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**The Social Construction of a Nuclear
Threat: The US Nuclear Disarmament
Discourse, 1945 - 2014**

Master Thesis

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Abstract

Nuclear weapons remains in the security discourse of the United States for over 70 years. The threat of nuclear weapons changed its content several times since then. Our study examines how the nuclear threat was socially constructed and how different actors securitized the threat and to which purpose.

Our Diploma thesis uses methodological framework of discourse analysis. We examine the political and social nuclear discourse in the U.S. along two levels of analysis: governmental level and nuclear disarmament level. The diploma thesis researches multiple governmental and societal sources in order to determine how different types of nuclear threat emerged within the discourse.

Key words:

Nuclear threat, securitization, nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation, nuclear disarmament, ABM, security policy, the U.S.

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Abstrakt

Nukleární zbraně jsou součástí bezpečnostního diskurzu Spojených států Amerických po více jak 70 let. Hrozba nukleárních zbraní se za tu dobu několikrát změnila. Naše studie zkoumá jak byla nukleární hrozba sociálně konstruovaná a jak různí aktéři sekuritizovali tuto hrozbu a za jakým účelem.

Diplomová práce užívá metodologický rámec diskurzivní analýzy. Zkoumá politický a sociální nukleární diskurz v USA podél dvou linií analýzy: úroveň vládní a úroveň hnutí za nukleární odzbrojení. Diplomová práce pracuje s mnoha vládními společenskovedními zdroji za účelem stanovení jak v rámci daného diskurzu různé typy nukleární hrozby vznikly.

Klíčová slova

Nukleární hrozba, sekuritizace, nukleární zbraně, nukleární proliferace, nukleární odzbrojení, ABM, bezpečnostní politika, USA

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Institute of Political Studies

Master Thesis

1. Introduction

Our research focuses on nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament in particular. Nuclear disarmament covers both reduction and elimination of these weapons to the state of nuclear weapon-free world. Nuclear disarmament debate accompanies nuclear weapons since their origin and their first use in practice. The nature of this discourse has developed into various forms since then. At the beginning, the first aim of this movement was to reverse the course of development of nuclear weapons. By popular demonstrations which usually commemorated the suffering of Japan people, they pressured government officials to stop development of nuclear weapons. Subsequently, these demonstrations were followed by a whole new worldwide concern for a mankind survival. This pushed many pacifist organizations to adopt this nuclear disarmament agenda. Along with changing demands and motives of nuclear disarmament movement, reasoning and justification of the nuclear lobby about a right to possess nuclear weapons are changing as well.

With the widening and broadening of the concept of security, and along with the changing nature of an international environment, this nuclear disarmament movement brought into focuses more and more topics. Several groups of this antinuclear movement began arguing that not only nuclear weapons, but also nuclear energy itself is a serious security threat to human mankind. They began increasing public awareness of nuclear dangers which includes also environmental concerns over a usage of nuclear energy. This development is being further bolstered by several accidents which occurred in nuclear power plants during several last decades. Nuclear disarmament and anti-nuclear debate are usually considered to share the same foundations, but they, in fact, differ significantly. Nuclear disarmament debate includes some very unique elements which leads our research to focus solely on disarmament debate.

In the last decade, the nature of this threat changed considerably. In the U.S., the debate on nuclear disarmament is led not only by non-governmental organizations but also by governmental officials. Currently, U.S. president B. H. Obama plays the key role in shaping this discourse and pushing this disarmament agenda towards future nuclear arms reduction. There are many possible causes for that. Whether a threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons

by terrorist organizations is real or not, it is undeniably one of many reasons standing behind recent nuclear disarmament efforts.

2. Research Question

The aim of this diploma thesis is not to provide a detailed development of nuclear disarmament movement or describe a development of anti-nuclear efforts in U.S.

This thesis focuses on a line of reasoning of both non-governmental groups and governmental officials in U.S. which are supporting the nuclear disarmament cause. We will make an attempt to trace down an agenda and a line of reasoning of nuclear disarmament discourse between 1945 and 2014. In our research we determine tendencies which stand behind this debate. In further reference to these tendencies, we answer our research question: **How has the construction of the nuclear threat changed since 1945?** This thesis addresses three central questions: 1) how the nuclear weapons have been stigmatized and a nuclear threat constructed; 2) which role has the disarmament movement played in the construction of the threat; and 3) how and with the help of which actors the nuclear threat evolved.

Our thesis analyzes nuclear disarmament debate on two different levels, non-governmental and governmental. Nuclear disarmament discourse is constructed by several non-governmental groups and movements. Some of them are active locally and some are supporting their agenda on a global level. This nuclear disarmament movement raises public awareness of the existence of nuclear threat and urges political figures to take actions to create future without nuclear weapons. Current non-governmental groups promoting restrictions on or reduction of nuclear weapons or nuclear disarmament are for example *Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament*, *Global Zero*, *Greenpeace*, *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War*, *Mayors for Peace*, *International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons*, or *Ploughshares Fund*. One of the key initiatives, *Nuclear Security Project*, entails actions of the key actors including Sam Nunn, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and George Schultz.

The second governmental level entails particular actions of individual political officials, governments and organizations. We examine how these units contributed to the construction of nuclear threat and how this perception evolved on this level since the start. For example, current U.S. government administration inclines to this trend of nuclear disarmament. However, we cannot determine if it was really in reaction to global disarmament movement or to which extent it is really a decision based on actual strategic interests of U.S. government.

We take into account also impact of particular actions of international governmental organizations, however, they are not in the core of this level analysis.

3. Literature Review

Current nuclear disarmament discourse is largely shaped by a debate between Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz (Sagan, Waltz: 1995) where both take the opposite standpoint. Waltz argues for a gradual spread of nuclear weapons which creates more stable international environment where states are less prone to miscalculation faults than otherwise. In this environment, where states are more careful due to the unacceptable high cost of miscalculation, nuclear weapons create mutual deterrence of states. On the other hand, Sagan defends the opposite point of view where existence of nuclear weapons is likely to create more instability. This unstable international environment leads to possible failures and accidents resulting in the nuclear war. According to Sagan, nuclear proliferation increases the possibility of the nuclear war and therefore nuclear abolition is desirable. On the basis of these joint questions thrives the public debate whether the nuclear disarmament is desirable and feasible and whether nuclear deterrence is indeed functional or rather imagined. However, the theory of nuclear deterrence is not in the center of our study.

Another field of studies is focused on the power of norms and the process of creation of international norms. We take into account theories explaining the creation of international norms, especially theories of Richard Price, Kathryn Sicking, and Martha Finnemore. Work of Nina Tannenwald, who focuses on the phenomenon of nuclear taboo in U.S., is also a part of this normative discussion. Nina Tannenwald analyzes the phenomenon of non-use of nuclear weapons which serves as a significant element in answering the most intriguing question why nuclear weapons has not been used in conflict since 1945. A

In our research we use the book *Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate* (Perkovich, Acton, eds.) which present the main challenges nuclear disarmament brings. The book *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement* by Lawrence Wittner, who provided a detailed description of a development of nuclear disarmament movement, is also very valuable for the purpose of our analysis. He analyzes how this movement evolved and how government policies often reflect public opinion in this matter. We also use the book by Frank Barnaby *How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear-Weapon*

Proliferation in the 1990s which provides us useful background to fully comprehend how the understanding of the nuclear threat changed in the 1990s.

4. Theoretical Concepts and Research Method

Nuclear disarmament debate can be interpreted on the basis of the concept of securitization created by Copenhagen school in the beginning of 1990s (Buzan a Wæver, 1998). According to Copenhagen school, our reality which is formed by speech acts is socially constructed. An actor usually moves a topic onto a political level and labels it as a security threat. In response to this speech act, subsequently, particular phenomenon is considered as a threat and is treated as such. Our thesis is based on an assumption that nuclear threat is created by individual actors and their speech acts.

Diploma thesis is researched through discourse analysis which gives us advantage in uncovering competing narratives which shapes anti-nuclear weapons movement discourse. We understand a discourse analysis to be a research method which requires studying texts as well as international conventions and discourse in overall. We must also take into account the social context to fully comprehend how the reality is constructed (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). With discourse analysis we make an attempt to uncover the way the reality of nuclear threat is constructed and produced.

In this approach we analyze various types of written and spoken language between years 1945 and 2014 which had a significant impact on or contributed to forming of the debate. First, we analyze scholarly articles, monographs, articles from U.S. daily news, and statements made by important non-governmental representatives of disarmament lobby. As second, we analyze documents, articles and interviews of U.S. government officials arguing for nuclear disarmament.

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List of Abbreviations

ABM	Anti Ballistic Missile
AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
CPD	Committee on the Present Danger
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
FAS	Federation of American Scientists
FREEZE	Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missiles
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
LTBT	Limited Test Ban Treaty
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NPR	Nuclear Posture Review
NSC	National Security Council
PNW	Prevention of Nuclear War Treaty
SANE	Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SDI	Strategic Defense Initiative
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

Introduction

Since the first use of nuclear weapons, the nuclear threat is significantly represented within the public discourse. Nuclear weapons are inherent components of the U.S. national identity. Nuclear weapons as *ultimate weapons*, how Bernard Brodie termed it, remain to be key determinants of American defense and foreign policy. Nuclear weapons are particularly powerful phenomenon in spite of the fact that they have not been used against civilians since 1945 and their potential use is usually considered to be low. A significant part of the nuclear discourse is preoccupied by the key question: How is it possible that since 1945 nuclear weapons have not been used? The public debate often presupposes that most influential factors might be the presence of nuclear taboo or by the non-use tradition, a massive opposition of world opinion toward the use of nuclear weapons, or a result of more willing or rational calculations of leaders of nuclear powers itself.

Nuclear deterrence strategy represents a significant part of the debate focusing on the threat nuclear weapons. This strategy was initially designed for the purpose of evading nuclear war. Since the potential use of nuclear weapons was seen as a national suicide and it was often stated that no rational leader would choose to employ such a devastating indiscriminatory weapon, nuclear deterrence started to be perceived as a strategy maintaining peaceful relations between countries and as a mean of ensuring national sovereignty and integrity of nuclear states. By disarmament movement, nuclear deterrence was labeled rather as a balance of terror. Nuclear aggressive strategies and striking nuclear implications sparked off a global nuclear disarmament movement which usually emphasized several nuclear threats.

Our thesis focuses on the difference between nuclear disarmament level and governmental level and their perception and construction of nuclear threat. It concentrates on the contribution of the U.S. administrations and disarmament movement to the construction of the nuclear threat and for which purpose the nuclear threat was constructed by that way. We examine how the current nuclear threat within the U.S. security discourse was constructed by securitizing actors since 1945.

1. Analytical Framework

1. 1. Methodology of the Thesis

Our diploma thesis focuses on the forming of the nuclear discourse. Discourse is a particular way of conversation and comprehensions which enable us to understand the world. Discourse is usually considered to be a form of language use.¹ For the purpose of our thesis, we understand discourse as “a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social world - including knowledge, identities and social relations – and thereby in maintaining specific social patterns.”² Discourse analysis represents an analysis of specific discourses, such as cultural and political discourse. These fields of discourses are very hard to define. Our analysis considers political discourse to be speech acts performed by political figures within the political context. Similarly, social discourse is performed by public figures by the use of language which targets the public societal domain. These two areas are very hard to distinguish from each other since it is impossible to draw a clear line between them.

Discourse analysis, as a type of constructionist approach is based, on an assumption that the knowledge of the world should not be considered to represent an objective truth because the reality of the world is inherently inter-subjective. Also, our knowledge about the world is dependent on historical and cultural specifications. Moreover, our understanding of the world is created by social processes. These social constructions of our knowledge produce further social consequences.³ Therefore, the social reality is not predetermined, but constructed socially. Discourse is not a reflection of the reality, but a continual process of construction. We understand that discourse itself influences and, thus, constructs the reality. Foucault stressed that knowledge is not a reflection of reality and truth is a mere discursive construction.⁴ The truth and knowledge are created discursively. The truth is not universal. The aim of the thesis is not to examine the truth of the world, but to examine how discourse constructed the threat, in our case, the nuclear threat.

We understand language as means by which actors constitute the social reality, social relations, social identities, and common threats. This approach is based on an assumption that

¹ VAN DIJK, Teun A. The Study of Discourse. In: Teun A. VAN DIJK, ed. *Discourse as Structure and Process*, Sage Publication: *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction*, London: Sage Publications, 1997, p. 2.

² JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 5.

³ JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, pp. 5-6.

⁴ JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 13.

meaning of words is not inherent within them, but is dependent on the social construction which shapes the meaning of these words. Accordingly, signs and symbols acquire their meaning by the discursive process as well. The meaning of these means of communication is not rigid but flexible and changeable. In this sense, discourse analysis represents a method of a study of socially constructive practices, which means by both verbal and non-verbal communication. In our work we will examine most importantly documents, articles, reports, monographs, but also movies, novels and campaign clips and slogans. Discourse analysis is an approach which explores the relation between text, discourse, and context. This approach focuses on how the social construction is created and for which purpose.⁵ Context plays a fundamental role in this discourse analysis.

The thesis takes into account how the social reality of nuclear discourse is constructed. The concept of nuclear threat was created diversely within variety of different domains and by various types of actors. “Discourse analysts, on the other hand, are attuned to the co-construction of the theoretical categories at multiple levels, including researcher, research subject, academic community, and even society, and they attempt to design and present their research in ways that acknowledge these complex relationships.”⁶ The thesis explores how this threat was constructed differently on government and disarmament movement level. How different actors exploited the discourse to achieve their agenda. Actors construct the reality themselves and shape the debate according to their interests and goals. According to Foucault, power is responsible both for creating and forming of our social world. Power is both a productive and a constraining force since it sets ways how the social reality can be talked about.⁷ We will explore how the different levels of powers in both domains influenced the evolution of such construction.

The thesis is based on a qualitative, interpretative, and constructivist approach. We consider a division of different discourse analysis approaches along two main dimensions. The first focuses on the emphasis on the text or context. The second dimension concerns whether the power dynamics or rather a social construction forms a social reality. Our research takes into account the interpretive structuralism perspective of the thesis which will

⁵ PHILLIPS, Nelson and HARDY, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 6.

⁶ PHILLIPS, Nelson and HARDY, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002, p.10.

⁷ JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 14.

focus on the context of the debate and process of social construction of the reality.⁸ Social construction of how a nuclear issue was designated as a security threat would represent the main focus of the thesis. The discursive approach enable us not only to analyze the changes of the discourse, but also help us to investigate how different actors use the discourse itself in their attempt to form a social reality and analyze social implications as well. Individuals are both products and producers of discourse.⁹ It takes into consideration also how individuals form the interactions and how these actions impact the discourse back. Individuals, through the discourse, constitute the social reality of the world

1. 2. Research Question, Structure of the Thesis and Data Processing

The main question of our empirical study is: **How has the social construction of the nuclear threat changed our perception of nuclear weapons since 1945?** How the threat was socially constructed? Which principal themes were incorporated into the general perception of the nuclear threat by social construction debate in each period? How the securitization of national security threats affected the perception of the threat of nuclear proliferation? How our two levels of analysis influenced each other? Were subcategories of nuclear threat securitized from different reason than what was actually securitized?

In the end of this analysis we will confirm or disprove two main hypotheses: Nuclear weapons are being perceived primarily as a political tool rather than a military weapon. The threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation by terrorists began to dominate governmental policy only after the 2001 attacks. Nuclear disarmament movement and public opposition to nuclear power had a significant impact on forming of the governmental nuclear policy.

The thesis does not consider a security doctrine to be a direct response to a threat. Particular doctrine is a result of a combination of discursive factors: the securitization of an issue, the presence of particular norms, and the presence of domestic identities.¹⁰ We do not strive to explain how particular U.S. security doctrines came into existence, since a securitization of a threat is only a part of this complex issue. Our research aspires to explain how and why the discourse of nuclear threat was constructed.

⁸ PHILLIPS, Nelson and HARDY, Cynthia. *Discourse Analysis: Investigating Process of Social Construction*, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2002, p.19.

⁹ JORGENSEN, Marianne and PHILLIPS, Louise J. *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage Publications, 2002, p. 7.

¹⁰ SJÖSTEDT, Roxanna. *Talking Threats: The Social Construction of National Security in Russia and the United States*, Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 2010, p.33.

The thesis is structured along two levels: the government level and nuclear disarmament level. In each area, the nuclear threat was constructed by a wide range of actors alongside distinctively different themes. We have to take into consideration that this division on two levels is artificial and it cannot be verifiably distinguished which actor should be regarded as actor of a particular level. These boundaries are not always clear since these actors themselves could influence both levels simultaneously. These two levels of analysis are examined chronologically according to time periods which correspond to the length of particular U.S. presidential administrations.

The first **governmental level** examines the construction of the nuclear threat on the basis of presence of different topics. The study recognizes a large variety of national security actors. The main actors are considered to be the President, his office with the National Security Council staff, and the Congress. However, the national security branch is much broader comprising also of courts and to some extent, also media, think tank organizations, and lobby groups.¹¹ In this level, we analyze a specific scope of actors. Taking the aim of this thesis into account, we will focus mainly on the President and his office. We will also take into account particular politicians, political groups, and individuals which substantially shaped the nuclear threat construction in particular meaning.

This first governmental level researches the literature along four main subcategories of nuclear threat and how they emerged and evolved within the discourse. These topics comprise of: 1) the threat of nuclear war and possible annihilation of the civilization, 2) the threat of use of nuclear weapons and limited war plans, 3) the threat of nuclear proliferation, and 4) the threat of nuclear testing. The first topic of the threat of nuclear war comprises of perception of nuclear weapons as leading toward nuclear war and the end of civilization. The second topic comprises of a societal construction of a possibility of the use of nuclear weapons, considerations whether tactical nuclear weapons are more usable in the battlefield, whether limited nuclear war is possible, or that nuclear exchange is survivable. The third topic of nuclear proliferation takes into account both horizontal and vertical proliferation. In our analysis, we consider vertical proliferation to be an increase of stockpiles of nuclear weaponry of nuclear states. Also it comprises improvement and other development-type changes of nuclear stockpiles. Horizontal proliferation is regarded as acquisition of nuclear weaponry by actor who did not have one already. This horizontal proliferation could be perpetrated by state

¹¹ GEORGE, Roger Z. and RISHIKOF, Harvey. Introduction: The National Security Enterprise. In: GEORGE, Roger Z. and RISHIKOF, Harvey, eds. *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011, pp. 2-3.

or non-state actors. Therefore, vertical proliferation signifies deepening the amount of nuclear weapons and horizontal proliferation signifies widening the scope of different nuclear actors. The fourth subcategory of the threat of nuclear testing comprises of nuclear testing in different types of environment such as atmospheric testing or underground or undersea testing. It is closely linked to health and environmental threats. We also distinguish short-term and long-term consequences of such testing. However, for the purpose of our thesis, we examine mainly studies focusing on long-term forecasts.

The second **nuclear disarmament movement level** studies the construction of the nuclear threat at the societal level of analysis. As other movements, also nuclear disarmament movement is not unified and comprises of several different organizations, groups and individuals which emphasize threats of nuclear weapons and calls for nuclear abolition. The study recognizes a large variety of securitizing actors which might be considered as anti-nuclear movement activists. For the purpose of our analysis, we consider actors of nuclear disarmament movement individuals or groups which made studies, documents, articles, statements, speeches, or addresses in which they expressed their intentions or beliefs to achieve nuclear limitation, reduction, or complete nuclear disarmament. One of the main actors of this level are pacifist groups, academic community, media, the public, influential public individuals.

In the thesis, we are using also the term anti-nuclear movement or anti-nuclear activism which describes movement which is not particularly interested only in nuclear-weapons abolishment, but might also struggle to abolish the use of nuclear power. We are using this term to describe nuclear disarmament movement in its early stages when they struggled to achieve variety of possible future goals and they did not focus only on nuclear disarmament as their final goal. Thus, our analysis also focuses on the issue of nuclear weapons, not on the whole problematic of nuclear power.

The main themes of this movement dimension are: 1) the threat to the world, 2) the threat to the U.S., 3) the threat to an individual, and 4) the threat to the environment. The first topic of the threat to the world comprises of perception of nuclear weapons as an existential threat to the world and the future of human civilization. Usually, the threat to the world is securitized as the concern that the mere existence of nuclear weapons or nuclear arms race inevitably leads to the end of all humanity. Second subcategory refers to the societal security threat which is usually perceived as a threat of the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. or as a securitization of nuclear terrorism. Third type of nuclear threat perceived as a threat to an individual represents a humanitarian threat which endangers lives of individuals, poisons

their environment or food system which individual eventually consumes. The third type of nuclear threat is usually securitized as a threat of nuclear testing. Fourth subcategory of nuclear threat is the threat to the environment which emphasizes the radioactive poisoning of the environment, atmosphere and biosphere.

The thesis is structured chronologically according to different eras and U.S. presidential administrations. The first period covers the era of Truman administration 1945-1953. The second period is structured along the Eisenhower administration which lasted from 1953-1961. Third chapter covers years of Kenney's and Johnson's presidencies from 1961 to 1969. Fourth period from 1969-1981 is divided according to the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Fifth era from 1981 to 1989 is periodicized according to presidency of Reagan. Sixth period covers G. H. W. Bush's and B. Clinton's presidency together lasting from 1989 to 2001. The last researched period lasts from 2001 to 2014 and corresponds to presidencies of G. W. Bush and B. Obama. Then, both levels of analysis are evaluated.

1. 3. Literature Review

In our research we use the book *Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement* by Lawrence Wittner as the main reference point.¹² Wittner provided a detailed description of a development of international nuclear disarmament movement, is also very valuable for the purpose of our analysis. He analyzes how this movement evolved and how government policies often reflect public opinion in this matter. For the purpose of manageability of our work, we focus on the sources with the most potential of influencing the American population and with the most evidence value. We understand that such precondition is inherently highly subjective. Therefore, we used several monographs as a litmus paper on whether we should include particular information it into our research or not. Even though, we focused on primarily American sources, we also included several foreign sources which significantly contributed to construction of nuclear threat. Moreover, we also included several sources, due to its meaningful and useful reference, which could not be regarded as overly influential. In addition, we have to take into account that many materials were not accessible.

¹² WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

Subsets of texts examined in the governmental dimension are mainly presidential speeches and proclamations from conferences and addresses. We also examine significant public speeches, documents and records released by the administration and its officials, as well as presidential campaign clips and slogans. However, we focus on a form of text as a more accurate form of language than others.

The main subset of examined materials comprises of monographs, scholarly documents, articles, proclamations, announcements, reports and also media news, films, interviews, novels, and poems. Sources use in this level are primarily *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. However, in certain period, only a limited amount of literature is available in primary sources. For this reason, we use several also particular secondary literatures from which we draw particular quotes.

Our research is written with the aim to contribute to the analysis of nuclear disarmament movement and the construction of nuclear threat. Valuable moment would be also symmetrical description of different levels in the same era and in which moment they differed.

1. 4. Theoretical framework: Securitization

“Almost everyone in today’s world feels insecure, but not everyone feels insecure about the same thing. Different threats seem more urgent to people in different parts of the world.”¹³

Our theoretical framework is based on a constructivist theory of securitization, outlined by Copenhagen school which considers security to be a *speech act*, therefore not an objective reality but an inter-subjective process constructed by different actors. Weaver, representing a Copenhagen school of thinking, outlined a constructivist approach toward security. He regarded security as a *speech act*, which constitutes the primary reality. A naming a certain development as a security threat could lead to this thing being widely perceived as a security threat. According to him, “something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so.”¹⁴ Thus it could be regarded as a strong elitist approach. Whether the security problem is being perceived as existential threat to sovereignty depends on if it is

¹³ ANNAN, Kofi A., *Lecture at Princeton University*. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

¹⁴ WEAVER, Ole. Securitization and Desecuritization. In: LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D., ed. *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 54-55.

labeled as such threat by power holders. Securitization is successful and, thus, complete when audience of this securitization perceive the issue as a threat. Success of such securitization is highly dependent on the power of securitizing actor.¹⁵ With more power, the more likely is that the securitization would be successful. Labeling something as existential threat creates conditions prone to a social change and an opportunity for leaders to justify their certain actions by this perceived need for a change.

Security issue is “when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a designated referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily, the state, incorporating government, territory, and society). The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them.”¹⁶ Labeling an issue as a security threat allows decision makers to employ extraordinary measures to cope with it. It is a tool of legitimization of the use of force as well as means to mobilize the population in order to gain their support.

Security is a self-referential practice because the issue becomes a security issue in consequence of how actors refer to it as such a threat. The process of securitization moves along the spectrum raging from non-politicized through politicized to securitized according to how the debate considers the issue to be an existential threat. The process of presenting something as a threat is called a *securitizing move*. The issue is securitized only when referent object accepts it as a threat.¹⁷ Something could be designated as a threat because they perceive it as more important than other issues. The audience must accept the construction as a fact that they are being threatened. Securitization is successful and complete once an audience or a referent object accepts the constructed threat as real. This causes the focus of the analysis to be on decision makers securitizing moves.

For the purpose of making the securitization theory more applicable, we follow the example of S and modify certain hypotheses. For the purpose of our analysis, we do not focus on the securitization as a successful process, but we concentrate on the securitizing moves of different actors.¹⁸ Thus our analysis do not regard successful securitization and an acceptance as a threat by the audience as the key. Rather, the research takes into account the presence of securitizing move as the key factor. Also, this elitist approach is limiting considering the

¹⁵ WEAVER, Ole. Securitization and Desecuritization. In: LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D., ed. *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, pp. 55-56.

¹⁶ BUZAN, Barry, WEAVER Ole, and WILDE de Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 21.

¹⁷ BUZAN, Barry, WEAVER Ole, and WILDE de Jaap. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 23-25.

¹⁸ SJÖSTEDT, Roxanna. Exploring the Construction of Threats: The Securitization of HIV/AIDS in Russia. *Security Dialogue*. 2008, vol. 39 (1), p. 10.

scope of our analysis. We regard securitizing move as a public framing of an issue and labeling it as a security and national threat. Existential threat could be understood only in relation to particular referent object. The nature of what is said to be an existential threat vary according to which sectors are being taken into account. We make an attempt to examine how different actors constructed and utilized the threat to achieve their own separate agenda. Thus, our research concentrates on two levels of analysis. In addition, we also take into account desecuritization as an attempt to lessen the general perception of the threat.

2. Construction of the Nuclear Threat at the Beginning of the Nuclear Era, 1945-1953

“If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.”¹⁹

This chapter will examine the beginning of nuclear era between years 1945 and 1953 which corresponds with the years of presidency of Harry S. Truman.²⁰ If we take into account the international context, we have to mention several key events which shaped forming of the nuclear discourse. In this era, the key event which started the narrative of nuclear weapons was the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. against Japanese cities in August 1945. Four years later on August 29, 1949, the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb. This fueled the development of thermonuclear weapons. The first U.S. thermonuclear detonation occurred on October 31 1952. Also United Kingdom tested their first nuclear bomb near Australia in 1952.

2. 1. Governmental level (1945-1953)

2. 1. 1. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

Initial approach of the government toward the use of nuclear weapons was predominantly positive. Both Roosevelt and Truman administration perceived nuclear weapons as another, just as slightly bigger and more expensive weapon.²¹ Thus, they were not overly alarmed by the possibility of their eventual use. Nuclear weapons were perceived as being conventional since their capability was not considered to be so powerful to be able to change rules of the world politics. This shows how politicians were not concerned, initially, about qualitative difference of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the decision making process of the use of nuclear weapons against Japan suggested, the government did not question whether

¹⁹ TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, Washington: The White House. Transcript available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12169>.

²⁰ Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt lasted from March 4, 1933 to April 12, 1945. Presidency of Harry S. Truman lasted from April 12, 1945 to January 20, 1953.

²¹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.3.

they even should be used. They were considering how they should be used.²² No one from the top governmental officials questioned the use. This weapon was seen as a weapon built to be used. Also the President did not lean toward questioning decisions of previous administration.²³ He believed that if such weapon existed, then it should be used.

Immediately after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombings, the general public started to securitize the idea whether the use of nuclear weapons was a military necessity. The evidence shows that the decision making process was influenced by military as well as political considerations. They strived to use the nuclear weapons not only because it would destroy Japan and speed up the end of the World War II, but primarily because there was an additional shock value which would intimidate the Soviet Union and provide them the upper hand in the post-war international relations in order to. They also chose not to warn Japanese people in order to increase the shock value.²⁴ Regardless of many alternatives available to the President related to the possibilities for ending the World War II within a short time, the official rhetoric centered on military implications of the use of nuclear weapons and on the necessity to shorten the war and avoid additional losses of American lives. Truman securitized the threat of Japan as a cruel and uncivilized nation and the use of the nuclear bomb as the absolute necessity in order to save Americans.²⁵ In his realist perception of nuclear bomb, the U.S. should be prepared to strike if their sense of responsibility forced them to. According to this point of view, use of nuclear weapons was seen as a moral act and a legitimate instrument of war.

After the nuclear bombings, Truman labeled the nuclear weapons as the *greatest marvel* of the U.S. scientific community. Truman stated that the U.S. has spent more than two billion dollars on the *greatest achievement*.²⁶ The message was that nuclear weapon was nothing to be stigmatized due to the fact that it is undoubtedly a scientific marvel which moves power of the U.S. to preferable international position. Moreover, Truman must have felt a strong responsibility to show some results because of the massive amount of money

²² MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 45.

²³ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 46.

²⁴ Potsdam Declaration, Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender Issued, at Potsdam, July 26, 1945, National Science Digital Library, available: <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Hiroshima/Potsdam.shtml>, accessed 19.10.1945.

²⁵ TRUMAN, Harry S. Letter to Richard Russell, August 9, 1945. Official file, Truman Papers. Available online: http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9.pdf#zoom=100.

²⁶ TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, Washington: The White House. Transcript available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12169>.

which funded the Manhattan Project. Truman labeled nuclear bomb to be the greatest destructive force. Moreover, he warned that Japanese might expect a rain of ruin if they would not surrender.²⁷ This warning of total destruction was the first sign of the use of nuclear weapons as a deterrent. The notion of the rain might suggest warning that there is no escape against it. Moreover, the same as rain, nuclear weapons are also indiscriminate. Furthermore, in a need to justify the decision to drop the nuclear bomb, several politicians continued to insist that this weapon was designed to be used as any other military weapon. According to them, the only difference was that nuclear weapons were slightly more expensive.²⁸

After the dropping of the bombs, there existed a general narrative that nuclear weapons could bring world peace, because Japan, in the end, reconsidered its policy and surrounded in response to nuclear weapons bombing.²⁹ The U.S. government made an attempt to promote an image of a choice between 1 million American lives or the employment of unfortunately indiscriminate weapon on Japanese. This rhetorical trade should be understood mainly in the context of a postwar justification of the use of the nuclear weapons.³⁰ Stimson emphasized that they were not overly optimistic about the prospects of Japan's unconditional surrender without the nuclear weapons being used, even though Japan was already very weak back then.³¹ This rhetoric resulted in a dominant belief that the decisive factor behind the end of War was the use of nuclear weapons. Also, the atom bomb was seen as the least abhorrent choice, therefore as the best available option.³² Nevertheless, according to the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey*, the use of atomic bomb was not a decisive factor behind the final defeat of Japan.³³ Moreover, 1 million American lives was a rather exaggerated number used mainly for political purposes.

The U.S. government perceived nuclear weapons as something to be utilized for political purposes. Truman even proposed to add a lightning symbolizing a nuclear bomb to

²⁷ TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, August 6, 1945, Washington: The White House. Transcript available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12169>.

²⁸ STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 98.

²⁹ Draft statement on the dropping of the bomb, July 30, 1945. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers. Available online at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/9-15.pdf#zoom=100.

³⁰ WALKER, Samuel J. *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*, Revised Edition, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p.5.

³¹ STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 101.

³² STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 107.

³³ United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War). Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1946. Available online at <http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#teotab>.

existing presidential emblem.³⁴ This should have been a symbolic reference to the significance of nuclear weapons and the impact it had on American policy. Nuclear weapons were considered to be a way to project power and therefore, fiercely pressed for a positive image of the nuclear weapons. They aimed to shield the general public from the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. They feared that public would become suspicious and start asking questions causing reevaluation of their nuclear policy. While confronting the public opinion and an increasing criticism to the use of the bomb, they greatly desecuritized the threat of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.

Subsequently, Truman reevaluated his perception of significance of nuclear weapons. He reflected the fact that since Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the public opinion turned rapidly against the use of nuclear weapons. After Nagasaki, he never again spoke of nuclear bomb as just another military weapon. Moreover, he ordered that no more nuclear weapons should be dropped. In the context of 1948 Berlin crisis, he stated that nuclear weapons should not be used unless absolutely necessary. Truman added that they are not just military weapons: “It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have got to treat this differently from rifles and cannon and ordinary things like that.”³⁵ They were securitized as weapons of a last resort, in the effect non-conventional.

Truman refused to use nuclear bomb during the Berlin crisis in 1948. Moreover, a nuclear strategy referring to the use of nuclear weapons and potential military targets was largely absent.³⁶ He did not specify under which conditions he would use them in an attempt to avoid nuclear escalation if such conditions were met. Despite the accelerated nuclear arms race and an existence of tactical nuclear weapons, Truman openly declared his non-use approach even in the context of the Korean War.³⁷ However, later that year he stated that there had always been active consideration of their use, just as of the use of any other weapon which is available, even though he believed that it would lead to possible total destruction of

³⁴ BROSCIOUS, David S. Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S. Truman’s Approach to Nuclear Weapons. In: GADDIS, John L. et al., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 15.

³⁵ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 117.

³⁶ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 7 -8.

³⁷ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 118.

civilization.^{38,39} Truman, for political reasons, refused to take publicly nuclear weapons out of the consideration. He securitized the threat of the use of nuclear weapons which might bring the total destruction. However, Truman wanted to avoid expanding the local war into a general nuclear war. Truman began the tradition of nuclear weapons being perceived primarily as a deterrent which can avert the escalation of the conflict between great powers.

Also, the non-use of nuclear weapons in the Korean War signified the emergence of the nuclear taboo. There is strong evidence that normative factors played an important role in restraining U.S. government from taking a pro-nuclear stance because the statement of Truman about the possible employment of nuclear weapons created a worldwide massive discontent among foreign officials and the public.⁴⁰ Moreover, they assumed that the nuclear attack would have resulted in the U.S. being placed in “the untenable propaganda position of a butcher discarding his morals and killing his friends in order to achieve hid ends.”⁴¹ This suggests that the nuclear attack would destroy image of the U.S. as a soft power.⁴² Thus, political considerations overruled the military ones.

2. 1. 2. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

The U.S. military officials adopted a strategy of preemptive nuclear strikes which was designed to obliterate Soviet nuclear capability.⁴³ They believed that in case international control negotiations would have not resulted in a substantial agreement, they, nevertheless, needed to be prepared to defend themselves forcefully. In the result, this aggressive deterrent policy resulted in the perception that the employment of nuclear weapons, while done without warning, would be massive causing terrible consequences. Moreover, the 1949 report suggested that despite the U.S. nuclear monopoly, the nuclear war would be highly difficult to win. It would not break resistance of the Russian people, but only further complicate subsequent fighting their vengeful forces. The study concluded that the U.S. could not afford

³⁸ TRUMAN, Harry S. The President's News Conference, November 30, 1950. Available online at The American Presidency Project: <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=13673>.

³⁹ UNKNOWN. Questions to Be Considered Regarding Possible US Use of the Atomic Bomb to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression in Korea, November 8, 1950. Available online at The National Security Archive: <http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-5/01.pdf>.

⁴⁰ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 118-122.

⁴¹ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 118.

⁴² WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 33.

⁴³ ROSENBERG, David Alan. US Strategy: Theory vs. Practice. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1987, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 20.

to lose this type of war and could not win a conventional war against Russia, therefore must rely on nuclear monopoly.⁴⁴

But in the situation where nuclear monopoly was longer present, the U.S. had to rely on accumulation of nuclear capabilities to gain quantitative advantage. Also, this brought the image of unwinnable nuclear war into the debate. After the 1950 decision to build a thermonuclear weapon, this perception was even strengthened. Kennan argued that the decision to develop thermonuclear weapon means a choice of either a self-preservation or a survival. He suggested that in the case of thermonuclear war, surrender to the Soviet Union would be preferable to igniting a thermonuclear war.⁴⁵ According to him, possession of thermonuclear weapons lead to a total destruction of civilization, which is the reason why nuclear control must be established. He supported international control of atomic energy and consider nuclear weapons to be only a temporary deterrent till international control would be established.

In the beginning of a thermonuclear age, Truman declared that nuclear weapons newly encompassed the threat for the whole mankind. He stated that nuclear power could lead to heights of civilization or it might destroy it.⁴⁶ This suggests a duality of the use of nuclear power. On the one hand, nuclear power could be liberating, on the other, nuclear weapons might destroy all the mankind it handled carelessly. For this purpose, Truman ruled out the possibility of nuclear attack: “Such a war is not a possible policy for rational men.”⁴⁷ This suggests that the U.S. were aware that it was not desirable to use nuclear weapons because it would lead to the end of our civilization. As Truman left the office in January 1953, he remarked that Americans would not use such a weapon because they are moral people who strive to prevent World War III. They would not use it because they are not the only power possessing nuclear weapons. Truman reaffirmed: “Starting an atomic war is totally unthinkable for rational men.”⁴⁸ Truman securitized that the use of nuclear weapons might bring the destruction to the U.S. itself. Therefore, thermonuclear weapon was to be understood as a deterrent used only for strategic purposes, not in warfare. Also D. D.

⁴⁴ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.24.

⁴⁵ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.27.

⁴⁶ TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 4, 1950. Available online at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/tap/1450.htm>.

⁴⁷ TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1953. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14379>.

⁴⁸ TRUMAN, Harry S. The President's Farewell Address to the American People, January 15, 1953, broadcast from the President's office in the White House. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14392>.

Eisenhower affirmed that with the existence of thermonuclear weapons, war no longer had any sense.⁴⁹

The existence of Soviet nuclear arsenal also created an image of indefensible American cities. The popular perception forced Americans to consider Soviet nuclear attack and destruction of American society as being more or less possible. The U.S. government disregarded such concerns by its emphasis on civil defense systems. Truman declared that building up civil defense against nuclear attack was essential. He securitized that with efficient civil defense, the likelihood of nuclear attack was considerably lessened.⁵⁰ Threat that the Soviet Union might launch an attack was predominant. For this reason, the administration promoted the idea that building civil defense would prevent such attack. It also promoted the perception that nuclear war might be survivable.

It was necessary both to explain to the public what nuclear bomb was exactly and to educate how to behave in certain nuclear war-like situations so they would be prepared. They needed to educate citizens on how to survive a nuclear attack. In 1951, the U.S. government released an educational civil defense video *Duck and Cover* in which they urged people how to act during a nuclear attack; in cases they would see a bright flash. According to this civil defense video, nuclear precautions must be dealt in the same way as any other every day danger such as fire. In the same way, radiation burns are explained in comparison to sun burns. In most cases, people would be warned ahead so there is time to hide. But if not, public was urged to duck and cover.⁵¹ The video encourages people to be always ready for an attack. The video shows a turtle using his carapace as a shelter, which is very symbolical given the overall duck and cover message. Also, it was in the line with the affiliated poster “You must learn to find shelter”. This film played a huge role in forcing people to accept nuclear precautions as an everyday reality.

Furthermore, the U.S. issued several handbooks to familiarize people with the nuclear weapons and nuclear war. The booklet *Survival Under Atomic Attack* declared that nuclear weapons would not destroy the earth and nuclear attack was highly survivable even without special protection. They even insinuated that even the power of hydrogen bomb is limited and

⁴⁹ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 17.

⁵⁰ TRUMAN Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 9, 1952. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14418>.

⁵¹ *Duck and Cover* [film]. Director: Anthony RIZZO, producer: Archer Production, USA: Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1951. Available online at <https://archive.org/details/DuckandC1951>.

therefore survivable.⁵² Moreover, the booklet stated that the destruction would not go beyond 2 miles and it was possible to recover from the radiation sickness.⁵³ They were, essentially, belittling radioactive burns and the massive blast impacts. They feared that public could rise against the nuclear weapons and they would be useless for them because public would prevent them from taking a strong deterrent posture. Therefore, the government needed to calm public opinion down and to tell people that nuclear attack was not really so catastrophic. Government made an attempt to desecuritize the nuclear threat by emphasizing that readiness (just to lie down or duck) would save lives by itself. However, widespread and everyday trivializing of nuclear danger led to early opposition to evacuation planning.

The film *Our Cities Must Fight* instructed citizens to stay in cities after a nuclear attack have occurred. The film suggested that massive evacuation, as an act of fear, would be disastrous and something what could never be permitted. Restoring the city and society would be essential and all manpower would be needed to keep city alive. Evacuation was labeled as desertion or responsibilities to oneself, to its city. They feared that everyone would leave the cities which would signify the loss of will to fight back, loss of power to produce.⁵⁴ They discouraged people from leaving by the appeal to their citizenry.

2. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

In the beginning of the nuclear age, the government officials did not focus on the need to control nuclear power on an international level. By that time, they were not overly concerned of the future proliferation of nuclear weapons nor did they fear nuclear arms race. The debate focused on three principal approaches of how to handle this weapon. The first alternative suggested maintaining a lead over the Soviets and other potential nuclear states to gain a strategic advantage by achieving their national objectives.⁵⁵ They knew they will maintain nuclear monopoly for certain amount of time till the Soviet Union builds their nuclear arsenal as well. There was a prevalent notion that with nuclear monopoly, even

⁵² EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD, and CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICE. *Survival Under Atomic Attack: The Official U.S. Government Booklet*, NSRB Doc. 130, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 3.

⁵³ EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD, and CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICE. *Survival Under Atomic Attack: The Official U.S. Government Booklet*, NSRB Doc. 130, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 5.

⁵⁴ *Our Cities Must Fight* [film]. Director: Anthony RIZZO, producer: Archer Productions, USA: U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1951. Available online at <https://archive.org/details/OurCitie1951>.

⁵⁵ WALKER, Samuel J. *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*, Revised Edition, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p.17.

though temporary, they will be able to set the rules in certain essential post-war matters. Byrnes, then the U.S. Secretary of State was convinced that the nuclear monopoly will be a useful diplomacy tool while colliding with the Soviet' interests. Stimson, then the Secretary of War, on the other hand, was concerned that by using its nuclear monopoly to pressure and compel the Soviet Union in an attempt to gain power over her would lead to an arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

In the second scenario, they would try to foster cooperation with the Soviet Union. For instance, H. L. Stimson, then Secretary of War, was particularly enthusiastic about the possible diplomatic outcomes on fostering cooperation with Soviets through information sharing of the nuclear weapons.⁵⁷ There was a belief that nuclear rivalry might be replaced by nuclear cooperation. In a result, the nuclear monopoly was not utilized either way.

The third option, outlined by some government officials and scientists, supported the idea of preventive attack against the Soviet Union to prevent them developing the bomb. They securitized the need to prevent future horizontal proliferation when it was feasible. The key aim was to stop their nuclear development program before it started to threaten U.S. national objectives. Several officials stated that it was essential not to permit any adversary power to obtain nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ The threat of nuclear proliferation was projected only to adversary countries. However, this scenario was not favored by majority of the top officials. The question was why the U.S. did not prevent other states from developing the bomb and avoid further spread of nuclear weapons, which should have been the highest priority of the U.S. government. If we take into account the anarchical nature of the world, the primary concern of the U.S. has to be ensuring their own security at all costs. It is the reason why concerns over ensuring their own security through developing more and better weapons prevailed over concerns of the spread of nuclear weapons to other states. They chose nuclear arms race, where they has a chance to be the first in line, over nuclear disarmament. Therefore they continued developing and testing nuclear weapons with the aim to gain primacy in it.

Role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. defense policy was highly interlaced with the Cold War dynamics through the whole Cold War era. However, threatening the growing tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, some attempts to establish international

⁵⁶ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 128.

⁵⁷ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 45.

⁵⁸ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 12.

control of nuclear power were, to some extent, successful. On November 15, 1945, the *Declaration on Atomic Bomb By President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King* was issued calling for cooperation on the basis on the new UN commission. In the “Agreed Declaration”, they stated three main reasons why this cooperation toward control is necessary. Firstly, nuclear weapons are means of destruction hitherto unknown. Secondly, there is no adequate defense against them. Thirdly, the nuclear monopoly is not possible.⁵⁹ In response, the *UN Atomic Energy Commission* was established. In 1946, Truman in his message to the Congress stated, that he believed that effective measures can be developed through the UN commission to prohibit and prevent the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes.⁶⁰

In cooperation with D. Lilienthal and R. Oppenheimer, D. Acheson, then an undersecretary of State, the State Department released a report known as the *Acheson-Lilienthal report*. The report called for the international control of nuclear energy and proposed a detailed plan for preventing proliferation of nuclear material while stating, that policing approach would not bring peace.⁶¹ Baruch, the U.S. representative at the new UNAEC appointed by Byrnes, followed these efforts by new Baruch plan. Baruch addressed the UNAEC with its plan for international control of nuclear energy and outlined a control of nuclear materials. The basis remained the same as in Acheson-Lilienthal Report, but the Baruch plan strengthened the notion of inspections to ensure fulfillment of the proposed plan. He refused the use of the UN Security Council veto in cases someone violated the control agreement. It also included sanctions for violations.⁶² In the state of mutual distrust, forceful measures must be employed. These strict rules were, nevertheless, unacceptable for the Soviets.

In 1947, Truman emphasized, that they do not seek to maintain nuclear monopoly but they wished that sufficient measures of international control will ensure that nuclear energy would be used only for peaceful purposes.⁶³ It can be argued that these cooperative attempts for international control were not genuine. On one hand, they needed to prevent the use of

⁵⁹ Declaration on Atomic Bomb By President Truman and Prime Ministers Attlee and King. Washington: The White House, November 15, 1945.

⁶⁰ TRUMAN, Harry S. Message to the Congress on the State of the Union and on the Budget for 1947, January 21, 1946. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12467>.

⁶¹ THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. A Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, Prepared for the Secretary of State's Committee on Atomic Energy by a Board of Consultants. Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, March 16, 1946.

⁶² BARUCH, Bernard. *The Baruch Plan*, Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, June 14, 1946. Available online at <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/BaruchPlan.shtml>.

⁶³ TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 6, 1947. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=12762>.

these weapons by others, and to prevent spreading weapons. On the other hand, they contributed significantly to the emergence of nuclear arms race.

The 1947 report evaluated that nuclear threat to mankind could be lifted only by outlawing all wars by efficient international control. This report insinuated that because international control of nuclear weapons was not achievable, states must engage in nuclear arms race in order to increase their nuclear deterrence. It was noted that with more powerful nuclear weapons increases also the value of surprise attack.⁶⁴ The threat of proliferation forces states to accelerate arming which creates additional nuclear buildup. Truman policy emphasized the necessity of maximum nuclear buildup to maximum attainable strength for some specific date in the future, known as a *year of maximum peril*.⁶⁵ To achieve this, he adopted the policy of unlimited nuclear spending. Moreover, people in charge were aware of the nature of nuclear knowledge and admitted a possibility of smaller countries or even groups obtaining these weapons in the future. Stimson acknowledged that they could be also constructed in secret and used suddenly against unsuspecting targets. They even contemplated the possibility of powerful state being *conquered* this way by much smaller one.⁶⁶ This reflected an interesting use of words such as conquered instead of the word destroyed or annihilated, which was being commonly used by anti-nuclear activists suggesting the unlimited power of nuclear weapons.

Initially, Truman believed that nuclear disarmament was possible, but only when other countries will be willing to disarm first. He stated that the world must be protected from the threat of nuclear destruction by enforcement of an international control.⁶⁷ The international control was essential in order to preserve the world and the U.S. would ensure that its misuse will be prevented. Till Soviets developed its own nuclear weapon, the U.S. nuclear arsenal gave Americans a sense of protection. The first Soviet nuclear test caused great upheaval among U.S. government officials because they estimated this would occur in a much longer term.⁶⁸ Truman made an effort to assure American public that the Soviets gaining nuclear

⁶⁴ The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon: The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Evaluation Board For Operation Crossroads. President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers, June 30, 1947, p. 10-14. Available online at

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/81.pdf#zoom=100.

⁶⁵ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, pp. 26-30.

⁶⁶ STIMSON, Henry L. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb. *Harper's Magazine*. 1947, vol. 194, no. 1161, p. 99.

⁶⁷ TRUMAN, Harry S. Radio Report to the American People on the Potsdam Conference, August 9, 1945. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12165>.

⁶⁸ By the time the Soviet Union performed its first nuclear test, the U.S. have already possessed more than 200 nuclear weapons.

arsenal was inevitable process once nuclear knowledge existed in the world.⁶⁹ They perceived nuclear proliferation as inevitable. In the 1949, the debate erupted as many U.S. officials tried to come up with the right response to it. The first approach urged to pursue the development of thermonuclear weapons.⁷⁰ According to the second approach, Oppenheimer and Lilienthal argued for the control of the nuclear energy and feared that this decision would fuel additional acceleration of costly and unnecessary nuclear arms race. The majority of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) argued that the inherent dangers of hydrogen bomb outweighed any possible military advantage of such bombs.⁷¹ Truman realized the significance of nuclear weapons and the need to establish international control of nuclear power. He acknowledged that the future of civilization depends on international arrangements with the aim to renounce the use of the nuclear weapons and to encourage the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.⁷² However, he believed that nuclear control was not achievable and, therefore, they must accelerate nuclear arms race.⁷³ Thus, they chose nuclear buildup over international control negotiations even though they possessed nuclear superiority and officially securitized the need for international control of nuclear weapons.

