

It has been more than twelve years since the swift military operation removed Saddam Hussien's dictatorship from Iraq. Thousands of American soldiers participated in both combat and stabilization missions, the post-conflict reconstruction cost a significant amount of money. However, Iraq is far from being in peace.

Therefore, the author of the thesis *Iraqi Democracy: American Nation-building and Counter-insurgency in the Iraq War* poses a question why the counter-insurgency and nation-building efforts did not meet with success in Iraq. He works with the assumption that one of the reasons the long-term stabilization mission in Iraq was unsuccessful was the American strategic culture, which is not ready for conflicts of the new century.

Most contemporary conflicts are non-conventional; often we can see asymmetrical conflicts of low intensity without a direct conventional encounter of opposing armies. Using qualitative analysis of various combat and non-combat provisions in the Iraq War, the author concludes that under the influence of a long-term strategic culture and conventional mindset in the conduct of military operations, the United States didn't manage to adapt to the new type of conflict and it didn't learn its lesson from previous mistakes.