motion, these acinematic accidents, dissimulated disparities bear the capacity to bring forth instantiations of individuating sites of intensities. (Chapter.6).

Resurfacing of intensities that are instantiated and individualized refer to the presence of what Déotte names ‘pre-theatric-space’ [2010]. This is a space that holds within itself the double-limit space that conveys the mise-en-scène and hors-scène. Expressed in cinema vocabulary as that which is captured in the frame and beyond the frame. The space that holds within the double-limit and suspended passages between the spaces becomes for
Lyotard, figural space. It is often hard to distinguish which space is specifically and singularly figural. As any in-between space, be it within poetic, pictorial, or cinematic register, can for Lyotard, become a carrier of figural space.
2.

2.1. Poetic Transgression I

By the example of Lyotard’s philosophy of cinema, acinema, we have seen the initial deployment of figural theory in nascent state. However, so as to fully install figural theory, Lyotard decided for a poetic and pictorial domain. In 1971, Jean-François Lyotard, published *Discourse, figure*, a stepping stone, long omitted, in the history of visual theory. The image suddenly found itself cross-examined through novel analytical-plastic mechanisms, antipodal to previous discursive practices.

Within the current established discourse of figural theory, there are several variations and specifications where the authors do not explicitly use Lyotard’s inaugural treatise as a starting point. Therefore, General figural theory ramifies into distinct movements. One such movement comes from Auerbach’s premise that images are suffused with figures-as-symbols, enriching the meaning, and figures-as-bodies, both seeking their fulfilment and not loci of radical transformation. Following Auerbach’s theoretical groundwork spring conceptions examining the figural from the standpoint of description or economy of signs [Jacques Aumont 1996, Nicole Brenez 1998], literary-aesthetic

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analyses [Olivier Schefer 1999\textsuperscript{44}, François Aubral 1999\textsuperscript{45}], and musicological comparative theory [Martin Zenck 2003\textsuperscript{46}], to mention a few.\textsuperscript{47}

As regards the Auerbachian theoretical line, two thinkers are pertinent as followers, establishing their own figural theories, Nicole Brenez and Philippe Dubois. The problematics of the figural theory as drawn by Brenez lies in the fact that Brenez’s figural criticism varies with each film the author examines. Her seminal work teems with such varied approaches to her own figural theories.\textsuperscript{48} The most cogent example is her analysis of a documentary film by Heinrich Hause, *Windammer und Jaarmaten: Die letzten Segelshiffe (The Last Sailing Ships 1930).*\textsuperscript{49} What Hauser conceived as a documentary travelogue (*Reisebericht*), becomes fertile ground for illustrating the figural argument in the Auerbachian line of thought: the spectator, via viewing life on a ship, experiences the ship through its parts and together fulfils the figure of the body of the ship, making it the subject of the film.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{44} Olivier Schefer, Article published in Critique, no. 630, November 1999, p. 912-925. Also published In.: (eds.) F. Aubral, D. Chateau, *Figure, Figural*, L’Harmattan, 1999.

\textsuperscript{45} In.: (eds.) F. Aubral, D. Chateau, *Figure, Figural*, L’Harmattan, 1999.


\textsuperscript{48} Nonetheless, an interesting take on figural analysis can be found in a more compact book, see: Brenez, Nicole, *Shadows: John Cassavetes*, Synopsis 1995.


\textsuperscript{50} Therefore the viewer’s eye finds itself activated through the constantly shifting camera angels depicting the ship.
It is often marginal film genres and cross-genres that became the center of examination by figural thinkers as narration tends to obscure the cinematic processes at work. Brenez’s theory relies on an oppositional logic, between form and matter, representation and presence. Despite the fact that her conception of the figural takes into consideration potential tensions between the binary oppositions, she researches potentialities of the image by framing them in a discursive logic. Despite her conceptually vast effort to pin down what she terms figural economy, such an attempt fields into economy of representation.

French theoretician of cinema Philippe Dubois seems to belong to both domains of the philosophical and cinematic investigations. He takes into consideration binary logic yet gradually and simultaneously works toward developing concepts of intermediality. Dubois examines his figural as,

“All that which persists in the image once the figurative has been removed in it (that is the referential reason in its iconographic part) and the represented (figuré, the second meaning(s), its rhetoric and iconological part - yet that is still possible to undergo figuration (figurable).” [Dubois: 2004:64]. From that standpoint he adds that we shall “consider the Figural as a process (not as a product), and which is more, process of the

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51 Dubois, *La Question de Figures à travers le champ*, In.: (ed.) F. Aubral, D. Chateau, Figure, Figural, L’Harmattan, 1999.

For Dubois, the figural can be grasped only indirectly, that is through its effects, (sudden glare, éclat, 2004). In his understanding, the figural manifests itself as an intensive presence of materiality of the image that ruptures within the texture of representation. Figural theory thus moves from static figures to stages or states of the image, as we will argue, as it encounters and is encountered by the subject.

However, in contrast to the above-mentioned theories Lyotard’s figural is distinct. It reposes on analytical groundwork. This means, the core figural project of Lyotard’s theory, springs from the psychoanalytical figurability as presented in the Freudian concept of dream-work.

The starting point for Lyotard’s figural research resides indeed within the framework of the classical psychoanalytical theory. At heart of the classical psychoanalytical theory stands the Freudian psychic arrangement that carries at its basis peculiar division of primary and secondary process thinking. Despite the necessary conceptual division and despite the fact that these two function in different registers, these procedural arrangements are intertwined and simultaneously co-work on psychic functioning.

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54 Lyotard, who coined the neologism figural is himself hesitant to pin it down. The French film theoreticians took some of his central concepts such as event and desire. (Lyotard, 1971, 23)
Let us look at both processes and detect from where Lyotard draws his conceptual figural groundwork. As regards the primary process, in his definition Charles Rycroft accentuates, “Primary process thinking displays condensation and displacement, i.e. images tend to become fused and can readily replace and symbolize one another, uses mobile energy[...] ignores the categories of space and time, and is governed by the pleasure principle, i.e. reduces the displeasure of instinctual tension by hallucinatory wish-fulfilment. In topographical formulations it is the mode of thinking operative in the id.” [Rycroft:1995:138].

To such a basal definition Rycroft adds the domains where primary and secondary processes operate, underscoring that creative activity necessitates an “admixture of both”. Rycroft adds,

“The Primary processes are exemplified in dreaming, the secondary processes by thought. Day-dreaming, imaginative and creative activity and emotional thinking contain an admixture of the two processes.” [Rycroft:1995:138].

Rycroft’s accentuation on the acute presence of mobile energy underlines the procedural side of such a primary space. In his figural project, Lyotard distinguishes the two arrangements whereby primary processes are defined as energetic. In contrast to these, the secondary elaboration is according to Lyotard a ‘linguistic and readable’ one [Lyotard: 1974:269]. For Lyotard, primary processes therefore refer to “process-desire” [1973:77], build a relief, and tap into a depth (relief).

The first mechanism as an energetic arrangement that is subsumed under the primary, relief-building array, is that of a compression (condensation, Verdichtung). The German equivalent however, as selected and defined by Freud, contains in itself217 the term of Dichtung as in poetic work. Still, the very concept of poetic creation, Dichtung, contains a double-edged spectrum: (a) it signals compression (dicht, densatio, density), as


we can find it in the dream-work and in extensio in poetic work (Dichtung, dichten, poesis). (b) Yet, it is also that which has the quality of monstratio, pointing to, showing, and potentially becoming center of attention and attraction.57

Didi-Huberman explains, “And yet, there exists, in German, troublesome twinning between Dichtung, the poésie (poesis, as indicate, in their big dictionary, Grimm brothers) and Dichtung the “densation” (densatio).” [Didi-Huberman 2005 :73/125].58 And in such an energetic twinning that lies at heart of the analytic compression, Didi-Huberman detects another semantic suggestion, “In this way, the Dichtung like poesis will be recognized for its work (oeuvre) of densatio particular of present, past, and to come temporalities, that is to say of occasion, memory (mémoire) and of desire.” [Didi-Huberman 2005 :73].

Within dreamwork and poetic work, it is the work of desire, in its psychoanalytical energetic sense that mirrors itself through Lyotard's figural examination. In conjunction with the compression mechanism and in direct reference to Freudian concept Lyotard rectifies, “One should not say that the compression be work through which the desire is distorted. One should say that the compression is the desire working on the text.”59

This means that the compression embodies the work of desire within the energetic charge, that belongs to process-desire. Subsequently such a set-up builds depth, rearranges

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58Didi-Huberman directly puts in relation the work of poetics and dreamwork in Freud’ s context and wonders why Freud does not delve into the description of the internal formation of poetic work and dreamwork once tackled. “Freud, curiously, does not make a case out of it: on the one hand, he brings light to the capital importance of the work of compression (Verdichtung) in the formations of the unconscious without ever, yet, to give an “internal” description of its process. (2005: f:126 ).Didi-Huberman on the other hand, he evokes the art of the poet (Dichter) and the transformation that makes of itself there a play (Spiel, qui s’y fait du jeu) in literary form, for instance in Trauerspiel, the “play of grief” (jeu de deuil), that is to say the tragedy”. In: Georges Didi-Huberman, Geste d’air et de pierre, p. 73. f: 127. See also: Lucien, Sur le deuil, Rivages Poche, Petite Bibliothèque, Editions Payot & Rivages, 2008, p.25.

59 “Il faudra dire qu’elle est le désir travaillant sur le texte de la pensée du rêve.” [Lyotard 1974]
content-pieces, and therefore lies at heart of poetic creation. The compression as a mechanism that disfigures syntax involves the densification process and is resurfaced in poetic figural imagery. As the illustration of the process of compression, Didi-Huberman offers the image of the vapour of water being shaped into a cloud.

Didi-Huberman encourages the notion of poetic work, pushing the concept of *Dichtung* towards the concept of *pointing to*. He claims as follows, “And yet, that into which *Dichtung* densifies itself is no other than “to show” as (vapour densifies itself into) the sculptural beauty - but passing one - of a cloud. It is in that, that the image, consubstantially, holds onto the very poetics of the word breathed in. Let us remind that the Latin dictum denotes above all else act of pointing to, to make known [...] for the saying (le dire) of a poet is taken into that dimension where it shall be let to appear in the process of pointing to (veiling-unveiling) [...].”

Through such a conceptual approach, *Dichtung* as the poetics of world-making, condenses itself into the act of showing. Within such a defined context, the densification process shows admixed presence of what Lyotard calls a thickness of discourse. The process of compressing and pointing, veiling-unveiling, inspects various mobile acts of shaping that take place. The energetically different acts of shaping instruct Lyotard to pursue his poetic-figural space, exploring such “thickness of discourse.”

In the course of various acts of shaping, in poetic work or dreamwork dream-thoughts browse from one medium into another. The manner in which this browsing occurs is the process Freud terms *durchdringen* (*se frayer le passage*).

Such a process of browsing, “making a way” of dream-thoughts to the conscious layer has been revealed on the example of psychoanalytical *negation*.

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60 In original the verb Didi-Huberman employs is *se densifie dans*.


In his 1925 article on *Negation (Die Verneinung)*, Freud describes the concept of negation in the context of psychoanalytical practice. The work of psychoanalytical negation, Freud asserts, demonstrates a process in which the repressed thought content (*ein vedrängter Vorstellungs- oder Gedankeninhalt*) works its way to the layers of conscious site. The thought content can for instance make its way through as in the framework of the analytic set-up between the patient and analyst. Here the set-up provides space for discharge of any seemingly random, conceived phrases.63

Such a repressed thought however can power through to the conscious surface only in negated or otherwise disguised forms. Freud explains,

“Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way (*durchdringen*) into consciousness, on condition that it is negated (*verneint*). Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting (*Aufhebung*) of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed. We can see how in this the intellectual function is separated from the affective process.”64 [Freud: 1925 :]

In his still phenomenology-oriented view Didi-Huberman brought forth, what we called the act of shaping, the densification process part of compression that runs one content-piece to the other. Freud’s concept of dream-thoughts engages a strange shaping act as well. For the dream-thoughts in order to make their way to the surface, in order to be articulated and pointed to, need to be reshaped as well.

The course of action pursued is however not shaping in the sense of densification, taking a form upon itself. The dynamics of this process involves the double-arrangement of


action-passion⁶⁵ where a once repressed content-piece, dispersed in subconscious site can be rearranged so as to burst out, in a scrambled shape, flicker as instantiation of intensity, As such it can explode into the visible conscious site and make itself apparent.

This mobile dynamics encompasses what we term acts of floating. The floating concept is presented by Freud himself in the reference to the movement of dream-thoughts that move freely. Subsequently such free-floating dream-thoughts are compared to ice-floes. The floating concept is indeed entailed in the extreme free mobility of the primary process thinking and in addition processes of creation.

Equally, we find the concept within Dubois’ concept of figural writing (l’écriture figural) where he refers to specific cinematic titles (overtitles, surtitres) as “floating bodies” (le corps flottant, Dubois: 1999:252).⁶⁶ These cinematic titles in some cases do refer to subconscious thoughts of the characters (see, The Cabinet of Doctor Caligari, R.Wiene, 1920, Fritz Lang, Woman on the Moon, 1929 Fritz Lang, Dr. Mabuse The Gambler, 1922, The Testamenet of Dr. Mabuse, 1933). Therefore this attests the direct reference of such cinematic floating bodies that behave like the floating ice-floes on the image.

Within his own figural vocabulary Dubois also discusses “floating configuration” (configuration flottante, Dubois: 1998a:273) and further mentions “breathing of floating representations” (respiration de representations flottantes). Such a semantic choice of vocabulary shows the resemblance to the phenomenological concept of Didi-Huberman [as “words are breathed in”: 2005: 75] and also places itself into the conceptual figural line that ties in with Casetti’s notion of figural as that which demonstrates representation in motion [Casetti : 2005].⁶⁷

In our rationale, we argue that at the end it is the acts of shaping that give rise to transgressive processes. In other words, it is through the acts of shaping that the work of

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⁶⁵ Cf. Chapter 1.

⁶⁶ Dubois, P., L’écriture figurale dans le cinéma muet des années 20, In.: (ed.) F. Aubral, D. Chateau, Figure, Figural, L’Harmattan, 1999

⁶⁷ See: Chapter 1, especially in regard with the concept of perceptive dispersion.
As demonstrated, compression is a specific process that gives rise to the presence of thickness of discourse. Compression also censors dream-thoughts. This thought-censorship occurs through the work of distortion (Entstellung). In the Freudian topology, the work of distortion is subsumed under the mechanism of displacement (Verschiebung). The (very) censored words, distorted and free-displaced, therefore yield to acts of floating. That means such mobile-floating words may reemerge where and when, the reader in conceptual discursive or the patient in psychoanalytic context, least expect it.

This brings us in detail to the second mechanism of dreamwork that is displacement (Verschiebung). Rycroft defines it as, “The process by which energy (cathexis) is transferred from one mental image to another. Displacement is one of the primary processes and is responsible for the fact that, for instance, in dreams one image can symbolize another (...).” On the account of displacement Lyotard notes that, “Freud calls it “the essential portion (das wesentliche Stück) of the dream-work, “one of the principal methods by which that distortion [Entstellung] is achieved.” [Lyotard, 2011: 241].

The very linguistic German prefix ent- refers to a semantic-spatial double-positioning. It signalizes disruptive processes in two ways (1.) as that which stands in

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68 However Lyotard uses the displacement as the first “preparatory process” to that of compression. [Lyotard, 2011: 241].

69 Rycroft enlarges the definition of displacement whereby he registers that there are serial displacements and various shifts an individual can execute. He carries on,“More generally, the process by which the individual shifts interest from one object or an activity to another in such a way that the latter becomes an equivalent or substitute for the other. Symbolization and sublimation depend on serial displacements.” [Rycroft Dictionary 39: 1995].
opposition (anti) [Sirois : 2004:8], henceforth as that which divides, cuts in two opposing parts. Yet even though divided, (2.) it may remain embedded within representative processes (ent- as within [Sirois : 2004]). Such a doubly-positioned distortion represents the disruptive opposition that co-shapes the Lyotardian thickness of discourse. In addition, distortion such defined, marks an always inclusive part of the poetic reconstitution. This means work of distortion (Entstellung) belongs to both domains: the purely primary process thinking as well as and secondary elaboration one. It thus operates as proto-transgressive force that can mediate the passages from one layer to the other. It henceforth marks indeed what Freud terms and proves to be the fundamental portion (das wesentliche Stück) of the dreamwork.

Lyotard interprets Freudian work of distortion within his figural concept, assigning its verbal form three semantic directions. He interprets the verbal form as “to distort” (sich entstellen) as (1.) to disfigure (se défigurer); (2.) to do violence to language (faire violence au langage) (3.) as that which “has censorship for its motive.” In conjunction with the violence performed he notes, there are two manners of violence that are being executed.

In the framework of analytical and discursive planes, this violence serves in order to (1.) make room (faire de la place) and points to the fact that the act of conducting violence is (2.) a substantial act itself (l’act lui-meme). [Lyotard 1974: 242]. Lyotard draws attention to the fact that violence within any discourse poetic or dream one, does not operate as an abstract concept. As regards the figural concept, violence functions as a distorting and dislocating activity.

This activity demonstrates itself as an act on the one hand and on the other hand this activity reveals freed-up space of censored dream-thoughts. Subsequently, such an activated distortion-dislocation process instigates the free mobility of floating potential. As a result, this set-up can trigger production of free-markers in transgressive pictorial-cinematic and adaptive processes (Chapter 6).

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70 François Sirois, Le rêve, object énigmatique. La démonstration freudienne. Les Presses de l' université Laval, 2004, (“either the opposite (as in anti-)”), p. 8. See also distortion as in correlation with the pictorial concept of anamorphosis, Sirois: 2004: p. 72.
Samuel Weber reasserts that Entstellung brings up “both distortion and dislocation” [Weber : 64: 1982]. In the essay *The Blindness of the Seeing Eye*, Weber, according to Simon Morgan Wortham, accords to *Enstellung* yet another signification. Wortham claims that, “this term” [...] carries the sense of dislocation as much as of disfigurement in Freud. For Freud, dreams cannot be considered *in terms of their latent content ultimately* to harbour a single, determinable meaning, nor, therefore, are they reducible to a self-contained object of cognition that is susceptible to ‘a hermeneutics that defines its task in terms of *explication* or of *disclosure.*’ [Wortham, 2007 :73].”

Weber’s position seems to be closely related to Lyotard’s when he emphasizes the dislocating and disfiguring facet of Entstellung. Wortham also accentuates the fact that dreams-thoughts do not harbour, (1.) a single ultimate meaning. This confirms dream-thoughts as those which are prone to launch heteroglossia, multivoicedness, thus acquire multi-meanings. (2.) As self-contained objects, dream-thoughts are not hermetically closed. That proves the fact that dream-thoughts are not folded onto themselves and they can instigate open-source flows.

Furthermore, Wortham underscores Weber’s point that dream-thoughts constitute themselves ‘through, and as interpretation’ (BS, 77)”. Despite the fact that certain interpretative processes take place, these are not being pursued in the register of Darstellung, that is as presentation, as that which “lies ahead” of the viewer (as the German verb *dar-stellen* makes apparent). The very interpretation that follows from the work of distortion (Entstellung) shall be conveyed in terms of Entstellung-processes.

Wortham thus draws attention to the fact that such an interpretation “must itself be conceived in terms of a process that is closer to Entstellung than Darstellung” (the latter

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73 Cf. Deleuze and his claim to replace interpretative register with experimentation. [Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 139].
Freud himself notes that the work of distortion hatches also part of the secondary elaboration. Freud inspect, “It is true that we distort [entstellen] dreams in attempting to reproduce them; here again we find at work the process that we have described as the secondary (and often misleading) elaboration of the dream by the agency of normal thought: But this distortion [Entstellung] is itself nothing but a part of the elaboration to which the dream-thoughts are regularly subjected as a result of the dream-censorship. [Freud: 5:514, In.: Weber: 1982: 65].

Dream-thoughts thus present a material that continuously undergoes changes. In the account of the dream-thoughts Freud instills a figurally remarkable comment. He characterises dream-thoughts, these distorted, malleable pieces, as ceaseless motions that, “branch out in all directions”. The manner or shape in which such a branching-out occurs is “into the netlike entanglement.”

Freud states, “The dream-thoughts to which interpretation leads are necessarily interminable and branch out in all directions into the netlike entanglement of our world of thought. Out of one of the denser places in this network, the dream-wish rises like a mushroom out of its mycelium.” [Freud: 2007: 133].

In Wortham’s understanding, this part forms “the navel of the dream, the place where...”
it straddles the unknown.”[Wortham 2007:74]. The entangled multi-directionality of the thoughts supports our argument of dream-thoughts as compressed heteroglossic pieces. The “denser places of this network” that Freud asserts, create analogy to the Lyotardian concept of thickness of discourse.79

As we had seen, Entstellung marks at least a double-movement. It works within the dreamwork scenario, and in extensio operates onto and toward poetic-figural level. According to Lyotard, through the work of desire (or Phantasie)80, which is a transgressive force, image becomes distorted (entstellt, travesti). Through this transgressive rupturing, depth arises, and as a result opens up “plastic sensual stretch.”

On the backdrop of such defined figural space Lyotard builds his poetic-pictorial space. Through the transgressive forces deployed in this space seeing ceases to be a discursive-reading, and can be inspected as sensual experience (sensible). Lyotard insists that in such a figural breaching we should not be talking about a work of distortion (travestissement) but a work of transgression. On the psychoanalytical interpretative level such a work of transgression can be detected when applied to poetic images. On the pictorial level, such a shift can be traced when Lyotard states that, after the Cezannian revolution, we cannot talk about modeling anymore. Instead, we should employ the term, “modulation.”

In our theory, transgression designates the activity that not only allows the viewer to enter beyond or within the Lyotardian thickness of the discourse, but also to enter transformative processes of both the viewer itself and the image. (Chapter 6.). Our theory will connect transgressive processes to those of individuation.

The third mechanism of dreamwork Freud characterizes as “dream's modes of

78 Simon Morgan Wortham, Gary Hall, p. 74.

79 Lyotard introduces the concept of thickness of discourse so as to construct the figural space.

80 The both concepts, that of desire and Phantasie, tend to overlap in the analytical figural conceptual work. Lyotard himself employs them with no strict distinction in meaning, “[...]in the imaginary activity itself. It is not the dream-content that fulfills desire, but the act of dreaming, of fantasizing, because the Phantasy is a transgression” [Lyotard: 1974: 241].”
representation.” Here Freud elaborates the dream-content distortion that he terms a squeezing effect. Such a squeezing distortion of the dream-material allows the pieces to behave as floating ice-floes that find themselves twisted around and drifting.  

Freud explains, “If the whole mass of these dream-thoughts then undergoes the squeezing effect of dream-work, in which the pieces are twisted around, broken up and thrust against one another, rather like drifting ice-floes, the question arises: what happens to the logical ties that had formed the structure hitherto? How are they represented in the dream - the ‘when, wherefore, just as, albeit either/or’, and all the other connecting words without which we cannot make sense what we are told?” [Freud: 2006:327-328]

Freud resumes his impact of either-or and comes to a result that is in direct correlation with the idea of rhizomatic, network-like structure. He records, “However, dream runs through these almost mutually exclusive possibilities and takes no exception to adding a fourth such solution from the dream-wish. [...] But where the narrator reproducing a dream, wishes to use an ‘either-or’ (‘it was either a garden or a room’ - that sort of thing), what happens in the dream-thoughts is not so much an alternative as an ‘and’, a simple following on. We generally use ‘either-or’ to describe a still resolvable character of vagueness about a dream-element.”[2006:119].

As Freud later demonstrates, dreamwork does not employ the either/or option. Freud argues that thoughts as they undergo compression emphasize the thought’s distinct

81 In another place Freud states that, “Dream-thoughts and dream-content lie before us like two representations of the same content in two different languages.”(Freud, 6 Dream-work, 2006:293). The famous Freud comparison of dream-content to hieroglyphic script has been a source of figural interpretations (see. D. N. Rodowick, 2001). However what has been chiefly failed to be mention was Freud’s demand for a language specific to the functioning of dream-thoughts. This means, a nondiscoursive rationale that would stand in contrast to the discoursive rationale. Not a conceptual consciousness but a language of, what Hamilton terms “plastic invasion of unconscious.” [Grant:2004 xv].

82 Freud further explains, “Dream-content is embedded, as it were, in a hieroglyphic script whose characters need to be translated one by one into the language of the dream-thoughts.” (SF, 6 Dream-work, 2006 p. 293).

ability for different consistencies. These malleable consistencies that can acquire the quality of drifting ice-floes undergo, in a space that knows no negation, nor the either/or separation as an alternative, a free-floating movement. (see: free-floating perception, Chapter 6).

Further Freud specifies the non-existent either-or separation within dreamwork: “the ‘either -or’ alternative is one that dream cannot express at all; it tends to absorb the two halves of the alternative into a single context, as if they enjoyed equal validity.

Such an energetic mobile behaviour of dream-pieces can be detected and demonstrated on the poetic-figural work. Lyotard’s figural analysis of Mallarmé’s, Un Coup de Dés attests to the compressive squeezing effect of dream-thoughts within the poetic-word formation. Mallarmé’s poetic image of Un Coup de Dés lays out an environment where the whole mass of dream-thoughts become “twisted around, broken up and thrust against one another.” [Freud: 2006:327-328].

The example that demonstrates the densification potential of Dichtung, as well as that awakens the free-floating perception, can be found in the poetic-visual images of e.e. cummings. The poetic work illustrates mobil energetic mise-en scènes where words, displayed and displaced in a mobile grid, reenact the poetic stasis. Such a poetic-visual display exhibits in part “representation in motion” Casetti: 2005:] At this juncture words behave as dispersed floating percepts. In such a compressed and yet dispersed poetic grid, a word torn out of the convoluted cobweb of poetic material can slip out as something to which we point to.

It is indeed in the Un Coup de Dés set-up, where the words pour down on a page in a flow resembling a random dice-throw. The words in displaced manner behave like “drifting ice-floes.” This poetic ordering that lacks any connecting links, nor punctuation, that knows no either/or, sparks off the floating perception of the viewer. The words thus floating, dislocated, ripple the page. As a result they open the thickness of discourse [Lyotard], the “denser places of this network.”[Freud: 2006]. And such a set-up allows them to harbour multivoicedness and solicit “a state(s) of continuous variation”[Deleuze/Guattari: 2009:97]. In consequence, they attain the approximative edges of the non-
discursive, non-articulable plane, and therefore can “straddle the unknown.” [Wortham 2007:74]. Both authors thus, through their poetic practices deploy play of compression that brings forth the malleable potential of the otherwise unified discursive practices.

On the cinematic level we encounter, in a different form, such a particularly cracked-open, poured-down space as well. We retrieve it as a space where speech no longer fulfills the role of a clear articulation, with each word visibly decodable. On the contrary, speech is to be fluidly compressed, indissolubly folded onto itself.

In silent film where lines are mouthed by actors, so as to assure coherence of image Epstein chooses to compress the words in a phrase. Such a newly acquired visual cohesion of the cinematic image creates a flow where cinematic image thus compressed finds itself not be decelerated by the actor’s pronunciation. Henceforth we find a special kind of compression, (*Verdichtung*), within a filmic example. French cineast Jean Epstein has used and imposed such a squeezing effect of words in directing silent film actors.

As the film theoretician Katie Kirtland reveals,

“As a director of silent film actors, Epstein developed a novel strategy that corresponds to the idea that the language of cinema should be exclusively visual. In an interview with Musidora conducted for the Cinémathèque Française in 1946, Gina Manès, who plays Marie in *Cœur fidèle*, recounts that in order to minimize the mouthing of words on the screen, Epstein would direct his actors to condense their lines,

“Thus, for example, when one had to say ‘Good day, madame, I am pleased to see you,’ he told us to say ‘day madame pleased see you.’” [Kirtland: 2012:109].

Kirtland continues: “With similar effect, in editing a sequence depicting a spoken line, Epstein would cut at the moment when the actor began to speak, insert the inter-title, which most likely had been designed as much for its visual properties as for its words, and then cut back to the actor just as the line was completed. “Thus the actor retained his natural expression and this prevented the flapping of useless jaws.”[Kirtland:

Thereafter, in such a technique, Epstein mediates new cinematic-poetic images. This image serves as a natural source for fluidified expression, through mutual adaptation and self-insertion of the truncated verbal and empowering visual aspect. Epstein scrambles the phonetic stasis of the silent film actors. Such an adjusted cinematic image “enhances the emotional intensity.” [Kirtland: 2012:104]. In his economy of the image, Epstein crafts new internal resonance of the image displayed. We can argue that he individuates the flow of the sequence, as well as actor’s gestural responsiveness. This editing technique allows Epstein to create new cinematic and expressive zones. This technique of scrambling the fluid form allows to access to thickness between the frames as if were, where new affects can slip in, float, unbound by the frame’s limits. The new cinematic enactment employed brings forth the adaptive internal resolutions of the image and as a result co-create new states of images.

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84 Kirtland states that such an editing technique accentuates the emotional impact as well as the photogenic effect, “The effect of this editing strategy is that interpersonal encounters, whether confrontational or amorous, are structured as a series of close-ups, thus enhancing the emotional intensity and photogenic potential.” [Kirtland: 2012:104].
2.2. Poetic Transgression II

As we had demonstrated, the prototypical figural theory is based on the psychoanalytical groundwork. In such a set-up, the energetic mechanisms of primary process arrangements are explored in conjunction with poetic-figural arrangements. The specific process of compression, displacement and dream modes of representation give rise to distinct procedural arrangements. Compression highlights the densification process. Displacement points to a complex concept of distortion (Entstellung), the dream modes reveal the squeezing effect, together with the absence of the either/or alternative. As a result, this allows dream-thoughts to acquire the ability to disperse in manner of drifting and floating ice-floes. These freed-up mobile dream-floes as they float they branch out into netlike entanglements. In such a set-up they can mediate new internal dream-formations.

As a result of the psychoanalytical groundwork, Lyotard builds the first draft of his figural theory on the (1.) figural-libidinal complicity and (2.) on a new sensible plasticity. Such a connivance and constitutional distortion of these complicities allowed Lyotard to explore the density and opacity underneath.

Lyotard examines,

“As we pursue the analysis we come up against a density, an opacity: the locus, I will assume, of the figural which deconstructs not only discourse but the figure, in as much as the figure is a recognizable image or a regular form. And underneath the figural: difference. Not just the trace, not just presence-absence, period, indifferently discourse or figure, but the primary process, the principle of disorder, the incitement to jouissance.” [Lyotard:1983: 334-335].85

Such a principle of disorder that lies underneath strengthens the connection between the figural and libidinal complicity. Lyotard scholar Iain Hamilton Grant reaffirms this statement,

“Freud’s elaboration of the ‘dream-work’, (...) provides Lyotard with an articulation of the connivance of the figural and the libidinal: the dreamwork (condensation, displacement, secondary revision and considerations of representability) distorts figural materials which are constitutionally more plastic, or so Freud argues, than ideational materials (words, signs and ideas).” [Grant:2004: xv].

This affirms that dreamwork mechanisms demonstrate the distortion of the poetic-figural set-ups, being out their plastic mobility and malleability. In the account of the figural project in *Discourse, figure*, Grant Hamilton pursues that there are two distinct organizations where one is the plastic arrangement of the figural unconscious and the other the conceptual conscious,

“In *Discourse, figure*, Lyotard draws out the implications of the figural unconscious’ plastic invasion into the realm of the conceptual conscious, the result of which invasion is not merely to demonstrate the inevitable confusion of the two realms, but to highlight difference in their respective organizations.” [Grant:2004 :xv].

Hamilton is right in the claim that Lyotard seeks to highlight and deconstruct the difference between conceptual conscious and figural unconscious for they serve him as a basal distinction upon which he builds his theory. He further describes,

“Whereas the conceptual relies on rigid opposition, the figural works differences: concepts, in other words, utilize negation (the ‘this’ and the ‘not-this’ in the language of *Libidinal economy*), isolating unit(ie)s as opposed entities, whereas figural difference, like the unconscious whose work it is, knows no negation.’[Hamilton: 2004, xv].

The vacillating connivance of the plastic disruptive differences exposes the discursive practices to negotiative and adaptive techniques. In the extended conceptual examination that we pursue and in relation to Gilbert Simondon’s theory Lyotard’s theoretical figural space can be defined as a mediator of auto- and alloplastic individuations.


Such a complicit vacillating connivance of disruptive differences can be observed on the example of seeing and reading modes. In Lyotard s figural theory seeing and reading are interactively negotiated within what Lyotard calls “figural space”.

The mutual imbrication, as presented on the level of figural space, fans out into complex interaction of ambiguously invested forces. Visual co-experience, especially in new immersive media demands of the viewer to be fully engaged in processes that encompass alloplastic and autoplastic negotiations. [Chapter 6].

Following Lyotard, the figural introduces the transgressive and uncontrollable potential of the image into discourse. For Lyotard, the space discourse carries within itself is inhabited by the primary process of thinking which brings out a specific “mode of functioning.” This primary processing is documented through dreamwork mechanisms. In psychoanalytic terminology defined by Freud, the primary space exists as a space that knows no negation (1923), and no difference. It shapes a space where either/or are co-present at one and the same time. It is a space of dream-work, a space of “production of fantasies”(Freud:1907), work of imagination [Phantasieren, 1908] that overturn discourse and figures, producing fis-course and di-gures. [Lyotard 1974].

As regards the secondary process arrangement Rycroft reflects as follows, We can thus assert that, “Secondary process thinking obeys the laws of grammar and formal logic, uses bound energy, and is governed by the reality principle.” [Rycroft :1995]. In other words “reduces the displeasure of instinctual tension by adaptive behaviour. (…)." [ Rycroft :1995]. Secondary revision is flattening out of the primary in-depth relief. Secondary Elaboration produces legible phrases, contrary to the scrambled “broken up, twisted and thrusted” words. The space where desire acts freely is manifest in primary relief. Here it becomes reduced in this case, so as to be articulable.

Rycroft explains Freud’s employment of terminology, “Freud believed the primary processes to be ontogenetically and phylogenetically earlier than the secondary processes - hence the terminology-and regarded them as inherently maladaptive, all ego development being secondary to their repression. (…)” Rycroft 1995.
However, Lyotard expands this concept of dreamwork with additional “works” that include figure-work (*travail de la figure*), work of the sensual (*travail du sensible*), the work of works of art (*travail de l’œuvre*), and what we call and shall employ as a working concept; work of transgression. The figure-work concept encapsulates works with three other figures: figure-image, figure-form and figure-matrix with figure-matrix subsuming the other three. This figure-matrix is put into direct correlation with the Freudian concept of death-drive. The work of the works of art will determine, later on, Lyotard’s concept of the sublime.\(^8^9\) The figural theory in this case, can be also understood as a quest for new sensibility that includes and searches for new expressivity and new subjectivity in image theories.\(^9^0\)

The figure-work that Lyotard lays out is demonstrated through a figural presence as well. In order to prove the figural presence, Lyotard follows Freud’s example, as drawn in the enigmatic script. In such a script he examines the occurrences of verbal-visual stages that undergo transformations.

In the first occurrence he is interested in the passage that occurs in a triply incomprehensible text and its transformation from one language to another. This at first triple incomprehension manifests the indwelling, underlying power of the figure-work, precisely figure-matrix. The text, Lyotard notes only “looks like the language”. Lyotard however does not discuss “writing” in this case; he talks about inscriptions as something that pierces into the discursive space.

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\(^9^0\) S. Freud, *Interpreting Dreams*, “Dream-Work, C,” (trans.) by Underwood, 2006, 332. SO as to demonstrate the copresence of either/or Freud alludes to the dream he himself had had the night preceding his father’s funeral, “You are requested to close your eyes” or “You are requested to close an eye”. The solution in representing both, Freud illustrates as follows:

| your                                           
| You are requested to close                      
| eye(s)                                         
| an                                             

\(^9^0\) Such a poetic set-up can remind us of Mallarmé’s dislocated word-formation of *Coup de dés*. In.: S. Freud, *Interpreting Dreams, Dream-Work, C*, translated by Underwood, 2006, 333.
For it is the discursive representation that carries within itself deceptive power. Lyotard records: “And it is in order to illustrate this deceptive function that he [Freud] cites the “enigmatic inscriptions” that he takes as an example from the newspaper that had regaled Bavarian and Austrian households for a century […]” [Lyotard:2013: 258].

Freud explains the functioning of the enigmatic script as follows,

“ If I look around for something with which to compare the final form assumed by dream as it appears after normal thought has made its contribution, I can think of nothing better than the enigmatic inscriptions with which the Fliegende Blätter has for so long entertained its readers. They are intended to make the reader believe that a certain sentence - for the sake of contrast, a sentence in dialect and as scurrilous as possible - is a Latin inscription. For this purpose, the letters contained in the words are torn out of their combination into syllables and arranged in a new order. Here and there a genuine Latin word appears; at other points we seem to see abbreviations of Latin words before us; and at still other points in the inscription we may allow ourselves to be deceived into overlooking the senselessness of isolated letters by parts of the inscription seeming to be defaced or showing lacunae.” [Freud :In: Lyotard:2011: 258].

We thus see that, the only way the reader can decode the enigma of the script is if he immerses into a new complicit mode of reading-seeing at once. Through such an appropriated double-stance, he can overcome the deceptive power of the discourse. Freud continues, “If we are to avoid being taken in by the joke, we must disregard everything that makes it seem like an inscription, look firmly at the letters, pay no attention to their ostensible arrangement, and so combine them into words belonging to our own mother tongue.” [Freud: In: Lyotard:2013: 258].

91 Lyotard attributes the work of secondary revision directly to the deception that is present in discourse,”Secondary revision is commensurate to that pseudein (to deceive, to cheat) which calls to mind what Plato said about painters and sophists, but which appears to be attributed by Freud in this instance to discourse itself. And it is in order to illustrate this deceptive function that he cites the “enigmatic inscriptions” that he takes as an example from the newspaper that had regaled Bavarian and Austrian households for a century, and of which, according to Lacan, he was “an avid reader.” [Lyotard 1974, translation by Lydon 2013: 258].
Therefore, as demonstrated, the example of Freud’s enigmatic script deals with a convoluted co-presence of discourse and figure. Within the script the two instances find themselves deformed enough yet not radically disruptive. The enigmatic variations of internal co-operation of discourse-figure can vary from a rebus, a pictorial deformation, to hypogram. All of these display the distinct execution of the textual-visual oscillation of meanings.