In 1950, Truman authorized development of a thermonuclear weapon, called superbomb. He acknowledged that the aim of this authorization is that the U.S. is able to defend itself against any possible aggressor. Moreover, he stated that his decision was, nevertheless, in line with the principle of maintaining peace and security and in the accordance of the plan to establish international control of nuclear energy in the future.⁷⁴ Truman authorized the development of thermonuclear bomb because it was highly probable that the Soviet Union would be capable to do it as well. In fact, according to the National Security Council (NSC) report, the Soviet Union has been already acquiring materials to develop thermonuclear weapon.⁷⁵ The U.S. desired to match Soviet nuclear capabilities. Since

⁶⁹ TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President on Announcing the First Atomic Explosion in the U.S.S.R., September 23, 1949. Public Papers of the Presidents. Available online at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1234&st=&st1=>.

⁷⁰ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 149.

⁷¹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 32.

⁷² TRUMAN, Harry S. Special Message to the Congress on Atomic Energy, October 3, 1945. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12327>.

⁷³ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 32

⁷⁴ TRUMAN, Harry S. Statement by the President on the Hydrogen Bomb, January 31, 1950. Public Papers of the Presidents. Available online at <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=642&st=&st1=>.

⁷⁵ THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68). Washington, President's Secretary's File, Truman

it could be perceived as threatening if those armaments were not on the same level, the decision to build a bomb might be perceived as not directly contradictory to the peaceful purpose of this nuclear development. Later, Truman justified this decision by arguing that since they had no longer nuclear monopoly in 1949, the only logical response to the Russian bomb was to strengthen the U.S. armed forces to maintain their lead in nuclear weapons as hard as they could. He was aware that every advantage in this race was only temporary. He also stressed, that they had to choose this path of continual building more deadly and more effective weapons due to the uncertainty about the Soviet intentions and objectives.⁷⁶ Truman stated that he believed that nuclear arms race was the only choice. He decided to build the thermonuclear bomb to preserve the Cold War balance. Nuclear arms race was regarded as the primary choice while international control agreement was seen as a future goal when the situation would be favorable for such step.

2. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

Health and environmental effects of nuclear testing were largely ignored since the principal concern was given to nuclear arms race and maintaining nuclear superiority. Nuclear tests and development were perceived to be a guarantee of national security and the only defense against the Soviet Union. Therefore, the government usually securitized that it was essential to maintain nuclear lead.

Threat of nuclear testing was not part of the discourse because the debate focused on how to survive nuclear attack, not how to survive own nuclear testing. Nuclear fallout dangers were not usually regarded as being very serious. Scientists considered possession of nuclear arsenal to ensure the U.S. security as the greater good which could justify the risks of nuclear fallout. They even compared radiation from flying airplane and radiation from fallout, where the latter was declared as less dangerous. They usually asserted that the danger of nuclear testing is acceptable and mild.⁷⁷ This debate over nuclear fallout was more political than scientific. The AEC withheld many materials about nuclear testing and nuclear weapons from

Papers, April 14, 1950. Available online at

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.

⁷⁶ TRUMAN, Harry S. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 7, 1953. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=14379>.

⁷⁷ GOERTZEL, Ted and GOERTZEL, Ben. *Linus Pauling: A Life In Science and Politics*. New York: Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, pp.145, 148.

the public. This belittling of the nuclear dangers followed the official AEC policy of desecuritizing of the threat of nuclear testing.

2.2. Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (1945 – 1953)

2. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the World

Due to dynamics of the World War II, physics scientists grew worried of the possibility that Germany could be the first to have constructed nuclear weapon. In the context of our thesis, it is particularly important to mention Albert Einstein's letters to the U.S. President F. D. Roosevelt. In his letters from 1939 and 1940, Einstein, in cooperation with physicist Leo Szilard, informed Roosevelt of the possibility to construct a powerful bomb based on a nuclear chain reaction and recommended him to take an action in this matter because of the threat that Germany might have built such a powerful weapon as well.⁷⁸ They urged them to build nuclear weapons to prevent the destruction of western civilization by German nuclear bomb. Physicists were the first group who securitized the nuclear threat that other country might possess such technology as first. The government chose that the only way how to cope with such a threat is to proceed with the development themselves. They hoped that if the U.S. possessed the nuclear bomb then Germany would not use it. Therefore, the primary purpose was to deter.

The nuclear bomb was initially designed to deter an attack. After Germany surrendered, the U.S. started considering actual use of nuclear weapons against Japan. Scientists were the first in line to oppose the actual use of nuclear weapons. They were the only group who had both proper information and scientific background to be aware of the risks of nuclear weapons. Several physicists, who participated on the Manhattan Project, started to question and, later, to oppose plans to use the nuclear weapons.⁷⁹ Many scientists started to fear that nuclear bomb will be used as an offensive weapon against Japan which would unleash a nuclear arms race. Many scientists, among them mainly L. Szilard, began writing reports and petitions trying to warn the U.S. government of the implications of the use

⁷⁸ EINSTEIN, Albert. Albert Einstein's Letters to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 1939-1945, [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available online at <http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtml>.

⁷⁹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. Resisting Nuclear Terror: Japanese and American Antinuclear Movements since 1945. In: SELDEN, Mark and SO, Alvin Y, eds. *War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, p. 258.

of the weapon and to convince them of the need for postwar nuclear arms control.⁸⁰ According to them, the use of nuclear weapons would unleash nuclear arms race which would end the civilization. Physicist Leo Szilard made an attempt to influence President Truman and Oppenheimer to convince them not to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer, then a member of influential *Interim Committee*, replied to him, that nuclear bomb was a big weapon with no military significance.⁸¹ On July 1945, Szilard wrote a *Petition to the President of the United States* signed by 155 Manhattan Project scientists, in which he appealed to the President to reconsider his decision on the basis of the nature of nuclear weapons which opens the door to an era of devastation.⁸² These appeals had no significant impact on the U.S. government's decision making process. Paradoxically, antinuclear movement led by scientists could not get enough popular support to halt the use due to the fact, that to draw sufficient public attention, the real consequences of the nuclear bomb first needed to be publicly demonstrated in action. Thus, their reports appealing against the use of nuclear weapons met without any significant response.

It is usually believed that after the first nuclear Trinity test on July 16, Oppenheimer recalled a part of Bhagavad Gita: "I am become death, the destroyer of the worlds." However, certain evidence suggests that immediately after the test was performed, scientists joyfully congratulated each other, obviously relieved that the test was successful, while not being overly concerned about the future of nuclear weapon.⁸³ Therefore, popular belief that Oppenheimer, immediately after the first nuclear test, realized the perils of nuclear weapons, most likely did not occur. This narrative was most likely created in the aftermath of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings and in response to emergence of anti-nuclear movement. Nevertheless, the popular narrative started to project a strong fear that nuclear weapons created a possibility of the end of the civilization. Nuclear scientists, while often feeling guilty for bringing such a disastrous achievement upon the world, started to emphasize perils of nuclear weapons which might cause a destruction of the world. The existence of the Soviet nuclear capability only fueled this narrative.

⁸⁰ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Resisting Nuclear Terror: Japanese and American Antinuclear Movements since 1945*. In: SELDEN, Mark and SO, Alvin Y, eds. *War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan, & the Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004, p. 258.

⁸¹ Chronology on Decision to Bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki, *The Project of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation* [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/timeline/timeline_page.php?year=1945.

⁸² A Petition to the President of the United States from July 17, 1945, *Miscellaneous Historical Documents Collection*, [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/79.pdf.

⁸³ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 62 - 63.

Nuclear scientists with the common cause of abolishing nuclear weapons formed the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). Also they established the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. They often lobbied for the international control of nuclear energy. The central goal was to inform general public about horrors of the future with nuclear weapons and warn them about the consequences of its use. They believed that if nuclear power were not controlled, the nuclear annihilation was inevitable. Therefore, a world government was being considered to be the only alternative to war. They believed that law and order in a form of world federation represents the only way how to prevent the total war.⁸⁴ They securitized nuclear power as a threat and that the only measure which could save the whole civilization could be a world government. They also began supporting the nuclear scientists in their effort for international control of nuclear power.⁸⁵ Besides that, also pacifist groups incorporated anti-nuclear agenda on the basis that the existence of nuclear weapons raised the overall stakes of future war. For pacifists like Fellowship of Reconciliation, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, or War Resisters League, the likelihood of nuclear war represented the gravest fear which could lead to a total annihilation of the life on the earth. Thus they also began raising nuclear awareness and called for nuclear abolition.

After the nuclear bombings over Japan, the antinuclear sentiment started to slowly spread among the American people. In the Hiroshima aftermath, there were not much accurate information among the general public about nuclear weapons and possible consequences of the nuclear war. Also the American public began occasionally questioning the use of nuclear weapons. The Chicago Tribune predicted, that in the future “this earth will become a barren waste, in which the survivors of the race will hide in caves or live among ruins.”⁸⁶ The media raised a subject that the mankind faced two eventualities, either to live in peace or to face a total destruction. The existence of nuclear weapons stirred up the widespread vision of the end of the civilization. When asked what kind of weapon would be used in the world war III, Einstein’s acknowledged this grave fear in his famous quote: “I don’t know. But I can tell you what they’ll use in the fourth. They’ll use rocks!”⁸⁷ They securitized that the existence of nuclear weapons could lead only to the end of civilization unless they move toward international control of nuclear power.

⁸⁴ HOLLIDAY, W.T. A World State? *The Rotarian*. June 1948, vol. 72, no. 6, p. 11.

⁸⁵ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.14.

⁸⁶ UNKNOWN. The Future, *The Chicago Tribune*, August 14, 1945. Reprinted in *The Chicago Tribune*, June 10, 1968. Available online at <http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1968/06/10/page/24/article/the-future>.

⁸⁷ EINSTEIN, Albert. Looking Ahead, *The Rotarian*. June 1948, vol. 72, no. 6, p.9.

Shortly after the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the idea of the World War III disappeared and was replaced by visions of holocaust, annihilation, or apocalypse. The U.S. media started portraying the use of nuclear weapons against Japanese cities as a *doomsday itself*, or as a *cosmic power*, or *sudden rain*, which completely *annihilated* these cities. The polls signified that a quarter of all American population believed that nuclear experiments would be likely to destroy the planet.⁸⁸ This signifies how nuclear fear of nuclear annihilation began spreading among American population. Moreover, nuclear power started to be personalized immediately after the bombings. They started depicting nuclear weapon as a mythical creation, a Frankenstein monster, and a horrifying force of the universe unleashed by scientists.⁸⁹ Slowly, the media began connecting nuclear weapons to the image of apocalypse, idea of a nuclear rain you cannot escape from.

However, the general public was still greatly confused to the extent whether nuclear weapons should be perceived as a tool which ensures the power and safety of the U.S., which is how the government often portrayed nuclear weapons potential, or as a Frankenstein monster bringing the end of the civilization upon them. Government made a strong effort to link the image of a mushroom cloud to the idea of progress and unprecedented power. They greatly benefited from not informing people about the implications of nuclear weapon use. In the spirit of such nuclear optimism of the utopian society, nuclear weapon was perceives as tools which could bring peace. American public tended to perceive nuclear weapons as a utopian achievement ensuring the position of the U.S. as a superpower, rather as a disastrous achievement threatening the existence of the U.S. itself.

In 1946, 67 percent of American public polled stated that they wanted to prevent all countries from making nuclear weapons. After Truman publicly acknowledged his approval for an accelerated development of hydrogen bomb, 68 percent of the public favored new efforts toward nuclear weapons control agreement with the Soviet Union.⁹⁰ The public perceived nuclear arms race and horizontal proliferation as potential existential threat. American population began considering nuclear non-proliferation and international nuclear control as the only possibilities of how to avoid the end of the world by nuclear annihilation. Einstein also expressed his grave concern about the future of nuclear arms race and appealed

⁸⁸ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 104-106.

⁸⁹ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 104-105.

⁹⁰ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.15.

for more efforts toward future peaceful coexistence. He warned that the U.S. falsely believed that by building thermonuclear weapons it was possible to maintain decisive military superiority. He stated that hydrogen bomb would poison the atmosphere by radioactivity which would lead to the *general annihilation* of all life on the Earth. He feared that the development of a hydrogen bomb would lead to imminent destruction of mankind. Einstein urged the U.S. government to reconsider their policy of unlimited nuclear arms race which leads to increased nuclear danger. He emphasized that if it was not possible to maintain nuclear monopoly, it was absolutely unfeasible to maintain nuclear superiority either.⁹¹

In a 1948 article, Bernard Brodie identified that even though the U.S. possessed monopoly, it was bound to be only a temporary status because multilateral possession was inevitable. The international control of nuclear energy was, therefore, desirable and also possible if the guarantees against potential violation or evasion are watertight. If the U.S. failed to deliver workable international nuclear control, it would lead to uncontrolled nuclear arms race.⁹² He recognized that nuclear knowledge was bound to be spread among more countries and therefore, the most probable but not rational response would be to accelerate nuclear buildup. The nuclear disarmament community increasingly securitized international nuclear control as the only way how to prevent nuclear proliferation and uncontrolled nuclear arms race. Such spread of nuclear weapons was perceived as a way leading to the nuclear annihilation.

2. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the U.S.

The main threat to the U.S. was depicted by the fact that since nuclear weapons were used against Japan, they could be easily used against the U.S. as well. The U.S. government struggled to contain such fears mainly by censoring information about nuclear weapons. Policymakers feared that proper briefing to the public about nuclear weapons would create a panic among American population which could greatly limit public support for a firm national nuclear policy. The government made a significant effort to prevent a dissemination of redundant information about the impact of the use of nuclear weapons and radiation among the public. Consequently, the public, while not being properly informed, usually tended to support the government policy. In the aftermath of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the American public overwhelmingly approved the use of nuclear weapons. The Gallup poll

⁹¹ EINSTEIN, Albert. *Albert Einstein Warns of Dangers in Nuclear Arms Race* [video news report]. NBC News, New York: NBC Universal Media LLC, February 12, 1950. Available online at <https://a248.e.akamai.net/7/1635/50139/1d/origin.nbclearn.com/files/nbcarchives/site/pdf/39895.pdf>.

⁹² BRODIE, Bernard. The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker. *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948, No. 55.

results showed that 85 percent favored the bombings and only 5 percent opposed them.⁹³ Thus, American public tended to praise the development of nuclear weapon and celebrated an atomic sensation as an embodiment of the U.S. superiority. This sentiment was only enhanced by the sensation of the end of the war. They strived to desecuritize such threat by downplaying the threat of the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. as well as belittling effects of the use of nuclear weapons.

However, American public began doubting whether nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were caused by a real military necessity. The use of nuclear bomb was labeled as a modern type of *barbarism*. According to this statement, the U.S. should have avoided the use of nuclear weapons on the basis of their Christianity and morality.⁹⁴ The reality where others might be barbaric did not justify that the U.S. should have acted accordingly. The spreading criticism of nuclear weapons caused some proponents to start defending nuclear bombings. Part of the popular debate began supporting the governmental rhetoric justifying the use of the bomb with the aim of saving American lives.⁹⁵ Due to the escalating Cold War and the accelerated nuclear arms race, the general public largely believed in the reliance of national security on the use of nuclear weapons. They started adopting government propaganda which focused on selling the bomb to general public. Governmental measures to cope with the Soviet threat enjoyed the popular support

The U.S. government was greatly concerned over activists opposing nuclear weapons thus the U.S. officials even started to contain their anti-nuclear activism. By various means, they tried to discredit many scientists and activists on the basis of alleged accusations of involvement in communist activities. J. Edgar Hoover, among others, made significant efforts to revoke Einstein's American citizenship.⁹⁶ In many cases, American physics scientists were suddenly treated like national enemies while intelligence organizations constantly spied on them.⁹⁷ Their loyalty to the U.S. was in question once they started opposing and criticizing nuclear development strategy. In reaction to nuclear disarmament movement, the government started securitizing the communist threat which in general justified their nuclear program.

⁹³ WALKER, Samuel J. *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan*, Revised Edition, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005, p. 98.

⁹⁴ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 115.

⁹⁵ MISCAMBLE, Wilson D. *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 114-115.

⁹⁶ GRUNDMANN, Siegfried. *The Einstein Dossiers: Science and Politics - Einstein's Berlin Period with an Appendix on Einstein's FBI File*, translated by Ann M. HENTSCHEL. Berlin: Springer, 2005, p. 367.

⁹⁷ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 35-36.

By the end of the World War II, there was a strong government propaganda that forced people into the political disengagement. Forces of conformity discouraged public to participate in oppositional politics. Public was pushed away from the public arena. Even governmental policies to build civil defense relied on home fallout shelters.⁹⁸ People were encouraged to perceive their home as the best shelter for the event of nuclear war. They did not participate in, question, or even oppose governmental Cold War policies. They perceived their home as the best defense available and this way they did not have to face the realities of the nuclear world. In the same way, media did not question government propaganda and were largely indifferent to the anti-nuclear movement. Frightening as the nuclear war could be, the best rational way of dealing with such problems was not to question governmental foreign policy. Nuclear issue was something people did not want to see and deal with in their everyday life.

In the same way, anti-nuclear movement was not particularly self-assertive and declined. Even though the result of nuclear disarmament movement was not overly successful in these years, it set the agenda on the necessity of nuclear control of atomic power as the first essential step toward nuclear disarmament. And even though the U.S. government maintained the policy of development of new and more effective nuclear weapons, they still rhetorically supported the idea of future disarmament as national objective and a measure how to avoid using nuclear weapons. They rhetorically labeled an international control of atomic energy as most favorable way to reach this state.

The existence of the Soviet nuclear arsenal brought into the discourse an immediate threat that Soviet nuclear arsenal might be used against the U.S. in a massive surprise attack. A deterrence theory symbolized this threat. In response to Soviet nuclear development program, the U.S. started considering the possibility of preventive nuclear strikes to disrupt their buildup because they perceived it as the primary existential threat. The strategy of a preventive war is based on an assumption that the total nuclear war was inevitable in the future and, therefore, it is more advantageous to strike massive first attack. In 1946, a political scientist Brodie published a book *The Absolute Weapon*, in which he defined the military utility of the nuclear weapons and what later became called nuclear deterrence. He later claimed that the cost of potential nuclear retaliation would be too high to contemplate which would make the nuclear preventive strike irrational and highly improbable. The nuclear deterrence works not due to the actual use of these weapons in war, but with the threat of their

⁹⁸ MOLLIN, Marian. *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, p. 75.

use.⁹⁹ The purpose of nuclear weapons was being considered more and more in terms of nuclear deterrence. Such strategy assumes that deterrence does not fail thus ensures reliable security. American public started to perceive nuclear weapons as their safety assurance.

The key factor of this strategy was to ensure that the U.S. would possess the power of retaliation. This threat of massive counterattack destroying the whole society prevents that such occurrence would happen. Brodie declared that a possibility of retaliation was the best guarantee of security. He acknowledged that the deterrence theory aimed to avert the possibility of nuclear war.¹⁰⁰ The mere explanation that nuclear weapons would ensure peaceful future and the fact that nuclear weapons would never be used provided a successful securitization of nuclear threat and a massive justification for nuclear spending. Brodie also emphasized that there is a need to protect those retaliatory forces to survive a surprise attack. According to him, nuclear superiority makes a little or no difference in a time of crisis because each side cannot be sure of its security. This fear will be a decisive strategic driver.¹⁰¹ Thus protecting retaliatory forces is a key measure how to avert annihilation of the U.S. Brodie also stated that there was no defense against the nuclear bomb and the bomb itself had no military utility. Nuclear weapons enable wars to be decisive, short, and to be waged on longer distance. He considered the American vulnerability to nuclear attacks in the future.¹⁰² He acknowledged that different states will possess nuclear bombs against which there is no defense, but he did not emphasize the political implications of this stalemate and their bargaining potential.

2. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

The American public began opposing nuclear weapons on the basis of its indiscriminate killing of civilians. On August 9, Samuel McCrea Cavert, an influential religious figure, complained to Truman about the indiscriminate nature of an attack. Truman responded that since Japanese government staged an attack on Pearl Harbor, it was only appropriate to respond in a way which would be understood to them.¹⁰³ The Truman's

⁹⁹ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 3.

¹⁰⁰ BRODIE, Bernard. The Development of Nuclear Strategy. *International Security*, Spring, 1978, vol.2, no.4, p. 65. Originally quoted in BRODIE, Bernard, *The Absolute Weapon*, New York: Harcourt, 1946, p.76.

¹⁰¹ BRODIE, Bernard. The Development of Nuclear Strategy. *International Security*, Spring, 1978, vol.2, no.4, p. 66. Originally quoted in BRODIE, Bernard, *The Absolute Weapon*, New York: Harcourt, 1946, p.83.

¹⁰² BRODIE, Bernard. The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker. *Foreign Affairs*, October 1948, no. 55.

¹⁰³ TRUMAN, Harry S. Correspondence between Harry S. Truman and Samuel Cavert, August 11, 1945. Available online at

response signified the division between Americans and Them, those who represent a group of barbarians, those outside of American culture. Then, nuclear bomb was perceived as the only way those Japanese people could understand reason. Truman initially did not consider nuclear weapons as weapons threatening individuals, but as the mere instrument of forcing government into surrender. Truman did not securitize nuclear bombs as weapons threatening individuals, but threatening governments. In the aftermath of nuclear bombings he justified this decision by stating that the U.S. was not the one first using indiscriminate killings. Morality of such act is then ensured on the basis of the eye for an eye principle. However such indiscriminate killing provided an agenda for nuclear disarmament movement. They mobilized Americans by stressing that nuclear weapons threatened every single American.

Norman Cousins emphasized that the threat of nuclear war might destroy the whole U.S. He outlined a possible scenario of 36 hour full-scale nuclear war in which more than ten million Americans were killed. He stressed that in this short but massive nuclear war, the enemy would not target the industry but would have strived to paralyze the U.S. by killing as many Americans as possible.¹⁰⁴ He securitized that Americans would be the real targets of such an attack instead of targeting the political and industrial infrastructure of the country in their struggle to destroy the U.S. By emphasizing that Americans would be the real aim of enemy nuclear attack he pointed out the imminency of such a threat of nuclear weapons. The debate started emphasizing how nuclear war would affect the lives of individuals.

This idea of an existential threat to every American was further strengthened by popular coverage of nuclear explosions and testing such as novels *No Place to Hide* by David Bradley (1948). People began feeling threatened by the *fear of the unknown* which Norman Cousins called a primitive fear. He emphasized that a threat of nuclear power is mainly the *fear of irrational death*.¹⁰⁵ This fear materialized within the disarmament agenda swiftly after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.

2. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1945-08-11&documentid=11&studycollectionid=abomb&pagenumber=1.

¹⁰⁴ SCHEIBACH, Michael. *Atomic Narratives and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom, 1945-1955*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2003, p. 157.

¹⁰⁵ SCHEIBACH, Michael. *Atomic Narratives and American Youth: Coming of Age with the Atom, 1945-1955*. Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2003, p. 157.

The threat of environmental damage caused by nuclear explosions and testing was not securitized initially due to the lack of knowledge about consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The government strived not to inform public properly because they feared it might cause panic which would disrupt their nuclear policy. Limited knowledge concentrated on harms to individuals, not on damages to environment.

3. The Construction of Nuclear Threat in the Beginning of Thermonuclear Age, 1953-61

“Science speaks in many tongues. The advancement of the nuclear arts has been the work of men of many nations. That is so because the atom itself is nonpolitical. It wears no nationality and recognizes no frontiers. It is neither moral nor immoral. Only man’s choice can make it good or evil.”¹⁰⁶

The second researched era corresponds with years of the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower.¹⁰⁷ During this era, the Soviet Union tested their first thermonuclear weapon in 1953 and first intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957. Also we have to take into account that several international crises such as Korean War or Suez crisis occurred in this period. Furthermore, the Soviet Union considered the U.S. nuclear superiority to be a national threat which in consequence unleashed another circle of nuclear arms race. France tested their first nuclear weapon in 1960. This nuclear development together with the infamous 1954 thermonuclear test significantly revived the anti-nuclear movement.

3. 1. Governmental level (1953-1961)

3. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

On December 1953, Eisenhower declared that their nuclear stockpile increased daily and now exceeded the explosive equivalent of all explosives used in the World War II.¹⁰⁸ Eisenhower brought into the discourse an image of massive nuclear armament with the capacity to wage more disastrous war than the World War II. He based his nuclear policy on a long-term projection of a maximum strength.¹⁰⁹ He opposed the idea of Truman’s unlimited spending to the absolute maximum accumulation of strength for a specific date of future nuclear exchange. John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, remarked, that the U.S. security is based on “a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost ... reinforced by the further deterrent of

¹⁰⁶ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Message to the United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva, August 8, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10334>.

¹⁰⁷ The presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower lasted from January 20 1953 to January 20 1961.

¹⁰⁸ EISENHOWER, Dwight D, Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf.

¹⁰⁹ EISENHOWER, Dwight D, The President's News Conference, April 30, 1953. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9832>.

massive retaliatory power.”¹¹⁰ This suggests, that the second strike capability of massive retaliation creates more powerful deterrent because it minimizes chances of surprise attack. He proposed this new policy to create the risk of waging nuclear war so great, that the Soviet Union would never chose that option.¹¹¹ Although Eisenhower did not share Dulles’s views of massive retaliation, the public perception regarded the Eisenhower’s nuclear policy is the policy of massive retaliation. In the beginning of his administrative, Eisenhower preferred Dulles’s policy of massive retaliation over limited war plans.¹¹² He insisted that the U.S. could win the nuclear war. Therefore, in an event of a Soviet surprise nuclear attack, U.S. should retaliate with all power that is available. Eisenhower acknowledged that if the U.S. used nuclear weapons, it would be translated as an initiation of global war.¹¹³ Eisenhower declared, that if such a surprise attack occurred, their reaction would be swift and resolute and retaliation capabilities so great, that they could inflict terrible losses upon aggressor and turn their land into waste. He added: “Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation “¹¹⁴ It is an approach where after the second retaliatory strike, an adversary has no more power to strike the forth one in response due to his absolute annihilation.

The 1953 first Soviet thermonuclear test shocked the U.S. administration. Consequently, they tried to downplay their achievement in public.¹¹⁵ They were threatened that the likelihood of nuclear war was far greater when thermonuclear weapons are part of the context. They felt extremely threatened by the Soviet thermonuclear capability with the potential to initiate mutual destruction that Eisenhower even considered preventive nuclear attack against the Soviet Union. Eisenhower stated that if it had corresponded with the U.S. national interests, they would use it. Dulles expressed several times that for this purpose, the

¹¹⁰ DULLES, John Foster. Speech of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Council on Foreign Relations, January 12, 1954.

¹¹¹ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 36.

¹¹² CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 36.

¹¹³ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. ‘War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever’: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., GORDON, Philip, MAY, Ernest, and ROSENBERG Jonathan, eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 98.

¹¹⁴ EISENHOWER, Dwight D, Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf.

¹¹⁵ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 47.

U.S. must bypass the nuclear taboo and create more usable nuclear policy.¹¹⁶ They felt threatened by the presence of the taboo which was perceived as an obstacle in their attempt to ensure national security. This together with the presence of soviet thermonuclear armament led military officials to shift their focus toward the employment of limited war strategy. Thus, government stated that in the event of Chinese or Soviet hostilities, “the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”¹¹⁷ Later, Eisenhower publicly affirmed, that nuclear weapons have achieved conventional status within the U.S. armed services.¹¹⁸ Their declared intention to react with nuclear forces as with any other weapon was proclaimed in order to encourage and compel caution on the other side. The purpose of this declaration, later known as *brinkmanship*, was to let them know that every provocation could inflict unacceptable damage. In response to that, certain top U.S. officials also shifted their views and started emphasizing the need for lessening international tensions.

The NSC report stated, that if both the U.S. and the Soviet Union possessed enough nuclear weapons to inflict critical damage on its adversary, this would not prevent major atomic retaliations but, nevertheless, it could create a stalemate when both sides are reluctant to ignite a general war.¹¹⁹ On the one hand, the report assumed that nuclear balance would inhibit the Soviets from attacking. On the other hand, they noted that for this reason, the Soviet Union might launch a surprise attack.¹²⁰ To minimize the chances of the general war and thus the probability of destroying the world, the NSC report maintained a strong security posture of massive offensive retaliatory capability and adequate defense system.¹²¹ Also Vice President Nixon stated that the U.S. must rely primarily on massive retaliatory forces in order to preserve the U.S. against the Communist threat.¹²² This stressed the need for massive retaliation which was a way to deter the Soviet threat in limited proxy wars. It reflected inability to cope with this threat so they chose massive retaliation as the ultimate deterrence

¹¹⁶ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 38.

¹¹⁷ THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p.22.

¹¹⁸ EISENHOWER, Dwight D, Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf.

¹¹⁹ THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p.4.

¹²⁰ THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p.4.

¹²¹ THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p.19.

¹²² FREEDMAN, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 (third edition), 1981 (first edition), p. 81.

which could counter their aggression. Launching the massive retaliation was therefore, securitized as the only way how to ensure their survival.¹²³ Moreover, the *Basic National Security Policy* declared that a total war would inflict such destruction that further survival of both blocs will be threatened. In spite of that, the U.S. would use all weapons available against the Soviet Union, if needed, while taking into account the fact, that limited war was not feasible anyway.¹²⁴

Later, Eisenhower updated this policy by adding, that the U.S. must reject the concept of preventive war.¹²⁵ In 1955, Eisenhower publicly stated, that the U.S. will never start an aggressive war, due to their support of prosperity, safety and good faith among nations.¹²⁶ It was an attempt to reaffirm that their intentions are to deter, not to provoke or strike preventively. However, in the same month, Eisenhower publicly declared that nuclear weapons should be used on military targets “just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”¹²⁷ Thus, if the U.S. would be provoked they would use all weapons available. Nuclear weapons were declared to be perceived as conventional weapons. During the NSC debate, Eisenhower added, that the U.S. must be willing to “push its whole stack of chips into the pot”, if it would be needed.¹²⁸ The purpose of this rhetoric was to deter Chinese military efforts and to make their strategy more credible by insinuating that Eisenhower would rather see the world destroyed than be the one who surrenders. Therefore, he securitized a totality of war and possible massive nuclear counterforce. Nevertheless, this policy was not particularly believable because it was a suicidal strategy. This pushed the U.S. even deeper into the search for tactical nuclear weapons with enhanced credibility.

During his first three years in office, Eisenhower believed that the nuclear war was thinkable and winnable. Later, we see clear evidence that the nuclear exchange was perceived as unimaginable and appalling, mainly due to the enormous number of estimated American casualties, reaching up to 65 percent of the population, and the minimal impact of prevention

¹²³ ROSENBERG, David Alan. *The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy*. In: GRAEBNER, Norman A., ed. *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.146.

¹²⁴ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 39.

¹²⁵ ROSENBERG, David Alan. *The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy*. In: GRAEBNER, Norman A., ed. *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.146.

¹²⁶ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 2, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10424>.

¹²⁷ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 16, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10434>.

¹²⁸ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.53.

arrangements.¹²⁹ He believed that defense measures would have minimal impact and would only scare people. As a result of these unimaginable potential costs, he took a stance that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union would not initiate nuclear war in the future due to the threat of escalation.¹³⁰ Later, Eisenhower stated, that mutual deterrence provided no stability guarantees because, in the same time, limited wars on the periphery might be waged. He stated that it would lead more likely to global war.¹³¹ Therefore limited war in Europe was perceived as unthinkable. He believed that it would escalate into global war between Russia and the U.S. He securitized the threat of nuclear escalation in order to deter potential Russian aggression.

Major shift was made in response to the 1953 first Soviet thermonuclear test. His view changed rapidly mainly due to the amount of damage thermonuclear weapons could inflict. Till then, they asked how much damage it would cause, with thermonuclear weapons they started asking reversed questions: who will survive and what will be left on both sides. In 1956, during the NSC meeting, Eisenhower even expressed his desire to abolish thermonuclear weapons for the sake of world population. He insisted that the thermonuclear war could not be won.¹³² Eisenhower strongly rejected the possibility of nuclear war on the basis that it would destroy the civilization. He felt threatened by the destructiveness of thermonuclear weapons which might cause millions of casualties. He declared nuclear and primarily war to be unthinkable.¹³³ Eisenhower was sure that there would be no winners in the case of thermonuclear war: “The destruction might be such that we might have ultimately to go back to bows and arrows.”¹³⁴ The hydrogen bomb changed the nature of warfare and Eisenhower was well aware of this fact. Destruction of the enemy now meant the annihilation of the U.S. He proclaimed that the nuclear war was too horrible to contemplate and to

¹²⁹ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.106.

¹³⁰ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p.47.

¹³¹ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 109.

¹³² ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.107.

¹³³ RHODES, Richard. *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995, p. 584.

¹³⁴ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 45.

practice.¹³⁵ They were terrified of the likelihood of the Soviet nuclear surprise attack, but in the same time they proclaimed, that it is impossible for a rational man to do that. Moreover, nuclear weapons must be handled with caution and without *going hysterical*.¹³⁶ He suggested that then the public had nothing to fear that nuclear weapons would be used. Nevertheless, he maintained his official policy of nuclear retaliation in spite of the fact that he believed the nuclear employment has no sense.

On the other hand, Eisenhower was pessimistic about the possibility that leaders would act rationally. He was concerned, that deterrence could fail despite the presence of large thermonuclear deterrent. According to his view, the existence of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) changed the nature of nuclear strategy. For this reason, he changed the U.S. nuclear strategy toward long-range nuclear weapons and a reliable warning system to ensure that U.S. could execute their massive nuclear retaliation plan in case of the Soviet surprise attack.¹³⁷ The primary factor behind it that he believed it would deter Soviets from initiating such an attack. Once the attack would be authorized, there was no turning back. In consequence, it made a possibility of nuclear holocaust more instantaneous and more likely. The second factor was the necessity to possess at least the same technology as the Soviets had because without proper retaliation capability, the surprise attack would be more probable. With the intercontinental ballistic missiles, the perception of potential nuclear war changed rapidly. The nuclear war transformed into one potential nuclear battle which was not expected to last longer than thirty minutes. In this case, mobilization planning and nuclear precautions were perceived, to some extent, as useless.

Furthermore, between 1955 and 1957, Eisenhower removed plans counting on non-nuclear weapons from military policy, thus ensuring that in the case of military conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the war would immediately become thermonuclear.¹³⁸ After the extensive debate, the 1957 NSC report placed the main reliance on nuclear weapons. This integrated nuclear weapons within other weapons in their armament.¹³⁹ It resulted in

¹³⁵ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 23, 1955, Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10437>.

¹³⁶ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 16, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10434>.

¹³⁷ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.44.

¹³⁸ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.45.

¹³⁹ JONES, Matthew. *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 340-341.

nuclear bomb achieving conventional status. Eisenhower made changes to ensure that the nuclear war would be so destructive, that it would never happen.

During the second Berlin crisis in 1958, Eisenhower was less confident about the mutual deterrence because he was concerned that Soviets did actually plan an attack. When journalists asked Eisenhower in 1959 about his intentions toward his no first strike policy, he answered, that if the U.S. were under a threat of attack or if it was needed to protect the future of the nation, then he would act as rapidly as was possible and order such strikes.¹⁴⁰ But nevertheless, he maintained his posture that the U.S. would not start any hostilities toward the Soviets. He stated that nuclear bombs were not policing weapons which could free people. He added that using nuclear weapons was senseless and self-defeating.¹⁴¹ He did not say the use of nuclear weapons are out of the question, but he expressed his belief that there were situations, like Berlin, where using nuclear weapons would not help but only create an utter destruction. During Eisenhower's first years of presidency, he understood nuclear weapons as an instrument of the U.S. policy which could be employed at any moment. During the second term of his presidency, when he threatened with the use of nuclear weapons, he emphasized its self-defeating potential. Therefore, he maintained his posture where he relied on deterrence as defense.

In response to Soviet thermonuclear test, the U.S. administrative also started considering the possibility of public education in national defense matters. They needed to inform the public in order to proceed with their civil defense planning. They emphasized that shielding population from potential nuclear blast and radiation increased their survivability. However, they feared that, by informing the public, they might lose public support and they could even fuel the pacifism sentiment. The government ordered a study on possible effects of nuclear attack on public. The report *Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development*, issued in 1956, assumed that in the nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, in which ninety cities would be destroyed with about fifty million casualties. They concluded, that such massive attack would caused several psychological and social changes: 1) major fears of radioactivity, new attacks, invasion, loss of relatives, starvation and cold, 2) feeling of loss and quilt, sense that the lives might have been spared by better preparations, and 3) hyperactivity or apathy. They deduced that confrontation with negative consequences and proper psychological preparation

¹⁴⁰ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 4, 1959. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11672>.

¹⁴¹ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 11, 1959. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11678>.

of public for such event would strengthen the society which can improve chances of surviving a nuclear war.¹⁴² Therefore, they assumed that informed public which was familiarized with national security objectives and some consequences of possible nuclear attack would be advantageous for the whole national effort. They needed to start informing the public about the risks and consequences of nuclear weapons. With better prepared public, there would be less disastrous consequences of surprise nuclear attack.

Thus, the report *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age* urged to develop adequate assurances of protection to civilians, mainly shelter and survival programs. Also they urged the government to ensure that the U.S. retaliatory forces would not be vulnerable to Soviet attacks.¹⁴³ There existed a wide belief that the civilian population must be informed properly because they must know what to expect. They presupposed that an adequate passive defense system will reduce casualties significantly because the public will understand the proper procedures. There was also strong government propaganda to sell the idea of survival after the nuclear attack, which gave legitimacy to civil defense measures and to the whole governmental policy of nuclear arms race.¹⁴⁴ They hoped people would be more supportive of their policies. For them it was essential to stress how, only with appropriate civil defense system, the chances of survival the nuclear attack was high. In order to justify governmental policies and civil defense programs, the public opinion had to believe that the nuclear war was survivable. The morale of nation needed to be stronger. They argued that the U.S. will survive everything and the nuclear attack is survivable.

Edward Teller, among others, began supporting the idea to build bomb shelters. Teller's and Kissinger's nuclear optimism was manifested in their idea of winnable nuclear war. They assumed that the population would hide underground for no more than two weeks and after that people would return to their daily lives.¹⁴⁵ They presumed that nuclear exchange would not alter the reality in any significant way. This proposition met with a strong opposition in the U.S. government while representing a classical security dilemma which explained that states which would choose to spend finances on welfare rather than on defense

¹⁴² VANDERCOOK, Wm. F. Making the very best of the very worst: The "Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons" Report of 1956, *International Security*, Summer 1986, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 190-191.

¹⁴³ THE WHITE HOUSE. Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee. *Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age*, Washington, November 7, 1957, pp.18-21.

¹⁴⁴ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 28.

¹⁴⁵ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 108.

systems would be destroyed earlier by its adversaries which chose the opposite.¹⁴⁶ There was a debate among government officials whether such civil defense programs would be effective or counterproductive. Many top officials argued that it would be appropriate to state officially, that no effective measures to protect the nation existed. Eisenhower believed that even minimal defense would increase significantly the chances of survival of many people.¹⁴⁷

On the other hand, in 1955 the government launched a series of national defense drills called *Operation Alert*. According to the *Operation Alert*, Americans practiced preparations for a potential nuclear attack each year throughout the whole U.S. Their propaganda films featured shockingly unrealistic images of the aftermath of nuclear holocaust. These films and photos were regarded by the public as ridiculously staged. This senseless divergence of approaches led to the anti-civil defense protests. The government response to these protests was an increasing perception that these civil defense drills pose a huge threat to maintaining nuclear strategy.¹⁴⁸ Nevertheless, they continued to made attempts to legitimize civil defense planning in order to assuage public opinion.

The U.S. officials suggested that the idea of private home shelters would be also a viable option given the circumstances. Evacuation of unprotected millions was politically very difficult to sell to public who was increasingly aware of the health dangers of nuclear fallout. They continued to avoid the question whether the shelters and other civil defense measures were necessary and effective in the situation when people do not survive direct hit anyway.¹⁴⁹ Also there is no way of warning people efficiently of coming nuclear attack. Warning time would not be sufficient to evacuate the cities. On several occasions, civil defense programs were criticized by the U.S. officials by labeling them as *calculated ineffectiveness* or *cruel delusion*. They also stated that these programs are “nothing more than a mean fantasy to fool the public into believing that many Americans could survive a multimegaton nuclear attack.”¹⁵⁰ Eisenhower administration had a huge problem with an antinuclear sentiment and the negative public opinion toward effectiveness of civil defense systems and the nuclear radiation fallout.

¹⁴⁶ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 254.

¹⁴⁷ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 28.

¹⁴⁸ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 56-7, 70-72, 75.

¹⁴⁹ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 58.

¹⁵⁰ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 64.

3. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

In his 1952 presidential campaign speech, Eisenhower pledged, that if he were in charge, he would end the Korean War honorably.¹⁵¹ This statement was usually translated as an insinuation to the employment of the nuclear weapons. Eisenhower was more willing to use nuclear weapons. Later as the President, during the Korean truce talks, as well as in other crises, he threatened several times to use conventional and nuclear force to end the Korean War honorably.¹⁵² Eisenhower saw a clear distinction between periphery and general big wars. Thus, he believed that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not trigger a total war no more than the use of conventional weapons would. Initially, he considered the use of nuclear weapons in local wars as likely.¹⁵³ In 1954 NSC meeting, Eisenhower mentioned, that he believes, that in the aftermath of a nuclear attack on the U.S., a totalitarian regime would be needed to be installed.¹⁵⁴

By 1954, Dulles started opposing massive retaliation policy with statements that massive retaliation would definitely not be employed under all circumstances and flexible retaliation would be more credible.¹⁵⁵ Eisenhower encouraged the development of tactical nuclear weapons with more applicability in the battlefield while not necessarily leading to a large-scale nuclear war. By 1960, out of 18,000 fission and fusion weapons developed by 1960, only 4,000 were designed for strategic purposes.¹⁵⁶ Tactical weapons were considered to be a more credible and applicable instrument of power projection due to limited damage they might cause. Eisenhower approached nuclear weapons as another instrument of war, not as an absolute weapon.

The U.S. administration hoped that the emphasis on tactical nuclear bombs and deployment of nuclear weapons in Western Europe would help them to cope with vast

¹⁵¹ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. I Shall Go to Korea Speech, October 25, 1952. Available online at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/education/bsa/citizenship_merit_badge/speeches_national_historical_importance/i_shall_go_to_korea.pdf.

¹⁵² DIVINE, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 29-30.

¹⁵³ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.108.

¹⁵⁴ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 97.

¹⁵⁵ FREEDMAN, Lawrence. *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 (third edition), 1981 (first edition), pp.81-82.

¹⁵⁶ ROSENBERG, David Alan. US Strategy: Theory vs. Practice. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March 1987, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 22.

Warsaw Pact conventional forces.¹⁵⁷ Thus, a strong retaliation policy together with the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and the establishment of extended deterrence significantly enhanced the credibility of the U.S. nuclear forces. However, it also strengthened the perception of the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

Consequently, Eisenhower started to emphasize the necessity of defense for the sole purpose to deter. He stressed the need for securing primarily the U.S. retaliatory forces and not to secure population first.¹⁵⁸ He desired to build stronger deterrent not because he wanted to have more powerful retaliatory forces, but because he wanted to limit the threat that the Soviets would take that risks and attack those retaliatory forces. For this purpose, he emphasized the importance of missile development.

Eisenhower admitted that the existence of the thermonuclear arsenals transformed the nature of warfare and created a condition of mutual deterrence.¹⁵⁹ Mutual nuclear deterrence took effect in mid-1950, when both the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a credible nuclear capacity to launch large-scale nuclear strikes from their homeland against their adversary.¹⁶⁰ There existed a debate whether the Soviets might start the war by provoking the U.S. into nuclear war. Both Eisenhower and Dulles declared that the Soviet Union was no more likely to start a nuclear war than the U.S.¹⁶¹ However, some officials started questioning the credibility of massive retaliation policy in the state of mutual deterrence.

In 1957, during the NSC meeting, Dulles admitted that the public opinion inhibited the U.S. from using the nuclear weapons in the battlefield. He stated, that using nuclear weapons would ruin their image.¹⁶² Due to the existence of the nuclear taboo, the use on nuclear weapons was politically impossible. During the last years of his presidency, there was a debate whether nuclear bombs should be really handled as conventional weapons. And if so,

¹⁵⁷ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 42.

¹⁵⁸ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.108.

¹⁵⁹ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 110.

¹⁶⁰ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.88.

¹⁶¹ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.109.

¹⁶² WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 79.

under which specific circumstances should they be used. Unwilling to decide, Eisenhower argued, that if nuclear weapons would be used in limited wars, the world would be repelled.¹⁶³

Also, the production of new neutron bombs releasing more radiation whilst not inflicting serious material damage was cancelled. Eisenhower administration perceived them as weapons which could not be employed to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Science advisor to Eisenhower, G. Kistiokowsky, noted that neutron bomb was not applicable against Asians.¹⁶⁴ They believed the employment of these weapons was not feasible due to public opposition.

3. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

The main threat of nuclear proliferation was considered to be nuclear arms race and a struggle to maintain U.S. nuclear superiority. In the UN *Atoms for Peace* speech, Eisenhower admitted, that the knowledge of development of nuclear weapons will inevitably spread among other states. He conceded that even a vast superiority in numbers and a strong retaliation capability is not preventive against the surprise attack. Therefore, beside a strategy of massive retaliation, a strong defense system is essential. But this alone did not guarantee safety for the people. Eisenhower urged a confidence building toward peaceful relations with Russia and proposed a plan of action which would facilitate it.¹⁶⁵ This statement indicated relative importance of nuclear arms race due to the fact that nuclear superiority would not guarantee their security. In a press conference in 1955, he indicated that a nuclear superiority is not essential to ensure defense of the country. He stated that if a country had enough of particular type of nuclear weapons, there was no point in having even more.¹⁶⁶ Eisenhower's rhetoric clearly suggested that the U.S. was more devoted to human welfare than was to human destruction.¹⁶⁷ However, this rhetoric of importance to halt nuclear proliferation did not match the policy.

Nuclear disarmament was being considered only as an imaginary goal which must be preceded by a series of mutual nuclear treaties and agreements. Eisenhower stated that

¹⁶³ CRAIG, Campbell. *Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p.46.

¹⁶⁴ COHEN, Sam. *F*** You! Mr. President: Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb* [online], 2006 (3rd edition), p. 186. Available at http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions_Sam_Cohen_2006_Third_Edition.pdf.

¹⁶⁵ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf.

¹⁶⁶ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 2, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10424>.

¹⁶⁷ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, March 2, 1955. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10424>.

the U.S. would seek to achieve more than mere reduction or elimination of nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁸ However, it is disputable whether the disarmament proposal was genuine or whether it was only a propaganda statement to gain a psychological advantage over the Soviet Union in their desire to exploit the rhetorical war over the disarmament debate.¹⁶⁹ Disarmament was possible, but under existing circumstances, highly improbable. The NSC report admitted that disarmament would be highly difficult due to mutual distrust and suspicion, but chances can be highly improved by agreement on other conflicts and the realization that disarmament would be beneficial for both sides.¹⁷⁰ Among the top U.S. officials, the prevalent idea was that the U.S. should not participate in the negotiations for the control or abolition of nuclear weapons. Dulles secretly admitted, that even if it was possible, the abolition was probably not desirable.¹⁷¹ Eisenhower considered moratorium on nuclear testing as a first step toward disarmament.

The *Antarctic treaty*, opened for signatures in December 1, 1959, was an extraordinary multilateral treaty signed to ensure that Antarctica shall continue to be used for peaceful purposes only. The treaty represents an international body which shall prevent colonial competition over this area. It refers to the nuclear weapons. According to the Article V, all nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive material in Antarctica is prohibited.¹⁷²

3. 1. 4. The threat of nuclear testing and radiation

One of the key moments of this administrative was the hydrogen bomb test (BRAVO), which occurred on Bikini atoll in the Marshall Islands on March 1, 1954. The explosion was so massive that it exceeded all scientific estimates and by accident exposed to radiation twenty three Japanese fishermen on a boat named the *Lucky Dragon* and more than 200 Marshall Islanders. Despite the fact that they were outside the cleared danger zone, they

¹⁶⁸ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Address delivered by the president of the United States before the General Assembly of the United Nations (Atoms for Peace Speech), December 8, 1953. Available online at http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/atoms_for_peace/Binder13.pdf.

¹⁶⁹ MEDHURST, Martin J. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Speech: A Case Study the Strategic Use of Language. In: MEDHURST, Martin J., et al, eds. *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997, p. 33.

¹⁷⁰ THE WHITE HOUSE. A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on Basic National Security Policy (NSC 162/2). Washington, October 30, 1954, p. 10.

¹⁷¹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 55.

