

Abstract

Counterinsurgency warfare has had an ambiguous position in the American military tradition. After the Vietnam experience, the population-control-oriented doctrine of David Galula was almost forgotten. Current war of the United States of America in Afghanistan turned out to be a conflict where application of the doctrine comes in question. It is codified in the 2006 *FM 3-24* counterinsurgency manual. The author of the thesis *Spojené státy americké a protipovstalecký boj: Afghánistán* asks a question whether the behavior of American armed forces in Afghanistan was in compliance with the COIN doctrine of David Galula.

The author looks at the conflict through lens of Galula's eight counterinsurgency steps, as defined in his book *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. The author of the thesis looks for factors that could influence fulfilment of the steps and he gives the factors in perspective with American strategic culture, as defined in the thesis.

The analysis shows that the fulfilment of Galula's eight steps has never occurred. Traditional military thinking partially locked successful adaptation of American armed forces to the environment of Afghanistan. However, the author comes to the discovery that in terms of strategic culture, there were some shifts in Afghanistan.