As regards the enigmatic script, the first transformation proves illusory finality of secondary revision. As such it thus uncovers the desire-depth of discursive space. It also proves the fact that what takes place here is not a mechanism of translation. Therefore the reader, instead of seeking wholesome finality is invited to enter into the decoding play and to create phonetic versions. Because it is only inscribed through an unexpected creation of versions that the reader can access the enigma in its full relief. Also enigmatic inscriptions display qualities of verbal-visual transformation that proceeds on various levels. According to Lyotard such a verbal-visual transformative interaction shows an “interesting play (jeu) of reading and seeing” [Lyotard: 2011:263]. The play illustrates the deceptive tactics and yet refers to the heterosemic capacities that can be uncovered through the potential presence of thickness of discourse.

So as to support his argument of thickness of discourse, Lyotard turns to the concept of hypogrammatic depth. In this case, Homer’s Illiad offers an example of a hypographed sentence. Hypographed sentence means, the syllables of the name Agamemnon are “disseminated throughout other words, so that the name is, so to speak, a subscript, hypographed, in that line.” [Lyotard: 2011: 263]. Syllables thus employed and arranged depict the malleability of the syntax. Yet, once puzzled together, the hypogram remains decoded and leaves no remainder and no space for free play of the reader-decoder. Therefore, as a decoded deictic-poetic phrase, it no longer represents an open form, but a finalised form, a form that closes in on itself.
Subsequently, Lyotard compares the figural interactions of enigmatic script in contrast to the hypogrammatic depth,

“Nonetheless what distinguishes our inscriptions from hypograms is yet again the switching of languages (although this is not essential); it is above all the fact that in the hypogram the manifest text contains repetitions, inversions, conversions of the syllables of the hidden name, whereas in secondary revision the space occupied by the manifest and latent texts coincides. As in a true anagram, the completed operation, in both directions, leaves no remainder.”[Lyotard:2011:263].

That means that even though the hypogram proves the presence of the thickness of the discourse, it does not challenge it. The form is completed and there is no remainder left. In contrast to this completed stasis, the enigmatic inscriptions engage “switching” of verbal and visual modes. Therefore the space is saturated with the manifest as well as latent texts that endure and provoke transformations. As concerns the decoding of hypograms, the reader remains in the mode of “reading” of the manifest text, analyzing inversions and conversions of syllables. This proves that the reader seeks, tests and tries out approximate combinations. Subsequently when successful he constructs a potentially new word formation. Yet in such a stance the reader does not engage in invention of new words, as in the case by poetic-visual set-ups by e.e. cummings. Nor does the reader arrest act of poetic imagination as opposed to intellectual rationale.

This shows that a singular engagement is not possible on the level of hypogrammatic depth. It is possible in framework of the enigmatic script for here the depth is opaque and engages “a transformation of the nature of the sign.” Lyotard accounts, “Hypogrammatic depth is of the order of resonance (assonance, consonance), and of harmonics: the line of the Iliad underlines the name of Agamemnon […]” [Lyotard: 2011:263]. Whereas, in the case of the inscription, a distinct register enters in play. Lyotard argues,

“But the depth of our inscription is opaque. It is not a graph, but a pseudo-graph, homophonic with the originating text, like Saussure’s hypogram, but at the expense of a double heterosemia. Transcribed from the phoneme to the letter so as to produce a

presumptive other meaning, it supposes the transformation of the nature of the sign and of the alleged signification.” [Lyotard:2011: 263]. In other words, this means this kind of an opaque depth concerns not a production of suppositional other meanings. This depth affects directly “the nature of the sign.”

However, Lyotard moves beyond these conceptual notions as they do not represent a figural example worth the practice. He finds an active figural instance on the level of poetic transgression. It is by William Shakespeare in the final scene of Hamlet where such a transgression occurs.

In this scene we come across a Freudian slip that stems from the invested primary space of the language. Moreover, the phrase employed, “mobled queen” returns, in its reiterated form as the other, the uncanny figural remainder that speaks from the depth of the unconscious overflow. On the poetic level the scrambled phrase of “mobled queen” demonstrates the presence of the dreamwork mechanisms. The example of the “mobled queen” presents for Lyotard a double poetic overthrow (renversement). For us, this clearly

93 We can conclude that the transcribed phoneme-letter site presupposes “transformation of the nature of the sign”. We saw a similar assertion as taken into account by the acinematic construction, See Chapter 1, Déotte 2010.

94 In the play, this phrase is being tossed among the dialogue participants. It skips from one speaker to the other. Not only is the phrase scrambled itself, it changes form, as it is presented in three distinct instances: as an unfinished phrase, a question-mark phrase and a quoted phrase.

“LORD POLONIUS
This is too long.
HAMLET
It shall to the barber's, with your beard. Prithee, say on: he's for a jig or a tale of bawdry, or he sleeps: say on: come to Hecuba.
First Player
'But who, O, who had seen the mobled queen--'
HAMLET
'The mobled queen?'
LORD POLONIUS
That's good; 'mobled queen' is good.” In W. Shakespeare, Hamlet, The Prince of Denmark, Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1994, See also Harold Bloom, The Western Canon of Civilization: The Books and Schools of Ages, Pac Macmillan, 1996, In Chapter on Shakespeare Bloom records Shakespeare’s capacity of overhearing. It can be argued that this very particularity of Shakespeare's writing is being echoed in the example of “mobled queen”.

"..."
The example of the poetic overthrow in the phrase as displaced in the Hamlet’s dialogue attests to the mechanisms of poetic transgression taking place. Bill Reading states that poetry serves Lyotard so as to demonstrate the figures at work. Reading remarks, “[…] poetry is for Lyotard the point at which the inevitable figurality of discourse, and discoursivity of figure, arises; where figure is to be found at work:” [Readings:1991:27]. In such a poetic-figural set-up, the transformation becomes inevitable. Figures are perceived, in their activated state, at work. This causes that language becomes out of joint, revealing its own mechanisms, precisely mechanisms of dreamwork.

As regards the Lyotardian figure-matrix, it corrodes the discursive coordinates. Not only does it corrode the discursive stasis, it dilates the thickness of discourse. It is in such a newly dilated space the figural space is being shaped. This forms the point of contact where primary space and secondary revision overlaps occur. Adolfo Fernando Zoïla evokes such a figural point of contact and terms it non-lieu de passage, “a spatial moment of transfusion.” [Fernandez-Zoïla: 2010: 119].

Beside the transformation of the nature of the sign, there is transformation of the whole discursive plane that arises. Example of such a discursive transformation can be found in Mallarmé’s and cumming’s poetic assemblages. Such an established free-mobility of poetic arrangement invites the presence of dream-processes to enter into play. These processes incite the reader, through adaptive interaction of both, the poetics and the dream-work, to sculpt his poetic image(s).

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Mallarmé, in Lyotard’s words, reveals a power at play that reaches precisely to the domain where the viewer’s eye is freed from the stasis of the reading mode. Mallarmé arrives, Lyotard notes, through his work to launch power to be seen. This power enables the viewer to emancipate himself from the discourse reading and enter the space of seeing. Therefore we can argue this mode empowers to experience visuality in nascent state.

Cumming’s poetic-visual site marks not a discursive plane, it creates nascent environment. His specific set-up transforms words into an arrangement that can be grasped as metastable image. In cumming’s arrangement words are conducted in a manner of floating bodies; singular yet belonging to the wholeness, connected through the disturbed equilibrium. This allows the word-formations to be favoured and exhibited in their different mobile states.

Cummings’ singularly posed words defy the discourse’s deictic space. Poetic-visual site shaped in such a manner, isolated yet connected, by the white spacing, temporarily brings forth a non-unifiable poetic image. Words-states fall out of their sentence-stasis, verse-stasis and ripple the whole poetic stasis. Words as states of floating plastic arrangement, behave like open form. In turn, they incite the set-up to behave like an emerging, individuating itself open-source image.

Such a poetic-visual site partly entails acinematic moments of immobility and extreme agitation at once. Words are not flattened out, they remain –if not create –their own emerging relief. Through such an assemblage, cummings treats words as singular intensities. As a result, words become carriers of “unbound energy.” They convey affect (spring is perhaps like a hand, 1925) and can display “surfacing of libido” of the poetic-figural work.

Cummings’ poetic-visual site invites and generates words-accidents. The white space leaves rooms for such accidental instances, that may have occurred during the writing process or are inserted intentionally (unfinished phrase, absence of punctuation, longer than usual white un-typed space).

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96 cummings publishes his poem in 1925, the same year as Freud’s publication of Negation article.

97 See Chapter 4 together with Baconian pictorial vocabulary.
The lack of punctuation unlocks and emancipates the authority of the reading eye. It authorizes the eye to see, to scan, jump from one line to the other, in other words to float. It authorizes the eye to treat - or rather thread- words as dream-content pieces which “break, thrust, twist” as articulated in Freud’s vocabulary. It invites the reader to treat the poetic construction pieces similar to Freud's drifting ice-floes. Such reading-drifting allows words to deploy their figural potential. In such a double reading-seeing practice the reader entertains, codes-decodes strata of text. The reader codes-decodes which means he binds and unbinds, unleashes free intensities, furthermore reconstructs strata of text.

All these mechanisms attest to the fact that cummings unbinds the language and makes it float, makes it adapt itself to the flows and combination that can emerge. The space thus paced with white non-typed space resembles Rothko's strokes in the “minute thrills which hem the contact regions.” In this case words-vowels function as charged “minute thrills.” Whereas the white space designs the subtly stretching relief of “the chromatic sands.” Language thus presented demonstrates metastable individuation-prone poetic malleability, displaying the widened chromatism palette. In such a chromatism states of “continuity of variations” can be formed.

The white non-punctuated non-bracketed space acquires also the role of Rothkian “contact regions”, abstractly pictorial zones, as those simmering with accident-prone, unbound energies, can be compared. Such a crafted space, behaves as a space where “unconscious can insert itself” [Miller: 2005:audio]. The space where unconscious inserts itself, creates space where diabolic powers can operate.

Such a reactivated mise en relief, forces the reader not only to read but experience Mallarmé’s demand, reiterated by Lyoatrd; the power to see. This power to see acquires a pertinent role in the individuating constructions and processes of self-negotiations of versions. [see Chapter 6].

In relation to novel poetic orderings the power to see, can be tied in, on the pictorial

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The concept of punctuation reveals a tactile potential of poetic texture. Punctuation, as that which paces the inner perceptive site, can be discussed from a content-forming angle. For an interesting take on tactile unconsciousness, consult Avril Blanchet, *L’inconscient tactile ou les échos de la chair dans l’image,Faculté des études supérieures et postdoctorales, Université de Montréal,Mars, 2011.* [pdf](https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1866/6141/Blanchet_Avril_2011_these.pdf?sequence=4)
level, to Lyotard’s demand of employing a specific vision. In Lyotard’s view, the power to see is launched, when we are in a painter’s stance. It is the attitude of when our eye can take into account the visual immensity ahead. This stanza Lyotard defines, in contrast to being seated (the reading mode), when, our horizon shrinks and thus limits the free mobility of the eye. The viewer can be fully engaged with an image, according to Lyotard, when he acquires the painter-stance. That is as if he was standing in front of an easel, as opposed to being seated. Only such a combined technique of both modes employed, seeing-reading mode, will allow the reader-viewer to enter Lyotard’s figural space, so he argues and engage in poetic image as open form. Through such perceptive acquisition the image-open form will be able to bring out the interaction with the reader.

Subsequently open-form arrangement points out to the quality of the poetic form that can arrest “a state continuity of variations”[Deleuze/Guatarri: 2009:97]. Once variations triggered, these variations incite creation of versions.

In connection with the aggramaticality, Deleuze/Guatarri examine that what exactly undergoes changes is the line of variation along which variables sprout. They explain, “Each time we draw a line of variation, the variables are of a particular nature (phonological, syntactical or grammatical, semantic, and so on), but the line itself is apertinent, asyntactic or agrammatical, asemantic. Agrammaticality, for example is no longer a contingent characteristic of speech opposed to the grammaticality of language; rather, it is the ideal characteristic of a line placing grammatical variables in a state of continuous variation. [2009:99].

Mallarmé’s, *Un Coup de dés*, and cummings poetic sites enable such variable, individuating “state(s) of continuous variation.”

Once the words, the drifting ice-floes, find themselves in these states of variations,

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99 Lyotard maintains in the introduction of his Discourse, figure and throughout the book that “This book is about localisation of the eye” [ ].
they open up to “their own widened chromatism.” [Deleuze/Guattari, 2009:98].

In relation to author’s style, Deleuze/Guatarri introduce a concept they term procedure of variation. [2009:97: 4]. They explain the procedure in the example of secret language. We can argue, in order to shape a style, the author uses a public language and puts it into a metastable state. That is, the author reaches into the states of the language and individuates some of them.

That means, the author destablizes the language yet this destabilisation does not predetermine that he creates an isolated subsystem within the public language. Rather, he activates variation lines that trigger distinct states of the language.[Deleuze/Guattari allege, “A secret language does not merely have a hidden cipher or code still operating by constants and forming a subsystem; it places the public language’s system of variables in a state of variation. It is crucial that language-within-language situates the public language into a “state of variation.”[Deleuze/Guattari :2009:97].

Following upon that, we can argue that the poetic-figural image thus offers its own “internal pragmatics of variation,” [D:G 2009: 98]. Through malleable states of language, states of variations, words acquire status of intensities or precisely “instantiations of intensities” [Lyotard: 1974]; in extreme immobility they arrest action, flicker above the text [par dessous de text Lyotard 1974].

Subsequently, such a state of variation allows the reader/viewer to bring out

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100 Deleuze/Guatarri define the author’s style as indeed a “language within language”;They maintain, “All languages, in the meantime, are in immanent continuous variation: neither synchrony nor diachrony, but asynchrony, chromaticism as a variable and continuous state of language. [Deleuze/Guattari: 2009:97].

101 Further they define the argument, “Because a style is not an individual psychological creation but an assemblage of enunciation, it unavoidably produces a language within language.” [D/G: 2009:97]. We can thus maintain, creation of another language-within-language can bring out the figural features of the system, thus activated. Deleuze/Guattari note, “… when one submits linguistic elements to a treatment producing continuous variation, when one introduces an internal pragmatic into language, one is necessarily led to treat nonlinguistic elements such as gestures and instruments in the same fashion as if two aspects of pragmatics joined on the same line of variation, in the same continuum.” [2009: 08]. For instance, “It's easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a different affair;” [2009: 98].
“versions” from the poetic-figural discourse [Borges:1932:135]. In relation to Borges’ theory of translation Andrew Hurley formulates the distinction between the definite and possible translation followingly,

“In “Versions of Homer,”[Las versiones homéricas, 1932], Borges makes it unmistakably clear that every translation is a “version” - not the translation of Homer (or any other author) but a translation, one in a never-ending series, at least an infinite possible series. The very idea of the (definitive) translation is misguided. Borges tells us there are only drafts, approximations – versions, as he insists on calling them.” [1998 : 135-136].

Hurley continues, “He chides us: “The concept of ‘definitive text’ is appealed to only by religion, or by weariness.”[Hurley: 1998: 136].

As Borges created his own line of variation within language, he argued that even translation, was a version of a text, one out of infinite possible series. We can thus argue that these series reflect internal pragmatics that lies at heart of poetic and image’s arrangements. The author as well as the viewer (1.) individuates states of images and (2.) conducts internal complicit approximations. This proves that there exists a link between the dream-work processes and a manner in which poetic image is constituted. This link, or rather a constant relinking, variable binding and unbinding, we call poetic transgression.

At this point we can summarise that, what Freud terms “production of phantasms” (1907) lies in close interrelation with what Lyotard explores in his figural concept, when calling for creation of “new substitutions”. The technique Lowess applies in his thorough analysis of Coleridge’s work indicates a practice that not only uncovers layers and work of the genuine imagination of Coleridge’s labour. Yet the very act of this decoding is involved in the process of “production of phantasms” and subsequently creation of new substitutions, series.

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105 It is pertinent to accentuate that not always and not all authors and reader can reach such a highly creative stage where the image communicates its own variables.
We have examined that for the dream content to be visible it has to struggle its way to the surface (*durchdringen*) so as to be applicable. The partial work of the poetic-figural transgression lies in detecting thickness of the discourse in poetic figurality. Such a transgression subsequently creates passages between the primary and secondary space and primary and secondary imagination. Such a passage creation, gives rise to acts of translation.  

This translation does not initiate *one* precise translation or definitive text. On the contrary the translation ought to be approached as an act of translating, enabling to produce what J.L. Borges (1932) calls *versions*, Lyotard calls “new substitutions”, (1974) and Simondon will call “new potentials” (1992).  

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108 Félix Guattari (1995) later terms the production of such new states of images *series*. 
3. Poetic-Figural Transgression on Cinematic Image

In this chapter we are going to examine the application of the poetic-figural transgression on cinematic image. As we had seen in Chapter 2, Philippe Dubois’ rehabilitation of Lyotard’s concept aims to ground the activity of figuration by relating it to representation and figurativeness. In Dubois’ understanding, Figural becomes the unspeakable Other that arises in and through an image, unbarring the remaining space. Such a remaining space within image, that waits to be disturbed, Dubois generally terms the virtual signified. As we had examined this disturbed variable space is present in internal interaction between phonetic, poetic scripts.

The theory of figural inscriptions demonstrates and questions malleable interactions of letter and line, comparing them to the modes of reading and seeing. We can see this in the example of inter-titles as used in the silent era, yet even beyond (contemporary advertising techniques).

In the framework of his theory, Dubois coins the term, figural writing, and hopes to establish an approach to inter-titles in contrast to traditional theories. Such an approach in Dubois’ words, “will show itself more sensible to the organicity of the matters, to the fluidity of spaces, to modulations of forms and the formless (l’informe), to the effects (poetic, ironic, ludic, lyric etc) [...] to the disarticulation of meaning [...]” [Dubois: 1999: 248]. He continues, “The text-images of figural writing that thus follow are less an affair of the eye that reads but an affair of the eye that grazes (l’oeil qui broute) so as to take again the famous expression of Paul Klee concerning the look (le regard) that the board-signs (tableaux-signes) arouse.” [Dubois: 1999: 248].

109 [Dubois :2004].
110 We opt to translate the French verb brouter as to graze with semantic emphasis on the second meaning, that is to touch, touch lightly, brush, brush against, rub lightly, shave (www.thefreedictionary.com). For it is that dimension that Lyotard himself focuses on when he discusses the differences between reading and seeing, applying the eye-metaphors. Subsequently, the referential frame of the activities of the eye resurface by Deleuze’s reframing of the figural in regard to the pictorial. See: Logic of Sensation, 1981.
We argue that the examples of figural writing, or rather figural inscriptions, are represented in types of film titles. In traditional film theory there are three kinds of titles in film:

1. An *inter-title* is located between two film frames.

2. An *intra-title* is inlaid within a single frame and belongs to the world of fiction: it is any text that appears within the film, that both the character and spectator can read — a letter for instance.

In his figural rationale to image, Dubois introduces a third kind of title:

3. An *ontitle (surtitre)* appears on the film frame, revealing a subjective world of the character. A comics bubble might be an example.

Dubois specifies, “The *ontitle* emanates from the diegesis but it is a text written on the image inaccessible in its material and its form to the protagonists of the story. Neither really inside, nor outside, neither a *(really)* strange body, nor a material *(fully)* incorporated in the diegetic universe, the ontitle is an inquisitive insertion, an in-between space [*entre-deux*], a genuine floating body [*le corps flottant*] in the indeterminate zone, somewhere in front of the image, at the same time inside and above.” [Dubois: 1999: 252].

What Dubois describes and conceptually departs from is characteristic of Lyotardian space.111 In Dubois’ theory, the ontitle as featured, remains placed in the representative axis. This means the ontitle is readable. It harbours communication on both the verbal and visual register. Despite its ambivalent or rather doubled ontological status as “nor really outside, neither inside,” the ontitle remains to be inscribed into the diegetic universe of the filmic image. As such it promotes solid visual basis. Dubois’ ontitle does not establish an image on its own *stricto sensu*. Despite the fact that it may seem to be a technically innovative tool, such a represented filmic title remains an accessory tool to represent the filmic speech by additional means. Although it presents a visually appealing inscription into the filmic fabric, the ontitle, as such, does not challenge the perceptive habits of neither the protagonist nor the viewer.

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111 Dubois does not explicitly quote Lyotard, nor Deleuze, yet his vocabulary and conceptual background directly reflect and draw upon this French tradition.
F.W. Murnau’s *Faust: eine deutsche Volkssage* (1926) exhibits however yet another kind of figural inscription. The film sequence that we term *Reading of the Contract* represents a process where a diegetically-based, solid narrative texture (the physical contract), becomes a moving, changing inter-title, undergoing physical and referential deformations. Such a singular type of intertitle transforms into unreadable word formations. The previously stable contract-words *power and glory* mould into a constantly moving abstract fog-painted lines that cut the static black background horizontally and vertically.

In contrast to Dubois’s ontitle, Murnau’s letter-line figural inscription is (1.) seen and thus accessible by both the protagonist and viewer (2.) progressively extends into poetic-pictorial transgression and (3.) establishes a singular filmic image.

Such a type of spatial title we call *integral title.* Integral title demonstrates a state of figural inscriptive imbrication as woven into the filmic fabric. This internal letter-line interaction (1.) is initiated within the filmic frame (2.) passes through the frame and moves freely within frame. (3.) Subsequently it becomes an independent visual image. The integral title erupts from something given, figuring it in return and setting the image into motion. It is accompanied by transitional images, which may be a part of it (it can incorporate them or result in them). It is also integral in the sense that it is *intact* (*in-tactus*, non-touched); the characters may see it but cannot touch it, therefore it escapes their control.

As regards the five types of title, subtitle, inter-title, intra-title, ontitle James Elkins asserts that all of these present interruptions to the visual. The integral title presents however a more complex interruption to the cinematic discourse for it yields disruption of the visual. Such a radical disruption can even “halt the even flow of meaning,” henceforth challenge the spectator’s narrative stability. In such a case, the viewer is forced to invent new perceptive tracks. [Elkins:2012: 40].

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Elkins examines the role of these perceptive interruptions, “All five of these are interruptions, but the first four are interruptions of writing into the visual. The fifth is also visual, so it is a more complex form of interruption, one Lyotard would probably have enjoyed. Either way, and in whatever form, the figural disturbs, slows, or halts the even flow of meaning that is so often the norm on discourse, from film to the writing of visual studies. Interruption in this sense isn’t an exotic theoretical concept. It is fundamental, for example, to the functioning of advertising.” [Elkins :2012: 40].114

The figurative reference of the filmic intertitles that function as interruptions to the visual can be traced to rebus. In the framework of the verbal-visual figurations, Lyotard examines the example of rebus, which provides evidence of constant mobility between text and image. Rebus can be characterised as pictorial quality that demonstrates the transgressive power of the alphabetized-and-pictorial order. Rebus is featured as type of pictorial punning that demands interpreting gesture of the floating eye, or the eye that grazes, as Dubois puts it. It embodies that strange simultaneity of both regimes, reading and seeing at the same time, that allows to free up forces of transgression and direct

The co-presence and subsequent vacillation of both regimes participates on the relief-related, atopic quality of the spatiality that awaits to be unraveled. Such a defined act of vacillation marks an unlocking of the thickness of the otherwise-flattened discursive figurations. In the relief-open vacillating discourse set-up the otherwise legible speech can “undo itself” [Lyotard 1974: 60], open the passages where the “unresolvable and ongoing desires” [Hall :2007: 74] can momentarily resurface and thus cause an overspill of subconscious [Kirtland 2012:104]. It is henceforth here, through such a crack of violent overspill, that new fresh series of states of images can be produced.

Within his philosophical framework Lyotard grasps the cohabitation of speech and anti-speech which he puts into implicit correlation with the coalescence of reading and seeing. Such an assertion can be further extrapolated from the Deleuze/Guattari’s

Lyotard would argue that this eye that moves, awakens the eye that also momentarily listens. For it seizes yet another quality than the obvious reading-seeing. Lyotard elaborates an argument in the beginning of Discourse, figure that is in direct correlation with Paul Claudel’s journey to Japan and his visual enlightenment. Lyotard criticizes Claudel’s spiritually-aesthetic epiphany, ascribing it to the occidental visual thinking that still seeks alignment of the eye and representation, and thus remains in the Cartesian framework, or in Albertian terms, within construzione legittima. In his essay Art Poétique, (1941, Paris) Claudel describes the perceptive shift he has experienced upon walking in the forests in the Japanese landscape, from Nikko to Chuzenji. “Once, in Japan, as I was climbing from Nikko to Chuzenji, I saw the green of a maple fulfill the harmony offered by a pine, the two trees being juxtaposed, though at a great distance, by the angle of my glance.” He continues, “The present pages are a commentary on that forest text, the arborescent formulation, by way of June, of a new Poetic Art of the Universe, a new Logic.” Larissa Bibbee, in her article The Art of Claudel’s l’Art poétique, remarks that, in Claudel’s perceptive stance “The human observer thus becomes the cause of the conglomeration and organization of the elements of the tableau: although God "programs" things to come together, by themselves they only form an unfinished composition which the human observer must "complete" by serving as the organizing nexus or central point of convergence where all lines and angles of the universe can come together.” (Bibbee: 2005, p.11). Lyotard opens his figural argument with Claudel’s example and thus departs on a quest to defend the free space for the “eye that desires” and a new vision. Lyotard argues; “This book is a defence of the eye, its localisation.” [1974:. 11 Lyotard].


116 correct phrase reads: “subconscious overspill”
standpoint, as examined in Chapter 2. As anti-speech feeds on speech. This sometimes complicit cohabitation of speech and anti-speech can cause a creation of a secret language within publicly shared language. Such a case is apparent in crafting author’s own style where the speech and anti-speech negotiate language’s stasis. This secret language can operate as actively disruptive and innovative challenge within that peculiar co-presence of language within language set-up. Such a language-within-language situates the public language into a “state of variation” [Deleuze/Guattari 2009:97]. It is within the register of “anti-speech, seeing, the continuity and difference”, it is in the framework of this extra-locution, where we find mobility and where the stasis of image opens itself to metastasis.

In conjunction with rebus, Lyotard clarifies, “One can track the recesses of speech as it undoes itself, on its way toward anti-speech or the rebus. It can be followed because there is anti-speech in speech, seeing in saying, continuity in the articulated, difference even in opposition.” [Lyotard: 2011: 59].

Lyotard carries on specifying the mobility of such a set-up, “One can follow them and one has to follow them because it is exactly this mobility that, (once) introduced into the order of the invariant divergences (écartements), can unseal them: ironic contribution of Eros-death to Eros-Logos.” [Lyotard: 1974:60].

We can thus argue that this speech can be invariably diverted along the line of activated variation. Figural inscriptions demonstrate the example of such undone speech. That means the inscriptions display the indwelling force of the seeing in the discourse. They deploy, following Lyotard, the (positive) difference in opposition, bring forth the Eros-Thanatos in the Eros-Logos. Figural inscriptions exhibit the mobility of “the invariant divergences” of reading-seeing modes and launch the activity of unsealed non-punctuated desire. Figural inscription mobilise different layers of cinematic textures and yield “powerful forms of subversion on textual space.” [Lyotard: 2011: 245]. As Lyotard it is indeed rebus that functions as the complicit subversion on the textual space.

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117 We term metastasis as the stasis that dwells within metastable systems. It is a state of the highest instability, holding within itself the vast repository of possible states of images, individuations, new fresh series. For metastability, consult: Chapter 6.

118 Lydon’s translation

Lyotard also notes that rebus is close to the dream. He pursues, “To gain a clearer view of the complexity of the articulation in question, I propose to analyze the ways in which the rebus operates. Close to the dream, the rebus imposes powerful forms of subversion on textual space.” [Lyotard: 2011: 245].

Murnau’s integral title represents the instance of such coalescence of poetic-pictorial forces. The integral title, this mobile image, forms a transgressive transition. The integral title is at once entering and un-writing the pact-writing, yet it remains exterior to it. Mobilizing the visual event that disrupts the so far clean cinematic flow, such a transition conceives a “non-lieu of passage” [Fernandez-Zoïla: 2010: 119]. This atopic, relief-bound non-lieu de passage enables to release the otherwise inaccessible space of desire. Thereafter, this integrally mobile title-image reveals the inherent mobility and conceptual untenability of the traditional letter-line opposition.

In the cinematic narrative framework the visual impact of the integral title functions as “unique event” [Gunning 1990: 384]. The empowering effect of this singular event is reinforced by Murnau visually through the employment of light. Murnau employs light in a manner of expressionist or more adequately fauvist fashion. Through a light-stroke that spreads, horizontally, in fauvist flair, through the contract, the visual attraction-bound effects are mobilized.

This means the light becomes in this case the coloring intensity that reigns the

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120 Translation Mary Lydon 2011, 29.

121 As regards the relation and shared characteristic features of Lyotard’s figural and the concept of “unwriting”, see Michel Sicard, Désécritures, [2010: 187].

122 This traditionally established imposition finds itself in this case reinforced by the deictic-discursive imposition that is in this case fluidified.
image, and owing to the light technique, grows into an abstract image.¹²³

In Murnau’s case integral title comes forth from the filmic diegesis. That means the words pursue ontological reference in the pact as drafted by Mephistopheles. However, once the two significant words are separated by a peculiar act unknown and inaccessible to neither the viewers nor the characters, they establish a novel cinematic environment on their own. The coupled words, taken out of the contract, Macht und Herrlichkeit, function as “offshoots (rejetons) of desire” [Lyotard 1974], as that which the text expels. Therefore through the figure-work, they wield on the side of death-drive and the figure-matrix.

As we observe in the example of inter-titles Faustian primary process-desire begins to spill itself from the borders of the contract. The desire spills or rather seeing that is desiring ¹²⁴ presents the desiring in its “unresolvable and ongoing” moments that are bound to “branch into all direction.” [Hall: 2007: 74]. As Gary Hall affirms in connection with dream-thoughts, “Dream-thoughts, as the entstellte “fulfillment” of conflictual and complicit hence unresolvable and ongoing desires, therefore unavoidably branch out in all directions.” [Hall: 2007: 74].¹²⁵

In conjunction with such distorted desire set-up, from the angle of the manifest and uncovered text, Lyotard maintains, “By this simple placing of the inscription, we pass from linguistic space, that of reading, where one hears, to visual space, that of painting, where one looks. The eye no longer listens, it desires. Now the manifest text does not deceive, does not allow itself to be taken for another, except in the exact measure that one looks at it without hearing it. What is inscribed is a kind of non-writing; the space in which it moves is

¹²³ The same year as Murnau’s premier of Faust in Berlin, Vasily Kandinsky publishes Punkt, Linie zur Fläche. Beitrag zur Analyse der malerischen Elemente (Point and line to plane. Contribution to the analysis of the pictorial elements, 1926). Murnau, with his light technique in the integral title, experiments with the precise link between the light-points and lines to(ward) the plastic-visual planes, as he conjures up the seeing-reading collusions. Among other concepts, Kandinsky’s aim was to “move beyond realistic representation,” which in this case seems to resound with Murnau’s abstract technique. For synthetic overview of the influences of German Expressionism and Der Blaue Reiter group, see: http://www.moma.org/explore/collection/ge/chronology.


that of an object, not a text. An object’s space is to be seen, not read. And this seeing is desiring.” [Lyotard: 1974:267].

In the film sequence, *Reading of the Contract*, and precisely in the establishing of integral title’s reading-floating, we are presented with an animated conflict of desires. In this scene Faust the reader-scanner, remains in a state of “emotional shock” [Eisenstein: 1923]. The interruption of such peculiar reading-decoding also presents an “aggressive moment”.

Subsequently Faust finds himself confronted with the new visual event where unconscious overspills, and he finds himself in “incapacity to react” [Didi-Huberman: 2001: 636]. While the mobilized whirlwind of both conflictual desires paralyses Faust (as does the frozen desire of the porter in Murnau’s earlier film, *The Last Laugh*, 1924), it also places him in a state of both “ alertness and intensification” at once: self-consuming desire on the one hand, Dionysian state on the other.

The new plastic adaptive mobility comes forth also owing to the peculiar set-up of Faustian desires that guide his reading-seeing. As we had mentioned earlier, the presence of speech and anti-speech anticipate the conflict of “ unresolvable and ongoing desires” [Hall: 2007: 74]. In this case the conflict interferes in strong interaction with Eros-Thanatos drive. The distortion of the seeing reinforces such interaction of conflictual desires. The Faustian desire is inscribed into the integral title, into the *seeing-floating*, and as such it engages with the newly undone speech. Perhaps, we could argue that such “offshoots of desire” [Lyotard 1974:], lie at the core of an undone speech, releasing the new states of images, as that which is being purged out from the textual and proving the visual. In Faust’s case, seeing-desiring, this self-immersive act of conflictual desires causes the desire to be *heautontimoroumenos*, self-consuming. In such a set-up created by Mephistopheles’ proposition, the contract resurfaces the alluring primary offshoots of desires. In this setup of a phantasy, Faust embodies what the Greeks called *heautontimoroumenos*, the man who tortures himself. In an eponymous poem, Charles Baudelaire describes the man who

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tortures himself, throughout the presence of the animated conflictual desires.\textsuperscript{127}

In relation to the Dionysian state Didi-Huberman alleges, “In the Dionysian state [. . .] the entire emotional system is alerted and intensified: so that it discharges all its powers of representation, imitation, transfiguration, metamorphosis - every kind of mimicry and play-acting- conjointly. The essential thing remains the facility of the metamorphosis, the incapacity not to react.” [Didi-Huberman: 2001: 636].\textsuperscript{128}

Such a type of integral title, dynamic and malleable in its nature, demonstrates collision of text and film image. Thereafter, this disruptive and dis-localising complicit collision foments the eye to place itself in the mode of reading-seeing, or seeing-floating, as we argue. This challenges both the characters and viewers to adopt the floating perception. This perception shapes the viewer’s vacillating eye that browses through the transgressive stages of the image. Here the viewer henceforth witnesses new images to be shaped. The new filmic image thus crafted becomes the core of the cinema of attraction.

As we have argued, Murnau’s example of \textit{Faust: eine deutsche Volkssage} (1926) introduces poetic-pictorial transgression. This poetic-pictorial transgression represented on

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\textsuperscript{127} Baudelaire’s poem articulates the conflictual passages in following verses:
\textquote{I am the direful looking glass
Which flashes her reflection back.}
\textquote{I am the wound, the knives that strike,
The blows that crush, the head that reels,}
\textquote{I am wrenched limbs and grinding wheels,
Victim and hangman, as you like!}
\textquote{Vampire of my own heart, meanwhile,
A derelict, I am of those}
\textquote{Doomed to eternal laughter's throes,
Yet powerless to frame a smile!”}\textsuperscript{127}
\end{flushleft}


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the innovative example of integral title demonstrates the instance of “cinema of attraction.” Tom Gunning states that cinema of attractions, “directly solicits spectator attention, inciting visual curiosity, and supplying pleasure through an exciting spectacle - a unique event” [Gunning 2006 :384].

Gunning further observes that, “The attraction to be displayed may also be of a cinematic nature, such as the early close-ups […], or trick films in which a cinematic manipulation (slow motion, reverse motion, substitution, multiple exposure) provides the film’s novelty […]. [Gunning: 2006 : 384 ].

Gunning argues accordingly: “Theatrical display dominates over narrative absorption, emphasizing the direct stimulation of shock or surprise at the expense of unfolding a story or creating a diegetic universe. The cinema of attractions expended little energy creating characters with psychological motivations or individual personality. Making use of both fictional and non-fictional attractions, its energy moves outward an acknowledged spectator rather than inward towards the character-based situations essential to classical narrative.” [Gunning: 2006:384].

This statement holds true for Murnau’s case. In our specific film sequence the energy moves outward of the diegetic framework as a result of which it creates an image of its own. This singular integral event functions so as to provoke “direct stimulation of shock.” However, in Murnau’s case, such an effect does not appear “at the expense of unfolding the story.” Despite the fact that it momentarily disrupts the narrative stasis and causes a distinct dissipation, such an irruption provides an extra-depth. Energy is shifted outwards yet only so as to reinstate itself underminingly and subliminally in the narrative framework.


130 The term itself was taken from S.M. Eisenstein’s analysis when he was looking for a model in theatre [Eisenstein, How I became a Film director, Montage of Attractions: 1923]. Gunning further glosses on, “In his search for the ‘unit of impression’ of theatrical art, the foundation of an analysis which would undermine realistic representational theatre, Eisenstein hit upon the term “attraction”. An attraction aggressively subjected the spectator to ‘sensual or psychological impact.’ According to Eisenstein, theatre should consist of montage of such attractions, creating a relation to the spectator entirely different from his absorption in “illusory” [depictions].” See: Tom Gunning, The Cinema of Attraction[s]: Early Film, Its Spectator and the Avant-garde, In.: The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded, (ed.)Wanda Strauven, Amsterdam university Press, 2006.
In the *Reading the Contract* film sequence we witness speech undoing the conflict of self-consuming desires that torture Faust’s deciphering of the integral figural title. The outwardly propelled seeing-desiring act of attraction causes in turn a monstration. Through such a unique event Faust is allowed the Mallarmean “power to see” or Tournier’s force of “to make see.” As Fernand Leger pointed out, “The unique power of cinema lied in a ‘matter of making images seen.’”