¹⁷² The Antarctic Treaty. Washington, October 15, 1959.

happened to be exposed to heavy doses of radiation.¹⁷³ The resettlement of Bikini islanders and subsequent evacuations, following lawsuits, radiation monitoring, and cleanup of the island, were, for more than next 50 years, media-attention issue. Lawsuits and compensation claims continue to be an issue still.

This accident stirred a lot of controversy worldwide and caused a great anxiety over the fallout of nuclear testing. The U.S. thermonuclear test on Bikini atoll stirred massive protests from general public so that the government officials were forced to answer for the incident. Also, the government had to deal with the pressure which came from the growing disarmament movement. In public statement, AEC Chairman L. Strauss emphasized the importance of testing weapons to be ready for enemy and that the weapon used is powerful enough to take out the city. He also stressed, that all people who were located within the danger range are under close observation. He even mentioned an obscure trivialization of the situation, that resettled natives were well and happy.¹⁷⁴ They inadequately downplayed the threat of nuclear testing and the consequences of radiation. They were even emphasizing the extensive security measures under which the test was performed.

In further questioning, Strauss declared, that such bomb can destroy any city, as large as one wished. This comment caused a lot of excitement as many journalists began asking what would be left of New York City after the bomb would hit it.¹⁷⁵ This remark forced many people to consider how personally nuclear attack would affect them if their city was hit. To some extent, people started to panic and to question governmental Cold War policy only after real consequences were shown to them directly. They started to fear that the nuclear catastrophe could happen in their own homeland, in their own city. People also began questioning the purpose of nuclear armament. This represented a continual source of concern for the administration. Eisenhower made several attempts to downplay the nuclear danger and to reassure public that they have no reason to be hysterical.¹⁷⁶

Strauss emphasized that testing and the nuclear development program itself is necessary for ensuring security of the U.S. He believed that on the one hand the testing might

¹⁷³ COLEMAN, David G. and SIRACUSA Joseph M. *Real-World Nuclear Deterrence: The Making of International Strategy*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2006, p. 20.

¹⁷⁴ STRAUSS, Lewis. Complete Statement After Bravo and the Japanese Government's Response, March 31, 1954. Available at Public Broadcasting Service (PBS): <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/bomb/filmmore/reference/primary/straussbravo.html>.

¹⁷⁵ Excerpts from Press Conference, Participants: Dwight D. Eisenhower, President, Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the AEC, March 31, 1954, [online], accessed 14.10.2014. Available at Nuclear Files: http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/library/correspondence/eisenhower-dwight/corr_eisenhower_1954-03-31.htm.

¹⁷⁶ VANDERCOOK, Wm. F. Making the very best of the very worst: The "Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons" Report of 1956, *International Security*, Summer 1986, vol. 11, no. 1, p. 186.

involve some health risks, but on the other hand, this negative elements will be counterbalanced by millions people saved by nuclear development program and their nuclear superiority. For this reason, the EAC continually denied any real danger from nuclear fallout. The U.S. officials struggled continuously to control the public opinion while trying to downplay the dangers of nuclear testing. They perceived proper information as threatening to their national security policy. Eisenhower even advised the AEC to keep the general public confused as what the difference between fission and fusion was. Moreover, public statements tended to be deliberately ambiguous in order to hide the facts.¹⁷⁷ They especially tried to conceal the truth of nuclear testing and the fallout from the public eyes while hoping they will have their support for defense spending. They were certain that the disclosure of the nuclear dangers would create anxiety throughout the U.S.¹⁷⁸

The U.S. government made several attempts to reduce public concern. They made several assurances to public that nuclear testing was not a health hazard. They were concerned that public pressure might caused the halt on nuclear testing.¹⁷⁹ The governmental officials maintained their pro-nuclear posture while reaffirming the public that humanity is not in danger. They even pointed out, that the nuclear danger was being greatly exaggerated.¹⁸⁰ In June 1955, in their effort to regain positive image, volunteers from all over the country were invited to observe the nuclear test explosion.¹⁸¹ They attempted to create a positive public image of the nuclear testing and nuclear bombs. In their massive propaganda effort, they built a stadium for people to observe nuclear tests. They struggled to shift the public attention to more positive characteristics of nuclear power while emphasizing that nuclear testing do not pose health danger. In 1955, The U.S. government released the statement on nuclear fallout. They emphasized, that the nuclear testing created fallout dangerous only within the Nevada Test Site and the nuclear fallout did not pose any health hazards beyond that.¹⁸² The AEC contended that the nuclear fallout is not a safety or health issue. The AEC was in a difficult position due to their dual responsibilities for both the nuclear development and establishment

¹⁷⁷ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.75.

¹⁷⁸ HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 279.

¹⁷⁹ HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 294.

¹⁸⁰ HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 295.

¹⁸¹ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 74.

¹⁸² HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, p. 286.

of protection arrangements. For this reason, the public tended to distrust the AEC and their protection provisions. Their reports which focused on dangers of fallout were regarded as inadequate and subjective.¹⁸³

They had to deal with the public debate on negative implications of possible nuclear or thermonuclear war and dangers of nuclear testing. They needed to convince people that nuclear weapons are under control and that nuclear weapons do not pose any health dangers. The U.S. government appointed several ad hoc committees to prepare reports on health effects and nuclear contamination. Moreover, agencies began sampling milk and water because of the possibility of contamination from testing. Also a radioactive contamination of food started to be a problematic issue.¹⁸⁴

The AEC denied any real danger to people from the nuclear fallout during most of the 1950s. This information embargo was being lifted by 1958 when Strauss left the position of the chair of the AEC and when the U.S. officials began supporting the idea of nuclear education and civil readiness.¹⁸⁵ Despite the growing need to start educating people on this problem, this change, nevertheless, did not lead to better informed population. Some commissioners continued to deny the hazards anyway. In response to criticism of nuclear testing being harmful to future generations, E. Teller in 1958 publicly recalled, that nuclear tests are not necessarily harmful, but might be possibly helpful.¹⁸⁶ On the other hand, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy acknowledged that there is a possibility that even a small amount of radiation from the fallout in the atmosphere might increase the incidence of cancer and genetic damages.¹⁸⁷

Furthermore, the general fear of nuclear testing resulted in U.S. population demanding a moratorium on nuclear testing. The U.S. government began seriously considering if the moratorium was feasible and desirable. Eisenhower genuinely favored nuclear test ban. Eisenhower stated that the ban could be considered as desirable and as the first step toward more comprehensive agreements with the Soviet Union or until there was a solid agreement

¹⁸³ HACKER, Barton C. *Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, pp.198-199.

¹⁸⁴ HACKER, Barton C. *Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p.198.

¹⁸⁵ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 56.

¹⁸⁶ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 74.

¹⁸⁷ DIVINE, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 124.

they would never be used at war.¹⁸⁸ Eisenhower strived to be perceived as a peacemaker to gain propaganda advantage over the Soviet Union. The U.S. government decided that temporary moratorium would be politically beneficial, but, nevertheless, they could not trust the Soviets and therefore they concluded that this agreement would be unenforceable.¹⁸⁹ They feared that nuclear test ban could not be monitored and verifiable. In order to bolster the idea of nuclear test ban, Eisenhower created the *President's Science Advisory Committee* as a counterweight to EAC, who opposed the test ban. They concluded that the test ban would be both advantageous and technically feasible.¹⁹⁰

Due to the growing worldwide concern over the fallout hazards, possible nuclear test ban was a sensitive issue. The key part of presidential democratic candidate Adlai E. Stevenson's 1956 campaign was based on a promise of an end to testing nuclear weapons. He declared that testing of nuclear weapons threatened the biological future of the species. Till then, dangers of nuclear testing were not part of the public debate.¹⁹¹ His speech brought nuclear fallout into presidential debates.

On June 26 1957 a press conference, Eisenhower acknowledged, that the U.S. was working on a production of a clean bomb which produce no fallout. They assumed that this weapon which will be entirely military in its application, would be developed in a five year horizon.¹⁹² They assumed that no civilian casualties would be caused by this weapon and only the target which was aimed at would be destroyed. Scientists who worked on development of this weapon, perceived a possible suspension of the tests as a "crime against humanity".¹⁹³ They perceived nuclear development as something which was done for the benefit of the mankind. Also, the primary idea was that clean weapons will dramatically reduce unnecessary civilian casualties. The suspension of nuclear testing was perceived, therefore, as not overly advantageous for the U.S. administrative because it would mean a suspension of the development of a new type of a hydrogen bomb. This need put the U.S. in a difficult position because in the same time, they continued with negotiations with the Soviets. Teller insisted on continuation of testing. He believed that nuclear testing was necessary because it would

¹⁸⁸ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, June 19, 1957. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10818>.

¹⁸⁹ HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 275-6.

¹⁹⁰ GREENE, Benjamin P. *Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-ban Debate, 1945-1963*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 6.

¹⁹¹ LINDEE, Susan M. *Suffering Made Real: American Science and the Survivors at Hiroshima*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 218.

¹⁹² EISENHOWER, Dwight D. The President's News Conference, June 26, 1957. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10822>.

¹⁹³ DIVINE, Robert A. *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, p.125.

enable the U.S. to maintain its military superiority.¹⁹⁴ The tests were necessary if the U.S. wanted to continue developing more sophisticated weapons and to be maintain its lead. There would have to be a suspension of all nuclear development and production and an effective inspection system/guarantees in order to this proposal being advantageous for the U.S. as well.

Consequently, the U.S. had no choice but to accede to the terms of the announced unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. Other possibility was public condemnation. Thus, on 1 November 1958 the U.S. officially began its test moratorium. This decision was not very hard due to the fact that they managed to perform seventy-two tests earlier that year.¹⁹⁵ This provided enough study material and therefore the moratorium was no much of a limitation to them. On December 29 1959 Eisenhower announced, that given the expiration of the moratorium and the fact that no satisfactory agreement was in sight, they felt free to resume testing.¹⁹⁶

3. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (1953-61)

3. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the World

In response to increasing securitization of the nuclear threat, the U.S. government started promoting the idea of nuclear disarmament. The initial public reaction to the Eisenhower's UN *Atoms for Peace* speech was a general support for the U.S. administration in their effort. It was viewed as a sincere effort toward disarmament. Both the New York Times and the Washington Post affirmed that cooperation on genuine disarmament is essential.¹⁹⁷ His speech raised hopes for possible nuclear disarmament. It signified that nuclear annihilation was not inevitable. Public increasingly pressured the government to change their policies and strengthen their disarmament negotiations. The main theme of public debate was that nuclear arsenals comprise so many weapons that they could put an end to all life on earth and there is no defense against such annihilation. Pacifists groups called for

¹⁹⁴ SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p. 13.

¹⁹⁵ HACKER, Barton C. *Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947-1974*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p.199.

¹⁹⁶ EISENHOWER, Dwight D. Statement by the President on the Expiration of the Voluntary Moratorium on Nuclear Weapons Testing, December 29, 1959. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=11654>.

¹⁹⁷ MEDHURST, Martin J. Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" Speech: A Case Study the Strategic Use of Language. In: MEDHURST, Martin J., et al, eds. *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, and Ideology*, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1997, p.44.

unilateral disarmament and nonviolent Gandhian disobedient actions directed against nuclear weapons.¹⁹⁸

The primary concern was that the Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons. The perception of imminent and inevitable nuclear conflict led anti-nuclear movement to promote the idea of nuclear disarmament and international control of nuclear power. The threat of nuclear war increased significantly after both the Soviet Union and the U.S. expressed their determination to develop thermonuclear weapon. Oppenheimer was using its influence to strongly oppose thermonuclear weapons development and to raise public awareness on the implications of nuclear and more importantly thermonuclear war. As a result, Oppenheimer was seen as a huge threat to the government and his security clearance was revoked.¹⁹⁹ The threat of acute nuclear annihilation worsened with the existence of thermonuclear arsenal. Thermonuclear weapon test brought into the picture a more acute vision of the end of the world. The 1952 test followed article titles such as “How to End a World: The Truth about the Bomb.”²⁰⁰ The nuclear threat began spreading throughout popular culture and created strong anxiety among the American population. People felt increasingly threatened by the theoretical possibility of a Soviet nuclear attack. Linus Pauling stated that nuclear arms race would lead to world catastrophe.²⁰¹

Also the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles made the nuclear attack against the U.S. more likely. ICBMs changed the nuclear balance, which further inspired nuclear disarmament movement. Schweitzer acknowledged, that with the intercontinental ballistic missiles and other technological advancements, the nuclear attack could occur within thirty minutes since its launching and it could be expected that an enemy will use the nuclear weapon on large cities. Schweitzer securitized the nuclear attack as continuous destruction: “In an atomic war there would be neither conqueror nor vanquished. During such a bombardment both sides would suffer the same fate.”²⁰² He warned that such nuclear war would be suicidal. Anti-nuclear activist started to appeal to the public with their message that nuclear holocaust is closer than one could have thought. Human errors are part of human

¹⁹⁸ MOLLIN, Marian. *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, p.77.

¹⁹⁹ HEWLETT, Richard G. and HOLL, Jack M. *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989, pp. 90-100.

²⁰⁰ JUNDT, Thomas. *Greening the Red, White, and Blue: The Bomb, Big Business, and Consumer Resistance in Postwar America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 74.

²⁰¹ PAULING, Linus. *No More War!*, New York: Dodd, Mead Company, 1983. p. 202.

²⁰² SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p. 27.

nature and nuclear encounter can happen by accident. But even if everything works automatically by electronics, there is still some room for errors.

However, Brodie proclaimed that total nuclear disarmament would not be reasonable because potential violation of international agreements would be too easy and the risks to the non-violator would be enormous. Nevertheless, he admitted, nuclear arms race creates huge risks and states should strive to reduce the nuclear danger.²⁰³ Also military strategist H. Kahn promoted the idea that totally disarmed world is senseless. The development of thermonuclear weapons only deepens this idea because it would be too easy to hide hundreds of these weapons. Mutual distrust and suspicion would pressure states to stockpile weapons covertly which would compel other countries to withdraw from such disarmament agreements and follow suit. Moreover, because the violation was so easy, we must presume that countries would tend to hide some weapons preventively because they had anticipated others might do the same. Therefore, such total disarmament would be possible only if an international authority with a power to destroy potential nuclear candidate existed.²⁰⁴ No state would risk it in the thermonuclear age

Kahn stressed, that thermonuclear war do not inevitably result in a total mutual annihilation. He did not agree with the saying that nobody wins a suicide pact. According to him, thermonuclear war would not end in mutual suicide and the attacked country would only be affected economically. Moreover, de declared, that states should build whatever weapon is needed to make retaliation talk at least look reliable and effective.²⁰⁵ He believed that maximum deterrence is essential. On the contrary, Kahn opposed strategists who argued that it does not make a difference whether the overkilling is done by factor two or ten, still it is an unnecessary armament. Kahn opposed such theories and maintains his maximum overkill stance.²⁰⁶ He presented a hypothetical Doomsday Machine, which could destroy all human life, while being triggered automatically if certain amount of nuclear weapons exploded over the U.S. This threat of total annihilation would not be under human control or final decision.²⁰⁷ It is the ultimate deterrent. Because people would not have any control over it, it would be automatic, in the result it would be the ultimate nuclear deterrent.

²⁰³ BRODIE, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*, RAND Corporation, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 300-301.

²⁰⁴ Kahn Herman, *On Thermonuclear War*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 2007, p. 5-6.

²⁰⁵ KAHN, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, pp. 10-21.

²⁰⁶ KAHN, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, pp. 10-15.

²⁰⁷ KAHN, Herman. *On Thermonuclear War*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007, pp. 145-148.

The image of the threat of nuclear global war was highly intensified by several novels and movies. These popular works has a huge impact on the overall construction of the threat. The 1957 novel *On the Beach* written by Nevil Shute depicted the world after the nuclear escalation in which a series of nuclear attacks polluted the whole northern hemisphere with radioactivity and the radioactive cloud slowly moved to Australia, the only remaining habitable place. They stated that human race would be completely wiped out by radioactivity: “The human race was to be wiped out and the world made clean again for wiser occupants without undue delay.”²⁰⁸

The movie *On the beach* released in 1959, based on a 1957 bestseller novel of the same title, depicts the aftermath of the fictional World War III. The movie suggested that nuclear global war would have occurred with the Soviet Union firing the nuclear surprise attack because they did not think the U.S. would retaliate. The nuclear war completely destroyed and polluted northern hemisphere, while the rest of the world was preparing for the moment when the nuclear radioactivity reaches them and destroys the whole civilization. The movie focuses on the soon to be dead people, who mostly choose suicide pills rather than face radiation sickness. The movie depicted a clear appeal of several anti-nuclear activists, that there was still time to reconsider such national policies.²⁰⁹ Movies and novels often depicted how the civilization might end and how only few people would have survived the global-scale nuclear holocaust.²¹⁰ They usually suggested that nuclear war might occur as an accident and misjudgment of situation of decision makers. Popular culture often took an extremely pacifist view that the fear of extinction was imminent. These fatalistic movies insinuated that civil defense systems could not save the civilization because radiation would spread across the globe despite the existence of fallout shelters. Then, also a vision of an annihilistic total nuclear war itself and statements that mutual deterrence is suicidal is based on an assumption that there is no effective defense against such an attack.²¹¹

Several novels also reflected the fear of nuclear war and urged the governments not to act rashly and to reconsider current policies. The 1958 novel *Red Alert* emphasized how

²⁰⁸ SHUTE, Nevil. *On The Beach*, New York: Ballantine Books, 1981, p.168.

²⁰⁹ *On the Beach* [film]. Director and producer: KRAMER Stanley, Lomitas Productions, Inc., 1959.

²¹⁰ *The World, the Flesh, and the Devil* [film]. Director: Ranald MACDOUGALL, producer: Siegel S.C, et al., USA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1959.

²¹¹ BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, p. 173.

easily the nuclear war could be sparked off if one general failed to follow its orders.²¹² A securitization of an accidental or unintentional launch was widespread.

The government launched the civil defense program called *Operation Alert* which was mostly ignored by the American public and several cities even refused to participate in its defense preparations enactment. Faced with ineffective civil defense system, more radical groups chose more direct opposition to civil defense programs. Individuals from the Catholic Workers, the War Resisters League, or the Fellowship of Reconciliation launched nonviolent civil disobedience actions such as refusal to take shelter. They claimed that the only purpose of these drills was to disseminate fear. Instead of participating in the drills, they often hold protests signs or prayers.²¹³ They criticize these programs for deluding public that the nuclear war is survivable. These drills frightened people and for this reason, they were later cancelled. These civil defense drills meant to form an idea that even in a thermonuclear age, there was still hope that civilization might survive.

3. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the U.S.

Peace activists also often securitized how superfluous and dangerous nuclear arms race was. The study *Speak Truth to Power*, issued by peace activists in 1955, acknowledged, that arms races has never built peace in history. Despite deterrent value of such arsenals, wars have always broken out. Why then build nuclear arsenal with such an uncertain hope that history will not repeat itself. Moreover, in strongly opposed nuclear strikes against China.²¹⁴ They strongly appealed to the U.S. as a moral country which cannot do such thing. These surprise attack were securitized as a threat to the U.S. because these nuclear power would retaliate on American cities. Gradually, anti-nuclear sentiment began spreading also throughout the newspapers. In the New York Times, James Reston noted that waging nuclear or thermonuclear war would not serve any national or human values.²¹⁵

²¹² GEORGE, Peter B. (pseudonym BRYANT Peter). *Red Alert: A novel of the first two hours of world war III*, New York: Ace Books, 1958, p.119.

²¹³ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 70, 76, 93.

²¹⁴ American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence* [online], 1955, pp. 7, 9. Available at http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Speak_Truth_to_Power.pdf.

²¹⁵ American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence* [online], 1955, pp. viii. Available at http://www.afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Speak_Truth_to_Power.pdf.

The nuclear threat to the society started to be more and more securitized. The existence of thermonuclear weapons brought into the discourse the imminence of the nuclear threat and also significantly higher risks of nuclear accidents and misjudgments which could potentially produce total destruction of any American city. Brodie admitted that in the thermonuclear age, offensive doctrine was more rational than ever before.²¹⁶ On the other hand, the mere existence of thermonuclear weapons and the strategy of massive retaliation make the nuclear war more improbable and unthinkable due to the threat of escalation.²¹⁷ Therefore the introduction of thermonuclear weapons brought about such high risks that it increased the probability of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in limited nuclear wars. Even though their employment was considered to be more likely in Europe, nevertheless, it increased the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapon which might escalate and threaten also the U.S.

Joseph Alsop declared rules of nuclear war since it is a possible but improbable outcome. First, that first blow must be the last to prevent a nuclear exchange. Second, the aggressor requires an overwhelming superiority of force to completely destroy enemy's nuclear forces to prevent any retaliation. Third, retaliation entails that a small number of nuclear forces must survive enemy's attack. Forth, survival of retaliatory forces is a *certain deterrent* of nuclear aggression. Nevertheless, he presupposes that purely accidental malfunction might cause a holocaust.²¹⁸ The key message is that, however improbable, the attack must be massive if an attack is needed. Furthermore, numerical advantage is essential. Also the first priority target must be the enemy's strategic retaliatory capabilities, then their cities.²¹⁹ The first strike capability itself implies that destruction of enemy's retaliatory power is a necessary primary goal. But even if the U.S. had the first strike capability, it would have most likely provoked the enemy to attack first in order to prevent the U.S. to take the initiative.²²⁰ The intention of striking first before being hit itself might worsen the crisis and trigger an enemy attack. Then, the U.S. would be the one receiving the first strike. In situation when strategy of the preventive war has been officially rejected as a policy, the U.S. must rely on a

²¹⁶ BRODIE, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*, RAND Corporation, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 176.

²¹⁷ KISSINGER, Henry. *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957, pp. 133-134.

²¹⁸ ALSOP, Joseph. The New Balance of Power: War and Peace in s Strange World, *Encounter*, May 1958, pp. 4-5, 10.

²¹⁹ BRODIE, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*, RAND Corporation, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 155.

²²⁰ BRODIE, Bernard. *Strategy in the Missile Age*, RAND Corporation, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 176.

deterrent strategy.²²¹ Accordingly, the U.S. defense policy must ensure primarily that retaliatory forces are protected against enemy attack.²²² In order to prevent an attack on homeland, the U.S. must ensure protection of their second strike capability.

In order to desecuritize such imminent fear, scientific community often emphasized a need to possess a reliable nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons could not be perceived as being just another weapon since they are predominantly strategic weapons.²²³ Also Snyder considered nuclear weapons primarily in the context of its deterrent role.²²⁴ Nuclear deterrence as a strategic instrument is based on an assumption, that the retaliation forces would hopefully never be used.²²⁵ This nuclear deterrence strategy worked as a guarantee that nuclear powers would not start such a disastrous nuclear attack against each other and, thus, created an image that American society was safe as long as the U.S. nuclear deterrence was credible. Brodie also contemplated the stability of a situation of mutual deterrence. The stable situation do not derived from the symmetry of their offensive nuclear power. It is the situation where neither side is tempted to strike first because gains would be overshadowed by tremendous costs.²²⁶ This, in the extent, gave justification to the possession of nuclear weapons.

Albert Wohlstetter further developed Brodie's theory of nuclear deterrence. He stressed that deterrence, called the *delicate balance of terror*, is feasible, but not automatic. Wohlstetter concluded, that universal acceptance of deterrence is faulty and also extremely dangerous.²²⁷ He indicated that the nuclear optimism is unprecedented and has no solid ground. Also, nuclear deterrence strategy by itself will not remove the danger of accidental nuclear war or reduce the inflicted damage if deterrence failed. Moreover, nuclear deterrence is not adequate for periphery crises.²²⁸

²²¹ BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 274.

²²² BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 185.

²²³ BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 227.

²²⁴ SNYDER, Glenn H. Deterrence and Power, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, June 1960, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 163.

²²⁵ BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, pp. 148, 273.

²²⁶ BRODIE, Bernard. Strategy in the Missile Age, *RAND Corporation*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, January 15, 1959, p. 303.

²²⁷ WOHLSTETTER Albert, The Delicate Balance of Terror [online], *RAND Corporation*, 6 November, 1958. Available at <http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html>.

²²⁸ WOHLSTETTER Albert, The Delicate Balance of Terror [online], *RAND Corporation*, 6 November, 1958. Available at <http://www.rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html>.

As nuclear arsenal moved toward nuclear parity, many scientists began arguing, that numerical superiority in nuclear weapons is not important, because certain small number of thermonuclear weapons is a sufficient and reliable deterrent.²²⁹ Others supported the idea that the main threat is the growth of Soviet nuclear striking power and, therefore, numerical superiority matters. This gave justification to unlimited nuclear arms race which in response only fueled the perception of nuclear threat.

Nuclear deterrence theory is based on an assumption that nuclear weapons induce stability because both enemies would perceive the risks of nuclear war as being too high. On the contrary, particular group of political scientists maintained a nuclear revisionist approach while stating that nuclear weapons have a limited both military and diplomatic value. They admitted that nuclear weapons induced wars, but questioned whether American superiority was essential to this restraint. This idea was later developed into more radical nuclear nihilism represented by J. Mueller and his hypothesis of nuclear weapons' essential irrelevance for international stability. This means that the nuclear weapons did not inhibit wars during the Cold War by themselves. The image of conventional war between two blocks of power was a sufficient deterrent.²³⁰

3. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

Anti-nuclear movement continued to campaign more actively for the testing ban because it was perceived as a more achievable goal. The general idea of anti-nuclear movement was that first they had to achieve a stop of nuclear testing which would then enable them to pursue total nuclear disarmament in the future. They began to securitize the threat of nuclear testing which was the most visual example of the nuclear threat.

In 1951 most nuclear testing was moved to Nevada Test Site. Initially, people living nearby started calling themselves *downwinders*. They felt not overly threatened by nuclear testing. This perception changed in 1953 with increasing occurrences of radiation poisoning. Despite increasing nuclear dangers, people were warned only not to consume local milk and dairy products.²³¹ People started to perceive nuclear testing as a threat to an individual. Even

²²⁹ SNYDER, Glenn H. Deterrence and Power, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, June 1960, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 165-166.

²³⁰ ERDMANN, Andrew P.N. 'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.87.

²³¹ JUNDT, Thomas. *Greening the Red, White, and Blue: The Bomb, Big Business, and Consumer Resistance in Postwar America*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 74.

before the 1954 nuclear testing series occurred, nuclear scientists tried to appeal to the U.S. government explaining that further testing was unnecessary and dangerous to humans. Protests against nuclear weapons increased exponentially after 1954 nuclear testing series, which shown how deadly hydrogen bombs could be. James R. Arnold titled them “Tests on Human Beings.”²³² Another red flag occurred in 1955, when radioactive rain fell on Chicago. Americans started to perceive nuclear fallout as a silent killer, especially after radioactive strontium-90 began emerging in wheat and milk.²³³

Nuclear motive was spread throughout the whole culture. Many movies, novels, comics, poems and even television series started to reflect the full-scale nuclear scare. But nevertheless, only a small part of public was asking for the change and for the ban of the testing. The word atomic was being used as a synonym to words such as modern or progressive and nuclear power was perceived as a utopian source of energy which could heal world problems and satisfy all human needs. Nuclear optimism suggested, in the beginning, that the future of nuclear power as promising. The 1954 movie *The Atomic Kid* quite interestingly signify that radioactivity was still quite an unknown phenomenon. This comedy depicts a man who was accidentally exposed to the biggest ever nuclear bomb blast while searching for uranium in order to sell it and get rich. Instead of showing a real suffering, they portrayed him as a radioactive man, who is well and is even able to sell his remarkable story. Glowing with radioactivity, the first ever radioactive man who survived a nuclear blast, he is suddenly shown as the most important man in the world.²³⁴ Radioactivity was portrayed as hugely profitable business, a way how nobody became somebody. This changed in mid 1950s when the debate following the thermonuclear test sparked off a massive reaction in general public which began asking for details on thermonuclear weapons and the health consequences of such nuclear tests. After the 1954 test, they started to fear of nuclear fallout from nuclear testing and began demanding also a halt on all nuclear tests due to their concerns over radiation.

Linus Pauling, influential scientists, peace activist, and a Nobel Prize winner, along with his wife Ava Helen Pauling, made several speeches and papers about the world peace and dangers from nuclear testing. Pauling also wrote a letter to Eisenhower, informing him

²³² ARNOLD, James R. Effects of the Recent Bomb: Tests on Human Beings, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1954, vol. 10, no. 9, p. 347.

²³³ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 822.

²³⁴ *The Atomic Kid* [film]. Director: MARTINSON Leslie H., prods.: Duke Maurice and Rooney Mickey, USA: Republic Pictures, 1954.

about the movement to ban the testing, and asking him to reconsider his nuclear testing policy.²³⁵ Pauling, in the name of American scientists, drafted *An Appeal by American Scientist to the Government and People of the World*, in which they urged that an international agreement to stop nuclear testing must be made immediately. They demanded the ban on testing because it releases *burden of radioactivity* all over the world while causing damage that leads “to an increase in the number of seriously defective children that will be born in future generations.”²³⁶ The center of the securitization was a concern over the health risks and the damage endangering future generations and cause children to be defective. The Petition implied that in the situation where only three countries possessed nuclear weapons the establishment of international control is still feasible. According to the Petition, if the possession of nuclear weapons spread, there would be an increased danger that an irresponsible national leader will use nuclear weapons in the reckless action.²³⁷ An international agreement to stop the testing was seen as a first step toward abolition of nuclear weapons. The Petition subsequently signed about two thousand geneticists and other scientists by June 1957 and more than nine thousand by early 1958. Among them was Herman J. Muller who won Nobel Prize on a discovery that a radiation causes mutations.

Pauling considered nuclear testing to be a catastrophe for human race.²³⁸ Also in 1955, Einstein and B. Russell issued a *Manifesto*, which on behalf of the whole human race urged the world leaders to renounce nuclear weapons and to resolve their conflicts peacefully because nuclear weapon will be otherwise necessarily employed in the future world war. It warned that radioactivity was still something unknown and thermonuclear weapons might destroy the whole human race.²³⁹ They securitized the threat of nuclear weapons as a threat to the whole humanity in order to accumulate support to ban the nuclear testing. The securitization appeals were stressing the threat to the whole humanity, but their aim was to

²³⁵ PAULING, Linus. Letter to the President, 4 June 1957. Ava Helen and Linus Pauling Papers [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at <http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/retrieve/ResourceMetadata/MMBBFR>.

²³⁶ PAULING, Linus. U.S. Signatures to the Appeal by American Scientist to the Government and People of the World written 15 May 1957 and presented as a Petition to the United Nations on 15 January 1958 [online], accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/peace/papers/peace5.008.1.html>.

²³⁷ PAULING, Linus. U.S. Signatures to the Appeal by American Scientist to the Government and People of the World written 15 May 1957 and presented as a Petition to the United Nations on 15 January 1958 [online], accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/peace/papers/peace5.008.1.html>

²³⁸ PAULING, Linus. *No More War!*, New York: Dodd, Mead Company, 1983. p. 266.

²³⁹ EINSTEIN, Albert and RUSSELL, Bertrand. The Russell-Einstein Manifesto [online], London, July 9, 1955. accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://scarc.library.oregonstate.edu/coll/pauling/peace/papers/peace6.007.5.html>.

emphasize that it might be a threat to each individual because no one could determine how far really radioactivity reached.

In late 1950s, a full scale nuclear radiation scare was present in the whole U.S. Several groups were formed with the goal of informing people about the facts of radiation. They issued radioactivity studies, baby tooth surveys and massive collections of them, and tested radioactive cow's milk which proved to be especially dangerous to children more than to adults.²⁴⁰ To prove radioactive fallout from the testing, Barry Commoner began collecting baby teeth from children in the whole U.S. These baby teeth contained radioactive elements which could emerge in teeth only by testing.²⁴¹ Baby teeth survey began to symbolize anti-nuclear testing struggle.

What we might call family concerns became the main securitization topic of peace activism in 1950s. Anti-nuclear activism switched its focus into non violent civil disobedience actions where Nevada Test Site functioned as a central focal point of such activities. They established The Committee to Stop H-Bomb Tests and formed the *Committee for Non-Violent Action*. They often tried to penetrate the test site in order to disrupt scheduled nuclear tests. They usually explained their actions in the way that they had to risk their freedom in order to save unborn children of the world. They claimed that as fathers and mothers, they opposed endangering the lives of children.²⁴² As concerned parents they would risk their lives for the lives of their children. They securitized nuclear testing as a thing which should concern every responsible parent in America because everybody was affected by such nuclear testing. They were emphasizing immorality of every single nuclear test.

In response to the government announcement that they were reinstating nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, in order to raise a public awareness, anti-nuclear activists sailed a ship *Golden Rule* into the nuclear testing zone. They hoped they would arouse the conscience of the world to end the production of nuclear weapons.²⁴³ They were more or less ad hoc efforts to turn public opinion in their direction but, even though media began covering these stories, public opinion nevertheless did not incline significantly toward their agenda. This changed by

²⁴⁰ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 67.

²⁴¹ Goertzel Ted, Goertzel Ben, Linus Pauling: *A Life In Science and Politics*, Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, p.143

²⁴² MOLLIN, Marian. *Radical Pacifism in Modern America: Egalitarianism and Protest*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006, p.73.

²⁴³ GOERTZEL, Ted and GOERTZEL, Ben. *Linus Pauling: A Life In Science and Politics*. New York: Basic Books, A Division of Harper Collins Publishers, 1995, pp. 83, 85.

the late 1950s when several studies about the health risks from nuclear testing were starting to be published.

The Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy (SANE) was formed in 1957 by anti-nuclear activists and pacifists such as Norman Cousins and Clarence Pickett. SANE became the most influential and most visible peace organization supported by many prominent public figures including Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. Benjamin Spock, and Bertrand Russell. SANE adopted the popular demand for an end to nuclear testing and ban the bomb agenda. They emphasized that they strived toward comprehensive disarmament in the future.²⁴⁴ They focused on public education and informing the general public about the dangers of nuclear testing. One of SANE's spokespersons, Dr. Benjamin Spock, was frequently being shown in news with a girl in order to highlight the statement that nuclear fallout pose an imminent threat to the health of all children.²⁴⁵

In 1957, Albert Schweitzer's statement *Declaration of Conscience* was broadcasted worldwide from Oslo. In his speech, he pointed out, that all three nuclear countries usually openly proclaimed their intentions to end the testing of nuclear weapons and to reach a joint agreement, but they do not really indented to do it. He declared that the main reason why nuclear testing is not halted is that there is no public pressure on them in these countries.²⁴⁶ He called upon the governments that if they really want to end nuclear testing, as they are openly declaring, reaching an agreement should not be as problematic. Later in his appeals from Oslo in 1958, he stressed, that in spite of the fact how the U.S. trivialized the radiation problem, the nuclear testing and the radioactive fallout was an imminent danger to the population. He especially called for involvement of women in this ban-the-testing effort.²⁴⁷ On the basis of the perception of nuclear testing as the main threat causing health problems of future generation, he appealed on the femininity which should safeguard the future generation and secure the health of their babies. Furthermore, Schweitzer stressed that nuclear testing threatened everyone: "Mankind is imperiled by the tests. Mankind insists that they stop, and

²⁴⁴ CORTRIGHT, David. *Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.135-6.

²⁴⁵ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 823.

²⁴⁶ SCHWEITZER, Albert. A Declaration of Conscience [radio broadcast]. Oslo, April 24, 1957 [online], accessed 16.10.2014. Available at: <http://www.quinnipiac.edu/institutes-and-centers/albert-schweitzer-institute/programs-and-conferences/declaration-of-conscience-fifty-years-later/a-declaration-of-conscience/>.

²⁴⁷ SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p.17.

has every right to do so.”²⁴⁸ He securitized the nuclear testing again as a threat to mankind in order to mobilize the worldwide opinion. His appeal had a great impact worldwide which was translated into a massive anti-nuclear test ban movement.

In 1955, the polls signified that 67 percent of the American public favored arms reduction agreement among major powers.²⁴⁹ The 1958 Gallup poll suggested that 70 percent favored international agreement to general ban to production of nuclear weapons.²⁵⁰ Consequently, the U.S. suspension of nuclear testing was perceived as a huge success of this movement. The anti-nuclear movement significantly impacted the outcome to establish nuclear testing moratorium which was also hugely favored by the general public. By 1959, the extension of the moratorium was favored by 77 percent of Americans.²⁵¹

3. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

In response to Eisenhower’s *Atoms for Peace* speech, people started linking nuclear weapons with nuclear power plants, which were not perceived as an existential threat. This perspective was reversed by the 1954 U.S. thermonuclear test on Bikini atoll which severely contaminated a vast area by its fallout. Prior to 1954 test A Los Alamos laboratory warned that water near the explosion would be a radioactive *witch's brew* with the potential to poison the whole U.S. arms forces.²⁵² Not only those Marshall Islands inhabitants needed to be hospitalized, but due to the land contamination, they needed to be also permanently resettled. People started asking what the real effects of nuclear explosions are. Information about the contamination of milk, grass, wheat, fishes, and radioactive rain started to be increasingly securitized.

However, environmental effects of nuclear testing were still regarded as not overly important in comparison to damages which radioactivity could inflict upon population. James R. Arnold even argued that the U.S. nuclear testing should have been performed exclusively

²⁴⁸ SCHWEITZER, Albert. *Peace or atomic war? Three appeals broadcast from Oslo, Norway, on April 28, 29, and 30, 1958*, New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958, p.19.

²⁴⁹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.63.

²⁵⁰ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.65

²⁵¹ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 822.

²⁵² SMITH, Linell. Representing victims of atomic testing has brought attorney to a ‘Crossroads’ Starting from ground zero, *The Baltimore Sun*, June 12, 1994 [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-06-12/features/1994163161_1_bikini-atoll-tests-at-bikini-operation-crossroads.

on American soil because they were their own risks to take in order to be secure. Moreover, Americans should not protest against such testing because they served the national security.²⁵³ The public had limited amount of information about the effects of nuclear testing because the government kept them secret in order to shield governmental policies from public critique. They were concerned that if the public knew about the radioactive fallout issue, it would kill their civilian defense programs.²⁵⁴

Nevertheless, increasingly, environmental damage of the food products caused by nuclear testing was in the center of the securitization debate. Several organizations together with the U.S. Public Health Service began sampling mainly milk and water. Also baby Tooth Survey was launched in order to determine effects of testing on humans. The research showed that radioactive levels were often much higher in wheat or vegetables than in milk. However, the hazards in milk were publicized the most. Media presented the picture of a milk bottle with skull and crossbones.²⁵⁵ The widespread fear of nuclear testing focus primarily on a damage caused on humans, environmental damage was not regarded with the same alarmist view. However, the public debate increasingly focused on the damage caused on environment products which were being consumed.

Also, the anti-nuclear movement began securitizing the dangers of radioactive pollution of air by itself. They perceived nuclear testing within the context of “the immorality of poisoning the air.”²⁵⁶ SANE’s statement *We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed...*, which appeared originally on November 15 1957 *New York Times*, was reprinted in several other newspapers. They emphasized, that the government’s approach to the danger is completely unequal to the actual danger and called to immediate suspension of nuclear testing. Moreover, the human community had the right to breathe unpoisoned air and to work on uncontaminated soil.²⁵⁷ They securitized that nuclear testing endangering Americans and poisoning its environment was the true existential threat to the U.S.

²⁵³ ARNOLD, James R. Effects of the Recent Bomb: Tests on Human Beings, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1954, vol. 10, no. 9, p. 348.

²⁵⁴ LAPP, Ralph E. Civil Defense Faces New Peril, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1954, vol. 10, no. 9, p. 350.

²⁵⁵ WEART, Spencer R. *The Rise of Nuclear Fear*, Cambridge: Harvard University, 2012, p. 121.

²⁵⁶ RICHARDSON, Erin L. *SANE and the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963: Mobilizing Public Opinion to Shape U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2009, a Master thesis, The Department of History, Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University, p.28 [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/!etd.send_file?accession=ohiou1257556741&disposition=inline.

²⁵⁷ THE COMMITTEE FOR A SANE NUCLEAR POLICY. ‘We Are Facing A Danger Unlike Any Danger That Has Ever Existed...’: A Statement for Americans in a Nuclear Age, *The Cornell Daily Sun*, 17 March 1958, vol. LXXIV, no. 102, p. 10.

4. The Construction of the Nuclear Threat and First Nuclear-Weapons Control Treaties, 1961-1969

“Total war makes no sense in an age when great powers can maintain large and relatively invulnerable nuclear forces and refuse to surrender without resort to those forces. It makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the allied air forces in the Second World War. It makes no sense in an age when the deadly poisons produced by a nuclear exchange would be carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.”²⁵⁸

The third examined period corresponds with the presidency of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.²⁵⁹ The Soviet Union violated its voluntary unilateral moratorium and conducted the largest ever nuclear explosion in October 1961. China performed its first nuclear test in 1964 and France tested its first hydrogen weapon in 1968. Also, in 1967 the Latin America was declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone. By the early 1960s, the U.S. governmental level struggled with the moratorium on nuclear testing. The nuclear discourse of 1960s was framed primarily by the aftermath of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty which resulted in a decline of anti-nuclear movement. Also the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968 represents a watershed in construction of nuclear threat.

4.1. Governmental level (1963-1969)

4. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

During Kennedy’s presidential campaign, when he referred to a novel *On the Beach*, he promised that he will not be “the President of a nation perishing under the mushroom cloud

²⁵⁸ KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

²⁵⁹ The president John F. Kennedy was in office from January 20, 1961 to November 22, 1963. Lyndon B Johnson took office in November 22, 1963 and left in January 20, 1969.

of nuclear holocaust.”²⁶⁰ This is a remarkable rhetorical statement because previous administrations usually refused to acknowledge the mere existence of such movies and novels because they perceived it as threatening to national security policy. Furthermore, Kennedy acknowledged the mushroom cloud as a symbol of nuclear threat to the U.S.

Also, Kennedy declared that war was no longer a rational alternative and mankind must put an end to war before the war put an end on mankind.²⁶¹ In personal correspondence, Kennedy was gravely concerned about the possible outcomes of a potential nuclear weapons attack and the prospects of the nuclear war. He even expressed his view that it would be preferable to be among the dead than among the ones who survived.²⁶² The one who survived would envy the dead. In order to protect the American population, Kennedy announced that new shelter program was an immediate national objective. He ordered to improve air-raid warnings and fallout detection systems and declared that it would be a failure of their responsibility not to save those families which would not be directly hit by the nuclear blast and would be saved in shelters.²⁶³ He suggested that the U.S. government must fulfill their responsibility to American families and protect the public as much as possible, in this case by building public and private shelters. Nevertheless, the program met strong opposition by the anti-nuclear movement and, subsequently, also by the Congress, who did not give approval to the program.²⁶⁴

Cuban Missile Crisis

Cuban Missile Crisis portrayed how the discourse of the threat of nuclear war intensified and underwent a radical securitization. The U.S. government officials were very anxious about the possibility that Soviets might began constructing nuclear missiles in Cuba. In response to Soviet involvement in Cuban anti-aircraft missiles defense buildup, Kennedy publicly warned the Soviets, that if offensive ground-to-ground missiles were placed in Cuba, it would cause the gravest unease and the U.S. would prevent it by whatever means will be

²⁶⁰ KENNEDY, John F. Excerpts of Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, American Legion Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, October 18, 1960. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74095>.

²⁶¹ KENNEDY, John F. Address at U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKGdHJ9NfgQ.aspx>.

²⁶² NASH, Philip. Bear any burden? John F. Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.125.

²⁶³ KENNEDY, John F. The Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961. Available online at <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/kennedy/berlincrisis.html>.

²⁶⁴ GARRISON, Dee. *Bracing for Armageddon: Why Civil Defense Never Worked*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 105-106.

necessary.²⁶⁵ On September 13 1962 Kennedy reaffirmed that if Cuba would become an offensive military base for the Soviet Union, then the U.S. would do whatever it could in order to protect itself and its allies.²⁶⁶ This was both a warning and a way to assure the public there is no imminent threat. It served also as a securitizing move and a declaration of what they perceived as an existential threat.

The Soviet Union started installing offensive nuclear missiles days later. This action represented something the U.S. officials would have never anticipated due to their prior declaration of their existential threat. After the discovery of those missiles in October, the U.S. top officials were deeply shocked. Kennedy was horrified by the prospects of nuclear escalation. There were several possible scenarios, presented at *ExComm* meetings, from which to choose in order to prevent nuclear strike exchange. Kennedy was quite skeptical about military solutions. Kennedy's primary concern was that the nuclear escalation should be prevented. His decision was based on a precondition that the chosen first step would lessen the chances of a nuclear exchange which was seen as a *final failure*.²⁶⁷ Employment of nuclear weapons was seen as a final failure resulting in nuclear holocaust.

From the beginning, both surprise air strikes and invasion were considered as their primary options. But military action had severe downfalls which led Kennedy to prefer diplomatic solutions. A blockade, for the intended purposes called as quarantine, was, therefore, chosen as a first step. The immediate comparison of missiles in Turkey as an equivalent those in Cuba was later transformed in the suggestion that the missiles in Turkey would be taken out if those in Cuba were as well.²⁶⁸ This trading of missiles for those in Turkey was not overly optimistic because it was regarded as a form of appeasement. McNamara was gravely concerned that even though Soviets would not authorize the attack against the U.S., they may, nevertheless, be launched by accident or by a rogue action by individuals.²⁶⁹

On October 22, Kennedy informed American public about the covert Soviet offensive nuclear buildup in Cuba and the order to a strict quarantine on offensive military shipments to

²⁶⁵ KENNEDY, John F. Statement by President John F. Kennedy on Cuba, September 4, 1962. Available online at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/jfkstate.htm>.

²⁶⁶ KENNEDY, John F. The President's News Conference, September 13, 1962. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8867>.

²⁶⁷ STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, p.59.

²⁶⁸ STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, pp.40-57.

²⁶⁹ STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, p. 56.

Cuba. He highlighted that the purpose of this could be only to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere and the U.S. was prepared even for a full retaliatory response. He added that that the U.S. would not risk the costs of nuclear war nor would they shrink from that.²⁷⁰ The presence of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles in Cuba was labeled as an existential threat because they were offensive and they were disrupting the integrity of the Western hemisphere. Also they needed to object the installation of the missiles because, otherwise, the Soviet Union might do something more direct and unacceptable next time. More importantly, they needed to maintain credible nuclear policy and, consequently, to punish the Soviet Union for this offensive act of provocation.

The Crisis also showed that Kennedy favored public diplomacy over the private one. This public confrontation could be seen during the Cuban missile crisis when he chose television broadcasts over diplomatic direct channels. Patterson suggests that it was because they wanted to wash away their shame and they sought revenge for the Bay of Pigs failure. But by choosing this form of a rhetoric action, he significantly increased the chances of war.²⁷¹ States do not practice open diplomacy and negotiations as easily as they do by private channels.. Also it was television and his general likeliness what help him to win the election. They were aware of the fact that the public confrontation would cause public mobilization and panic, put they were not overly disturbed by this consequence.

On 24 October 1962, when the blockade took effect, the alert status of Strategic Air Command was for the first time in history raised to Defcon 2 (Defense Readiness Condition). The U.S. top officials were frightened that the Soviet Union might use nuclear weapons and trigger the nuclear exchange. Kennedy was skeptical about this outcome when he pointed out that the use of any kind of nuclear weapons means great risks of nuclear escalation into general nuclear war.²⁷² He perceived it realistically, but nevertheless, the possibility was still very real.

The U.S. government securitized the whole crisis with the language insinuating that the end of the world might be a near possibility because once the crisis escalates into using military force there would be no turning back. The accurate example of their securitization move happened during the UN NSC meeting, when the U.S. ambassador to the U.N.

²⁷⁰ KENNEDY, John F. Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba, October 22, 1962. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/sUVMCh-sB0moLfrBcaHaSg.aspx>.

²⁷¹ PATERSON, Thomas G. John F. Kennedy and the World, Virginia Quarterly Review, 1987. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, pp. 134-136.

²⁷² STERN, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005, p.202.

Stevenson emphasized that the U.S. demanded that the Soviet Union acknowledges they were placing missiles in Cuba. Stevenson stressed: “I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that’s your decision.”²⁷³

The fact that a withdrawal of those missiles has been ensured by a pledge not to invade Cuba and with a secret promise to withdraw reciprocally the U.S. missiles from Turkey signify the political use of nuclear weapons as a instrument of diplomacy. The Cuban missile crisis created a turning point in Kennedy’s thinking. With securitized threat of nuclear war and with the world being close to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, he chose to restrain the U.S. nuclear arsenal. He began advocating for a nuclear moderation and nuclear arms control negotiations because nuclear arms race presented a vicious circle of suspicion breeding another arms race.

The successful conclusion of the crisis opened a window of opportunity for the process of détente. In June 1963, Kennedy spoke publicly also about the desirability of general and complete nuclear disarmament. He spoke about the need for a world peace which is not enforced on the world by the U.S. weapons. He stated that in the nuclear age, total war makes no sense and peace is the only rational end. In the case of total nuclear war, whole civilization would be destroyed within the first 24 hours.²⁷⁴ He disagreed with common ideas of inevitability of war and labeled them as defeatist. Because the nuclear weapons are manmade, then their problems can be resolved by man as well.

