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**The UN Security Council: the Voting  
Procedure and Effectiveness**

*Bakalářská práce*

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## **Abstrakt**

Objektom skúmania tejto bakalárskej práce je Bezpečnostná rada OSN (BR), jej hlasovacia procedúra a akcieschopnosť. V práci je aplikovaná hypotetická zmena hlasovacej procedúry BR založená na potrebe negatívnych hlasov minimálne dvoch alebo viacerých stálych členov BR pre zablokovanie danej rezolúcie. Cieľom práce je zistiť, aké by boli dopady hypotetickej zmeny hlasovacej procedúry BR OSN a ako by bola ovplyvnená schopnosť stálych členov BR OSN presadzovať ich národné záujmy. Analýza sa sústreďí na zablokované rezolúcie BR vetované iba jedným z jej piatich stálych členov. Cieľom poslednej časti analýzy je zistiť, či existuje určité prepojenie medzi štruktúrou hlasovacej procedúry BR a bezpečnostnými otázkami preberanými vo VZ. Analýza je založená na predpoklade, že negatívny hlas jedného zo stálych členov BR na hlasovaní vo VZ vedie k absencii danej témy v BR, nakoľko by bola týmto stálym členom pravdepodobne zablokovaná. To znamená, že určité bezpečnostné témy sa v BR nevyskytujú z dôvodu štruktúry jej hlasovacej procedúry.

## **Abstract**

This Bachelor thesis deals with the UN Security Council (SC), its voting procedure and effectiveness. A hypothetical change of the SC voting procedure is applied in the thesis. Such change consists in establishing the requirement of at least two or more negative votes of the SC permanent members for a draft resolution to be rejected. The goal is to discover what would be the consequences of the hypothetical change of Security Council voting procedure on voting outcomes. In addition, I aim to find out how would change the ability of the Security Council permanent members to further their national interests? Analysis is focused on the blocked SC resolutions with the negative vote of only one of its five permanent members. In the last part of the analysis I aim to discover, whether there is any connection between the structure of the SC voting procedure in the security issues discussed in the GA. Analysis is based on the presumption, that some security issues do not become a matter of the SC voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members in the GA. Such issues would be probably blocked in the SC. It means that certain security issues do not appear in the Security Council due to the structure of its voting procedure.

## **Kľúčové slová**

Bezpečnostná rada OSN, hlasovacia procedúra, veto, stály člen, akcieschopnosť, Valné zhromaždenie OSN

## **Keywords**

UN Security Council, voting procedure, veto power, permanent member, effectiveness, UN General Assembly

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## **1. Prehlásenie**

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V Prahe dňa 7.5.2015

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## **Pod'akovanie**

Na tomto mieste by som rada pod'akovala vedúcemu svojej bakalárskej práce, Michalovi Parízkovi, M.Sc., Ph.D., za jeho konštruktívnu kritiku a cenné rady pri písaní.

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## **List of acronyms**

UN – United Nations

SC – Security Council

GA – General Assembly

USSR – Soviet Union

USA/US – United States

UK – United Kingdom

## Introduction

Recently, considerable attention has been paid to the United Nations Security Council and its effectiveness. Security Council is being largely criticised for failing in its primer duty - maintenance of international peace and security. Previous research has demonstrated that one of the main reasons of the Council's decreased effectiveness are shortcomings of its voting procedure. To solve this problem, many researchers have proposed various voting procedure-oriented reforms of the Security Council. Major part of these reform proposals includes changes in the Security Council membership, restriction of the veto power, or its total abolition. Up to now, only one Security Council reform has been effected in 1965. This reform led to the expansion of non-permanent membership from six to nine member states. However, such reform did not have any impact on the permanent members' voting power.

My thesis deals with the Security Council decision-making procedure and the implications of its hypothetic change. This change would consist in modifying conditions of the use of veto. Concretely, it would establish the requirement of at least two or more negative votes of the permanent members for a draft resolution to be rejected. This raises two main research questions of the thesis: *What would be the consequences of the hypothetic change of Security Council voting procedure on voting outcomes? How would change the ability of the Security Council permanent members to further their national interests?* Such change of the voting procedure is purely hypothetic and I aim to discover possible consequences of its application. Firstly, I aim to identify all the cases relevant for this kind of voting procedure change. Secondly, analysing the voting behaviour of permanent members in these resolutions, I specify the issues affected by the change of voting procedure. Finally, I define the permanent member most frequently using the veto power on issues constituting its national interests. Additionally, I conclude with the implication of this change on its ability to further its national interests. Since the establishment of the United Nations Security Council in 1946 until 2014, the veto power has been used by all the Security Council permanent members. Table 1 shows that the most vetoing power is Russia (the Soviet Union), which casted its negative vote 130 times. The United States used the veto 83 times, the United Kingdom 32 times, France 18 times and China 11 times. Out of the 228 vetoed resolutions, 195 were blocked by one single veto-wielding power. It means

that approximately 85% of blocked resolutions would be affected by the change of the Security Council voting procedure. A detailed analysis of the use of veto by the permanent members is shown in the Annex 1.