In Murnau’s case we are presented with cinema of attraction together with expressionism. Frederic Levine argues that expressionism had for its purpose to present *collective desire* more precisely “to reenter the world of unconscious consciousness.” Levine thus shows that Murnau’s visually expressive technique serves to access and render visible the primary process-desires. Levine clarifies, “The ultimate goal of Expressionism was literally to ‘lose its own mind,’ ‘to seek an identification with forms of precognitive existence as a manifestation of its collective desire to reenter the world of ‘unconscious consciousness,’ the world in which all life proceeds on the most primitive, the most

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131 In his novel *Les Météores* (1975), anticipatingly translated as *The Twins*, Michel Tournier, plays upon a latent, derived, meaning of monstrum, “And first of all, what is a monster? The etymology reserves us already slightly disconcerting surprise. Monster comes from to show/to point to. Monster is that which one shows-by finger in the fairies etc. And therefore more a person is monstrous, more he ought to be exhibited.” [In.: Michel Tournier, *Les météores*, Paris, Gallimard 1975, p.14]. With reference to Tournier’s employment of rather inventive etymological examination, Marishka Koopman-Thurlings, develops the notion of such defined concept further, “The word, *monstre* (monstre in Fr, TN) has for its origin *monstrum* in Latin, whose primitive meaning is presage, a good omen. The Latin substantive is first of all associated with the verb *monere* (to put something under attention of somebody) but one can possibly bring it closer to the verb *monstrare* (to show). Suggesting a deepened etymological knowledge of the term, Tournier does but pick up the most superficial origin, which even every reader possessing the elementary knowledge of Latin can discover. The French verb, in accordance with its Latin etymology, signifies just as well “faire voir” as “show, indicate (*désigner*)”, but Tournier delights in highlighting the second meaning, the more amusing one than the first one.” [Marishka Koopman-Thurlings, *Vers un autre fantastique: Etude de l’affabulation dans l’oeuvre de Michel Tournier*, Editions Rodopi B.V. Amsterdam - Atlanta 1995, p. 185, my translation]. Koopman-Thurlings terms the second meaning “amusing”. Yet she omits to grasp that is both terms that allow the rendering-visible act to come to life.

132 Fernand Leger, quoted in [Gunning 1986, 1990].
instinctual of levels.” [Levine: 1979: 3].

The Expressionist visual poetics thus configured, as we see underscores the dynamic of “the most primitive, the most instinctual of levels.” Therefore it is at the level of “precognitive existence” where the Faustian chaos can instil itself and alternatively cause an overflow [Warburg 2001: 626]. In such defined precognitive state we encounter this state in the form of “it” (es), and not yet in the version of the first person singular, of I (Ich). The collective precognitive desire lies in the “es” which becomes transformed into a singularly individualized imprint of Faustian desire. Such a conveyed concept of desire presents “a psychic drama” for the subject, where the constraining desires remain intact.” Later, the formation of individual however has to proceed through such Warburgian chaos-overflow. This means the uncanny chaos, the complicit and conflictual transaction of drives become, somewhat integral to the individual itself.

Didi-Huberman describes, “The omnipresent themes of Warburg's last years were: the ‘combat with the monster’ (Kampf mit dem Monstrum) in ourselves, the ‘psychic drama’ (Seelendrama) of culture as a whole, the ‘complex and dialectical’(Complex und Dialektik) knot of the subject with this mysterious Monstrum, defined in 1927, as the ‘original causal form' (Urkausalitätform). To Warburg's mind, the fundamental and 'uncanny duality' (unheimliche Doppelheit) of all cultural facts was as follows: the logic they set

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134 Cf. Sigmund Freud’s phrase “Wo es war, soll Ich werden”. The term of id (das Es, lit. "the it") Freud borrowed term from Georg Groddeck's The book of the it. New York : International Universities Press, 1976. (Original title: Das Buch vom Es). (1923). Groddeck defines it thus: “I hold the view that man is animated by the Unknown, that there is within him an "Es," an "It," some wondrous force which directs both what he himself does, and what happens to him. The affirmation "I live" is only conditionally correct, it expresses only a small and superficial part of the fundamental principle, "Man is lived by the It." [Groddeck, 1923/1961, p. 11]. Doug Davis at Haverford explains the concept as follows: “The notion that we experience as other, as it rather than I, our own deepest sexual and aggressive motives -- and their linkage to memory images, to the flow of speech and action, and to the general tone of our personality -- is at the very center of Freud's psychology. His own best discussion of these matters is in the 1933 New Introductory lectures on Psychoanalysis, where Freud sums up the goal of therapy -- and indeed of all healthy personality development -- with the evocative epigram, "Where id was, there shall ego be" (Wo Es war, soll Ich werden, literally "Where it was, I shall come to be").” http://www.haverford.edu/psych/ddavis/p109g/fgloss.html
allows the chaos they combat to overflow; the beauty they invent lets the horror they repress burst through; the freedom they promote leaves the constraining drives they try to break intact.\textsuperscript{135} Warburg liked to repeat the adage Per monstra ad astra (to which Freud's Wo es war, soll Ich werden seems to offer a variant):[ ...]” [Didi-Huberman: 2001:626].\textsuperscript{136}

In Murnau’s Reading of the Contract scene, the moving inscription shows the spectator what Mephistopheles wants Faust to see - the confluent knot power and glory.\textsuperscript{137} The integral title therefore also functions as “an operator of subjectivity.” [Dubois 1999, 258].

In the framework of Dubois’ \textit{figural writing} concepts, the filmic titles do not radically alter their shape or meaning. Nor do the titles become illegible or grow to purely abstract visuals in motion. Murnau on the other hand experiments with the visual poetics of the filmic title texts and conjures up singular poetic-pictorial aesthetics. Murnau anchors into his filmic fabric the figural’s “always singular and heteromorph imprint (empreinte) of the desire.” [Durafour 2013 : 414].

Murnau’s innovative, almost acinematic, aesthetics exposes possible states of image. Such displayed states of the image demonstrate features of video-states.\textsuperscript{138} In addition, Murnau shows the significantly fragile equilibrium of the image and exploits its stasis. Equally, Murnau experiments with the seeing-reading modes that challenge the perception of the main characters and viewers, ultimately affecting their individuation.

In \textit{Faust} (1926), it was the main character Faust who attempted to shape a meaningful layer from the moulding pact.


\textsuperscript{137} Faust is seduced by the light-attraction of this coupled word-formation of power and glory. This reflects the collapsing and conflictual desire process in the pursuit of which he sacrifices love. However, at the end he awakens up to his real desire.

In *The Last Laugh (Der Letzte Mann, 1924)*, what we term the *Dismissal Letter* film sequence, it is the aging bellboy, again the main character, who is confronted with novel visual images and subsequently challenged by his novel perception. In the scene the bellboy is handed the dismissal contract, he begins to immerse into reading it incredulously. In this case, the typed words undergo various changes; (1.) in shape: they zoom out, acquiring the length of the whole screen; (2.) in texture: their sharp contours blur and progressively fade out into illegible shapes; (3.) in speed: from a slow-paced reading, the reading-pacing becomes compressed and accelerated. Such a combination of altering speeds demands the browsing eye to adapt rapidly to each state of the image.

The *Dismissal Letter* film sequence presents the event in which a bellboy’s desire, contrary to the Faustian desire, remains unfulfilled, rejected. The contract is also formed into a narrative scene -displayed within the text- that clearly and violently presents direct repercussion of the typed contract. In contrast to Murnau’s 1926 aesthetics, in this case, the desire is frozen. Reading-seeing becomes physically unbearable, for it materialises the act of being fired for the bellboy. The viewer witnesses the physical reading where the bellboy’s eye becomes physically absorbed into the seeing-scanning. In turn it alters the spaces of letters. The, at first, formal letter-alteration transforms itself into a perceptive dissipation of such a mobile image that overtakes the screen-size. The attempt to make sense of the event of being fired, thus results in vertiginous reading-floating that overpowers the perception.

The reader’s and viewer’s eye grow into the page-screen and partake on a construction of distinct set of states of the image. Such a mobilized page allows the bellboy to enter beyond the representation’s textual stasis.

In contrast to *Faust*, in this case Murnau does not create a separate film sequence, so as to establish a new type of image. Instead, Murnau opts to insert a whole new video-like film sequence inside of the already passing film shot. The contract that we read, and that deforms in front of our eyes, remains to be the narrative coordinate backbone into which a new short video-sequence slips into.

In addition we observe that the video-sequence is introduced through an act of a small vignette that embarks on expanding the middle of the text. This white-encircled
vignette opens up a new spatiality. It is in this video-bubble, still conjointly placed onto the contract, where a short video appears, as if subversively founding the visual explanation to the vertiginous reading-seeing.\(^{139}\) This video-sequence within the textuality manifests again inscriptions being unsealed, a speech undoing itself. The sequence demonstrates not only the violent unbolting of a video-visuality within cinematic textuality, it shows their intermedial interaction, and released self-reflexivity, that moves inward as well as outward.\(^{140}\)

As regards the cinematic image, Lyotard’s demand of the work of the sensible, or even Lyotard’s interpretation of figural as the work of the sensible - the unbolting of the animated process-desires, the tactile reading-floating - finds its conceptual echo in Epstein’s cinematic theory. Epstein formulates his demand, in this case specifically yet not exclusively for film, in what he calls “sensible demand.” Such a demand is directed to the image so as to assure that the image be purely cinematic. He coins the term of photogeny. [Epstein: 1926].\(^{141}\) Epstein notes that photogeny stands for the “emotional potential” of the image. Morin, when pinning down the concept of photogeny calls it cinema’s “awareness” (prise de conscience). [Morin: 1956].\(^{142}\) Morin adds that such a potential is determined as self-recognizing force, form of acknowledging image’s own power. [Morin: 1958].\(^{143}\)

Film theoretician Emily Apter comments on Morin’s cinema’s awareness, and defines it as “the moment when it [cinema] recognizes its own powers of visual enthrallment.” [Apter: 1999:180-181]. Apter enlarges the sensible demand by furthering it

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\(^{139}\) The video-image in *The Last Laugh* depicts a scene in which the bellboy encounters a woman responsible for the personnel, to whom he ought to hand in his work uniform. In the act where he is forced to give up his life’s identity, in exchange, he obtains ordinary clothes.

\(^{140}\) The *Dismissal Letter* film sequence can be put in direct intertextual connection with Epstein’s final scene in *Glace à trois faces* (1926).

\(^{141}\) The Cinema Seen from Etna, *Le Cinématographe vue d’Etna*.


\(^{143}\) When Epstein talks about the photogeny, he mentions that photogeny has for its role to *majorer* the movement. Deleuze picks up on this definition of photogeny, so as to develop his own theory of image-movement. Yet what is remarkable is that the phenomenon of dilation of movement within cinematic image, stands in the interest of Lyotard in the acinema article. See: Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema1: Movement, Image*, Athlone, 1986, p 47.
into the register of a clear “visual enthralment,” which resounds with Lyotard’s figural concept and reaffirms a recurring thread in the philosophy of cinema. The very concept of photogeny encompasses a type of a specific reflexivity, visual-cinematic reflexivity. Apter adds, “Photogeny emerges as an ethics of visual reflexivity, involving the spectator’s apperception of the magical realism of quotidian representations, the legendary embedded in the everyday, and his/her own obliquity as subject of representation. Morin distinguished between photographic and cinematic photogeny on the grounds that the latter, in its reliance on a deprivatized viewing space, enhances the alterity and strangeness of the image.”


Murnau’s aesthetics of film inscriptions concomitantly examines and indirectly refers to the cinema’s attraction-laden emotional potential. Such cinematic potential, displayed in this case as a transgressive affect is mediated as and through self-recognising forces of the image. In such a fashion, it brings out alterity and estrangement's of the image. As a result, the poetic-figural transgressive processes, as discerned on the example of specific film intertitles, enhance viewer’s new perceptive instances.

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145 The deprivatized viewing space can be put in correlation with today’s video online streaming where all can be shared, commented on, hence the viewer’s subjectivity gets forked out infinitely. Or rather, it can be pictured as open-source image where the viewer produces and streams distinct sets of subjectivities.
4. Pictorial Transgression

4.1. Pictorial Transgression

In this chapter we examine figural theory from the perspective of pictorial transgression. We are going to proceed from the figural pictorial groundwork as pursued by Gilles Deleuze *Logic of Sensation*, (1981). Subsequently we are going to consider the pictorially innovative presence of disseminated red blotches on a Fra Angelico’ painting *Sacra conversazione said Madonna delle ombre* (*Saint Conversation, said Madonna of the Shadows*, (1438-1450). The conceptual backdrop investigating the color as a figural and metastable environment is going to be supported by an analysis of a cinematic color event as presented in the film sequence *Don’t Look Now* (1973, Nicolas Roegh).

In *Logic of Sensation*, (1981) Gilles Deleuze embarks on presenting his pictorial figural theory in direct reference to J.F. Lyotard’s figural project as elaborated in *Discourse, figure*. Even though the philosophical initiation stems from Lyotard’s work, Deleuze advances the theory extending it to a new pictorial concept which falls under the umbrella term of diagrammatics. However, since diagrammatics becomes a vast concept in Deleuze’s further examinations [Deleuze/Guattari: 2009] reaching out beyond pictorial transgression, our research focuses primarily on Deleuze’s pictorial theory as presented in the above-mentioned study.

Deleuze’ s pictorial theory strives to examine modes of pictorial manifestations that bypass classical figuration. He researches the ways the painter, in his case Francis Bacon, conveys modes of pictorial manifestations that bring forth variations of the image. Such a

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*see: [Deleuze: 2008:2]*

philosophy of image grants non-object-based and non-narrative-based pictoriality. It shapes conceptual path that privileges fluid states of images, highlighting modulation of colour, foreground, and Figure, and examines these as blocks of sensations.

Deleuze scholar Daniel W. Smith identifies three main conceptual trajectories within Deleuze’s pictorial theory. Smith notes that, “The first trajectory concerns the concepts Deleuze uses in his formal analyses of Bacon’s work.” He accentuates that Deleuze’s main concern is not the search for an epistemological system of an artwork but when faced with artwork, asks the question “How does it function?” [Smith :2003 :2]. On this level Bacon’s paintings are reviewed from the point of view of Figure, fields of colours, their mutual relationships, where “the fields of color tend to curl around the contour and envelop the Figure, but at the same time the Figure itself tends to strain toward the fields, passing through washbasins, umbrellas, and mirrors, subjected to the forces that contort it. […]” [Smith :2003 :2].

Smith thus captures the double-movement that enwraps the pictorial collusion of the color patches that envelop the figure on the one hand together with the fluidity. For on the other hand this figure, as much as enfolded in color interval, it equally continues to undergo athletic deformations, fluidly straining out its own stasis. The figure absorbs forces, “that deform or contract it in a kind of “derisory athleticism,” revealing the intensive “body without organs” beneath the extensive organic body. […] [Smith :2003 :2]”

Figure thus straining, pushing to its limits, seeks its variation, physical history, striving to becomes itself at the cost of an injury or self-annihilation.

Such a collusive pictorial portrayal challenges the perceptive attitudes that can register movements in colour fields, record the effusive minute thrills and resolve individuated affects. Figure that drives itself to such a state of a moment of aliveness, touching its corporeal thresholds, exercises qualities of what Erin Manning calls, in direct

reference to Deleuze, *biogram*. Manning defines such a corporeal constellation of a figure as “an affective experience,”

“The emergence of a biogram is not the creation of a static body. It is a virtual node out of which a bodyness can be felt. This feltness of a body is an affective experience. It is the tendency of a body to become that the biogram makes palpable. With the appearance of the biogram what is foregrounded is the affective tone of the event rather than a body as such.” [Manning: 2012: 124].

Figure, in its biogramatic stage, thus embodies something we may term a tonal event, that reflects a stage of the image.

We can find such a peculiar athleticism, athleticism that absorbs alters the forces yet expunges them, in Bertolucci’s transposition of Baconian postures in *Last Tango in Paris* (1972). For instance, the figure of an old woman putting on her dental prothesis in front of a mirror in public toilet, demonstrates this physical accessory as part of herself yet proves as well the “feltness” of not truly being appropriated with it. Or the main character’s, Paul’s, final posture when he is unexpectedly shot by his lover. In this case he lies on the floor, wrapping up his body, at once wanting to hold the body together, hold onto the life that melts away yet floating out of it, like a Baconian biogramatic figure. Being back to the floor recalls the scene during a competition in a ball room when in drunk dancing delirium, his body, kept falling in twists and turns on the danse floor.

Body straining in such manner demonstrates as though he kept be pulled down to the floors, wanting to ground himself or fall through the danse-arena. His body, once on the floor, is at once melting and being absorbed, fighting and giving in to the motion. This corporeal twists and falling affirm and recall Baconian figures as when they incorporate the colour patches of the arena yet purge the invading colouring contours as well so as to establish their own biogramatic emergence of affect.

In the pictorial framework of the figural the specific attention is drawn towards the instances where the Figure as colour field embodies “scrubbed zones” [Deleuze: 2008: 42,

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150 Bacon’s paintings are directly referenced in the opening titles of *Last Tango in Paris* 1972.

In the Baconian approach to the pictorial concept Ian Heywood accentuates the role of defiguration opposing it to figurative-narrative legibility. Heywood detects that Baconian disruption of figurative discourse has for its goal foregrounding of intensive sensations. He alludes accordingly, “Bacon takes the path of ‘defiguration’, the isolation or removal of the figure from any narrative that might ‘explain’ it, thus seeking to limit its discursive legibility. This is another example of defiguration or the logic of sensation, a process in which sensation is foregrounded by the disruption of literal or conventional meaning.” [Heywood: 2002: 376].

In conjunction with these pictorial concepts we argue that defiguration as disruption of conventional pictorial references, defiguration as a process that seeks to convey sensations, does not lead up to pure abstraction or portrayal of indiscernible arrangements. This is clearly apparent in Bacon’s defigurative arrest which contains architectural coordinates, yet succeeds in recruiting these so as to serve his pictorial-figural practice. This means, Bacon employs the pictorial planes so that they join - or even decide - stages of modulation processes.

Heywood explains the use of architectural axes in detail, “Nevertheless this does not lead to pure abstraction. In his use of planes, tableaux, framing spatial structures, oval arenas, smeared paint, and in his treatment of what is still recognizable as the figure his practice of defiguration neither encodes nor departs from the visible world but modulates it, transforms it into fluid, rhyzomic scenes of transformation and becoming.” [Heywood

152 It is questionable whether the conceptual trajectories thus applied are not rather yet another philosophy applied on Deleuze’s more clustered than compact pictorial system. However the questioning after functionality, bears a relevant enquiry that lies within Deleuze’s pictorial explorations. Smith further argues, that, “A second level of complexity appears in the works in which Bacon paints coupled Figures that nonetheless resonate together in a single “matter of fact.”” Smith notes that, “Subsequently a third level of complexity emerges in the triptychs, where this “matter of fact” includes not only the distances that separate the distinct panels but also the forced movement or rhythms that constitute the true Figure of the triptychs: the steady or “attendant” rhythm; an active, rising, or diastolic rhythm; and a passive, descending, or systolic rhythm (chapter 10).” University of Minnesota Press 2003. http://www4.uwm.edu/c21/conferences/2008since1968/banai_deleuze_trans.pdf.
After the theoretical background, in the next part we are going to focus on the practice of such sensation-based pictoriality. So as to highlight the difference between the figurative practices and the pictorial transgressive processes, we are going to analyze two paintings. The first example is the painting by Diego Velázquez, Pope *Innocent X* (1650. Oil on canvas. 114 x 119 cm. Palazzo Doria Pamphili, Rome). The second is Francis Bacon’s, *Study after Velázquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X*, 1953 and *Head VI* (1949, London).

The oil painting *Innocent X* portrays a figure of the Pope Innocent, seated in a chair, both arms resting. The posture is fixed slightly diagonally, turning the Pope’s whole body to the left side whereas his look is not aligned with the body’s direction. The look turns subtly yet distinctly to the right lending it a suspicious tone. The Pope’s expressly imposing look gives impression of facing the viewer as though wishing to transmit an uncanny message. Yet the look extends beyond the frontal plane, looking beyond the space in front of him as it were as it measures the intimate distance toward the viewer/painter.

Despite the fact that the whole figure is perfectly lit, by Velázquez we do not know where the light’s source springs from. On the one hand, the warm light seems to be directional, authoritatively projected onto the Pope’s figure, arresting it even more in his compact, contracted position. It is remarkable that almost half of the painting is reserved to the lushly ruffled white folded frock that absorbs most of the projected light. Equally the frock’s folds capture the subtly changing motion, as the only pictorial element in contrast to the other rather pictorially static frozen parts (the arms resting in paralysed motion, glued to the armchair holders, head, the still background curtain). Therefore we can observe that Velázquez’s Pope despite depicting “exceptional strength and liveliness” [Pérez Sánchez: 1996: 131] remains depicted along conventional representational coordinates.

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153 Other sources note different measures of the painting, 1.40 x1.20 m, and adding a year to the date c. 1650-51.

Alfonso E. Pérez Sánchez notes, “Velázquez's position as painter to the King enabled him to frequent the Vatican and to paint Innocent X, a work of exceptional strength and liveliness; the likeness of the portrait impressed everybody, and it is even said that the Pope commented that it was 'too truthful'. Although the composition follows traditional papal portraits, its expressiveness is achieved by a confident use of a range of reds.” [Pérez Sánchez :1996: 131].

Sánchez’s observation begs a question: What could have been that 'too truthful' liveliness as Sánchez notes, that the pope himself might have noticed in his very expression? Perhaps we can argue it was a peculiarly suspended presence of a pictorially uncanny element of such ‘too truthful’ an expressiveness that also enabled Francis Bacon to exploit in its full force in his display of Head VI (1949; London). Perhaps it is also the intensely latent violence afflicted to the posture, that remains by Vélazquez, caught in the chromatic range of reds. In contrast to the present nonfigurative forces dwelling within this oil painting stands a pictorial version that dislodges such a force, giving it the vital expression of a scream.

In the next part we are going to focus on the examination of the non-figurative forces in Francis Bacon’s. Study after Velázquez's Portrait of Pope Innocent X, and Head VI. In addition to Heywood’s commentary on Bacon’s defigurative process that unlocks fluid transformations of the image, Gilles Deleuze accentuates the role of violence in Bacon’s pictorial practice. What the viewer comes to perceive in Bacon’s paintings is not representation anymore, but violence that expresses and defines the pictorial engagement to capture individuating sensations. Deleuze states, “Francis Bacon’s painting is of a very special violence. [...]What directly interests him is a violence that is involved only with color and line: the violence of a sensation (and not of a representation), a static or potential violence, a violence of reaction and expression.” [Deleuze: 2008: xii].

In *Last Tango in Paris*, Marlon Brando’s figure of Paul expresses such a static, or potential violence. His violence exposes a force of the figure that finds itself in the position of a rhythmic attendant. Absorbed by this force, this force unearths the body as that which strains toward the obscure redemptive desire. It forces him to flow out of his body in the dance floor arena, as he tries to stretch out and melt in the intoxicated dance convulsions. We can observe that his figure is waxed in an organic violent sensation, whirling in a *danse macabre*.

Such a sketched out understanding of violence suggests a presence of disfiguring pictorial transgression. In this case pictorial elements therefore become not representative carriers but transitional zones, scrubbed zones [Deleuze: 2008: 42, 77] that ultimately result in “zones of scrambling” [2008: 111 : see: Chapter 6]. These zones convey space for “violence of a sensation.” Such a transgressive violence liberates “coloring sensation” (Cézanne) and allows the sensations to find their singular metabolic expressiveness.

This metabolic expressiveness is deployed in the athleticism of the figures. It is expressed in the attendant figures, that become contorted. Through nonfigurative, contracting forces, metastable intensities unlocked force pictorial elements to acquire and negotiate a state. These metabolic forces sculpt fluid scrambled zones where bodies, through metastable colour technique, wed with washbasin, or curl into animal-positions as they merge with a pictorial arena.

It is not only the oil that enters into physical malleability of the material implemented. Bacon employs diverse materials that render his practice manual and intermedial. Bacon’s pictorial practice encompasses diversified textures and fragments that he incorporates into his quest for painting vivid blocks of sensations.

Juanita M. Ellias explains Bacon’s implementation of variety of elements, “Bacon had begun by this time to base his imagery largely on a great variety of photographs, often combining elements taken from several completely different types in the same picture. His principal sources included images printed in newspapers (including some of Adolf Hitler), film stills, photographs of big game, studies of the human figure and animals in motion by

In fact we could say, Head VI, composed of a reproduction still of Innocent X and the still from Eisenstein's Battleship, behaves like a collage. Based on Vélasquez-reproduction, it thus marries intermedial source of a baroque background with movement study - as studied by Muybridge- which reveal the breaking down of one single movement into play by play captures. Here the focal point becomes the (meta)static stream. The pursed mouth of the crisply self-contained Pope becomes revealed as it were in sieved successive streams.

In connection with Head VI, Juanita, M. Ellias observes a clear pictorial intertextuality, “Thus in Head VI, (1949, the last of an astonishing series of six heads painted in 1948-9, the head of a Pope, inspired by the Vélazquez portrait, is given a screaming mouth and shattered pince-nez, based on a still from Sergey Eisenstein's film Battleship Potemkin, in which an elderly woman is shown in close-up just after being hit by a bullet; the upper part of the head dissolves away into a curtain.” [Ellias: 1996 :V. 3: 27].

The choice of such a pictorial caption is clear: to deconstruct or disfigure the Pope up to the blocks of pure sensation. Bacon’s practice thus, seeks to illustrate a papal portrait not in its static evocation but search for its depiction - to violate it enough so a sensation bursts palpable - until it starts to be metabolically expressive. In this case, metabolic means that colour is apparent in the stages of digestion, combinations of broken tones. Also it refers to its organicity, the fact that it is being digested as a bodily fluid. This in turn manifests the way a sensation submits to and sustains individuating stages. Bacon’s


pictorial strategy treats the shapes and tones of colour in his specific color spectrum till they are filtered into that single mediating sensation.

Such a strong sensation happens to become, in this case, a scream. This scrubbed zone of scream is however supported by subtly smeared architectural bars. The white bars in the screaming pope do not function as representational vertically ordered bars. However, their architectural force resides in their modulation that is aligned with the colour. Such a pictorially transgressive treatment of the rhythmic color-gesture of disconnected white-smeared lines refers to (1.) on the one hand, ailment of the pope. (2.) and the burst-open expressive accident of scream elongated along the bars that reinforce the very imprisonment and aphasia of the pope. In addition the architectonic bars enhance the vertical crescendo of the scream.

These specifically striated bars have yet another function. What remains by Vélazquez an immobile dark-burgundy curtain, an obscure suppressed backdrop, supporting the back of the figure, becomes by Bacon part of a vertical shower of exactly white bars transgressing the still sitting pope, forcing him to individuate himself. The individuating stage to which he responds in this phase, is his tuning in that materialises into the scream. In Bacon’s affect-charged depiction it is the scream that becomes his primal expression. It is as though the Pope needed to scream in order to experience himself alive via the immediacy that conveys such an active vital affect.

We can thus observe that the Pope thus depicted loses his essence-defined stasis and experiences himself as/via an active collapse.

Deleuze pronounces that what defines the modern painting, is the accident, in contrast to the previous essence-defined pictoriality. He notes, “Modern painting begins when man no longer experiences himself as an essence, but as an accident. There is always a fall, a risk of the fall; the form begins to express the accident, and no longer the essence.” [Deleuze: 2008: 87].

However, such an expressiveness is achieved not solely through new pictorial mise-en scène but also through enacting new color-registers so as to strain and procure sensation.
Deleuze suggests that Bacon “has reassumed the entire problem of painting after Cézanne [Deleuze: 2008: xii]. He observes that the technique Cézanne has applied to colour treatment has reintroduced two problems for painters. He records, “Cézanne’s “solution,” basically a modulation of color by means of distinct touches that process according to the order of the spectrum”, introduces a “rebirth to two problems.” Deleuze namely states, “how, on the one hand, to preserve the homogeneity or unity of the background as though it were a perpendicular armature for chromatic progression, while on the other hand, also preserving the specificity or singularity of a form in perpetual variation?” [Deleuze: 2008: xiii -xiv].

Secondly, in relation to new colour register according to Deleuze, Van Gogh and Gauguin succeeded to invent “new colours for the flesh ...that seem to have been baked in a kiln, and which rival ceramics.”[Deleuze: 2008: xiv]. Color thus becomes a decisive device in depicting pictorial transgressions. It depends however on the ways it is modulated.

Daniel W. Smith characterises pictorial modulation as relation between colours. However it involves not only relations between colours but relations, or rather approximations as we come to argue among varied states of color-individuation. “Thus, each element of Bacon’s paintings converges in color, and it is modulation (the relation between colors) that explains the unity of the whole, the distribution of each element, and the way each of them acts upon the others. This is why Deleuze says that it is the “coloring sensation” that stands at the summit of Bacon’s logic of sensation.”[Smith: 2003: 5].

In conjunction with Figure, Smith further argues that Figure by Bacon functions “as the material support or framework that sustains a precise sensation.” [Smith: 2003: 5]. At this point the question to ask is how if ever and through which means can a sensation be sustained? Sensation as such, is difficult to be sustained. Rather, what can be sustained are its various states. In Bacon’s case, we argue, these pictorial states are violated, and through such a violation they can access their semi-figurative stasis. Such a violation can be found

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158 Deleuze continues his explication,. “This was the new problem for Van Gogh as much as for Gauguin - problem with two pressing dangers, since the ground could not be allowed to remain inert, nor could the form become murky or dissolve into grisaille.” [Deleuze: 2008: xvi].
for instance in Deleuze’s concept of “catastrophe.” Alternatively sensation can be captured as in “fault lines” or folds [Heywood: 2002: 374] or in their metastable state. [Chapter 6.]

Therefore, as demonstrated, colour as folded sensation is sustained by Bacon through violence and motion. As regards the rehabilitation of this Pope’s portrait, Bacon changes the chromatic register of colours. Vélazquez employed a palette of rubin-red, and off-white pigments which included “red iron oxide, vermilion of mercury, and organic red lake”, white “comprised of lead white and calcite.” In contrast to this “confident use of a range of reds” [Pérez Sánchez: 1996: 131] Bacon uses unease-inducing white, purple and yellow. Centrally, Bacon posits white. In Bacon’s version white becomes a violent color, similar to the white space that functions as colouring sensation which also expresses a condensed motion. Thus whiteness as employed by Goya to depict torture scenes, or bullfight arenas. With Bacon, the white feather-folded motion, soaked up in the frock, fans out into the arena, comprised of brushstrokes that together with the static chair encircle the figure in the lower part.

We can summarise that the scream, itself a disfiguring process, renders of the painting that “what is still recognizable” [Heywood 2002: 376]. The Pope’s scream constitutes that part which “neither encodes nor departs from the visible world but modulates it.” [Heywood 2002: 376]. Scream becomes that pictorially transgressive act that transforms the painting into a fluid scene of transformation and becoming” [Heywood 2002: 376].

In addition, Bacon’s pictorial stratification is pierced by a coloured force that finds itself concentrated in the pope’s mouth. It is this by Velázquez suspended force that has dwelled in the Pope’s gaze, fixating the viewer. Whereas Velázquez’s pope is aphasic,

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159 See Chapter 6 on diagram, Sahara and metastable state.

Bacon’s study, through the pictorial scream, expresses the suppressed muteness. This muteness folded within Pope’s gaze seems to indicate as though he strived to prevent an event from happening.

We can note that in Bacon’s version the very architectural arena is used so as to highlight the scream-accident. There scream is depicted as a dilating rhythm that de-territorializes the Pope’s aphasic stasis. This disfiguring active rhythm frames the unease that bursts into a block of pictorial scream-sensation. Thereupon on the pictorial level Bacon unbars the saturated ruffled folds that Velázquez's Pope holds onto and turns them into a painterly scrubbed block of sensation.

It is in the scream-accident, scream as a disfigured flesh, that the Pope’s figure allows itself to be traversed with these newly unbarred expressive rhythms. In such state of the image, the block of sensations renders itself pictorially palpable. Here the painter -or the character himself- selects a state that shall be further individuated. After the selection the potential happening versions run through the flesh of the colour, tipping off the pictorial stasis, and thereafter bringing forth the possible new stages. This selection is a self-negotiation of which the result is the portrayed animated state, in this case, the scream. We can thus conclude, Bacon’s reanimated Pope is a Pope violently resuscitated through the primary processual desire, the unlocked unconscious force, that finds itself shifted to its pictorial metastable state.

Bacon anchors deteritorialized movements and pushes them to the “absolute de-territorialisation. He thus captures the figure’s metabolic movement that allows the states of images to be present as “slow, sticky, coagulated.” This deteritorialized position showcases expressive metabolic enactments as in copulating couples turning into one fluidly contorted organ-flesh, congealed wrestlers melting into one block of martial movement that becomes one color-force expanding into arena or rather melting into and becoming the arena themselves.

These transformative states evoke the biogrammatic qualities where bodies try literally through a strainer in a washbasin to flow out of themselves, or through a strange coupling acquire a double-body.

In relation to literature we can notice that what Kafka does to language, Bacon
afflicts in pictorial manner. As Kafka ripples language where he gives new syntax to the scream, so does Bacon shift the pictorial syntax of violated yet liberated, authorized scream. Bacon takes the first step to bring pictorial language to its metastability.

In conjunction with analysing Kafka’s work, Deleuze/Guattari say, “we need to create syntax of a scream” [Deleuze/Guattari :2001:49]. In relation to the de-territorializing propensities within Kafka’s German Deleuze/Guattari note, “He will push it toward a de-territorialization that will no longer be saved by culture or by myth, that will be an absolute de-territorialization, even if it is slow, sticky, coagulated. To bring language slowly and progressively to the desert. To use syntax in order to cry, to give syntax to the cry.”[Deleuze/Guattari : 2003: 26].

In Bacon’s depiction the individuating scream refers to a peculiarly pictorial intensity, almost a sonority that escapes signification. Deleuze/Guattari comment on sonority as follows, “What interests Kafka is a pure and intense sonorous material that is always connected to its own abolition - a de-territorialized musical sound, a cry that escapes signification, composition, song, words - a sonority that ruptures …martyred instrument.” [Deleuze/Guattari :2003:6].

Applied to our study we can state that bacon’s Pope’s scream marks a “pure and intense” material that reconnects him to his own ending, to his humanity. Through the pictorially transgressive scream Bacon depicts “a cry that escapes signification”[Deleuze/ Guattari :2003:6] pictoriality that “dismantles consciousness” [Lyotard 1991: 81]. In order for a rhythmic metabolic force of primary scream to resurface it takes such a “consciousness that has to forget itself”[Lyotard 1991: 81], it takes “unseen forces” to arise. In such an arising the unseen forces testify new aliveness or one’s own survival.

At this point let us come back to the treatment of colour once again. What remained with Velazquez deadly white static of gloves becomes in the Baconian version an intensified vibration of colour that drives the scream-sensation. We can thus assert the screaming pope expresses “gesturality of the color - a space that is imposed upon the eye

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161 Or as another translation notes “to turn syntax into a cry”[Deleuze/Guattari :2003: 26].

as an absolutely foreign power in which the eye can find no rest. These are no longer the tactile referents of vision, but, precisely because it is the manual space, the absolute deteritorialized space of what is seen that displays a violence done to the eye.”[Deleuze: 2008:75].

In relation to temporality of pictorial set-up, Deleuze argues that there are two ways Bacon conquers time, (1). through colour (2). and as passage, whereas this passage is defined as “metabolic variability in the enactment” [Deleuze: 2008:xiv]. Deleuze notes, “It is as though painting were able to conquer time in two ways: through color - as eternity and light in the infinity of a field, where bodies fall or go through their paces; and in another way as passage, as metabolic variability in the enactment of these bodies; in their flesh and on their skin (thus three large male backs with varying chasms in value). It is Chronochromie, in the spirit in which the composer Olivier Messiaen named one of his works.”[Deleuze: 2008:xiv]. In another place Deleuze confirms, “[…] in Bacon, time itself is being painted.”[Deleuze: 2008:34].

As regards the temporality, we can remark the Pope dwells fully and overtly in his metabolic now. Or more precisely the Pope’s scream harbours the metabolic enactment of such a now. He radiates through his individuating potential the de-territorializing block of sensation. This experience of the now animates the image in its fluid unstable state therefore reinforcing its unpredictability.

As we had observed, the block of pure intensities manifests states of images and one of these states is time. The viewer confronted with such depiction of pure intensity experience time as metabolic enactment as well.163

On the cinematic level we can find an example in Roeg’s film, Don’t Look Now (1973) that conquers time through color (see next subchapter). Different example Sokurov’s Faust (2011), captures time through a precise watercolor progression. This colour progression has been established in a meticulous pre-production where the director himself

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163 The hysteric patient in his unpredictable seizure, or an epileptic in his equally unpredictable fit, or a diabetic in sugar-deficiency, they all experience such an intense “now.” They are succumbed by time conquered as passage, time as that metabolic variability in the enactment” [Deleuze: 2008:xiv].
hand-painted each film strip so as to instil the chromatic evolution to each shot and sequence. In this case time has thus found itself captured at once (1.) “as eternity and (2.) light in the infinity of a field”. Similarly as Bacon’s transgressions, Sokurov portrays bodies that also rhythmically and metabolically “fall”: they fall open, they are anatomically dissected, they fall ill, they fall apart and are examined in their metabolic decay. We could observe that the bodies by Sokurov, in such a manner, “go through their paces.” As the bodies in *Faust* (2011), are portrayed not in their metabolic vitality yet rather through their metabolic variations. In addition, the chromatic metabolism proceeds from the always lit up with that malaise-inducing and decay-highlighting colored light, spreading across the palette of the soft turquoise green subduing to emerald blue that fades into yolk-white.

As regards the Baconian version of the baroque oil painting, time is not demonstrated in its eternity. By Bacon, Time is not as omnipresent as Sokurov’s panoramic all-embracing “light in the infinity of field.” Nor is it depicted as subtly unfolding light - spectrum progressively ingrained into the pictorial fields. The Baconian Pope is time-tortured: his whole Figure is violated by the time he has not lived. In Bacon’s depiction time is conquered through the passage as a “ metabolic variability in the enactment,” furrowed by the scream-sensation, scream-passage. Time is seized through being experienced, namely in its fleshed out pictorial presence. It is the liberated scream which manifests such an excess of presence and punctuates his survival.

As we had examined the various states of images on Bacon’s study, we can note that such depiction of time as metabolic enactment in a way hystersizes the pictorial state. In this case the scream-state thus comes to define pictorial après-coup and already insinuates a horror that may be experienced. Deleuze accounts the Velazquian elements that find themselves hystericized by Bacon as follows, “In a way Bacon has hystericized all the elements of Velázquez’s painting. [...] In Velázquez, the armchair already delineates the prison of the parallelepiped; the heavy curtain in back is already tending to move up front, and the mantelet has aspects of a side of beef, an unreadable yet clear parchment is in the hand, and the attentive, fixed eye of the Pope already sees something invisible looming up.”[Deleuze: 2008:38]. Deleuze also further discerns, “It is rather the way in which the Pope himself sees nothing and screams before the invisible. Thus neutralized, the horror is
multiplied because it is inferred from the scream, and not the reverse.” [Deleuze : 2008: 27-28]. The horror thus presented is drawn from the scream as a block of intensified sensation cutting through the whole flesh of the Pope. Pope screams before the invisible forces, the horror, and yet comes to embody some of these forces as they precipitate in his scream (dee. Chapter 6 on alloplastic adaptation).