Kennedy used opportunity after signing the *Limited Test Ban Treaty* (LTBT) to shift public attention to the problem of spiraling nuclear arms race which produced more instability which again produces more tensions. He warned that the full-scale nuclear war could wipe out more than 300 million Americans, Europeans, and Russians, all in less than 60 minutes. To express more clearly the imminence of this everyday threat and to illustrate the scale of potential devastation, he added that in that situation, the survivors would envy the dead. Also, he insinuated that nuclear war could occur without people even knowing how and why.²⁷⁵ This statement suggests that nuclear war would be highly irrational. He acknowledged that nuclear arms buildup do not ensure national security.

²⁷³ STEVENSON, Adlai. Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to U.N. Security Council, October 25, 1962. Available online at <https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/adlai.htm>.

²⁷⁴ KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

²⁷⁵ KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

Johnson's presidency

Taking into account the circumstances of Kennedy assassination, it was only logical for Lyndon Johnson to honor President Kennedy's memory by following up with his ideals and concerns over the nuclear scare to make sure Kennedy did not die in vain.²⁷⁶ President Johnson chose an extraordinary tone for his 1964 presidential campaign. His presidential campaign spot depicted a girl counting daisy petal from one to ten. The image then changed into counting from ten to zero which ended with the image of nuclear bomb explosion insinuating that stakes were too high.²⁷⁷ This clip insinuated that voting for his rival would lead to increased dangers of a nuclear war. While preceding presidential candidates were frequently raising the bomb issue and threatening with the possibility of nuclear war, this presidential campaign escalated into popular nuclear madness. The anti-campaign bumper stickers asserted slogans with nuclear threats like "IN YOUR GUT YOU KNOW HE'S NUTS" and "STAMP OUT PEACE—VOTE GOLDWATER."²⁷⁸ Johnson continued with the strategy of nuclear deterrence in order to deter nuclear attacks against the U.S. He emphasized that the U.S. would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons if needed. Johnson declared its policy of prevention of war, but winning the war if needed: "We intend to bury no one, and we do not intend to be buried."²⁷⁹ He securitized the threat of nuclear war which could be prevented only by responsible governmental policy. Also, in 1967, Johnson proclaimed that the war in Vietnam is waged for the purpose to reduce the Communist power in Southeast Asia, in order to reduce the chances of a much larger war, probably even a nuclear war.²⁸⁰ He justified the U.S. engagement in the Vietnam War by suggesting, that without them, the threat of general nuclear war would substantially increase.

The speech made by Secretary of Defense R. McNamara in 1967 was an important proclamation of the U.S. deterrence policy titled as *deterrence of nuclear aggression* which is based on an *assured-destruction capability*. He proclaimed, that the official policy of the U.S. continued to be an ability to deter nuclear attack, upon the U.S. or its allies and to be able to

²⁷⁶ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. President Johnson's Address Before Joint Session of Congress, November 27, 1963. Available online at <http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/audio/video.html>.

²⁷⁷ *Peace, Little Girl* (Daisy Spot) [Presidential Campaign television spot]. Created by SCHWARTZ Tony, BERNBACH Doyle Dane, USA: Democratic National Committee, 1964, [online], accessed 18.10.2014. Available at: <http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/audio/video.html>.

²⁷⁸ DALLEK, Robert. *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 183-4.

²⁷⁹ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787>.

²⁸⁰ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Speech on Vietnam, September 29, 1967. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-4041>.

retaliate even after a surprise attack.²⁸¹ The policy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD) was based on an assumption, that they must be able to survive an attack on their retaliatory forces and population in order to be capable to strike back to destroy the aggressor's whole society. McNamara declared that first-strike capability in fact means the elimination of enemy's retaliatory second-strike forces. Therefore the U.S. can never allow other state to possess a first-strike capability in order to be able to deter aggression.²⁸² McNamara declared that the deterrence theory implies that stockpiling nuclear weapons was not done for preparation for war where they were to be used, but to prevent that they would not be employed by the enemy. This was being ensured by Soviets believing that their nuclear first strike would cause massive U.S. retaliation. Before McNamara made this statement, MAD theory was used exclusively within scholar field.

4. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

The threat of the employment of nuclear weapons was securitized by nuclear deterrence strategies. Kennedy continued with Eisenhower's strategy of giving primary emphasis on protection of nuclear retaliatory forces from nuclear surprise attack.²⁸³ In his 1961 Message to the Congress, Kennedy announced that the primary purpose of their nuclear arms is to make sure they will never be used, to deter and convince potential aggressors that any attack would be futile. He declared that the U.S. would never launch a nuclear attack as first.²⁸⁴ They securitized the use of nuclear weapons and how it would affect other countries. Their defense policy was based on a deterrence counterforce policy, to deter potential aggressors and to display the effectiveness of the flexible nuclear and conventional armament and its bargaining power. During Kennedy administration, nuclear weapons were used mainly as a foreign policy tool.

The threat of the use of nuclear weapons was usually embodied by the possibility of disrupting nuclear balance. In his presidential campaign, Kennedy often exploited the theme of a supposed *missile gap* in nuclear capabilities. He warned that the Soviet Union was

²⁸¹ MCNAMARA, Robert, Mutual Deterrence Speech, San Francisco, September 18, 1967. Available online at <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml>.

²⁸² MCNAMARA, Robert, Mutual Deterrence Speech, San Francisco, September 18, 1967. Available online at <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Deterrence/Deterrence.shtml>.

²⁸³ KENNEDY, John F. Excerpts of Speech by Senator John F. Kennedy, American Legion Convention, Miami Beach, Florida, October 18, 1960. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=74095>.

²⁸⁴ KENNEDY, John F. Special Message to the Congress on the Defense Budget, March 28, 1961. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8554>.

winning the nuclear arms race and the Cold War in overall. Presumed stronger Soviet nuclear capability was being often mentioned in order to harness the public opinion and, later, to justify nuclear development spending. Kennedy administration later ordered a substantial enlargement of their nuclear capabilities, in order to strengthen their ability of flexible response. This in the result meant to be able to meet any kind of threat by all kinds of means, in which unconventional weapons held a prominent place.²⁸⁵ Flexible response deterrent strategy was based on an assumption of preparedness on every threat with every weapon which might be needed. He acknowledged that both conventional and nuclear forces must be adequate, modern, and mobile to better assure the ability to respond to any crisis in every part of the world at any moment.²⁸⁶ This ordered extensive nuclear buildup caused an increase by 150 percent of nuclear weapons. This buildup occurred partially because Kennedy believed in nuclear superiority and personally opposed the idea of nuclear parity.²⁸⁷ He believed that only nuclear superiority would ensure their survival.

The overall purpose of this strategy was to send a message to the Soviet Union and threaten them with more credible deterrent of unacceptable damage. When Kennedy learned about the U.S. massive nuclear capability, he made sure that the Soviets knew about it. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense R. Gilpatrick publicly spoke about actual numbers of their missiles, bombers, and submarines. Moreover, he stated that the U.S. had power to administer a devastating retaliatory strike. On the basis of this message declaring their second strike capability, the Soviets concluded that the U.S. possessed the first strike capability.²⁸⁸ This arms buildup led to corresponding excessive Soviet nuclear arms buildup. They created additional unnecessary nuclear arms race, and greatly contributed to the situation of a nuclear overkill.

He acknowledged that the existence of nuclear weapons brings an enemy to a choice between either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To prevent such ends, the U.S. nuclear capability is “nonprovocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter, and capable of selective use.”²⁸⁹ By arms buildup Kennedy sought to avoid disproportionate reliance on nuclear

²⁸⁵ PATERSON, Thomas G. John F. Kennedy and the World, Virginia Quartetly Review, 1987. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, p. 134.

²⁸⁶ KENNEDY, John F. State of the Union Address, January 30, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-006.aspx>.

²⁸⁷ PATERSON, Thomas G. John F. Kennedy and the World, Virginia Quartetly Review, 1987. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, pp. 134-135.

²⁸⁸ GIGLIO, James N. and RABE, Stephen G. *Debating the Kennedy Presidency, Debating 20th century America*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p.18.

²⁸⁹ KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

weapons and a policy of massive retaliation. He often publicly stated that he reduced the U.S.'s reliance on nuclear weapons.²⁹⁰ His flexible response policy was based equally on nuclear and non-nuclear forces while considering different nuclear scenarios. Kennedy also acknowledged that nuclear alliances are based on the common vital interests. Therefore the U.S. is willing to ensure safety of its allies by force because it is the way of securing their own vital interests.²⁹¹

McNamara ordered a study which showed, that there are three possible strategies how to limit nuclear attack: counterattack, civil defense, and missile defense. The study concluded that no combination of these approaches can sufficiently secure protection of the U.S., since it was always easier to build offensive nuclear weapons than to establish an effective defense system.²⁹² McNamara believed that building offensive weapons was a primary concern. With overwhelming power of offensive nuclear forces, there is no need for defensive forces. He regarded Anti Ballistic Missile System (ABM) as not advantageous enough.

During the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the U.S. military planners were concerned about the ability to defend Berlin with conventional weapons. Not only war plans included the use of nuclear weapons, but Kennedy was also strongly advised to launch a preemptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union. Assistant Secretary P. Nitze suggested that such an attack would be victorious.²⁹³ Others doubted whether this could be achieved or whether the U.S. could be the one who uses nuclear weapons again. In comparison, Eisenhower emphasized that such crisis would need policing forces rather than nuclear weapons because states could not liberate nation with nuclear weapons. Also, Eisenhower's massive retaliation policy had a huge credibility gap in the Berlin scenario.

Kennedy often expressed his disbelief in the concept of limited nuclear wars. He was also skeptical about the possibility of the winning of the nuclear war.²⁹⁴ The nuclear war was considered as unacceptable and unwinnable. Soviet nuclear capabilities were too robust to guarantee winning the war. In the same way he did not differentiate between strategic and tactical weapons. Also he considered the nuclear holocaust to be possible outcome of nuclear

²⁹⁰ NASH, Philip. Bear any burden? John F. Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 120, 125, 126.

²⁹¹ KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC714C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

²⁹² SCOBILIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 145.

²⁹³ GIGLIO, James N. and RABE, Stephen G. *Debating the Kennedy Presidency, Debating 20th century America*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p.26.

²⁹⁴ GIGLIO, James N. and RABE, Stephen G. *Debating the Kennedy Presidency, Debating 20th century America*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, p.22.

arms race.²⁹⁵ The nuclear war was more and more unthinkable and, therefore, improbable. Peripheral wars were being lost rather than won by the use of nuclear weapons due to the projection of nuclear taboo. The U.S. government feared of public reaction. They did not use nuclear weapons due to the Cold War balance, where they needed to win the people's hearts and minds while not to give the Soviets free points. But after the Cold War ended, the same concern over the loss of soft power prevailed and the nuclear taboo still functioned.

4. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

In his inaugural speech on 20 January 1961, Kennedy mentioned that the United Nations are their last best hope in the world where “the dark powers of destruction unleashed by science engulf all humanity in planned or accidental self-destruction. ...For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”²⁹⁶ He acknowledged vertical nuclear proliferation to be inevitable, their only hope. He titled nuclear weapon as *deadly atom* and nuclear arms race as a race to alter that uncertain *balance of terror*. He expressed his belief in future international nuclear arms control.²⁹⁷ Therefore arms race should be replaced by peace race.

Kennedy administration came into power very concerned about the probability of nuclear war. He was concerned about the Eisenhower's strategy of all-or-nothing. Kennedy appeared to be more interested in finding peace than Eisenhower was.²⁹⁸ In 1961 Address at the U.N. General Assembly, Kennedy urged to halt the spread of nuclear weapons and to halt the spiraling nuclear arms race. Moreover, he presented a disarmament program proposal.²⁹⁹ He stressed that spiraling nuclear arms race must be halted. Kennedy considered the further nuclear arms proliferation to be the greatest hazard of his time.³⁰⁰ Kennedy urged that nuclear proliferation must be stopped because of the threat of both vertical and horizontal nuclear

²⁹⁵ NASH, Philip. Bear any burden? John F. Kennedy and Nuclear Weapons. In: GADDIS, John L., et al., eds. *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.123.

²⁹⁶ KENNEDY, John F. Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntF17SVAjA.aspx>.

²⁹⁷ KENNEDY, John F. Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntF17SVAjA.aspx>.

²⁹⁸ SCHLESINGER, Arthur M. Jr. Interview with Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr, City University of New York, April 1986. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, p.2.

²⁹⁹ KENNEDY, John F. Address at U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961, Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx>.

³⁰⁰ KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

proliferation. He pledged that the greatest threat would “to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries large and small, stable and unstable, responsible and irresponsible, scattered throughout the world. There would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security, and no chance of effective disarmament. There would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts.”³⁰¹ Kennedy regarded spread of nuclear weapons to other countries as a gravest threat. More nuclear states created more insecurity and higher chance of nuclear accidents. Nuclear states must prevent further nuclear proliferation to other non-nuclear states. It is their obligation in order to maintain stability and security. He even comprehended, that the launch can be either accidental or intentional, or dropped by a madman. This was also the main reason why he insisted on advancement in nuclear arms control effort and signing of Limited Test Ban Treaty.

According to Johnson’s rhetoric, the main security threat was the spread of nuclear weapons.³⁰² The U.S. strongly opposed the development of nuclear forces by additional states, whose nuclear forces would not be part of NATO forces. They firmly opposed the French nuclear policy.³⁰³ Furthermore, in response to Chinese nuclear test, the President appointed a special Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation to study how to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.³⁰⁴ The issue of the nuclear proliferation was securitized as the existential threat and the matter of highest national urgency.

The U.S. government started considering whether to deploy an anti-missile defense system. McNamara called this development of new weapon systems as a *mad momentum* which should be replaced by much reasonable policy.³⁰⁵ McNamara announced that the Johnson’s administration has decided to install a limited ABM to meet a possible Chinese nuclear attack. This led the Soviet Union to engage in genuine negotiations on nonproliferation and limits on ABMs which fueled the U.S.-USSR détente.³⁰⁶ The rhetoric

³⁰¹ KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

³⁰² JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Address at the State Department's Foreign Policy Conference for Educators, June 19, 1967. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=28308>.

³⁰³ THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Action Memorandum 294: U.S. Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France, Washington, April 20, 1964. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam294.asp>.

³⁰⁴ THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Action Memorandum No. 320: Task Force on Nuclear Proliferation, Washington, November 25, 1964. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/nsams/nsam320.asp>.

³⁰⁵ SLAYTON, Rebecca, *Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012*, Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2013, p. 97.

³⁰⁶ DALLEK, Robert. *Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 290-291.

implied that the ABM system would be installed against China, but in fact, such an attack would be practically suicidal for China. They wanted to force the Soviets into negotiations. To give them some motivation, they introduced them a choice of possible installation of ABM system. However, the Soviet Union rejected the U.S. proposal for limits on ABM systems. This led to authorization of a Sentinel ABM system to provide defense against enemy missiles

In his 1967 *Annual Message to the Congress*, Johnson declared, that since the Soviet Union already proceeded with its limited antimissile defense, it is his responsibility to ensure also that no state could find it rational to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons as a credible threat against the U.S or its allies. He added that continuation of international nuclear control negotiations is essential. He also stated that nuclear arms race must be stopped. He called it an additional waste of national resources which lead to no increase of security.³⁰⁷ This declaration suggests that the U.S. will proceed with their Anti Ballistic Missile System in order to prevent nuclear attack launched against them.

In 1969 Johnson suggested that the U.S. should resume negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning limits on offensive and defensive missile systems.³⁰⁸ Johnson wanted to halt the nuclear arms race, but it is questionable whether he really wanted a complete nuclear disarmament. Johnson emphasized that even if new nuclear arms control agreement was not reached, the U.S. must not stockpile arms beyond its needs which could be both provocative and wasteful.³⁰⁹ He warned that another nuclear arms race is wasteful while emphasizing the dilemma of such armament which encourages the enemy into additional arming.

The U.S., the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom signed the *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies*, also known as Outer Space Treaty. This treaty was inspired by the Limited Test Ban Treaty which, among other things, prohibited to place nuclear weapons and its testing in outer space. The OST represents another treaty variation to the Antarctic treaty created in order to prevent colonial competition in other areas and adopted for the purpose of establishing peaceful rules of conduct between states.³¹⁰ This nonproliferation measure served as an instrument to prevent spiraling nuclear arms race into the area of outer

³⁰⁷ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 10, 1967. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=28338>.

³⁰⁸ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 14, 1969. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-5667>.

³⁰⁹ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787>.

³¹⁰ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. New York, December 19, 1966.

space. In his remarks at the signing of the Treaty, Johnson considered the Treaty as the safeguard that there would be no war in outer space.³¹¹ The rhetoric suggests that the mankind must prevent the outer space being contaminated by such horrible instruments of war.

In 1968, Johnson proclaimed, that the U.S. is participating with other states on reaching an agreement that would stop the spread of nuclear weapons.³¹² They desperately needed to stop proliferation to other countries. The *Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, known as Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), represents a prominent milestone of nuclear nonproliferation efforts. The NPT, opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force on March 5, 1970, was created to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and to avert the danger of nuclear war. In this case, they securitized primarily horizontal nuclear proliferation. The Treaty dealt primarily with nonproliferation of other states, not with nonproliferation to the capacity of existent armaments to stop nuclear arms race.

State parties must not assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapons state to develop or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. This provision includes a ban on providing them with fissionable material. They seek to ban all nuclear testing and to end nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation in the future. The NPT was based on an assumption that nuclear proliferation enhances the risks of nuclear war.³¹³ In the pursuit of complete nuclear disarmament, the only acceptable proliferation of nuclear energy is for peaceful purposes. They emphasized that there are strong benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology. There are double standards considering that the Treaty seeks to reach complete nuclear disarmament, but the treaty does not place any restraints on any nuclear state and their nuclear armaments. This by itself should encourage/motivate other states not to pursue nuclear weapons development. Also the treaty is ambiguous about banning nuclear weapons of nuclear states in non-nuclear states, which the U.S. violates by storing nuclear weapons in NATO countries.

There is an also an inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the Treaty. The Article X acknowledged the right of every party state to withdraw from the Treaty, given the

³¹¹ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Remarks at the Signing of the Treaty on Outer Space, January 27, 1967. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/670127.asp>.

³¹² JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 17, 1968. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/680117.asp>.

³¹³ The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (The NPT). United Nations, New York, signed on July 1, 1968, entered into force on March 5, 1970. Available online at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.

prior notice.³¹⁴ The treaty presupposes that in matter of exercising the national sovereignty, states have the right to withdraw from the Treaty. In his Remarks to the signing of the NPT, Johnson declared that the NPT significantly reduced the danger of nuclear war among nations and encourages the peaceful use of nuclear energy by assuring safeguard measures. Also, he stated that the U.S. will continue to negotiate for additional measures to halt the nuclear arms race.³¹⁵ The NPT prevents the future spread of nuclear weapons, but it is highly questionable whether it really was reducing the danger of nuclear war by that time. However, the whole rhetoric signified that Johnson wanted to emphasize that the overall danger of nuclear war is limited because the main threat is proliferation, not their own nuclear arsenal.

4. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

During his presidential campaign, Kennedy expressed his opposition to resumption of underground nuclear testing and promised he will make significant effort to secure international control agreement. He noted that only when all negotiations fail the nuclear testing should be resumed.³¹⁶ In 1961 he again urged to halt the contamination of the air.³¹⁷ The U.S. administration, nevertheless, continued to claim, that drinking milk did not present a any health hazard.³¹⁸ Kennedy declared that milk was mistakenly regarded as a food product which might be contaminated. He ordered that milk be served at every White House meal and to support his statement, he even theatrically drunk a glass of milk. He emphasized that there was “no danger from the present amount of exposure. The milk supply offers no hazards.”³¹⁹ Kennedy was concerned of a rapid drop of milk consumption and therefore he struggles to improve the image of this commodity.

³¹⁴ The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (The NPT). United Nations, New York, signed on July 1, 1968, entered into force on March 5, 1970. Available online at <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPTtext.shtml>.

³¹⁵ JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Remarks on Signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, July 1, 1968. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/lbjohnson/speeches/speech-4037>.

³¹⁶ KENNEDY, John F. A Letter by Senator John F. Kennedy to Thomas E. Murray, October 9, 1960, accessed 18.10.2014. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25739>.

³¹⁷ KENNEDY, John F. Address at U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1961, Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/DOPIN64xJUGRKgdHJ9NfgQ.aspx>.

³¹⁸ KENNEDY, John F. President Kennedy's News Conference, January 24, 1962., Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/Press-Conferences/News-Conference-21.aspx>.

³¹⁹ KENNEDY, John F. Remarks to the National Conference on Milk and Nutrition, January 23, 1962. Available online from White House Audio Recordings: <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKWHA-068-004.aspx>.

When the Soviet Union unilaterally broke the voluntary moratorium on testing nuclear weapons in 1961, the Kennedy administration used this opportunity to criticize the Soviet Union as a partner who is not responsible and do not take arms control negotiations seriously. The initial response of the U.S. government was a release of a joint appeal to the Soviet Union to end atmospheric testing for the purpose of protecting mankind from hazards of nuclear fallout.³²⁰ This statement put an emphasis on the health threats produced by radioactive pollution by atmospheric nuclear tests which endanger whole mankind. In comparison, previous administration often stated that nuclear testing was harmless. It was clear that underground tests were not being securitized as a threat because the U.S. could not ensure sufficient verification that the Soviet Union would also mutually comply to halt underground testing.

Nevertheless, there was a strong pressure on Kennedy to resume testing as well. Nuclear testing and nuclear weapons development was usually securitized as an instrument ensuring the U.S. security. Some politicians feared that the U.S. was losing unacceptable time in nuclear development by this moratorium.³²¹ They securitized the theme that by continuing a suspension of testing, the U.S. was practically giving the Soviets an opportunity to catch up with their nuclear development which diminished American presumed superiority. Therefore, unilateral continuation of nuclear moratorium was securitized as a threat to the U.S. national security. However, Kennedy was concerned that the resumption of testing will cause massive opposition against nuclear weapons and nuclear development program. He was hesitant to resume testing

Resumption of testing was perceived as a logical choice given the governmental tensions. However, Kennedy made sure there was as little publicity to the resumption of nuclear testing issue as possible. Kennedy ordered resumption of underground nuclear testing on September 1961 and atmospheric nuclear testing in March 1962. This decision created a popular disagreement. Consequently, the broken moratorium gave the U.S. the opportunity to proceed with neutron bomb development. In 1960, they tested their first neutron bomb.

³²⁰ Joint Statement With Prime Minister Macmillan Proposing a Three-Power Agreement To End Atmospheric Nuclear Tests. Parties: the U.S. and the U.K. Released on September 3, 1961 at Hyannis. Available online at http://www.jfklink.com/speeches/jfk/publicpapers/1961/jfk345_61.html.

³²¹ SCHEELE, Henry Z. The Kennedy Era: A Retrospective View of the Opposition Party, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 1987. In: SNYDER, J. Richard, ed. *John F. Kennedy: Person, Policy, Presidency*, Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988, p.59.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

In 1963, Kennedy, in the spirit of peaceful cooperation, proposed not to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere so long as other states do not do the same.³²² The Cuban Missile Crisis aftermath formed a momentum for a change toward a strategy of peace. Consequently, in 1963, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom signed the *Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water*, known as Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).³²³ A euphoric atmosphere of change and Kennedy's endorsement for this issue caused both the U.S. politicians and public to support the LTBT. The treaty was ratified by the Senate with overwhelming approval.³²⁴ The public opinion enthusiastically approved this change of their course. The LTBT was perceived as two advancements in one act: the health danger of nuclear testing lessened on one hand, and there appeared to be a great hope for a decrease of tensions between two adversary states on the other hand. The treaty bans nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and under water and does not include underground testing. The treaty proclaimed that parties of the treaty strive to achieve general and complete disarmament to put an end to the armaments race and to end all nuclear testing.³²⁵ Nevertheless, the treaty do not in any way cover such limitations of nuclear arms race and, therefore, the U.S. security and its ability to deter was not affected by this treaty.

The treaty has many flaws which reflected difficulties of mutual negotiations and the mutual suspicion of secret violations. It does not cover underground nuclear testing because of the needed inspections opposed by the Soviets. Other types of nuclear testing could be detected by other states by a variety of techniques and therefore did not require inspection by the other parties. However, Kennedy stressed, that the treaty is not a result of concessions to the Soviet Union because it is simply a common goal of all nations.³²⁶ By government, it was labeled as a victory for the mankind, a symbol to free people from the horrifying dangers of nuclear fallout. He maintained his rhetoric of these dangers when he expressed his belief that the loss of even one life or a malformation of even one baby should concern whole

³²² KENNEDY, John F. Commencement Address at American University, June 10, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BWC7I4C9QUmLG9J6I8oy8w.aspx>.

³²³ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (The LTBT). Signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, entered into force on October 10, 1963.

³²⁴ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p.821.

³²⁵ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (The LTBT). Signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, entered into force on October 10, 1963.

³²⁶ KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

population.³²⁷ According to this statement, the nuclear testing presents a danger to all humans, its indiscriminate nature should alarm everybody. LTBT helps to preserve the health of all human lives and protect the environment. Nevertheless, LTBT was generally considered to be a failure to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty because it did not prohibit underground testing explicitly. There was, nevertheless, incorporated a clause which might prohibit this kind of nuclear explosions. The testing is prohibited in specific environments which contaminates the area outside the specific state territory.³²⁸ The LTBT represents a weak precedent for future treaties, but, nevertheless, it was a success in the sense of abolishing testing in the atmosphere.

The overall atmosphere was enthusiastic. Kennedy wanted to utilize this achievement to its limits. Enthusiastic of this historical treaty, he also gave credit to the worldwide disarmament movement, because without the pressure of the world public opinion, the treaty would not have been achievable. In the same way, nuclear disarmament activists praised Kennedy for this historical achievement while labeling the LTBT as the greatest event in the history of the world. Kennedy used these celebratory remarks to further improve his political image.³²⁹ Kennedy explained that banning nuclear testing was in their national interest so that Americans could breathe more easily. The LTBT was interpreted as an effort toward improvement of the US-Soviet relations which meant preventing nuclear “holocaust of endless death and destruction.”³³⁰ Also the Treaty raised hopes for both a subsequent improvement of mutual relations and disarmament negotiations

It is questionable whether the LTBT was such a success as was advertised. The continuation of underground testing was caused by both parties. Khrushchev opposed having foreign inspections in his country and the U.S. wanted to continue their nuclear development program for which the testing was essential. The nuclear development programs continued unaltered to the extent that the development program even accelerated because public was no longer interested in the agenda of banning the testing. Between 1963 and 1990, both adversaries conducted nearly eleven hundred underground tests.³³¹ Some test could be

³²⁷ KENNEDY, John F. Address to the Nation on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, July 26, 1963. Available online at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ZNOo49DpRUa-kMetjWmSyg.aspx>.

³²⁸ Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (The LTBT). Signed in Moscow on August 5, 1963, entered into force on October 10, 1963.

³²⁹ WITTNER Lawrence S. Blacklisting Schweitzer, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 51, no. 3, May 1995, p. 60.

³³⁰ KENNEDY, John F. Address at the University of Maine, October 19, 1963. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9483>.

³³¹ GIGLIO, James N. and RABE, Stephen G. *Debating the Kennedy Presidency, Debating 20th century America*, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003, pp. 67-68.

undetected/concealed... secret violations are thus possible... Nuclear development moved to underground testing which served the U.S. nuclear policy greatly, because no nuclear disarmament group focused on that... - out of sight, out of mind.

In his 1964 State and Union Address, Johnson announced the continuation of Kennedy's nuclear policy of the LTBT on one hand, and a commencement of new approaches toward the control and the eventual abolition of arms on the other hand.³³² In 1966, Johnson ordered that information about nuclear testing launched by other states must be strictly confidential. Unauthorized disclosure of this information was prohibited in order to minimize speculation and to safeguard intelligence sources used in obtaining such information.³³³ He was concerned about the reaction of public in the situation of further nuclear air pollution from foreign nuclear testing.

4. 2 Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (1961-1969)

4. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the World

The nuclear threat to the world was continuously securitized by emphasizing the possibility of a full-scale nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. In 1959, 64 percent of Americans had listed nuclear war as the most urgent issue.³³⁴ Resumption of nuclear testing and the mere existence of intercontinental ballistic missiles signified that the nuclear catastrophe might be closer than all thought. Cuban missile crisis prove this assumption to be right. This threat of the end of civilization heightened with the Cuban missile crisis. The American people started preparing for nuclear holocaust immediately after Kennedy's official statement of the missiles in Cuba aired. They started proclaiming that Kennedy's actions might have signified the beginning of the nuclear holocaust. The Student Peace Union proclaimed that Kennedy was gambling hundreds of millions of lives by his move.³³⁵ The anti-nuclear movement together with the general public feared that by forcing

³³² JOHNSON, Lyndon B. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, January 8, 1964. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=26787>.

³³³ THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Action Memorandum No. 347: Release of Public Information Concerning Soviet, French and Communist Chinese Nuclear Tests, Washington, May 24, 1966. Available online at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam347.asp>.

³³⁴ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 826.

³³⁵ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. xv.

the Soviet Union into withdrawal of the missiles, the U.S. moves closer into the nuclear escalation.

Americans began to panic rapidly. Overwhelming number of Americans began calling civil defense officers to get some information. In many cities, a shortage of survival supplies occurred the day after Kennedy announced the presence of missiles in Cuba. Two days after that, the Presbyterian Church arranged a prayer chains for peace. Organized prayers began asserting the need for an international peace. Some pacifist groups even urged the U.S. government to accept concessions to the Soviet Union.³³⁶ Also the U.S. defense agencies and the public began preparing for war. New York schools were ordered to stage air-raid drills.³³⁷ Food hoarding was a usual image of the crisis in many cities. Shovels and sandbags were sold out and civil defense leaflets were distributed in great amounts. Many important disarmament activists and anti-bomb supporters fled the U.S. in order to escape radiation fallout if the crisis escalated. Many of them flew to Australia, L. Szilard fled to Switzerland.³³⁸ Nevertheless, many chose the opposite approach and faced the potential consequences of nuclear war with their heads held high.

Popular image of nuclear war included an inevitable end of all mankind. The image of mushroom cloud scared Americans more than ever during the crisis. People lived under a threat of a probable imminent nuclear disaster by a deliberate, covert, and unprovoked sneak attack. Pacifist movement expressed that it might be the beginning of the nuclear annihilation. Nevertheless, the actual occurrence of nuclear war on their homeland was incomprehensible for large portions of population. On the other hand, for some Americans, the risk of nuclear war was acceptable as long as it is part of the struggle against communist evil, the Soviet Union per se. Slogans such as “Better Dead Than Red” were, in fact, quite common.³³⁹ Threatening rhetoric became part of containment policy to counter the Soviet threat. It was essential to be perceived as the united nation who does not fear threats.

During the last decade, the U.S. population was on high alert while having got used to living with evacuation plans, radio alert systems, air-raid drills, warning sirens, and educational civil defense videos. The Cuban crisis forced Americans to reassess the real efficiency of civil defense measures. It showed what American civil defense program really

³³⁶ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, pp. xv-xvii.

³³⁷ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. xviii.

³³⁸ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 259.

³³⁹ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, pp. 22-25.

consisted of. The crisis forced Americans to admit that civil defense measures would not help them to survive in every circumstances because there could be little defense against nuclear war. Skeptical and terrified public regarded building shelters as a mere civil defense propaganda which should cover the fact that nuclear war is not survivable. Several anti-nuclear activists noted that the shelters would save only a few people. Also, in a thermonuclear age, the benefits of such shelters were more questionable than ever.³⁴⁰ Moreover, usual rhetoric suggested that those who would survive would envy the dead. Furthermore, many Americans agreed with the image presented by Soviet media, that a nuclear shelter represent “a coffin, a grave prepared in advance.”³⁴¹ For anti-nuclear groups, the fallout shelters represented only a reminder that without the existence of nuclear weapons, there need not be any shelters to hide in. Thus they perceived nuclear shelters as a good demonstration of nuclear realities. Such defense measures were a mere epitome of absurdity of nuclear war where only a few people might survive. For governments, on the contrary, shelter program represented a back door in case deterrence would fail.

In spite of this the widespread opposition to government civil defense measures, many Americans began fiercely building private nuclear shelters. However, only certain people could afford building such fallout shelters. Following a common suit, many banks began exploiting the situation by launching loan programs to build shelters. Also, such underground housing only certain people could afford only intensified the debate of only a few survivors in case of general war occurring. The U.S. public debate started discussing whether such individuals possessing shelters would let others in or ousted them out. Americans started contemplating whether, in such occasion, they would really turned into savages desperately fighting for a place in such shelters.³⁴² The image of an Americans desperately fighting for themselves individually, while ousting their own neighbors out of their lawn, has aroused a strong anxiety in minds of many Americans, which, ultimately, only aggravated the debate over the threat of nuclear war.

A. George studied why Americans never embraced civil defense programs. She observed that there were two principal forces which fuel the U.S. history, optimistic hope for the future and defensive fear of the other. Unfortunately, during the Cold War, the other, meaning the Soviet Union, had the capability to completely destroy their belief of future. George concluded that their natural optimism hindered their ability to comprehend the

³⁴⁰ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 256.

³⁴¹ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 257.

³⁴² WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 256.

prospect of futurelessness, which prevented them to embrace their civil defense possibilities.³⁴³ They could not comprehend the threat of nuclear war because it inevitably meant the world without its future. Therefore they chose to disregard such threats as too improbable and ignore nuclear defense preparations as not adequate or ineffective.

The aftermath of the crisis caused that the heightened atmosphere of imminent nuclear war faded away. In 1965, only 16 percent of Americans considered nuclear war as the main problem. Subsequently, the issue disappeared from the survey list entirely.³⁴⁴ This rapid change signifies how the public debate changed significantly. In 1969, a Gallup poll asked Americans to list two or three most important problems, 63 percent stated Vietnam war and only 2 percent stated the threat of nuclear war.³⁴⁵ After the Cuban crisis faded away, many people refused to deal with the enduring threat of nuclear armaments and turned their attention elsewhere.³⁴⁶ The LTBT created a temporary euphoria among people. Nevertheless, the level of further activism dropped significantly shortly after that. The rapid change of the anti-nuclear atmosphere was labeled as “a conspiracy of silence about the threat of nuclear holocaust.”³⁴⁷

However, the threat of a nuclear war continued to represent a significant place within the public discourse. Very influential movie from this decade was *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* which was released in 1964 as a satirical comedy which depicts a U.S. general, who by himself ordered a first strike attack which triggered the doomsday scenario.³⁴⁸ It focuses on the limitation of MAD theory as a stability mechanism. The movie suggested that even in the situation of nuclear parity and the mutual assured destruction the automatic doomsday machine could be triggered.

The anti-nuclear movement continued to securitize the nuclear threat to the world. Political scientists often suggested, that hydrogen weapons inhibited nuclear full-scale wars. In 1960 book *Deterrent or Defense*, Liddell Hart argues, that the existence of hydrogen bomb inhibits the possibility of a full scale war because a total war seems absurd. Also, hydrogen bombs might inhibit the use of tactical nuclear weapons since the use of tactical weapons

³⁴³ GEORGE, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, p. 10.

³⁴⁴ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 826-836.

³⁴⁵ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 836.

³⁴⁶ WEART, Spencer R. *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988, p. 259.

³⁴⁷ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 825.

³⁴⁸ *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb* [film]. Director and producer: KUBRICK Stanley, USA, UK: Columbia Pictures, 1964.

might spark off the total war when the hydrogen bomb might be used/might escalate into the total war where hydrogen bomb might be used. On the other hand, it has not reduced the likelihood of limited war.³⁴⁹ His hypothesis later served as a basis of a stability-instability paradox which tried to explain how nuclear weapons could inhibit nuclear wars. Liddell opposed Eisenhower's policy of massive retaliation, which he regarded as not credible since thermonuclear war was unthinkable. With such a destructive power, the deterrent is less credible. For this reason, the policy of massive retaliation evolved into policies of flexible targeting options assuming the possibility of a limited war.

With the hydrogen bomb being part of the debate, some strategist started assuming that it opens the door for limited wars. On the other hand, Glenn Snyder declared that it would not be achievable for Soviets to wage minor wars without being punished for it.³⁵⁰ Thus Snyder took the concept of limited nuclear wars out of the consideration. He suggested that having a policy of massive retaliation in a thermonuclear age, the doomsday becomes less inevitable.

Brodie stated that offensive forces must have the capability to destroy the enemy before he can retaliate, which can be accomplished only if enemy did not recurred his retaliatory forces. The situation becomes highly unstable if one or both sides fail to secure their retaliatory forces. He argued that in such situation, the idea that existence of thermonuclear weapons abolished war is incorrect. He stated, that thermonuclear weapons make nuclear war more likely.³⁵¹

4. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the U.S.

This societal nuclear threat was not overly securitized in the 1960s since the debate focused on the threat of nuclear escalation during the Cuban missile crisis and on the threat of nuclear testing. Subsequently, as the Cuban missile crisis subsided, so did the anti-nuclear movement. With the end of the Cuban crisis and signing of the LTBT, the anti-nuclear movement gradually faded away as well. Nuclear disarmament groups lost public support due to the circumstances which turned that nuclear disarmament agenda into a political dead horse. People started to believe that, most probably, nuclear war might not actually occur. Strategy

³⁴⁹ HART, Liddell. *Deterrent Or Defense: A Fresh Look at the West's Military Position*, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, pp. 23-24, 62-63.

³⁵⁰ SNYDER, Glenn. *Deterrence and defense: Towards a Theory of National Security*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 226.

³⁵¹ BRODIE, Bernard and BRODIE, Fawn M. *From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The evolution of the weapons and tactics of warfare*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973 (revised edition, first published in 1962), p.266.

of MAD and the idea that nuclear forces are balanced bolstered the popular nuclear apathy. They were convinced that nuclear forces were balanced and the possibility of nuclear war was low. There were, suddenly, more crucial problems such as Vietnam War, or human rights. Some activists and large portions of public shifted their attention and began calling for a stop of wars, not for a stop of nuclear arms race. Moreover, there was a widespread exhaustion of movement itself and disillusion from their limited successes.

Psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton explained that nuclear apathy, which emerged after 1963, is a type of defense mechanism which he called *nuclear-induced psychic numbing*. He implied that people submerged threatening knowledge of annihilation and denied their nuclear awareness.³⁵² Also, Paul Boyer noted that reasons behind such nuclear passivity might be that the nuclear arms race was unimaginable for most Americans, and the image of peaceful atom dazzled people with its vision of nuclear utopia.³⁵³ Another reason why the passivity spread across the U.S. with such intensity is a perception of peaceful atom energy in the image of nuclear power plant.

Political scientists continued to emphasize the MAD strategy and its benefits of stability. However, since the threat of nuclear war was not particularly relevant after the Cuban missile crisis, the idea of a limited nuclear attack was still part of the discourse. The 1964 movie *Fail Safe* depicts downfalls of mutually assured destruction, when in 1967 a loose U.S. bomber drops a bomb on Moscow. In order to prevent massive Soviet retaliation and to save the U.S., political scientist pressured to order massive first strike attack on Soviet Union. This plan was revoked as immoral. In an attempt to avert a massive Soviet retaliation on American cities, the U.S. President decided to drop a nuclear bomb on New York as atonement, since it would be one of the cities which would be surely destroyed by Soviet retaliation anyway.³⁵⁴ The movie portrayed a widespread fear that nuclear holocaust could happen by miscalculation. Once signals to launch an attack were sent, the nuclear war becomes irrevocable, moreover when orders are given to less rational generals. The movie stressed that in the age of thermonuclear war, everyone loses since there are no winners. Moreover, the movie more importantly securitized the threat that it would be American cities in particular which would be left to be annihilated by the nuclear attack.

³⁵² BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 828.

³⁵³ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, pp. 829-31.

³⁵⁴ *Fail Safe* [film]. Director: Sidney LUMET, prods.: Lumet, Maguire, Youngstein, USA: Columbia Pictures, 1964.

Signing of the NPT considerably divided the nuclear disarmament movement. Some groups perceived it as a significant nonproliferation measure which substantially bolstered nuclear control efforts. Other perceived it as a double standard treaty which enabled nuclear states to retain nuclear arsenals while prohibit others do seek such weapons.³⁵⁵ On the one hand, the NPT was designed to prevent further proliferation and to proceed with disarmament. Non-nuclear states were promised not to be attacked and therefore they commit not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons. From this point of view, the NPT was securitized as a measure which safeguarded the U.S. homeland against other proliferators. On the other hand, the NPT did not limit nuclear arms race of present proliferators, therefore did not contribute to greater societal safety.

4. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

Disarmament movement, inspired by their ban the nuclear testing agenda, continued to grow also in 1960s. The movement was focusing mainly on the health hazards of nuclear testing and spiraling nuclear arms race. They emphasized that testing damaged future generations. As the moratorium on testing was perceived as s huge success of the anti-nuclear campaign, the resumption of nuclear weapons testing was translated as an enormous fiasco of the movement. SANE remained to be the largest organization which promoted the test ban agenda. They were vigorously raising public awareness in order to gather support for the nuclear test ban agenda. They continued to emphasize the danger of nuclear fallout from testing, especially harmful to children. The newly formed Women Strike for Peace organized a massive demonstration on November 1, 1961, in response to the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. More than 50 000 women in 60 cities across the U.S. demonstrated against nuclear weapons. They demanded the end of the nuclear arms race and to stop nuclear testing.³⁵⁶ Many nuclear disarmament activists expressed their grave concern of the resumption of testing. Schweitzer, in his letter to Kennedy, reminded him of the nuclear fallout dangers. He stressed that it will cause the American population to receive radiation through radioactive milk, vegetables, and water.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁵ JOHNSON, Rebecca, *Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, pp. 50-51.

³⁵⁶ SWERDLOW, Amy. Ladies' Day at the Capitol: Women Strike for Peace versus HUAC, *Feminist Studies*, Fall 1982, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 493-94.

³⁵⁷ WITTNER Lawrence S. Blacklisting Schweitzer, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 51, no. 3, May 1995, p. 60.

After unsuccessful negotiation rounds and the resumption of nuclear testing, Cuban missile crises represented a critical moment which created a great window of opportunity for both nuclear disarmament movement and government. Government used this opportunity to establish ban on atmospheric testing in the LTBT. Historically first nuclear arms control agreement was labeled as a huge success of both nuclear disarmament movement and the Kennedy administration. Nuclear disarmament movement considered the LTBT to be their greatest accomplishment. SANE's co-founder Norman Cousins played a role of a main facilitator of these negotiations between blocks.³⁵⁸ They regarded it as evidence that their effort was not done in vain. The LTBT was being perceived as a reasonable step, toward possible future negotiations and other agreements. In the celebratory atmosphere after the LTBT was signed, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* set their doomsday clock from seven back to twelve minutes to midnight position.³⁵⁹ L. Pauling also obtained the Nobel Peace prize for his peace activism and for his longstanding opposition to nuclear weapons in year 1962. He won the prize for his efforts to pressure the government of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to sign the LTBT.

The LTBT was considered to be both victory and defeat for nuclear disarmament movement. The LTBT banished atmospheric testing which in response removed the image of mushroom cloud from the public debate and with that also “the visible reminder of the nuclear arms race.”³⁶⁰ Mushroom-shaped cloud as a symbol disappeared from the American daily life after the LTBT was signed. This resulted into more passivity since the effects of nuclear testing were no longer visible and therefore unimaginable. Nuclear arms buildup was invisible. This caused that the driving force to ban all nuclear testing vanished. The threat of nuclear weapons was too abstract to prevail in the public debate because a majority did not perceive it as threatening any longer. Even media stopped depicting nuclear danger from nuclear testing as existential.

The AEC continued to declare that “man always has and always will live in an environment filled with nuclear radiation. ...Naturally occurring radioactive materials in our food supply irradiate us from within. To these levels of radiation exposures are now added those from fallout – but these radiations (gamma rays and beta particles) are no different in

³⁵⁸ SEABORG, Glenn Theodore. *Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981, p. 208.

³⁵⁹ BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Doomsday Clock: Timeline [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/timeline>.

³⁶⁰ JOHNSON, Rebecca, *Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 54.

kind from those emanating from natural sources. Nor is there any evidence that they produce any fundamentally different biological effects.”³⁶¹ They securitized fallout radiation as a mere addition to normal type of radiation and therefore nuclear weapons testing did not inflict any damage.

The anti-nuclear movement approached these governmental documents with disbelief and tried to disprove their statements. The Committee for Nuclear Information showed that, according to their highly publicized *Baby Tooth Survey*, babies born in 1964 had about 50 times more amount of radioactive strontium-90 in their baby teeth than those babies born in 1958 and in late 1950s in overall.³⁶² In Addition, these radioactive materials could be found in human bodies only as an effect of nuclear testing. These conclusions corresponded with the increasing rate of nuclear testing. This finding created an additional scare which fueled the anti-nuclear movement. But, nevertheless, the biggest fear was perceived as if vanished with signing the LTBT. Public considered the LTBT to be satisfactory success and did not worry about the underground testing. After signing of the LTBT the perception of health dangers of nuclear testing significantly lessened.

4. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

The early 1960s experienced the rise of environmentalism which began questioning the relationship between humans, environment and technological advancement. Subsequently, environmentalists encompassed also the anti-nuclear agenda.

The securitization of nuclear weapons affecting the environment focused primarily on nuclear testing which was poisoning cow’s milk. This radioactive milk was later consumed by humans which caused that by breastfeeding it started appearing also in children’s bodies. The purpose of the Baby Tooth Survey was to show how nuclear testing affects especially children and how Strontium remained in their teeth and bones. As mentioned earlier, the securitization of the dangers of radioactive strontium in milk caused significant drop in milk consumption. However, even Kennedy himself continued to deny any nuclear dangers of drinking milk.

Nuclear testing in Alaska was designed to measure electromagnetic and seismic effects of explosions. Besides considering potential effects on population, a protection of environment and its habitat played a big part in organization of testing as well. They wanted

³⁶¹ THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, *Health Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Testing*, Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1964, p. 1.

³⁶² ALLEY, William M and ALLEY, Rosemarie. *Too Hot to Touch: The Problem of High-Level Nuclear Waste*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 53.

to avoid public protests and therefore took environment under a consideration. Nevertheless, in the end the most important considerations were focused on whether it would threaten human population or not. Studies urged not to perform nuclear tests in Alaska because of the possible damages done to fisheries, wildlife, more importantly to the sea otter population. Reports stated that testing would destroy “breeding grounds for the highly important fur seal industry.”³⁶³ Nuclear planners also downplayed studies which emphasized negative effects of nuclear testing in an unstable geological area such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions. However, in the end, damage caused by nuclear testing was regarded as *acceptable* by planners because all damage on environment would be only temporary.³⁶⁴ Planners of nuclear testing considered environmental damage as mild and health risks as minimal.

In 1965 the scandal sprung out with moving nuclear warheads across the New York City in the nighttime. The convoy of nuclear weapons was transported through Manhattan streets at night despite the fact that it was prohibited. It drew a strong media attention and ultimately, the U.S. Defense Department was forced to stop moving completed nuclear warheads across the city.³⁶⁵ The media started securitized the probability of contamination by nuclear accident and promoted more thorough security measures.

This accident was closely followed by the 1966 accident of the U.S. B-52 bomber, which carried 4 hydrogen bombs, which collided with a tanker. Subsequently, three hydrogen bombs were found on land in Spain near village Palomares and one in the sea. Two of the bombs detonated upon impact which caused radioactive land contamination due to a non-nuclear explosion.³⁶⁶ In overall, bombs caused minimal physical damage, but because of the radiation contamination, the following media coverage created a wide nuclear scare anyway. It took several months to recover missing nuclear bombs and to clean the radioactive contamination of land.³⁶⁷ These were only two main incidents which draw an extensive media attention and caused a strong public disapproval with the reckless nuclear safety policy. Media securitized the environmental damage of this accident together with the fact, that the U.S. contaminated yet another country. The most shocking was an inability to find missing nuclear bombs.

³⁶³ KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, pp. 49-50, 53.

³⁶⁴ KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 50-53.

³⁶⁵ STILES, David. A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Winter 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 49-51.

³⁶⁶ STILES, David. A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Winter 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 49-50.

³⁶⁷ STILES, David. A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Winter 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, p. 53.

Gradually, the Pentagon was forced to react. After another nuclear-armed plane crash, the government released a list of thirteen potentially disastrous nuclear accidents which occurred between 1950 and 1968.³⁶⁸ However, Palomares nuclear accident was still the most serious of them considering the actual contamination of land and local produce.

The nuclear scare of nuclear contamination and potentially disastrous nuclear accidents projected also into the nuclear popular culture. The 1964 movie *The Horror of Party Beach* depicts an attack of radioactive monsters created by radioactive waste.