Table 1: Use of veto by the UN Security Council permanent members in 1946-2014

Year	USA	Russia (USSR)	UK	France	China	Number of vetoes
<b>1946-1955</b>	0	80	0	2	1	83
<b>1956-1965</b>	0	26	3	2	0	31
<b>1966-1975</b>	12	7	10	2	2	33
<b>1976-1985</b>	34	6	11	9	0	60
<b>1986-1995</b>	24	2	8	3	0	37
<b>1996-2005</b>	10	1	0	0	2	13
<b>2006-2014</b>	3	8	0	0	6	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>274</b>

Source: List of UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

The blocked resolutions of the Security Council and the voting records would be the basic data for my analysis. As to the blocked resolutions, key ones are those with only one veto casted. By this means, I identify all the cases relevant for the voting procedure change explained above. Using the voting records I define the concrete powers, which blocked the resolutions by their single veto. These are the powers, whose national interests would be affected by establishing such voting procedure change. In order to identify the topics affected by the voting procedure change, a content analysis of 195 vetoed resolutions (corresponding to app. 400 pages of text) needs to be provided.

An additional part of my analysis is concerned with the General Assembly. The General Assembly agenda includes questions related to the international peace and security. However, some of the security-oriented resolutions adopted by the General Assembly were not discussed in the Security Council. By this reason, I include the General Assembly resolutions in the analysis. In this part I aim to extend the consequences of the Security Council voting procedure change on the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. In order to achieve this objective, I focus on the General Assembly security-oriented resolutions and I study the voting behaviour of the five Security Council permanent members. Key resolutions are those with negative vote

of one single Security Council permanent member. I presume that these resolutions did not become a matter of the Security Council voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members in the General Assembly. Hence, it is probable that such permanent member would take a negative vote in Security Council, as well, and prevent the Council from adopting the resolution.

The originality of my thesis consists in the extension of the veto power on at least two or more Security Council permanent members without any changes in membership. Many possible reforms have been proposed and analysed so far, however, this type of reform is not a common objective of the existing research.

In my research I came to conclusion that the permanent member most frequently using the veto power on its own is Russia (USSR) (122 times). However, it does not make it the state most affected by the voting procedure change. From the data obtained I conclude that the issue most affected by the voting procedure change would be the situation in Middle East. In addition, the permanent member whose ability to further its national interest would be affected the most are the United States. The United States has used its veto power as the only permanent member 60 times. 42 times it served to block resolutions related to the Middle East question and Israel, the US more important ally in the region.

My work is divided into four parts. In the first theoretical part I resume the existing research on the United Nations Security Council and its voting procedure. Consequently, I define the concept of the voting procedure, institutional design, voting outcomes and national interest. In addition, I describe the methodology of the analysis. In the second part, I first identify all the resolutions affected by the procedural change of the Council. It means, I focus on the resolutions where only one veto has been casted. In this part I gradually examine the use of veto by all five permanent members. With respect to every permanent member, I define the issues affected by the voting procedure change. In the final part of this chapter I bring up conclusions that can be drawn from the previous analysis. Here I describe the impact of the voting procedure change on the concrete power and its interests. In the third part, the analysis is extended with resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. This part presents the voting behaviour of the Security Council permanent members in the security-oriented resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Finally, the fourth part summarizes the results of this work.

# **1. Voting in the Security Council: literature review, concepts, data and methodology**

This thesis will be concerned with the voting procedure of the UN Security Council and its hypothetical change. The voting procedure is often considered to be the cause of the decreasing effectiveness of the Security Council. The following part will first review the existing research, later it will deal with structure of the voting procedure and finally, basic concepts and method of the analysis will be explained.

## ***1.1 Literature review***

Several publications have appeared in recent years documenting the UN Security Council. They examine the functioning of the Council in general, its decision-making procedure, the voting power of the permanent members and the veto privilege. The studies aim to solve the problem of decreased effectiveness of the Council. In addition, they introduce various reform proposals suggesting the extension of the permanent membership and abolition or restriction of the veto power.

One of the general publications about the origin, structure and functioning of the United Nations is *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (2007) written by over forty scholars and edited by Sam Daws and Thomas G. Weiss. This handbook examines the UN's development and problems and challenges the organization has been facing in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The handbook also describes the functioning of all UN's bodies (including the Security Council and the General Assembly), their structure, voting procedure and the summary of the vetoed Security Council resolutions.

Another collective publication concerning especially the Security Council is *The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945* (2010) edited by Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum. The book includes the list of armed conflicts the Council had to deal with. Moreover, it contains case studies of certain armed conflicts and examines the manner how the Council intervened in the conflict and how it acted or failed to act.

The academic study *The UN Security Council* (1958) written by Leland M. Goodrich analyses the failure of the Security Council in its primary function, which is

responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Author emphasizes on the increasing inability of the Council to serve its purpose. The consequent breakdown of the lines of functional separation between the two UN bodies – Security Council and General Assembly, and the gradual assumption of the General Assembly in the maintenance of the international peace and security are being discussed as well. Goodrich sees the primary cause of the Security Council's decline in the failure of the wartime alliances of USSR, UK and USA and the rivalry among these powers.

Another discussed issue is the legitimacy of the Security Council. Martin Binder and Monika Heupel study this problem in *The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates* (2014). They examine the legitimacy of the Council analysing the statements made by the UN member states. They conclude that the Council suffers from a legitimacy deficit. It is caused by the member states' concerns regarding the Council's procedural shortcomings. They propose the procedural improvement of the Security Council and adoption of a procedure-oriented reform.

Another study concerning the legitimacy of the Council is *The Political Origins of the UN Security Council's Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force* (2005) by Erik Voeten. He analyses the Council's ability to legitimize or delegitimize the use of force by forming commonly accepted political judgements. He defines legitimacy as the belief of actors that the military intervention authorized by the Council is not induced by a direct self-defence against an attack. He argues that states look for a reassurance about the consequences of proposed military interventions.