Further Deleuze interrogates the Pop’s peculiar smile that becomes a scream, “What is this hysterical smile? Where is the abomination or abjection of this smile? Presence or insistence. Interminable presence. The insistence of the smile beyond the face and beneath the face. The insistence of a scream that survives the mouth, the insistence of a body that survives the organism, the insistence of transitory organs that survive the qualified organs. And in this excessive presence, the identity of an already-there and an always-delayed.” [Deleuze: 2008:36-37].

We can therefore affirm that, it is the aphatic spasm in the smile that, “survives the mouth” that conveys the “excessive presence.” This portrayal demonstrates the most vital of screams that expresses and survives such an “interminable presence” [Deleuze: 2008:36]. Following upon Deleuze’s argument we can assert that the malaise of the mute attentively pursed Pope’s lips expresses “the identity of an already-there” [Deleuze: 2008:36]. In addition it is not only the “already-there” of the invisible that we witness. The metabolic passage of screaming-sensation consuming Bacon’s pope voices that “always-delayed” identity. That means his scream comes always-already too late, and yet it is always-already deferred.

Leading up on this, we can come to argue that the representation becomes here impossible. “Everywhere there is a presence acting directly on the nervous system, which makes representation, whether in place or at a distance, impossible.” [Deleuze: 2008:36-37]. In this case it is such a hystericalized scream that wields the previously “looming up” invisible forces, that converts that aphasic paralysis, into an “immediately visible” metabolic presence. This presence is already there, and as yet always delayed. Through this disequilibrating statis, through this now that forces the states to constitute themselves, such a dismantled diagram, grows into environment in which the states seize to
individuate themselves. The expressed scream-now exposes that “afterward”. Such a violated afterward, is revealed as an invested zone, a “delay[s] of the wave’s oscillations.” [Deleuze: 2008:35].

Deleuze notes, “Painting is hysteria, or converts hysteria, because it makes presence immediately visible. It invests the eye through color and line. But it does not treat the eye as a fixed organ. It liberates lines and colors from their representative function, but at the same time it also liberates the eye from its adherence to the organism, from its characters as a fixed and qualified organ: the eye becomes virtually the polyvalent indeterminate organ that sees the body without organs (the Figure) as a pure presence.” [Deleuze: 2008:37]. Deleuze clearly states that painting that animates deferred action (hysterein, Greek for womb) makes presence immediately and irremediably visible.

Within the psychoanalytical concept this deferred action, après-coup (Nachträglichkeit, deferred action) relates to “temporality and psychic causality” [Laplanche/Pontalis 2011:33]. In this conceptual framework new experiences “can thus find themselves to confer impressions at the same time as the new meaning, psychic efficacy.” [Laplanche/Pontalis 2011:33].

Laplanche/Pontalis explain, “ [...] Freud has shown that the subject reworks (remanie) après-coup the passed events (passés) and that his rearrangement confers a meaning to them and even efficiency or a pathogen power (pouvoir)” [Laplanche/Pontalis 2011:34]. They carry on, “On 6-12-1896, he [Freud] writes to W.Fliess: “... I am working on hypothesis that our psychic mechanism establishes itself through stratification: the present materials in form of mnesic traces are subjected (subissent) from time to time in accordance to new conflicts, a reorganisation, reinscription.” [Freud :1887 - 1902].

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165 Deleuze examines the image of hysteria from a close point of view: “If we look at the “picture” of hysteria that was formed in the nineteenth century, in psychiatry and elsewhere, we find a number of features that have continually animated Bacon’s bodies. First of all, there are famous spastics and paralytics, the hyperesthetics or anesthetics, associated or alternating, sometimes fixed and sometimes migrant, depending on the passage of the nervous wave and the zones it invests or withdraws from. Then there are the phenomena of precipitation and anticipation or, on the contrary, of delay (hysteresis), of the afterward, which depend on the accelerations and delays of the wave’s oscillations.” [Deleuze: 2008:35].

166 [Laplanche/Pontalis 2011: 34]
Following this conceptual groundwork in connection to pictorial states we can observe that Bacon reshuffles the baroque pictorial events. These once specifically rearranged become scream-stratified. Bacon equally empowers his Pope with that color-stratified “pathogen power.” Such a pathogen power unlocks the pure presence where the metabolic enactment of the scream can slide in. Here the new pictoriality unleashes the mobile polyvalent eye of the viewer. This all-scanning viewer’s vision forces him to constitute new state of that which is to be articulated. In relation to the pictorial après-coup these states of the metabolic enactment design a peculiar now as well. Such a defined presence resonates together with the Newmanian now.

In his article *Newman: The Instant*, Lyotard observes that there is type of a pictorial now that “dismantles consciousness.” Lyotard carries on, “Newman’s now which is no more than a now is a stranger to consciousness and cannot be constituted by it. Rather, it is what dismantles consciousness, it is what consciousness cannot formulate, and aven that what consciousness forgets in order to constitute itself.” [Lyotard 1991: 81].

We can conclude at this point that as we have argued figurative statis, as portrayed in the baroque study, finds itself by Bacon out of joint, out of tune, moulded into a metastatic and biogramatic study of movement. In Bacon’s version, *Head VI* (1949), opens up with difficulty but opens up the individuating moment of “the being passing out of step with itself.” [Simondon: 1992:314].

Pictorial transgression thus portrayed unlocks the block of sensation through which the viewer can enter the image’s potential metastable environment, a germ of chaos. It is in this experiencing of the germ of chaos where the metabolic “excess of presence”, the Newmanian “now” are harboured. It is in such a newly acquired transgressive state that the image begins to function as open source.

It is this state, when the viewer enters image as an open source, where he encounters “visibility in its nascent state” [2006 : 127- 128]. It is in such an open nascent state where “images multiply owing to their natural core.” [Bachelard: 1997:103].

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4.2. Pictorial Transgression - Disseminated Red blotches: Color-event on Painting

In the following part we are going to examine pictorial transgression on the example of Fra Angelico’s disseminated red blotches that trace and store the figurative shifts and thus move the figurative stasis so as to accentuate mobile stages of images.

In the painting, Sacra conversazione said Madonna delle ombre (Saint Conversation, said Madona of the Shadows, (1438-1450, fresco and tempera, 193x273) Fra Angelico introduces marni fati red blotches as peculiar pictorial elements that mark the shift from resemblance to dissemblance. It is Fra Angelico’s “formless audacity” [Didi-Huberman 1996: 55-56] and “strikingly new and original manner” [Finocchio : 2006] of the “multicolored insolite zones” [Didi-Huberman 1996: 55-56] that introduce new representability to visual texture. These disseminated blotches carry in themselves a semantic range of allusions: from defamatory “spot”, “stain”, “blob”, to a more abstract “blot”, to a slightly more concrete “freckle,” “measle”, up to the moral concept of “the stain of sin” [Todd: 1995: xiv].

The multicolored, at first sight, abstract zones initiate new overthrown figurability. The color-event of marni fati “disturbs the ordinary economy of representation in order to go beyond, that is, to endow the visible.”[Didi-Huberman :2005: 87]. Subsequently the red

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169 This painting appears later in Fra Angelico’s career (1438) and comes also in conjunction with a challenge of a new architectural space. It is the move from his Dominican circle in Fiesole to the San Marco convent in Florence that allows Fra Angelico to apply his pictorial skills as well as to expand upon the treatment of figuration techniques. The spacial arrangement and challenge of the new Florentine space equally empowers Fra Angelico to advance the traditionally pre-set panel-display arrangements and continue with innovative figuration of subjects. Therefore, the fresco commission for Museo di San Marco will allow the versatile artist to push the borders further of not only figuration but also the manner in which image is displayed, viewed and experienced.


blotches launch “moments in the painting where the visible vacillates and spills into the visual” [Didi-Huberman :2005: 87]. Such a visual constituted out of a visible overspill yields “omnipotence of strangeness.” [Didi-Huberman :2005: 9]. What seems at first as a dissemblance becomes a pictorial core of the marble panels. Henceforth Fra Angelico distorts literal, explicit, interpretational tactics of perception, breaking off with tradition of direct representability.172

Didi-Huberman affirms, “The dissemblance of colored blotches (taches colorées) painted by Angelico is a way of disturbing the ordinary economy of representation in order to go beyond, that is, to endow the visible (donner au visible) with an anagogical virtue with the aim of “rendering a presence” - as one would say “rendering an account” - of the mystery of the Incarnation.” [Didi-Huberman: 2005: 87].173

In Fra Angelico’s painting the displaced red-colored-blotches are distinctly punctuated across large marble-blocks. The eye usually anchoring pictorial significations finds itself at a stroke rhythmized - and thus individualized - in new site of abstract painting.174 The viewer remains at once within the pictorial Saint Conversation, yet finds

172 Jane Marie Todd explains, “The expression Johannes Scotus Erigena renders as dissimilitudo becomes in French dissemblance. Like its English cognate, the French term retains the notion of concealment and deception; more precisely in this context it alludes to the deceitfulness of earthly appearance and the hiddenness of God. But the primary sense of the French term is archaic in English: dissemblance is the opposite of resemblance, not the repetition of semblance but a deviation from it. It is also related to vraisemblance, “true semblance”, or “versimilitude.” Colm Luibheid’s English translation of Pseudo-Dionysius (Complete Works, Paulist Press, 1987) translates the term as “dissimilitude” or “dissimilarity”. [Todd: 2005: xiii].


174 The viewer’s eye accustomed to interpret figuration as fixed meaning in the upper painting suddenly finds itself disturbed. The viewer may be both interpretatively and pictorially confused and challenged by the below-marble blocks. These may seem ostentatious yet as well as containing a disguised strangeness.
himself somewhere strangely elsewhere.¹⁷⁵

Fra Angelico displaces “shifts in (an) accent”¹⁷⁶ from the pictorial pala quadrata to the abstract quadriptych. Subsequently the four-pieced square fresco becomes space for the colour-event.

The color-event is reinforced owing to a double displacement:

1. The central figuration is not represented in the central panel, yet it is detoured via disseminated abstract zones.
2. Also the Incarnation is spatially displaced in the abstract below-quadriptych from the upper *pala quadrata*.

This set-up enhances the disruptive pictoriality of the chromatic variation thus disseminated. Such an environment of a double displacement produces in fact “moments where the visible vacillates.” It is such a punctuated vacillation that renders presence to the chromatically displaced Incarnation. In addition the disturbing disseimulant zones can be tackled as instances of intensity where “visible oscillates and spills into the visual.” Didi-Huberman terms these zones the “cursed part” of paintings”. However, it is such an afflicted part that allows for the “ omnipotence of strangeness” to be brought to bear in the image. And this strangeness opens toward new pictorial economy.

Didi-Huberman asserts that these zones where visibility collapses into a disturbing visual blur the mimetic order. He explains, “I have designated the specifically pictorial category of this disturbance by the (Proustian) term “patch” of painting. This is a way of naming those zones, those moments in the painting where the visible vacillates and spills into the visual. It is a way of naming the “cursed part” of paintings, the indexical.

¹⁷⁵ We can observe the single compartments of the quadriptych are distinct in their pictorial display. The first and third block build a chromatic echo, both being painted within the same colour and light spectrum. The second and fourth ones act in the same manner of colour - light response. Such an intentionally inserted alteration frames an interesting rhythm for the viewer, where the eye finds itself punctuated, skipping from one piece to the other. Such crafted rhythm, cleaves the representation, providing for new transitions to be created by the viewer.

nondescriptive, and dissemblant part. In fact, paintings often reserve - and this is once more their gift for disconcerting - a part of themselves for negating or clouding what they affirm in the mimetic order. Something in their aspect collapses at that point and dissemblance, a sort of disturbance, comes to reign there as the omnipotence of strangeness.” [Didi-Huberman :2005: 9].

As demonstrated, the moment where the visible oscillates and becomes visual colour-event is achieved through chromatic variation of the disseminated red flickers of marni fati. These Fra Angelico’s red spots create points of contacts, instances of intensity, that attest the displaced pictorial après-coup. The pictorial après-coup shapes here the delayed event of the Incarnation that finds itself presented ex post, in contrast to the narratively primordial event of the Madonna and Child vested around saints. Such displayed intensities of red-flickers attempt “to trap this living fact alive” (Bacon), they brand the potential states of the image where the “painting sensations” (Cézanne) are captured. Such sensations that come alive reinstigate the mobility of the viewer’s eye.
4.3. Pictorial Transgression on the Cinematic Image

In his early-Renaissance frescos Fra Angelico has introduced a new pictorial challenge for the viewer. In the following subchapter in a distinct form we are going to analyse the presence of a red blotch as a pictorial transgression on cinematic image.

In the beginning of the film, *Don’t Look Now* (1973) Roeg initiates a cinematic color-event. In the key sequence we term “It’s happening I” a color-event appears as organic expansion of a red blotch. This red blotch surfaces on the photographic slide-surface that John, the main character, is about to project. The color-event occurs in the approximately 4-minute long key sequence shaped by chromatic editing techniques. In this sequence a non-narrative, dissemblant yet all-absorbing red blotch bestows color as metastable environment. In this color-event the red blotch as expansive metabolic block of sensation acquires a pictorial life on its own.

It appears from nowhere for neither the clairvoyant character nor the viewer know its origin nor direction. Yet on the interpretative level it refers to Christine, the red-dressed daughter drowning outside. On the second level it refers to the fully red-dressed unknown character as presented on the slide. He is seated in the church in front of an altar, displayed from the back. These two semantic layers find themselves overlapped in the pictorial transgression that appears on the cinematic image.

This pictorial transgression is intertwined and strengthened by the preceding film sequence. The very first image the spectator is confronted with, before the opening titles begin, is that of a void pond. This pond is depicted in a desaturated grey-greenish landscape. It depicts a grey-still water dynamised by the movement of the falling light-stretches of rain. The densely and heavily falling raindrops activate the otherwise still, waveless water-surface. As they fall they reflect sharp white light points. These drops shine back, flicker, in a movement modulating streams of white light. Such a lit rain lends the pond uncanny presence that spreads through the chromatically desaturated landscape.
In relation to pond as a lieu Bachelard observes, [...] “the pond is the very eye of the landscape, the reflection in water, the first view that the universe has of itself, and the heightened beauty of a reflected landscape presented as the very root of cosmic narcissism.” [Bachelard: 1994:209-210].

It is not precisely a pictorial narcissism but rather a peculiar temporality and visuality that overspill onto the static slide. In the color-event that occurs after the pond scene the red blotch rhythmically takes over the slide as John examines it. It is as though the whole grey outside pond spilled over and drowned the color-image to be projected. Such a transposition of the pond as spilled onto the slide echoes the presence of the “eye of the landscape” and the “earth’s eye.”

In the shot it is precisely John’s panoramic and clairvoyant vision where the time zones coalesce and collapse. Eye thus positioned becomes an eye that joints (1.) the premonition of the already-there, (2.) already-happening death of the drowning Christine in the beginning of the film with the (3.) death always already-delayed of John, in the final scene.

It is in such a vision set-up that the excess presence of water, pictorially and chromatically fluidifies and transforms the states of image. The fluid transformation of the image is reinforced through the preceding water imagery. It is also such fluid stretching “eye of the landscape” that finds itself transposed into John’s clairvoyant’s eye.

The second color-event, we term It’s Happening II, represents John’s death in Venice, the drowning city par excellence.

In the first color-event, once the red stain enigmatically appeared, overlaid on the slide it eroded the whole screen. However the red stain becomes reemployed as a static chromatic reference throughout the film. As a result, this gives rise to the “transient

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178 Bachelard examines Thoreau’s perception as when he puts in relation the lake and the earth’s eye, “In Walden, Thoreau followed this enlargement of images quite naturally: “A lake is the landscape’s most beautiful and expressive feature. It is earth’s eye; looking into which the beholder measures the depth of his own nature.” [Bachelard: 1994:209-210].
eruption of red” [Patch: 2010:259] - for instance we encounter it in the clothes of bystanders in Venice, Christine’s red shoes, dwarf’s red apparel, cardinal’s red gown).

In relation to topochromatic meaning, the red blotch reaches beyond the representative-narrative horizon. It also reaches beyond its aesthetic and symbolic qualities (red as symbol of blood, death, or related to the religion-related dress code). Such a transgressive aliveness, is created also owing to “the added unconscious thought” interweaved into the cinematic fabric [Du Maurier : 2002: 151].

The film itself, Don’t Look Now (1973, Nicolas Roeg) is an adaptation based on novella by Daphné du Maurier. Du Maurier herself served as one of Hitchcock’s main narrative sources (see: The Birds 1952). Du Maurier’s biographer Nina Auerbach notes that Roeg’s adaptation “was her favorite film of her work […] in that it was the only one to rely, like her fiction, on a subjective camera.” [Auerbach: 2002: 151].

Indeed, Daphné du Maurier herself addressed the following to Roeg, “I know I make the adaptor’s work more difficult by too often writing a story as a narrator or through a single character’s mind, which necessitates further invention on the part of the adaptor, and director, to enable a story and its people to come alive, and here you have succeeded admirably, indeed added more depth to unconscious thoughts that might have been my own!” [Auerbach: 2002: 151].

Du Maurier also notes that Roeg has accomplished to “add more depth to unconscious thoughts.” This Roeg achieves among other techniques, through his integral color strategy. The two main color-events, It’s Happening I in the beginning of the film and It’s Happening II in the final scene, are representative of this inventive transgressive touch.


181 In.: Nina Auerbach, Daphne Du Maurier, Haunted Heiress, Movie Star, p. 151.
In his study *Beneath The Surface: Nicolas Roeg’s Don’t Look Now*, Andrew Patch analyses specific parts of the color-strategy. Patch states, “Don’t Look Now’s aesthetic is based around a colour strategy that elevates one particular hue, red, over a more restrained and desaturated palette. In other words, Don’t Look Now is constructed around the juxtaposition of a vibrant red (associated specifically with Christine and the dwarf in particular) with a landscape and urbanity comprised of a more subdued palette of blues, greens, browns, grays, whites, blacks, etc. Venice, for example, through this aesthetic strategy, becomes monochromatic, a wintry liminal urbanity within which the transient eruptions of red draws the spectator’s eye, teasing us to look.” [Patch: 2010 : 259].

Patch attests, that the two key color-events are strengthened owing to the strict chromatic division that Roeg employs. Specifically it is owing to the “ the restrained and desaturated palette” that the pictorial-cinematic transgression is enabled and reinforced.

Therefore this guarantees that the isolated color transgressions that occur in the color-events receive the viewer's full attention as they break out a vibrant palette of stark-vivid red, clear skyblue, and transparent yellow. These color patches eventually fan out into an almost imperceptible momentum that paints the whole rainbow palette onto the slide image (in sequence *It’s happening*). Equally, such a chromatically regulated demarcation of color strategy, underpinned with portrayals of monochromatic landscapes allow for iterated mosaic-like eruptions of red to resurface. Subsequently these subtle flicker eruptions tied together in precise color strategy “ tease us to look”, throughout the film.

As in Sokurov’s *Faust*, where the chromatic set-up had been well-research in pre-production, similarly in Roeg’s *Don’t Look Now*, the chromatic set-up had been elaborated upfront. Andrew Patch further elaborates this chromatic environment,

“As Anthony Richmond, the film’s director of photography, recollects, this aesthetic juxtaposition between vibrant/desaturated was an integral concern in pre-

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production, particularly in relation to the film’s *mise-en-scène*: “Nick is very visual... he knew that taking the colour red out of everything except the dwarf’s clothing and the little girl’s mac, really played a very big part in the design and costume design [...] It’s a very subtle thing, you don’t miss it, your eye really just goes to the red jacket of that girl and then the dwarf.” [Richmond 2002, In.: Patch: 2010 : 259].

In another study *On Seeing Red: The Figurative Movement of Film Colour;* (2007) Laure Brost offers insight into what articulations color can take upon itself. Based on Brost’s observation, we can conclude that color can function as vital medium in order to convey as singular as well as adaptive metastable color-environment. Therefore chromatic environment can communicate various states.

Brost explains, “Mobile chromatic modulations created by the *patterning* of minor rhetorical figures emphasize the kinetic aspect of colour. Artists and colour theorists such as Wassily Kandinsky and Joseph Albers often drew parallels that stressed the importance of relating colour to movement. Kandinsky speaks of the balance of colour as intimately tied to dance-like motion: the scale remains in oscillation while the counterpoised elements continuously change, so that kinesis derives from the colours. For Albers, “Colors present themselves in continuous flux, constantly related to changing neighbors and changing conditions” (Albers 1975: 5)” [Brost: 2007: 136].

As we see Kandinskij attests that color can express movement in an even dance-subtle oscillation where “counterpoised elements continuously change.” Following up on that we can argue that this oscillation, liminal kinesis, points to the transgressive character of the color-environment. On the other hand, Albers accentuates the “continuous flux” that color can hold within itself. In this case within this flux is absorbed vibration of the changing neighbouring as colors as well as conditions. Such a kind of absorption that undergoes mobile chromatic modulations brings out the metastable qualities of color thus employed.

In addition to the,

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(1). subtle oscillation that bears the posed, as well as the varying counterpoised elements
(2). the continual flux that sustains the constantly readjusting chromatic states, there is a
(3). specific rhythmic element supporting the ‘emotional shades’ that Eisenstein adjoins.
Brost comments as follows, “Sergei Eisenstein argues in 1948 that a crescendo is created by
colour movement from one colored object to another, expressing the ‘emotional shades’ of
what we see on screen. [Eisenstein 1970: 128]’

We can thus affirm that the above-mentioned elements partake in pictorial-cinematic transgressive states. They shape color as a phase prone to adaptative exchange. In the application of our cinematic color-event It’s Happening I [Roeg 1973]:
(1). The red blotch thereupon exhibits the oscillation between the poised static red element as depicted on the slide in form of the dwarf’s red apparel. In an instant the red blotch now fluid and mobile spills over the static slide-image. In this case the shift from a static red, to the over-throwing eruption refers to the event that happens outside. It refers to the equally from head to toe dressed Christine drowning in the abysmal pond. In this moment once the stasis overthrown the abstract and accidental red-blotch overspill occurs.
(2). The red blotch emerges in an all-absorbing continuous flux that streams copiously over the image.
(3). As it overspills and overthrows the image it arrives in a rhythmic crescendo that confirms the immediacy of emotional impact of the drowning Christine.

Later in the film what is in this scene insinuated on the slide as the static red referent in the form of the seated dwarf person, becomes a reanimated person in the final scene. In the color-event It’s Happening II in Venice, it is this red-hooded dwarf that resuscitates the image of the dead Christine to John. It is the dwarf that becomes ultimately John’s assassin and closes the circle, inlaying the last mosaic piece into the color grid.

Therefore we argue, the color that individuates itself on the slide instills a sudden disequilibrium into the cinematic image. Henceforth both of these color-events create “mobile chromatic modulations” [Brost: 2007: 136] and together with specific rhythmic “patterning” partake on the cinematic transgression.

In the two key instances Roeg proves that color-event articulates triply joint action:

184 In.: [Brost: 2007: 136].
the already-there event of the child drowning outside, (2.) the present act of looking at
the static slide inside (3.) and the future anticipating death of the one who is looking (hence
the title’s warning Don’t Look Now). Additionally, this triply joint action/affect
communicates “virtual conjunction.” [Deleuze 1986: 109]. This virtual conjunction
launches space that harvests the It’s happening I. In this scene we witness the clairvoyant’s
act of looking together with through color-modulation pictorially addressed cinematic
après-coup.

It is essential to note that the act of looking at the slide is the act accessible
exclusively to John. John represents the clairvoyant who taps into the inaccessible vision
that links the out of his reach happening present. John, in a God-like position, witnesses the
color-event of the invasive fluid blotch. Color here transforms and invades the rippling
full screen, in abounding dramatic crescendo. Color grows here to “the locus of
possible” [Deleuze 1986: 109]: the possibility that links Christine’s death by drowning
while playing by the pond; the possible journey to Venice to restaure a past as the final
destination of John’s death.

Venice becomes here the place of transition. It was conceived in John’s mind as the
place for a new beginning and a place of restoration of a church’s top-ceiling mosaic. It is
Venice that embodies the at once fluidly changing place and impossible quest. The quest
that takes gradually form of detectively obsessive stalking of Christine’s red-hooded
doppelgänger by John. This figure has been already evoked, indirectly, on the slide in the
first color-event It’s Happening I.

The process of restoring the mosaic colludes together with the process of following
upon the traces and catching the enigmatic dwarf-child. These two are aligned with the
third process that happens moving towards one’s own death.

As demonstrated, it is through these chromatic transgressive linkages that the
affective states of image, in color-event, resurface. Brost explicates Deleuze’s strategy of
defining color,

“In Cinema I: The Mouvement Image, the philosopher Gilles Deleuze also points

185 John’s wife Laura does not notice a least change on the slide.
out the importance of what he calls ‘movement-color’, which is one of the three principle forms of colour, and the only one - according to him - that is peculiar to cinema. Movement-color creates a distinctive type of space, l’espace quelconque (the “any-space-whatever”, as it has been translated), where ‘linkages can be made in an infinite number of ways. It is a space of virtual conjunction, grasped as pure locus of the possible’ (Deleuze 1986: 109). Deleuze further explains that this ‘locus of the possible,’ this ‘expressed state of things’ (...), is inseparable from the ‘absorbent function’ of colour.” [Brost: 2007: 136-137].

Further on in relation to colour, Deleuze draws a distinction between a “simply colored image” and “color-image” itself. He affirms, (“) In opposition to a simply colored image, the color-image does not refer to a particular object, but absorbs all that it can: it is the power which seizes all that happens within its range, or the quality common to completely different objects.” Deleuze 1986: 118, In.: Brost: 2007: 137].

At this point we can thus conclude that as demonstrated on our example, the mobile transgressive red blotch as displayed communicates the unstable fluid environment that pronounces “expressed state of things”. This transformative environment mediates “absorbent function of colour.” Therefore, this proves the states of colour that color can absorb cinematic and affective accidents and shape the après-coup environment. That means it can present the delayed action: death happening outside yet being re-presented under the microscopic light on the examined slide. The transparent slide, the positive photography, thus demonstrates under the clairvoyant’s eye, the locus of sheaf of present, past, future. Indeed, these color-events confirm color which “seizes all that happens” [Deleuze 1986: 118].

As we argue, Roeg demonstrates adaptive absorption of the color through the construction of the color-events, The red-colour continuity in Don’t Look Now, is assured through the mobile mosaic-pieces of red inlaid in various shots as displaced throughout the film. Once the first color-event erupted, in the It’s Happening I key sequence, the spectator is guided through the strategically disseminated color-signals leading up to the final color-

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186 Deleuze later notes that, “Color is on the contrary the affect itself, that is, the virtual conjunction of all the objects which it picks up.” [Deleuze 1986: 118, In.: Brost: 2007: 137].
eruption. Such a specifically rhythmmed chromatic punctuation of plastically redistributed shots forms a mosaic. This mobile chromatic mosaic is activated in and with the key sequence *It’s Happening I*. This mosaic-image is relaunched in different moments throughout the film. Specific shots-shards of moving image thus acquire function of mosaic-windows that link together and thus template the chromatic grid of the film. The chromatic mosaic finds itself reunited with the second color-event that erupts in the final scene “*It’s Happening II*” which closes in the circle of all mosaic shards.

In *Don’t Look Now* the manner in which the viewer’s eye is being instigated throughout the film illustrates mosaic-like montage of color-shots. This color-event erupts in various parts of the film. Tied together these chromatic displacements function as broken shards of a virtual mosaic-piece that the restaurantor-clairvoyant pieces together. In addition, disseminated throughout the film the micro color-eruptions acquire, though interplay of editing, quality of minute pulsations of perception. They behave as color-flickers.

In contrast to Roeg’s pictorial color-events, a different kind of pulsation of perception is presented in Michelangelo Antonioni’s *Red Desert*, (1964). In *Red Desert*, large blotches function as “pulsations that penetrate chaotically inside the characters.” In conjunction with the color strategy in his film *Red Desert* (1964), Antonioni recounts, “For *Red Dessert*, on the other hand, I chose very short takes. Perhaps it was the fact that I was using color that suggested this technique to me, this deep-seated need to deal with it in large blotches, as if the were pulsations that penetrate chaotically inside the characters.” [Brunette 1998: 95].

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187 John himself works on restoring and assembling a mosaic in one Venetian cathedral. During the restauration he almost falls and dies. Yet his death is postponed.

188 This virtual chromatic mosaic holds together only through the clairvoyant’s and viewer’s look.

5. Cinematic Transgression on Animated Image

In this chapter we are going to examine the example of cinematic transgression on animated image. In *A Note upon the “Mystic Writing Pad”* (1925) Freud elaborates the concept of an apparatus of the mind that he compares to a celluloid wax tablet onto which perceptive data is being captured. Freud explains,

“The Mystic Pad is a slab of dark brown resin or wax with a paper edging; over the slab is laid a thin transparent sheet, the top end of which is firmly secured to the slab while its bottom end rests upon it without being fixed to it.” [Freud: 1940: 212].

Furthermore, this apparatus functions as a receptive surface that retains permanent traces and absorbs new ones and therefore in such a manner operates as a wunderblock. Freud compares this receptive apparatus to the preconscious and conscious systems. Freud resumes,

“Nonetheless, I do not think it is too far-fetched to compare the celluloid and waxed paper cover with the system Pcept.-Cs. and its protective shield, the wax slab with the unconscious behind them, and the appearance and disappearance of the writing with the flickering-up and passing-away of consciousness in the process of perception.” [Freud: 1940: 211].

This set-up described by Freud can be observed on the example of the animated video *Automatic Writing* [Kentridge, 2008]. As we argue, Kentridge’ s special video continuously uncovers the “flickering-up and passing-away” of the multiple states of the image in the process of perception.

The cinematic practice of Kentridge reveals through the writing-drawing animation a peculiarly cathected, energy-invested movement that is being displayed. In Kentridge’ s

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191 Freud notes; “Thus an unlimited receptive capacity and a retention of permanent traces seem to be mutually exclusive properties in the apparatus which we use as substitutes for our memory: either the receptive surface must be renewed or the note must be destroyed.” [Freud: 1940: 208].
practice simple drawing pad becomes the support for the artist’s hand that launches the automatic writing-drawing processes and practices. Thereupon this set-up allows the access to unconscious samples that resurface in such a manner. Additionally the motion video constantly refers to the very source of the animation, the first step in production, the blank paper itself. It will be thus the blank pad that serves in the artist’s preparatory and proto-transitional phase.

The energy-transmitting cathected mechanism can be observed on the following instance of the video. Once the animated image receives and transmits perceptions, once it “passes the excitation” [Freud:1940: 212], the image becomes invested. Afterwards however once the invested visual-movement discharged onto the image, it does not remain to nurture the image. It is as though the image could not sustain such an intense, individuated investment. Thereafter the visual state is withdrawn, only to be again revived, hence reinvested, in a sharp turn. Kentridge perceives this energetic abandoning and reviving investment as follows, “A drawing abandoned is revived by the next drawing.” [Kentridge: 2009:67].

Freud articulates that discharged energy and the withdrawal in other terms. He records that in such a double transition the “unconscious stretches out feelers” [Freud:1940: 212], and it does so “toward the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it.”[Freud:1940: 212].

However, in our case thus it is through the video-medium that the unconscious thrusts out its feelers toward the external image representation. Once the excitations sampled, shaped and scrambled into perceptive forms, brief motions, the digital brush withdraws them. Freud describes,

“So long as that system is cathected in this manner, it receives perceptions (which are accompanied by consciousness) and passes the excitation onto the unconscious mnemic systems; but as soon as the cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the functioning of the system comes to a standstill. It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system Pept.-Cs., towards the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it.”[Freud:1940: 212].
In conjunction with automatic writing Rachel Leah Thompson explains the process of simultaneous functioning of discrete layers of conscious and unconscious forces. She records that such simultaneous display got first introduced by the French psychiatrist Pierre Janet \[1977: 281\]^192 who examined the mechanisms of the automatic writing when he analysed his patient Bertha. Thompson recounts, 

“Automatic writing functioned for Janet to prove the persistence of memory in the amnesiac patient. Janet theorized two discrete layers of consciousness (which often separated completely in the hysteric patient, producing a condition known as dédoublement).^193 Automatic writing bridged the gap, often allowing the patient “to perceive and express ideas [she] could not account for previously.” [Janet :1977: 281].

Kentridge’s take on the *Automatic Writing* displays (1.) this kind of persistence of memory, recording and testifying to the event of apartheid, exile and its resurfacing to the conscious layers. (2). The video equally manifests a kind of internally individuated bridging of discreet layers. (3.) Thereafter, in correspondence to Lyoatrd’s figural set-up, such a layered resurfacing and bridging of layers confirms active switching between reading-seeing modes. In the automatic writing practice, the participant, the author himself uses the practice of automatic writing so as to demonstrate the persistence of memory and spin it into an image. In this image or rather image as adaptive, constantly readjusting environment, the polychronic networks flicker up and pass through display of disturbing cooperation, the experience of edging the Pt-Ct system. Such a set-up allows for new unexpected expressions to resurface.

In connection to the automatic practice Thomson notes that in the creative self-

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193 Thomson explains dédoublement followingly, “Dédoublement, literally defined as a splitting or doubling of consciousness, is related to Freud’s work on disassociation. However, while Freud insisted that subjectivity is a coherent whole, with consciousness and unconsciousness forming opposite sides of a single surface, Janet suggested that a single body might contain multiple selves.” In.: Rachel Leah Thompson, *The Automatic Hand: Spiritualism, Psychoanalysis, Surrealism*, In, 2004, p. 5, footnote 18.
experience it is the eye of the viewer that participates and unties, “disturbing sense of decorpolisation” of the body of image. [Thompson: 2004:5].

However creation of new expressions can cause a destabilising effect on the anlysand. Thomson explains, “But with this new expression came estrangement, a disturbing sense of decorporealization, and a loss of ownership for the analysand. As his patient Birtha reports,

When I want to write, I find that I have nothing to say; my head is empty, I must let my hand write what it pleases; it thus fills four pages; I cannot help it if it is all absurd trash [. . . ]. My ideas are no longer comprehensible to myself; they come of themselves; one might say that they are written on a big roll which unrolls before me. . . . I am nothing more than a puppet held by a string . . . I am here only to stand for something.” [Thompson: 2004:5].

Kentridge’s video and creative practice testify the same processes as they embody “new expression” as well as highlights disturbing “estrangement” [Thompson: 2004:5]. It proceeds precisely in an unsteady flux of “the big roll” that “unrolls” before the viewer.

In Chapter 2, we have examined the bridging of the reading-seeing mode. In this concept Lyotard claimed that in the shift concerned the subject moves from hearing mode to looking, whereby the act of looking bore the eye that “desires.” In such a mode the space became a complex “object’s space” as opposed to the flattened “text’s space.”

Equally as regards placing an inscription, or inscribing new expressions into a moving image through which the unconscious stretches out its fellers, such a new positioning is no longer nor can be an object based one. And in this case the status of the


195 Lyotard attests, “An object’s space is to be seen, not read. And this seeing is desiring.” [Lyotard: DF: 267]
object ought to be redefined as well.

Yet what kind of an object could it be that creates such a seeing that is desiring? It will not an object per se yet a specific kind of a transitional space, that fosters a specific seeing. It will be a seeing that is liberated and that literally breaks through and beyond the support so as to reach a source of image. It is going to be through a new transition where the previously purely pictorial object breaks through. Lyotard describes,

“The wall must now be broken through, the support must be excavated, an effect of depth must be obtained. The great difference is that the image provokes the fiction of a breaking through of the eye, a crossing of the eye beyond the support, into a space.” [Lyotard: 2011:53].

Kentridge’s video testifies to such breaking through of the eye and its subsequent crossing beyond the intermedial support. As the complex manner of bridging, stretching out, testing engages states of images, the video thus demonstrates stages of the image in their transitional shapings.

In relation to the pictorial object Lyotard marks additional shift. He records that the object undertakes “new mutations.” In this case the object ceases to be reference for a fixed narrative, as well as it no longer works as a way to access the meaning. That means, the object starts to serve as a transitional phase. The object begins to acquire a feature of adaptive phase.

In his study Painting and Desire (2011) Lyotard mentions, “From Césanne on it seems to me that the pictorial object will be subjected to new mutations, which is to say that it is no longer meant to be read - no more than in the Quoattrocento - and it cannot be read for a simple reason: there is no longer a holy narrative to acknowledge […], onto which the image would be fixed. But on the other hand, the pictorial object is no longer treated as a window opening onto a view, onto a scene that would be out there, on the other side, behind this support.” [Lyotard: 2011:53].

Therefore as we can notice the once broken-through object is the one that undergoes new mutations which allow for the delicate seeing-reading mode at once. We can thus argue that image individualised in such a manner, image that associates and disassociates with its environment, can create peculiar folds. A fold joints the double-movement, the invested and withdrawn, yet holding within that self-propelling, self-unfolding germ of the next image. The fold culminates in itself the tipping point that overthrows the image’s stasis. As a result, such an overthrown saturated stasis allows the unconscious to reach out its advances.

Such an idea of an image lies in close correlation to Deleuze’s concept of a fold, “Hence the ideal fold is the Zweifalt, a fold that differentiates and is differentiated. When Heidegger calls upon the Zweifalt to be the differentiator of difference, he means above all that differentiation does not refer to a pregiven undifferentiated, but to a Difference that endlessly unfolds and folds over from each of its two sides, and that unfolds the one only while refolding the other, in a coextensive unveiling and veiling of Being, of presence and of withdrawal of being.” [Deleuze: 2003: 30].

A similar motion of coextensive unveiling and veiling was detected by Didi-Huberman when he described the densification process. (Chapter 2.). In this densification process he was linking the unconscious process of compression (Verdichtung) with the process of creation (Dichtung).