The debate about a possibility of nuclear testing in Alaska continued in the late 1960s. The emphasis was put on dangerous seismic disturbances caused by such testing. People together with several organizations began writing to politicians in panic demanding cancelation of nuclear testing. The Alaska Conservation Society declared their posture against these *atomic experimentations*. One of many frightened citizens even suggested that if nuclear tests were “so safe, let them set them off under the Pentagon.”³⁶⁹ They emphasized primarily environmental contamination and the possible effect of testing on fishing industry. The issue of nuclear testing was raised into political debate when the AEC started considering also nuclear testing in Hawaii. The U.S. Senator Gaylord Nelson stressed the irony that the AEC chose to test nuclear weapons in a wildlife refuge where even hunting was prohibited. He stated that nothing would convince him “that a wildlife refuge and a nuclear blast go together.”³⁷⁰

³⁶⁸ STILES, David. A Fusion Bomb over Andalucía: U.S. Information Policy and the 1966 Palomares Incident, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Winter 2006, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 49-50.

³⁶⁹ KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, pp. 75-78.

³⁷⁰ KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 76.

5. The Construction of the Nuclear Threat and Détente, 1969-1981

“[I]n a world beset by economic tensions, by vast inequities, mass deprivation and starvation – a world where the have-nots are increasingly refusing to accept their place in a disintegrating order – nuclear weapons in the hands of desperate or irresponsible groups will mean nuclear weapons used”³⁷¹

The fourth nuclear period from 1969 to 1981 corresponds with the presidency of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter.³⁷² If we take an international context into account, the nuclear threat was not securitized as the greatest existential threat since the Vietnam War was in the center of the security discourse. Also an anti-nuclear movement was in decline. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 and France its first neutron bomb test in 1980.

5. 1. Governmental level (1969-1981)

5. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

The notion of a possibility of peaceful coexistence of both countries started growing in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. In order to lessen the probability of nuclear war, the U.S. and the Soviet Union embarked on the process of détente. Overall securitizing debate pressured them to establish mutual peaceful relations and the necessity to learn to live with the Soviets, while not destroying themselves along the process as the official aim of their policy. Détente was perceived as a process of reinforcing mutual toleration.

In 1969 Nixon declared that the U.S will continue to assist where their treaty commitments prevail and if a state asks for it, but they will prevent being again dragged into conflicts.³⁷³ Nixon struggled with their commitments in Asia and, therefore, he stressed that states should strive to ensure their own security. This promise evolved into Nixon’s doctrine

³⁷¹ FELD, Bernard T. Charade of Piecemeal arms limitation, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1975, vol. 31, no. 6, p. 9.

³⁷² Richard Nixon was the U.S. President from January 20 1969 to August 9 1974. The President Gerald Ford took office on August 9 1974 and left it on January 20 1977. The Presidency of Jimmy Carter lasted from January 20 1977 to January 20 1981.

³⁷³ NIXON, Richard. Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen, July 25, 1969. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140>.

which included an assurance of nuclear umbrella policy. Nixon pledged that the U.S. “shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.”³⁷⁴ Nuclear umbrella would be provided if the country requests it while being under nuclear threat of nuclear state. By this doctrine, Nixon made an attempt to ensure that other nuclear nations would avoid making nuclear or other threats where the U.S. might have its interests. By itself, the nuclear umbrella pledge might induce other countries to employ nuclear restraints strategies and not to practice aggressive policies and wage proxy wars. As a result, the Nixon’s doctrine could be perceived as an attempt to lessen the probability of conflict escalating into a nuclear war.

Moreover, he approved the deployment of ABM system called Safeguard program, which represented a safeguard of the U.S. deterrent against three main threats: Chinese nuclear attack, Soviet attack, and against any irrational or accidental attack launched from the Soviet Union. Nixon also admitted that the defense system does not defend cities and prevent unacceptable loss of civilian lives. That is why the purpose of this defense system is to prevent war, which in this case means protecting the deterrent.³⁷⁵ This rhetoric resulted in ABM being securitized as a defense system inhibiting the likelihood of the nuclear war. But in the consequence, the ABM induced more instability as Soviets perceived it as a system reducing their first strike potential. They acknowledged that accidental war was a distinct possibility.

One of the main topics of the threat of nuclear war was the threat of accidental nuclear war accidental launches, false warnings, and the prevention and reduction of misunderstandings if such events occurred. In the same spirit the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed *The Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR* in 1971. The main purpose of this treaty was to secure that accidental or unauthorized launch would not occur.³⁷⁶ They sought to prevent mutual misunderstandings leading into accidents and improve their missile warnings and communication.

³⁷⁴ NIXON, Richard. Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, November 3, 1969. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2303>.

³⁷⁵ NIXON, Richard. The President's News Conference, March 14, 1969. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1951>.

³⁷⁶ Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR. Parties: the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Washington, signed and entered into force on September 30, 1971.

Carter's shift of nuclear rhetoric

Continual enlargement of the Soviet nuclear armament was increasingly securitized as an existential threat to the U.S. Moreover there was a strong unease about the Soviet proclaimed intentions to win the war. This pressured the U.S. to adopt more credible deterrent. Carter's *Countervailing Strategy*, called for flexible nuclear forces, responsive nuclear pre-planning, and escalation control. They declared that if deterrence fails, the U.S. nuclear capability must be employed to such extent, that the adversary would not achieve his goals and would undergo unacceptable losses. The strategy suggests that their retaliatory attack would employ flexible and responsive targeting plan aiming on a full range of military targets while retaining a capability for pre-planned options of attacking industrial and urban areas.³⁷⁷ Different plans ranged from massive counterattack to flexible options which, in the result, enhanced the credibility. The main purpose of this strategy was to threaten Soviets that they could not win the nuclear war and if they had attempted, they could bring utter destruction upon themselves. They strived to convince them that the main purpose of the U.S response "would not be just to kill Soviets but to prevent military victory."³⁷⁸ The aim was to deny an enemy the right to win a nuclear war.

The U.S. strategists were deeply concerned about the Soviet rhetoric declaring that they do not wish for it to happen, but if it did, they would win. The primary purpose of this policy was to emphasize, that the U.S. would ensure that the Soviet Union would not win the thermonuclear war. The secondary purpose was to strengthen the U.S. ability to employ nuclear weapons in a selective way to prevent further escalation. There was a strong notion that deterrence of nuclear war was essential and if deterrence failed, the escalation control would ensure the survivability by preventing mutual destruction anyway. However, some top strategists remained skeptical about the possibility of limited nuclear war.³⁷⁹ They remained skeptical if the escalation of nuclear war can be stopped to prevent massive nuclear exchange.

To reduce the threat of nuclear war and to lessen the mutual hostility both countries signed the *Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War* (known as Prevention of Nuclear War Treaty, PNW). Given the fact that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for

³⁷⁷ THE WHITE HOUSE. Presidential Directive NSC-59: Nuclear Weapons Employment policy, Washington, July 25, 1980, p. 1-2. Available online at <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/pddirectives/pd59.pdf>.

³⁷⁸ GETLER, Michael. Carter Directive Modifies Strategy for a Nuclear War, *The Washington Post*, August 6, 1980, p. A10.

³⁷⁹ BROWN, Harold. A Countervailing View: No, we did not think we could win a nuclear war, *Foreign Policy*, September 24, 2012. Available online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/a_countervailing_view.

mankind, both countries desired that the danger of nuclear war would be reduced and ultimately eliminated in the future. According to the PNW agreement, they considered their objective to be a removal of the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons. They pledged they will act to prevent the nuclear war and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the other state or their allies if the international peace would be endangered by that.³⁸⁰ According to rhetoric, the main purpose of this non-armament agreement was to avoid or reduce the danger of nuclear war. However, they still vigorously continued with their accelerated nuclear buildup.

5. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

In the context of Vietnam War, Nixon complained that the nuclear disarmament movement created a greatly intricate political situation where using nuclear weapons is practically impossible for him because of the negative reaction of public opinion which would follow. He was very much concerned that the employment of nuclear weapons would have caused both domestic and international uproar and, consequently, damaged their whole foreign policy.³⁸¹ Thus, Kissinger as a National Security Advisor and then the Secretary of State and one of the principal authors of Nixon's nuclear policy, struggled to make nuclear weapons more useful. Despite the minimal chance of their use in the battlefield, he wanted nuclear weapons to represent a strong diplomacy instrument. Kissinger believed that nuclear weapons could serve diplomatic purposes and threats of the use of nuclear weapons could create substantial political benefits. For this purpose, he advocated flexible, creative maneuvers to create a strategy of aggressive nuclear posturing.³⁸² For the purpose of strengthening nuclear credibility, he chose a rather confrontational posture. In October 1973, in response to Middle East Crisis, he even ostentatiously raised the nuclear alert status to Defcon 3.³⁸³

³⁸⁰ Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Parties: the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Washington, signed and entered into force on June 22, 1973.

³⁸¹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 111.

³⁸² SURI, Jeremi. Henry Kissinger and American Grand Strategy. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 76.

³⁸³ SURI, Jeremi. Henry Kissinger and American Grand Strategy. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 79.

Rather than to decrease the international tensions, his aim was to use nuclear weapons in confrontational manner to achieve his goals. Kissinger did not intend to launch a nuclear attack, but nevertheless, he used the nuclear card to threaten Soviets they would employ them unless they proceeded with negotiations over Vietnam. He believed that weapons do not cause wars, but people do. Nuclear weapons might even make the war less likely. As Kissinger once explained to Nixon: “[W]e’ve got to play it recklessly. That’s the safest course.”³⁸⁴ He considered nuclear weapons to be just a strong diplomacy tool. But Kissinger did not take into consideration that each increase of tensions created further spiraling of nuclear arms race which produces another tension.

The Schlesinger doctrine, named after then Secretary of Defense, declared more flexible nuclear policy based upon *a wide range of limited nuclear employment options*. This capacity for limited nuclear war suggests that the U.S. should be able to conduct conventional military operations complemented by selected nuclear operations. The main purpose of this alteration was to be able to control potential escalation and duration of violence.³⁸⁵ The strategy is based on a belief in limited nuclear war. The principal goal was to bypass the nuclear taboo to be able to actually use the nuclear weapons not only as a deterrent, but also as a military weapon. Nixon desired to build a more plausible nuclear deterrent policy. Nixon believed that the U.S. nuclear superiority mattered and should be regained, but if it would not be possible, the U.S. nuclear strategy should rely on flexible nuclear options.³⁸⁶ According to them, this strategy by itself would be sufficient enough to gain strategic advantage. The Schlesinger doctrine was based on deterrence, control of escalation, and general war option if escalation control fails. Nuclear forces needed to be flexible, responsive, and based on pre-planning. Furthermore, the primary goal of nuclear targeting was to destroy economic and military resources essential for the enemy’s post-war recovery and to destroy political leadership and military command structure.³⁸⁷ They noted that targeting civilian population is not an objective.

³⁸⁴ GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 127.

³⁸⁵ THE WHITE HOUSE, National Security Council. National Security Decision Memorandum 242, Washington. January 17, 1974.

³⁸⁶ GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 127.

³⁸⁷ OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, Washington, April 3, 1974.

To enhance overall credibility and defense, Nixon authorized development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Nixon publicly defended the morality of nuclear deterrence policy by saying that deterrence policy necessarily includes attacks on civilians if a counterattack is needed. He added that only idealists cannot comprehend that the existence of nuclear weapons is irreversible.³⁸⁸ Thus he acknowledged that nuclear counterattacks might be a necessity in certain situations. Moreover, he perceived it as a moral issue since it ultimately ensures that nuclear annihilation might be prevented by that. In 1980s, Nixon shifted its belief toward the irrelevance of nuclear weapons as a tool of deterrence due to the credibility gap. He stated that the use of nuclear weapons could have been credible in the past, but not anymore. He noted that nuclear weapons “are irrelevant to the solution of the Third World problems. ... What American President, in order to protect the Third World, is going to threaten the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons?”³⁸⁹

Carter’s strategy of flexible and massive counterattacks was followed by an announcement of increased conventional and nuclear buildup and a production of neutron radiation enhanced bomb. Neutron bomb was securitized as a more applicable weapon. However, due to his moral considerations and a strong public opposition to the weapon, Carter, in the end, refused to order the development of the neutron bomb.³⁹⁰ The threat of the use of neutron weapon debate was fueled by its alleged usability. When later questioned about the morality of nuclear weapons and about his preparedness to launch an attack against the Soviet Union, Carter stated that he really did consider the use of nuclear weapons in order to prevent further destruction the U.S.³⁹¹ This assertion, along with other statements from the time of Carter’s presidency, suggests that he would not hesitate to order a nuclear counterattack. Carter did not consider the use of nuclear weapons to be unthinkable.³⁹²

Carter administration also strived to emphasize its nuclear arsenal is designed for defensive purposes only. Carter administration used the U.N. Special Session to pledge that they nuclear weapons would not be used against non-nuclear NPT party state.³⁹³ This negative

³⁸⁸ SCHEER, Robert. *Playing President: My Close Encounters with Nixon, Carter, Bush I, Reagan, and Clinton – and How They Did Not Prepare Me for George W. Bush*, New York: Akashic books, 2006, p. 26.

³⁸⁹ SCHEER, Robert. *Playing President: My Close Encounters with Nixon, Carter, Bush I, Reagan, and Clinton – and How They Did Not Prepare Me for George W. Bush*, New York: Akashic Books, 2006, p. 33.

³⁹⁰ PAUL. T. V. *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 78-79.

³⁹¹ CARTER, Jimmy. Jimmy Carter on Morality and Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, January 2010, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, [online], accessed 24.10.2014. Available at <http://www.wagingpeace.org/jimmy-carter-on-morality-and-nuclear-weapons/>.

³⁹² GAILLARD, Frye. *Prophet From Plains: Jimmy Carter and His Legacy*, Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2007, p. 18.

³⁹³ PAUL. T. V. *The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 79.

assurance was a modification of first use nuclear doctrine. They promised not to launch a nuclear attack against non-nuclear state except as a response to their attack. To certain extent, this statement also suggested that the principal national objective was to prevent further nuclear proliferation, which meant not to provoke any state into initiating a nuclear development.

5. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Nuclear parity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union made mutual disarmament negotiations more relevant and more likely to be successful. However, both Nixon and Kissinger comprehended détente with the Soviet Union to be primarily an opportunity to shift Soviet behavior into a more positive direction with a less hostile attitude. Nixon and Kissinger were not overly attached to the idea of nuclear disarmament or the end of nuclear arms race. They did not believe that the existence of nuclear weapons altered significantly the principles of politics among great powers.³⁹⁴ Therefore, they did not consider the nuclear arms race to be the decisive factor affecting the Cold War because there were other more influential forces. Rather, they perceived *geopolitical competition* as the key driver of international politics.³⁹⁵

Nixon was aware of the strategic potential of nuclear weapons and knew other states would want to seek nuclear weapons as well. But, neither Nixon nor Kissinger was willing to sacrifice their political goals in order to halt nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, they regarded nuclear proliferation as inevitable and potentially desirable because nuclear states would tend to act more cautiously.³⁹⁶ On the one hand, promoting a halt on nuclear proliferation would not help them to acquire any political gains. On the other hand, they perceived nuclear proliferation as desirable because behavior of nuclear states would be more restrained in their behavior. Nuclear arms control was one area of common interest which had a potential to be only a mutual ground for negotiations. Thus, they proceeded to negotiate not with the purpose to lessen the threat of nuclear war, but to achieve their geopolitical objectives and to manage the Soviet threat.

³⁹⁴ PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 11, 16.

³⁹⁵ GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 127.

³⁹⁶ GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 127-8.

In 18 May 1972 *The Agreement on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof* entered into force. This multilateral treaty was created in order to exclude sea-bed and the ocean floor from the nuclear arms race.³⁹⁷

In 1972, the U.S. and USSR concluded Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) dealing with limits on strategic defensive systems and limits on strategic offensive weapons. First of the treaties, the 1972 *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems* (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, ABM Treaty) represents a watershed in the U.S. and the USSR negotiations. Both countries agreed that each may have only two ABM deployment areas and these systems cannot be deployed for a defense of its territory, but the treaty permits one to protect the capital city and another one to protect a ICBM launch site. There are limits on the number of ABM launchers and ABM interceptor missiles, ABM radars and the treaty do not permit sea-based, air-based, or space-based ABM systems.³⁹⁸ The purpose of the ABM treaty was to limit nuclear arms race. The logic behind this is that if retaliatory forces are protected, the country does not need to develop its offensive forces in such vast numbers. Also with unlimited numbers of ABM defense sites, the other country would tend to accelerate its nuclear arms buildup to overcome the defense systems of its adversary. In 1974 the additional Protocol to the ABM Treaty was signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974 (entered into force on May 24 1976). It limited ABM missile sites to single one – either around the capital or the ICBM deployment area.³⁹⁹ The U.S. maintained its ABM defense of its ICBM missiles. It was in accordance with Nixon's belief that the ABM defense cannot protect the cities and people in it.

The second 1972 SALT I agreement, titled *Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* (known as Interim Agreement or SALT I Treaty), froze numbers of strategic ballistic missile launchers and permits increase of SLBM launchers to certain level only if certain number of ICBM or SLBM launchers is

³⁹⁷ The Agreement on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. United Nations, opened for signature on February 7 1971, entered into force on 18 May 1972.

³⁹⁸ Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Signed at Moscow on 26 May 1972, entered into force on October 3 1972.

³⁹⁹ Protocol To The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Signed at Moscow on July 3 1974.

destroyed simultaneously.⁴⁰⁰ It did not cover mobile ICBMs. Also the SALT treaty did not cover the issue of multiple nuclear warheads in a missile. Nixon told privately Kissinger that he did not believe the treaty will be at all important. The SALT I Treaty was being perceived as a public relation trick among American public. It was often labeled as window dressing, or stage-managed, rather than genuine disarmament treaty.⁴⁰¹ The SALT I Treaty was staged to bolster the image of Nixon as a great world leader. Because Nixon did not regard nuclear weapons to be a significant phenomenon he also did not believe that nuclear limitation agreements could have a particular impact. Thus, treaties do not necessarily matter if the President does not believe they would have any affect. SALT I Treaty placed certain limits on nuclear arms, but the U.S., nevertheless, continued to depend on nuclear weapons buildup.

Successive Ford administration relied greatly on Kissinger in national security issues, who continued with Nixon's détente approach. Kissinger continued with SALT negotiations which culminated with signing Vladivostok SALT II agreement. This tentative agreement served as a basis for future SALT II Treaty. Ford declared his continuation of negotiation commitments of previous administration while stating, that in a thermonuclear age, there is no other alternative to a peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.⁴⁰²

Carter's shift of nuclear rhetoric

Carter declared that unnecessary proliferation of nuclear weapons was the biggest waste and danger in the world. Therefore, the U.S. should rationally strive to eliminate nuclear weapons.⁴⁰³ In his Inaugural Address, Carter declared that the massive armaments race constitutes an enormous problem. He pledged to limit the arms race to amounts of weapons necessary for ensuring safety of each nation. Carter promised to move toward the ultimate goal, the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. Moreover, he appealed to all people to contribute to this goal: "We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death."⁴⁰⁴ Carter performed quite effective securitizing move while labeling

⁴⁰⁰ Interim Agreement Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Signed at Moscow on May 26, 1972, entered into force on October 3, 1972.

⁴⁰¹ GREENBERG, David. Nixon as Statesman: The Failed Campaign. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 57-58.

⁴⁰² FORD, Gerald R. Address to a Joint Session of the Congress, August 12, 1974. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4694>.

⁴⁰³ CARTER, Jimmy. *Why Not the Best?: the First 50 Years*, Layetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1996, (first published 1975), p. 155.

⁴⁰⁴ CARTER, Jimmy. Inaugural Address, Washington, January 20, 1977. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=6575>.

nuclear proliferation as their primary existential threat. He recognized the nuclear disarmament goals as their own ultimate goals and called for other people to join the nuclear disarmament movement.

To certain extent, Carter administration favored the idea of nuclear disarmament and also did not resist establishing informative channels with nuclear disarmament leaders. The Carter administrative often utilized these channels with the aim to promote their own agenda to general public and to mobilize public support for their disarmament treaties.⁴⁰⁵ Carter made significant effort to set the public debate to his advantage. However, on the basis of the polls which showed the growing public disagreement with the weakness of U.S. foreign policy, Brzezinski advised Carter not to proceed with further bonding and public cooperation with disarmament movement leaders.⁴⁰⁶

Carter desired to be perceived as peacemaker and mainly for this reason, he started to promote a good and peaceful image of the U.S. That was the main driver behind the SALT II Treaty. The *Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, SALT II) was signed at Vienna June 18, 1979. The Treaty stated that both parties are conscious that nuclear war would be devastating for all mankind and therefore limiting strategic arms is especially important. The treaty sets limits on numbers of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for both sides. Number of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers and ASBMs cannot be higher than 2,400, while limit for offensive arms were not to exceed 2,250.⁴⁰⁷ These and other limits on strategic offensive weapon systems, among other thing, included also bans on new ICBMs. The SALT II Treaty was never ratified due to Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and opposition of the U.S. Congress. States nevertheless complied with the Treaty. Soviet invasion to Afghanistan effectively ended the détente phase.

In the late 1970, due to the increasing international tensions and rising Soviet power, many politicians and public figures started securitizing nuclear spending and buildup as inadequate. They started expressing their disapproval with softening of the U.S. security policy. This securitization of nuclear threat led many Americans to feel more threatened by the continuation of the U.S.-Soviet détente. Consequently, they began opposing the idea of

⁴⁰⁵ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 129.

⁴⁰⁶ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 130.

⁴⁰⁷ Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Signed at Vienna on June 18, 1979, not ratified.

setting limits on the U.S. nuclear buildup. Furthermore, several mainly republican politicians to a 1976 re-establishment of the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which demanded substantial increase of military spending with the emphasis on nuclear arms. They pressured the government to proceed with neutron bomb development since the Soviets exploded their first neutron bomb already in 1978. Rostow proclaimed that nuclear weapons could no longer be limited by nuclear control agreements.⁴⁰⁸ He insinuated, that nuclear arms race already passed over the phase where control treaties could limit them anyway. Furthermore, the CPD insinuated that nuclear control treaties tended to be ineffective. This propaganda tried to disrupt SALT II negotiations as they were perceived as superfluous and counterproductive. Ultimately, they challenged Carter administration disarmament efforts. Reagan, who joined the CPD in 1976, became a strong proponent of immediate nuclear buildup. He utilized this propaganda later during 1980 elections when he labeled the SALT II Treaty as a concession to the Soviet threat and an attempt to appease the Soviet Union.

The possible ratification of the Treaty played its role again during the 1980 presidential campaign. During presidential debate when asked how to stop the nuclear arms race, Carter stressed that only rational choice is to ratify the current version of SALT II Treaty. On the contrary, Reagan proposed to cancel the current (yet not ratified) SALT II Treaty, and intensify an offensive weapons buildup to force Soviets into concessions to a new more favorable treaty and to restrain the Soviet buildup.⁴⁰⁹ Reagan referred to Carter's reduction of nuclear strategic weapons as to concessions to Soviets during mutual arms control negotiations. Reagan criticized Carter's inability to negotiate equally advantageous treaty: "Mr. Carter had canceled the B-1 bomber, delayed the MX, delayed the Trident submarine, delayed the cruise missile, shut down the Minuteman missile production line, and whatever other things that might have been done. The Soviet Union sat at the table knowing that we had gone forward with unilateral concessions without any reciprocation from them whatsoever."⁴¹⁰

During 1980 presidential campaign, Carter made a strong statement that the nuclear arms control was the *single most important issue*, with comparison to unemployment, or to

⁴⁰⁸ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 136-37.

⁴⁰⁹ REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

⁴¹⁰ REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

inflation. Carter made an attempt to depict Reagan as a hawkish politician who never cared about nuclear disarmament negotiations and actually opposed every nuclear arms control treaty that the U.S. signed.⁴¹¹ Carter made an attempt to depict Reagan as a candidate who will accelerate another nuclear arms race. After Reagan won the election, Carter was often ridiculed for his remark, that nuclear limitation in order to stop nuclear proliferation was more important than economy.

During 1980 presidential debates, Carter declared, that the U.S. must take a resolute position and control *terrorism of all kinds* and do not proliferate nuclear material to countries involved in terrorist activities. “Ultimately, the most serious terrorist threat is if one of those radical nations, who believe in terrorism as a policy, should have atomic weapons. Both I and all my predecessors have had a deep commitment to controlling the proliferation of nuclear weapons in countries like Libya or Iraq. We have even alienated some of our closest trade partners, because we have insisted upon the control of the spread of nuclear weapons to those potentially terrorist countries.”⁴¹² This proclamation demonstrated a then predominant threat of nuclear proliferation debate, which was the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorist states. They feared that those states would not consider the use of nuclear weapons as inherently irrational.

The U.S. took a strong stance to prevent those terrorist states to obtain nuclear weaponry. Nuclear terrorism was portrayed as terrorist reckless autocracies obtaining nuclear weapons, but the U.S. did not publicly consider further spread of nuclear weapons. This issue refers also to the problem of preventing uncontrolled nuclear proliferation and how to efficiently draw the line to determine which state should or should not be permitted to possess nuclear weaponry. Also it is notable that in the 1980s, states often labeled as the biggest nuclear proliferation threats were Iraq and Libya. As all international politics, also nuclear weapons proliferation is inherently guided by double standards which deeply impacts what is perceived as a major threat and what is not.

In 1980, the U.S. signed the multilateral *Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials* focus on protection of nuclear materials in order to avert dangers posed by stolen and used nuclear material. The Convention applies on nuclear material used for

⁴¹¹ REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

⁴¹² REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

peaceful purposes while transported internationally, and partly also on nuclear material in domestic use, storage and transport. The treaty also takes into account the necessity to prevent nuclear material being stolen and appropriate punishments for such acts.⁴¹³

In his Farewell Address, Carter warned that more sophisticated technology and bigger nuclear arsenals also significantly increases a probability of miscalculation, which should make nuclear disarmament a paramount priority.⁴¹⁴

5. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty caused the end of atmospheric testing and transfer of the nuclear testing to underground. In response to that, the image of nuclear explosion moved from the public debate and, consequently, also the threat of nuclear testing disappeared from the discourse because it was too intangible. From the government perspective, this rapid shift of public attention into ignorance was very advantageous. For a significant amount of time they felt no strong public pressure which would force them to securitize this threat of nuclear testing.

The AEC representatives proclaimed that in the situation with no comprehensive test ban treaty, nuclear testing are absolutely essential to national security. They downplayed concerns of anti-nuclear activists and declared that damage of nuclear testing on the environment would be minimal and those would be repaired.⁴¹⁵ They securitized nuclear testing as necessary and safe. Nixon administration regarded nuclear test ban debate as threatening their national security interests. They strived to limit nuclear disarmament movement potential and thus, they even began targeting them.⁴¹⁶ Despite their approach to test ban debate, they signed bilateral *Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests* known as Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) in 1974. This treaty establishes a threshold on

⁴¹³ Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. United Nations, signed at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980, entered into force 1987.

⁴¹⁴ CARTER, Jimmy. Farewell Address, Washington, January 14, 1981. Available online at <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/farewell.phtml>.

⁴¹⁵ KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, pp.101-103.

⁴¹⁶ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.116.

nuclear testing which prohibits nuclear weapons test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The Treaty also encourages party states to limit the underground testing to a minimum.⁴¹⁷

In 1976 they also signed bilateral *Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes* (PNE Treaty), signed on May 28 1976. State parties have a right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions as long as it is performed within their jurisdiction or in the territory of another state given their permission.⁴¹⁸ Peaceful nuclear explosions meant nuclear explosion done for non-military purposes, which were practically undistinguishable from regular military nuclear explosions...

5. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (1969-1981)

5. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the World

By the early 1970s, the nuclear disarmament movement was weak and unable to rise against the accelerating nuclear arms race. Anti-nuclear groups had little manpower and financial support from the general public due to lack of powerful anti-nuclear agenda to mobilize people to again struggle against the nuclear weapons threat. International conflicts were usually regarded as more imminent issues, among which the Vietnam War was considered to be the most prominent problem. Therefore, pacifist and disarmament groups also shifted their attention to different agenda in order to sustain their support base. The anti-nuclear movement slowly re-emerged with the end of the Vietnam War, while being driven by the contradiction between the détente policy and continual nuclear buildup. By the second half of the 1970s, nuclear agenda returned to the public debate. During the Carter administration, anti-nuclear groups were not restrained by the government, but quite the opposite. The administration needed these groups to promote government objectives which gave to anti-nuclear groups a notable influence.

The anti-nuclear movement continued to securitize the existential threat of the end of the world. Jonathan Schell emphasized that the nuclear danger leads to extinction: “[T]he nuclear peril threatens life, above all, not at the level of individuals, who already live under

⁴¹⁷ Treaty Between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. Signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974, entered into force on December 11, 1990.

⁴¹⁸ Treaty Between the USA and USSR on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes. Signed at Washington on May 28, 1976, entered into force December 11, 1990.

the sway of death, but at the level of everything that individuals hold in common. Death cuts off life; extinction cuts off birth.”⁴¹⁹ According to this statement, nuclear danger threatened the whole human race and all life on earth. This statement suggested that nuclear weapons inevitably lead to extinction. One of the key groups, which emerged in the late 1970s, was also Mobilization For Survival. Their four principal aims were Zero Nuclear Weapons, Ban Nuclear Power, Stop the Arms Race, and Meet Human Needs. These slogans appeared on buttons, bumper stickers, and in other advertisement media.⁴²⁰ They vigorously securitized the nuclear existential threat by stressing the need to achieve nuclear zero and ban all nuclear weapons. In order to reach such development, they first needed to secure a stop of the nuclear arms race.

Another very influential group Physicians for Social Responsibility started to securitize potential consequences of nuclear war. Many anti-nuclear groups, including SANE, united under the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign (Freeze). Randall Forsberg pressed nuclear disarmament organizations to start promoting a united agenda. She drafted a call to both the U.S. and the USSR urging them to bilateral halt of the nuclear arms race. Forsberg released a *Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze*, which calls for a mutual freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and of missiles. The proposal urged both sides to stop nuclear arms race on the basis of the fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union already possessed 50,000 nuclear warheads, the capacity to destroy all cities in the northern hemisphere within a half an hour.⁴²¹ The main message was that both countries have such a massive nuclear armament, that further nuclear buildup was redundant and a dangerous risk. It proposed that both countries would retain nuclear parity which would enable future reduction proposals. Nuclear freeze was considered to be the first and essential step toward creating conditions of nonproliferation and possible elimination of nuclear weapons. The majority of pacifist groups and other organizations joined the Call.

An enormous aversion to nuclear weapons has spread throughout the whole country. Anti-nuclear disarmament groups organized demonstrations and anti-nuclear marches. During 1980 presidential election, more than 50 towns in Massachusetts held local referenda, in

⁴¹⁹ SCHELL, Jonathan. *The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000, p. 117.

⁴²⁰ DAVIDON, Ann Morrisett. The U.S. Anti-nuclear Movement, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1979, vol. 40, no. 10, p. 46.

⁴²¹ FORSBERG, Randall. Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race: Proposal for a Mutual US-Soviet Nuclear-Weapon Freeze, *Security Dialogue*, October 1981, vol. 12, pp. 417-421. Originally released as pamphlet by Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign in 1980.

which a clear majority voted for nuclear freeze.⁴²² But in the same elections where people voted for a nuclear freeze, they simultaneously elected the President who promised nuclear buildup and opposed every disarmament treaty the U.S. signed.

On the other hand, political scientists usually emphasized that nuclear balance would prevent any nuclear escalation and nuclear strategy of MAD ensured that nuclear weapons would not be used. Brodie noted that nuclear balance is definitely not *delicate*, because he believed that there were strong moral inhibitions against undergoing risks of nuclear exchange. Also because of their robust nuclear arsenal, it would be quite unfeasible for their enemy to destroy all their nuclear weapons in one nuclear attack.⁴²³ To strengthen such a robust nuclear balance supported by the nuclear deterrence theory even more, political strategists maintained that states must obtain a secure second strike capability, which cannot be vulnerable to enemy attacks. If both countries had invulnerable second strike forces, the situation would be stable and states should not seek to obtain first strike capability. But this theory did not work efficiently in the past since states nevertheless sought to accumulate more and more nuclear weapons which always accelerated another nuclear weapons buildup. Therefore, this circle could be stopped only by nuclear arms control agreements.⁴²⁴ Spiraling nuclear arms race was ruining stability therefore it would be advantageous to control nuclear arms race. Many scientists praised contemporary non-armament treaties because it had a potential to make things more stable. They securitized that there will be a stable long peace without nuclear arms race. But, in the end, SALT agreement was being perceived worldwide as a rather rhetorical exercise which had nothing to do with arms limitation.⁴²⁵

Furthermore, Bernard T. Feld warned that there existed a 50 percent chance that nuclear war would occur in the 20. century. Feld criticized nuclear arms control negotiations for not presenting meaningful outcomes. He considered the Threshold Test Ban Treaty to be a mere insult. In this context, other treaties were also not overly successful in limiting nuclear testing of number of nuclear weapons. He titled LTBT to be *an arms control disaster* instead of an ecological blessing due to an accelerated development and underground testing. He emphasized that safeguards against the diversion of nuclear material and strengthening of the

⁴²² KLEIDMAN, Robert. *Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1993, pp. 144-145.

⁴²³ BRODIE, Bernard. The Development of Nuclear Strategy. *International Security*, Spring 1978, vol.2, no.4, p. 69.

⁴²⁴ GAVIN, Francis J. Nuclear Nixon: Ironies, Puzzles, and the Triumph of Realpolitik. In: PRESTON, Andrew and LOGEVALL Fredrik, eds. *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969 – 1977*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 128-9.

⁴²⁵ BOYER, Paul. From Activism to Apathy: The American People and Nuclear Weapons, 1963-1980, *The Journal of American History*, March 1984, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 827.

NPT is extremely important in order to prevent nuclear weapons to be obtained by either governments or nongovernment groups.⁴²⁶ He believed that strengthening of nuclear control agreement would inhibit incentives to construct nuclear weapons both private and national actors. Feld represents a highly critical position. He considered strengthening the NPT and signing a new reduction treaty to be the only reasonable ways out of this nuclear arms race which threatened to trigger nuclear war. The anti-nuclear activists often securitized that the U.S. must ensure comprehensive anti-nuclear treaties in order to stop the nuclear arms race and save the civilization

5. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the U. S.

Societal nuclear threat emerged within the discourse in the context of development of neutron bomb and then also threat of nuclear proliferation. Harrison Brown noted that the major threat of the future proliferation lies within poor countries. He noted that since there were once problems with hijacking and kidnapping by terrorists, the consequences would be much worse in the situation where the nuclear energy and nuclear materials will be widespread throughout the world. He insinuated that if nuclear material continued to be unprotected, it might lead to nuclear energy being in hands of terrorists. Only a strong governmental control could prevent this course of actions.⁴²⁷ The threat of horizontal proliferation started to be securitized, but it was not a primary concern of anti-nuclear movement. Anti-nuclear movement focused primarily on vertical proliferation and how to stop nuclear arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Besides that, anti-nuclear movement performed a securitizing move concerning the threat of the neutron bomb development. Enormous worldwide protests emerged in 1977 immediately after the U.S. government announced its intentions to develop a neutron bomb, an enhanced radiation weapon designed to release neutron radiation rather than explosive blast. The U.S. government made an attempt to promote the effectiveness of such weapons. Reagan declared, that the neutron bomb “could easily and economically alter the balance of power. It could be the ideal deterrent.”⁴²⁸ Reagan praised neutron bomb to be an *ideal deterrent weapon* because it would force Soviets not to start a nuclear war. He considered

⁴²⁶ FELD, Bernard T. Charade of Piecemeal arms limitation, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1975, vol. 31, no. 6, p. 9-12.

⁴²⁷ BROWN, Harrison. The Fissioning of Human Society, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January 1975, vol. 35, no. 6, p.7.

⁴²⁸ BIDDLE, Wayne. Neutron Bomb: An Explosive Issue, *The New York Times*, November 15, 1981.

neutron bomb to be “the dreamed of death ray weapon of science fiction. ...It wont even destroy an enemy tank – just kill the tank crew.”⁴²⁹ He noted that the neutron bomb would not inflict material damage to surrounding environment, only cause deaths by its radiation. It was also believed that it would not cause escalation of nuclear war and nuclear annihilation because it would facilitate a possibility of a limited nuclear war. Thus, the neutron bomb would be also a deterrent against the Warsaw Pact nations because it aimed “at killing enemy soldiers and not tearing up the nations that are under attack.”⁴³⁰

Cohen, a scientist who constructed the neutron bomb, often justified his scientific achievement by statements that the neutron bomb is moral because it does not cause total destruction. Deeply disturbed by war images of inhuman societies living in completely destroyed cities, the bomb was designed with the idea that it would kill combatants and leave cities undamaged and civilians unharmed. He advocated the purpose of his weapon by stating, that the “neutron bomb has to be the most moral weapon ever invented.”⁴³¹ As G. F. Kennan noted, the U.S. strived to improve their image after the Vietnam War and to portray their power struggle in moral terms.⁴³²

The debate focused on assumed tactical advantages of the neutron bomb in the battlefield and possible enhanced deterrent value of neutron bomb. Defenders of the neutron bomb often marked the bomb as efficient weapon with military advantages because they do not destroy property. Neutron bomb was stated to be discriminatory while killing only people within a certain range and leaving only little material damage. Neutron bomb advocates usually argued that once nuclear war was perceived as thinkable, the development of neutron weapon was inevitable.⁴³³ In addition, a debate about the effectiveness and morality of the neutron bomb sprung out also among scientific community. Enhanced-radiation weapon was designed to have two main advantages. It was theoretically a clean weapon, which imply that is does not contaminate wide areas around the target with radiation, and it possessed surgical

⁴²⁹ SKINNER, Kiron K., ANDERSON, Annelise, and ANDERSON Martin, eds. *Reagan, Ronald. In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For America*, The Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation Foreword, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, p. 99-102.

⁴³⁰ AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, p. 53. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

⁴³¹ COHEN, Sam. *F*** You! Mr. President: Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb* [online], 2006 (3rd edition), p. 267-68. Available at http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions_Sam_Cohen_2006_Third_Edition.pdf.

⁴³² AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, pp. 8, 12-13. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

⁴³³ WORTHY, William. The neutron bomb, *The Baltimore Afro-American*, October 25, 1977, p.5.

delivery without collateral damage. Current debate, nevertheless concluded, that these supposed characteristics were not met.⁴³⁴

This campaign caused massive public opposition labeling neutron bombs as immoral, inhuman, and being based on militaristic thinking. J. Garrett Allen declared: “*The production of neutron weapons is probably as immoral a concept as human minds have yet devised.*”⁴³⁵ The biggest protests were launched in Western Europe as it was believed to be the eventual target of such nuclear buildup. Moreover, there were significant domestic and foreign protests. People started questioning also an artificial division on small and controllable neutron bombs and other nuclear warheads. A journalist Walter Pincus actively railed against the production while labeling it *killer warhead*.⁴³⁶ It was believed to be more deadly. This led Carter to his decision to defer production of neutron weapons.⁴³⁷ But, in fact, the production was just postponed till more suitable opportunity opened in the future.⁴³⁸ However, there might be many reasons behind the decision to suspend the neutron bomb project. First, Carter stated several times he was devoted to the idea of elimination of weapons. Also, neutron bomb might be seen as additional arms race when there was need for a budget cuts.

5. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

The nuclear threat to an individual was not overly securitized in the 1970s due to the primary importance of the Freeze campaign which focused on the stop of the nuclear arms race. However, the threat of underground nuclear testing still prevailed in the discourse. By 1977 three quarters of the population called for a comprehensive test ban treaty.⁴³⁹

The AEC struggled with the anti-nuclear movement calling for a stop of nuclear testing. The agency maintained that nuclear tests did not cause any problems since all safety measures were met in order to protect civilians. They even delegated a governmental expert group to determine the safety of nuclear testing.⁴⁴⁰ The AEC made an attempt to desecuritize

⁴³⁴ AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, pp. 19, 23. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

⁴³⁵ COHEN, Sam. *F*** You! Mr. President: Confessions of the Father of the Neutron Bomb* [online], 2006 (3rd edition), p. 189-190. Available at http://www.athenalab.com/Confessions_Sam_Cohen_2006_Third_Edition.pdf.

⁴³⁶ AQUINO, Michael A. *The Neutron Bomb* [online], San Francisco, 2002, pp. 38-40. Available at <http://www.rachane.org/docs/NeutronBomb.pdf>.

⁴³⁷ CARTER, Jimmy. Enhanced Radiation Weapons Statement by the President, April 7, 1978. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30630>.

⁴³⁸ MEHROTRA, O.N. Controversial Neutron Bomb, *Strategic Analysis*, October 1981, vol. 5, no. 7, p.350.

⁴³⁹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.123.

⁴⁴⁰ KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p. 90-91.

the issue of testing by stressing their safety concerns. The nuclear disarmament movement suffered of lack of vital information about nuclear testing.

5. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

Underground testing remained to be one of the main nuclear issues which reemerged in the public debate by the early 1970s. In order to prevent underground testing in Alaska, the newly formed Canadian group called *Don't Make the Wave Committee* began raising awareness of the U.S. continual testing which could cause earthquakes or tsunamis. Thus environmental consequences such as fear of a tsunami wave played a major role in these protests. Their media-covered attempt to sail a ship into the nuclear testing area, consequently, sparked off the Greenpeace phenomenon which began protesting against nuclear testing.⁴⁴¹ While their voyage was of insignificant importance, it returned underground testing into the public debate. Later, Greenpeace movement emerged with their ban the underground nuclear testing agenda.

Several Alaskan organizations and agencies such as Aleut League, Save Our State Committee, or Alaska's Department of Fish and Game argued that nuclear testing was causing severe damage to the environment. They regarded nuclear testing to be a risky play with the planet and stressed that according to an estimated cause of additional testing would damage fish, seal, sea lion, and sea otter population.⁴⁴²

Moreover, several studies started declaring that nuclear explosions caused depletion of the ozone layer and other atmospheric changes. The study *Effects of Nuclear Weapons* also affirmed that nuclear testing decreased the atmospheric ozone concentration and increased adverse biological effects due to extreme ultraviolet radiation. It was also expected that nuclear testing caused “an increased incidence on skin cancer and to have adverse effects on plant and animal life.”⁴⁴³

Antinuclear disarmament movement underwent significant changes. Earlier, environmentalist focused mainly on nuclear power plant issue while regarding nuclear weapons as necessary for national security. On the other hand, pacifist groups, having

⁴⁴¹ THE GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL. *Amchitka: the founding voyage* [online], accessed 19.10.2014. Available at <http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/amchitka-hunter/>.

⁴⁴² KOHLHOFF, Dean W. *Amchitka and the BOMB*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002, p .101.

⁴⁴³ GLASSTONE, Samuel and DOLAN, Philip J. *The Effects of Nuclear Weapons*, Washington: United States Department of Defense and the Energy Research and Development Administration, 1977 (third edition, 1957 first edition), p. 78.

separate agenda, focused on opposing nuclear weapons production. Pacifists usually considered nuclear power plants as desirable and, to certain extent, also harmless. Gradually, the process labeled as *nuclear connection*, which merged these two approaches, occurred in the mid-1970s.⁴⁴⁴ There were strong concerns about the environmental dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants. The movement became more and more concerned of nuclear energy and nuclear reactor accidents which could contaminate the environment.

We have to take into account that the nuclear arms race was too abstract for general public. Moreover, when nuclear testing moved to underground, people no longer saw nuclear explosions in their lives. Nuclear weapons were largely invisible and, for a large part of population, their effects were practically incomprehensible, but the pervasive threat was still present in the discourse. The dominant issues were a continual health and overall environmental concerns. From this point of view, the environmental and health threats represented the common ground of both anti-nuclear weapons and anti-nuclear power agendas, which resulted into the two agendas being perceived as one. The release or leakage of radiation epitomized the common ground of these different approaches. On the other hand, nuclear power plants were more tangible and real, therefore a more visible target for a nuclear disarmament movement. Also, many disarmament and pacifist groups perceived stop the nuclear arms race campaign as inconclusive. Subsequently, they incorporated opposition to nuclear power reactors into their broad agenda. Thus, a threat of nuclear reactors became a big part of the nuclear disarmament movement rhetoric.

General public perceived nuclear power issue largely as inseparable from nuclear weapons problematic. Often, nuclear power plants were depicted as *silent bombs*, also were referred to as *nukes*. The 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear accident in Pennsylvania, and the 1980 Indian Point nuclear power plant leakage, only strengthened this perception.⁴⁴⁵ After the accident, the fear of nuclear power plants spread like wildfire. American population was gravely concerned which led to a release of several reports on negative health effects. The accident ignited massive protests, marches and rallies, public gatherings, vigils, occupying nuclear power plant sites, and general civil disobedience actions. Also movies depicted nuclear power accidents mostly. This trend accelerated after the Three Miles accident when people started to pay real attention to safety of nuclear power plants issues and accented the

⁴⁴⁴ DAVIDON, Ann Morrisett. The U.S. Anti-nuclear Movement, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1979, vol. 40, no. 10, p.45.

⁴⁴⁵ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 121.

environmental dangers linked to that. The 1977 movie drama *Red Alert* depicted an accident at a nuclear power plant which trapped power plant workers inside. Also many other films such as *The China Syndrome*, *Island Claws*, *The Children*, *The Plutonium Incident*, all depicts nuclear power plant accidents.

To the contrary, some individuals started arguing that this unification of different agendas is unprecedented and illogical. In defense of nuclear power plants, some people argued that “there is no more connection between nuclear power and the bombing of Hiroshima than there is between electricity and the electric chair.”⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴⁶ DAVIDON, Ann Morrissett. The U.S. Anti-nuclear Movement, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, December 1979, vol. 40, no. 10, p.45.

6. The Construction of Nuclear Threat and Escalating International Tensions, 1981-89

“We have gone on piling weapon upon weapon, missile upon missile, new levels of destructiveness upon old ones. We have done this helplessly, almost involuntarily: like the victims of some sort of hypnotism, like men in a dream, like lemmings heading for the sea. ... And the result is that today we have achieved ... levels of redundancy of such grotesque dimensions as to defy rational understanding.”⁴⁴⁷

The fifth period covers the era of Ronald Reagan’s presidency.⁴⁴⁸ During 1980s the international environment changed dramatically. In 1991 the Soviet Union announced they began producing neutron bombs. Also France began producing neutron weapons. Furthermore, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was declared in 1985. Also nuclear development program of Israel was revealed. In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev took the office of General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In April 26 1986 the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident occurred. Meanwhile, the U.S. struggled with the rising anti-nuclear movement and hard-line approach toward nuclear restraint.

6.1. Governmental Level (1981-1989)

6. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

In the beginning of his presidency, Reagan believed that nuclear war was possible and limited war feasible. Reagan strongly opposed the strategy of MAD by arguing that deterrence through assured destruction is reasonable only when a defense system would be built along with other offensive weapons. He thought that if they build strong defense systems, then they could even win nuclear war.⁴⁴⁹ He securitized the need for defense system to heighten the possibility of winning the nuclear war. Moreover, being a member of CDP

⁴⁴⁷ KENNAN, George F. *A Modest Proposal* [online], New York Review of Books, July 16, 1981, accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1981/jul/16/a-modest-proposal/>.

⁴⁴⁸ The presidency of Ronald Reagan lasted from January 20, 1981 to January 20, 1989.

⁴⁴⁹ SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 142.

himself, he appointed a large portion of CDP members into key posts in his administration, including George Schultz and Edward Teller. Many of them advocated that nuclear war was winnable. Rostow stated that the U.S. could survive a nuclear massive attack, because Japan “not only survived but flourished after the nuclear attack.”⁴⁵⁰ They often emphasized that the nuclear attack, however massive, would not obliterate entire population. However, the public largely did not share his hawkish idea

Reagan rejected Carter’s nuclear countervailing strategy based on belief that the use of nuclear weapons would most likely escalate into mutual destruction. Reagan’s Secretary of Defense C. Weinberg noted that in the event of major nuclear exchange, a fallout and blast program shelter would be a sufficient protection measure which would significantly reduce both damage and casualties.⁴⁵¹ Thus stating that nuclear exchange would be survivable and shelter program is essential.

Their statements often emphasized that nuclear war could be won if the government prepared appropriately, thus, insinuating the need for a weapons buildup. Vice-president George H. W. Bush proclaimed that the U.S. could win the nuclear war if it have possessed “a survivability of command and control, survivability of industrial potential, protection of a percentage of your citizens, and you have a capability that inflicts more damage on the opposition than it can inflict upon you. That’s the way you can have a winner.”⁴⁵² Furthermore, due to their aggressive rhetoric and heightening of international tensions, the threat of nuclear annihilation was becoming more and real.

In response to 1982 rising popular protest, Reagan was advised to change dramatically the rhetoric. In 1984, Reagan declared: “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”⁴⁵³ This remarkable statement was a turning point causing easement of international tensions. Reagan was forced to soften his policy and to reaffirm his commitment to nuclear arms negotiation. On March 1983, Reagan reaffirmed: “The United States does not start fights.

⁴⁵⁰ SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 142.

⁴⁵¹ BROWN, Harold. A Countervailing View: No, we did not think we could win a nuclear war, *Foreign Policy*, September 24, 2012. Available online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/24/a_countervailing_view.

⁴⁵² SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 144.

⁴⁵³ REAGAN, Ronald. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1984. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205>.

