ABSTRACT

Richard Rorty's main thesis in his work *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* centers on a critique of representationalism in a fundamentally relativistic way. The aim of this dissertation is to grasp Rorty's ideas in broader sense as a critique of inadequate interpretation of *knowing-that* and shift the attention to *knowing-how* as a key to new understanding the success of natural sciences. The fact that something is *reproducibly* possible for us to make in the surrounding world is not relative, and it is precisely in this way that technology (*knowing-how*) spreads so successfully even at multi-cultural level. In contrast, the *explanatory* function (*knowing-that*) of the natural sciences is relative, making sense only in the context of what is already known and accepted. Natural sciences are so successful because their experiments and only then take agreement of hypothesis with experimental practice (*knowing-how*) as the criterion of its acceptability. This dissertation offers, as a way out of Rortian relativism, the concept of “open authority” and proposes a new development in philosophic pragmatism based on it.