It seems that what Deleuze describes bears strong ties to an in-between space, as examined by Lyotard in Discourse, figure. In such an in-between space the object acquires a function of an intermediating instance. In this case, object becomes an “incident” or “

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Zwischenfall,” that is that which falls apart or literally falls between. It is first on the grounds of the Freudian self-splitting (Entzweiung) and the incident, Zwischenfall, that Deleuze describes a fold. The processes that occur through the breaking-through of the object via mobile vision can be grasped as follows,

(1.) object in motion collapses into itself and confronts its own instability. Therefore (2.) such an open set-up colludes double-proceedings that allow for the intermediary space to emerge. Subsequently (3.) this unbarred intermediary space provides to produce new states and mutations of the image and render them visible. The very term Lyotard employs is Klee’s. Klee terms as such singular process as rendering visible, Sichtbarmachen:

Klee observes, “Art does not reproduce what is visible, but makes things visible. [...] The purer the graphic work, i.e. the greater the importance attached to the formal elements used in the graphic representation, the more inadequate the preparation for the realistic representation of visible things.” [Klee: 1920].

We can thus perceive that Klee’s statement demands of the artist to tap into the intermediary state, where he can access acts of folding. In creative practice the goal is to hold within the perfect portion of the formal elements, stabilized enough yet mobile enough in order to communicate the rendering of the new visibility. By Lyotard, the new visibility was obtained through the mode of seeing-reading at once. For, it was in that joint-mode, in their inter medial overtipping, that viewer could access at perceptive oscillations and unravel new states of images.

198 Deleuze explains to his employment of Zwischen-fall followingly, “André Scala has studies this in La genèse du pli chez Heidegger (forthcoming). The notion springs up between 1946 and 1953, especially in “Moira,” in Essais et conférences (Paris: Gallimard, 1980); it follows the entre-deux or the incident, the Zwischen-fall, that had rather marked a thing fallen. This is “Greek” fold, especially related to Parmenides. Scala notes one of Riezler’s comments that, as of 1933, he found in Parmenides “a pleat of being,” “a fold of one in being and non-being, the two being narrowly stretched into each other” (Faltung); when Kurt Goldstein discovers that he is Parmenidian when he comprehends the living, appeals to Riezler (La structure de l’organisme, Paris: Gallimard, 325-29). cf. Dürer “zweifalten cubum”, In.: Erwin Panovsky, The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 259. [Deleuze 2003: 147]. The Fold. Leibniz and The Baroque, Continuum 2003.

199 It is also being translated as self-dividing.
This shift from reading to seeing is revolutionary for Lyotard. As in this shift the eye moves from “the edge of the discourse” to the “heart of the discourse” [Lyotard: 1974: 129]. And such an edging motion is detected in Automatic Writing video where the eye finds itself folding at the heart of the mobile malleable discourse. However it indicates not really an object’s space yet rather what we could term a proto-transitional space.

William Kentridge in his animated video Automatic Writing, (2008), employs the image as a mystic writing pad. This animated pad briefly records and erases folding states of images in perpetual motion. Such a process demonstrates different and scrambled states of cinematic transgression. In such animation technique Kentridge on the one hand brings forth (1.) the psychological mechanisms of the automatic drawing that advance the memory as well as the multiple selves of the hand that engraves this recording (2.) On the other hand he renders visible states of these images as they are being created. Kentridge thus provides the viewer with a richly individuating perceptive platform.

His technique fans out not only the images as created by the automatic mind yet also it confirms the very process of the unconscious stretching out its feelers, with the personal censorship exposed. In his practice and final production the artist displays the processes of the eye in unrest, the eye that desires to nest, “to settle in” (Lyotard). Yet the process at hand wrenches the eye that seeks the discursive stasis. However the viewer’s eye finds itself wrestling within a mobile perpetual loop. As Kentridge animates the stages as they undergo processes of erasure and subsequent overdrawing -overwriting. This support thus functions as a palimpsestic mystic mnesis writing.

To the animated drawings thus engaged, the stasis escapes for it collapses into unpredictable motion. Kentridge sees “drawing as inherently animated.” [Kentridge : 2009: 242] In order for a drawing to be inherently and coextensively energised, stretching into

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200 In Discourse, figure Lyotard mentions, “For the supposed split (le dedoublement) of a pre-world (du pre-monde) does not only open the distance where the eye settles in (s’installe) on the edge of the discourse. This wrenching (arrachement) produces within (dans) the discourse the effects of distortion.” [Lyotard: 1974: 129].

its driving folds the process of erasure must occur.

Kentridge declares that this process is pictorially pertinent to his creative practice, “Erasing is actually an important part of the process. The image comes into being as much from what I’m taking away as from what I’m putting down. Erasure becomes a kind of pentimento, an element of layering as you get in painting, but it is more ghostly in drawing.” [Kentridge: 2009: 239].

This ghostly patinated pentimento, perpetually layering, allows for otherwise imperceptible passages of time to be registered. Kentridge confirms that this technique aligns the memory’s and mind’s demand, a self-recognising force. “Erasure and the traces it leaves are about the passage of time and hence memory. Fragmentation is about resilience and recognition.” [Kentridge: 2009: 239].

In such a manner Kentridge crafts singular plasticity that uncovers each manual state of the moving image. The viewer witnesses the animated hand-drawn and handwritten layers overlapped in a palimpsestuous manner. This technique that reintroduces automatism to the contemporary video, allows for “dissociative states” [Gibson: 2009] of the images to be recorded [Gibson: 2009].

As a result, Automatic Writing video gives evidence to unstable, that is collapsing and individuating, semi-static and scrambled, states of the images. These states recall stages

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202 This ghostly element is equally present in the pinhole photography. See: Chapter 1.

203 Gibson clarifies, “Psychological automatism is the result of a dissociation between behaviour and consciousness. Familiarity and long usage allow actions to become automatic so that they are performed with a minimum of thought and deliberation. Pathological automatism, also the consequence of dissociative states, ensues from psychological conflict, drugs or trance states; automatism may also be manifested in sensory hallucinations.” (Gibson, 2009)
as though experienced through a kind of a process that occurs “during a trance.”

In fact, the *Automatic Writing* depicts image through a fluid vacillating transe. It manifests the dissociative states in perpetual letter-line variations that are about to individuate and reindividuate themselves. However, as soon as the individuation strand is spun, the initiated image-thread collapses. Henceforth image fails to contain or rather sustain its metastable potential. Nor does the image further work with metastability thus vested. The triggered disequilibrium, open in-between space, vast in liberated potentials, withdraws and collapses into another disintegrating flow that stretches into next volatile flux.

In a visual manner this technique equally affirms degrees to which the unconscious interacts with the conscious. In consequence slow motion practice enhances image in its vacillating danse-subtle trance. Additionally a whole new pre-creation phase preceding the actual work is necessary in order for such a trance to be put in motion.

Kentridge himself accounts that the very act of drawing embodies “slow motion version of thought.” Kentridge explains in detail, “The activity of drawing is a way of trying to understand who we are or how we operate in the world. It is in the strangeness of the activity itself that can be detected judgement, ethics and morality… So drawing is a slow motion version of thought […] The uncertain and imprecise way of constructing a drawing is sometimes a model of how to construct meaning.” [Kentridge: In.: Danto 2005: 116].

Yet it is not only a thought process that participates on the construction of a drawing. The complex “strangeness of the activity” is ingrained in physical, almost

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204 Gibson explains the difference between the automatic process in psychological and pathological automatism; “In particular, he (Janet) studied the automatic behaviour of mediums to determine the degree to which the subconscious interacts with the conscious during a trance. A medium, while in a self-induced trance, performs spontaneous physical acts with no conscious control. Psychiatry suggests that their apparent messages from a spirit world may actually be subliminal thoughts or feelings, released and given free expression.” In.: Jennifer Gibson, *Automatism*, From Grove Art Online, 2009 Oxford University Press, 2009. https://www.moma.org/collection/details.php?theme_id=10947.

biogrammatical adjustments as well. As Kentridge describes his work as, “Walking, thinking, stalking the image. Many hours spent in the studio are hours of walking, pacing back and forth across the space gathering the energy, the clarity to make the first mark […] This pacing is often in relation to the sheet of paper waiting on the wall.” [Kentridge: 2009:13].

As Kentridge notices such process of pacing and waiting allows the artist to “gather energy,” to saturate the sheet of paper with a first, automatic accident. This gathering of random accidents allows new relations to take place. Therefore we could argue on the pictorial-figural backdrop as tackled in Chapter 4., the first mark is born out of an outburst from the platform of probabilistic givens.

Such a preparatory pacing paves a way of dealing with the image and Kentridge himself confirms that, “...drawing is a way of processing.” [Kentridge: 2009: 238].

This singular processing suggests that the painter’s presence, whether pacing or other, is already englobed in the canvas, in the blank space ahead.

In direct conjunction with the artist’s personal work Deleuze examines what he terms preparatory work. This preparatory work includes the artist in an environment that he is about to create as well. However, this energetically new environment through adaptive advances is about to co-shape him as well. That means the active advances of the artist alter the environment - they enter inalloplastic mode - as well as reform the artist as immersed in the environment, where the autoplastic mode occurs. [Rycroft: 1995: 6].

Deleuze notes, “We do not listen closely enough to what painters have to say. They say that the painter is already in the canvas where he or she encounters all the figurative and probabilistic givens that occupy and preoccupy the canvas. […] There is thus a preparatory work that belongs to painting fully, and yet precedes the act of painting. […] This preparatory work is invisible and silent, yet extremely intense, and the act of painting itself appears as an afterward, an après-coup (“hysteresis”) in relation to this work.” [Deleuze: 2008: 70].

As we see, the preparatory work demands and entails movements and gestures that

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allow for transgressive stages to come forth. Deleuze ask, “What does this act of painting consist of? Bacon defines it in this way: make random marks (line-traits); scrub, sweep, or wipe the canvas in order to clear out locales or zones (color-patches); throw the paint, from various angles and at various speeds.” [Deleuze: 2008: 70].

We can argue that all these processes confirm yet another way of “stalking the image” until a “first mark”, first accident appears.

The pacing and stalking of the image not yet born, the very core of the image, proceeds from various angles, until active marks simmers up. In the Automatic Writing we can notice the exposition of an invasion of the image with instilling random marks, that undergo scrubbing and wiping strokes.

Therefore we can resume that, the video exhibits the animated trajectories of “pacing back and forth” that gather energy from various sources. Such kneaded and threaded energy scrambles the stasis and searches for (1.) interactive complicities (between wrist’s gesture, thickly smeared black charcoal, thin pencil, grey erased scrubbed zone, overspilled black ink spot, shadow-figures, Mozart’s partition)\textsuperscript{207} that could result in (2.) internal resolutions prone to be individuated. This pacing back and forth recasts the image and the eye into the scanning mode, investing the image into new cinematic economies and enactments.\textsuperscript{208} The video exhibits the cursory edging of the letter, flickering up, in due course bridging into a line. It exposes the intermediating interplay of presence/absence, bringing to the foreground the inscribed-scrubbed states of images as they register the

\textsuperscript{207} Examples precisely chosen from the concrete body of work by William Kentridge.

\textsuperscript{208} In a way, these overtly vibrant movements reflect kind of an energetic athleticism where the hand stokes echo the work of the artist’s muscles. These moves, stretch out of his bodily stasis so as to furrow the large pages, stages of animation. Via the self-driven motions in preparatory phase artist thus finds himself already in the canvas.
immediately wiped off pleats of the artist’s and image’s memory.\textsuperscript{209}

In such an energetically demanding employment of perpetual overdrawing Kentridge situates the viewer’s vision in a state of continual readjustment. As the vision is demanded in fast random pace, to pass, from the mode of reading to seeing, often reading-seeing at once so as to keep up with the corresponding image states of constant inscribing-erasing. This viewing experience nurtures and challenges a continually renewed adaptation of the viewer’s stance. In such a manner Kentridge resurfaces “the ambiguity of the image as memory of the fragment.”\textsuperscript{[Buci-Glucksman : 2013: 97].}

In conjunction with the palimpsestuous character of the support Buci-Glucksmann observes, “This archaeology of gaze situates the palimpsest at the very site of vision. In the ambiguity of the image as memory of the fragment (the deadly side of defunct desire and its funeral scenario) and as memory of an Apparition[…].”\textsuperscript{[Buci-Glucksman : 2013: 97].}\textsuperscript{210}

The palimpsestuous platform nurtures the gaze as situated at the site of vision. It is such a strangely and yet precisely fragmented scrambled and struggling memory of Apparition that the video liberates and affirms. The multiple processes occurring within the \textit{Automatic Writing} furnish the quest for a new vision.\textsuperscript{211} This quest for new vision occurs on the level of the visual-mental techniques, as well as the intermedial material techniques.

\textsuperscript{209} Christine Buci-Glucksmann explains these discharged trace-images and in relation to Baudelaire’s artistic process accentuates the artist’s zestful and in this case insatiable eye, “The gaze, the play of presence/absence, establishes a close link between the “palimpsestuous” and the “incestuous” to the extent that Baudelaire was fascinated particularly by the dual and even larger plural nature of engraved trace-images in the psychic metaphor of the palimpsest, “From my earliest youth, my eyes filled with paintings or engravings, could never be satisfied, and I think that worlds could come to an end, \textit{impavidum ferient}, before I would become an iconoclast.” [Buci-Glucksman :2013: 97]. Christine Buci-Glucksmann, \textit{The Madness of Vision: On Baroque Aesthetics}, Ohio University Press, 2013

\textsuperscript{210} The theme of mourning is weaved into Kentridge’s politics of the image. See: miniature theater, video installation \textit{BlackBox/Chambre Noir} [2005], \textit{The Magic Flute} [2010], \textit{Felix in Exile} [1994], \textit{The History of the Main Complaint} [1996].

\textsuperscript{211} On another place in connection with Baudelaire’s aesthetics Christine Buci-Glucksmann states, “... In this primitive scene of vision, “ Baudelaire describes eyes that could be said to have lost the ability to look” (Writer, 250).
Intermediality that is fusion of multiple mediums reinforces the already differed and drifting states of the image. Moreover, it also activates interactions between these mediums, whether observable or not, however in this case explicitly detectable. The states of the image, thus demonstrate not only “limits of the images” but the “images of these limits.” [Szczepanik: 2002].

Dick Higgins (1981) defined intermediality as a “conceptual fusion”. Szczepanik notes that, “In the confrontation with the fusion, the recipient is forced to accept the work of art as something radically inter-mediate, emanating from simultaneously two or more sources, and to let various perception horizons permeate or leak in his experience (e.g. musical horizon with a literary one).” In the reception it forms “aesthetic experience of a new quality” [Szcepancik 2002].

The intermediality of the image exploits not only the relationships between various media (photography, film, digital video, painting, performance, optics, chemistry, science of representation) but suggests their transformative potential which can give rise to new materialities of the image in a sequence of cineplasticities that affect the figural potential of the image. There is a logic of verisimilitude to subsequent productions of image representation technologies. Each of these, in their failure, represent new possibilities in the figural relationship between the viewer and the image.

Such images are thus challenged to be negotiated in the viewing process by the viewer. The example of the hand-drawn animated videos (*Automatic Writing*, 2008), miniature theatre installations (*The Black Box/Chambre Noir* 2005) or operatic installations (*The Magic Flute*, 2010) of William Kentridge expose mutual imbrications of various media. Such an intermedial interaction proves that one medium needn't be eliminated at the cost of the other. In such an animated set-up seeing and reading occur at once, confronting the viewer with a co-experience of ambiguous invested forces, forcing him to engage in transgressive processes.

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214 However, intermediality and cineplasticity must also be viewed in time, the materiality of an object must assume change through time and so an object, viewed at different points in time will also have slight alterations in its potentiality. For instance, a film ravaged by exposure will eventually fall into pure potentiality, having no references as the chemicals affixed to the celluloid denature.
As we had remarked the example of *Automatic writing* unlocks the concept of the image-making that also functions as “a big roll” that “unrolls before” the viewer. This corresponds to concepts of image as palimpsest,\(^\text{215}\) *in extensio*, the concept of mind as a mystic palimpsestuous pad. Image as palimpsest reveals “network of agency” where the viewer acquired with a sense of activated agency, negotiates and designs “polychronic assemblage” [Harriss 2011: 17]. This underlines “the untimely matter” that the polychronic palimpsestuous image mediates.” [Gill Harriss :2011:17].\(^\text{216}\)

It seems the animated images by Kentridge (1.) express the process of “coming of themselves”, similarly, as in Bertha’s experience where ideas “come of themselves” and her being there “only to stand for something.” Equally, (2.) the images carry in themselves their very core, the driving force of desire, which allows them to constantly reanimate themselves. It is as though it was through some nurturing lack, that such a set-up provides that which activates the self-driven (Greek for *automaton*) animation.\(^\text{217}\)

The concept of image as palimpsestuous roll that needs to be decoded within the viewing process reinforces the concept of plasticity as an unifying force that would allow to bring together these diverse intermedial dissipative layers. Such a kind of unifying plasticity we find in Coleridge’s concept of the esemplastic imaginative unity.

This imaginative unity yields to two imaginative processes: primary and secondary. Coleridge terms the primary imagination “the living power”. This power forms the subject’s infinite I am. It marks the self-individuating state of the subject in the flux of

\(^{215}\) As regards palimpsest, the global definition states, “In general terms, palimpsest refers to writing which is superimposed on already existing scripture. In his later work Gérard Genette uses the term palimpsest to describe a literature made up of hypertexts which derive from, imitate or relate to an earlier work of hypotext. Together a hypertext and its hypotext make up a multi-layered palimpsest. For instance, Joyce’s *Ulysses* and Homer’s *Odyssey* (the hypotext) together make up a palimpsest. The same goes for *Michel Tournier’s Vendredi ou les Limbes du Pacifique* and its hypotext Robinson Cruso.” p. 140. In.: *Key terms in semiotics*, (eds.) B. Martin, F.Ringham, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006.


\(^{217}\) It is questionable whether that lack is that of an unifying force as that may prove at the end to be a paralysing verdict to the image’s vivacity. Part of the answer may lie in the subtle balance of both. That means keeping the sufficiently driving force of the desire, the image-drive, in a supple collision with the finely unifying yet still elastic force that would tie it into an active metastable bundle.
infinity. Secondary imagination echoes the primary imagination, “differing only in degree.” It is its role to “dissolve, diffuse, dissipate”. In contrast to Fancy, the secondary imagination does not work with “fixities nor definites” [Coleridge: 2008:151]. It unlocks these formed fixities and disperses them.

The mutual functioning of these two imaginative environments is underpinned by an esemplastic power. The framework of esemplasis has its origin in Schelling’s concept of *In-eins-bildung*, “a shaping into one.” However Coleridge claims he has created the neologism (Greek for *eis en plattein*, to shape into one) so as to bring forth the new unifying sense. [Coleridge: 2008:81].

When Coleridge scholar Parish [1985:103] examined I.A. Richards’ study on Coleridge (*Coleridge on Imagination*, 1935) he was convinced “that Fancy and Imagination are not two powers at all, but one. The valid distinction which exists between them lies not in the materials with which they operate, but in the degree of intensity of the

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218 Coleridge further notes that, “I know myself through self” which proves that this primary imagination is self-forming. “The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be living power and prime agent of all human perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.” [S.T.Coleridge, Bibliographia Literaria, 2008, p. 151].

219 Coleridge records, “The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to recreate: or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.” [Coleridge: 2008:151]. As the Latin prefix *dis*- suggests, a common denominator of dispersion and dissemination is to be “apart-, asunder”. It refers to the separating act that disperses, dematerialises. It stands in contrast to the densification process as applied by Didi-Huberman on the creation process of *Dichtung*. See:Chapter 2.

220 In reference to fancy, Coleridge maintains, “equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its materials ready made from the law of association.” [Coleridge: 2008:151].

221 Ferrier notes that Coleridge did not invent the word yet has taken it from Schelling. Thus the neologism is not in place. See: The Evolution of the Term ‘Esemplastic’, The Modern Language Review Vol. 24, 3 No 3, July, 1929.

222 Coleridge insists, I constructed it myself from the Greek words, eis en plattein, to shape into one; because, having to convey a new sense” [Coleridge: 2008: 81].

We can thus argue that creative esemplastic act thus functions as “a process of organic becoming” [Volant Baker: 2006] that produces “something absolutely new, and also very likely, strange.” It is such a process of strange becoming where Coleridge’s mechanism invite “scene from elsewhere” [Lytard: 1974, Chapter 1]. These features are related to innovative gesture yet still remain in static pathic modes as opposed to metastatic individuating stages.

Following up this line of thought at the background of the Automatic Writing video we can detect what we term proto-transitional space. As exemplified through Kentridge’s preparatory technique and production this proto-transitional space is manifest on the example of presence and disappearance. Such a proto-transitional space alludes to Freud’s fort-da (gone-here) concept. This concept introduces the initiating of appearance and disappearance by a child, and thus crafts a singular “game in itself.” [Freud: 18-19].

Freud describes, “The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind him, for instance, and play at its being a carriage. What he did was to hold the reel by the string and very skilfully throw it over the edge of his curtained cot, so that it disappeared into it, at the same time uttering his expressive ‘o-o-o-o’. He then pulled the reel out of the cot again by the string and hailed its

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225 Another Coleridge scholar, James Volant Baker, accentuates the process of “organic becoming” entailed in the creative act within esemplastic concept. He affirms, “The creative act, on the contrary, is a godlike-act-of-power and causing-to-be, imagination being the divine potency in man. The creative act by which the poet writes the poem is similar to the creative act by which God ordered the world out of chaos; if the poet's creative act is not a creation ex nihilo, it is a process of organic becoming through which the materials are transformed into something absolutely new, and also very likely, strange.” [Volant Baker:2006] James Volant Baker, The Sacred River. Coleridge's Theory of the Imagination, quoted in: http://www.online-literature.com/forums/showthread.php?16344-Coleridge-quot-imagination-and-Fancy-quot

reappearance with a joyful *da* (there). This, then, was the complete game - disappearance and return. As a rule one only witnessed its first act, which was repeated untiringly as a game in itself, though there is no doubt that the greater pleasure attached to the second act.” [Freud: 1988: 18-19].

In such a to and fro movement the child experiences the space that it creates. The space the movement shapes is precisely a transitional space that allows the child to play and in such a play reach beyond this play. Similarly, this evokes Kentridge’s preparatory work of “pacing back and forth”, which allows him to harvest germane creative energies.

This initialisation of space where the child, as a creator, makes a reel appear and return can be further expanded into a different developmental level as elaborated by Donald W. Winnicott. Further on the Freudian concept can be expanded to Winnicottian proto-creation transitional space.

In the paper entitled *Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena* [1953, 1971]. Donald W. Winnicott examines the formation of an extremely relevant object that he terms a transitional object. This object is being developed in the early stages of infancy. It comes to existence within a space, that we term proto-transgressive, proto-creation or later individuating space. Such a space creates and shifts areas of experiencing and visual adaptabilities.

Winnicott demonstrates, “It is assumed here that the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality, and that relief from this strain is provided by an intermediate area of experience (cf.

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229 Gaston Bachelard notes an important observation in relation to the creation. He paraphrases the French painter Jean Lescure (loc.cit., p. 132): “Lapique (loc.cit., p. 132) demands of the creative act that it should offer him as much surprise as life itself.” In.: *Poetics of Space* 1994, p. xxxiii. First published, in French in 1958, couple of years after Winnicott’s formulation of the hypothesis on transitional space and object.
Riviere, 1936) which is not challenged (arts, religion, etc.). This intermediate area is in direct continuity with the play area of the small child who is ‘lost’ in play.” [Winnicott: 1971: 9]. Winnicott confirms the presence of such transitional space clearly when he further refines the concept of intermediate area. He accentuates that in the developmental states of an adult this area becomes progressively dormant, thus unchallenged. The “intense experiencing” becomes exclusive “to the arts and to religion.” [Winnicott: 1971:10].

Winnicott glosses out, “This intermediate area of experience, unchallenged in respect of its belonging to inner or external (shared) reality, constitutes the greater part of the infant’s experience, and throughout life is retained in the intense experiencing that belongs to the arts and to religion and to imaginative living, and to creative scientific work.” [Winnicott: 1971:10].

In conjunction with the transitional object, Winnicott proves that it becomes disinvested in the course of the development, “An infant’s transitional object ordinarily becomes gradually decathected, especially as cultural interests develop.” [Winnicott: 1971:9]. That means once the creative work takes place the transitional object becomes withdrawn, as opposed to cathected (besetzt).

We could thus argue that Winnicottian child experiences itself in a manner similar to the Baconian painter. When the child eventuates the transitional object in its intermediary space, there is an “entire battle” that takes place between the child and the “probabilistic givens that occupy” such a space. [Deleuze: 2008: 70]. This work is, in direct reference to the experience of the primary capacity for creation. As the artist’s preparatory work, so the child’s entire battle when at play, are “invisible and silent, yet extremely intense.”[Deleuze: 2008: 70].

Deleuze confirms this invested struggle taking place, “An entire battle takes place on the canvas between the painter and these givens.”[Deleuze: 2008: 70].

We can state, this “extremely intense” battle stretches itself in the mediated space between the painter and the canvas. Such a proto-creation set-up is finds itself invaded with “preindividual potentialities” as not yet challenged ones. [Simondon: 1992].
Additionally, this instantaneously outstretched transitional space reaches beyond the representative status of the object or ontological stasis of subject. As it emerges, it brings with itself nods of new sensations.

Deleuze comments, “It is like an emergence of another world. For these marks, these traits are irrational, involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative. They are no longer either significant or signifiers: they are asignifying traits.”[Deleuze: 2008: 71].

Although these asignifying traits are instantiated, they need to be challenged so as to become active mediators. As a result they can operate as individuating strands and convey sensations.

Deleuze explains that these sensations that emerge are confused ones, “They are traits of sensation, but of confused sensations (the confused sensations, as Cézanne said, that we bring with us at birth).[Deleuze: 2008: 77].

We can conclude that there is something of the prenatally uncanny tied in with the pictorial confused sensations that refer to the state of birth. Equally they can evoke something monstrous once conveyed through these transgressive stages. Such prenatal and pre-individuation prone points of contact in space are carried by the Woolfian “hideously difficult white space” as we shall later see.

To follow upon Winnicott’s concept and resume the pictorially cinematic occurrences by Kentridge, we can say that these do not qualify as pictorial mobile objects anymore. For they display states of image that give rise to the play of letter-line, in extension text-image. This play launches a mobile cluster where random, involuntary, brushlike charcoal strokes activate and challenge states of images.

Cinematic object here cedes to be ontologically grounded. It becomes a self-individuating pictorial-cinematic strand that ripples through and defines states of the image to come. In such a pictorially animated play the transitional object communicates possible transition that the image can undergo.

To the question upon whether Kentridge thinks of drawing as “the purest form of thinking” Kentridge replies,“[…] it’s not that I think drawing the purest form of

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230 The comment is supposedly subscribed to Giorgio Vasari.
thinking. Rather that drawing as an activity gets close to being a visible external equivalent of an invisible internal process. Drawing (and all art making) is about negotiating the space between what we know and what we see.” [Kentridge : 2009: 244]. As we will later argue these negotiating processes, as part of the internal formation, are followed up in Simondon’s concept of individuation. (see: Chapter 6).

As Michael Auping observes “the drawing is always in a state of transformation.” [Kentridge : 2009: 240]. As a result, it is such a state of transformation that allows the cinematic form to function as an open source.

In relation to the transitional space, we can claim that the Winnicottian “intermediate area of experience” evokes Klee’s between-world (inter-world, Zwischenwelt) that he also later terms a side-world (Nebenwelt). In fact, it seems in such a world where artistic activity is instigated. Furthermore it is in this world “in which the monstrous and the formless have their rights because they can be sublime.” [Lyotard : 1991:97]. In this conceptual continuity of Winnicottian and Klee’s space, Lyotard coins what he first calls an in-between world (inter-world, un entre-monde). Subsequently he argues that it is in such an intermediary space where figural area emerges. As we had remarked and will argue in a more detailed manner in the next Chapter, Lyotard’s figural space clearly indicates an intermediary zone that bears qualities with the metastable environment.

When the artist experiences this intermediary zone, he is in a state when he is confronted with the space inhabited by pure intensities, he is confronted with a space that is


232 Lyotard himself directly refers to Klee’s between-world as well as to Winnicott’s transitional object. However, in his figural project (1974), they remain without further elaboration. Years after his initial figural project Lyotard revives his Kleean reference. It is in connection with sublime where he maintains, “Art does not imitate nature, it creates a world apart, eine Zwischenwelt, as Paul Klee will say; eine Nebenwelt, one might say in which the monstrous and the formless have their rights because they can be sublime” [Lyotard : 1991:97]. “The Sublime and The Avant-garde”, Lyotard: The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Stanford University Press, 1991.

233 In Discours, figure, Lyotard makes an explicit reference to Winnicottian concept of transitional object.
“too much”, somewhat “too full”. In this stage the artist needs to generate possible adaptive techniques so as to select certain elements. That means the artist needs to capture the intensity and individuate it into a sustainable yet vivid form. In this pre-transgressive, pre-individuating stage, the intensities, variations of accidents do not function as objects. Rather, they function as pleats taking part within this “often painful process of learning.” [Strauss: 1935].

Thereupon in reference to Deleuze and Kentridge we can argue that the preparatory phase can be conceived of as an energetic environment that is “populated by pure intensities (of sound, light, hunger, etc.) in which the baby cannot yet distinguish between itself and the world.” [Smith 2003:5].

It is in this pre-individuating preparatory phase as inhabited by pure intensities where states of image unravel themselves to the artist’s mind. Through the metabolism of the colour events, light, hunger and resistance, the artist paces the unstable stages of image and self. Image, born through such self-adjusting flows, harvests the germ of immediacy. In this phase artist is open to capture instantiations of intensities and individuate them.

Erwin Strauss (1935) writes, “In sensory experience,”[...]“there unfolds both the becoming of the subject and the happenings of the world. I become only insofar as something happened, and something happens (for me) only insofar as I become [...] . In sensing, both self and world unfold simultaneously for the sensing subject.” [Strauss: 1935, In.: Smith:2003]. On the background of sensory experience, Strauss depicts a proto-metastable environment. As in such an environment the instability is sensed, established by as well as by the subject as its environment. As yet it remains proto-metastable for the overthrow of the saturated stasis has not occurred.

The image can thus spring up, from a random play which may capture at once the “often painful process of learning,” creating and individuating. We can argue that image thus conceived can reveal itself as “an immediate image.” That means immediate is an


235 In Daniel W. Smith, Translator’s Note: Deleuze on Bacon: Three Conceptual Trajectories in The Logic of Sensation, Strauss: The Primary World of the Senses (1935).
image that “looks as if it were born in a minute.” [Frankenthaler In.: Rose: 1975: 85].

The American painter Helen Frankenthaler reports on this experience,

"A really good picture looks as if it's happened at once. It's an immediate image. For my own work, when a picture looks labored and overworked, and you can read in it—well, she did this and then she did that, and then she did that—there is something in it that has not got to do with beautiful art to me. And I usually throw these out, though I think very often it takes ten of those over-labored efforts to produce one really beautiful wrist motion that is synchronized with your head and heart, and you have it, and therefore it looks as if it were born in a minute." [Frankenthaler In.: Rose: 1975: 85].

Frankenthaler’s practice reveals that the challenged stalking and sketching of the image may proceed through at least ten transitional pre-individuating versions. In her case, the ten too static and straightforward, over laboured stages do not as yet express her self-forming individuating desire. However it seems, these images need to be created so as to carefully saturate the prevailing “blank space”, always too full, too inhabited expressing the fully-tuned in state of the artist. Once the space thus permeated with versions, overloaded or overheated through the multiple warm-ups of the writ’s motion, the artist can reach into the authentic potential, the true inner alignment where she speaks with one voice - in one rhythmic motion. In that authentic individuation “one really beautiful wrist motion” can surge. The inner resolution comes alive in the corporeal biogrammatic head-heart alignment as well. Here, image rendered visible, conceals the Kleean Zwischenwelt, stretches out its feelers and is born through a germ of immediacy, “ in a minute”. It is the “work of one wrist” that brands for Frankenthaler signature of the artist.

Whereas Kentridge described the proto-creation phase as “stalking the image”, in this phase Woolf’s artist has a different mindset. Woolf’s painter directly experiences

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237 In Barbara Rose, Frankenthaler, New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc. 1975, p. 85 In a different context, Frankenthaler returns and maintains the concept of “the work of one wrist”. We are convinced that it is this rhythmic “work of one wrist” that allows for an immediate image to break through. She carries out: “I don't start with a color order, but find the colors as I go. I’d rather risk an ugly surprise than rely on things I know I can do. I had the landscape in my arms as I painted it. I had the landscape in my mind and shoulder and wrist. Every canvas is a journey all its own. I've explored a variety of directions and themes over the years. But I think in my painting you can see the signature of one artist, the work of one wrist. To sustain conviction is often a struggle. No one enjoys being alone.” Helen Frankenthaler, 1928, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helen_Frankenthaler](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helen_Frankenthaler)
presence of the already too full, too inhabited by heavy sensations a space. The painter’s process is described as follows, “...her mind kept throwing up from its depths, scenes, and names, and sayings, and memories and ideas, like a fountain spurting over that glaring, hideously difficult white space, while she modelled it with greens and blues.” [Woolf: 2012:121].

Again, in this case, Woolf’s painter voices the state of the proto-creation, individuation and autopoietic investment. When she encounters the white blank momentum, the excess of space, this one is experienced as Winnicottian “an immediate area of experiencing” For it is also in such a “hideously difficult white space” where all the possibilities meet.

As we had noticed, that which gives rise to the “immediate image” Frankenhalter terms “wrist’s motion.” This motion mediated by the wrist becomes by the Woolfian painter the “hand” that quivered with life”. These two processes demonstrate the proto-creation space where the states of images render themselves palpable. While creating the image Woolf’s artist literally “loses consciousness of outer things.” This echoes with Freud’s explanation of the immersive “game in itself” that accompanies the movement of the child as it establishes its first transitional object or to say it with Kentridge as it stalks the space.

In delineating the developmental stages of transitional space, Winnicott’s analytical study proceeds in examination of the play of illusion-disillusion, weaning, to the the

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238 V. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, Interactive Media, 2012, p. 121.

239 In the novel To the Lighthouse, Woolf maintains, “Can’t paint, can’t write, she murmured monotonously, anxiously considering what her plan of attack should be. For the mass loomed before her; it protruded; she felt it pressing on her eyeballs. Then, as if some juice necessary for the lubrication of her faculties were spontaneously squirted, she began precariously dipping among the blues and umbers, moving her brush hither and thither, but it was now heavier and went slower, as if it had fallen in with some rhythm which was dictated to her (she kept looking at the hedge, at the canvas) by what she saw, so that while her hand quivered with life, this rhythm was strong enough to bear her along with it on its current. Certainly she was losing consciousness of outer things. And as she lost consciousness of outer things, and her name and her personality and her appearance, and whether Mr Carmichael was there or not, her mind kept throwing up from its depths, scenes, and names, and sayings, and memories and ideas, like a fountain spurting over that glaring, hideously difficult white space, while she modelled it with greens and blues.” V. Woolf, To the Lighthouse, Interactive Media, 2012, p. 121.
initiation to establish a play. All the time it highlights infant’s primary creative capacity.

At this point, we can conclude that this primary creative activity occurs within a special area. As demonstrated Winnicott terms this area “an intermediate area of experience” and it is here that the child finds itself “lost in play”. Such a play state is pursued in direct continuity with the Deleuzian “preparatory work”, and stretches out to Simondon’s “preindividual process of formation.” Deleuze links the preparatory work to the artist’s process of wrestling with the work of art before its displayed creation or even before any cognitive thought has been shaped. In this conceptual line we argue that this process is reflected by Simondon connects the preindividual process with the subject’s formation. In this internal yet adaptive-prone formation the individual is about to be in the midst of encountering its own falling out of sync which enables him to open itself to potentially new, even radically random, individuated states. This process, as we see, requires a highly creative capacity of (1.) being fully immersed and ready to react when an immediate stage makes itself apparent. (2.) Even so, to be capable of self-negotiating the arising preindividual states. This experience, whatever its conceptual form, conditions a natural source of “information and mediation” [Simondon: 1992:] and places the image at hand in a state of an open source.
6.1 Cinematic Diagram

Cinematic transgression as explored on the animated image brought forth the metastability of the cinematic image. Such a specific characteristic of cinematic image as a metastable environment allows the viewer to unlock the individuating intensities of the image states. In stark contrast to the unifying and object-based qualities, cinematic transgression seeks to underscore individuating stages of the image along with the auto- and alloplastic adaptive practices, as well as viewer’s appropriation to them. Cinematic image thus conceived, is defined as environment bound to creation. As a result we argue image as a creation-prone environment functions as an open source. As a source we define and comprehend the site of metastable potentialities of image. The work of Hiroshi Teshigahara offers a cinematic platform for examining cinematic transgression in conjunction with distinct individuating plasticities, both auto- and alloplastic ones. In *The Woman in the Dunes* (1964) the cinematic image defines its metastable capacities and thus opens its resources of individuating sites, of both the image and the character.

In *The Face of Another* (1966) the cinematic image breaks open, redefining itself in the white-burnt glow, which refers to as its origin as in the white screen as well as its newly individuated stages.

In this chapter we are going to examine Deleuze’s concept of pictorial diagram. We shall demonstrate that the diagram behaves as what is known in science as a metastable system. Subsequently, we are going to examine diagram and metastability in conjunction with the individuation process as elaborated by Gilbert Simondon.240 We are going to apply all these on the nature of the cinematic image and show how image can bear qualities of metastable system, instigate individuation processes within the image itself, character or the viewer, therefore function as what we call open source.

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The concept of diagram as elaborated on the pictorial support in Deleuze’s theory laid out in *The Logic of Sensation* (1981), clearly acquires qualities of the metastable environment.241

Deleuze defines the diagram as that which is detected at the centre of the painting, in the scrambled zone and from which newly discovered series emerge. He registers, “[…] the diagram can be found, not at the level of the umbrella, but in the scrambled zone, below and to the left, and it communicates with the whole through the black shore. It is from the diagram – at the center of the painting, at the point of close viewing – that the entire series emerges as a series of accidents “mounting on top of another.” [Deleuze: 2008: 110].

Such a framed exposition demonstrates that diagram will function as a disruptive, acinematic intervention that “scrambles the form” of the image at hand. Subsequently the once disrupted, scrambled form will allow for “a form of a completely different nature” to be rendered visible.