We will never be an aggressor. We maintain our strength in order to deter and defend against aggression -- to preserve freedom and peace.”⁴⁵⁴

Gradually, the Freeze movement started being recognized on the governmental level. In 1984, the democratic presidential nominee Walter Mondale based his presidential campaign on the need of continual tradition of nuclear control treaties. He stressed that since Kennedy, the U.S. signed several nuclear arms control treaties while Reagan opposed them all, because he desired to build more. Mondale promised that he would follow Kennedy tradition of nuclear negotiations to get a nuclear treaty, because he is aware that once they go off, it is the end. Mondale wanted to alarm the public with the vision of nuclear *killer weapons in space*, with “the response time so short there will be no time to wake a President.”⁴⁵⁵

In 1985, Reagan announced, that his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) will eliminate the threat of nuclear war by finding a nonnuclear defense against ballistic missiles attack.⁴⁵⁶ Thus the existence of defense will now prevent the possibility of nuclear war. Furthermore, he made an effort to explain his move to public in order to prevent their massive protests: “Some say it will bring war to the heavens, but its purpose is to deter war in the heavens and on Earth.”⁴⁵⁷ According to his statement, the SDI could not be considered to be an act of next nuclear arms race which would accelerate another Soviet defense buildup, but it need to be regarded as an essential measure to close the gap. Reagan strived to depict the SDI as a peaceful system, which did not go against the freeze campaign. Reagan also noted that reliance on mutual assured destruction, with a possibility of total retaliatory annihilation, was neither logical nor moral.⁴⁵⁸ This shield scenario was considered to be morally preferable than reliance on offensive forces.

6. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

Reagan stated that limited nuclear war was feasible. However, he was reluctant to declare whether he would use nuclear weapons. The 1982 defense guidance plan, signed by

⁴⁵⁴ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

⁴⁵⁵ 1984 Reagan vs. Mondale, Living Room Candidate, Presidential Campaign commercials 1952-2012, *Museum of the Moving Image* [online], accessed 20.10.2014. Available at <http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1984/arms-control-5>.

⁴⁵⁶ REAGAN, Ronald. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 6, 1985. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38069>.

⁴⁵⁷ REAGAN, Ronald. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 6, 1985. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38069>.

⁴⁵⁸ REAGAN, Ronald. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985. Available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan2.asp.

the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, outlined a possibility of protracted war with the Soviet Union. According to this strategy, the U.S. forces must be ready to launch nuclear counterattacks over a protracted period of time. This must be done in order to force the Soviets Union to end the hostilities on terms advantageous to the U.S. According to the plan, the U.S. conventional and unconventional forces must be able to maintain capability to inflict serious damage over an unlimited period of time.⁴⁵⁹ It is the first official strategy which took into account the possibility of the prolonged nuclear war and accepted that it did not have to necessarily be all done in one hour. More importantly, this strategy represented a shift from nuclear deterrence to a more direct doctrine of counterforce.

Reagan stated that NATO's nuclear policy is inherently policy of peace and therefore it maintains its strategy that no NATO weapons will be used in Europe except as a response to an attack. He declared that both conventional and nuclear weapons will not be used, but in the same time he warned, that Soviet buildup seriously threatened conventional and nuclear balance.⁴⁶⁰ Moreover, Reagan even questioned whether, given the Soviet nuclear armament buildup, there is reason in calling it a balance.⁴⁶¹ His policy was based on an image of strong leader who arms only to close the gap.

In his November 1982 television and radio broadcast Reagan affirmed that the U.S. would never use nuclear weapons except if under an attack. He also expressed his belief that nuclear weapons will not be employed in conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union because now, "Soviet leaders have also expressed a sober view of nuclear war."⁴⁶² Reagan made a serious effort to create an image of the U.S. rational nuclear policy in contrast to evil nature of the Soviet Union. He also declared, that while the Soviet Union was in the arms race, the U.S has not raced. He even showed the charts depicting statistics of military spending of both countries to show the public that modernization of weapons is needed in order to "correct the imbalance."⁴⁶³ All this rhetoric was done to primarily justify the U.S. additional buildup and modernization in order to face the soviet threat properly. Striking change of discourse

⁴⁵⁹ HALLORAN, Richard. Pentagon draws up first strategy for fighting a long nuclear war, *The New York Times*, May 30, 1982.

⁴⁶⁰ REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

⁴⁶¹ REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

⁴⁶² REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence, November 22, 1982. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/112282d.htm>.

⁴⁶³ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence, November 22, 1982. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/112282d.htm>.

which shows how the Reagan administration tried to create an image of a nation who tried to stay peacefully behind the race and does not aspire to be part of the race.

In 1982, he also explained his view on nuclear deterrence: “Certainly, we don't want such weapons for their own sake. We don't desire excessive forces. ... Basically, it's a matter of others knowing that starting a conflict would be more costly to them than anything they might hope to gain. And, yes, it is sadly ironic that in these modern times, it still takes weapons to prevent war. I wish it did not.”⁴⁶⁴ Reagan made significant effort to explain that the U.S. was the one behind who needed more excessive buildup. In the same time, he emphasized that their intentions are not offensive because the U.S. only needs to make sure their arsenal is so enormous that the war would not be likely. This line of reasoning was, to certain extent, even supported by media.

Preceding administrations were based on détente approach. During campaign, he opposed Carter in cancelation of nuclear weapon projects. On the contrary he was stressing the need for nuclear buildup because of the Soviet aggressiveness which was exponentially rising. Reagan’s rhetoric implied that the U.S. could not bow to the Soviet pressure, but must be stronger in rhetoric and in actions. Reagan’s presidency was based on aggressive reassertion of interests of the U.S. and investments into buildup of its nuclear weapons. Reagan very often justified his nuclear strategy by emphasizing the threat of massive Soviet nuclear armament. He usually even specified which U.S. military weapon systems are obsolete and need a rapid buildup and modernization and which types of weaponry needs to be authorized for development to face the highly sophisticated soviet armament.⁴⁶⁵ He stressed that there was a general need to strengthen the strategic triad, all sea-, land-, and air-based missiles. In the same time, he often acknowledged, that they would not be employed because it will not be needed: “The more effective our forces are, the less likely it is that we’ll have to use them.”⁴⁶⁶ It represents an enormous securitization on order to justify nuclear modernization and development of new weapons. Reagan insinuated that building more effective weapons would ensure that their security would not be challenged by other countries. The aggressive tone of Reagan sparked off massive public protests. This heated campaign led many people fear about the first use policy intentions.

⁴⁶⁴ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Strategic Arms Reduction and Nuclear Deterrence, November 22, 1982. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/112282d.htm>..

⁴⁶⁵ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

⁴⁶⁶ REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

In 1981, Reagan authorized the production of neutron bombs while hoping they would be deployed in Europe to counter a huge army of the Warsaw pact. It was perceived as the easy way to deter overwhelming forces in Europe as well as in other regions. This order again raised the problem of tactical effectiveness of neutron weapon in their attempt to defend Europe. One of the proponents of the neutron bomb, democratic politician Samuel S. Stratton stated: “The neutron weapon is essentially defensive, simply because it kills tank operators without destroying the German countryside you're trying to defend.”⁴⁶⁷ According to this statement, neutron bomb would be ideal weapon which could be used on territory invaded by the enemy while leaving the environment intact.

Reagan desired to decrease the reliance on the threat of offensive nuclear weapons retaliation by increasing the U.S. defense systems capability. He declared that defense systems must be able to counter a threat of nuclear ballistic missiles attack, while being in accordance with the ABM Treaty.⁴⁶⁸ In 1983, Reagan announced building a defense system for the purpose to protect and strengthen the peace. A major modernization program could reduce the incentive that the Soviets might threaten to attack and thus, deter their aggression. Reagan clarified, that he was aware that if these defensive systems were “paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and no one wants that.”⁴⁶⁹ He understood SDI as a measure which would replace offense for defense. Reagan argued that the SDI enabled the U.S. not to rely on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence because the SDI would form a perfect *security shield*. Therefore, in effect, usefulness of nuclear weapons would be diminished. Reagan stated that this defensive system should render nuclear weapons as *impotent and obsolete*. Ultimately, the threat of their use would be eliminated.⁴⁷⁰

Therefore he sought to build a security shield that would destroy missiles before they would have reached the land. “It wouldn't kill people; it would destroy weapons. It wouldn't militarize space; it would help demilitarize the arsenals of Earth. It would render nuclear weapons obsolete.”⁴⁷¹ But in fact, such shield, if realizable, would bolster the U.S. first strike capability. SDI, known as Star Wars, was designed as a ground-to-space defense system with

⁴⁶⁷ BIDDLE, Wayne. Neutron Bomb: An Explosive Issue, *The New York Times*, November 15, 1981.

⁴⁶⁸ THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Decision Directive 85: Eliminating The Threat From Ballistic Missiles (NSDD-85), Washington, March 25, 1983.

⁴⁶⁹ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

⁴⁷⁰ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

⁴⁷¹ REAGAN, Ronald. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985. Available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan2.asp.

the aim to protect the U.S. homeland from nuclear missile attacks. SDI claimed they would intercept soviet missile attack and that they could by themselves prevent destruction of nuclear attack. However, such shield was never feasible and its main outcome was to undermine peace negotiation and accelerate nuclear arms buildup.⁴⁷²

6. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Reagan criticized détente policy of previous administrative, especially détente performed by Nixon and Kissinger. Reagan, on the other hand, based its rhetoric on renewed hostilities toward the Soviet Union, which, in the consequence, significantly reversed benefits acquired by détente of previous presidencies. Initially, Reagan administration strongly opposed the idea of nuclear disarmament as being undesirable. E. Rostow, newly appointed director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), stated that “arms control thinking drives out sound thinking.”⁴⁷³ They were deeply disturbed by the Freeze campaign potential, thus, they approached them as unreasonable and unpredictable. In the beginning of the 1980s, media sometimes even copied the government’s line of reasoning that nuclear disarmament movement was being orchestrated by the Soviets.

Zbigniew Brzezinski held the view that nuclear weapons, together with conventional forces, were a necessary deterrent to Soviet aggression. He replied to Gorbachev’s proposal of total elimination of nuclear weapons by 2000: “It is a plan for making the world safe for conventional warfare. I am therefore not enthusiastic about it.”⁴⁷⁴ The top officials of his administrative mostly opposed the nuclear arms limitation and arms reductions and advocated primarily a nuclear buildup. Reagan shared their conservative ideological views and the militant anti-communism approach, but he perceived nuclear weapons as pragmatist who saw significant benefits to nuclear arms control negotiation.⁴⁷⁵ Reagan genuinely believed in abolition of nuclear weapons but his efforts to negotiate disarmament were being sabotaged by own advisers, who perceived nuclear abolition as unrealistic, unachievable, and

⁴⁷² SEYMOUR, Richard. *American Insurgents: A Brief History of American Anti-Imperialism*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012, p. 136.

⁴⁷³ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 138, 142.

⁴⁷⁴ MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, p.6.

⁴⁷⁵ SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, pp. 132, 137.

presumably undesirable.⁴⁷⁶ Overall hawkish attitude of the administration was, nevertheless, translated into negotiations on the nuclear limitation.

Initially, Reagan administration did not strive genuinely to reach a mutual nuclear control agreement as much as did Soviets. Reagan used nuclear arms control negotiations mainly for propaganda reasons.⁴⁷⁷ Reagan was devoted to the negotiations only to the extent that it would be based on a strict reciprocity and it would enhance or ensure the U.S. interests. In 1981, he called for resumption of bilateral negotiations.⁴⁷⁸ Bilateral negotiations were in the center of disarmament discourse. Also, nuclear buildup could be then perceived as an attempt to force the Soviet Union into negotiations.

Reagan declared that, even though not ratified, his administration will comply with the SALT II Treaty if the Soviet Union shows signs of mutual restraint. However, Reagan regarded SALT II to be an acceptable nuclear reduction treaty and he strived to open new negotiation rounds. In 1982, SALT talks were renamed to START according to their alleged dedication to achieve reduction of nuclear weapons not only limitations. His nuclear control policy was based on an assumption, that by ensuring nuclear reduction they could again close the gap and therefore regain nuclear balance which would enhance stability. Therefore, the main goal of START negotiations was declared to force the Soviet Union into a significant reduction of ICBMs.⁴⁷⁹ The principal aim of negotiations was to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability through reductions. Limitations only if it will serve the U.S. objectives.

In response to 1983 mass march, Reagan changed this perception of evilness of the Soviet Union and engaged in sincere negotiations because it could be greatly beneficial. To strengthen the U.S. national security, they needed to close the missile gap between them. Due to an assumption that they could not achieve sufficient modernization so easily, they chose the path of nuclear arms control which would both give them public support and chance to close the gap. Moreover, they needed to obtain political support in order to get an approved budget for their nuclear buildup. In order to reach this strategic advantage, they needed to show some

⁴⁷⁶ SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 153.

⁴⁷⁷ SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 138.

⁴⁷⁸ REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks to Members of the National Press Club on Arms Reduction and Nuclear Weapons, November 18, 1981. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/111881a.htm>.

⁴⁷⁹ THE WHITE HOUSE, National Security Decision Directive Number 33: U.S. Approach to START Negotiations (NSDD-33), Washington, May 14, 1982.

positive results which meant to proceed with sincere negotiations.⁴⁸⁰ They needed political support for buildup therefore they needed to proceed with negotiations.

Initially, Reagan strictly opposed any idea of nuclear freeze. In his famous speech where he called The Soviet Union *evil empire*, he declared that nuclear freeze, as a mere distraction, would not be advantageous and possible to verify. “The truth is that a freeze now would be a very dangerous fraud, for that is merely the illusion of peace. The reality is that we must find peace through strength. ...A freeze at current levels of weapons would remove any incentive for the Soviets to negotiate seriously in Geneva and virtually end our chances to achieve the major arms reductions which we have proposed. ...A freeze would reward the Soviet Union for its enormous and unparalleled military buildup. It would prevent the essential and long overdue modernization of United States and allied defenses and would leave our aging forces increasingly vulnerable.”⁴⁸¹ Reagan believed that the Cold War is an apocalyptic battle between good and evil. Reagan again in 1983 argued against the nuclear freeze, which would only made the U.S. less secure and raised the probability of war. He justified his belief with the argument that this freeze would be unverifiable and would only reward the Soviets since the U.S. forces were not that modernized as theirs.⁴⁸²

The 1983 marches of millions demonstrators terrified Reagan to the extent that he needed to make a strong statement about his sincere belief in nuclear disarmament. 1983 movie *The Day After* allegedly also contributed to Reagan’s change of thinking. In January 1984 he acknowledged that the current U.S. nuclear stockpile was at the lowest level in 25 years. Also he maintained that there must be greater reduction as he believes in zero option for all nuclear weapons, as his “dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the Earth.”⁴⁸³ Reagan publicly stated that he believes in a nuclear free world. Reagan stressed that the halt of nuclear proliferation would be a major part of his foreign policy. Reagan cleared Carter’s rhetorical accusation and declared his determination to pursue nuclear arms control treaty: “I would say to the Soviet Union, we will sit and negotiate with you as long as it takes, to have not only legitimate arms limitation but to have a reduction of these nuclear weapons to the point that neither one of us represents a threat to the

⁴⁸⁰ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 175.

⁴⁸¹ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the National Association on Evangelicals (“Evil Empire” Speech), March 8, 1983. Available online at <http://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/reagan-evil-empire-speech-text/>.

⁴⁸² REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security, March 23, 1983. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm>.

⁴⁸³ REAGAN, Ronald. Address to the Nation and Other Countries on United States-Soviet Relations, January 16, 1984. Available online <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/11684a.htm>.

other.”⁴⁸⁴ He built on a securitizing move of previous administrations that a primary goal was to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In the same time, he reaffirmed that SDI should support further progress in nuclear control negotiations. He stated that he sought reductions of nuclear armaments and a total elimination of nuclear weapons.⁴⁸⁵

In response to Gorbachev call for a nuclear free world, the U.S. administration started to panic. Reagan favored this vision, but other politicians were horrified. Schultz even called the idea utopian while others stated that complete nuclear disarmament would be the worst it could happen.⁴⁸⁶ In 1987, Reagan did not immediately respond to the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium announcement. Nevertheless, he struggled to show some significant results. Reagan administrative proceeded to negotiate the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. In 1987, Reagan signed a bilateral *Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles* (INF Treaty), requires a destruction of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with certain range and their launchers.⁴⁸⁷ Reagan praised the Treaty by calling it a *history-making agreement* and *visionary*. The treaty for the first time orders not *arms control*, but *arms reduction*. The treaty achieved a *zero option* for intermediate-range missiles, which means an elimination of an entire class of weapons.⁴⁸⁸ The Remarks on the Signing the Treaty was a remarkable propaganda opportunity which emphasized the historical importance of the INF Treaty. They needed to win the public opinion and the INF negotiations were a window of opportunity to attain it. The INF Treaty significantly contributed to lessening tensions which substantially changed the mutual relationship between both countries. Nevertheless, the INF Treaty was not received well due to strong conservative politician, who called the Treaty an act of appeasement to soothe to the mass movement; a proposition which they did not consider to be genuine.

⁴⁸⁴ REAGAN, Ronald and CARTER, Jimmy [Presidential debate]. Debate organized by League of Women Voters, moderator: Howard K. Smith, ABC, Cleveland, October 28, 1980. Transcript of the debate available at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/10.28.80debate.html>.

⁴⁸⁵ REAGAN, Ronald. Second Inaugural Address, January 21, 1985. Available online at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/reagan2.asp.

⁴⁸⁶ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 186- 187.

⁴⁸⁷ The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, entered into force on June 1, 1988.

⁴⁸⁸ REAGAN, Ronald. Remarks at the Signing of the INF Treaty with Soviet Premier Gorbachev, December 8, 1987. Available online at <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/120887c.htm>.

Under Reagan administration, R. Gates as head of the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence was deliberately exaggerating some threat while downplaying several emerging threats, such as Pakistan's nuclear development program, in order to concur with Reagan's foreign policy. Reagan administration needed Pakistan as an ally and they could not afford to lose their alliance. Those analysts who warned that there exists a possibility that Pakistan could have proceed with covert nuclear weapons development program were punished.⁴⁸⁹ Those who raised alarms were silenced. This contributed to Pakistan obtaining nuclear weapons.

6. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

In 1982, The National Security Council reaffirmed, that the Comprehensive Test Ban remains a long-term national objective. The U.S should achieve this only under verifiable conditions because the comprehensive test ban by itself significantly reduces a nuclear deterrent credibility.⁴⁹⁰ However, the threat of nuclear testing was not particularly securitized because these nuclear tests were out of public sight.

6. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (1981-1989)

6. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the World

The nuclear threat to the world reemerged with the new debate about the possible deployment of tactical neutron bombs. After Carter announced plans for building a neutron bomb, American public was deeply shocked. The debate again started to question whether the neutron bomb represents a blessing or brings them closer to potential disaster. Media often asked "how to defend Europe in the atomic age without destroying it" or whether it is even possible.⁴⁹¹ There was a strong anxiety toward the deployment of neutron weapons in Europe and a general uncertainty of how exactly would it succeed in deterring vast Warsaw armies. European leaders were skeptical of its deployment in Europe and were declaring that the use

⁴⁸⁹ PARRY, Robert. *America's Stolen Narrative: From Washington and Madison to Nixon, Reagan and the Bushes to Barack Obama*, Arlington: The Media Consortium, 2012, p. 223.

⁴⁹⁰ THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Decision Directive Number 51: U.S. Nuclear Testing Limitations Policy (NSDD-51), Washington, August 10, 1982.

⁴⁹¹ BIDDLE, Wayne. Neutron Bomb: An Explosive Issue, *The New York Times*, November 15, 1981.

of tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably “lead to a strategic nuclear exchange, which in turn is almost bound to lead to the end of civilization.”⁴⁹² This statement captured the securitization of the likelihood of the use of these tactical weapons which would inevitably lead to the end of the civilization.

The popular polls reflected the growing nuclear opposition to proposed plans and growing international instability. By 1981, 76 percent of the public believed that nuclear war would break out within a few years.⁴⁹³ Taken into account the growing international tensions and strong Reagan’s rhetoric toward the Soviet Union, nuclear exchange was securitized to be more likely than before. Jonathan Schell stated that if the nuclear disarmament movement would not “rise up and cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons,” the U.S. could “sink into the final coma and end it all.”⁴⁹⁴ Subsequently, this rise of hawks and a Reagan’s aggressive policy of extensive nuclear buildup and development of SDI system led to a widespread feeling of nuclear despair. This ignited massive protests throughout the whole country which fueled the nuclear disarmament agenda. Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, the largest and most influential anti-nuclear group, represented the mainstream of American population who called for a freeze of nuclear arms race. Many activists were deeply concerned by the proposed acceleration of nuclear production and modernization. In comparison with 1970s, when the nuclear weapons issue was usually mixed with nuclear power issue, the Freeze campaign of late 1970s caused that the anti-nuclear movement started to again concentrate exclusively on the nuclear weapons issue. Activists started to mobilize people against the nuclear buildup and to promote Freeze. In the 1980s, the dominant issue within the nuclear disarmament discourse was the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. The campaign called for a bilateral mutual freeze of testing and production of nuclear weapons. They felt they were not threatened by other state’s nuclear armaments as much as they were by the opposing two countries. The fact that movement focused only on bilateral nuclear freeze is striking particularly due to the number of nuclear states by that time.

Women organizations calling for a nuclear free world became a major part of the nuclear weapons disarmament movement. They began establishing peace camps and also started organizing Women’s Pentagon Action demonstrations. They emphasized that they

⁴⁹² OWEN, David. *Nuclear Papers*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2009, p. 269.

⁴⁹³ SCOBLIC, J. Peter. *U.S. vs. Them: Conservatism in the Age of Nuclear Terror*, New York: Penguin Books, 2008, p. 149.

⁴⁹⁴ MUELLER, John. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World. In: LYNN-JONES, Sean M., MILLER, Steven E., VAN EVERA, Stephen, eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990, p.3.

protested against the male-dominated world of nuclear weapons. In 1981, 3,000 women encircled the Pentagon with yarn and cloths.⁴⁹⁵ This action was in line with the global movement of women empowerment which among other issues also emphasized the dangers which this nuclear arms race posed. During 1982 Ground Zero Week anti-nuclear activists were raising general awareness about the possibility of nuclear war. Forms of protests against governmental nuclear policy varied from the educational meetings and lectures to civil disobedience actions. On June 12, 1982, one million people gathered in New York City calling for an immediate stop of nuclear arms race. The actions was organized by many anti-nuclear and peace groups. Together the main theme of this massive march was a demand to halt the arms race.⁴⁹⁶ This massive mobilization produced a largest political march in the U.S. history.

The SANE remained to be the one of the most influential organizations promoting ban on nuclear weapons. They protested against the current policy of nuclear buildup. Later, the SANE and the Freeze campaign merged together to create new organizational body SANE/FREEZE. Furthermore, Physicians for Social Responsibility continued to promote the nuclear awareness. They held symposia in order to inform public about the consequences of nuclear war. They were explaining what would presumably happen to the city obliterated by a nuclear attack. They also opposed the official government nuclear policies, civil defense planning, and called for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and demanded halt on development of first strike nuclear weapons.⁴⁹⁷ They used their professional background and prestige to capture the public attention by showing them facts no one usually wanted to hear.

As a part of 1982 elections, which included also local referenda, nuclear freeze issue was put on the ballot in ten U.S. states. The nuclear freeze issue happened to be one of determining factors in many American states and many candidates tended to use the nuclear freeze idea in their campaigns. Jim Leach predicted that the nuclear freeze issue would be the *greatest single issue* in 1982 elections.⁴⁹⁸ Consequently, the referenda results showed that a global nuclear freeze was demanded by voters in eight states and many major cities, while containing votes of approximately 25 percent of the U.S. population.⁴⁹⁹ Despite Reagan's

⁴⁹⁵ DIEHL, Sarah J., MOLTZ, James Clay. *Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Book*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002, p. 107.

⁴⁹⁶ DIEHL, Sarah J., MOLTZ, James Clay. *Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation: A Reference Book*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002, p. 107.

⁴⁹⁷ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp.153-4.

⁴⁹⁸ ISAACS, John. The freeze, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1982, vol. 38, no. 8, p. 9-10.

⁴⁹⁹ UNKNOWN. News Summary, *The New York Times*, November 4, 1982.

warning that nuclear freeze would damage security of the U.S., a significant portion of population voted for nuclear freeze. John Herbers called it “the largest referendum on a single issue in the nation's history.”⁵⁰⁰ It signified a great victory of the movement even though the results were of only advisory nature. Nevertheless, the majority of mass media showed little attention to these results. Noam Chomsky affirmed that the Freeze movement was “probably the most successful campaign ever carried out in the US peace movement”, however, even though they won the public attention, they had zero impact on the government level.⁵⁰¹ But the success of the 1987 bilateral arms control treaty was, as least to some extent, done with the help of the pressure by Freeze movement.

The anti-nuclear movement had nevertheless, a significant success with securitizing of the nuclear threat to the world. In 1980s polls signified that between 70 and 85 percent of the public supported the Freeze agenda. In 1984, the polls showed that 74 percent of Americans believed that nuclear weapons could never be used even in small numbers and 79 percent declared that nothing could justify their massive use.⁵⁰² Therefore, people believed that the use of nuclear weapons in a full-scale war would be unjustifiable. The 1983 science fiction movie *WarGames* depicted nuclear weapons in hands of a powerful computer, which in the end, chose not to fire nuclear missiles because he learns that it is the only correct scenario. The computer finally concluded: “The only winning move is not to play.”⁵⁰³ The movie brings up a powerful analogy of nuclear stalemate. It stressed that nuclear escalation into full-scale nuclear war would not end successfully for any side.

In 1981, George Kennan admitted that the sense of urgency and excitement about banning the nuclear weapon has vanished. People were discouraged and resigned about the possibility of reinstating the agenda of banning the bomb again. However the nuclear stockpiles increased to the stage of absolute redundancy, which makes the issue more urgent than ever. He declared that nuclear weapons represent “a type and volume of weaponry that could not possibly be used without utter disaster for everyone concerned.”⁵⁰⁴ Kennan securitized that nuclear arms race actually increases the importance of banning the bomb.

⁵⁰⁰ HERBERS, John. Widespread Vote Urges Nuclear Freeze, *The New York Times*, November 4, 1982.

⁵⁰¹ SEYMOUR, Richard. *American Insurgents: A Brief History of American Anti-Imperialism*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012, p. 140.

⁵⁰² WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 157.

⁵⁰³ *WarGames* [film]. Director: John BADHAM, prods.: Leonard Goldberg, Ruch Hashimoto, Harold Schneider, Bruce McNall, USA: United Artists, UAA Films, distributed MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 1983.

⁵⁰⁴ KENNAN, George F. *A Modest Proposal* [online], New York Review of Books, July 16, 1981, accessed 18.10.2014. Available at <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1981/jul/16/a-modest-proposal/>.

Several scientists emphasized, that even though states considered nuclear weapons and new nuclear defense systems to be means for enhancing national security, paradoxically, they had an opposite effect. Carl Marcy noted that both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are less militarily secure than a decade ago. Therefore, he stated that nuclear weapons or nuclear deterrence cannot be considered as tools of national security. And even if they functioned as such tools, the risks in a possession of nuclear weapons would be too great.⁵⁰⁵ The nuclear arms race was being more and more explained as a situation in which states are trapped in a cycle of hostilities which fuels this nuclear insecurity dilemma. The debate focused on the theme of inevitability of nuclear encounter. Many activists started emphasizing that the current situation will lead to perilous acceleration of hostilities which end up with unavoidable general nuclear war. The debate focused on an immediate need of preventing nuclear war, because “if the superpowers do not manage to deal with the common problem of preventing nuclear war, there will be no other problems to worry about. ...Learning to live side by side with an adversary is a better deterrent than living with weapons drawn and aimed.”⁵⁰⁶ They focused on the threat of nuclear war inevitability, on the need for bilateral prevention, and totally unnecessary nuclear weapons buildup

McNamara declared that in the late 1980s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were on the verge of escalation of the arms race which would only increase the risk that one would initiate a preemptive nuclear attack. McNamara noted that the war seemed inevitable due to pervasive frictions which usually lead to irrational decisions. He declared: “The risk that military conflict will quickly evolve into nuclear war, leading to certain destruction of our civilization, is far greater than I am willing to accept.”⁵⁰⁷ On the other hand, due to Reagan’s statements referring to their no first use policy, he labeled the U.S. nuclear strategy as not being overly credible: “One cannot build a credible deterrent on an incredible action.”⁵⁰⁸

Jervis opposed the countervailing strategy, being applied since Nixon, calling for counterforce actions, which includes a determination to fight full-scale nuclear wars which also includes capabilities to fight limited wars. Jervis argued that the strategy expresses the willingness to dominate any conflict at any level, and borders on actual war planning, without

⁵⁰⁵ CARL, Marcy. U.S.-Soviet relations, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1982, vol. 38, no. 8, p. 12.

⁵⁰⁶ CARL, Marcy. U.S.-Soviet relations, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, October 1982, vol. 38, no. 8, p. 12.

⁵⁰⁷ MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, pp.3-4.

⁵⁰⁸ MCNAMARA, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, p.5.

admitting, that a defense against total devastation is impossible. However, he still believed that the *balance of terror* was *indelicate*.⁵⁰⁹

6. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the U.S.

In the book *Blundering Into Disaster*, McNamara noted that nuclear weapons “are not military weapons in the traditional sense and therefore serve no purpose other than to deter one’s opponent from their use.”⁵¹⁰ He stressed that to certain extent, nuclear deterrence ensured a security of the U.S. He desecuritized the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons in the battlefield since nuclear weapons are unconventional. He added that however nuclear-free world would be desirable, it was, nevertheless, unfeasible in near future: “Unless we can develop technologies and procedures to ensure detection of any steps toward building a single nuclear bomb by any nation or terrorist group, an agreement for total nuclear disarmament will almost certainly degenerate into an unstable rearmament race.”⁵¹¹ McNamara recognized that the threat of nuclear proliferation came both from countries and terrorist groups. He stated that because of this terrorist threat, nuclear disarmament would not be as easy as anticipated. He insinuated that the horizontal nuclear proliferation by terrorists was one of the greatest existential threats to the U.S. and therefore the U.S. could not disarm. However, the vertical proliferation was still securitized with the greatest priority.

The 1983 film *Special Bulletin* chose a realistic but fictional approach, when it portrayed a group of terrorists with homemade nuclear weapon and their desperate attempt to force the U.S. government to abandon nuclear weapons. Terrorists are portrayed as average activists in a desperate plea to change the course of government nuclear policy and disarm. Terrorist nuclear blackmail, as something the U.S. feared for a long time, was initially downplayed because the U.S. government could not make concessions to terrorists. The film portrayed how media, together with the public, perceived them as despicable murderers. Also, anti-nuclear activists, being appalled by such terrorism, demanded bilateral and verifiable disarmament instead. These two sides differed in their conviction who the real terrorists were.

⁵⁰⁹ HARDIN, Russell. Review of *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* by Jervis Robert, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1985, vol. 41, no. 2, p.47.

⁵¹⁰ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 82.

⁵¹¹ MCNAMARA, Robert S. *Blundering into Disaster: The First Century of the Nuclear Age*, *The Brookings Review*, Spring, 1987, vol. 5, no. 2, p.5.

The main message was: “Terrorism has reached the atomic age.”⁵¹² In overall, the movie insinuated that governmental nuclear policies are inherently terrorist. In addition, people who are being called terrorists are only desperate people forcing states to nuclear disarmament. The movie significantly securitized the threat of nuclear terrorism to the U.S. and how one nuclear bomb in wrong hands could destroy a whole city.

There was also an extensive debate on whether possession of nuclear weapons induces stability and peace or not. Robert Jervis outlined the theory of nuclear stability-instability paradox, when he declared: “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”⁵¹³ States possessing nuclear weapons would tend to act more cautiously to avoid a full-scale war. In the same time, due to the nuclear deterrence and the threat of retaliation, they could afford to wage low level wars. This theory is usually applied to series of proxy wars which occurred during the Cold War. Strategists were searching for the reason why these low-level wars, which were fought without the use of nuclear weapons, prevailed without the following crossing of the nuclear threshold into the full-scale nuclear exchange. While there were no direct violent confrontations between the U.S. or the Soviet Union, either conventional or nonconventional, due to the relative nuclear parity and their protected second-strike capabilities, there were limited outbursts of instability on regional levels. Jervis also expressed the historical significance of nuclear weapons, which altered the principle of defense, by stating: “The forces that inflict damage on the adversary no longer protect the state, as they did in the past. Coercion, not brute force, deterrence, not defense, are the function of our weapons.”⁵¹⁴ According to this statement, nuclear deterrence was the only way how to protect the U.S. against enemy attacks. The U.S. could not ensure its security any other way.

Two principal actors in the debate whether nuclear weapons induces stability or instability was Kenneth Waltz and later also Scott D. Sagan. In 1981 Kenneth Waltz contested the nuclear disarmament debate about effects of the spread of nuclear weapons. He declared that according to the popular opinion, “the world will become a more dangerous one as nuclear weapons spread.”⁵¹⁵ This includes the view that with more nuclear weapons, there is a higher chance that nuclear weapons will be fired accidentally or in anger. Waltz, on the

⁵¹² *Special Bulletin* [film]. Director: Edward ZWICK, produced: Marshall Herskovitz and Edward Zwick, USA: NBC, 1983.

⁵¹³ JERVIS, Robert. *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 31.

⁵¹⁴ HARDIN, Russell. Review of *The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy* by Jervis Robert, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, February 1985, vol. 41, no. 2, p.47.

⁵¹⁵ WALTZ, Kenneth. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter*, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.1.

contrary, advocated the stance which might be titled as *more may be better*. He argued that horizontal spread of nuclear weapons across countries was inevitable. He added that both bipolarity of the system and nuclear weapons helps to maintain peace: “They make the cost of war seem frighteningly high and thus discourage states from starting any wars that might lead to the use of such weapons.”⁵¹⁶ His argument was based under an assumption that wars are caused by miscalculations, but nuclear weapons prevent such miscalculations making the system more stable. He performed a securitizing move when he declared that horizontal nuclear proliferation would not endanger security of the U.S. but quite the opposite.

Waltz also argued that possession of nuclear weapons might slow down nuclear arms race and reduce military costs rather than otherwise: “Conventional arms races will wither if countries shift their emphasis from conventional defence to nuclear deterrence.”⁵¹⁷ Moreover, nuclear states tended to wage fewer wars which were also less destructive.⁵¹⁸ According to this logic, with more nuclear states, the world was going to be less violent one. This also means that further nuclear proliferation was desirable and was in fact a national interest of the U.S. He acknowledged that a continuation of the arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union occurred in response to actions of third countries.⁵¹⁹ On the other hand, he also added, that with more countries trying to acquire nuclear weapons, the possibility of preventive strikes increases. The threat of preventive strikes indicated that nuclear or non-nuclear states tended to forestall another country to acquire its nuclear arsenal. But, Waltz noted that it is impossible to determine whether a country develops or already possesses nuclear weapons. Waltz mentioned a concern of some people that nuclear weapon might be fired anonymously, by radical Arab state targeting Israel for example. Waltz added that an aggressor would surely not remain unidentified.⁵²⁰ Waltz therefore acknowledged that there was a nuclear threat to the U.S. posed by nuclear strikes from Arab countries. However, Waltz declared it as improbable because such firing could not be anonymous and therefore it would be deterred by the threat of retaliation.

⁵¹⁶ WALTZ, Kenneth. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter*, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.4.

⁵¹⁷ WALTZ, Kenneth. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter*, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.26.

⁵¹⁸ WALTZ, Kenneth. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter*, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.29.

⁵¹⁹ WALTZ, Kenneth. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter*, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.32.

⁵²⁰ WALTZ, Kenneth. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Batter*, *Adelphi Papers*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, no 171, p.17.

6. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

During the 1980s, anti-nuclear activists continued to securitize the idea of a nuclear test ban. They staged demonstrations at nuclear test sites, promoted nuclear-free zones and organized others civil disobedience actions. In 1985 a petition signed by 1, 2 million Americans demanded a nuclear test ban. Also, 1988 polls showed that 85 percent of Americans favored a treaty which would ban all nuclear testing and 71 percent favored bilateral efforts to eliminate all nuclear weapons.⁵²¹ Threat of nuclear testing which negatively affects human health was continuously securitized, but instead of stressing the health effects, the emphasis was put on the necessity to stop nuclear arms race.

When anti-nuclear activists securitized the threat of nuclear war, they usually emphasized that they posed a threat to citizens as well as to the environment. The 1985 study suggested that majority of the human population would survive a major nuclear exchange.⁵²² Studies usually started regarding environmental damages as much more severe than damages on population. They securitized what would be environmental obstacles to people if such nuclear exchange occurred.

Several movies started to depict more realistic visions of nuclear attack aftermath. One of the most influential sources of anti-nuclear sentiments was a 1983 movie *The Day After*, which depicted preparations and the aftermath of nuclear exchange. They presumed that the nuclear war would be triggered by the crisis in Berlin. It portrayed a very realistic vision of nuclear aftermath horrors, while taking into account that *there is no nowhere anymore* and everyone would be affected.⁵²³ The film concentrated on a total societal destruction in one American city where survivors, surrounded by ruins of the city, await their death. Immediately after the movie aired on television, the U.S. government officials made a statement that the Americans had nothing to worry about.⁵²⁴ They made a serious effort to censor the movie and to assure the public that the nuclear scare of nuclear war is unrealistic. In comparison to Dr. Strangelove movie, *The Day After* chose to depict the nuclear issue completely differently. This film focused on several average Americans and their lives and

⁵²¹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.178.

⁵²² COMMITTEE ON THE ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS AND RESOURCES, and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. *The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange*, Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, p.1.

⁵²³ *The Day After* [film]. Director: Nicholas MEYER, produced: Stephanie Austin, Robert Papazian, USA: ABC Motion Pictures, 1983.

⁵²⁴ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 156

how they coped with their worst fears being materialized. The main message was that it affects everybody, which served well in mobilizing people.

6. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

Department of Defense published a list of 32 accidents involving nuclear weapons which occurred between 1950 and 1980. The document confessed that out of all these occurrences, “[o]nly two accidents, those at Palomares and Thule, resulted in a widespread dispersal of nuclear material.”⁵²⁵ It is highly questionable why the document did not mention other serious accidents. Another document, *Summary of Significant Nuclear Accidents*, listed a total of 1,250 nuclear weapons accidents which occurred only between 1950 and 1968.⁵²⁶ In response, American population started to be even more anxious about the nuclear weapons safety provisions.

Also, in response to the 1986 *Freedom of Information Act*, the U.S. government declassified, among other documents, also information about nuclear testing and nuclear accidents. This release confirmed long-lasting concerns over health risks caused by nuclear testing. It confirmed the worst fears of downwind and downstream populations that nuclear testing was slowly poisoning them. It also disclosed a 1949 nuclear Green Run incident which contaminated a large area and poisoned several local citizens. The 1949 Nuclear test Green Run released large quantities of radioactive Iodine 131 and contaminated a large area along the Columbia River and people within.⁵²⁷ Thus after several decades, local population finally got proof of who was responsible for their health damage and increased occurrences of thyroid cancer.

The disclosure of 1949 Green Run incident caused great protests. It also inspired The *Downwinder poem* stating that the U.S. government lied to people when they maintained their position that nuclear testing was safe. The poem declared: “But mother’s milk can be a deadly dish. If mom, a downwinder, eats Columbia River’s fish, or consumes white snow – garden salads on the spot Then mother’s milk can become a deadly lot. So I fed poison to my nursing son with radioactive iodine-131. Just because we lived in the wrong place I maimed my babe

⁵²⁵ DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. *Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1980*, 1981.

⁵²⁶ HANSEN, Chuck. 1,000 more accidents declassified, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1990, vol. 46, no. 5, p.9-14.

⁵²⁷ GERBER, Michelle Stenehjem. *On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the Hanford Nuclear Site*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002 (second edition), p. 91-92.

for that nuclear race.”⁵²⁸ People started protesting against such nuclear testing. They securitized it by insinuating that the U.S. government experimented on their own citizens and lied to them about consequences of such testing. In the center of the debate was threat of environmental contamination which subsequently also poisoned local citizens. The environmental threat of nuclear testing causing long-lasting effects also emerged in movies. The 1988 Academy Award-nominated documentary *Radio Bikini* depicted effects of nuclear testing near Bikini Atoll and the consequences it had in local population. Several other films continued to depict the threat of nuclear power plant malfunction, a leakage, and radioactive waste creating variety of creations.⁵²⁹ This threat perception was further strengthened after the Chernobyl disaster happened.

Furthermore, in order to get support for nuclear abolishment, the spiritually-based movement Nevada Desert Experience gathered in 1982 at Nevada Test Site to raise awareness about negative effects of nuclear weapons testing and moral problems of nuclear weapons and WMD in overall. Annually, they called nuclear testing an “ongoing nuclear violence” not only on local population, but more importantly violence on “environmentally devastated location.”⁵³⁰ They securitized existence of nuclear weapons, nuclear testing and questioned morality of nuclear weapons program. They primarily emphasized the environmental and historical uniqueness of Nevada which has to be protected and not further violated by nuclear testing. Effects of nuclear testing represented an existential threat to the environment.

Several scientists also started examining probable environmental outcome of nuclear war. They securitized that nuclear war could cause severe degradation of the atmosphere. The debate focused on a smoke produced by nuclear explosions and subsequent firestorms which would “drastically reduce the amount of sunlight reaching the earth’s surface... rendering any agricultural activity in the Northern Hemisphere virtually impossible.”⁵³¹ They assumed that it would lead to changes in surface temperatures and wind systems and overall cooling of the atmosphere caused by the temperature inversion. They also mentioned a probable depletion of ozone layer. However, the study added that ozone depletion was not necessarily the cause

⁵²⁸ UNKNOWN. *Downwinder Poem* [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at Hanford Project: <http://www.hanfordproject.com/index.html>.

⁵²⁹ Movies such as *Human Highway* (1982), *Silkwood* (1983), *The Being* (1983), *Class of Nuke Em High* (1986), and *Choke Canyon* (1986) all depicted nuclear power plant accidents.

⁵³⁰ NEVADA DESERT EXPERIENCE, *Brief History* [online], 2011, accessed 20.10.2014. Available at <http://www.nevadasdesertexperience.org/history/history.htm>.

⁵³¹ CRUTZEN, Paul and BIRKS, John W. The atmosphere after a nuclear war: Twilight at noon, *Ambio*, 1982, vol. 11, no. 2-3, p. 115.

of nuclear testing of 1950s and 1960s.⁵³² The 1983 study modeled global consequences of nuclear exchange which would cause *severe long-term climatic effects* such as surface darkening, subfreezing land temperatures, large perturbations in global circulation, and dramatic changes in local weather – a harsh nuclear winter. Furthermore, these large effects could occur even from small nuclear exchange.⁵³³ A term nuclear winter became a central part of the nuclear environmental discourse. Nuclear winter described probable long-term effects of nuclear exchange on global environment, caused mainly by firestorms, dust and smoke clouds.

According to the 1985 study, such environmental degradation should represent a primary national concern. Also, researches started promoting the idea that a major nuclear exchange would cause “long-term climatic effects with severe implications for the biosphere.”⁵³⁴ The study also remarked that other researchers also suggested that smoke from nuclear explosions might cause severe damage and that effects of nuclear war might be the same as after a collision of a large meteor with the Earth which occurred 65 million years ago.⁵³⁵ They noted that widespread dust and smoke clouds from nuclear exchange could severely damage the global environment. This reflects how the threat of nuclear war was the major part of the nuclear discourse due to increasing international tensions and hostile governmental rhetoric. The debate shifted from the nuclear testing threatening environment to the nuclear war threatening environment. Newly, the debate focused on consequences of nuclear war, not nuclear testing.

⁵³² CRUTZEN, Paul and BIRKS, John W. The atmosphere after a nuclear war: Twilight at noon, *Ambio*, 1982, vol. 11, no. 2-3, pp. 115-122.

⁵³³ TURCO, R.P., et al. Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions, *Science*, 1983, vol. 222, p. 1290.

⁵³⁴ COMMITTEE ON THE ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS AND RESOURCES, and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange, Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, p. 1.

⁵³⁵ COMMITTEE ON THE ATMOSPHERIC EFFECTS ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS AND RESOURCES, and NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL. The Effects on the Atmosphere of a Major Nuclear Exchange, Washington: National Academy Press, 1985, p. 2.

7. The Construction of Nuclear Threat and Rising International Tensions, 1989-2001

“There is evidence that conscious decisions were made to accept harm to people and to the environment in the pursuit of larger and more deadly nuclear arsenals. The need for military secrecy was inappropriately used to conceal information vital to protecting the public health.”⁵³⁶

Sixth period our analysis examines starts with the end of the Cold War and dissolution of the Soviet Union and ends with the beginning of 2001. It examines years of presidency of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton.⁵³⁷ End of the Cold War caused that the foreign policy of the U.S. administration was no longer framed in the bipolar rivalry and the nuclear balance or nuclear deterrence. Also, during 1990s, Africa was declared as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The 1996 signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty created a watershed in nuclear threat perception. Nevertheless, India and Pakistan continued to conduct nuclear testing.

7.1. Governmental Level (1989-2001)

7. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

In 1991, Bush acknowledged that the U.S. nuclear strategy went through significant changes. They no longer saw the threat of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe as realistic.⁵³⁸ Bush significantly desecuritized the threat of nuclear war: “So now, for the first time in 35 years, our strategic bombers stand down. No longer are they on 'round-the-clock alert. Tomorrow our children ... won't have, as my children did, air raid drills in which they crawl under their desks and cover their heads in case of nuclear war. My grandchildren don't have to do that and won't have the bad dreams children had once, in decades past. There are

⁵³⁶ INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, p. xi.

⁵³⁷ President George H.W. Bush was in the office from January 20 1989 to January 20 1993. President Bill Clinton took the office on January 20 1993 and left on January 20 2001.

⁵³⁸ BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

still threats. But the long, drawn-out dread is over.”⁵³⁹ Bush announced that with the end of the Cold War also air raid drills came to the end. This statement about the children which go to bed without the fear of the nuclear war was repeated several times during his presidential 1992 campaign.⁵⁴⁰

Reduction of nuclear arsenal was securitized by a need to lessen the threat of nuclear proliferation which ultimately also desecuritized the threat of general nuclear war. In 1994 Clinton stated: “Because of the agreements we have reached this year, last year, Russia's strategic nuclear missiles soon will no longer be pointed at the United States, nor will we point ours at them. Instead of building weapons in space, Russian scientists will help us to build the international space station.”⁵⁴¹ Again in 1995 Clinton proclaimed: “this is the first State of the Union Address ever delivered since the beginning of the cold war when not a single Russian missile is pointed at the children of America. ...We've come so far so fast in this post-cold-war world that it's easy to take the decline of the nuclear threat for granted. But it's still there, and we aren't finished yet.”⁵⁴² The key statement was that the U.S. and Russia stopped targeting each other's population. The threat of nuclear war vanished by symbolical nuclear de-targeting. Nuclear weapons now aimed at no country and no nuclear weapons were aimed at the U.S. Moreover, this policy of detargeting meant to serve as an acknowledgement that there are far more serious existential threats and Russia is no longer one of them. Also it was a tactical calculation which should have forced Russia to reduce their arsenal.

However, the 1997 Directive restated the Cold War rhetoric and nuclear targeting strategies which aimed at leadership and nuclear forces in Russia and possibly also China. The directive restated that nuclear weapons represent a cornerstone of national security for the *indefinite future*. It declared that military “must be prepared to win a protracted nuclear war that would devastate the globe.”⁵⁴³ They maintained their continual reliance on nuclear weapons in wars.

⁵³⁹ BUSH, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

⁵⁴⁰ BUSH, George H. W. Debate with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

⁵⁴¹ CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1994. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

⁵⁴² CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1994. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

⁵⁴³ SMITH, Jeffrey, Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear Arms: Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop Terms for Long Atomic War, *Washington Post*, December 7, 1997, page A01.

7. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

Bush administration continued with the Star Wars SDI in order to both deter and potentially also defend against enemy nuclear attacks if necessary. In 1989, he announced that they will pursue activities in space to fulfill its right of self-defense.⁵⁴⁴ Despite the overall desecuritization of the threat of nuclear war, the U.S. still must have been prepared for any possible nuclear attack. Nuclear strategy was still based on deterrence and nuclear forces ready to be employed if the relations with Russia again worsened. They reduced and limited particular nuclear weapons while retaining certain numbers if their deployment would be needed.

Bush often strongly opposed the Freeze campaign agenda. During 1992 presidential campaign, he insinuated that if they have chosen nuclear freeze approach, the U.S. would never *won the Cold War*. He stated:” For 40-some years, we kept the peace. ... We never would have got there if we'd gone for the nuclear-freeze crowd; never would have got there if we'd listened to those that wanted to cut defense spending.”⁵⁴⁵ He still securitized the need to retain nuclear weapons.