Part of the Security Council research is focused on the voting procedure of the Council and its possible improvements. *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (1998) by Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws reflects on the developments in the procedure of the Security Council and its changes since the Cold War. The authors examine the voting procedure of the Council and consider whether there is a need for Charter revision in order to make the Security Council more effective. They conclude that a better way to make the Council work more effective are changes in national attitudes and national policies of the member states.

The Barry O'Neill's study *Power and Satisfaction of the United Nations Security Council* (1996) aims to answer the question how the Security Council could be more equitable and what would happen to the members' voting power, if the voting procedure was changed. O'Neill introduces the example of adding a nonveto member. However, adding more seats to the nonveto group would decrease their total power. He suggests

that without veto, the member has almost no power and it is not in a position to make a difference in the decision-making process.

The decision-making procedure of the Security Council is also the subject of the study of James E. Todd *An Analysis of Security Council Voting Behaviour* (1969). His analysis is based on the polarization between the Western and the Soviet blocks. This is the dominant factor in the international political system during most of the Security Council's existence. He examines how this polarisation has been reflected in the voting behaviour of the Security Council, what voting alignments have frequently occurred on what issues. Finally, he makes a summary of voting trends over the years.

Hans Köchler in his study *The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council* (1991) examines the contradictions between the UN Charter and its real applications. Overall, he designates the veto privilege as the main cause of the Council's inability to act as a democratic body. The Yalta formula, which introduced the veto privilege into the voting procedure of the Security Council, is the biggest contradiction. This formula does not comply with the principle of the sovereign equality of the states included in the UN Charter. It causes an inequality among the member states.

The voting procedure in general is the subject of *Voting Procedures in International Political Organizations* (1947) by Wellington Koo. This analysis of decision-making process in some international organizations demonstrates the functional theory of voting procedures. As suggested, the unanimity rule is not in accordance with the requirement of functional efficiency upon which any such organization should be founded. The unanimity rule is abandoned in the Security Council, which adopted the majority vote. Thus, it does not insist on the equality of voting, but adopts the principle that the privilege should be in proportion to responsibility.

Another basic factor of the Security Council analysis is the veto power of the permanent members and its implications. Origin and history of the veto in general is elaborated in the study of Richard A. Watson *Origins and Early Development of the Veto Power* (1987). This piece is covering the veto development which explains the origin of the veto in the early Roman Republic. Additionally, it outlines origins of the president's veto power back to former governments in the USA and the various forms it has taken.

The veto power is examined in the article *Voting and Vetoing* (1996) written by Eyal Winter. The objects of his study are the committees with the veto power in general.

Afterwards he applies his survey to the decision-making procedure of the Security Council. The basic aspects of his survey are the excessive power of veto members and the minimal power of nonveto members. He aims to find a means to decrease the excessive voting power of veto members. The voting power of permanent members is rising by vetoing repeatedly the same issue. Therefore, the most effective way to diminish this power is to restrict the number of vetoes each permanent member is allowed to submit on the same issue.

Sally Morphet in her study *Resolutions and Vetoes in the UN Security Council: Their Relevance and Significance* (1990) discusses the role and the structure of the Security Council. She tries to discover in what way the vetoes have been legally and politically relevant and significant. She concludes that the main political reason for taking a negative stand and using the veto power is usually connected with these four headings: East-West rivalry, self-protection, protection of allies and the bringing to an end the expressions of frustration.

The Security Council research and the debate on its current effectiveness led to various proposals for its reform. A paper questioning the current power and effectiveness of the Security Council is the publication of Brian Cox *United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and Possible Consequences* (2009). This paper presents some of the proposals for the Security Council reform and draws their possible consequences. Many of these proposals call for the abolition of the veto power to increase fairness, legitimacy and representation of the Council. The author finds the reform necessary, yet no reform can be realized without maintaining the veto power. He suggests the extension of permanent membership by adding two more seats. He recommends Brazil and Nigeria as appropriate candidates.

James A. Paul in *Security Council Reform: Arguments about the Future of the United Nation System* (1995) introduces a summary of the most common proposals for the Security Council reform. He is questioning the credibility and legitimacy of the Council in maintaining international peace and security. As the major problem he sees the fact, that the Council's acting is motivated by the geopolitical interests of the permanent members. The veto power, which isn't concurrent with the Charter principle of sovereign equality of states, is considered even bigger obstacle than the permanent membership. The abolition of the veto power or permanent membership is improbable to achieve, as the permanent members are likely to block these proposals of the Charter

changes. Although, some modest changes like restricting the circumstances in which a veto can be cast, could be possible.

Bardo Fassbender demonstrates a new approach to the UN reform in his publication *UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A Constitutional Perspective* (1998). He offers his own reform proposal based on the idea of the UN Charter as a constitution, settled on three principles: the principle of equality suggesting inclusiveness, the principle of representativeness based on inequality in order to reflect the importance of some members, and the principle of effective governance limiting the ability to block an action preferred by the majority. He recommends a system of periodic election by which certain seats would be allocated for ten- or twelve-year terms instead of permanent membership. Furthermore, he would reduce the use of veto while taking into account the possibility of requiring the negative votes of two permanent members for a veto to be effective, which is the basis of my thesis.