We see that within the diagrammatic framework the whole emerges from an immediate investment of nonfigurative, unstable traits that give rise to new series of accidents.

In this case it is no longer the Albertinian *contruzzione legittima* that guarantees the discernible pictorial alignment.242 What is sought is a body of an image that conducts itself as a malleable environment that would allow for the activated zones to generate new perceptive series. Therefore such semi-static scrubbed environment, patterned within the shaking grid, nonfigurative stasis, extends toward nonformal color-patches. Such a newly arranged set-up creates a different whole. Deleuze points out yet the whole emerges “as if from a pool.”

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241 For the purposes of our research we focus and limit ourselves to the first diagrammatic theory, as presented and published by Deleuze in 1981. This concept was elaborated in direct continuation to Lyotard’s figural project. However Deleuze will later on develop an extended version, refined in continual collaboration with Félix Guattari. See: G. Deleuze/F. Guattari, *A thousand Plateaus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, University of Minnesota Press. (trans.) B. Massumi, 2009.

242 This statement has been equally raised in Lyotard’s figural project, see: Chapter 2.
This indicates that the diagrammatic basis is already cast within an potentially and partially invested reservoir, a seething supply (that the artist provided, or insinuated or that slipped in by accident, reactivated by the viewer) in contrast to limited, bound representational storage. Image that conceals in itself what Deleuze calls by Bacon “an animality”, conveys in itself a seething reservoir of forces. This animality, as instantiated force, simmers at the heart of the diagram that deploys its arising presence.

This set-up instigates existence of the simmering, free potentials that arise from the colour patches, ready to bind other free potentials and create series, Therefore such a free energy can be harvested as a pure force. Following upon that we argue that the whole breaks out, this liberated force can communicate an active and activated environment. We can thus say, together with Deleuze, that what then arises from such an invested zone, is not a bird, but a pure individuated intensity of his birdness. Equally the scrambled color-patch of birdness emerges teeming “as if from a pool.”

That means in order for animality-force to be deployed, the whole must break out and make room for diagrammatic and metastable acts of actualisation. This demonstrates that such a conditioned breakout indicates that once the fully contained figuration finds itself oversaturated, the previously constituted or anticipated stasis of the image must step out of itself.

As a result, the no- longer figurative stasis finds itself out of tune and warped. It is at such a stage of development of the image, thrown ahead of itself, that it opens zones of scrambling. These newly opened, scrambled zones endowed with indiscernibility as their characteristic feature open the colour patches toward new individuating investments. As soon as the indiscernibility inserts itself between two forms, between the no-longer and not-yet, it activates the between-space. The non figurative, once cleaved out of the colour zones “raises to the power” allowing colour zones to be invested. In such a manner the activated unbound force of animality can be harvested within color-patches that arise from these sensitive nonfigurative scrambled zones.
Deleuze explains these intricate entanglement of processes, “The diagram-accident has scrambled the intentional figurative form, the bird: it imposes nonformal color-patches and traits that function only as traits of birdness, of animality. It is from these nonfigurative traits that the final whole merges, as if from a pool; and it is they that raise it to the power of the pure Figure, beyond the figuration contained in this whole. Thus the diagram acted by imposing a zone of objective indiscernibility or indeterminability between two forms, one of which was no longer, and the other, not yet: it destroys the figuration of the first and neutralizes that of the second. [Deleuze: 2008: 110].

We can read this diagrammatic description in terms of metastable formation of image. What Deleuze describes as (1.) two forms, where one is no longer, and (2.) the other not yet are in fact phase states that (1a) precede and (2a) are contained within metastable equilibrium. In terms of the diagrammatic set-up the nonfigurative traits that have “risen to the power” of the pure Figure/intensity\(^{243}\) demonstrate the oversaturated metastable point that has flipped off and thus distorts the figurative stasis. The diagramatic-accident points to the fact that new image-source, held within, breaks out. Source unearthed, it yields to the image’s newly individuated states.

Further on Deleuze insists that once the diagram is manifested within the scrambled zone or scrambled form, “something must emerge from this diagram, and present itself to view. Roughly speaking, the law of the diagram, according to Bacon, is this: one starts (1.) with a figurative form, (2.) a diagram intervenes and (3.)\(^{244}\) scrambles it, and a form of a completely different nature emerges from the diagram, which is called the Figure.” [Deleuze : 2008: 109].

Such a complex set-up affirms the pertinence that the diagram launches creative qualities that can interact with the liberated forces, bind them and resolve to new adaptive

\(^{243}\) In fact, Deleuze himself is not consistent in keeping the terminology clear throughout his body of work. In some places the distinctions are hard to establish because more terms refer to and define the same or similar conceptual vision. Figure is often conceptually close or in some places indeed overlapping with the argument of intensity, diagram, sensation. Another conceptual confusion can be detected on the level of diagram when for instance, diagram refers to the vision of a what we call perceptive grid and what resembles malleable environment. Equally it is something close to the form in becoming, or “technique of existence”, as Massumi terms it (2011). A similar terminological inconsistency is to be detected by Lyotard as regards the term figure.

\(^{244}\) This is our chronology inserted into the argument so as to better understand and follow the conceptualisation.
resonances of the image. The challenge of such a set-up liable to transgressive ventures is how to make the transgressive performances communicable. Should such a creative potential not succeed in communicating and sharing the freed forces, it fails. In relation to this Deleuze further specifies another diagram’s demand, “The essential point about the diagram is that it is made in order for something to emerge from it, and if nothing emerges from it, it fails.” [Deleuze : 2008:111]. Such an emergence enters as an immediate radical distortion. Yet still this disconcerting emergence proceeds progressively.

We can claim that emergence as a distortion that proceeds in two temporal registers, coordinates (1.) the Newmanian quality of the sudden, immediate presence - similar to the outburst of a deferred action (après -coup) - (2.) with the quality of Baconian invisible yet incrementally simmering “possibilities of the fact.” This double-emergence is explained by Deleuze as follows, “And what emerges from the diagram, the Figure, emerges both gradually and all at once, as in Painting, where the whole is given all at once, while the series is at the same time constructed gradually.” [Deleuze : 2008: 111].

In the language of metastability this means that the equilibrium has flipped over, at a tip and such an outbreak unbolted the source of images, series of which will have been built gradually. Based upon the pictorial groundwork of diagram as laid out by Deleuze and the general metastable theory, we can resume that a cinematic diagram, blending these shall be formed as follows:

(1.) Diagrammatic systems demonstrate that once the oversaturated stasis bursts open, the free accidents embark on a search to approximate or bind themselves. Such a concept of “active approximation” is proper to metastable systems.

The crucial part in application of metastability on cinematic image lies in the new apprehension of the contact between two instances. This contact between two instances or distances is characterised as the concept of constantly active approximation, an eventuating investment of a zone, rather than a contact apprehended as a fixed physical anchorage in a point. Zone of active approximation allows transitions of different degrees of instabilities to
occur. These transitions arise within metastable as well as unstable zones, as the distinction often may be not sharp.

Pablo C. Debenedetti formulates the transition from metastability to instability followingly, “In particular, in a rigorous microscopic theory the transition from metastability to instability is not sharp, and the spinodal becomes a useful approximation rather than a physical locus.” [Debenedetti : 1996: 64].

In relation to the metastable system, Debenedetti asserts that the system’s inclination ensues towards “a greater stability.” This is equally what we want from an image namely that it remains communicable, semi-stable, as much as its descriptions may alter.

Debenedetti adds, “A metastable system will eventually evolve towards a condition of greater stability, and its properties can only be measured if its lifetime is sufficiently long. Hence the very definition of a metastable state involves the notion of time, and calls also for a kinetic description (Binder, 1987) [...]” [Debenedetti : 1996: 64].

In application of the metastable characteristic on the image (such as, highly unstable phases, abrupt dephasing, flipping over the oversaturated equilibrium, causing an emergence of unexplored potentials), we observe manifestation of temporality that corresponds to the diagrammatic demand. Because if the diagram-accident's presence is too short for the environment to notice, neither its relevant properties nor its direct invested impact can be measured.

Question that arises is as follows: Why does the metastable system call for a kinetic description? And what exactly should such a description entail? We can assume that the description ought to be kinetic for the metastable system is inherently process-based, it marks and implies an ongoing cluster of processes. Equally, the processes triggered within metastability - transduction, individuation - bear a high degree of unpredictability, unstability hence their dynamic and energetic character.

(2.) As we had mentioned the diagram appears at the center of the image/painting [Deleuze: 2008: 110]. This centring is however not defined in terms of the coordinates of the deictic physical center. This diagrammatic centring represents a centre that can be saturated and subsequently overthrown. Afterwards, such a center can be invested internally, displaced into any state of the image. As demonstrates the case by Bacon, and as we argue such diagrammatic mobile centring directly relates to the unstable equilibrium of the metastable system. This highly volatile equilibrium is equally always ready to collapse.

The metastable point thus defined dispatches temporary equilibrium that the cinematic environment can entail and draw from. Additionally we investigate metastable system is a system within which individuation processes arise. It is a system that precipitates these processes to be triggered. Metastable system presupposes what is termed “preindividual center.” This centre carries in itself a vast field, a site of charged density, of what Simondon calls “potentialization of incompatibilities.”

Rephrased in the diagrammatic language, the system’s potentialization of incompatibilities refers to the potential of the diagram-accidents, the non-figurative, and thus incompatible traits as tracked by Deleuze. Once this preindividual centre acquires the state where the individuation can be triggered, the image finds itself in an open state where it “passes out of step with itself.” Through such a disruptive dephasing it thus opens its source. That means that the “pre-individual centre does not represent “a unity.” It bears a cluster of possible stages of the individual. Simondon explains, “It is never a step or a stage, and individuation is not synthesis, a return to unity, but rather the being passing out of step with itself (se déphaser), through the potentialization of the incompatibilities of its preindividual center.” [Simondon: 1992:314].

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(3.) As demonstrated by Deleuze, the diagram’s intervention scrambles the form and as such provides a platform where “something must emerge from this diagram, and present itself to view.” [Deleuze : 2008: 109]. In due course, this emergence elicits Figure, that Deleuze defines as “a form of a completely different nature [that] emerges from the diagram.” [Deleuze : 2008: 109]. In individuation phases the subject, once overtly out of tune, reaches out toward unknown and until-now unexperienced incompatibilities. Through these, the subject allows and empowers itself to arise anew. As the diagram’s intervention remains unpredictable, so does the concurrent emergence of the newly individuated states of the subject remain “unforeseeable”.

As the diagram’s invested involvement scrambles the figurative groundwork, and subsequently precipitates new free states of image, in a similar manner in the metastable language, the subject precipitates out of the metastable stasis, opening up a fan of individuation states.

As Simondon accentuated the dephasing quality by the subject, Shaviro strengthens this position by noting that, “The subject cannot be given in advance;” Shaviro specifies that the subject “must always emerge anew, in an unforeseeable way, as it is precipitated out of the metastable transcendental field. Shaviro also reaffirms the clear tie between the diagrammatic and metastable systems, in the Deleuze’s and Simondon’s concepts. What’s fundamental for Simondon and Deleuze is not the individual, but the always ongoing, and never complete or definitive, process of individuation. [Shaviro 2012:80]. We can thus reason that the ongoing and never completed process compliments the kinetic description of metastable system, as stated by Debenedetti earlier.

(4.) Once the state of being or the image finds itself thrown out of sync (déphaser), it refers in such a desynchronised state to the disconcerting alert of the Mountainsque swing and sway of the world (Chapter 1). It is in such a state of experiencing the simmering swing and sway where the individuation-prone intensities start to seek out and reach out to their incompatibilities. This state can be related to what

Deleuze terms as the diagramatic catastrophe. Metastable environment encapsulates in itself such a diagrammatic catastrophe, as well in the outbreak of the equilibrium. Following, through such outburst, an equilibrium once overthrown, dephased, can give rise to the “nascent states” of visibility.

However, Deleuze stresses, “Being itself a catastrophe, the diagram must not create a catastrophe.” [Deleuze: 2008: 111]. This is comprehensible as the diagram is not a self-destructive investment, and as we can claim it must communicate the stages.

(5.) Further specification of definition demonstrates that the diagram emerges from nonfigurative “series of accidents” [Deleuze : 2008: 110] which mount on top of each other. This corresponds to the metastable that is accident-prone irruptions. It is these diagrammatic/metastable irruptions that shake the image, scramble its form henceforth causing the image to be out of sync. These irruptions can mount on top of each other in an avalanche manner. Scientific experiments, measuring the micro-structures and transitions, have demonstrated that the manners in which an avalanche can be triggered, and states that it manifests, suggests a metastable state. In fact the example of avalanche-like mounting of layers, their caving in, serves as an illustrative example of metastable environment that falls out of sync. The avalanche, as metastable environment, represents a folding that collapses within and outwards.

In the framework of the avalanche example, as well as on the level of the diagrammatic systems we notice that once a system is dephased, it searches to resolve itself. The demanded “resolution” arises “at the heart of the system” [Simondon: 1992:

\[249\] For instance this nascent state makes itself apparent through the coloring grey, as it scrambles colour. In relation to the tipping point of metastability, see the concept of grey point by Klee.


304]. We can maintain that the once arisen resolution serves as a clear indicator that a fold of potentialities has broken free ready to solve its incompatibilities. As soon as the density-charged -figurative, cinematic-wave falls out of the stasis, new internal formation is about to take place. As in the diagrammatic systems, as well as in the metastable microstructures and transitions, states that are “rich in potentials” do “preexist in the system”. [Simondon: 1992: 304].

This statement as we had discovered in pictorial and cinematic systems, could have been a lean depiction of the artists’ attempts to throw out of the sync the pre-pictorial, pre-cinematic stasis together with dephasing the stages they and the image find themselves in (Fra Angelico, Bacon, Kentridge, Roeg, Frankenhalter). This image’s initial dephasing proceeds as the artist tries to fill up the space with “random marks” (Bacon), or “to pace and stalk” the space (Kentridge). Such a dephasing and search for tuning in or into new states was visible on the example when the artist tested to saturate the space with ink-spots, sketches so as to provoke reaction in order for random energetic irruptions to occur.

As we can argue, dephasing of image and search for its attunement and a delicate attainment allows a thought to come alive (Kentridge). In order to endeavour the film’s specific diagrammatic tonality we saw that Sokurov attempts to capture series of lightly floating water-colour strokes aligned along film strips so as to loosen up the subtle play of metastable states of colour. Roeg on the other hand so as to field the color-diagram focuses on creation of specific color-event irruptions that will detonate and in turn define states of his cinematic diagram. Once the chromatic density-charged avalanche thrown out of synch, the image reattempts to reinstate its previous equilibrium. Such a mutual gridding comes to pass through resolutions and their attunement between image’s and subject’s diagrammatic stances. Alternative states may include as when subject responds to image’s grids (highly desirable state), or doesn’t respond or creates his new grids. The image, as it fails to return to its previous states, confronted with new replete incompatibilities, carves out a new equilibrium-state. In the cinematic diagram, for instance in Roeg’s color-allocation, the color-event always already precedes and pre-defines the film’s diagrammatic grid. The fact that it always already preexists the system put in place proves existence of a set-up embedded in the pre-production chromatic strategy and sampled in the opening sequence.
We thus reason the diagrammatic network appears as that which renders the image to be thrown out of its sync, dephased, as well as that which trials its new compatibilities within the viewer’s perceptive grids.

(6.) Simondon explains the preexistence in metastable system as individuation. He states, “[It] would manage to grasp that activity which is at the very boundary of the crystal in the process of formation. Such an individuation is not to be thought of as the meeting of a previous form and matter existing as already constituted and separate terms, but a resolution taking place in the heart of a metastable system rich in potentials: form, matter and energy preexist in the system.” [Simondon: 1992: 304]. Since metastable system holds within self rich potentials, equally individuation processes draw from these fresh potentials.

The individuation processes thus occur at the very boundary of the image. The process ought to be understood as Simondon accentuates, not as a “meeting” of form but as “resolutions”. The “active approximation” [Simondon :1992] appears within the relations of what Deleuze calls “new distances”. In Deleuze’s pictorial concept the very act of creating or entering the metastable point is the act of scrambling. Deleuze’s “new relations” within diagram establish the reference to Simondon’s “new resolutions, new internal structures” as emerged from metastable system and which take form throughout the individuation process. It is through the interaction of resolutions in manner of active approximation that rich potentials of the system communicate and bind.

(7.) Within his system Simondon clarifies that the activity of a true principle of individuation occurs at the very boundary of the process of formation. It is only through being within a boundary, at core of the formation process, where the resolution can take place. This vocabulary directly echoes Lyotard’s demands for the new vision when discusses the eye that desires as that which moves “at the heart of the discourse” as opposed to the edge. For Simondon the limits are edging open within the core of the system.

Simondon describes the metastable system as the one that is (1.) rich in potentials (2.) where the form, matter and energy preexist the system. Such a depiction is, as we had demonstrated, in line with the concept of the artist’s preparatory phase, as interpreted by
Deleuze and explicitly practiced by Bacon and Kentridge. It is the preparatory phase that reemerged in another form in infant’s developmental stage as demonstrated by Winnicott.

Such transitional proto-creation space is part of what Simondon calls pre-individual system. As in artistic and psychoanalytical practice, we had observed that the status of a form has been redefined. In individuation process form is defined in conjunction with mediation. Mediation enables and lends to the whole system processes of active approximation and appropriation. Simondon notes that, “form appears as an active communication” [Simondon: 1992:319: f. 14]. Such a statement directly echoes Deleuze’s notion of “singularity of a form” that finds itself “in perpetual variation.” [Deleuze: 2008: xiii -xiv]. For only such a form being moulded in perpetual variation can adapt itself within processes of active approximation and invest new potentials.

Simondon carries on,

“The true principle of individuation is mediation which generally presumes the existence of the original duality of the orders of magnitude and the initial absence of interactive communication between them, followed by a subsequent communication between orders of magnitude and stabilization.”[Simondon: 1992: 304].

(8.) As we can investigate among other definitions we notice that diagram is defined as that which is “found in the scrambled zone”[Deleuze : 2008: 110]. The scrambled zone demonstrates a mediating zone that gives rise to distinct stages of the image. These stages of the image allow to make room for fresh individuations to take form. The scrambled zones, in their dynamic and malleable nature, confirm the ongoing developments that proceed within each new individuation. As when Deleuze described in the diagrammatic set-up the existence of the zone that allowed for the emergence of the diagram, in the metastable system such a zone manifests itself, as the emergence of the new environment, as opposed to the stable environment that it overthrows.

In the diagrammatic system Deleuze described an overtly unstable and unknown in its immediate outputs, that is metastable, in-between space. He depicted this in-between space.

252 Even though not explicitly glossed out, the form defined as being in perpetual variation, is a form within a metastable system.
space as space that constituted itself between the not-yet and the already passed form. In the metastable system, this space or rather environment as we argue is empowered through the ongoing, arrested active approximations that elicit complex relations. The Lyotardian in-between space that is found in Deleuze forms the metastable environment that brings forth “internal resonance”. What lies within the Deleuzian delineation the form- not- yet and form -no- longer phases marks precisely the challenged span of such an individuating internal resonance.

Simondon confirms that the relations are shaped through an internal individuating formation. He records, “A relation does not spring up between two terms that are already separate individuals, rather, it is an aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation.”[Simondon: 1992:306].

As demonstrated, this diagrammatic zone or metastable environment enables the internal resolutions to eventuate. Once this internal formation established, it conveys internal resonance and eventuates new individuations. In this process and once the environment thrown wide one should not fixate upon one arisen incompatibility, on one potential individuation, yet open and chart varieties and variations of individuating resonances. Once certain resonances tackled and rippled, afterwards the subject chooses the one post-metastable, temporarily stable, fresh identity.

(9.) We had observed that in the diagrammatic set-up immediately after the diagram manifested, it incites “a form of a completely different nature” to emerge [Deleuze : 2008: 109]. This indicates that a form in order to be of a completely different nature, must, in the language of metastability, undergo a process of individuation. Individuation processes occur and fully belong to the metastable systems. Once the individuated forms emerge in the diagram, this means in language of the individuation processes that new individuated states of the image are revealed. Subsequently these forms give rise to new environments through which other image states can be reapproximated and re-appropriated. Thereupon such a new environment can trigger “future metastable states” [Simondon: 1992:306].
The individuation formation is pushed further in contrast to diagrammatic assumptions, in that it invited the hypothesis that each “genuine relation”, can acquire a statute of a being. In our case this means that every newly formed tie between potentials in the image can therefore undergo further individuating developments, and become a genuine image state. Simondon explains, “The preindividual nature, which remains associated with the individual, is a source of future metastable states from which new individuations could eventuate. According to this hypothesis, it would be possible to consider every genuine relation as having the status of a being, and as undergoing development within a new individuation.” [Simondon: 1992:306].

As we had discerned, the Simondian internal resonance expresses a constant “changing of shape.” It includes and invests Deleuzian “accidents”, that conduct themselves as “formless forces”. Therefore, resonance arisen reaffirms the diagrammatic credentials. In the following depiction, Deleuze expressly reinstates the metastable environment within the diagram. Deleuze notes,

“There is indeed a change of form, but the change of form is a deformation; that is, a creation of original relations which are substituted for the form: the meat that flows, the umbrella that seizes, the mouth that is made jagged. As the song says, “I’m changing my shape, I feel like an accident”.

In such an event, the diagram has introduced or distributed formless forces throughout the painting, which have a necessary relation with the deformed parts, or which are made use of as, precisely, “places.”” [Deleuze: 2008: 110].

When Bacon portrays the coupled wrestles thawing into each other into one flesh-flow, or the jagged mouth disfiguring a face, these expressions evince such contorting “formless forces”. Equally in their treatment of colour they are examples of a scrambled illustrations of non-formal color-patches.

(10.) This scrambled treatment of colour, highlighting broken tones, bears features of metastability. The chemical scientist Stephen Z.D. Cheng defines metastable state as follows, “In order to quantitatively describe metastable states, we need to define metastability. The reference state is always the equilibrium state at infinite size. Therefore, metastability is the stability difference, between the metastable state and the equilibrium
This “stability difference”, as internal difference, as Cheng shows, indicates precisely the zone that is invested. As demonstrated, in the diagrammatic systems, this zone refers to the zone of scrambling.

In addition to Cheng’s definition, the design engineer Ashirwad Bahukhandi accentuates the necessity of asynchronicity in the signals within metastability. Bahukhandi explains, “Metastability in digital systems occurs when two asynchronous signals combine in such a way that their resulting output goes to an indeterminate state.” [Bahukhandi : 4].

What Bahukhandi terms as “combination in such a way” reflects Simondon’s described what we call strategy combination, that is the cooperation of internal resonance and active approximation. The condition that the metastable environment can precipitate such an indeterminate state corresponds to the indiscernible zone as nurtured and harvested by the Deleuzian diagram. The signals in the scientific terminology echo Deleuzian accidents, as the accidents occur in the asynchronous unpredictable manner. Once these accidents as asynchronous instances converge or resolve they cause outputs that reach “indeterminate state.” This state is precisely what Deleuze has in mind when he discusses diagram as that which imposes “indeterminability between two forms”. This further proves the diagrammatic system as a system that displays metastable characteristics. Equally it further justifies indeterminable and indescribable state present between the two signals or two forms.

(11.) In a specific description of the diagram Deleuze comes to a conclusion that the desert, notably the Sahara, represents an explicit diagrammatic system. In Deleuze’ s theory,

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253 Cheng pronounces that, “This metastability is analogous to the development of the concept of crystallinity more than half’s a century ago.” Cheng examines metastability specifically in reference to polymeric systems. He explains., “Crystallinity was introduced initially to explain the difference between experimentally measured densities and those calculated based on the nit cell lattice dimensions...” [Cheng: 2008: 7374]


Bahukhandi, Ashirwad , Advanced Logic Design and Switching Theory, Metastability. http://www-classes.usc.edu/engr/ee-w/552/coursematerials/ee552-G1.pdf No year indicated. The author has contacted the scientist yet had not as of June 2014, received a response.
Sahara, embodies and proves the illustration for the zones of scrambling. We can thus confirm that it is in these zones that we can claim that the internal negotiating transactions of individuation versions take place. Sahara pinpoints the “coloring grey” which activates the unstable challenged difference between the other tones. This specific grey highlights the internal difference that assures that “new relations will emerge.” [Deleuze: 2008: 111]. Thereafter Deleuze claims Sahara produces a “uniquely figural Image.” As a result we can conclude this unique image is depicted as the most unstable, dynamic and individuation-prone environment.

Deleuze reveals, “One scrambles it from one contour to the other, like a gray that spreads itself everywhere. But this gray is not the undifferentiated gray of white and black; it is the colored gray, or rather the coloring gray, out of which new relations will emerge (broken tones) that are completely different from relations of resemblance.”

Deleuze continues, “And these new relations of broken tones produce a more profound resemblance, a nonfigurative resemblance for the same form; that is, a uniquely figural Image.” [Deleuze: 2008: 111].

Deleuze further explains, “The figurative lines will be scrambled by extending them, by hatching them; that is, by introducing new distances and new relations between them, out of which the nonfigurative resemblance will emerge: “you suddenly see through the graph [diagramme] that the mouth could go right across the face.” [Deleuze: 2008: 111].

On the example of Sahara we can examine that the desert-distance is indeterminable. As at any point, subtly and constantly shifting sand dune can overthrow its temporary stasis. As dune-wave absorbs within itself the incremental and often imperceptible movements, it absorbs the wave phases. As a metastable state, it collapses in an avalanche manner. Therefore dune that absorbs the wave phases, clearly proves the diagrammatic and metastable states. It is not by chance, we claim that on the theoretical ground Deleuze chooses Sahara as a diagrammatic example, that supports the whole

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Deleuze additionally explains, “There is a diagrammatical line of desert-distance, just as there is a diagrammatic patch of grey-color, and the two come together in the same action of painting, painting the world in Sahara grey (“you would love to be able in a portrait to make a Sahara of the appearance - to make it so like, yet seeming to have the distances of the Sahara.” [Deleuze: 2008: 111].
metastable interpretation he does not explicitly report or refer to. Equally, on the cinematic base, it may not be a coincidence, that Hiroshige Teshigahara, who chooses desert and a desert dune as one of his characters (*Woman in the Dunes*, 1964), dedicates his first film to Hokusai’s work (*Hokusai*, 1953), who in *The Great Wave of Kanagawa* (1830-1833), emblematised the metastable point of a wave to a pictorial icon.

Sahara, the metastable environment par excellence, proves the final rationale that the figural, diagrammatic and metastable system share the same conceptual ground. As a result, such a new definition of image system engages new relations with the viewer. The individuation processes that occur within diagrammatic and metastable system demand of the viewer to be fully engaged in processes that encompass alloplastic and autoplastic appropriation and negotiation. These processes of negotiation take place through the internal resonance interactions within the image-environments.

Processes of negotiation activate “dissipative structures” of the image, visual experience, and cinematicity. These processes of negotiation and adaptive processes encompass the following states (and metastates)\(^{257}\) of the image:

1. Their unstable and dissipative character makes them prone to fall out of sync. (2.) Subsequently such abrupt dephasing, falling out of sync, challenges viewer’s old perceptive habits. (3.) In such an overtly destabilized state the viewer is challenged to entertain and negotiate “modes of complicity” [Simondon: 1992] and grapple to come again, yet anew, into a self- tuned-in phase. (4.) Actualization or rather individuation of “potentials” [Simondon: 1992] together with the production of “fresh series” of the image, give rise to the need for creation of new perceptive patterns by the viewer.

The individuation-inducing complicit interaction profits and is nurtured from the natural disequilibrium of the viewer’ stasis, that encompasses the viewing experience. This

\(^{256}\) This demand is especially formulated in the visual-experience of the new immersive media, both onsite and online.

\(^{257}\) Equally we must bear in mind that meta-stability steps out of the binary logic. In meta-stability, the mutual imbrication of figural space becomes interactively challenged.

\(^{258}\) In connection with the Simondon’s concept of falling out of sync, be thrown out of tune (*se déphaser*), we take the conceptual frame and assert the alternative state as that of, as the French phrase records, literally “to be in phase” (*être en phase avec/de*), meaning *to be tuned in, to be in line with.*
complicity privileges both the active interaction between the viewer and the image. Such a interactive complicity is brought to bear within activities of viewing. Further on, this metastable-based complicit activity gives rise to the production of new states of image.

Complicit activities, according to Lyotard, are tied with the work of desire. The underlying force forms, in this case, the transgressive force. As a result, the processes of individuated adaptations fall under complicit activities. They add to the creation of internal structures.[Simondon: 1992]. Therefore we argue the negotiation process establishes and stirs up a “regime of internal resonance of the viewer” [Simondon: 1992]. Faced with the metastable states of the image the viewer is forced to create new internal resonances of image and self, that is to individuate himself.

Such a complicit metastable set-up bears at its core an openly disruptive and dynamic equilibrium, pointing to the Lyotardian “denser space”, where the abetting process-desire nets. Such a dephasing metastasis, no longer marks space with bound energy. On the contrary it unbinds clusters of free energies and forces to reorganize old patterns into new ones.259

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In the following subchapter we focus on explicit example of desert in its various states as represented in the film *The Woman in the Dunes* (1964). As we had charted in the previous subchapter and shall examine in this case, the desert functions as metastable environment (1.) in its global presence, as well as (2.) in specific example of the sand-dune, as a desert-niche. These destabilising desert environments both act upon the main character who experiences the desert as from within, being inescapably trapped in a sand-pit as well from the outside.

In the film *The Woman in the Dunes* (1964), the entomologist Niki Jumpei, ventures out to the desert in order to examine and sample the forms of insects. Once absorbed in his adventure, he becomes confronted with the destabilizing flows of the dessert-experience and subsequently the metastable challenges of the environment. This experience of the desert brings forth the individuating variations of both the image and the character. As demonstrated earlier, desert defines a form of a metastable environment. In the film *The Woman in the Dunes* desert is represented through various angles.

However our main focal point encloses (1.) the individuation process of the main character that is mediated through his experience of metastable states of the desert. (2.) Together with varied collusions and dephasings of metastable interactions between the image and the character, the metastable desert environment and the formative individuation processes as they precipitate within the subject. The first case of a metastable desert state is presented in the sand-pit house into which Niki is lured and falls. In this sand-trap Niki is forced to adapt himself to a constantly destabilising environment. As this sand-world lives and depends on motions of a larger, specifically arising desert-rhythm. This rhythm is reflected through the daily manual tasks as in exporting the sand outside and out of the dune so as to outweigh the fragile balance of the house. The rhythm is evoked also in daily living palpable on sticky sand-coated skin, sleeping, cooking, all these echo the sand-rhythm of daily hygiene. These manual motions are necessary so as to avoid that the system gets over saturated.
Desert as a metastable environment reinforces the individuating experiences of
the main character in confrontation with the open desert. This open space culminates in the
film sequence where Niki finds himself freed from the sand-pit, sitting in an abandoned
wooden boat.

After having experienced the inner formation of the dessert’s sand-house, Niki
acquired newly pulsating and soon-arising inner stages. Through the processual
approximation of new stages and appropriation of new internal resonances, once seated in a
dessert-boat, Niki encounters full drama of the newly individuated self.

However it is not only the character who undergoes radical adaptive changes in
Teshigahara’s metastable cinematic systems. Placed specifically and treated carefully in
metastable environment, the film image individuates itself as well, confronted with its new
internal resonances. The sequence where desert takes over the whole screen, transformed
into the very image itself displays crisis of the image. In this crisis the image addresses and
reappropriates its new stages in the individuation process.

This film sequence in which the entire film frame is invaded by the pure sand
wall, illustrates the sand wall as it collapses in vertically violent motion, folding up like a
wave of sand, taking with itself all that crosses its way. This sequence demonstrates the
potential individuation triggered through the image’s collapse yet also it pictures the
character’s suddenly demanded appropriation to the image. This sequence verifies “the
fundamental drama of the material image(s)” [Bachelard: 1994 : 204].

This drama is represented through the full-screen overthrow of the supersaturated
point of metastability. It conveys the sand avalanche as it breaks down, fundamentally
flooding the image. This break-down underlines the individuating variations of both the
image and the character, who in a poised pace, walks, in front of the collapsing curve. His
inner resonance has already been thrown out of stasis before this explicit avalanche event as
when he was confined in the dune-house, impelled to integrate the almost daily metastable
collapses from within the environment. Equally, the disintegrating sand-wall exemplifies
the wall as the inner sand-wall of his sand-house that has been, in minute shift, always
already slowly collapsing inwardly. Therefore this powerful ostentatious breakdown of the sand-wall arrives as a visual testimony of an event that has happened in his internal system. Thereupon, towards the end when the desert’s metastable phases collapse, he seems to take it.

In the next part we are going to take a look at selected experiences through which Niki encounters the new individuating stages. In Teshigahara’s interpretation of Kobo Abe’s novel (1962) Niki Jumpei represents a desert-wanderer, or “the dream-haunted traveler” [Diolé:1992:11]. In this case the dream-haunting represents a personal quest for one’s own identity and place. Also the desert offers itself as a landscape that incites projections, as a dream-scape. Bachelard observes, “Before becoming conscious in sight, every landscape is an oneiric experience.” [Bachelard: 1983: 4].

Subsequently we can argue that Niki embodies within himself both the “concentration of wandering” [Bachelard] and the concentration of a constant self-alienation. This concentration, oneiric and real, accompanied with alienation amplify the ongoing approximation of the new stages that precipitate within his self-individuating flux. He autoplastically absorbs the metastability of the desert and alloplastically appropriates his new stages. Yet at the same time, he remains a stranger.

As Niki encapsulates that constant double self-appropriation of belonging and being uprooted, then he behaves as the autochton (the native) and the stranger. Such a double enactment ensues in a double-presence he inhabits: as the native, he is fully here, yet the nomadic desire of the stranger pushes him entirely away from here.

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260 Despite the fact that Niki has ventured on his scientific quest as a researcher-tourist, he becomes a traveller, wanderer, not a tourist. Even though he departs as a tourist, he may not and does not return to his point of departure. In the novel The Sheltering Sky (Penguin Books, 2006) Paul Bowles makes a difference between a traveller and a tourist, where he stresses that, “A traveller may not come home.” Indeed, Niki does not ever return to what used to be home.


Remarkably, through such a double-presence, the desert, strengthened with the quality as the most mobile, shifting of grounds, grounds him. Desert in its metastable variations, that are utmost unstable and unpredictable, allows him to behave within his state-of-the-art individuation spectrum. This reaches from the stable phase, to pre-individual relatively stable phase up to the radically subverted phase of the stasis-overthow that prompts individuating process.

As he earths himself, and dephases himself at once, he experiences “arising of the cartography of his unconscious” [Guattari: 1979:][263]. Within his internal cartography, he absorbs the immensity of the desert within himself and thus becomes the very first inhabitant of the desert. As he earths himself, he experiences his shifting internal cartography of individuating intensities. His internal resonance - of who he was, is forced to be renegotiated through the desert’s malleable metastable changes. As Diolé mentions the desert’s immensity reenacts the sites of inner intensities.

Bachelard writes, “For here the immensity of a desert that has been experienced is expressed through inner intensity. As Philippe Diolé says - and he is a dream-haunted traveler - the desert must be lived “the way it is reflected in the wanderer” [Bachelard: 1994: 20].

In Niki’s case this means, the desert inserts itself into the lived (vécu) as an inner drama of “‘disconnexion’ and ‘uncoupling.’”[Laing: 1990:127]. It also suggests that this intensively experienced environment is lived “as a space for delirium” [Racamier: 2000:824-825]. Because we claim desert as metatable environment “is without origins just as without limits.” [Racamier: 2000:824-825][264].

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In conjunction with mirror-screen (l'écran-miroir) the film theoretician Julien Milly [Milly:2012:222] perceives that this Racamierian space-for-delirium “opens into a proximity that is elsewhere (un ailleurs de proximité).” [Milly:2012:222].

He continues, “I see there some analogies with the fourth space, such as Paul-Claude Racamier defines it. Neither on the interior, nor on the exterior, not even a transitional air, but properly a space for hallucinating (l’espace pour délirer).” In consequence Racamier defines this space as that which “is evidently immaterial; and yet habitable. Not delimited and not delimitable, but rather outside. Sometimes deserted and sometimes well endowed, as one of these remote places which are by nature these nooks of rooms […][Racamier: 2000:824-825]. And precisely such a space gives rise and enables variations of actively present individuating phases.

British psychoanalyst R.D. Laing investigates conditions of constitutions of the inner self of a subject. When studying defence mechanisms in conjunction with his patient Peter he observes two conditions that he terms disconnexion and uncoupling.

Laing explains that his patient Peter, “was able to carry on in an outwardly normal way the deliberate employment of two techniques which he called 'disconnexion' and 'uncoupling'. By disconnexion, he meant widening the existential distance between his self and the world. By uncoupling he meant the severance of any relationship between his 'true' self and his repudiated false self. These techniques were basically to avoid being discovered and had many variants.” [Laing : 1990 :127].

Niki represents such a disconnection for he does “widen his existential distance” and with it the individuation spectrum. The uncoupling occurs in the brief moments of his dephasing. We can thus maintain that metastable environments reflect the states of constant disconnecting and uncoupling. Therefore these two processes participate on active approximations that prompt and later evolve toward constituting a new stable phase. As a

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265 The French term as employed by Racamier is les recoins des pièces which refers to1. a nook, as in a spacial part of a building. It can however also denote 2. a recess, as in a secret fold, something well hidden.

result the “drama” thus enacted can shape concentration as well. It can bring forth the focus that is necessitated to survive, to reach into one’s own individuating resources and thresholds. For any metastable universe, hence a desert as well, is “annexed to inner space. “Bachelard notes,

“And Diolé invites us to a type of meditation in which, through a synthesis of opposites, we can experience concentration of wandering. For this writer, “these mountains in shreds, these dunes and dead rivers, these stones and merciless sun, all the universe that bears the mark of the desert, is “annexed to inner space.” And through this annexation, the diversity of images is unified in the depths of “inner space” [Bachelard: 1994: 204-205].

What kind of a tie, a relation does this “annexation” that Diolé experiences refer to? Bachelard interprets this annexation as a link which in fact allows the "diverse images to be unified.”This annexation can be put in relation with the adaptive inventions as revealed by Simondon that the subject resolves “through a modification and invention of new internal structures.”