The threat of the use of nuclear weapons emerged in the center of the discourse again with the Gulf War in 1991. In Bush’s letter to Saddam from January 1991, Bush stated that the *future of Iraq* was at stake unless they would withdraw from Kuwait. He stressed that the U.S. would not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons and terrorist actions against them: “The American people would demand the strongest possible response. You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable acts of this sort.”⁵⁴⁶ He insinuated that once Saddam were to cross that line, he would employ force far more powerful against them. Thus, this statement was translated as a threat of the use of nuclear weapons.

Several influential politicians also argued for the employment of tactical nuclear weapons against if conventional bombings were not effective enough to defeat Saddam Hussein. Congressman Dan Burton stated that the U.S. “should use everything at our disposal before we send our young Americans into a meat grinder.”⁵⁴⁷ The rhetoric of several

⁵⁴⁴ THE WHITE HOUSE. National Security Presidential Directive 30: National Space Policy. NASA Historical Reference Collection. (File: 012605). November 2, 1989.

⁵⁴⁵ BUSH, George H. W. Debate with Bill Clinton and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

⁵⁴⁶ BUSH, George H. W. Letter to Saddam Hussein, January 5 1991. In: *Los Angeles Times*, January 13, 1991. Available online at http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-13/news/mn-412_1_u-n-security-council-resolution.

⁵⁴⁷ RUBIN, Trudy. U.S. Shouldn’t Use Nukes On Iraqis, February 15, 1991, *The Inquirer* [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at http://articles.philly.com/1991-02-15/news/25773242_1_nuclear-weapons-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-ground-war.

politicians suggested that the use of tactical nuclear weapons represent a better choice than sending American troops to conventional warfare. On the contrary, Congressman Newt Gingrich said that if the U.S. should “establish a pattern out there that it is legitimate to use those kinds of weapons, our children and grandchildren are going to rue the day.”⁵⁴⁸ He suggested that the use of nuclear weapons is illegitimate and could bring disastrous consequences.

Later, Bush refused to specify which measures he was considering to employ. But he affirmed that he did not seek to destroy Iraq nor punish the Iraqi population for decisions of their leaders.⁵⁴⁹ According to Nina Tannenwald, nuclear weapons were a part of both the context and the dynamics for two main reasons. First, the war was legitimized by the goal of destroying Iraq’s nuclear development program. Second, the U.S. military officials made particular threats given the presence of 1,000 nuclear weapons in the region.⁵⁵⁰ Also the war was waged with the justification of combating possession of WMD. The use of nuclear weapons was taken completely out of the consideration by the administration with the 1991 Gulf War. The U.S. officials, however, did not rule out the use of nuclear weapons publicly.⁵⁵¹ Thus Bush followed the long tradition of non-use. According to the George Bundy, the Gulf War has remarkably reinforced the tradition of the nonuse.⁵⁵² There were no dire circumstances, but nevertheless, it was a significant case of nonuse since it was the first major post-Cold War conflict.

With the end of the Cold War, several officials started to advocate the idea that nuclear weapons were obsolete and military does not need to use nuclear weapons. They could even rely on conventional weapons in countering proliferation Carter, in the context of NPR, even proclaimed: “We can use conventional forces to prevail anywhere in the world.”⁵⁵³ Nevertheless, the 1997 Directive reaffirmed their usability.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁴⁸ MCGEORGE, Bundy. Nuclear Weapons and The Gulf, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 83.

⁵⁴⁹ BUSH, George H. W. The President's News Conference, February 5, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19278>.

⁵⁵⁰ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 294-5.

⁵⁵¹ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 296.

⁵⁵² MCGEORGE, Bundy. Nuclear Weapons and The Gulf, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 83.

⁵⁵³ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 81.

⁵⁵⁴ SMITH, Jeffrey. Clinton Directive Changes Strategy On Nuclear Arms: Centering on Deterrence, Officials Drop Terms for Long Atomic War, *Washington Post*, December 7, 1997, page A01.

7. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

Vertical Proliferation

Initially, Bush was very skeptical toward the disarmament approach and suspicious about Gorbachev's intentions. Gradually, Bush began experiencing difficulties considering that Gorbachev was perceived as more genuinely inclined toward nuclear control negotiations so that public opinion started to praise his initiatives. He could not afford to lose propaganda advantage to the Soviets so they changed their hard-line approach and proceeded with negotiations on missile reductions. In 1989, he stated that they "will not miss any opportunity to work for peace."⁵⁵⁵ Despite that Bush did not favor nuclear negotiations and tried to obstruct such process, he was pressured into more direct stance.

On 31 July 1991, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* (START I) which prohibited parties to possess more than 6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 deployed ICBMs.⁵⁵⁶ This Treaty was the first to reduce the numbers of nuclear warheads symbolized by the shift from limitation talks (SALT) to reduction talks (START). The treaty was to be expired on December 2009. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, additional Lisbon Protocol was signed in 1992 to let newly independent states with nuclear weapons in their possession to become parties to the Treaty. The Treaty entered into force as a five nation party Treaty. The U.S. feared greatly that the former Soviet nuclear warheads would not be secure in newly formed successor states of dissolved Soviet Union. This led U.S. senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar to propose the *Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act* which eventually led to the *Cooperative Threat Reduction program* which eventually facilitated also the nuclear threat of post-soviet states. Bush desired to continue with this nonproliferation measures so Bush and Yeltsin started negotiating on START II Treaty. They implemented START I reductions and Clinton pressed to ratify START II. This treaty was ultimately signed by January 1993. However, the START II never entered into force.⁵⁵⁷ Generally, only nuclear arsenals of these two countries were securitized. They were concerned of nuclear armament of other countries but, nevertheless, they focused only on bilateral reductions. They did not securitize increasing China's nuclear power.

⁵⁵⁵ BUSH, George H. W. Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress, February 9, 1989. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16660>.

⁵⁵⁶ Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty). Signed by G.H.W. Bush and M. Gorbachev on 31 July, 1991, Lisbon protocol signed on 23 May, 1992, entered into force on 5 December 1994.

⁵⁵⁷ The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II). Signed by G.H.W. Bush and B. Yeltsin on 3 January, 1993, never entered into force.

With the end of the Cold War and general loosening of international tension came also particular changes in domestic nuclear strategy and nuclear spending. George H. W. Bush announced that the U.S. will eliminate unilaterally all ground-launched short-range tactical nuclear weapons. They will also remove their sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons from their ships and submarines, while still preserving significantly reduced air-delivered tactical nuclear weapons. However, he stressed that these changes should be reciprocal and the Soviets should not only destroy their corresponding nuclear weapons, but primarily also those which the U.S. already destroyed, such as nuclear land mines.⁵⁵⁸ The U.S. emphasized their commitment to significantly reduce all their nuclear arsenals while keeping only certain numbers of particular types of weapons. According to the announcement, those weapons which would not be destroyed would be removed from their warships and stored in areas where would be available for future deployment if such need should have occurred.

In 1992, Bush declared that since it was a new era, he ordered a unilateral extensive cuts in military spending which included changes in their strategic nuclear forces and cancelled nuclear development projects.⁵⁵⁹ Bush was the driving force behind these reductions. He was influenced by several factors. First, he was gravely concerned over the fate of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Second, he was seriously concerned over the Soviet nuclear command and control reliability. Third, he perceived nuclear reductions to be both a reflection and an accelerating force of changing relationship with the Soviets.⁵⁶⁰ It is likely that one of the main motives was to seize the window of opportunity of changing relations with the Soviet Union and to signify their willingness to mutual improvement. With the end of the Cold War, Bush sincerely strived to seize the historical opportunity to lessen international tensions in this case by reducing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, besides the fear of uncontrolled massive Soviet arsenal, the nuclear disarmament movement could have also impacted his decision.

Bush securitized that these reductions were made for the purpose to halt the spread of nuclear weapons which, by extension, would also lessen the likelihood of nuclear war. He declared: “[W]e can dramatically shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. We can more effectively discourage the spread of nuclear weapons. We can rely more on defensive

⁵⁵⁸ BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

⁵⁵⁹ BUSH, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

⁵⁶⁰ KOCH, Susan J. *The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991-1992*, National Defense University, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington: National Defense University Press, 2012, p. 4.

measures in our strategic relationship. We can enhance stability and actually reduce the risk of nuclear war.”⁵⁶¹ Instead of their reliance of vast nuclear arsenal, he would base their nuclear strategy on defense against possible attacks. Bush stated that he would vigorously pursue SDI and the stop of spread of nuclear weapons. He estimated 1,000 satellites ensuring their security.⁵⁶²

During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton stated that one of the main challenges of the post-cold war world is the need to continue the negotiations to reduce the U.S. and the Soviet nuclear arsenal.⁵⁶³ In the beginning of his presidency, due to the change in the international environment, Clinton also needed to cut significantly redundant military spending. He announced: “We are eliminating programs that are no longer needed, such as nuclear power research and development. We're slashing subsidies and canceling wasteful projects. But many of these programs were justified in their time.”⁵⁶⁴ Clinton stated several times that the U.S. should have reduced nuclear arsenal and that the U.S. does not need to develop new nuclear weapons systems. He suggested that nuclear weapons are now obsolete and wasteful. It was a measure which was in line with overall military cuts in defense spending response to the end of the Cold War.

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) released in 1994 stated that the U.S. nuclear policy was no longer based on MAD, but on Mutual Assured Safety (MAS).⁵⁶⁵ The NPR recognized five main topics of the U.S. nuclear strategy: First, nuclear weapons, in the first time in nuclear age, had smaller role in U.S. security. Second, the U.S. required a much smaller nuclear arsenal now, which was already reduced by 59 percent since 1988, and did not need having any new nuclear weapons programs. Third, there must be prudence toward new potential security risks. Forth, the U.S. does not have a purely deterrent posture, but their strategy is still based on nuclear extended deterrent protection of allies and on continued commitment to other allies. Fifth, the U.S. sets the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and control.⁵⁶⁶ NPR reaffirmed the government determination to reduce its vast

⁵⁶¹ BUSH, George H. W. Address to the Nation on Reducing United States and Soviet Nuclear Weapons, September 27, 1991. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20035>.

⁵⁶² BUSH, George H. W. Address on Administration Goals Before a Joint Session of Congress, February 9, 1989. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16660>.

⁵⁶³ CLINTON, William J. Debate with G. H. W. Bush and Ross Perot, October 11, 1992. Available online at <http://millercenter.org/president/bush/speeches/speech-5532>.

⁵⁶⁴ CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals, February 17, 1993. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=47232>.

⁵⁶⁵ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 80.

⁵⁶⁶ PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 83-4.

nuclear arsenal and their determination to ratify and commit to international nuclear control agreements. Reductions of nuclear weapons are done for the purpose to acknowledge a smaller role of nuclear weapons in the new international environment.

It also states that the concepts of deterrence and survivability must adapt to the new international environment. NPR reasserted the status quo in this way. NPR reaffirmed their commitment toward nuclear reductions, but they still reserved their right to retain some nuclear weapons which did not decrease beyond START II levels in order to ensure their safety.⁵⁶⁷ The NPR significantly reduced the U.S. dependence on nuclear weapons. They will retain the nuclear strength to respond to any crisis or to any challenge, but they did not expect to use them or to even rely on them

Some politician started to doubt these nuclear reductions because they feared that Russia will significantly surpass their nuclear capability. Moreover, the U.S. began emphasizing the no new nuclear programs are under development.. In response to these statements, some even began doubting that Russia's nuclear capacity would be more modern than American.⁵⁶⁸ In the context of adopting NPR, Deputy Secretary Deutch warned, that Russia will most probably return to its aggressive nuclear posture due to its inability to retain vast conventional forces. He added that due to their political and economic collapse, reliance on aggressive nuclear deterrence would be much cheaper. However, by the time Russia were to increase their aggressive policy, the U.S. would be unable to restore its nuclear forces that would match them. "So if something does go wrong in Russia, it is likely that it is in the nuclear forces area that we will face the first challenge."⁵⁶⁹

Horizontal Proliferation

Bush performed a securitizing move about the threat of nuclear proliferation. Bush stated that it is essential "to protect our country from limited nuclear missile attack. We must have this protection because too many people in too many countries have access to nuclear arms. And I urge you again to pass the Strategic Defense Initiative, SDI."⁵⁷⁰ He stressed that defense systems are essential because there are still new challenges and new threats the U.S.

⁵⁶⁷ PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 84.

⁵⁶⁸ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p.85.

⁵⁶⁹ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 88.

⁵⁷⁰ BUSH, George H. W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 1992. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=20544>.

must face. They were concerned of nuclear arsenal already in possession of many countries and feared of the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Bush perceived the proliferation of nuclear weapons to be the greatest threat. He securitized threat of nuclear proliferation also in order to get support for the SDI.

In the context of Gulf War, Congressman Newt Gingrich noted: “We would not want to live in a world on which we had sent a signal to every country on the planet to get nuclear weapons as fast as we can.”⁵⁷¹ He recognized that threats of the use of weapons only encourage other states to possess such weapons. Thus, the U.S. must make an effort not to provoke countries to develop nuclear weapons because it is a primary objective of the U.S. national strategy.

Main threats of proliferation were mainly North Korea, and then India, Pakistan. The U.S. made several attempts to halt North Korean nuclear proliferation. Clinton strived to stop nuclear proliferation of North Korea by continuing inspections and sanctions. The U.S. continued to promote also nuclear disarmament of post soviet states. Clinton stated several times that for the U.S. it was essential to safeguard also nuclear material in Russia, Ukraine, and other former Soviet nations in order to prevent that it would fall into the “wrong hands”.⁵⁷² He was involved in agreements over nonproliferation of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine to achieve complete elimination of their nuclear armament.⁵⁷³ The U.S. made an effort to assist in dismantling their nuclear weapons.

Clinton believed that with the end of the Cold war, the greatest existential nuclear threat comprised of proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and terrorist organizations. In June 1995, Clinton declared nuclear proliferation to be the greatest threat. “Our generation's enemies are the terrorists and their outlaw nation sponsors. ... Their reach is increased by technology. ... Today, the threat to our security is not in an enemy silo, but in the briefcase or the car bomb of a terrorist.”⁵⁷⁴ Therefore it was essential to limit spread of nuclear material and to set nonproliferation as a national priority.

In 1995 Clinton administration released U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism which declared that detection, prevention, defeat, and management of the consequences of nuclear,

⁵⁷¹ MCGEORGE, Bundy. Nuclear Weapons and The Gulf, *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1991, vol. 70, no. 4, p. 83.

⁵⁷² CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 19, 1999. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

⁵⁷³ CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 1994. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50409>.

⁵⁷⁴ CLINTON, William J. Remarks by President Bill Clinton at the United Nations 50th Anniversary Charter Ceremony, San Francisco, June 26, 1995. Available online at <http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=933>.

biological, or chemical materials or weapons use by terrorist is their primary concern. “There is no higher priority than preventing the acquisition of this capability or removing this capability from terrorist groups potentially opposed to the U.S.”⁵⁷⁵ Clinton declared that since the U.S. possessed military superiority, it was increasingly likely that nations, terrorist groups, or criminal organizations would attack the U.S. in unconventional way. They emphasized that since states and state-sponsored groups were not to defeat the U.S. conventionally, they would choose asymmetrical assaults through terrorism and the use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, prevention of terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction was stated as one of primary objectives and responsibilities. Thus they shifted their focus on reduction or elimination of WMDs of other nations, on prevention of further proliferation, and ensuring that they would not come into the possession of terrorists.⁵⁷⁶

The Nuclear Posture Review acknowledged that the U.S. nuclear strategy is based on retaining strategic nuclear forces “sufficient to deter any future hostile foreign leadership with access to strategic nuclear forces from acting against our vital interests and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.”⁵⁷⁷ It means that the U.S. nuclear forces must be ready to deter foreign aggressions and nuclear proliferation.

According to the NPR, the proliferation of nuclear weapons represents greater security risk than nuclear arsenal of a hostile superpower. Moreover, the nuclear forces must be used to promote regional stability, avert crises, and deter war. However, the NPR made an emphasis that the response of WMD threat or use must be, especially, non-nuclear.⁵⁷⁸

7. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

Bush strongly opposed initiatives demanding limits on nuclear testing. Nevertheless, Congressional measure to terminate funding for the nuclear tests, promoted and sponsored by anti-nuclear groups, was passed in 1992. It prohibited underground nuclear testing for 9 months, restricted further nuclear testing and demanded the test ban by 1996. Bush, in his attempt to be reelected, did not dare to veto this legal measure and, therefore, was compelled

⁵⁷⁵ THE WHITE HOUSE. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-39: U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, Washington, June 21, 1995.

⁵⁷⁶ THE WHITE HOUSE. Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-62, Washington, May 22, 1998.

⁵⁷⁷ PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 84.

⁵⁷⁸ PERRY, William J. Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Report of the Secretary of defense to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 84-5.

to sign it. However, he hoped that after his reelection, he would significantly revise it.⁵⁷⁹ Thus the U.S. nuclear testing was halted. This action was substantially sponsored and promoted also by anti-nuclear SANE/Freeze movement.

Bush also signed *Radiation Exposure Compensation Act* which provided financial compensation to those exposed to nuclear testing by uranium mining. In 1990, Bush and Gorbachev signed protocols to the *Threshold Test Ban Treaty* which led to ratification of this Treaty signed already in 1974. He also signed *Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty* (PNET). Still, there was a strong pressure to establish a comprehensive test ban measure.

The Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing forced the U.S. to reconsider their nuclear testing policy. Subsequently, the U.S. acceded to this proposition and thus, their last nuclear test occurred on 23 September 1992. Nevertheless, Clinton was, to some extent, considering resumption of underground nuclear testing.⁵⁸⁰ But in the end, he chose to extend the moratorium.

Clinton was constantly asserting the need sign and then ratify a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.⁵⁸¹ Clinton believed that comprehensive test ban treaty would ensure inhibition of nuclear proliferation to other countries.⁵⁸²

In 1996, the U.S. signed a multilateral Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).⁵⁸³ Clinton remarked, that signing of the treaty by five declared nuclear states “will immediately create an international norm against nuclear testing.”⁵⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the subsequent ratification of the CTBT in the Senate was very problematic. Many U.S. politicians continuously expressed their concerns that signing of the CTBT would damage deterrence capability and viability of their nuclear arsenal. Also detecting nuclear explosions of other countries is difficult and therefore, it would be easy for states to violate such an agreement. Then it would not be beneficial for the U.S. if only other countries would continue their

⁵⁷⁹ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p.201.

⁵⁸⁰ MCMANUS, Doyle. Clinton May OK Resuming Underground Nuclear Tests, *Los Angeles Times*, May 16, 1993.

⁵⁸¹ CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 23, 1996. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53091>.

⁵⁸² MCMANUS, Doyle. Clinton May OK Resuming Underground Nuclear Tests, *Los Angeles Times*, May 16, 1993.

⁵⁸³ The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (The CTBT). Adopted on September 10, 1996 by the UN General Assembly, opened for signature on September, 24 1996, not entered into force.

⁵⁸⁴ HAQ, Farhan. Disarmament: Clinton Leads CTBT Signing but Experts Doubt Results, United Nations, Inter Press Service, News Agency [online], September 24 1996, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.ipsnews.net/1996/09/disarmament-clinton-leads-ctbt-signing-but-experts-doubt-results/>.

testing covertly and the U.S. could not.⁵⁸⁵ Democrats struggled to mobilize support for the ratification which Republicans took advantage from and pressed for an early vote. Thus the U.S. did not ratify the treaty. He believed that the CTBT would make nuclear proliferation more difficult to other states which would obtain nuclear weapons harder. He believed that the CTBT could *end nuclear testing forever*.⁵⁸⁶ His approach toward the ban on nuclear testing was in the direct opposition to the preceding Bush's policy, who opposed the congressional proposition to ban the testing. On the other hand, Clinton never missed an opportunity to appeal to the Congress to ratify nonproliferation treaties and to reduce nuclear dangers by ratifying comprehensive test ban treaty. However, in overall, the ratification of the CTBT was regarded as a security threat because there were allegedly no reliable verification measures to track nuclear testing of other countries. Also, many politicians were concerned that the U.S. would reduce their nuclear potential by this ratification.

In 1999, then Secretary of State, Madeline K. Albright stated that the ratification of the CTBT was in the U.S. national security interest because "America would retain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. But by preventing testing, the Treaty will inhibit the development of more advanced weapons by other nuclear weapons states, and make it harder for countries that do not now have such weapons to build them."⁵⁸⁷ The need to sign and ratify the CTBT was securitized not because of the health threats, but because of the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation.

7.2 Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (1989-2001)

7. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the World

The end of the Cold War and the rise of new types of actors and conflicts changed the perception of nuclear threat considerably. The main securitized existential threat of nuclear proliferation shifted from accented vertical to horizontal proliferation threat. "As the threat of

⁵⁸⁵ KRAUSS, Lawrence. It's Time for the U.S. To Finally Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: A recent report removes all of the legitimate scientific objections to ratifying the agreement, *Slate*, April 2012 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now.html.

⁵⁸⁶ CLINTON, William J. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 19, 1999. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=57577>.

⁵⁸⁷ ALBRIGHT, Madeline K. Statement by Dr. Madeline K. Albright, Secretary of State, prepared for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on the CTBT, October 7 1999. Available at <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/100799albright.htm>.

war with Russia diminished virtually to the vanishing point, the United States came to believe that countries such as Iraq and Iran would acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.”⁵⁸⁸ The government started to securitize nuclear threat as the threat posed by rogue states and unsecured nuclear weapons in possession of post-Soviet states. The need for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament started to be perceived as more acute than ever by the U.S. government. However, since the likelihood of the global nuclear war substantially lessened and the new and different threats arose, nuclear weapons were no longer securitized as the principal threat. Also the impact of anti-nuclear movement was significantly reduced and Americans perceived the nuclear threat as not immediate. Moreover, the end of the Cold War resulted in significant disengagement of nuclear disarmament movement.

The societal discourse on nuclear threat to the world could be examined along two lines of argumentation. First group of securitizing actors argued that *non-proliferation* measures must be the first step to reach future without nuclear weapons. This posture is often advocated by states possessing nuclear weapons and their defenders who argue that the nuclear weapons do not present a threat to the world, but the danger comes from variety of proliferation actors.⁵⁸⁹ This approach urges the halt of horizontal proliferation on the basis of unpredictable or evil character of nuclear proliferators, such as rogue nations and terrorists. During the Cold War, the NPT was perceived as major assurance of non-proliferation. However, the end of the cold war brought into the discourse many new actors which caused that horizontal nuclear non-proliferation was again substantially securitized. The threat of proliferation to non-state actors was being more and more securitized. This fueled public debate about the need to strengthen NPT and ensure its indefinite extension.

Contrary to the non-proliferation first approach, the second group called for nuclear *disarmament* as the first and main goal of anti-nuclear efforts focused on the threatening potential of existing massive nuclear arsenals of current nuclear-weapon states. This standpoint was usually pressed by non-nuclear weapons states and their advocates which securitized vertical proliferation as the main threat.⁵⁹⁰ They perceived nuclear stockpiling to be the primary threat. Vertical proliferation was in the center of the public and political debate

⁵⁸⁸ TURNER, Stansfield. The case for strategic escrow, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2, p.16.

⁵⁸⁹ ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

⁵⁹⁰ ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

throughout the whole Cold War. However, the U.S. government used this theme more rhetorically than genuinely. The end of the Cold War brought into the discourse the fact that nuclear states failed to commit to the NPT clause of their determination of future disarmament in order to prevent stockpiling and to stop nuclear arms race.

During the 1995 NPT review conference, given that abolition of nuclear weapons was not on the agenda, anti-nuclear activists written the *Abolition 2000 Statement* founding Abolition 2000 Network. They declared that lack of political will of nuclear-weapon states is the only true barrier to the nuclear-weapon-free world. Therefore they called upon them to establish a nuclear weapons abolition convention, pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons and declare it as illegal, complete comprehensive test ban treaty, cease to produce and deploy new nuclear weapons systems, to subject all weapons-usable radioactive materials and nuclear facilities to international control, to close all nuclear test sites, and to create additional nuclear weapons free zones.⁵⁹¹ Abolition 2000 Statement declared the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as a common goal: “A world free of nuclear weapons is a shared aspiration of humanity. This goal cannot be achieved in a non-proliferation regime that authorizes the possession of nuclear weapons by a small group of states.”⁵⁹² The use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons is unjustifiable. They proclaimed that nuclear abolishment is the aim which all humans would benefit from. According to them, non-proliferation regimes would not ensure safety or future abolition because non-proliferation inherently entails double standards.

In 1998, political scientist J. Mueller declared, that nuclear weapons had no great utility during the Cold war in keeping the peace and therefore they were essentially irrelevant. He suggested that possession of nuclear weapons did not mean significant changes to history nor to world stability.⁵⁹³ He argued that even without the nuclear weapons, the war would have been too costly for any rational power to start it. According to him, “what deters is the belief that escalation to something intolerable will occur, not so much what the details of the

⁵⁹¹ THE ABOLITION 2000. The Abolition 2000 Founding Statement, *Abolition 2000: Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons* [online], accessed 16.12.2014. Available at, http://www.abolition2000.org/?page_id=153.

⁵⁹² THE ABOLITION 2000. The Abolition 2000 Founding Statement, *Abolition 2000: Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons* [online], accessed 16.12.2014. Available at, http://www.abolition2000.org/?page_id=153.

⁵⁹³ MUELLER, John. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World. In: LYNN-JONES, Sean M., et al., eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990, p. 4.

ultimate unbearable punishment are believed to be.”⁵⁹⁴ This statement insinuated that nuclear abolishment did not represent a necessity since nuclear states would not use such weapons anyway.

7. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the U. S.

In response to easement of nuclear tensions and the governmental effort to disarm certain types of nuclear weapons, the general public started asking whether the U.S. still benefits from the presence of nuclear weapons when nuclear balance was disrupted or whether the U.S. still needs a massive nuclear arsenal to deter potential aggressors. Some strategists began arguing that the U.S. strategy of nuclear reductions lacked certain logic. According to them, more reasonable would be to retain more different types of nuclear weapons to effectively counter the threat of WMD. “The Pentagon seems to have forgotten an early Cold War lesson: an effective mix of battlefield and strategic nuclear weapons is a force and dollar multiplier in deterring either nuclear or conventional war.”⁵⁹⁵ Furthermore, historian Donald Kagan noted that concept of mutual assured destruction has diminished the likelihood of war. On the contrary, he declared that the concept of mutual assured safety (MAS), based on minimal deterrence and nuclear weapons cuts, was destined to fail because it had a minimal potential to accumulate fear and, therefore, it increased the likelihood of war.⁵⁹⁶ This statement signified that the presence of nuclear balance and the policy of assured destruction created stability. On the other hand, elimination of nuclear weapons might be partially destabilizing.

Also, bilateral reduction might lack logic in the situation of many different nuclear actors and future potential nuclear proliferators. Pete V. Domenici declared: “Bilateral agreements make sense if we are certain who our future nuclear adversaries will be. ... We do not want to find ourselves limited by a treaty with Russia in a conflict with another entity.”⁵⁹⁷ He suggested that the U.S. must necessarily retain nuclear capability in order to be prepared

⁵⁹⁴ MUELLER, John. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World. In: LYNN-JONES, Sean M., et al., eds. *Nuclear Diplomacy and Crisis Management*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1990, p. 14.

⁵⁹⁵ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 87.

⁵⁹⁶ BOLDRICK, Michael R. The Nuclear Posture Review: Liabilities and Risks, *Parameters*, Winter 1995-1996, vol. 25, p. 89.

⁵⁹⁷ DOMENICI Pete V. The Domenici Challenge, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54 No. 2, p.43.

for any nuclear proliferation threat. Also, it is significant the statement mentioned entity as a proliferation unit which signifies that not only states could be nuclear proliferators.

Another central part of the debate preoccupied the question whether the end of the Cold War changed nuclear stability and the strategy of nuclear deterrence. Therefore, anti-nuclear movement struggled with the question whether this change made the use of nuclear weapons more likely than before. Nina Tannenwald raised a question whether the end of the Cold War made the use of tactical nuclear weapons more probable: “With the end of the Cold War, a central question is whether normative constraints on the use of nuclear weapons built up since 1945 will persist in a world in which nuclear deterrence is less central than it was during the Cold War. ... Or alternatively, would the relevance and value of the taboo continue to be upheld (as others argued), regardless of the perceived military utility of small nuclear weapons under some circumstances?”⁵⁹⁸ Tannenwald added that according to the public debate, nuclear fear developed into the stage when the use of nuclear would be considered as acceptable only in “vastly reduced circumstances”⁵⁹⁹ This suggested that the American population increasingly perceived the use of nuclear weapons as absolutely unacceptable. First, the use of nuclear weapons against a nuclear state was regarded as not probable nor acceptable due to the threat of escalation. Second, there was no question whether the U.S. should use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country. In the context of the Gulf War, different polls showed that majority of population opposed the use of nuclear weapons.⁶⁰⁰ The media mostly considered that “there is no “silver bullet” that can spare Americans the costs of war. Using nuclear weapons would make those costs immeasurably higher.”⁶⁰¹

The major part of the nuclear disarmament discourse was preoccupied by the NPT extension debate. Anti-nuclear movement perceived the NPT treaty as an assurance of their security which would prevent unlimited horizontal proliferation of different actors. Originally, the duration of the NPT treaty was set at twenty-five years. Non-nuclear states feared that indefinite duration might justify the “idea that nuclear-weapon states could hold on to their nuclear weapons forever, while denying non-nuclear states their sovereign right to develop

⁵⁹⁸ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 295.

⁵⁹⁹ TANNENWALD, Nina. *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 295.

⁶⁰⁰ RUBIN, Trudy. U.S. Shouldn't Use Nukes On Iraqis, February 15, 1991, *The Inquirer* [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at http://articles.philly.com/1991-02-15/news/25773242_1_nuclear-weapons-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-ground-war.

⁶⁰¹ RUBIN, Trudy. U.S. Shouldn't Use Nukes On Iraqis, February 15, 1991, *The Inquirer* [online], accessed 16.11.2014. Available at http://articles.philly.com/1991-02-15/news/25773242_1_nuclear-weapons-hiroshima-and-nagasaki-ground-war.

such weapons.”⁶⁰² Therefore, the 1995 review conference was set to decide whether the NPT treaty should expire, to be extended indefinitely or only for definite number of years. The majority of nuclear disarmament initiatives opposed such indefinite extension of the treaty because they considered that a short extension would have more likely encouraged states to pursue genuine nuclear disarmament.⁶⁰³ The idea was that states would chose disarmament when facing the reality of soon to be expired treaty and accelerated proliferation.

Other nuclear disarmament groups such as Campaign for the NPT argued that short extension of the NPT would force nuclear states into more accelerated arms race with the aim to stay ahead in the race.⁶⁰⁴ They securitized that short extension would cause unlimited vertical nuclear proliferation which could represent enormous threat to the U.S. They emphasized that indefinite extension would be a guarantee of the U.S. security against the future use of nuclear weapons against their homeland. According to them the indefinite extension of the NPT would guarantee a stop of horizontal proliferation. Therefore, the NPT was extended indefinitely mainly due to an immense securitization of the proliferation threat of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.⁶⁰⁵ However, in overall, the NPT review could not be regarded as a success because a conference failed to commit nuclear-weapon states to complete nuclear disarmament. Non-nuclear weapons lost their leverage in compelling nuclear states to commit to their promised future goal of nuclear abolishment.

The anti-nuclear movement extensively securitized the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons which were left on the territory of post-soviet republics. According to Frank von Hippel, the inadequate protection of Russian nuclear materials in post-Soviet countries or also issue known as *loose nukes*, posed the greatest threat of nuclear proliferation.⁶⁰⁶ The problem of post-soviet nuclear weapons brought into the picture the issue of existential threat posed by unsecured nuclear material and nuclear weapons which could get into dangerous hands. The anti-nuclear movement increasingly copied the securitization of the governmental level which was emphasizing the threat of nuclear weapons in hands of rogue state leaders. Also with

⁶⁰² EPSTEIN, William. Indefinite Extension – with increased accountability, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 1995, vol. 51, no. 4, p. 27.

⁶⁰³ JOHNSON, Rebecca, *Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 65.

⁶⁰⁴ JOHNSON, Rebecca, *Advocated and Activists: Confronting Approach on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty*. In: FLORINI, Ann M., ed. *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 65.

⁶⁰⁵ TURNER, Stansfield. The case for strategic escrow, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 16.

⁶⁰⁶ VON HIPPEL, Frank. Working in the White House on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: A Personal Report, *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, March/April 1995, vol. 48, no. 2.

increasing amounts of nuclear waste from nuclear power plants and unsecured nuclear material worldwide, the disruption of the American security was perceived to be much easier. Frank von Hippel emphasized that the discourse changes considerably regarding the general perception of nuclear weapons of adversary states. The debate changed from “Where are their missiles?” considering location of missiles into “Is their nuclear-weapons material secure?”⁶⁰⁷ Also the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists securitized the threat of Russian unsecured nuclear weapons and facilities in the post-soviet republics which terrorists might easily exploit. After several years of easement, the Bulletin moved their doomsday clock back from 17 minutes to 14 minutes to midnight in order to stress a potential nuclear threat.⁶⁰⁸

This threat perception of unrestrained nuclear power compelled anti-nuclear groups to promote the idea of a convention on nuclear weapons. Within the U.N. framework, representatives of a social and political community drafted a model of Nuclear Weapons Convention which would supplement existing NPT and CTBT. This effort was later altered into more concrete and comprehensive proposal which would establish an international regime prohibiting all states from pursuing and participating in the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons.⁶⁰⁹ However, this debate is currently still in the process of discussion.

7. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

The U.S. agencies and non-governmental organizations were gradually disclosing facts about dangers of nuclear testing and fallout to the public. Increasing knowledge about nuclear testing and radiation risks resulted in substantial securitization and demands of compensation of contamination victims. Recent studies showed that 1954 bravo nuclear test resulted in increased risks of dying from cancer. Also, children of these populations often suffered from thyroid disease. Several people still could not return to their home due to the continuous radiation contamination.⁶¹⁰ Accumulated threat of nuclear accidents and health

⁶⁰⁷ VON HIPPEL, Frank. Working in the White House on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: A Personal Report, *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, March/April 1995, vol. 48, no. 2.

⁶⁰⁸ BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Domsday Clock: Timeline [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/timeline>.

⁶⁰⁹ THE NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE. Proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC), *Nuclear Threat Initiative: Building a Safer World Timeline* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/proposed-nuclear-weapons-convention-nwc/>.

⁶¹⁰ INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND

and environmental damage of nuclear testing led the U.S. government passed *Radiation Exposure Compensation Act* in 1990.

The 1991 study acknowledged the paradox that the principal agency which had a responsibility of assessing the health and environmental effects of nuclear testing also managed nuclear testing. This contradictory assignment caused that accurate information about these effects was often withheld from population. The study noted that the AEC acted irresponsibly when they gave more preference to buildup of nuclear arsenal before dealing with radiation damage. They even mentioned several cases of radioactive contamination of downwind communities which were downplayed by governmental agencies.⁶¹¹ The anti-nuclear movement emphasized that the U.S. nuclear agencies were deliberately withholding essential information about nuclear testing which resulted in substantial underestimation of nuclear testing by the general public. The study estimated that overall global cancer fatalities would reach to 2,4 million only from atmospheric nuclear testing between 1945 to 2000. If we took into account that atmospheric testing had continuous impact on human health, they estimated that the effect of atmospheric testing would cause 430,000 cancer fatalities only within years of 1991 to 2000.⁶¹² In 1997, the National Cancer Institute revealed that due to atmospheric nuclear testing, American children were exposed to 15 to 70 times as much radiation than previously stated. This caused that they were at higher risk of developing thyroid cancer.⁶¹³

They tried to trace nuclear fatalities caused by underground testing, however, such long-term effects would be difficult to determine. They noted that nuclear waste from underground nuclear testing compromised geological suitability of these sites. These areas with a nuclear waste would probably not be suitable for humans for over thousands of years. Also it was likely that such nuclear waste material would reach the human environment

ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, p. 164.

⁶¹¹ INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991. pp. 1-2, 56-7.

⁶¹² INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, p. 40.

⁶¹³ ORTMEYER, Pat and MAKHIJANI Arjun. Worse than we knew, *Bulletin of the Atomic scientists*, November/December 1997, vol. 53, no. 6, p. 46.

endangering their health.⁶¹⁴ They securitized environmental contamination, but mainly in the context of endangering human population.

The 1992 U.S. voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing was a great success of anti-nuclear disarmament movement which continuously securitized the threat of nuclear testing and vigorously campaigned for the comprehensive nuclear test ban. However, the Clinton administration was considering whether the nuclear testing should be resumed or not. Frank von Hippel of the FAS has written an appeal that further nuclear testing was unnecessary. This paper and his expertise advice ultimately led to a governmental decision not to resume nuclear testing.⁶¹⁵ Further nuclear testing was considered to be unnecessary and redundant.

The 1994 and 1995 survey showed that 80 percent of Americans favored test ban treaty and 60 percent favored an elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world.⁶¹⁶ The world opinion was significantly inclined to comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and condemned any possible violations to it. They strongly favored the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty because they hoped it would lessen dangers of nuclear contamination as well as lessen dangers of the use of nuclear weapons. Without nuclear testing, the development of nuclear weapons would be more difficult. Even though the CTBT was not ratified, a full scale nuclear testing was significantly decreased. In order to promote ratification of the CTBT, nuclear disarmament continued to securitize effects of nuclear testing and how it contaminated the U.S. population. Researcher James Cizdziel was examining collected radioactive dust from attics of homes located near nuclear testing grounds. The data showed that after several years, the dust was still radioactive which could, eventually, also help to determine the severity of nuclear exposure of local population to nuclear testing.⁶¹⁷

The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers also stressed the importance of securing nuclear material properly because there is a threat that nuclear weapons would be build by using nuclear waste. Furthermore, there is a danger that nuclear waste could get into hands of terrorists which could build dirty bomb. Radiation from nuclear weapons and dirty bombs could “be extremely damaging to the human body,” causing cancer and “birth defects in

⁶¹⁴ INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND THE INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH, RADIOACTIVE HEAVEN AND EARTH. *The health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons testing in, on, and above the earth*, New York: The Apex Press, 1991, pp. 67-8.

⁶¹⁵ VON HIPPEL, Frank. Working in the White House on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Arms Control: A Personal Report, *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, March/April 1995, vol. 48, no. 2.

⁶¹⁶ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 206.

⁶¹⁷ UNKNOWN. In brief: Toys in the attic. *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, March/April 1998, vol. 54, no. 2, p. 7.

future generations.”⁶¹⁸ Thus, they securitized the threat of nuclear proliferation not only as threatening the U.S. society, but also individuals.

7. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

There prevailed a general anxiety about estimated consequences of nuclear war. They agreed with an estimated depletion of ozone layer. However, several scientists began arguing that nuclear war would not cause environmental consequences severe enough. Many scientists noted that global chilling after a nuclear war would not be extreme enough to be described as nuclear winter. They noted that dust and smoke would surely block the sunlight which could cause similar phenomenon called rather as nuclear fall. Also, it would not cause extinction of humans. Dr. Turco said that ecological damage of nuclear exchange would not cause extinction of human race, but it would end “civilization as we know it.”⁶¹⁹ However, since the probability of nuclear war was significantly decreased, the securitization of nuclear environmental threat posed by nuclear war faded away. The focus of popular culture and anti-nuclear movement shifted again primarily to nuclear testing and nuclear material leakage.

The environmental threat of nuclear weapons was securitized in the context of nuclear safety of nuclear material and nuclear waste. This securitization increased after the 1989 Rocky Flats incident. This resulted in funding cuts and cancellation of new nuclear facilities which, in the extent, ended also nuclear weapons production.⁶²⁰ General public started to fear contamination of nuclear waste and the fact that government did not inform them of their risks properly.

One of the central themes of environmental securitization was a forming and following ratification approval of the CTBT in the Senate. The Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers sought political and popular support in order to assure its ratification. For this purpose they securitized that nuclear testing could generate environmental disaster. They stressed that nuclear power in overall presents unacceptable health risks and uranium mining cause immense environmental damage. Long term effects of radiation on the environment and future generations could be enormous. They argued that Chernobyl disaster left thousands of acres of land unusable. According to them, the real threat posed nuclear waste and radiation

⁶¹⁸ COALITION TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS, *Nuclear Threats* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.crnd.org/nuclear.html>.

⁶¹⁹ BROWNE, Malcolm W. Nuclear Winter Theorists Pull Back, *The New York Times*, January 23, 1990.

⁶²⁰ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 200.

leaks, not nuclear power plants. They stressed that leaking radioactive waste contaminated ground water throughout the whole U.S.⁶²¹ They noted that ratification of the CTBT was essential in order to secure the U.S. natural environment from a nuclear threat.

Furthermore, according to the Abolition 2000, nuclear waste poisons the environment for thousands of centuries. Furthermore, the Abolition 2000 Statement declared that it is necessary to achieve secure and livable world and “redress the environmental degradation and human suffering that is the legacy of fifty years of nuclear weapons testing and production.”⁶²²

⁶²¹ COALITION TO REDUCE NUCLEAR DANGERS, *Nuclear Threats* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.crnd.org/nuclear.html>.

⁶²² THE ABOLITION 2000. The Abolition 2000 Founding Statement, *Abolition 2000: Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons* [online], accessed 16.12.2014. Available at http://www.abolition2000.org/?page_id=153.

8. Construction of the Nuclear Threat and Adaptation to the Age of Terrorism, 2001-2014

“Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons. They want the capability to blackmail us, or to harm us, or to harm our friends -- and we will oppose them with all our power.”⁶²³

Our last examined period starts with the 2001 inauguration of President G. W. Bush and ends with the current presidency of B. Obama.⁶²⁴ International context of this era was determined primarily by the 2001 terrorist attacks which dramatically shifted the whole perception of national threat. 2001 attack formed a significant watershed in nuclear threat construction as well. Also North Korea and Iran represents main proliferation threats.

8. 1. Governmental Level (2001-2014)

8. 1. 1. Threat of Nuclear War and Possible Annihilation of the Civilization

The threat of general nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia significantly lessened with the end of the Cold War. The idea of a general nuclear war was taken largely out of the discourse and politicians made significant effort to stress that these countries entered the path of partnership. Nuclear threat of the general war was very specific during the Cold War. On the other hand, now the nuclear threat emerged from actions of many different actors. The primary emphasis was put on prevention of regional nuclear threats and nuclear proliferation.

By the 2001, the threat of nuclear war was being considerably desecuritized. Taking the Russian nuclear threat into account, the 2002 NPR declared a shift from the Cold War *threat-based approach* to a *capabilities-based approach*. They stated that this should be a sufficient deterrence projected by a lowest level of nuclear weapons possible.⁶²⁵ They were declaring that their intention was to work on more positive relationship with Russia to

⁶²³ BUSH, George W. President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, United States Military Academy at New York, June 1, 2002. Available at <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>.

⁶²⁴ Presidency of George W. Bush lasted from January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2009. Barack Obama took office on January 20, 2009.

⁶²⁵ RUMSFELD, Donald. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Foreword (cover letter forwarding NPR to the Congress), 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

encourage mutual confidence building. They declared their desire to set aside Cold War hostilities and thus, they renounced the strategy of MAD toward Russia.⁶²⁶ Instead of MAD relation, the NPR proposed a mutual vulnerability and more cooperative relations. The NPR declared that nuclear strike involving Russia was plausible, but not really expected. Therefore Russia was not considered to be a threat.⁶²⁷ The 2010 NPR reaffirmed that even though Russia continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, they could no longer be considered as their adversaries. Moreover, they called the threat of global nuclear war as *remote*.⁶²⁸ Russia was being treated as a partner in questions on nuclear proliferation and the threat of nuclear war. Secondary benefit from this approach was that people did not question their vast nuclear armaments as much now that they were being approached as not threatening.

This desecuritization changed significantly with Obama administration. He attempted to securitize the aim of complete nuclear disarmament by emphasizing the threat nuclear weapons pose to all people. In his Prague Speech, Obama emphasized that it was a legacy of the Cold War, which must be revoked now in the 21st century, that for several decades people lived with the fear that “their world could be erased in a single flash of light”.⁶²⁹ Obama urged that if nuclear weapons were used, the consequences might be threatening not only to economy or society, but to the ultimate survival.⁶³⁰ According to Obama, the world without nuclear weapons is a possibility. However, this remark could be perceived as being a mere deterrent practice rather than an acknowledgement of a real threat. There could be many reasons standing behind this securitization. There can be no precise answer to the question whether it was the determination of Obama himself or pressure of disarmament movement which influenced this securitization. However, it is plausible that the main reason behind this securitization could be the growing nuclear proliferation threat which inspired this current need for current counterproliferation efforts. This historical effort led to Obama being awarded with Nobel Peace Prize. However, several politicians opposed such an idea of total

⁶²⁶ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

⁶²⁷ Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>, p. 17.

⁶²⁸ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, p. iv, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>.

⁶²⁹ OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

⁶³⁰ OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

nuclear disarmament by warning that Obama plans to transform the U.S. into *nuclear impotent*. Former–Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger titled such ideas as American utopianism.⁶³¹

In 2010, Obama again called for the need to complete nuclear disarmament. He stressed that the greatest danger to American people represents the threat of nuclear weapons. “I’ve embraced the vision of John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of these weapons and seeks a world without them. To reduce our stockpiles and launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing negotiations on the farthest reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades.”⁶³² This statement suggests that the main reason behind this securitization was a need to securitize the threat of nuclear proliferation.

8. 1. 2. Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and Limited War Plans

The 2002 *Nuclear Posture Review* (NPR)⁶³³ declared their willingness to reduce nuclear capabilities to the lowest number of nuclear weapons possible. However, they also put an emphasis on developing credible non-nuclear and nuclear attack plans because they considered them to be essential in ensuring security of their allies and friends.⁶³⁴ They put emphasis on defense to discourage potential attacks and then also on nuclear and non-nuclear response options. Despite their declared attempts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategy, nuclear weapons remained central to ensuring their defense and the NPR even justified their sustainment and modernization.

There exists a longstanding debate whether the U.S. should declare its non-first use policy. During the Cold War, the U.S. refused to declare such policy because they feared it would diminish their deterrence capabilities to ensure security of the U.S. and its allies and partners. Bush’s nuclear strategy also opposed such declaration. Moreover, the U.S. declared their preemptive/preventive attack doctrine. The 2002 NPR is usually translated to include a preemptive attack doctrine where the U.S. reserved itself a right to disrupt proliferation efforts

⁶³¹ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p.88.

⁶³² OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 27, 2010. Available online at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87433>.

⁶³³ Nuclear Posture Review released in 2002 is a classified document. For the purpose of our analysis, we examine its excerpts which are available online, its cover letter, and statements to press.

⁶³⁴ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

of other actors. The 2002 NPR declared: “A broader array of capability is needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military, or technical courses of action that would threaten U.S. and allied security. U.S. forces must pose a credible deterrent to potential adversaries who have access to modern military technology, including NBC weapons and the means to deliver them over long distances. Finally, U.S. strategic forces need to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any aggressor.”⁶³⁵ The NPR assumed different targeting mainly against rogue states. The existential threat was proclaimed to be states which aspire to acquire or already possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. According to the NPR, the existence of this threat gives the U.S. the right to disrupt such actions, also with the possible use of nuclear weapons. This notion that nuclear weapons might be used against non-nuclear nations was only strengthened by the categorization of different existential threats coming from *rogue nations*.

Bush administration also declared his preventive war doctrine in the *National Security Strategy* by reaffirming the U.S. long-standing policy of retaining an option of preemptive actions to counter national security threats: “The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.”⁶³⁶ It is a doctrine which emphasized the right to defend itself against actions and supposed actions of different actors, in this case mainly rogue states. Bush securitized that the U.S. must be able to defend itself preemptively against national security threats. This policy later enabled him to employ force against alleged nuclear proliferators.

After he received the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize, Jimmy Carter stated that during the Cold War, both sides were well aware of the fact, that any political conflict or misjudgment could lead to nuclear holocaust. “There had to be a constant and delicate balancing of our great military strength with aggressive diplomacy. ... We must remember that today there are at least eight nuclear powers on earth, and three of them are threatening to their neighbors in areas of great international tension. For powerful countries to adopt a principle of preventive

⁶³⁵ Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>.

⁶³⁶ THE WHITE HOUSE. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Washington, p. 15.

war may well set an example that can have catastrophic consequences.”⁶³⁷ He recognized that the world after the end of the Cold War is more dangerous and preventive war is a dangerous strategy which could incite nuclear employment.

In Prague Speech, Obama remarked that since more countries possessed nuclear weapons, nuclear materials and technology has spread, terrorists attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, and nuclear testing continues, the risks of the use of nuclear weapons are far more greater. He noted that “the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.”⁶³⁸ The threat of nuclear attack was highly securitized. The main reason behind this securitization was the threat of nuclear proliferation.