*Security Council Reform: A New Veto for a New Century?* (2005) written by Jan Wouters and Tom Ruys considers the most problematic uses of the veto power, the various veto reform proposals and the respective national positions. Besides the usual proposals calling for abolitions of the veto power or restriction of its use to certain circumstances, he also introduces the proposal submitted by the African Union and some UN member states. This requires the veto to be casted by two or more permanent members simultaneously. However, he doesn't bring any further analysis of this proposal. In conclusion, the author suggests a mechanism which allows the veto to be overruled in cases of ethnic cleansing, large-scale massacres of civilians or genocide.

The publications proposing the redesign of the Security Council require addition of the new member states and the abolishment of the veto power. Some of them consider the requirement of casting two or more negative votes of the Security Council permanent members for a veto to be effective. However, none of them offers a deep analysis and the consequences of such reform. My thesis aims to fill this gap and introduce possible consequences of this kind of change in the voting procedure.

## ***1.2 Basic concepts***

As mentioned above, in my thesis I examine the voting procedure of the Security Council, its structure and hypothetical change. In order to provide the analysis, it is important to explain the basic concepts, which are the voting procedure, the voting outcomes and the national interest.

### **1.2.1 Voting procedure**

The voting procedure is formal mechanism by which the Security Council makes its decisions (Todd, 1996 p.62). Its structure is defined in the Article 27 of the UN Charter. The Charter provides for majority vote and states that each member of the Security Council has one vote. Decisions are made by an affirmative vote of nine members, in other words, by a three-fifths majority. The Charter distinguishes between procedural and substantive matters. The substantive matters would be the basis of my thesis, while the procedural ones are excluded from the analysis. Regarding the substantive matters, decision-making process is supplemented by the veto privilege of Great Powers. This voting pattern results from defining five permanent members of the Council (UN Charter, art. 23, para. 1) and assigning them a special position in the voting process (UN Charter, art. 27, para. 3). It means that “decisions are made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting” (UN Charter, Chapter V, art. 27, para. 3). However, the regulation requiring a member state to abstain from voting when a party to a dispute is valid only in certain cases and rarely obeyed (Köchler, 1991 p.2).

### ***Institutional design***

The development of international institutions depends on their institutional design. Institutional design is a mechanism developed from rational interactions among states and other international actors in order to solve specific issues (Koremenos, Lipson, Sindal, 2001 pp. 762-768). Through the rational design “states and other international actors, acting for self-interested reasons, design institutions purposefully to advance their joint interests” (Koremenos, Lipson, Sindal, 2001 p. 781). This theoretical concept is based on the presumption, that international institutions constitute means for

furthering state's own goals, and they are designed accordingly (Koremenos, Lipson, Sindal, 2001 p. 762). Theory of institutional design considers five key design features. One of them is "control", which explains how the collective decisions are made. An important aspect of this design feature are voting arrangements. They imply two important voting rules – the equality of all members' votes, and the veto power of a state or a subgroup of states. In such case, the state's vote carries a special weight and the veto power assigns a state some control over the institution. This control is related to state's importance to the institution. In case of the Security Council permanent members it is related to their military and financial support essential to the enforcement of resolutions. Moreover, veto power provides a state an unilateral protection (Koremenos, Lipson, Sindal, 2001 pp. 772-792).

Providing for a majority vote, the Council has abandoned the unanimity rule and the principle of equality. Most formal international organizations operate on the basis of sovereign equality (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, Zaum, 2008 p. 135). However, this principle is often being considered unprofitable in the view of powerful states. Hence, the voting procedure of the Council is based on the presumption that the privilege should be in proportion to responsibility. Structure of the voting procedure places the permanent members in an advantaged position in the voting process, while the non-permanent members are quite disadvantaged. Veto power gives the permanent member an excessive power to further its own interests through blocking resolutions regardless of the votes of other member states. While the permanent members have high voting power, states without veto hold almost none. A nonveto member can make a difference only if all five veto members plus exactly three other nonveto members support the resolution. If more than three support it, the nonveto member's vote becomes redundant. If less than three, its vote is ineffective. (O'Neill, 1996 pp. 219-223)

By this reason I apply a hypothetical change of the Security Council voting procedure. This change consists in establishing the requirement of casting at least two or more negative votes of the permanent members for the veto to be effective. This change would imply a higher number of resolutions adopted by the Security Council. Moreover, it would avoid the blocking of resolutions by a single veto-wielding state.

### **1.2.2 Voting outcomes**

Change of the voting procedure would have a considerable impact on the voting outcomes. By voting outcomes are meant the votes taken by permanent members in the blocked draft resolutions. The veto has been totally used 274 times in order to block 228 draft resolutions. 195 draft resolutions were blocked by the veto used by only one of the five permanent members. It means that approximately 85% of the blocked resolutions would be affected by the change of the voting procedure.

Voting behaviour of permanent members strongly influences the number of adopted resolutions, as the veto power gives them a high voting power. Consequently, the number of adopted resolutions influences the total effectiveness of the Council. In terms of effectiveness, veto is a block to action. A single veto-wielding power can stop the action, and no action could be taken against a permanent member or without its consent (Goodrich, 1958 p.274). Frequent blocking of resolutions is considered to be a reason of the decreased effectiveness of the Council. Especially, during the Cold War period the Council was paralysed by the superpower opposition (Lowe, Roberts, Welsh, Zaum, 2008 p. 136). Change of the voting procedure establishing the requirement of at least two vetoes for a resolution to be blocked, would imply a higher number of adopted resolutions. By this means, the effectiveness of the Security Council would increase.