Simondon explains,

“The living being resolves its problems not only by adapting itself -- which is to say, by modifying its relationship to its milieu (something a machine is equally able to do) -- but by modifying itself through the invention of new internal structures and its complete self-insertion into the axiomatic of organic problems”. [Simondon: 1992:305]. That indicates that any relationship, any approximative and adaptive tie, enables the subject to individuate itself and reach to the next stable phase.

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268 There is however a difference in perceiving a horizon in specific annexation to inner space or simply as a horizon. Counter example to Diolés experiential perception of annexation of “drama of images”, is a young officer’ s query regarding the incommensurable spaciality as described by Lotti. In contrast to Diolé, Pierre Lotti, observes: “Our eyes turned toward the interior of the country, we questioned the immense horizon of sand.” [Pierre Loti, Un jeune officier pauvre, p. 85, In.: Bachelard, 1994, p. 204]. We can argue however this observation does not convey “concentration of wandering”, henceforth it does not abide immensity of an “inner space”. Lotti, confronted with Dakar’s dunes, “questions” the horizon that on the contrary ought be harboured, absorbed and individuated, in its rich vastness. Bachelard comments on it followingly: “But this immense horizon of sand is a schoolboy’s desert, the Sahara to be found in every school atlas.” [1994: 204]. Therefore this example does not represent the diagrammatic/metastable Sahara. For Sahara, as diagram defines “a map larger than a country”, as Deleuze defines. Similarly Bachelard, as a phenomenologist, is not interested in Lotti’s desert. He is on search for a more nuanced cartography of poetic imagination of spaces. He muses “we dream over a map, like a geographer.” 1994, p. 204. Another counter example to Diolés’ annexation of images is Henri Bosco, L’Antiquaire and forest imagery.
In Niki’s case, he does not only adapt himself to the the diagrammatic desert, he self-inserts himself into the environment. In Diolé’s case we can observe that Diolé interiorizes the desert. He thus annexes the outside immensity into which he is immersed in adherence to his inner space. Bachelard notes, “In Diolés work, however, this interiorization of the desert does not correspond to a sense of inner emptiness. On the contrary, Diolé makes us experience a drama of images, the fundamental drama of the material images of water and drought. In fact, his “inner space” is an adherence to an inner substance.” [Bachelard: 1994 : 204]. Such an inner substance can distinctly create the resource of one’s own arising individuating incompatibilities and resolving potentialities.

In her article *Who owns Kafka* Judith Butler discusses a concept related to Kafka and his specific restlessness that may be related to his uprootedness. Butler notes that, “Departure and arrival were constant issues for European Jews who were considering leaving Europe for Palestine, but also for other sites of emigration.” [Butler 2011:3-8].

Within her political argument, in relation to Kafka she examines the specific example of “Weg-von-Hier” (away-from here) concept that the reader encounters in Kafka’s story *My Destination* (Das Ziel, 1917). In this story the reader is presented with a dialogue where the servant enquires about the sir’s destination. He asks, “Where are you riding to sir?” I answered "away from here, away from here, always away from here. Only by doing so can I reach my destination.” replies the superior.

269 In his study Bachelard explores “ the correspondence between the immensity of world space and the depth of “inner space” [Bachelard: 1994 : 205]. In relation to Diolé he later notes, “As it happens, he has had long, delightful experience of deep-sea diving and, for him, the ocean has become a form of “space.” [Bachelard: 1994 : 204]


271 The full version of the story reads as follows, "I called for my horse to be brought from the stable. The servant did not understand me. I myself went into the stable, saddled my horse and mounted. In the distance I heard a trumpet blast. I asked him what it meant but he did not know and had not heard it. By the gate he stopped me and asked "where are you riding to sir?" I answered "away from here, away from here, always away from here. Only by doing so can I reach my destination." "Then you know your destination" he asked. "Yes" I said "I have already said so, 'Away-From-Here' that is my destination." "You have no provisions with you he said. "I don't need any" I said. "The journey is so long that I will die of hunger if I do not get something along the way. It is, fortunately, a truly immense journey." [http://www.kafka.org/index.php?aid=172](http://www.kafka.org/index.php?aid=172)
In this case the concept of Away-From-here bears the germ of the very destination. Butler observes, “In ‘My Destination’, we were left with the question of how can one go away from here without moving from one here to another? Does such a departure and arrival not assume a distinct temporal trajectory across a spatial continuum? The amalgam ‘Weg-von-hier’ appears to be a place name only to confound our very notion of place.”[Butler 2011:3-8].

In our case, Niki’s destination marks precisely that away-from here urge. In fact, the desert can represent the destination as well as the perpetual non-arrival. Niki does not strive to arrive to a specific point anymore. What drives him is his insistence on leaving. This leaving is inherently entailed in his arrival. However his arrival, a perpetual waking up to his new reality, becomes a constant arriving, as well as the denial of this arrival. Such an enigmatic non-arrival, keeps being reexperienced for the desire to be away-from here keeps on reinvesting itself. In fact, he denies that he has already arrived.

However we argue that Niki, as the very first inhabitant of the desert, embodies a double away-from-here. He is the first settler of a new land yet he is there not at home. He strives to flee away from the sand-pit yet once he leaves, he recognises he has been thrown out of sync and wishes to return. In a newly acquired internal resonance, once seated on a shipwrecked desert boat, he remains still and silent. He has finally arrived, and finally gone away from the here that stalked him. The decisive moment of being anchored on a desert-boat exposes a clear stage of beginning to reappropriate himself the new individuated inner intensities.

The film sequence of being on the shipwrecked boat in the middle of desert demonstrates at once (1.) the deterritorialized moment of being away from the sand home and (2.) the newly experiencing full presence, self-insertion as acquired through the

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272 Butler concludes that, “ If Kafka’s parable in some ways charts the departure from a common notion of place for a notion of perpetual non-arrival, then it does not lead towards a common goal or the progressive realisation of a social goal within a specific place.”[Butler 2011:3-8].

273 Such a condition could be perhaps attributed owing to the metastable base that cannot be lived out, nor sustained in long-term.

274 Teshigahara reemploys a similar visual image in The Face of Another (1966), where instead of a man he places a young girl who has survived a catastrophe with a deformed face, into a boat, before in full contained sublime beauty, she enters the ocean.
individuating challenges. The moment of being on the boat, ready to sail away from the static, rooted in the sand presence displays the internal conflictual instance of the Kafkaesque *Weg-von here*. It portrays the absolute “elsewhere of another world” (Diolé) and at the same time the uncontainable fullness of “here”. En face of this immensity, Niki stays immobile, with the daunting desire to go away. Yet recognising there is “no place for him”. W.G.Beasley observes, “If we use Abe’s own metaphor, we are surrounded by desert or dunes, and there is no other place for us.” [Beasley: 1977: 173].

What offers itself as another interpretation is the immediate limitless of desert as concurrent with the limitless of the deep sea. It seems as though such an immediate limitless uncovered a collapsing state of the metastable point and thus enabled the individuation process.

When on he shipwrecked desert-boat, Niki is fully mindful in his present here, in the now, he realises there is no other place to be. If he cannot become himself in the now, he will continue to be submerged in the ceaseless flow of the sands. Should he fail to enter the core and thresholds of becoming self, he will carry on to be living at the edge of the movement of the sand waves, in contrast to encountering the internal edging resonance.

As one may expect the immediate limitlessness, in case of Niki is experienced not when tricked in sand-pit house. For the sand-pit house, with its daily sand tides, represents a metastable ambush that needs in a way to be sustained. Or rather, the environment itself forces Niki and his sand woman to be sustained. The limitlessness thus becomes fully experienced in the oneiric sea desert, facing the desert horizon, when anchored on the boat. There, with head down, Niki encounters the fullness of the presence, the radical resonance and impossibility to go *Weg-von-hier* and being there. His previous pre-individual states cross with the newly individuated states. He finds himself at the heart of his organic self-insertion. This self-insertion proceeded through the continual adjustment of his internal incompatibilities with the environment. In his full autoplastic and alloplastic adaptation, that is in their complicit interaction, he stands at heart of becoming self.

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This film sequence finds a visual echo with another Teshigahara’s films. In *The Face of Another,* (*Tanin No Kao,* 1966) the girl’s with the scar final self-individuating stage is indeed represented as entering into a deep open sea, in a similar mise-en-scène yet in this case resulting in fully entering the deep sea. The girl, in the moment of pulling all of her hair to a pony tail, unveils and recognises for the first time her complete face. In the same manner as Niki, seated in a shipwrecked boat, grounded in the sand, facing the sea’s horizon, she resolves to individuate herself to a completely new stage. Unfortunately here it ends up being the last stage actualised.

We can thus confirm the experience and demand for a self-appropriation and interiorization that occur through the kinetic deviations within the instability prove that after such an experience one “could never be like other men again.” Such a change also includes the stage of oneself as in previous states. It seems, in case of Diolés encounter with water or any dense matter mutual relationship between the metastability and the mind, bursted open.

The “invented immersion” as Diolé calls it, allowed him to annex the otherwise overwhelming or ungraspable space and invest it accordingly. This intense imaginative act allowed him to adapt himself in terms of “to modify its relationship to milieu.” [Simondon: 1992:305]. Such an experience of “invented immersion” exposes what Simondon calls “self-insertion”[Simondon:1992:305]. This self-insertion proves necessary for a living being. In order for the self-insertion to occur, the subject needs to modify its relationship (1.) not only to the milieu (2.) but also and mainly toward itself. As we had observed, such a self-modification takes place through the “invention of new internal structures”. Therefore what Diolé describes, is a perfectly traceable phase, as examined by Simondon within the metastability and its individuation process.276

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276 Evidently, Diolé’s experience is significantly strengthened by the fact that he finds himself in the metastable environment. The serious preparatory work of artists necessitates as well such an intensive self-insertion, as the creative practice by Bacon and Kentridge has demonstrated (Chapter 4, 5).
Diolé shares,

“I once wrote that a man who was familiar with the deep sea could never be like other men again. Such moment as this (in the midst of the desert) prove my statement. Because I realize that, as I walked along, my mind filled the desert landscape with water! In my imagination I flooded the space around me while walking through it. I lived in a sort of invented immersion in which I moved about in the heart of a fluid, luminous, beneficial, dense matter, which was sea water, or rather the memory of sea water.” [Diolé : 178 , In.: Bachelard : 1994: 207].

As we see, Diolés alloplastic-autoplastic adaptation proceeds through his invented or half-oneiric experience where he fills up the desert-space with aquatic matter. In such a self-appropriation of environment, he fully abandons himself so as to individuate himself within the dense matter.

In order for a self-insertion to occur the subject must interact with the environment. For a full insertion with the environment to take place one almost ought to abandon oneself to the “ceaseless movement of the sand” as the author of the novel himself accentuates [Abé :1991:14]. When describing the environment in his novel The Woman in The Dunes [1991 Suna No Onna], the author himself Kobo Abe accentuates the status of freeing oneself from a fixed position. In this state the subject must step out of the prearranged position, a stable phase, in order to “live its life.” Such a stepping out however necessitates “abandoning oneself to the movement of the sands.” [Abe:1991:15]. This abandoning corresponds with Diolé’s immersion and Simondon’s self-insertion. Still, this high degree of adaptability and individuation can occur only if the subject proves “great ability to adjust” [Abé: 1991:14].

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277 Philippe Diolé, Le plus beau désert du monde, Albin Michel, p. 178. In.: Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, Bachelard observes, “ Diolé really entered into the volume of the water. And when we have read his earlier books and shared with him this conquest of the intimacy of water, we come to a point where we recognize in this space substance, a onedimensional space. One substance, one dimension. And we are so remote from the earth and life on earth, that this dimension of water bears the mark of limitlessness.” [Bachelard: 1994: 205].

Abé writes, “Certainly sand was not suitable for life. Yet, was a stationary condition absolutely indispensable for existence? Didn’t unpleasant competition arise precisely because one tried to cling to a fixed position? If one were to give up a fixed position and abandon oneself to the movement of the sands, competition would soon stop. Actually, in the deserts flowers bloomed and insects and other animals lived their lives. These creatures were able to escape competition through their great ability to adjust—for example, the man's beetle family.

While he mused on the effect of the flowing sands, he was seized from time to time by hallucinations\(^{279}\) in which he himself began to move with the flow.” Abé: 1991:15.

As Diolé’s experience demonstrated, the metastable environment can be experienced as a “space-for-delirium” [Racamier: 2000:824-825]. In such a state, Diolé begins to “move with the flow” [Abé:1991:15] and images thus float in the most fluid, pre-natal, pre-individuated of stages: water. When Abé describes the key character’s mind, he insists on an exact mindset, that is the fully-invested abandoning, almost hallucinating state as when being in sync and tuning in to the flows of the challenged environment. This subject’s mindset reflects the diagrammatic/metastable potential and perceptive grid of the desert. For in this environment, when fully abandoned to the flow “the close and the remote are here confounded”. [Racamier: 2000:824-825].

The type of hallucination that comes with immersive experience of “moving with the flow” is evoked in Antonioni’s Red Desert (1964). Released the same year as Teshigahara’s Woman in the Dunes, Red Desert depicts a complex female character that of Guliana. In the beginning of the film Guliana wakes up, in the middle of the night, disturbed. After her husband follows up on her, she recounts a dream to him,

“I have dreamt that I was on bed and it was moving. I looked and we were on the moving sands (sabli movili). We had been sinking always more [...].” (sempre plus giù).” [Red Desert: 1964].\(^{280}\) In her disconcerting oneiric experience Giuliana abandons

\(^{279}\) Abe himself invites the thought that the desert can work on the mind as Racamier’s space for hallucinations.

\(^{280}\) Translated from the French subtitles: “J’ai rêvé que j’étais au lit et ca bougait. J’ai regardé, on était sur des sables mouvants. On s’enfonçait…. Toujours plus [sempre plus giù].”
herself to ceaseless movements of sand. In Guliana’s description her bed transforms into moving sand dunes into which she “is sinking more and more.” Guliana’s recounting echoes her inner tumultuous instability.\footnote{She adheres to an away-from-here in a different sense than Niki. She creates an escape-place of a desert which she narrates to her boy child. Desert becomes here also a dream-escape one recounts to self and children. That means, desert, as metastable environment, fulfils its role as it functions as that space where one can fully become who one is, or one desires.}

The “hallucinations in which he himself began to move with the flow” evoked by Abe can be put in parallel with Giuliana’s words in \textit{Red Desert} [Antonioni 1964]. We can argue that while asleep, in her oneiric experience Giuliana abandons herself to the ceaseless movements of the sand. Her affective instability, her self-splitting and yet wholeness find themselves evoked in the beginning of the film and later echoed in the escape-place she describes to her boy child. Desert there becomes again, a \textit{Weg-von-Here} reinforcing the fully-integrated not-lived, yet unbearably lived now.

From a different angle, the experience of the desert has resurfaced in a dream that Franny unfolds, “There is a desert. Again, it wouldn’t make any sense to say that I am in the desert. It’s a panoramic vision of the desert, and it’s not a tragic or uninhabited desert. It’s only a desert because of its ocher color and its blazing, shadowless sun. There is a teeming crowd in it, a swarm of bees, a rumble of soccer players, or a group of Tuareg. I am on the edge of the crowd, at the periphery; but I belong to it, I am attached to it by one of my extremities, a hand or foot. I know that the periphery is the only place I can be, that I would die if I let myself be drawn into the center of the fray, but just as certainly if I let go of the crowd.”\footnote{A \textit{thousand Plateaus}, Capitalism and Schizophrenia,(trans.), B. Massumi, 2009, p. 29} Franny’s fear of “dying”, anguish of this self-annihilation that would occur should she let herself be “drawn into the center” reflect the fear of a full-abandon, a full-insertion and the possible, dephased individuation.

Franny describes the desert as something, a force perhaps that happens to her. She experiences this event of the desert as a new individuated immersion. In such a state, she finds herself annexed to the desert-environment by one of her extremities. She encounters her corporeal radical instability as being on the periphery, deteritorialized. However, her desert is fully populated by the actively displacing crowds, swirling swarms that put her “in
perpetual motion”. As the rhythm is impossible to grasp nor follow, the experience translates into a “violent, almost vertiginous” flow. [Deleuze/Guattari:2009:29].

This description recalls Guliana’s “sinking sensation” of the sabli movili that pull her down and into which she may dissolve, melt or flow out of her body as the Baconian figure. Therefore, in this state it is difficult to remain in a fixed position while summoned by the constant unpredictable motions coming from all sides. As much as the desert here acquires a clear horizon of a panorama, the invasion of forces catches one always unprepared. She recounts and confirms,

“This is not an easy position to stay in, it is even very difficult to hold, for these beings are in constant motion and their movements are unpredictable and follow no rhythm. They swirl, go north, then suddenly east; none of the individuals in the crowd remains in the same place in relation to the others. So I too am in perpetual motion; all this demands a high level of tension, but it gives me a feeling of violent, almost vertiginous, happiness.” [Deleuze/Guattari:2009:29].

In her portrayal, Franny is annexed to and interacts with the vertiginous flows of the desert environment by its borders. Exposed to the vacillating tension she experiences the avalanches of appearing crowds as they storm and swirl around her, enhancing her peripheral physical enactment. She absorbs the movements with “no rhythm” in asynchronous flows. She experiences the movements as “brief pulses”, oscillations that sway and pull her into a strange osmosis with the environment. 283

Deleuze/Guattari comment on it followingly, “A very good shizo dream. To be fully a part of the crowd and at the same time completely outside it, removed from it: to be on the edge […]”. [Deleuze/Guattari: 2009: 29]. 284

We could say that Franny perceives the desert as a whole yet herself as being outside of it, attached only by parts of her body. From such a perspective, Franny could be

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283 Bahukhandi describes that within digital circuit systems, metastability can present itself as a “brief pulse” or cause “output oscillations”. Further he explains in detail, “The duration of the metastable condition is a probabilistic phenomenon, and therefore there is no guaranteed maximum time. One can't build a bistable device such as a flip-flop that cannot go metastable. Metastability can appear as a flip-flop that switches late or doesn’t switch at all. It can present a brief pulse at a flip-flop output (called a runt pulse) or cause flip-flop output oscillations. Any of these conditions can cause system failures.” Advanced Logic Design and Switching Theory, Metastability by Ashirwad Bahukhandi, http://www-classes.usc.edu/engr/ee-s/552/coursematerials/ee552-G1.pdf.
well the narrator of the following lines “The world is entire, and I am outside of it, crying, “Oh save me, from being blown for ever outside the loop of time!” [Woolf: 2000: 11].

We can conclude that the apparently schizoid nature of Franny’s dream refers to her dissociative disorder. Nancy McWilliam states, “The split” implied in the etymology of the word “shizoid” exists in two areas: between the self and the outside world, and between the experienced self and desire (see Laing, 1965). When analytic commentators refer to split experience in schizoid people, they refer to a sense of estrangement from part of the self or from life that is essentially “dissociative” [McWilliam: 2011: 200].

We can confirm that in the _Woman in the Dunes_, Niki carries within himself a distance between self and desire, yet once altered by this desert experience, he achieves to overcome that self-estrangement by invention and self-appropriation of new internal resolutions. In the _Red Desert_, Giuliana’s world continues to bear the dissociative versions, as does Franny’s recounting of her corporeal oneiric narrative.

To resume, we can conclude that the metastable environment of the desert allows the entomologist Niki Jumpei to experience stages of self-individuating involvement through his extreme and unique deterritorialisation that overthrows his tipping point of stability. This proceeds in following stages:

1. The first stage is as he enters the desert with a registered identity and a precise mission. He remains a scientist, disturbed by the desert until his falling into the uncharted inner world of desert.
2. Upon his fall into the sand-pit he encounters the inner rhythmic lives of the desert and self as he fights stages of self-alienation.
3. Once out of the sand-dune house, he re-encounters, through a new individuated optics, the desert and self. He becomes (3.a) “fully a part of the crowd and at the same time completely outside” [Deleuze/Guattari: 2009: 29], At once he becomes (3b) the first settler of the new country, its own _autochton_ (the native) and the stranger. He appropriates his new

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internal resolutions, stages, gradually and instantly. Such an appropriation proceeds through autoplastic adaptation with the desert.

As we had observed, diagrammatic experience emerges from invested series of accidents that in a wave and phase-manner mount on top of each other. [Deleuze : 2008: 110]. Such a metastable condition teems with unpredictable, fresh irruptions, which cause the image or the character to dephase.
In the following subchapter we are going to examine the metastable cinematic environment in its detail on the example of a film sequence in *The Face of Another*, by Hiroshige Teshigahara (1966).

When Franny recounts her dream, she notes that the only characteristic feature that proved her to be in a desert was its “ochre colour” with its “blazing shadowless sun.” Such an ochre monochrome field restores the subject’s sensation of infinity. In conjunction with pictorial examination of colours, Deleuze observes, that Van Gogh and Gauguin opted for “restoring to the background vast monochrome fields that are carried toward infinity” [Deleuze: 2008: xvi]. As his correspondence testifies, Van Gogh himself, became an avid explorer of the Japanese etchings, mainly of Utagawa Hiroshige. In his artistic work, Hiroshige employed the traditional *ukiyo-e* technique which portrays “images of the floating world.”

Cinematic image reflects this aspect in Teshigahara’s use of the desert as a floating world, as well as the ocean [*Woman In the Dunes, 1964, The Face of Another, 1966*].

The sequence we call *Silent Explosion* starts with a representation of a young girl with a scar sits in a shipwrecked boat, calmly tying her hair carefully into a ponytail with a white ribbon, as if it was her last ritual. Through this act she exposes for the first time in the whole film, her entire face, half of which is deformed (whereas the deformation can testify the event, and be the carrier of the repercussions of A-event).

Once she leaves the boat, she starts walking, determined and audacious, into the spumed ocean. At this point, as she is walking, adamantly embodying each step, her older brother, who just woke up, opens the window, witnessing the suicidal act. Facing the open

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287 *Ukiyo* 浮世絵 literally means a “floating world”, *e* stands for “image”. An exhibition dedicated to the pictorial comparative study of both artists, Van Gogh and Hiroshige, was held at the Pinacothèque, Paris 2012. Teshigahara made the work of Katsushika Hokusai, the Japanese etcher of the wood print technique *nihikie*, the theme of his first documentary film *Hokusai, 1953*. 
horizon of the sea, like a tortured Baconian figure, he screams. Beforehand, he had noticed
the pile of neatly folded clothes she had left behind, with a letter on top.

While she clean, dressed up, walks into the ocean, he grabs the hanging curtain
with both of his arms, so as to hold onto something. Subsequently he falls into his knees,
leaning his head to the back opening up the horizon-space in front of him. In such a manner
he creates with his convulsed body, stretched across the window-frame a vast empty white
space. Then a large white ray of light pierces through from the exterior. It falls diagonally,
entering this space, then drawing a circle.

Subsequently the image is bleached and white stain takes over the image.
Teshigahara however pushes the cinematic event further. In a half-crucified position, the
body of the brother, with both arms stretched, as though wanting to tear down the ends of
the curtain, tear down the foil of the image, hollers an après-coup scream. In this moment,
the window open, his body burns and is transformed into the skinned flesh. Subsequently,
the image torn down, as it burns to its instantaneous, invested whiteness, exposes its very
origin - the white screen.288

In this scene brother’s flesh as stretched across the screen, skinned to its pure bone,
(1.) descends in a Baconian manner where “the flesh descends from the bones, the body
descends from the arms …” [Deleuze: 2008:57-58] as well as it represents (2.) the flesh
that is at once the arising to its limits. This demonstrates the fact as though the human body
was not strong enough to bear the event. Silence explosion scene covering the arisen flesh
recalls the Baconian flesh stretched across an armature (Painting, 1946, oil on canvas,
198cmx132cm).289

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288 In this scene the brother’s scream comes always too late. Cinematic images in the final scene manifest
transgressive states of visual event. This event keeps on stating It’s happening, referring to the double-
catastrophe (girl’s suicide, A-event). Equally Teshigahara’s cinematic statement demonstrates its own source
that continues to be charged with (previous, current) events that in this act are revived and keep on beginning.
The cinematic succession of events unfolds as follows: (a) the girl enters the wave-whirled ocean (b) light
beam dissects the image (c) brother’s body is burnt and skinned (d) Baconian animal flesh rises up (e)
bleached screen (f) sunset above ocean.

289 This pertinent reference remains overseen by most film critics.
In this scene a white flash violently splits cinematic shot diagonally. Through such a diagonal it connects the outside distant ocean horizon with the inside window view. The bleached screen represents the atomic explosion in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945). The atomic explosion announces the moment which has arrived and yet bears the stamp of the deferred action. The gaze that witnesses such a moment arrives always already too late, in tis intervention.

In this case, the gaze is assigned to the brother of the young girl watching the scene from the window. As she steadily walks into the sea, in his accompanying gaze, she is always already drowned. For he witnesses in this active approximation (Simondon), that strange zone of proximity (Deleuze) (1.) at once this not-yet happened event - her walk to the ocean. (2.) as well as his gaze and scream attest to the already -happened drowning. We observe that his gaze and scream embody the unbearable event as it thaws into the white-burnt screen that integrates in itself the whole zone of acts. That is the reason such an act of looking cannot last and must be interrupted or rather expressed through a pictorial-cinematic transgression. In other words, it must individuate itself to a new stage.

In this case it is through such a violent cinematic deferred action that allow to crack the potential of the open source image. In such a state, “The picture presents a presence, the being offers itself up in the here and now now and here.” [Lyotard: 1991: 84].

As we had demonstrated in Chapter 4. and shall briefly resume here the deferred action at hand, après-coup can be grasped on following levels of the semantic reference: (1.) on the psychoanalytic level après-coup (Nachträglichkeit, deferred action) relates to “temporality and psychic causality” [Laplanche/Pontalis 2011:33]. New experiences “can thus find themselves to confer impressions at the same time as the new meaning, psychic efficacy.”[Laplanche/Pontalis 2011:33]. Bacon has expressed in his paintings state of the figure’s and colour’s metabolic enactments which designed a peculiar now that contained a deferral.

(2.) By Lyotard, on the philosophical level the deferred action is entailed in the concept of “instant” that he later extends to the concept of sublime. (3.) What we call the cinematic après-coup is that which shapes a coalescence of all above-mentioned definitions.

290 In case of the bombing, once the event happened, this deferral is illustrated in the ephemeral clouds that rise up to the sky, unable and always too late to testify the event.
It animates the image, making its acute arising, that is the presence and the event immediately and inescapably visible. (See: Chapter 3.)

This action reshuffles the cluster of previous instances, integrating them into outbreaks of metastable motions. Therefore in our conceptual framework such an invested animated action underscores transgressive characters of the image as the metastable environment. It shows the states of images that dissect the time and make it stop, or make it dwell within a seething intensity. Subsequently this event exhibits the states of images that capture time, where the world can start anew, budding along its states.

In his pictorial-cinematic animation in the Silent explosion sequence Teshigahara grasps the impossibility of the abstraction/figure division and demonstrates the cohabitation of both. Yet he presents them not in their simultaneity, one disrupting the other, as would be the case, of early figural approaches (F.W. Murnau 1924, F.W.Murnau 1926). Nor does he depict them in their indissociable possibly conflictual confrontation. We claim that Teshigahara engages abstraction and figure in visual tactics of subtle and violent progression, that englobes image states as mounted one on top of the other, in a flicker-fast speed, toward the act of après-coup. In such a fast-succession the viewer’s eye does not have time to adapt, just to immerse and self-insert itself.

As we had mentioned earlier in his pictorial depictions Van Gogh employs “vast monochrome field while preserving the singularity of the event and the character.” In The Face of Another the young girl with a scar indeed preserves her singularity and is not absorbed in the event. She contains, en face the vast infinite ocean, a world on her own. In Woman In the Dunes the viewer equally feels Niki’s fully anchored singular presence and the event of the infinite immersion of the open desert.

We can thus claim that Teshigahara engages these vast monochrome environments in motion and this allows him to film them in their incremental transgressive stages, thus assure their singularly perpetual variation. In Woman In the Dunes sand is filmed in its variations such as (1.) the microscopic insect’s perspective of the grains of sand, (2.) the flow of the immense desert, its rhythmic waves as sieved through the image. (3.) the
collapsing avalanche of the sand-wall, (4.) vastly calm sand surface of posed sand-dunes in contrast to the inner sand-pit house or an intimate sand-womb as the ultimate immersion.

In *The Face of Another* the individuating ocean-space is present throughout the film. Ocean is experienced and felt through the film’s fluid texture that we observe in the psychiatric laboratory of Dr. Hira. In this experimental environment the viewer witnesses anatomic models of organs that hang in the space, conserved fluids. This experimental office is filmed through multiple transparent screens. The overall effect presents it as a water environment, in which new life (new life of Mr. Okuyama) is born.

Teshigahara contrasts these chromatic unities (dessert, ocean, static etching)\textsuperscript{291} with their inherent parts (grain of the sand/desert, minuscule spiral convolute at the tip of the wave/ocean.\textsuperscript{292} Deleuze at one point notes that monochrome fields “take life not in variation of hue but in very subtle shifts of intensity or saturation determined by zones of proximity.” [Deleuze: 2008: xiv].

As demonstrated such defined Deleuzian diagrammatic zones of proximity correspond to individuation-prone “levels of approximation by Simondon. In his cinematic practice Teshigahara provokes and moulds these zones of proximity. Subsequently these invested zones allow him to display “subtle shifts of intensity.” And it is precisely in these delicate shifts of astute intensity that the metastable state can break out and the individuation processes be triggered. In contrast to “variations of hue” which delineate a stable value, proximity zones favour saturation and shifts that follow and flow.

\textsuperscript{291} Teshigahara, *Hokusai* 1953. From another angle, Van Gogh’s “fields that are carried toward infinity” find their correspondence in Teshigahara’s filming of Hokusai’s etchings. In *The Face of Another* he arranges an overlapping of multiple screen-layers which evoke his interest in the etching technique. In the etching process it is the incremental process of minute over-layers and layouts that shape the image. Equally, the etching technique lends itself to an infinite process of versions that undergo variations. Yet all the time even though not visible the very multiple process itself is absorbed into the metal plaque that lies underneath. In such a manner in one film sequence in *The Face of Another* Teshigahara inserts the transparent glass-wall screen with dismembered body parts painted in black fluid ink.

\textsuperscript{292} *Hokusai* 1953.
In his essay *Newman: The instant*, Lyotard suggests a definition of an occurrence that expresses a peculiar instant. On the example of the pictorial figuration of Barrett Newman’s painting Lyotard examines a specific moment that this work reveals. He terms this moment the “instance” which represents for him an event, through which the image can be grasped in its instantaneous intensity.

However it seems this instant cannot be grasped in its entirety. The part that may be discerned is “merely its meaning,” or the intense impact of the instant. Lyotard notes, “One cannot consume an occurrence, but merely its meaning. The feeling of the instant is instantaneous.”[Lyotard: 2006:331].

Following upon this Lyotard claims that the image evinces “the occurrence, the moment which has arrived.” [Lyotard: 1991: 79]. Such an understanding of event pushes the pictorial figuration to the level of assimilating image in its instantaneous intensity, as an emerging event. In this case image in such a state thus announces a presence through which it communicates its present and deferred states. We can thus argue that the diagonal that cuts through the image in the *Silence explosion* behaves like the Newmannian zip, “it breaks down the light”, like a prism, it cracks the image’s source open and points to the heart where the image breaks, indicating the site where “the chaos threatens” yet from which the image, again and again arises.

Lyotard explains, “For Newman, the escape does not take the form of transgressing the limits established for figurative space by Renaissance and Baroque art, but of reducing the event-bound time [*temps évenementiel*] in which the legendary or historical scene took place to a presentation of the pictorial object itself. It is chromatic matter alone, and its relationship with the material (canvas, which is sometimes left unprimed) and the lay-out (scale, format, proportions), which must inspire the wonderful surprise, the wonder that there should be something rather than nothing. Chaos threatens, but the flash of Tzimtzum, the *zip*, takes place, divides the shadows, breaks down the light into colours, like a prism, and arranges them across the surface like a universe. Newman said that he was

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primarily a draughtsman. There is something holy about line in itself.” [Lyotard: 1991:85-86].

In addition, Lyotard notes that when an event arrives it is integrated into the network of happening. The event may announce a flash that demonstrates the instant, or we can argue a flicker of presence and a survival. In this way, the image can go on and chaos remains adverted. Lyotard maintains, “Occurrence is the instant which ‘happens’, which ‘comes’ unexpectedly but which, once it is there takes its place in the network of what has happened. Any instant can be the beginning, […]. Without this flash, there would be nothing, or there would be chaos. The flash (like the instant) is always there, and never there. The world never stops beginning.” [Lyotard: 1991: 82].

As we had seen in the Silent explosion scene the image torn down, burnt to the white screen. In this case the white exhibits not an empty space, rather it marks a surplus of space. In this invested event, as we had see, the emblazed image represents the cinematic après-coup. Brother’s scream and the whole cinematic-pictorial event represent the deferred action of the girl’s death, concurrently with the A-event. His scream, spastic gesture of a warning and suffering occurs always already too late. The white screen as an après-coup, bears the reference to the glow caused by the devastating atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945). Such a cinematic après-coup is also represented in contemporary photography in the selected work of the photographer Hiroshi Sugimoto.

In his Theaters project Sugimoto presents photographs obtained by a specific process. At the beginning of the movie, while seated in the cinema theatre he captures the duration of a film “with the shutter at a wide-open aperture.” The whole cinematic action is thus being absorbed by the open camera shutter. The moment the film finishes, the photographer-cum-cinema viewer clicks the shutter closed. Therefore, the following visual result presents the film in its elapsed entirety.


295 This technique resembles the pinhole photography technique, see: Chapter 1. and the work of Craig Barber.
As a result cinematic duration captured on a photograph results in a white shining screen. What cinematic image delivers in its photographic-cinematic après-coup is a white glowing screen, imprint of an action that has happened “after the event,” “after the fact”. The action is both deferred yet fully absorbed, invested in the articulate whiteness. The cinematic bleached screen as captured via the photographic action demonstrates new experience of stratification of temporality. The whole event is reorganized and reinscribed in a form of its pure creative origin: the white screen.

Sugimoto explains his revelation, “I am a habitual self-interlocutor. Around the time I started photographing at the Natural History Museum, one evening I had a near-hallucinatory vision. The question and answer session that led up to this vision went something like this: Suppose you shoot a whole movie in a single frame? And the answer: You get a shining screen. [...]That evening, I developed the film, and the vision exploded behind my eyes.”

In addition, Hiroshi Sugimoto’s work is “revealing the workings of our own vision, slowing down the act of perception”. [Brough:2005]. Long exposure on a large-formate camera, allow him to bring forth subtly stretched tonal variations of landscapes. These cinematic landscapes that absorb time bear diagrammatic metastable qualities as captured of theater film screens. The photographs show how whole film in its narrative stasis, semi-static transitions, duration, flips over and results in the original point of the white space.

This whitened screen refers to the artist’s proto-creation preparatory space, out of which any film form can emerge. The white sheet of screen shows similarity to the Deleuzian diagram that can break out and wipe out the image at any point. It is such a

296 http://www.sugimotohiroshi.com/theater.html

condensed diagrammatic white space that boils with all fresh potentials. Sugimoto’s photographic screen contains its full-information flow. We can thus conclude that the cinematic and photographic diagram reveal practice of perceptive self-awareness. Subsequently the white screen represents image as an open source.

We can thus assert that this state of the image can therefore testify the simple Lyotardian “there is.” Lyotard observes that, “Presence is the instant which interrupts the chaos of history and which recalls, or simply calls out that, ‘there is’, even before that which it has any signification.” [Lyotard: 1991: 87]. Once the event of girl entering the ocean occurred, what remains is a white glow, so as to testify to the A-bombing presence. Teshigahara depicts this event through the cinematic transgression and the cinematic après-coup. He “lets that occurrence to be”, an outburst of an all-bleaching glow, a pure white screen in its instant. Lyotard demands of the image that, “It must constantly begin to testify anew to the occurrence by letting that occurrence be.” [Lyotard: 1991:88]

We can observe that the pictorial or cinematic accidents, as elaborated in Chapter 4. comport themselves in a similar manner as what Lyotard elaborates in his late works that means once they emerge in their unpredictable instantaneity, they get integrated “in the network of what has happened”. This network has however proceeded the states entailed in the preparatory phase that is rich in potentials and which forms the space for incompatibilities. The outburst of the instant presented, the break down of the over saturated image -the collapsing desert-dune as the arising of the image in Woman in the Dunes -, or the outbreak of the bleaching A-radiation, they all carry within themselves that teeming network as well as the deferred actions. They bear the simmering sources of the image that make the image alive. The instant through which image communicates its source and crafts one cogent actualisation of the occurrence.

Despite the fact that, “chaos threatens” the instantaneous intervention of the event, “arranges” emerging intensities “across the surface like a universe.” [Lyotard: 1991:85 -86]. Teshigahara lets the image to arise. For only through such an arising, the viewer’s ear can be invested in the pricking, the eye peeled, the viewer fully thrown out of
sync, out of its phase. Once the instances are arrange, the world and the image can thus always begin, budding at the heart of their source, resourcing their series of variations.

As we had seen in the Silent explosion scene the altering states of image demonstrate these emerging instants. It is along these instances that the world begins to bud. Cinematic images bear that instant within themselves and with it the world in its deferred action. Teshigahara demonstrates such budding instances of images. The example of such emerged event and its deferred action can be specifically seen in the Silent explosion final scene.

In Silent explosion Teshigahara composes his high-pitched accord through the sequence of distinct cinematic and pictorial images. Where Antonioni opts for illustrating a visual event in the final scene of Zabriskie Point (1970) as composing an accord through the reiterated visually-kaleidoscopic explosion, Teshigahara chooses a Newmanian approach. In this final scene Antonioni illustrates explosion of variously dismembered parts of the consumer’s society which is underscored and empowered by the Pink Floyd’s music. As a result, such a pictorial-cinematic set-up accentuates the harped on variation of the It’s happening. Teshigahara chooses another way to unravel the visual event of the instantaneous happening. Teshigahara displays not only “violation to figuration” [Deleuze: 2008: ], he shows a “visual event. In addition Lyotard proves that a visual event in painting erases the time between what is recounted and time it has taken to recount. After the A-bombing event there is never enough of justified time to recount, to explain the event. Lyotard notices, “The time of what is recounted (the flash of the knife raised against Isaac…) and the time taken to recount that time (the corresponding verses of Genesis) cease to be dissociated. They are condensed into the plastic (linear, chromatic, rhythmic) instant that is painting.”[Lyotard: 1991:83].