The 2010 NPR declared their commitment to continue with reducing the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. Moreover, the U.S. declared not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states who were party to the NPT and with compliance of nuclear non-proliferation.⁶³⁹ The NPR reduced the role of nuclear weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks. This also means that the U.S. retained an option to employ nuclear deterrence against nuclear states not under NPT or nuclear non-proliferation obligations. The 2010 NPR declared that they would consider use of nuclear weapons only in *extreme circumstances* in order to defend *vital interests* of the U.S. or its allies and partners.⁶⁴⁰

Also, the 2010 NPR declared that it is in the U.S. interest that “nuclear non-use be extended forever”.⁶⁴¹ Moreover, it insinuated that in the future the U.S. will be preparing policy declaring that “detering nuclear attack is the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.”⁶⁴² This means that the Obama administration took into account that offensive use of nuclear weapons will be out of the consideration.

⁶³⁷ CARTER, Jimmy. Nobel Lecture Oslo, December 10 2002, The Nobel Foundation 2002, Nobel Media AB 2014 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2002/carter-lecture.html.

⁶³⁸ OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

⁶³⁹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p. viii.

⁶⁴⁰ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, pp. viii-ix.

⁶⁴¹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, pp. viii-ix.

⁶⁴² U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, pp. viii.

8. 1. 3. Threat of Nuclear Proliferation

With the end of the Cold War, horizontal proliferation started to be increasingly securitized at the expense of vertical proliferation. The Gulf War strengthened the perception of the nuclear threat posed by irresponsible rogue states with aspirations to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. The threat of the use of chemical weapons in Iraq caused that the nuclear threat started to be perceived in the context of the whole WMD debate. The 2001 terrorist attacks caused that the securitization of horizontal proliferation and the threat posed by rogue states shifted toward the securitization of the terrorist threat. Politicians started to alarm the world opinion by threatening with the image of terrorists possessing nuclear weapons in order to get support for their policies of the war on terror.

Horizontal Proliferation

In the beginning of 2001, stated that the U.S. needs a new strategy which would allow them to cope with the new threats of the 21st century more effectively. These threats “range from terrorists who threaten with bombs to tyrants in rogue nations intent upon developing weapons of mass destruction. To protect our own people, our allies, and friends, we must develop and we must deploy effective missile defenses.”⁶⁴³ Bush securitized the need to build defense systems in order to adapt to today's threats due to pervasive terrorist and rogue state threats.

In 2001 Bush announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the ABM treaty with the explanation that the ABM treaty was outmoded because then, it was based on mutually MAD strategy. He added that the ABM Treaty “hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue state missile attacks.”⁶⁴⁴ This justification exposed a remarkable shift in the U.S. defense thinking. During the Cold War, the main existential threat behind building missile defense systems was first the Soviet Union and, later, both the Soviet Union and China. Now it was securitized by different type of proliferation, mainly by threats posed by countries like Iran and non-state actors possessing WMD. Bush effectively securitized the 2001 terrorist attacks to ensure approval for strengthening their defensive systems and support for withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. This securitization of

⁶⁴³ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Administration Goals, February 27, 2001. Available online <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29643>.

⁶⁴⁴ GARAMONE, Jim. Bush Announces ABM Treaty Withdrawal, American Forces Press Service, Washington: Department of Defense News, December 13, 2001 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44365>.

an existential need for defensive systems was aimed at nuclear threat posed by terrorists and rogue states. However, this securitizing move was nevertheless perceived by Russia as targeting them because it a missile defense shield would diminish their nuclear capabilities.

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review established a New Triad composed of: both nuclear and non-nuclear offensive strike system, passive and active defenses, and revitalized infrastructure. This change was allegedly designed to reduce dependence on nuclear weapons and to improve “ability to deter attack in the face of proliferating WMD capabilities.”⁶⁴⁵ The possibility of deterring WMD proliferation was in the center of the debate. The 2002 NPR presumed that terrorists and rogue states possessing WMD will likely test the U.S. commitments to its allies and, therefore, the U.S. must deter its adversaries more effectively.⁶⁴⁶ They feared that rogue states or terrorists will threaten to attack the U.S.’s allies and therefore they must strengthen their extended deterrence. But primarily, they must prevent the proliferation itself.

The main declaratory purpose of this NPR was to shift nuclear strategy from Cold War offensive triad to post-Cold War defense New Triad. They changed their threat-based approach to nuclear planning because they could no longer rely purely on offensive forces. When faced with many different adversaries, they needed to start focusing primarily on defensive strategies. They noted that while missile defenses were considered by some being impractical and destabilizing during the Cold War, now they are really essential. The main defensive goals were declared to be to assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat.⁶⁴⁷ Furthermore, this capability approach also comprised of more flexibility and different planning because there were a variety of different threats and actors.

The NPR declared that they are concerned specifically about growing biological, chemical and nuclear capabilities of certain states. The 2002 NPR categorized three different threats (titled as contingencies). First category of threat *-immediate-* was introduced on examples of possible North Korean attack on South Korea, or Iraqi attack on Israel. Second – *potential-* contingency represented plausible, but not immediate threats, such as emergence of hostile coalition in which at least one actor possessed WMD. Third –*unexpected-* threat

⁶⁴⁵ RUMSFELD, Donald. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Foreword (cover letter forwarding NPR to the Congress), 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁶ RUMSFELD, Donald. Nuclear Posture Review Report, Foreword (cover letter forwarding NPR to the Congress), 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁷ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

comprised of unpredicted challenges such as sudden regime change with WMD threat introduction. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya could be involved in all of these threats. China was considered to be a immediate and potential threat.⁶⁴⁸ Russia was no longer securitized as a potential threat which had several political implications. The 2002 NPR asserted the threat of Iraq as a regime which harbored terrorists and “have active WMD and missile program.”⁶⁴⁹ The threat posed by rogue states was securitized mainly by the assertion on their harboring and aiding of terrorists which suggests that the main declaratory reason behind it was terrorist threat.

In 2002, Bush announced to continue to pursue two main objectives: disrupt terrorist plans and “prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world”⁶⁵⁰ This rhetoric remained the same even after the 2003 Iraq War. The U.S. still declared their determination to confront regimes that harbored and supported terrorists and could provide them with nuclear weapons. Bush proclaimed: “We refuse to live in the shadow of this ultimate danger.”⁶⁵¹

Bush started securitizing Iraq as a part of an axis of evil more than a year before the Iraq War occurred. On January 2002, Bush proclaimed that Iraqi regime undoubtedly developed nuclear weapons for over a decade. He chose a rhetoric which distinguished *civilized world* from *axis of evil*, which contains rogue states like Iraq and their terrorist allies. He added: “This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.”⁶⁵² Throughout 2002, Bush continually declared that Iraq sought weapons of mass destruction and the U.S. will not hesitate to act to prevent that: “We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. ...And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. ...History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”⁶⁵³ Bush securitized the

⁶⁴⁸ Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>.

⁶⁴⁹ Nuclear Posture Review Report [Excerpts]. Submitted to Congress on 31 December 2001 [online], 8 January, 2002, accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://web.stanford.edu/class/polisci211z/2.6/NPR2001leaked.pdf>, pp.16-17.

⁶⁵⁰ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>.

⁶⁵¹ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29646>.

⁶⁵² BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 29, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29644>.

⁶⁵³ THE WHITE HOUSE. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Washington.

nuclear proliferation threat posed by rogue states to be an existential threat to the U.S. but the threat to all mankind, therefore the U.S. must take such responsibility and act.⁶⁵⁴

Bush vigorously emphasized that the risks of Iraqi nuclear proliferation are too high to remain inactive: “We cannot let our enemies strike first. ...In the Cold War, weapons of mass destruction were considered weapons of last resort whose use risked the destruction of those who used them. Today, our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as weapons of choice. For rogue states these weapons are tools of intimidation and military aggression against their neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to attempt to blackmail the United States and our allies to prevent us from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue states. Such states also see these weapons as their best means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the United States.”⁶⁵⁵

Bush securitized the image of nuclear terrorism as the *ultimate weapons of terror*: “Today, the gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world, is outlaw regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. These regimes could use such weapons for blackmail, terror, and mass murder. They could also give or sell those weapons to terrorist allies, who would use them without the least hesitation.”⁶⁵⁶ He made an effort to justify this act against rogue state by saying it was done for the purpose of the threat of nuclear terrorism. Moreover, he often proclaimed that he had evidence that Saddam Hussein aided and protected terrorists, which suggested that he could also provide them nuclear weapons.^{657,658} He even insinuated that if Iraq obtained nuclear weapons, it would destroy regional stability.⁶⁵⁹ Without any doubt, Bush often proclaimed that it is clear that Iraq developed nuclear weapons.

Several influential politicians argued that it was essential to avoid using force against Iraq. Even if Saddam Hussein were developing nuclear weapons, Brzezinski urged that the issue would be resolved by deterrence, not by force. He stated that since the U.S. successfully

⁶⁵⁴ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645>.

⁶⁵⁵ THE WHITE HOUSE. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, Washington, p.15.

⁶⁵⁶ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645>.

⁶⁵⁷ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645>.

⁶⁵⁸ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645>.

⁶⁵⁹ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29645>.

deterred the Soviet Union, they sure could deter Iraq as well.⁶⁶⁰ Although, strong government propaganda often led to reconsideration of such concerns. Consequently, in the face of Iraq's supposed possession of the WMDs, Brzezinski started supporting forceful measures against this *long-term grave and gathering threat*.⁶⁶¹ Bush also securitized Saddam Hussein's evil character for the purpose of ruling the deterrence option out of the consideration. He often stated that Hussein was mad and therefore the U.S. could not take such a risk of inaction. In 2004, Bush explained why he did not chose deterrence over preventive war by saying "Containment doesn't work with a man who is a madman."⁶⁶² To mask his misperception, he again began emphasizing that nevertheless, Saddam Hussein did use WMD against its own people.⁶⁶³ Thus, it allowed him to deemphasize the nuclear context of this War. However, he still continued to emphasize the unilateral approach toward terrorist and rogue state nuclear counterproliferation: "America will not permit terrorists and dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most deadly weapons."⁶⁶⁴

It is often stated that the U.S. involvement in Iraq was the result of intelligence failures.⁶⁶⁵ But the CIA played its role in the decision to invade only in the final phases. For some officials, the question of invading Iraq appeared inevitable right after the 2001 attacks. But this question was not formally addressed at any NSC meetings. According to Department of defense official, several meetings of the NSC occurred, but there was no question whether a war was necessary or not.⁶⁶⁶

Immediately after the beginning of the Iraq war, it was becoming clear that the justification of the war, that Iraq possessed WMDs, was false. This uncertainty about alleged nuclear weapons program created a massive opposition to the War. The situation worsened

⁶⁶⁰ MANN, James. Brzezinski and Iraq: The Making of a Dove. In: GATI, Charles ed. *Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, p. 230.

⁶⁶¹ MANN, James. Brzezinski and Iraq: The Making of a Dove. In: GATI, Charles ed. *Zbig: The Strategy and Statecraft of Zbigniew Brzezinski*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013, p. 240.

⁶⁶² BUSH, George W. *Interview with President George W. Bush* [interview]. The Oval Office, February 7, 2004. Broadcasted on NBC's "Meet The Press", February 8, 2004. Transcript available online: http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4179618/ns/meet_the_press/t/transcript-feb-th/#.VJFXoyu8020.

⁶⁶³ BUSH, George W. Remarks at the National Defense University: Bush's Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, February 11, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html>.

⁶⁶⁴ BUSH, George W. Remarks at the National Defense University: Bush's Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, February 11, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html>.

⁶⁶⁵ FINGAR, Thomas. Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Promising Start Despite Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Animosity. In : GEORGE, Roger Z. and RISHIKOF, Harvey, eds. *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011, p. 149.

⁶⁶⁶ GEORGE, Roger Z. Central Intelligence Agency: The President's Own, In: GEORGE, Roger Z. and RISHIKOF, Harvey, eds. *The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth*, Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2011, p. 169.

when the U.S. army could not show the nuclear evidence. Ultimately, also Brzezinski argued against the war: “We’re now maintaining that they may be hidden somewhere, which is kind of comical, actually. If they had them, and they were armed to the teeth with them, why didn’t they use them?”⁶⁶⁷

Iraq War created a watershed in nuclear proliferation thinking. The War sent a message to rogue states that either they will manage to develop its own nuclear arsenal and then they would be safe from foreign invasion, or they will negotiate nuclear non-proliferation in exchange for non-invasion promise by which they would become more vulnerable to invasion than ever. Accordingly, Libya, North Korea, and Iran rapidly changed their behavior. North Korea chose to accelerate their nuclear program in order to avoid being next to be invaded. Also Iran continued their nuclear development program.⁶⁶⁸ In 2005, Bush regarded Iran to be “the world’s primary state sponsor of terror.”⁶⁶⁹ Libya, on the other hand, cancelled their nuclear development program. Bush stated that negotiations with Libya were successful because Iraq war caused the threat to be perceived as more credible.⁶⁷⁰

The discourse also focused on double standards inherent in the NPT agreement which was originally designed in order to prevent spread of nuclear weapons beyond states which already possessed nuclear weapons. Bush proposed several changes which would facilitate halt of the spread of nuclear weapons, among them, he also urged to strengthen Proliferation Security Initiative and NPT.⁶⁷¹

Obama chose completely different stance to nuclear proliferation. Obama based its campaign on emphasizing the threat of nuclear terrorism and the need to secure all loose nuclear materials. For this purpose, the U.S. must seek a world without nuclear weapons.⁶⁷²

Prague Speech was based on the importance of non-proliferation regime and strongly opposed the idea that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable. He added that such views are a mere fatalism because it suggests that also the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable.⁶⁷³

⁶⁶⁷ BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew and KISSINGER, Henry [interview]. CNN, July 13, 2003 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0307/13/le.00.html>.

⁶⁶⁸ BUSH, George W. Remarks at the National Defense University: Bush’s Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, February 11, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html>.

⁶⁶⁹ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 2005 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58746>.

⁶⁷⁰ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union," January 20, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29646>.

⁶⁷¹ BUSH, George W. Remarks at the National Defense University: Bush’s Speech on the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, February 11, 2004 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/11/politics/10WEB-PTEX.html>.

⁶⁷² OBAMA, Barack. Remarks in West Lafayette, Indiana, July 16, 2008 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=77720>.

Also Prague Speech was based on the assumption that the U.S. must be prepared to deal with new threats. According to Obama, the U.S. will lead the nonproliferation endeavor toward a world without nuclear weapons. He promised to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. security strategy as a first step toward disarmament. Obama stated that terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon was “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.”⁶⁷⁴ The rhetoric suggests that the threat of the spread of nuclear weapons by terrorists was considered to be the gravest threat and also the primary reason behind this initiative. Therefore, in order to overcome this gravest threat, the U.S. must lead the non-proliferation cooperative effort.

According to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, five key objectives of nuclear weapons policies are: preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, reduction of the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security, maintaining deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels, strengthening regional deterrence, and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.⁶⁷⁵ NPR declared that the danger of nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme existential threat.⁶⁷⁶ The report also recognized North Korea and Iran to be two main state proliferation threats.⁶⁷⁷ Thus, the NPR also declared concrete steps to disrupt such nuclear proliferation efforts. NPR recognized that now we are approaching *nuclear tipping point* when if not reversed, the accelerated trend of nuclear proliferation would cause growth in numbers of new nuclear states and an increase of likelihood that terrorists would possess nuclear weapons.⁶⁷⁸ For this purpose it is essential to reduce massive nuclear arsenal.

Obama emphasized the need to cooperate with other states to reach a common goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material to prevent that such material would reach hands of

⁶⁷³ OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

⁶⁷⁴ OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

⁶⁷⁵ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p. iii.

⁶⁷⁶ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p. iii.

⁶⁷⁷ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p. vi.

⁶⁷⁸ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Nuclear Posture Review Report [online], 2010, accessed 22.10.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, p. vi.

terrorists.⁶⁷⁹ Obama performed a securitization of terrorist nuclear proliferation. For this purpose he often emphasized the need to secure nuclear material and strengthen NPT regime.⁶⁸⁰ In 2014 he stated that since multinational coalition ensured that nuclear material would not fall into terrorist hands, the U.S. itself could reduce their “reliance on cold war stockpiles.”⁶⁸¹

Obama approached nuclear proliferation threat more cooperatively. In 2012, he threaten Iran that if they would not reach Iran’s nuclear restraint, the U.S. would be forced to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons by other than peaceful means.⁶⁸² Later, he changed his rhetoric and proclaimed that “Iran must recognize that now is the time for a diplomatic solution, because a coalition stands united in demanding that they meet their obligations, and we will do what is necessary to prevent them from getting a nuclear weapon.”⁶⁸³

Obama administration also struggled with the defense missile system project which Bush administration so vigorously promoted. Obama securitized the need for two radar systems installed in Europe, but after strong Russian opposition, he ultimately cancelled this project.

Vertical Proliferation

The discourse focused predominantly on horizontal proliferation. Since the threat of general nuclear war was desecuritized, there was little pressure on the government to reduce numbers of existing nuclear weapons. The U.S. government chose to accent the threat of nuclear surprise attack of rogue states and terrorists and the need to secure nuclear material through different counterproliferation initiatives.⁶⁸⁴ The need to reduce nuclear armament was strategically not accented because the discourse focused on reducing nuclear risks and proliferation of nuclear material. Majority of efforts which aimed to strengthen non-proliferation regimes such as NPT was led by the idea of preventing terrorist to acquire

⁶⁷⁹ OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 27, 2010 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=87433>.

⁶⁸⁰ OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 2011 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>.

⁶⁸¹ OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 28, 2014 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=104596>.

⁶⁸² OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, January 24, 2012 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=99000>.

⁶⁸³ OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, February 12, 2013 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=102826>.

⁶⁸⁴ BUSH, George W. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, February 2, 2005 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58746>.

nuclear weapons.⁶⁸⁵ The top priority was given to the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation. Idea of nuclear disarmament was dropped.

However, in 2002, Bush administration signed bilateral *Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty* (SORT) which reduced numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads.⁶⁸⁶ But redeployed weapons did not mean destroyed. Bush administration did not strive to achieve serious nuclear disarmament commitments. NPR declared their hope that their dependency on nuclear weapons will be reduced which would lead to smaller nuclear forces. However, since their national security policy called for flexible response to proliferation threats, they sought to develop new types of small and tactical nuclear weapons.

When Obama brought into the discourse again the idea of complete nuclear disarmament and with it also proposal to significantly reduce nuclear armament of the U.S. and Russia, the U.S. and Russia began again negotiating possible nuclear reductions of nuclear arsenals. Obama affirmed that this will lead to global effort of securing nuclear material worldwide.⁶⁸⁷ This effort led to New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START Treaty), which facilitated that fewer nuclear weapons would be deployed.⁶⁸⁸

8. 1. 4. Threat of Nuclear Testing

Since 1992 the U.S did not perform any nuclear test, therefore, the threat of nuclear testing was largely desecuritized. Nuclear testing was part of the nuclear discourse only in response to foreign demonstrative nuclear testing and when the U.S. government considered ratification of the CTBT. The U.S. Congress continued to opposed ratification of the CTBT since it would not be beneficial for the U.S. Bush administration declared their opposition to the ratification of the CTBT. But they also declared they will abide by the testing moratorium.⁶⁸⁹ On the contrary, Obama promised to vigorously pursue ratification of CTBT since verification capability to detect nuclear testing significantly improved and the U.S. could retain its nuclear capability without further nuclear testing. He stated: “After more than

⁶⁸⁵ Initiatives such as International Nuclear Material Protection, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, Proliferation Security Initiative, Terrorism Prevention Act, or National Implementation Plan for Counterterrorism.

⁶⁸⁶ Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT). Signed in Moscow on May 24, 2002, entered into force in June 2003.

⁶⁸⁷ OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, February 12, 2013 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=102826>.

⁶⁸⁸ OBAMA, Barack. Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, January 25, 2011 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88928>.

⁶⁸⁹ U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review: Transcript, 2002 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1108>.

five decades of talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned.”⁶⁹⁰ The National Academy of Science report stated that ratification of the CTBT would not in any way diminish the U.S. nuclear capability.⁶⁹¹ This report further promoted the ratification campaign.

8. 2. Nuclear Disarmament Movement Level (2001-2014)

8. 2. 1. Nuclear Threat to the World

Anti-nuclear organization usually copied the governmental desecuritization of a threat of a global nuclear war. However, the nuclear disarmament movement continued to securitize the threat of nuclear war in order to stress the importance of abolishment. They were stressing that nuclear exchange might still occur. Recent studies suggested that even though it was not likely that the U.S. would be dragged into a nuclear exchange, they considered that there was a possibility of a nuclear exchange between other nuclear countries such as Pakistan and India.⁶⁹² They were stressing that there still existed more than 20,000 nuclear weapons and even though the general nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia was not likely, there still existed a threat of an accidental nuclear exchange. The nuclear disarmament movement urged that “if these nuclear weapons exist indefinitely, they will definitely be used.”⁶⁹³ Also Kissinger declared: “Nuclear Weapons have rendered war between countries possessing them less likely—though this statement is unlikely to remain valid if nuclear weapons continue to

⁶⁹⁰ OBAMA, Barack. Remarks By President Barack Obama in Prague As Delivered, The White House, 2009 [online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.

⁶⁹¹ KRAUSS, Lawrence. It’s Time for the U.S. To Finally Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: A recent report removes all of the legitimate scientific objections to ratifying the agreement, *Slate*, April 2012 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now.html.

⁶⁹² GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE. Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 16, 2010 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/regional-nuclear-war-could-devastate-world-population-report-warns/>.

⁶⁹³ HARRELL, Eben. Why Nukes are the Most Urgent Environmental Threat, *Ecocentric*, *Time magazine*, February 25, 2011 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://science.time.com/2011/02/25/why-nukes-are-the-most-urgent-environmental-threat/>.

proliferate into countries with a different attitude toward human life or unfamiliar with their catastrophic impact.”⁶⁹⁴

The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* continued to reflect their perception of nuclear threat on their Doomsday clock. In 2002, they shifted it to seven minutes to midnight due to rising threat of nuclear terrorism and the U.S.’s intention to build new nuclear weapons. In 2007, the Bulletin securitized nuclear proliferation of Iran and nuclear testing of North Korea and their concerns that the U.S. and Russia remains “ready to stage a nuclear attack within minutes.”⁶⁹⁵ They securitized that nuclear proliferation and poor attempts to reduce nuclear armaments presented a grave danger to the world. The Bulletin desecuritized the nuclear threat later in 2010 due the new START treaty and then again securitized in 2012 due to the CTBT treaty ratification failure.⁶⁹⁶ Thus they maintained their position that the existence of nuclear weapons by themselves presented the greatest threat to the world. In 2005, the anti-nuclear movement organized anti-nuclear massive march for the purpose of gathering support for the nuclear abolishment.⁶⁹⁷

In 2006, Kofi Annan declared nuclear weapons to be a “unique existential threat to all humanity” and the greatest present danger due to both crisis of confidence of nuclear non-proliferation regime and the rise of terrorism who attempts to acquire nuclear weapons which increases the danger nuclear weapons will be used.⁶⁹⁸ He stressed that it is the threat to all humankind. Anti-nuclear movement promoted the vision that nuclear terrorism was a threat to all humans. Kofi Annan urged a complete nuclear disarmament. He asserted that the public debate wrongly focuses on the threat of nuclear proliferation while, in fact, it should concentrate on the evilness and threat of nuclear weapons itself.⁶⁹⁹ By emphasizing that nuclear weapons are weapons of self-annihilation, nuclear states could not so easily reserve their right to possess certain amounts of nuclear weapons. Kofi Annan called that the current

⁶⁹⁴ KREPON, Michael. *The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia*, p. 7. [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf>.

⁶⁹⁵ BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. Doomsday Clock: Timeline [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/timeline>.

⁶⁹⁶ BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS. *It is 5 minutes to midnight*, January 10, 2012 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://thebulletin.org/press-release/it-5-minutes-midnight>.

⁶⁹⁷ WITTNER, Lawrence S. *Confronting the bomb: A Short history of the World Nuclear Disarmament movement*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 219.

⁶⁹⁸ ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

⁶⁹⁹ ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

non-proliferation and disarmament efforts are situated within a ‘mutually assured paralysis’ because countries are unwilling to move forward with disarmament because their adversaries might attack them. For this purpose, Annan urged to proceed with disarmament and non-proliferation in the same time. He stressed that despite the disarmament agreements, there are still attempts to develop new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons and more than 27,000 nuclear weapons remain in service, while approximately 12,000 of them are actively deployed by 2006.⁷⁰⁰

In this spirit, in 2008, a group of influential politicians and activists established Global Zero, a international movement with the aim to achieve nuclear disarmament. They declared that in order to eliminate nuclear threat and to achieve global zero, it is essential to stop spread of nuclear weapons, secure all nuclear material, and eliminate all nuclear weapons.⁷⁰¹ They were stressing both the nuclear threat to the world as well as the threat to the U.S. posed by the nuclear terrorism. They emphasized that nuclear disarmament was the primary goal and non-proliferation regimes were not enough.

8. 2. 2. Nuclear Threat to the U.S.

Anti-nuclear movement focused on the securitization of nuclear proliferation. They stressed that nuclear proliferation could present “one of the greatest dangers to the stability of society since the dawn of humans.”⁷⁰² One of the greatest nuclear proliferation threats were considered to be Iran, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq. In response to general securitization of the Iran threat, Kenneth Waltz proclaimed that Iran should have a right to possess nuclear weapons in order to ensure its own security. Moreover, he declared that it would lead to regaining of the stability in the Middle East after Israel destabilized it. In overall, new nuclear-weapon states usually contributed to regional and world stability and international security. He based his theory on the hypothesis that nuclear weapons contribute to balance of power and nuclear deterrence which leads to strengthened stability. He stated that Iran and Israel would have deterred each other since no nuclear powers waged wars against each

⁷⁰⁰ ANNAN, Kofi A. Lecture at Princeton University. A Lecture At Princeton University on November 28, 2006. Transcript available in Press release, In Lecture At Princeton University, Secretary-General Calls For Progress On Both Nuclear Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/10767.

⁷⁰¹ GLOBAL ZERO. *Who We Are* [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.globalzero.org/our-movement/who-we-are>.

⁷⁰² GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE. Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 16, 2010 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/regional-nuclear-war-could-devastate-world-population-report-warns/>.

other.⁷⁰³ His argument is based on the balance of power theory. Waltz slightly disregarded possible threats implied in having a nuclear Iran because he perceived nuclear proliferation as a positive stability feature which the U.S. might benefit from.

Waltz as a nuclear optimist and an advocate of nuclear deterrence theory regarded nuclear weapon to be a stability building instrument. He declared: “Those who like peace should love nuclear weapons.”⁷⁰⁴ He considered nuclear weapons to be the only true deterrent. Waltz assumed that nuclear states would be responsible when considering the usability of nuclear weapons. Moreover, he did not believe that nuclear disarmament was feasible and governmental efforts genuine. He argued that even though the U.S. government proclaimed its willingness to achieve nuclear disarmament, there were no clear signs that they would take concrete steps toward this goal in order to drop its nuclear armament below second strike capability. Thus, the U.S. could not expect that other nuclear states would really consider following their path in spite of the fact that Obama proclaimed that they would maintain a safe and effective nuclear arsenal. He suggested that the U.S. government did not really planned to reduce all its nuclear arsenal and only needed to reach some international cooperation in order to ensure prevention of nuclear terrorism.⁷⁰⁵

Waltz’s argument against nuclear zero was based on an assumption that nuclear states would tend to hide some nuclear weapons and pretend they got rid of all weapons. Waltz stated that states could not be trusted in matter of disarmament and enforcement of nuclear zero was therefore not feasible.⁷⁰⁶ Waltz declared: “With conventional weapons, countries worry about winning or losing. With nuclear weapons, countries worry about surviving or being annihilated.”⁷⁰⁷ Waltz assumed that it was possible that states would reduce their nuclear armaments, but it could not be expected that states would get rid of all nuclear weapons because of the anarchical society where actors cannot trust each other. In anarchical society, states build nuclear weapons in order to secure themselves from the nuclear attack. Therefore, Waltz securitized nuclear weapons as a security guarantee which induces stability.

Several journalists also argued that this goal of nuclear disarmament is counterproductive. Harold Brown and John Deutch labeled elimination of all nuclear weapons

⁷⁰³ WALTZ, Kenneth N. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2012.

⁷⁰⁴ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010.

⁷⁰⁵ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p.92.

⁷⁰⁶ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, pp.92-93.

⁷⁰⁷ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 93.

a fantasy. According to them, declaring a goal of such elimination “will not advance substantive progress on nonproliferation; and it risks compromising the value that nuclear weapons continue to contribute, through deterrence, to U.S. security and international stability.”⁷⁰⁸ Moreover, they declared that any alterations of the U.S. nuclear policy would have no impact on other states behavior and their determination to proliferate. Even if they committed themselves not to proliferate they would still be able to develop nuclear weapons clandestinely. Then, possible impact of the U.S. nuclear posture on terrorists is also elusive. “[H]ope is not a policy, and, at present, there is no realistic path to a world free of nuclear weapons. One cannot, for example, make the scientific knowledge and technological know-how that make nuclear weapons possible disappear. ...Nuclear weapons are not empty symbols; they play an important deterrent role, and cannot be eliminated.”⁷⁰⁹ For this reason they argued that it is essential for the U.S. to maintain their nuclear capability to deter others. They hold a standpoint that nonproliferation is a right choice, but not at the expense of nuclear arsenal of nuclear-weapon states.

Sagan criticized Waltz for downplaying the nuclear threat and stressed the urgency for nuclear abolishment. The most problematic part of Sagan’s vision of a zero state was a question of how to prevent uncertainty among nuclear weapons states and persuade them that all of them would be playing by the rules and would not retain a small amount of nuclear weaponry out of the sight of others. Sagan concluded that these former nuclear states would retain the option of nuclear rearmament if a proliferating country is caught red handed.⁷¹⁰ According to this scenario, complete nuclear disarmament would be feasible and highly desirable. The primary obstacle of this scenario would be possible violations to nuclear nonproliferation regime. Sagan saw nuclear weapons free world not as a utopian one without conflicts over national interests but as a world with wars where nonproliferation commitments would be enforced by conventional forces.⁷¹¹ Therefore, he suggested that the world without nuclear threat would be a possibility. Moreover, according to Sagan, nuclear weapons were and in the future they will be even more dangerous: “The Cold War witnessed many close

⁷⁰⁸ BROWN, Harold and DEUTCH, John. The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy, *Wall Street Journal*, New York, November 19, 2007, A19.

⁷⁰⁹ BROWN, Harold and DEUTCH, John. The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy, *Wall Street Journal*, New York, November 19, 2007, A19.

⁷¹⁰ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 90.

⁷¹¹ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 91.

calls; new nuclear states will be even more prone to deterrence failures.”⁷¹² He urged that nuclear weapons are becoming more and more dangerous.

Besides this securitization of nuclear proliferation which might threaten to the U.S., the anti-nuclear movement securitized also the threat of nuclear terrorism which was regarded also as the greatest security threat to the U.S. by the government. However, these concerns over the likelihood of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons were already present within the nuclear disarmament debate. This perception became stronger after the evidence showed that terrorist groups made attempts to access certain unsecured nuclear weapons in Russia. This threat of nuclear proliferation was significantly strengthened after the 2001 attacks after which the general public felt increasingly frightened of the possibility that terrorists could have seized nuclear power from unsecured places or penetrated nuclear power plant areas in order to get nuclear material. They increasingly securitized the issue of safety of nuclear power and secure power plants. The general public increasingly feared that terrorists might have acquired a radioactive dirty bomb.

In 2007, four former American statesmen George P Shultz, William J Perry, Henry A Kissinger and Sam Nunn released an essay titled *A World Free of Nuclear Weapons*. They argued that nuclear weapons, functioning as a deterrent, maintained international security during the Cold War. Now, reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent is becoming very hazardous. The strategy of MAD also cannot be replicated because of the number of potential nuclear enemies who increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons would be used. According to them, terrorists possessing nuclear weapons which are “the ultimate means of mass devastation ... are conceptually outside the bounds of a deterrent strategy.”⁷¹³ They were primarily concerned that nuclear weapons will get into hands of terrorists which could not be deterred unconventionally by possible retaliation. For this reason, the government considered nuclear cooperation and nuclear non-proliferation regime to be the main approaches how to prevent nuclear terrorism. However, anti-nuclear movement perceived nuclear abolition and control as the only way how to prevent terrorists obtaining nuclear material. Nuclear terrorism was regarded as the greatest existential threat to the U.S. They argued that in the spirit of NPT,

⁷¹² SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, pp. 94-5.

⁷¹³ SHULTZ, George P., PERRY, William J., KISSINGER, Henry A., and NUNN, Sam. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007.

they urged nuclear-weapons states to agree on urgent steps such as securing nuclear material and achieving ratification of the CTBT.⁷¹⁴

Scott Sagan objected to Waltz's conclusions and stated that the zero state is the only alternative to having many nuclear weapons states. He argued that within the Iran proliferation debate currently prevailed a strong belief that no additional nuclear weapons state would be tolerated. Sagan criticized Waltz for not taking risks of nuclear proliferation into account. Sagan noted that with "more nuclear nations, and more atomic weapons in global arsenals, there will be more opportunities for terrorists to steal or buy the bomb."⁷¹⁵ There was a widespread concern, that by allowing countries such as Iran and Syria to acquire nuclear weapons, the likelihood that terrorists would obtain these nuclear weapons or radioactive dirty bombs increased as well. Sagan securitized the need to abolish nuclear weapons because otherwise terrorists might have acquired nuclear weapons. On the contrary, Waltz ignored the threat of nuclear terrorism. Waltz stated that terrorists might cause some damage, but they were inherently weak actors incapable of strong statements.⁷¹⁶ For this reason, he desecuritized the threat of nuclear terrorism.

The 2010 international Nuclear Security Summit agreed on protection of nuclear materials from terrorists. Also the 2010 NPT review conference acknowledge the need to improve protection of nuclear power plants.⁷¹⁷ In the center of the debate was a threat of nuclear proliferation which might present dangers to the societal security. Moreover, they often stressed that spread of nuclear weapons to problematic rogue countries might result in terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons.

8. 2. 3. Nuclear Threat to an Individual

The debate focused on a continual refusal of the Congress to ratify the CTBT. The campaign focused on disproving their objections and supporting the idea on the basis of moral considerations. They even stated that the U.S. has no right to criticize others for nuclear testing if they could not even ratify the CTBT: "If we do not forgo the right to test our own

⁷¹⁴ SHULTZ, George P., PERRY, William J., KISSINGER, Henry A., and NUNN, Sam. A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007.

⁷¹⁵ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 88.

⁷¹⁶ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 96.

⁷¹⁷ SAGAN, Scott D. and WALTZ Kenneth. The Great Debate, *The National Interest*, September/October 2010, p. 90.

vast arsenal, it is hypocritical to vilify North Korea for testing nuclear weapons or Iran for possibly trying to manufacture them.”⁷¹⁸ Without ratification of the CTBT, the U.S. has no right to hold a moral high ground. Missing ratification of the CTBT moved the possession of nuclear weapons into a major moral discussion.

Humanitarian threat posed by nuclear weapons was not particularly securitized as the greatest existential threat in researches era. However, anti-nuclear movement made certain attempts to emphasize how nuclear testing affected human health and environment. In 2003, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Weapons (IPPNW) released a statement in which they protested against the proposition of Bush administration to develop new types of low-yield nuclear weapons which might be more usable in the battlefield. They maintained that collateral damage of such use would be unacceptable and definitely not minimal as what Pentagon stated. They stressed that the use of nuclear earth-penetrating weapons might result in additional release of biological and chemical materials stored in targeted underground enemy bunkers. Furthermore, they described in details the consequences of radiation exposure on human body and what radiation sickness really means.⁷¹⁹ They outlined what impact the use of tactical nuclear weapons would have on enemy’s population. In addition, IPPNW emphasized that nuclear testing will have long-term severe health and environmental effects. They noted that nuclear testing will eventually cause 2.4 million human cancer fatalities. “Every human alive now and over the next tens of thousands of years will carry radioactive elements created by nuclear tests, causing an increase – however small -- in their lifetime cancer risk.”⁷²⁰ They securitized that nuclear testing presents an existential security threat because it will have effects on every human for thousands of years.

The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) was established in 2007 by Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The aim of their global campaign was

⁷¹⁸ KRAUSS, Lawrence. It’s Time for the U.S. To Finally Sign the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty: A recent report removes all of the legitimate scientific objections to ratifying the agreement, *Slate*, April 2012 [online], accessed 22.10.2014. Available at http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/04/comprehensive_nuclear_test_ban_treaty_the_u_s_should_ratify_it_now.html.

⁷¹⁹ INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Testing, and Depleted Uranium Weapons: Medical Consequences and Implications for NPT Compliance*, 2003[online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.ippnw.org/statements/2003-earth-penetrating-nuclear-weapons.pdf>.

⁷²⁰ INTERNATIONAL PHYSICIANS FOR THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Testing, and Depleted Uranium Weapons: Medical Consequences and Implications for NPT Compliance*, 2003[online], accessed 22.12.2014. Available at <http://www.ippnw.org/statements/2003-earth-penetrating-nuclear-weapons.pdf>.

to raise public support and to pressure states to: 1) acknowledge that any use of nuclear weapons would “cause catastrophic humanitarian and environmental harm”, 2) acknowledge that there is a “universal humanitarian imperative” to ban nuclear weapons, 3) acknowledge that nuclear-weapons states have an obligation to eliminate these weapons completely, and 4) support negotiations for a treaty banning all nuclear weapons.⁷²¹ They focused on humanitarian threat posed by nuclear weapons. They wanted to raise public awareness of humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons and to persuade governments to support the ban as well. ICAN also organized the Nuclear Abolition Day.

8. 2. 4. Nuclear Threat to the Environment

If compared with other environmental threats such as climate change threat, environmental nuclear threat was still considered to be the greatest threat to the Earth's environment. “Nuclear weapons are the greatest environmental danger to the planet from humans.”⁷²² Anti-nuclear organizations regarded full-scale nuclear war as not particularly likely. However, they securitized that even the limited nuclear exchange would have devastating environmental effects. Researchers often noted that regional nuclear war would cause as many human fatalities as the World War II and disrupt the global climate for a decade at minimum. Also that the civilization remains at risk of nuclear winter despite reductions of nuclear arsenals.⁷²³ Current studies, which used computer modeling, suggested that even a limited nuclear exchange would cover the atmosphere by smoke all over the world within two weeks. The reduction of sunlight would cause a drop of temperature by 2.3 degrees for several years. It “would block out the sun with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of around 1 billion people.”⁷²⁴ The report suggests that such nuclear war could trigger worldwide panic which would halt the whole agricultural trading

⁷²¹ INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO ABOLISH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. *Campaign overview* [online], accessed 24.12.2014. Available at <http://www.icanw.org/campaign/campaign-overview/>.

⁷²² JHA, Alok. Climate threat from nuclear bombs, *The Guardian*, December 12, 2006 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2006/dec/12/nuclearindustry.climatechange>.

⁷²³ STARR, Steven. Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflict, *International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation* [online], accessed 24.12.2014. Available at <http://inesap.org/node/11>.

⁷²⁴ GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE. Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World Population, Report Warns, *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, March 16, 2010 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/regional-nuclear-war-could-devastate-world-population-report-warns/>.

According to the 2011 study, a nuclear conflict involving 100 exploded nuclear weapons could create a long-term damage to the ozone layer which would result in extreme levels of ultraviolet radiation reaching the land. The exposure to UV radiation could result in skin cancer, vision impairment, and plant reduction. In a total outcome, it could result in a *global nuclear famine* and ecological catastrophe.⁷²⁵ In response to these scenarios, researchers concluded that the end of civilization could be a result of a much smaller nuclear exchange than expected. “It seems it does not take a cold war posture of MAD—mutually assured destruction—to threaten civilization as we know it.”⁷²⁶ They noted that limited nuclear exchange would destroy the natural environment which would result in the end of current civilization.

⁷²⁵ SCHNEIDMILLER, Chris. Limited Nuclear War Could Deplete Ozone Layer, Increasing Radiation, *Global Security Newswire* February 24, 2011 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/limited-nuclear-war-could-deplete-ozone-layer-increasing-radiation/>.

⁷²⁶ HARRELL, Eben. Why Nukes are the Most Urgent Environmental Threat, *Ecocentric, Time magazine*, February 25, 2011 [online], accessed 26.12.2014. Available at <http://science.time.com/2011/02/25/why-nukes-are-the-most-urgent-environmental-threat/>.

9. Conclusion

Our study examined how different types of nuclear threat changed the content and the meaning of nuclear threat perception according to the way how the nuclear threat was securitized by different actors. We made an attempt to uncover how the social construction of the nuclear threat within the U.S. discourse changed the perception of nuclear weapons since 1945. We examined how the nuclear threat was perceived on two different levels of government and nuclear disarmament movement and how particular actors constructed the content of these different types of nuclear threats. It signified how in different period of securitizing actors emphasized what they perceived as an existential threat.

We concluded, that our research confirmed both our research hypotheses. Nuclear weapons are being perceived primarily as political tool which functions as a safeguard of the security of the U.S. On the basis of nuclear deterrence theory, nuclear weapons creates more stable environment which enable state to use nuclear weapons as policy instruments. Also the threat of horizontal proliferation started to be securitized as a greatest existential threat after the 2001 attacks. Threat of nuclear terrorism was in the discourse for several decades. Kennedy proclaimed nuclear proliferation in 1960s as greatest threat, however, it was not perceived to be the existential threat by the administrative not the general public in overall.

In the beginning of nuclear era was the period of nuclear optimism. Government typically approached nuclear weapons as a conventional instrument of war and the nuclear monopoly as a great diplomatic advantage. The U.S. government was considering their actual employment even after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. On the other hand, government was particularly frightened that the general public might start protesting against nuclear weapons development. This led to strict censorship about effects of nuclear weapons and nuclear testing. Their initial approach slightly changed when the Soviet Union tested their first nuclear bomb. However, government still preferred nuclear development over nuclear control negotiations. The Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons significantly changed the whole discourse. Not only they labeled nuclear weapons as non-conventional, but they also started securitizing the threat of nuclear war and the possibility of use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. Moreover, the U. S. governmental level began to refuse the use of nuclear weapons and started to emphasize the nuclear deterrence theory. Initially, nuclear disarmament movement struggled with limited information about nuclear weapons and nuclear testing. They began securitizing immorality of the use of nuclear weapons and the threat to the world. Use of nuclear bombs was perceived as a threat of annihilation of all life

on the Earth. Limited information caused little securitization of the threat of radioactivity and consequences of nuclear testing.

Nuclear threat evolved significantly in 1950s due to the development of thermonuclear bomb and increasing knowledge about the nuclear weapons testing among by the general public. Governmental level began securitizing the inevitability of the use of nuclear weapons in a massive retaliation attack. However, after the Soviet Union performed its first thermonuclear test, the Eisenhower administration shifted their perception of the possible use of nuclear weapons. Gradually, Eisenhower began securitizing that the use of nuclear weapons was unthinkable and nuclear war could not be won. On the other hand, the U. S. government maintained their nuclear deterrence strategy and their right to use nuclear weapons. The greatest existential threat to the U.S. was perceived to be the nuclear weapons development of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the U.S. securitized primarily the vertical proliferation threat of nuclear arms race. They did not perceived possible other nuclear countries as overly threatening since the U.S. possessed huge nuclear armament and the U.K. was not regarded as their adversary. The U.S. government struggled with the threat of nuclear testing and the public which pressured them to stop testing in response to the ill-famous nuclear testing incident in 1954. By the mid-1950s, anti-nuclear movement increasingly securitized the threat of nuclear arms race as the primary threat which makes the nuclear war more likely. As a result, the accident represented a watershed in the societal construction of nuclear threat because it dramatically shifted the perception of health and environmental dangers of nuclear testing into the center of the public debate. The anti-nuclear movement increasingly protested against nuclear testing and urged the U.S. government to halt the testing. They emphasized primarily health impacts of testing on future generations, especially children. Also, they began stressing environmental dangers since radioactive particles were found in baby teeth which got there by contaminated cow's milk. Anti-nuclear movement securitized the threat of nuclear radiation and consequences of nuclear testing.

In 1960s, governmental level securitized the need for additional nuclear buildup in order to close the missile gap. Even though both presidential administrations acknowledged the irrationality of the use of nuclear weapons, they nevertheless continued with accelerated nuclear arms buildup. The U.S. government considered the vertical nuclear proliferation of the Soviet Union as the primary existential threat to which they must respond by increased nuclear weapons buildup. However, they also securitized the need to stop horizontal nuclear proliferation. The U.S. administration securitized the need to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the first step toward nuclear disarmament. They pledged to a promise of abolishing

nuclear weapons in the future. Also, in response to public pressure to cancel untenable atmospheric testing program, they signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty. By the end of the 1960s, Johnson securitized the need to establish anti-ballistic missile system. Anti-nuclear movement followed with its securitization of a threat of nuclear testing which endangered primarily human health. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, anti-nuclear movement grew on the momentum which exposed how nuclear deterrence was inherently unstable and how easily nuclear holocaust could be attained. In the aftermath of the Crisis, anti-nuclear movement continued with its agenda urging the primary importance of halting nuclear testing. Their securitizing move resulted in signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty and moving nuclear testing underground. This led to abandoning nuclear testing agenda and overall apathy within the anti-nuclear movement which shifted their attention to the threat of nuclear vertical proliferation.

Disengagement of anti-nuclear movement which occurred during the late 1960s and early 1970s caused that nuclear threat was not particularly securitized on both levels of analysis. Nixon administration continued to promote the ABM system. The U.S. administration securitized it on the basis of a defensive shield which was discursively constructed to be an existential necessity in order to survive an enemy attack. They securitized the need to shield the U.S population against the threat of nuclear attack. However, such shield would lack efficiency and was designed to protect retaliatory forces, not population. Besides that, they proceeded with limited war plans which suggested their willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons against a wide range of targets. Governmental level continued with the détente approach which was considered to be a promising direction toward lessening international tensions and decreasing the likelihood of nuclear war or accidental launch. The U.S. securitized primarily vertical nuclear proliferation as the greatest threat. However, by the late 1970s, continued nuclear disarmament efforts started to be ridiculed in the public debate. Several politicians securitized that because of the rising international tensions and strong likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear disarmament and détente efforts threatened the security of the U.S.. The anti-nuclear movement reemerged within the discourse by the mid-1970s with the increasing securitization of the nuclear environmental threat. Disarmament movement started connecting the threat of nuclear weapons to the threat of nuclear power and emphasized the threat of nuclear reactors. They securitized primarily environmental threat and ecological effects of nuclear tests which exploded during previous decades. Since the atmospheric testing and visible effects on human health were no longer within the debate,

they shifted their focus on how testing changed the atmosphere. By the late 1970s they adopted the securitization of the higher probability of nuclear war.

During the 1980s, Reagan administration securitized the imminence of nuclear war. As a result of his securitizing move, he proposed a “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative which was supposed to effectively shield the U.S. against enemy attacks. Since there were many nuclear weapons states, there were also many potential proliferation threats which might launch a nuclear attack against them. Additionally, Reagan proceeded with development of new types of tactical nuclear weapons, especially the neutron bomb. His administration securitized the neutron bomb as an instrument which would enable the U. S. to use nuclear weapons on battlefield more likely. Anti-nuclear movement regrouped in the form of umbrella agenda of nuclear freeze. They securitized the need to freeze nuclear testing and development. Gradual rise of public knowledge about effects of nuclear testing led anti-nuclear activist to reconsider effects of nuclear testing on atmosphere and biosphere and how a nuclear war would affect it.

By the early 1990s, the threat of nuclear war was largely desecuritized by the official detargeting. The nuclear threat of the use of nuclear weapons shifted to concerns about a nuclear or WMD attack from rogue states. The U.S. particularly securitized the threat of uncontrolled nuclear weapons and a threat of nuclear proliferation by rogue countries. In response to new proliferation threats, the Clinton administration enforced the indefinite extension of the NPT. It reflected how the rise of different actors enable them the shift from primary emphasis of vertical to horizontal proliferation. Bush administration responded to anti-nuclear sentiment and declared the nuclear testing moratorium. Even though the threat of nuclear testing was widespread, the government did not ratify the CTBT due to the concern that it might disrupt their credible nuclear deterrence. Anti-nuclear movement grasped this securitization of horizontal nuclear proliferation and started focusing on the threat of rogue states. The movement emphasized the need to control nuclear material and nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear movement also called for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as a guarantee that no nuclear testing would violate the health of individuals. Environmental threat changed its scope and examined how would a limited nuclear war affect atmospheric and biosphere conditions of human living.

Since 2001, governmental level continued to desecuritize the threat of nuclear war and securitized the use of nuclear weapons, in this case by terrorists and rogue states against the U.S. homeland. Bush administration stressed the threat of rogue states which might support terrorist groups. Obama administration emphasized the need to abolish nuclear weapons. He

urged that complete nuclear disarmament is more urgent than ever because nuclear proliferation of nuclear material into hands of terrorists is inevitable if international cooperative would not ensure otherwise. Anti-nuclear movement adopted the governmental agenda and started emphasizing the need to control nuclear material and the need to reach nuclear zero. They securitized the idea of complete nuclear disarmament as the only way how to protect the U.S. homeland and its population against terrorist nuclear attack.

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