### **1.2.3 National interest**

National interests of the permanent members constitute an important concept of the analysis of voting outcomes. Realistic theory of international relations defines international politics as a struggle for power. The concept of interest is defined in terms of power, as well. When states aim to realize their goals by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power. In the state-centred approach, all state actions seek to keep, demonstrate, or increase their power (Morgenthau, 1948 p.13).

I assume that states cast their votes in accordance with their national interests. By means of casting their votes they aim to protect and further these interests. Furthermore, I assume that negative voting of the Great Powers and using the veto power to block some draft resolutions is motivated by their aim to further their national interests. Moreover, they intend to prevent another member states from adopting resolutions incompatible with their interests.

The results of my thesis will present the implications of such procedural change on national interests of the Great Powers. Further, they will define the power, whose interests would be affected the most. In other words, the most frequent single veto-wielding power.

### ***1.3 Methodology***

Finally, in this part I explain the method applied in the analysis. In my thesis I analyse voting behaviour of Security Council permanent members in vetoed resolutions applying the method of descriptive statistics. Particular attention is paid to resolutions with one single veto casted.

The cases relevant to the voting procedure change are identified in the first part of the analysis. This part examines resolutions rejected due to negative vote of one permanent member. At first, I focus on topics of vetoed resolutions. Subsequently, I consider the importance they have for the vetoing powers, in other words, if they constitute power's national interest. Having considered these aspects, the analysis continues in two steps: identifying all the issues relevant to given voting procedure change, and defining the power whose interests would be affected by adopting of this change.

These conclusions are drawn in the second part of the analysis. From the findings obtained in the previous part I conclude, what issue repeatedly blocked in the Security Council voting process would be affected the most by the adoption of the voting procedure change. Additionally, I identify the permanent member, whose ability to further its national interests would be affected the most, as well.


Furthermore, I add one more part examining voting behaviour of the Security Council permanent members in the General Assembly. In this part I aim to extend the implications of the Security Council voting procedure change by involving the General Assembly resolutions. Key resolutions are those security-oriented where only one of the Security Council permanent members took a negative vote. Hereby, these resolutions did not become a matter of the Security Council voting process. Analysing these resolutions I focus on their topics and the powers whose votes were negative. Moreover, I examine their interests in given area. I presume that the absence of these resolutions in Security Council is caused by negative vote of one of its permanent members in General

Assembly. In other words, these resolutions were not discussed in the Security Council, because one of its permanent members took a negative vote in such matter in the General Assembly. Accordingly, such permanent member would probably take a negative vote in Security Council, as well, and the resolution would be rejected. By this part of the analysis I aim to identify the security-oriented resolutions which did not become part of the Security Council voting process due to the structure of its voting procedure. Moreover, I apply the consequences of the hypothetical change of the Security Council voting procedure on another UN body and extend the initial analysis.

## **2. Likely consequences of voting procedure change: descriptive analysis of UN SC vetoed resolutions**

The following part of the thesis analyses the concrete data resulting from the voting behaviour of the Security Council permanent members. Having examined the resolutions adopted and blocked by the Security Council, following data represented in the Graph 1 were collected. Since the creation of the United Nations Security Council in 1946 until the end of 2014, the total number of 2195 resolutions has been adopted by Council. During the same period, 228 resolutions have been rejected due to the veto exercised by the Council's permanent members. In order to block these resolutions, the veto has been casted a total of 274 times by all of the five permanent members. Following graph represents adopting and blocking of resolutions by the UN Security Council during 1946-2014.

Graph 1: Adopting and blocking of resolutions by the UN Security Council in 1946-2014



Source: UN SC adopted resolutions (<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml>) and UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

As follows from the graph above, an inverse tendency is observed when comparing the progress of adopting and vetoing the Security Council resolutions. Considering the resolutions adopted by the Council, the difference between the Cold War and post-Cold War period is obvious. During 1946-1990, the average number of resolutions adopted by the Council in one year was 15 resolutions. Later, at the turn of 1990 and 1991 there is a rapid growth in the number of resolutions adopted by the Council, as well as in the number of operations conducted by the United Nations. (Berdal, 1996 p. 75) During 1991-2014, on average 63 resolutions yearly were adopted. The growth of the number of adopted resolutions in the post-Cold War period is caused by the effort of the Security Council member states to reach agreement on issues of common interest. Consequence of such agreement was the UN's bigger involvement in attempts to resolve conflicts within states. (Berdal, 1996 p. 75)

Regarding the vetoed Security Council resolution, the highest number of vetoed resolutions falls within the first ten years of the Council's functioning. Contrast between the Cold War and post-Cold War period is clear, as well. While during 1946-1990 the average number of vetoed resolutions was six resolutions yearly, since the 1991 this number has decreased to one vetoed resolution yearly. The high intensity of blocking resolutions during the Cold War period led to the low effectiveness and the paralysis of the Council. Such situation was caused by the inability of the major powers to reach consensus and collaborate in defence of common interests. (Berdal, 1996 p.73)

In the 1990 the activity of the Council grew due to the agreement of Great Powers on multilateral action. Nonetheless, this agreement does not imply the harmony of permanent members' interests after the Cold War. (Voeten, 2001 p. 846) Relations among the Great Powers were changing until the second half of the 1990s. During the first decades of the Cold War, the typical proportion among the Great Powers was 4:1 (US-UK-France-China against USSR). This situation changed after the China's seat was taken by the Mao's communist government. The central lineup among permanent members shifted into 3:1:1 (US-UK-France against USSR, with China in the middle). After the Cold War it has shifted into 2:1:2 (US-UK opposing China-Russia, with France in the middle). (Huntington, 1999 p. 42)

In spite of the actual decreasing number of vetoed resolutions, the excessive voting power of the permanent members remains unchanged. The Great Powers' ability to block the Council's resolutions is unlimited. I examine the vetoed resolutions in order to discover, whether there is a trend to block a specific issue by a specific power.