In his description of the image Lyotard states that picture that refers to a presence marks an accord, it represents an arising. Lyotard notes, “The picture presents, being offers

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298 In The Face of Another other film scenes are usually musical (waltz scene). However the final scene opts for a shrieking scream and silence in which only the sound of the ocean waves in the far distance can be detected. This scene represents the “rising up” of the image. [Lyotard: 2001: 116]. Here the viewer witnesses, “A sound coming from silence”, “image is this sound, this accord.” [Lyotard: 2001: 116].

299 Album “Heart Beat, Pig Meat”, Music title "Come In Number 51, Your Time Is Up"
itself up in the here and now. No one, and especially not Newman, makes me see it in the sense of recounting or interpreting what I see. I (the viewer) am no more than an ear open to the sound which comes to it from out of the silence; the painting is that sound, an accord. Arising [se dresser], which is a constant theme in Newman, must be understood in the sense of pricking up one’s ears [dresser son oreille], of listening.”[Lyotard: 1991:83-84].

Applying Lyotard’s observation on our example, we can state that in his cinematic practice Teshigahara displays the rising up of the image, “rising up as an event.” [Thomas B. Hess: 1971: 116].

In the framework of the pictorial individuation we can detect that in his composed visual statements Barnett Newman’s pictorial interpretation of the crosses in 14 Stations evokes the affirmed brushstrokes of the painter Pierre Soulage. Soulage’s oil painting Peinture [1970] represents one mobile stroke of a black oil paint. This stroke refers to the instance of intensity. It can be seen as bamboo stick that distills a perceptive state of the whole forest. In this the densely poised stroke functions as that Newman’s zip. It broaches the very line that bears the source of the image in itself. We argued, Newmanian zip opens out the source of the image. In these pictorial states “whole time” is being absorbed in that one vertical line, which testifies that “the world incessantly is becoming.” In that self-composed stroke the forest can keep on budding always through the one germ of time, germ of event.

As we had investigated Woman in the Dunes has allowed the viewer to unfold the individuating states of image-shaping. It has granted the viewer with a perceptive acuity ‘To see the world in a grain of sand.’ [W. Blake]. The Face of Another’s final scene permitted the viewer to witness the world in It’s happening stages, that is (1.) in the “it has happened” stage and (2.) après-coup stage, the it has always already happened reshuffled stage. What

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301 202 x 327 cm, Pierre Soulages, Pierre Soulages, four superposed pieces of 81 x 181 cm Acrylic/canvas.

302 This explanation Soulage himself conferred as he explained his paintings.

303 In that self-composed stroke, the brushstroke can function as the Guattarian autopoietic nucleus.
the viewer is faced with remains the image that is constantly beginning, budding with new individuating intensities.

As the image arises that is opens itself to its individuating states, dephasing and attunements, perhaps it can bring alive a moment in which the viewer’s unconscious site can arise. Image as a “site of every possibility”, the open source, can thus develop a site where the viewer can stretch out its feelers. In an interview with Robert Maggiore, Guattari, redefines the field of the unconscious as follows, “The field of the unconscious is the site of every possibility, in every domain, of connections and not separations, of stratifications and segmentarities.” [Guattari : 2009: 32]. Teshigahara’s Silent explosion scene demonstrates such “site of every possibility” and with that the possibility of “ fresh series” of the world that keeps budding along its metastatic stages.

Teshigahara demonstrates through the white-burnt screen the post-atomic event represents the aftermath of the social unconsciousness that has exploded. It attests to the unconscious overspill in its deferred action. It attests to the society’s and viewer’s arising cartography of unconscious [Guattari:1979].

From the pictorial angle The Face of Another (1966) can incite references to surrealism, especially in painterly Daliesque designed psychiatric clinic that evoked an almost dream-space as in the depiction of vast black space with contemplative patient seated on an hypertrophied ear. The film’s scenes shot through the painted glass-screen with motives ranging from abstract shapes to dismembered body parts, can create a clear reference to the cinematic artwork of P. P. Passolini (Teorema 1968). It is in Passolini’s Teorema that we find a film sequence with glass-screens arranged in an encircled arena. This glass-wall arena is painted on with large abstract dark brushstrokes à la Soulage, encircling the young artist standing in the middle of it, voiceover filling up the glass-space.

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305 For a comparative film study and a dream-sequence as specifically designed by Salvador Dali see A. Hitchcock, Spellbound 1945.
Equally we can assert that it may not be a coincidence that the young artist in Passolini’s *Teorema* is being initiates into painting - and his authentic sexual life- via the catalogue of Francis Bacon’s paintings.

At this point we can conclude that in contrast to the visually lush shots from the psychiatric clinic or crowded scenes of people in the streets in the *Silent explosion* film sequence we witness a singular event. The scene demonstrates an example of a metastable environment through which states of images individuate themselves. It displays a quick succession of distinct simplicity of shots that precede the punctuated slowness. This slowness partakes on the rhythm of the powerful sequence. In the *Silent explosion* sequence Teshigahara represents a catastrophe.

By Teshigaharara the *Silent explosion* scene displays the incandescent hanging meat-pieces, the corporeal deformation of the one who survived (first the girl, then her brother), which follow the bleaching-glow shot. Teshigahara lets the whitened space rest. He wants the viewer to pause time. He wants the viewer to “re-live” the catastrophe in its entirety. He aims that the viewer re-experiences the event, in a “manner that is new.”[Bachelard:1994: p. xxxiii]. Thereupon, through his cinematic après-coup he creates the “possibility of a fresh impact.”[Bachelard:1994: p. xxxiii]

He wants the viewer, in that deferred action, to remain at rest within the fresh offshoots of the overspilled social unconscious.

In his *Introduction* to *The Poetics of Space* [1994, 1958] Gaston Bachelard highlights that, “Even in an art like painting, which bears witness to a skill, the important successes take place independently of skill.” To this statement Bachelard adds a remarkable example of the French writer Jean Lescure. When analyzing Lapique’s painting, Jean Lescure says, “Lapique demands of the creative act that it should offer him as much surprise as life itself.” [Bachelard:1994: p. xxxiii]. In his analysis Lescure elaborates the “possibility of fresh impact. He records, “In a quotation of Lapique himself (...) we read: “ If, for instance, I want to paint horses taking the water hurdle at Auteuil race- course, I expect my painting to give me as much that is unexpected, although of another kind, as the actual race I witnessed gave me.
Not for a second can there be any question of reproducing exactly a spectacle that is already in the past. But I have to re-live it entirely, in a manner that is new and, this time, from the standpoint of painting. By doing this, I create for myself the possibility of a fresh impact. [Bachelard:1994: p. xxxiii].

What we learn from Lapique is that in order for a fresh impact to individuate itself, we must relive it from the standpoint of painting that is we could add, also, from the standpoint of its source and its specific individuating environment. From the standpoint of cinema, Teshigahara articulates such a “reliving of the event” as he creates cinematic events that assure the fresh impact on the viewer. It is essential to underline that the process of reliving ought to occur in its entirety. Through reliving the mobile entirety of the event, painter summons the unexpected, henceforth, creates “possibility of a fresh impact.”

In our case, the cinematic-visual après-coup as the deferred action, allows the spectator to relive the event in its entirety, as Lapique demands of the creative act itself.
6.4. Cinematic Transgression as Autoplastic and Alloplastic Adaptability

In this last subchapter we are going to apply the concept of individuation on the film example of *A Scanner Darkly* [R. Linklater, 2006].

When Lyotard examines transgression he discusses the whole environment where the transgression proceeds. However Lyotard announces types of transgressions “transgression of the object, transgression of form, and transgression of space.” [2013:276]. The transgression acts are to him “ fundamental modes of complicity that desire entertains with figurality” (276). For Lyotard the destabilizing force that causes the image state to fall out of sync represents the desire in the psychoanalytical sense of the word. Owing to his desire, modes of complicity the subject entertains within himself, evoke Simondon’s “regime of internal resonance.”

In a peculiar manner these modes of complicity are entertained on the example of a scramble suit. Scramble suit is a type of a suit that the novelist Philip K. Dick invents for his characters who work as undercover narcotics policemen, so as to protect their identity, even from themselves.

Philip K. Dick describes the scramble suit as follows, “Basically, his design consisted of a multifaceted quartz lens hooked up to a million and a half physiognomic fraction-representations of various people: men and women, children, with every variant encoded and then projected outward in all directions equally onto a superthin shroudlike membrane large enough to fit around an average human.

As the computer looped through its banks, it projected every conceivable eye color, hair color, shape and type of nose, formation of teeth, configuration of facial bone structure - the entire shroudlike membrane took on whatever physical characteristics were projected at any nanosecond, then switched to the next...
In any case, the wearer of a scramble suit was Everyman and in every combination (up to combinations of a million and a half sub-bits) during the course of each hour. Hence, any description of him - or her - was meaningless.” [Dick:1977].

However for Bob Arctor, the main character, the protective work-suit becomes a living environment through which he begins to question his own identity. The suit becomes an organic part of Bob’s identity and ongoing confusion. This state is caused and reinforced, so the neurologists claim, by the unusual set-up of his mind, where a constant interaction and often overlapping between both of his hemispheres arises. Bob thus gets to engage in complex modes of complicity and inner individuations.

In the film version we observe that this suit forms a peculiar screen-membrane, a non-lieu of passage, through which the new scrambled intensities are mediated. Yet once these intensities imperceptibly interact with Bob’s inner identity, the complicit links arise and the outward fractions of representations become the triggers for the stasis-overthrow of Bob. From the inside of the suit we notice that there is, as a suit’s controlling mindset, a thin transparent light-blue screen that separates the undercover narcotics policemen Fred from Bob Arctor.

The screen functions also as a recording device. It works as the semi-permeable membrane that can be switched-on and switched-off (displayed in the Live and HQ mode). When in the live mode, Fred facing an auditorium of policemen delivers his prepared speech. In his suit-stance he is placed in pre-established, rehearsed, unshakeable stasis of the policeman. In case he falls out of synch, a voice, helps him to follow and deliver the proper discourse. We can notice that the transparent screen-membrane manifests that limit through which the appropriation and adaptation processes occur. In such a membrane state, new forms of thinking, reacting and behaving can be mediated between the Bob’s mind and the suit.

We observe as well that the suit represents a constantly malleable environment where the displayed characters are in “constant becoming”[Stone 2013:160]. This condition causes that Bob is constantly repositioning himself in two environments. Therefore his adjustment techniques, challenged and altered, result in the fact that as he alters toward his

new individuated stages, autoplastically, he alters alloplastically the environment as well. This demonstrates the sensitive and astute interaction that proceeds between the adaptive environments. Therefore we can discern the suit presents a “constantly shifting blur” [Linklater:2006] that is a zone of constant adaptive approximations between the randomly flickered up identities on the suit-surface and Bob’s internal identity environment.\footnote{This adaptive and dephasing interaction is brought to a whole new level when he as Fred, the undercover policemen, is assigned to spy and report on Bob.}

Film theoretician Rob Stone notices a following interpretation of the suit, “[…] because the suit effects a Cubist expression of a human in astute of constant becoming it also represents Bergson’s notion of real time as “flux, the continuity of transition’ (Bergson: 1992b:16). For Bergson as for the scramble suit ‘it is change itself that is real’ [Stone 2013:160].\footnote{Rob Stone, \textit{The Cinema of Richard Linklater: Walk, Don’t Run}, Columbia University Press, 2013.}

Even while, or despite the fact that, Fred is playing a role of the undercover, Bob Arctor, a real person, with a real physical voice tonality, in contrast to the anonymous, monotone, computer-voice, perceives himself, in both stages. Fred/Bob finds himself in constant free floating attention, switching between his undercover, scrambled identity and real, uncovered identity. The switch occurs (1.) when he takes off the suit (through the physical presence when being back to \textit{his} body) or even in a high self-awareness mode while wearing it (2.) or through an affect that arrests the moment (as when he thinks of his casual girlfriend). Here he slips out of his scrambled role and switches, dephases and attunes, to the zone of affect. (3.) The affect arisen usually provokes self-doubt or existential questioning.

When being in the suit-phase, playing the work role, Bob questions the position of Fred, the undercover scanner. He admits to the embodied confusion, “What does a Scanner see? asks Bob Arctor [2006: 1.12.18] Into the head? Down into the heart? Does it see into me, into us? Clearly or darkly? I hope it sees clearly, because I can't any longer see into myself. I see only murk. I hope for everyone's sake the scanners do better. Because if the scanner sees only darkly the way I do...then I’m cursed and cursed again. And we’ll only
wind up dead this way... knowing very little and getting that little fragment wrong too.” [Linklater: 2006: 1:12:33].

Such a profound questioning of both of his representative identities, puts them into elastic semi-stases, open to adaptive versions. This in-depth questioning thus also proves the presence of the individual’s rich incompatibilities. The manner the incompatibilities mount on top of each other causing a floating metastasis of a “constantly shifting blur” reinforces their friction with newly liberated, free energetic potentials. Subsequently, the emerging zone of the new and dormant environments, demands to be invested.

As we had briefly mentioned this state is reinforced by Bob Arctor’s structural disposition of his brain, as the neurologists discover where hemispheres interact in constant pulsations. Bob Arctor thus bears an inherent incompatibility, a highly metastable phase within himself.

In the scramble suit mode, we can perceive Bob Arctor’s stasis that demonstrates “ambivalent form of tension.” [Simondon:1992: 314]. The tension proceeds on the level between the scramble suit environment and his real fixed individuated form. The incompatibility unfolds on various levels, whereas the main one occurs between his professional undercover position and the daily complex self.

Such an anomalous interaction stands in opposition to the normal undercover agents, where these spheres remain in their separate domains of action. Bob’s singular condition allows him to reach in a site where different scrambled potentials abound. This means that being in such a highly unstable phase, he demonstrates qualities of preindividual being together with individuation processes that are at work.

Bob Arctor appears, at first compatible with his own phases, when he spies on himself. Simondon recounts, that the other-side the presence of potentials brings with itself is the existence of incompatibilities. Yet these are of a pertinent self-appropriating value, as

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309 In the film, the neurologist refer to the constant hemisphere interaction as a “cross-chatter”. The experience that Bob encounters he addresses at one point when stating “My brains are scrambled today”. This very depiction can refer to the scramble suit environment as it acts upon Arctor’s mindset.
they reinforce the negotiating states of individuation. Simondon registers, “Indeed, it is the most positive element in the preindividual being - namely, the existence of potentials - that is also the cause of the incompatibility, but it is also the other side of the richness of potentials.” [Simondon:1992: 314].

Such a suit set-up demonstrates the existence of a “multifaceted model.” Powell’s analysis of *A Scanner Darkly* defines the scrabble suit as “dynamic and multi-faceted model [that] stresses change and multiplicity [Powell :2008: 121]. Powell depicts the suit also very close to the Simondon’s pre individual model. The suit is tackled as “fluid and shifting” and is in fact grasped as a living organic entity. Powell conducts his observation of the suit and asserts that, “this body in process draws on the pre-subjective mental and emotional forces of the “orphan unconscious.” [Powell :2008: 121].

As we had seen, Bob Arctor serves himself of the scramble suit truly as an environment that allows him to test his levels of adaptability. The scramble suit acts as an environment mediating multitude of scrambled anonymous identities, that are activated in a shifting blur.

The scramble suit allows Bob to examine his own systems of resistance and appropriation that allow him to reach into the real richness of multiple selves. These multiplicities bud along the states of potential identities that no longer belong to him (the Bob Arctor as the previous good father), simultaneous identity phases (Bob Arctor as the substance-D addict and Bob Arctor as undercover officer, Bob actor as in detox period).

As we had seen through its internal inherent structure the scramble suit as environment is populated by probabilistic givens and accidental identities. These accidental potentials are illustrated through the flicker-changing color-patches that operate as miniature anonymous identity enactments. We can thus argue that the scramble suit manifests distinct fractions of representation and as such functions as a “singularity of a form in perpetual variation” [Deleuze: 2008: xiii -xiv]. Moreover, the example of scramble

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suit ceases to be a proper form and becomes what we term example of the image as an open source.

Such an adaptive open set-up allows the main character to,

1. experience “an individuation in progress” [Simondon:1992: 313] which shapes “a being in a state of preindividual tension, which is to say, in a being that is more than a unity and more than an identity, and which has not yet passed out of step with itself into other multiple dimensions.” [Simondon: 1993: 313]. What Simondon refers to as the “other multiple dimensions comments upon the dimension of Pierre Janet’s patient Bertha as she recounts, “My ideas are no longer comprehensible to myself; they come of themselves; . . . I am here only to stand for something.” [Thompson: 2004:5]. This identity-dimension refers to Bob actor as when he is keeping his both roles, not yet questioning either. Within the individuation process phases of transduction occur that Simondon defines as “mental procedure, or better, the course taken by the mind on its journey of discovery.” [Simondon: 1992: 314]. It is indeed through such a “journey of discovery” that the subject encounters new “multiple dimensions.”

2. The scramble identity allows the subject to experience metastability that connects Bob Arctor with his auto-plastic environment. This ongoing new experience provides him with “genuine interiority.” [Simondon:1992:298]. Scramble suit acts as an environment that accords the subject “medial strings” through the authentic internal perception of his “inherent instability” and constant dephasing [Simondon:1992:298].

3. We thus argue that such a set-up of medial strings and singular interiority in constant negotiating attunements gives birth to “emergence of [this] individuated being.” [Simondon:1992:298].

4. When emerged incompatibilities open colliding spaces, shake the delicate internal balanced state the subject falls out of sync (se déphaser). This dephasing that the wearing of scramble suit instigates, allows the subject to be “in permanent individuation” [Simondon: 1992: 305], “perpetually ex-centric, perpetually peripheral in relation to itself” [Simondon:
1992: 305]. The constantly challenged reappropriation, the “living on the limit of itself”, lead up to the state where the subject finds and forms himself in constant self-individuating process, thrown out of sync with self.

(5.) Such a state places him in a stance of active approximation that propels the negotiation of his stages of becoming in contrast to his unified identity, fixed stasis.

(6.) Scramble environment allows Bob Arctor to employ free-floating attention mediated between the scrambled and static identity states. This switching and negotiating between the two basic states activates the “free potentials” (Simondon), “free markers” (Bacon), “intensities” (Lyotard) and allows them to vibrate and freely circulate across phases. Such a release of concurrent free energies, free fractions of random representations, probabilistic gives, disrupts the personality’s equilibrium. This release of fresh potential states allows to mould new individuating paths, to “modify[ing] itself through the invention of new internal structures.” [Simondon: 1992:305]. This posits the individual into a potential state as an open source. Therefore we argue the individual exists at a moment of flux, between an alloplastic representation and an autoplastic appropriation.

In the film *Dark City* [A.Proyas,1998] a different kind of an adaptive mediation through mental process of the main character and the alien colony, that enhance individuation phases of both entities occurs. The main character John Murdoch alters his inner states and the space around him by the will power of imagination, concentration and focusing on specific parts of his memory from his previous life. As he adapts his inner autoplastic phase, this tuning in alters the space, the alloplastic representation in the architectural arrangement - in this case buildings, move, streets change, city gets rebuilt, in a direct mediation of the individuated phases. As he radically reshuffles the physical space to a different, non-recognisable labyrinthine state (streets have no names), this act forces the aliens to upgrade their own collective memory.

It is a distinct mind concept from the one as depicted in the *Village of the Damned* (W. Rilla,1960). In the Village, it is the collective unconscious that evolves or changes via a collectively shared telepathy. In *Dark City* the precognitive collective unconsciousness of aliens changes through injected memories they receive from humans who dispose of these
real affective material that means auto- and alloplastic germination of mental forces. Aliens thus grow, individuate themselves via these individuated reservoirs of human lives. However the aliens do not acquire the capacity to alter space as they lack the ability to individuate themselves.

As demonstrated image examined via metastability means that the status of image as object is no longer tenable. Image acquires quality of vital intensity. The metastable point indicates the moment where we experience the image, in its potential dephasing to an environment where it works as an open source. This highly vibrating state can cleave out and remain just stable enough to be perceptible, just unstable enough so as to be ungraspable. In pictorial language this refers to a figurative form that is going to deform itself in a manner of stretching out and flowing out of itself, so as to establish a new elastic semi-stasis. Metastable states mark mini-breakdowns in the system that offer a chance for a change. They highlight crisis in a form of an oscillating trance.

We argue that the individuation process that Bob goes through is tied in with character formation. Such a character formation proceeds along the alloplastic and autoplastic adaptations.

Rycroft notes that, “Alloplastic and autoplastic adaptation [was] introduced by F. Alexander (1930) to distinguish between adaptive responses which alter the environment and those which alter the self. Defence mechanisms as used in the psychoneuroses are the classic examples of autoplastic adaptation.”[Rycroft: 1995:6].

Bob Arctor, through the intense interaction with scramble suit environment that reappropriates and mediates adaptive responses of both plasticities, vascillates, or is rather imbued within alloplastic and autoplastic adaptation phases.

However Halleck uncovers the conceptual inconsistency of the distinction of both plasticities and accentuates, in a Simondian way, their “continual interaction.”311 Halleck explains, “The concept of autoplasticity and alloplasticity admittedly represents an inherently inconsistent and oversimplified categorization of adaptive responses. It assumes

311 The example that Halleck offers for the autoplastic adaptabilities is a criminal act. It is the criminal act that allows him to demonstrate interaction of autoplastic and alloplastic states. He states, “Criminal act is almost always an alloplastic adaptation.”[Halleck: 1971:64]
a distinctiveness between the internal and external environments and ignores their continual interaction with one another. Once we recognize that any change in either the external or internal environment leads to a change in the other, classification of a particular adaptation in a single category has limited meaning.” [Halleck: 1971: 64].

Such adaptive strategies testify to the creation of new in-between spaces that take shape. As regards the mediated phases, preparatory, proto-creational ones, that the viewer experiences in contact with the image, such a creation-mediation is described by Paul Klee. Li-Hsun Peng observes, “Already in the 1920s, Paul Klee describes the relationship between a viewer and a work of art using the term the space-in-between. That is, the space, situation and opportunity, which can open up between two persons, or, for instance, a viewer and an object. It is, most of all, a question of encounter, which possibly creates the third space. An event, which simultaneously belongs to both parties. [Peng:2005:71].

In this Kleean third space, Klee maintains, “The visible bursts out between two things.” [Klee: 1968: 107-8]. Similarly in individuation processes “the visible”, the new potential “bursts out” between two phases. Bob Arctor experiences such intense individuation phases while exposed to the suit-environment. These launch a state where he, similar to artist’s mindset, has to leap out of himself, wrestle with confused sensations and reinstate himself into a new individuated state or fail the event. Passing from the previous stasis to a new post-metastatic phase, bears an impact as acute and violent as “a passage through the finite to the infinite.” [Bogue: 2003: 176, In.: 2006: 95].

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312 In Chapter 8, Psychopathy and Related Traits, Halleck observes,” In 1930 Franz Alexander used psychoanalytic concepts of character formation and alloplasticity to describe certain antisocial individuals as “neurotic characters”. [p. 100]. Halleck further notes that, “The concept of autoplasticity and alloplasticity has also been misused in discussions of neurosis vs. crime. Most psychoanalytic writers correctly assign the criminal act to alloplastic defenses. They assume, however, that neurosis is a purely autoplastic adaptation. This latter assumption is not valid. Some mental illnesses (e.g. catatonic excitement) are a direct attack upon the environment, and in fact most mental illnesses are subtle efforts to alter the environment through a communication of helplessness and suffering.” [Halleck: 1971:64].


We can assert that this Kleeian outburst of visible points to the type of space that Klee examines as the inter-world, Zwischenwelt, that gives rise to fresh creative individuations. In this space we can situate the “grey point” and grasp it as an enigmatic metastability overthrowing trigger that can launch and activate the chaosmos. We can thus assert that this point mobilises the approximative zones as well. Klee however carefully states, that this great point, “point in chaos”, seeks stability.\textsuperscript{315} Klee describes grey point as that which “leaps out of itself and generates a self-forming line, but only in order to wrestle sensation from bodies, in order to form a “chaosmos”, a composition of chaoid sensations that render chaos perceptible and make possible a passage through the finite to the infinite.”\textsuperscript{[Bogue 2003: 176, In.: 2006: 95].}

In relation to our example we can remark that Bob Arctor, owing to the scramble suit variations, keeps being uprooted which allows him to access self-leaping, autopoeitic grey-zone of creation. Klee records, “The intangible - nothing is heavy, nothing light (light-heavy); nothing is white, nothing is black, nothing red, nothing yellow, nothing blue, only an approximate grey […] No here, no there, only everywhere. No long-short, only everywhere.” \textsuperscript{[Klee in Dewsbury/Thrift : 2006: 92].}

In such a briefly accessible grey-zone of creation, novel “forces of folding” can be invested as Deleuze/Guattari describe a pictorial variation introduced by Cézanne. Such a specific variation defines rather a mediation of colour intensities, and scrambling forces. Whereas a scrambled shard of the suit demonstrates “fractions of representation”\textsuperscript{[Linklater: 2006]}, the adaptation approximation processes that the subject entertains, allow him to sustain vivid sensation in motion. This adaptive individuation-prone environments prove “germination” of non-visual intensities, that govern over representation. We can report that such forces of folding, or micro-states of images, are being harnessed in Kentridge’s animated video and through the flickering scrambled pleats by Bob Arctor.

Deleuze/Guattari grasp the individuating and approximative appropriations in their pictorial observation of Cézanne. They record that the point where a form is

\textsuperscript{315} Klee claims,“A point in chaos: Once established the grey point leaps into the realm of order.”
abandoned to adaptive investments (affective, pictorial, cinematic) is when the form mediates a state where the forces of germination are folded. They lay out,

“[This is the postromantic turning point: the essential thing is no longer forms and matters, or themes, but forces, densities, intensities. The earth itself swings over, tending to take on the value of pure material for a force of gravitation or weight.] Perhaps it is not until Cezanne that rocks begin to exist uniquely through the forces of folding they harness, landscapes through thermal and magnetic forces and apples through forces of germination: nonvisual forces that nevertheless have been rendered visible.” [Deleuze/Guattari:2009: 343].

As we have demonstrated in order to be able to switch between different adaptive states, Bob Arctor and John Murdoch have to acquire a specific floating perception and invite a high tolerance of ambiguity. The term floating attention stems from the psychoanalytical framework. The concept examines a type of attention which one acquires and strives to keep in the conceptualizing or perceptive experience. One appropriates this specific evenly poised attention in order to refrain from getting fully, non-negotiably immersed and fixated onto one event and thereupon prioritize one type of data. This evenly distributed, evenly-floating attention undertakes to act on all options open. Such a type of attention,

(1.) Fosters free play, free association of concepts and in our case images. Therefore it enhances crafting of new creative ideas, image states and individuated investments.

(2.) It accords a potential to impulses, in contrast to preselecting and disregarding some ad hoc

(3.) It defines attention as a special presence [Karasu 2013: 52], that we term a floating semi-elastic stasis, “nor under-presence nor over-presence”[Karasu 2013: 52]

Retaining this distinct attention demands from the individual constant attitude adjustment that is to be aware and alert toward new individuating opportunities.

(4.) The floating attention as it is open to integrate the flux of data without judgment, it

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“reactivates structural conflicts” [Kohut: 1971: 158]. Such a reactivation therefore allows for the individual to dephase from his current stasis, step out of himself, access, follow up or invent his individuation processes.

In psychoanalysis the free-floating attention is required from the analyst stance. T. Byram Karasu observes that “Attention is a special form of presence. It is neither overpresence nor underpresence” [Karasu: 2013:53]. He compares the concept by Freud and Kohut,

“For; example, in the Freudian conflict framework the technique of free-floating attention is designed to form a connection to the patient while giving free play to ideas aroused in oneself. If the therapist focuses on one area attentively, he may miss important material. As Freud (1912b : 112) said: As soon as anyone deliberately concentrates his attention to a certain degree, he begins to select from the material before him; one point will be fixed in his mind with particular clearness and some other will be correspondingly disregarded, and in making this selection he will be following his expectations or inclinations.” [Karasu 2013: 52].317

Therefore, such a selective stance favouring fixation as Freud pinpoints, does not allow the analyst, in our case the viewer, the subject, to attend to all the material at hand.

Karasu further elaborates, “As Kohut (1971: 158) said: As we listen to our patients’ free association, we will hold both viewpoints in suspension — the classical one that alerts us to the presence of evidence for the transference reactivation of structural conflict, the self-psychological one that alerts us to the presence of evidence for the transference reactivation of thwarted development needs — in order to determine which one of them will lead us to the more psychologically valid understanding of the patient. [Karasu 2013: 52].

We can thus conclude that the work of the analytical interpretation requires the analyst be in a state of free-floating attention. Such a state to hold is understandably a desired state, yet it can be held only for a limited period of time. To acquire the stance

allows the analyst to enter into a state or rather a process of approximative adaptation that edges and includes the thin layer of auto- and alloplastic mediation, a perception that allows to capture inconsistencies, as free-floating potentials rising up from patient’s uninterrupted narrative, gestural and affective flow.

Thereupon the analyst cocreates, through such free-floating attention, conditions for alloplastic (altering the environment) and autoplactic (altering the self)- creation. Visuality grasped as and in such an open environment of fluctuation of free markers, calls for and can result in creation of new perceptive patterns.

At this point it is pertinent to accentuate that he dynamic set-up of the individuation platform shows that the individual must be “actively present”. The individual “itself maintains the metastability by which it exists.”

As regards the individual that finds himself in a specific altering states Simondon notes,

“The living lives at the limit of itself, on its limit.[…] The characteristic polarity of life is at the level of the membrane; it is here that life exists in an essential manner, as an aspect of a dynamic topology which itself maintains the metastability by which it exists. … The entire content of internal space is topologically in contact with the content of external space at the limits of the living; there is, in fact, no distance in topology; the entire mass of living matter contained in the internal space is actively present to the external world at the limit of the living. […] To belong to interiority does not mean only to “be inside,” but to be on the “in-side” of the limit. … At the level of the polarized membrane, internal past and external future face one another […]” [Simondon: 1990:104].

Bob Arctor wearing the suit and even not wearing it yet harnessing and harvesting the suit’s activated impacts, finds himself living at such an “in-side” of the limit. Following Simondon we can argue that, if we lived at the limit of ourselves, that would mean we would occupy the whole dynamic topology of ourselves. However to actively occupy and invest the whole cartography of self may not be sustainable nor desirable. At all events, to invest a significant part of this cartography, in an active self-negotiating mode, is

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318 In an ideal state the analyst can create an environment, a temporary one, where the patient’s mind operates as an open-source, ready to acquire any authentic inner individuation.

Image is one point, a phase, in an evolution. The individuating subject in viewing experience can thus briefly access some of the image’s evolutionary phases. To push it further, if we lived at the limit of ourselves we could occupy the whole potential of visuality.

As we have proved the Scanner represents the deployment of internal resolutions as they react between variety of self-negotiating paths and phases. Scramble suit thus staged, presents a new corporeal-affected embodiment which may serve as a site of time dilatation. It can thus represents a viable background for exploring internodal adaptive techniques.

As we have investigated, mediation proceeds on both levels of plasticity, where the subject becomes a node investing itself in both environments. The subject functions in such a state as "node of information." Simondon recounts, “The living being can be considered to be a node of information that is being transmitted inside itself -- it is a system within a system, containing within itself a mediation between two different orders of magnitude.” [Simondon: 1992:306].

Such an ongoing internal invention renders the individual not a static point in space, yet defines him as an active adaptive internal platform, a node of mediation. Within the adaptive networks such a mobile positioning allows for internal transmitting processes to cooperate. Subject thus becomes a node of and for mediating individuating plasticities.

In conjunction with the “living at the limit” we can show that in The Face of Another the artificially constructed facial mask serves as limit, through which the main character became a viewer of his own deferred image. The mask-as-a-face (as opposed to face-as-a-mask) functions as a limit through which Mr. Okuyama keeps individuating himself. This limit on which the living being lives, edges and is shaped alloplastically in contact with the outside autoplastically, in relation to the faceless self. Thereupon the new facial mask marks the individuating environment that disrupts and forms the subjectivity(ies).

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320 We can argue that subjects often work hard and force themselves to be content with their fixed basal topology.

321 We could say cineplasticity demonstrates materiality of the image viewed at different points or rather states in time.
The character of *The Face of Another* is indeed to employ Simondon’s terminology, “living lives at the limit of itself, on its limit.” [Simondon:1990:104]. His mask, new facial foil portrays an environment through which Mr. Okuyama accesses the differently individualised and attuned phases of self. His face is “actively present to the external space at the limits of the living.” [Simondon]. Through such a reexperienced or constantly co-experiencing mask-face, face-limit, he is forced to be constantly individualizing and reindividualizing himself. Wearing his mask, he had believed for a new identity to take shape. Yet the mask, it seems, simply spills out, in an exacerbated manner his real repressed character. In such a manner he becomes even more cruel than perhaps he would have ever been.

As regards the distinct nature of the scramble suit that allows for a double mediation of environments, we can assert that in this case each kaleidoscopic shard of the scramble suit functions as “autopoetic nuclei” [Guatarri: 2006: 112]. We have argued, scramble suit demonstrates “chaoid sensations” [Klee] and “infinity of virtual entities.” [Guatarri]. Individuating processes happening in the metastable zones evoke the state of chaosmosis, as elaborated by Félix Guattari. In such a state the new zones of contact the individual alloplastically acquires with environment and autoplastically resolves in internal structure function as mobile forms of autopoietic nucleus.

Guattari explains, “So chaosmosis does not oscillate mechanically between zero and infinity, being and nothingness, order and disorder: it rebounds and irrupts on states of things, bodies and the autopoietic nuclei it uses as support for deterritorialisation: it is relative chaotisation in the confrontation with heterogenous states of complexity. Here we are dealing with an infinity of virtual entities infinitely rich in possibilities, infinitely enrichable through creative processes.” [Guattari: 2006: 112].

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As we perceive, Guattari accentuates that the chaotic constellation irrupts on states of things. These irrupted states function as an active support for deteritorialisation processes. In his highly volatile individuating phase, the subject encounters and negotiates “heterogenous states of complexity.” Thereupon once temporarily self-negotiated, the subject self-inserts one or more viable versions out of the “infinity of virtual entities.” Guattari remarkably adds that this whole process can be infinitely enriched through activation of “creative processes.”

As we had argued throughout, the phases, preparatory, transitional, diagrammatic, metastable, partake on the internal plastic formation of individuation paths. Therefore the activated auto-poetic nucleus enhances mediating strings that can tie and eventuate new phases of the subject and the image.
Conclusion

In this in-depth research we have investigated various conceptual groundworks that covered the examination of the figural, diagrammatic and metastable theories. We have observed that the Lyotardian pre-figural concept of cinema presented accidents, incorrect forms as “instantiation(s) of intensity.” [Lyotard: 1993:246]. Further developed in our theory these invested instantiations referred to image’s limits that function as active mediators toward new perceptive patterns of the viewer.

These interactive accidental irruptions emerge in a moment when a fixed form fallen out of sync with itself is forced to search and reach into new adaptive tactics. Such a thrown out of sync, dephased form initiates processes of individualisation of image or subject, or alternatively invests in their mutual tuning in.

We have examined that within acinematic set-up the intensities have struggled to shape their way outward so as to be instantiated (cf. concept of durchdringen). Once the contrasted intensities initiated, these carriers of both libidinal potentials were ready to launch processes of taking form and that means acquiring new states of image. We have argued that intensities in such an unbound phase are, look for their strands of individuation.

We have demonstrated that metastability as a conceptual platform of the image can be conceived of and function as a “site of intensities” and additionally discerned or tackled within adaptive techniques of auto plasticity and alloplasticity.

The quality and success of the individuating investments presupposes and depends on the fact whether the viewer is ready to draw from the potential of the image’s flux and whether he can access the open source of both autoplasticity and alloplasticity. That means whether he is ready, willing and able to access the crises of the image, as it is collapsing down demanding new variations. Image receiving impulse of a crisis, that can lead up to, stasis-overthrown, that can pave the way for the creation of another possible state that needs to be addressed. Within the process of individuation and viewing process it means the
impulse of “falling out of sync with oneself” causes the individual to react, to adapt, fail or pass to another new environment. In this case the intensities are thus put in motion and seek their paths to be shaped.

As we have observed instantiation of intensity can be also demonstrated as a perceptibly visible flicker that ripples the zones of the image. Viewer, actively invested, viewer drawing from the anticipating interaction between the image liberates, negotiates and adapts free markers of both the image and his own set up and is thus partaking on “metamorphosis of figuration.” [Chateau 2006: 126].

As we had seen, there is at least a double functionality of the individuation process that is being played out. On the one hand the living being (1.) modifies its relation to the changing milieu (2.) yet also it liaises with the internal structures to be invented and negotiated.

As demonstrated, the proto-creation, preparatory phase as the transitional phase equally shape “source of future metastable states”. It is here where the “new expressions” [Thompson], “fresh series” [Guattari] “new individuations” [Simondon: 1992:306] eventuate. Once the process of individuation launched, the subject enters into individuation processes that may reach beyond its scope (the very creation of work of art or viewing experience). This attests to the unpredictable problematic that comes with individuating phases which may have “a wider scope” [Simondon: 1992] than the individual being itself.

As we have argued, metastability highlights the concept of constantly active approximation rather than a fixed physical anchorage in a point. The example of the concepts of scramble suit [A Scanner Darkly, 2006] and tuning-in mind [Dark City, 1998] display such an ongoing active approximation. This permanently active approximation is shaped through the adaptive and invested transitions as they occur.

We had seen that metastable platform of the image evolved in time as well. In the language of metastability it means the viewer attempts to attain temporary equilibrium, with the lowest, or most tolerable level of free energies. In the Deleuzian terminology this free
energy was apprehended through the example of free markers. In the language of the work of imagination it means the viewer in relation to the image-state, not only strives to fill in the Ingardenian “points of indeterminacy” (Unbestimmtheitsstellen, Ingarden 1968), yet acquiring free floating perception, the interest of the viewer and the image is to activate and individuate these suggestive points. Through this interaction the image conducts itself as an environment that allows for the auto- and alloplasticities to take place. Such an invested reactivation of the new zones, allows the viewer to weave new perceptive series of the image.

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