Moreover, I aim to discover, whether blocking of some issues by a specific power is related to its national interests.

The rational-institutionalist approach considers the states the main actors in the world politics. Through international organizations, states design social ordings convenient for achieving their goals. Therefore, international organizations constitute “structures enabling states to achieve their ends”. (Abbott, Sindal, 1998 p.6) In addition, states take advantage of centralization and independence of international organizations. It enables them to achieve the goals they are not able to realize on the decentralised basis. (Abbott, Sindal, 1998 p. 27) Following the rational-institutionalist approach, I presume that permanent members make use of their Security Council membership in order to further their national interests and accomplish their goals, which are difficult to achieve on decentralised basis. By taking an affirmative or negative vote, or even by abstaining from voting, the member states express their position on the issues discussed in the Council. I assume that by taking a vote in the voting process, the member states aim to defend and further their national interests. The permanent members’ right to veto is an effective voting pattern, which enables them to simply block the resolutions incompatible with their national interests.

In the following parts I examine the use of veto by every permanent member state. Additionally, I aim to discover which issues are being persistently blocked by a specific power.

## ***2.1 Russia***

Russia (the Soviet Union) has used its veto power a total of 130 times since the creation of the Council in 1946. It makes it the most veto-wielding permanent member of the Security Council. The frequent exercise of veto by the USSR was one of the main reasons of Council’s paralysis during the Cold War period. However, there is a big difference in the use of veto during the Cold War and post-Cold War period. That is to say, the veto power was used more frequently in the USSR era, than after its dissolution in 1991. Until 1991, the USSR was the most frequent user of veto and it casted its negative vote 119 times. During this period, the USSR used the veto only twice together with another permanent member. Huge part of the Soviet vetoes (117 vetoes) was casted by the USSR as the sole permanent member. After the USSR break-down, the

number of vetoed casted dropped and during 1991-2014 Russia exercised the veto power to block only 5 draft resolutions.

Out of the 130 cases when Russia (USSR) used the veto, in 122 cases it was the only permanent member state to cast a veto in order to block a resolution or a part of a resolution. In other eight cases it used the veto jointly with another permanent member state. Russia has blocked one resolution together with France (a resolution concerning the Franco's fascist regime in Spain). Another seven resolutions were blocked by the common veto of Russia and China. Five of them regarded the situation in Middle East, another one the Zimbabwe question, and one resolution concerned the situation in Myanmar.

The 122 cases with the sole veto of Russia (USSR) are essential for the analysis. I divided these uses of veto into following groups based on the vetoed issue: *UN Membership, Middle East, Spain, Greece, Congo, South-East Asia, India, Republic of Korea, USA, Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, Regulation of armed forces, Former Socialist Republics, Corfu Channel, Atomic Energy Commission, Situation in Berlin, China, Guatemala, Hungary, Kuwait, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina.*

Division of the vetoes casted by Russia (USSR) implies a diversity of issues vetoed throughout the functioning of the Council. There is not any clear repetition of issues persistently blocked by Russia (USSR). The most frequently blocked issues shown in the Table 2 are the UN membership applications, the Middle East question, Spain, Greece, the South-East Asia region, India and the situation in Congo. The table below shows the frequency of casting a veto on these issues by the USSR.

Table 2: Issues most frequently vetoed by the USSR

Issue	Number of vetoes	Period
UN Membership	51	1946-1961
Middle East	10	1946-1984
Spain	6	1946
Greece	6	1946-1947
South-East Asia	6	1949-1979
India	6	1957-1971
Congo	6	1960-1961

Source: List of UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

The USSR exercised its veto power 51 times in order to reject the UN membership applications of 17 different countries (Jordan/Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos, Spain, Japan, Republic of Korea, Viet-Nam, Mauritania, Kuwait). The applications of some of these countries were rejected repeatedly. Among the UN membership applications denied by the USSR, the most frequent one is the application of Italy. However, this group is quite heterogeneous and does not show any clear Soviet intention to use the veto against one specific country.

The most frequently vetoed compact group of resolutions is the Middle East group. The USSR used its sole veto on this issue 10 times during 1946-1984. The fact that vetoing of the Middle East resolutions by USSR falls within the Cold War period can be explained by the following factors. The first one is that the Arab-Israeli conflict constituted a proxy conflict in the Cold War and it represented the global rivalry between the two nuclear-armed superpowers – USA and USSR. Another one is related to the expansionist objectives of the USSR. Making use of the political instability of the Middle East after the World War II and the Arab-Israeli conflict, the USSR entered in the region with the goal of eliminating the Western influence and expanding their own. The last factor is based on the Soviet effort to ensure the safety of its borders with the Middle East countries. (Slater, 1990 pp. 558-561)

Concerning the Middle East conflict, the USSR limited its use of veto on blocking resolutions related to Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, the major Soviet allies in the Middle East region. The resolutions regarding Lebanon request the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the territory and condemn the United Arab Republic's interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Resolutions related to Syria involve the Israeli actions and concern the General Armistice Agreement between both countries. Finally, the two resolutions concerning Egypt refer to Suez Canal and the restriction on the passage of ships trading with Israel.

By the voting behaviour in the Middle East question, the USSR expressed its support to the revolution-oriented Arab regimes and opposed the regimes associated with the West. (Campbell, 1972 p. 127) After the USSR break-down, Russian interests are likely to remain in the Middle East region. (Slater, 1990 p. 577) This is confirmed by the Russian voting in the Council. Since 1991, Russia has totally used the veto 11 times (alone and jointly with another permanent member). 4 of these blocked resolutions concerned the Middle East question. However, Russia was not the only

permanent member to block such resolution. Its negative vote was accompanied by the veto of China. Hence, the 4 Middle East resolutions vetoed by Russia do not constitute part of the analysis, whereas they would not be affected by the change of the Security Council voting procedure.

Other issues frequently blocked by the USSR are the Spanish question, Greece, South-East Asia, India and Congo.

Concerning the Spanish question, the USSR used the veto six times in 1946 in order to block a total of two resolutions related to the Franco's fascist regime in Spain. The resolutions which became matter of the Security Council meetings S/PV.47 and S/PV.49 condemned the Franco regime and considered it to be likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Moreover, they suggested the practical measures directed towards the removal of the Franco's fascist regime representing a threat to peace.

Another issue frequently blocked by the USSR is the situation in Greece. One of the vetoed resolutions includes a complaint of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic against Greece. Other five resolutions concerned the Greek frontier incidents with Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. These resolutions condemn the assistance of Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government.

The South-East Asia group implies a variety of issues vetoed by the USSR. The blocked resolutions included in this group regard four countries – Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Democratic Kampuchea. As to the Indonesian question, the resolutions commend the assistance to Indonesia in the time of achieving independence. The blocked resolution regarding Thailand demanded observing of the situation in the country. Another blocked resolution relates to the armed incidents in Malaysia. The last two resolutions demand withdrawal of all foreign forces from Democratic Kampuchea and condemn the armed intervention in the internal affairs of Democratic Kampuchea and armed attack against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

Another motive for the Soviet veto became also India. Five of the six vetoed resolutions related to India, concerned the dispute between India and Pakistan. The sixth one condemned the use of force by India in Goa, Damao and Diu.

Finally, in 1960-1961, the USSR took its negative vote in order to block resolutions considering the situation in Congo six times, as well. In general, these

resolutions consider the unsatisfactory economic and political situation that continued in the Republic of Congo.

All of the frequent uses of veto in order to block a specific issue fall within the USSR era. Major part of these blocked resolutions regarded the proxy conflicts in the Cold War. By using the veto power, the USSR expressed support to its Cold War allies and aimed to diminish the US influence. By this means, many of the Soviet vetoes can be explained with the opposing interests of the USSR and the USA in the Cold War. Since the formation of Russian Federation, a seldom use of Russian veto is being observed. The resolutions blocked by the sole Russian veto concern Cyprus (2 resolutions), Bosnia and Herzegovina (1 resolution), Georgia (1 resolution) and Ukraine (1 resolution).

Russian foreign policy is quite heterogeneous and former Soviet republics (especially Ukraine) constitute its special part. Russia aims to increase its influence especially in the post-Soviet states. (Kubicek, 1999 pp. 547-556) This might explain the recent Russian vetoes on the Georgia and Ukraine question.

Examining the voting outcomes, it is apparent that Russia, resp. USSR, is the most veto-wielding power of the Security Council. However, there is not any specific issue persistently blocked by Russia, resp. by the USSR. The highest number of vetoes cast in order to block one type of resolutions is 10 (the Middle East question), which form only app. 7, 7% of its total use of veto. Generally, Russia exercises the veto on different types of resolutions without any obvious repetition. Based on these results, it can be concluded that Russia does not exercise its veto power exclusively in order to further its national interests.

## ***2.2 United States***

The second most frequent user of the veto power are the United States. The USA has totally exercised its veto power 83 times. 60 times it has used the veto to block a resolution as the only Security Council permanent member and 23 times it has used the veto jointly with one or two other permanent members. 13 of these resolutions were blocked by the concurrent negative votes of USA, UK and France during 1974-1989. These resolutions regarded especially the Namibia and the South Africa question, but also the situation in Panama, Libya and Bahrain. The Namibia and the South Africa

question, Falkland Islands and Southern Rhodesia were crucial became a reason for the USA and UK negative votes in 1970-1988. Totally 10 draft resolutions were blocked by these two powers.

Key resolutions for the analysis are those with the sole veto of the USA, it means, the 60 resolutions rejected due to the negative vote of the USA. These 60 resolutions can be divided into following seven groups with respect to their topics: *Middle East (42 uses of veto)*, *Nicaragua (8)*, *UN Membership (6)*, *Bosnia and Herzegovina (1)*, *Grenada (1)*, *South Africa (1)* and *Panama (1)*.

Resolutions considering the situation in Middle East form the major part of the resolutions vetoed by the USA (42 out of 60, resp. 83 resolutions). Providing a more detailed analysis of the Middle East resolutions, it is possible to divide them into following sub-groups: *Palestine*, *Israeli military activities against Lebanon* and *Arab territories occupied by Israel*. Resolutions concerning the situation Palestine constitute the most numerous sub-group within the Middle East question. These resolutions involve recognition of the inalienable national right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, military operations of Israel in the Gaza Strip, promotion of the dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian sides, Israeli settlement activities in the occupied Palestinian territory, deportation of Palestinian civilians by Israel and Israeli practices violating the human rights of the Palestinian people. The Lebanon question includes resolutions regarding Israeli attacks against Lebanon, demand to the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Lebanon and invasion of Southern Lebanon by Israeli forces and its abusive practices against the Lebanese population. Finally, the resolutions regarding other Arab territories occupied by Israel cover the Israeli acts of aggression in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights, Israeli acts violating the sanctity of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem, Israeli settlement activities in East Jerusalem and cessation of Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories.

In general, all of these resolutions regard the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East region. The Arab-Israeli conflict was often on the top of the UN agenda. However, the US frequent use of veto on this issue led to the Council's inability to act and the US voting behaviour stands in the way to diminish internal conflicts of the region by the UN action. (Sarsar, 2004 pp. 457-458) Another fact emerging from the analysis of Middle East resolutions vetoed by the USA is that in all of the 42 blocked resolutions, USA was the only Security Council member state (respecting the permanent and non-permanent members) to take a negative vote in such matter. Concretely, in 24 of these

resolutions, 14 states took an affirmative vote, while the USA was the only state opposing the resolution. The factor of permanent member's abstention from voting is present in 18 of these resolutions (18 abstention of the United Kingdom and 6 abstentions of France). Abstention from voting can be considered as support to the vetoing state's decision, however, it cannot be certainly explained as state's negative position in the issue (as explained further). These findings allow me to conclude that the US voting behaviour in the Security Council clearly shows its effort to block the resolutions oriented against Israel.

Another type of resolutions repeatedly blocked by the USA are the resolutions related to Nicaragua and military activities that have taken place in and against Nicaragua. The Nicaragua question became an issue repeatedly vetoed by the USA during 1982-1990. These resolutions concern the crisis in the region of Central America in general, further they consider the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua, financing of military activities against Nicaragua by the USA, events at the residence of the Ambassador of Nicaragua in the Republic of Panama and the US economic sanctions against Nicaragua.

Other resolutions less frequently blocked by the USA concern status of the Panama Canal, UN membership applications of Vietnam and Angola, South Africa's armed invasion against the People's Republic of Angola, United States-led armed intervention in Grenada and extension of the mandate of the UN mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The results obtained in the analysis of the USA voting behaviour indicate an obvious trend of blocking one type of resolutions - situation in the Middle East territory. In case of the USA, despite the higher number of resolutions vetoed by Russia, the US ambition to further its national interest through voting in the Security Council is more explicit. This makes it the target state for my analysis.

### ***2.3 United Kingdom***

The third most frequent vetoing Security Council permanent member is the United Kingdom. Similarly as the United States, despite the lower number of vetoed resolutions than the USSR, there is a clear tendency to veto one specific issue. The United Kingdom has totally used its veto power 32 times. In seven of these cases, the

United Kingdom was the only power to block a draft resolution. All of these resolutions regarded the same issue – the situation in Southern Rhodesia. In other 25 cases, United Kingdom cast the veto together with other one or two permanent members. Both, the United Kingdom and the United States, took a negative vote ten times in issues regarding the situation in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia and Falkland Islands. Only two resolutions were blocked by the concurrent vetoes of the United Kingdom and France. Both of them concerned the Palestine question. Thirteen times the United Kingdom has exercised the veto with other two permanent members, the United States and France. In these cases, the three powers took their negative votes in order to block the resolutions considering the situation in South Africa, Namibia, Panama and Libya.

The resolutions vetoed by the United Kingdom can be divided into seven groups: *Southern Rhodesia*, *South Africa*, *Namibia*, *Libya*, *Panama*, *Falkland Islands* and *Palestine*. However, only one issue has been blocked by the single use of the United Kingdom - the Southern Rhodesia question. This is an evident case of using the veto power in order to further the state's national interests. Southern Rhodesia is an issue constituting the former national interest of the United Kingdom. The country has adopted an authoritarian and racist character since the British annexation of the territory in 1923. Since 1963 the goal of the white Rhodesians, forming approximately 6% of the population, was the political independence from the United Kingdom. However, the independence of the territory was refused until the installation of genuine majority rule within the country. The minority rule present in Southern Rhodesia was incompatible with the principle of equal rights and self-determination expressed in the UN Charter. The country's independence was unilaterally declared in 1965 by the Ian Smith regime and existed as an unrecognized state until achieving its independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. (McDougal, Reisman, 1968 pp. 1-4)

The permanent members' abstentions are an interesting factor emerging from the analysis of resolutions vetoed by the UK. In all of the seven cases, when the UK casted its sole veto on the Southern Rhodesia question, at least one or two other permanent members abstained from voting, while all the other member states (permanent and non-permanent members) took an affirmative vote. The abstaining powers are the United States (seven times) and France (six times).

### *Abstentions from voting*

The voluntary abstention from the voting process is a controversial question of the Security Council voting procedure. According to the UN Charter, when a permanent member is a party to a dispute, its abstention from the voting process is obligatory and it is not considered to be a negative vote. However, a voluntary abstention of a permanent member not being a party to a dispute is not specified within the Charter. According to some interpretations, decision on a substantive matter cannot be adopted by the Council, if there is an absence of the affirmative vote of any of the permanent members. Following such interpretation, abstaining from voting would be another way of exercising the veto power. (Liang, 1950 pp. 694-696) However, the practice of the Security Council does not interpret the voluntary abstentions as equal to the veto power. (Stavropoulos, 1967 p.742)

In case of considering the voluntary abstentions as a way to express a negative stand on the matter, positions of the United States and France on the Southern Rhodesia question could be considered negative, as well. However, as the question of the voluntary abstentions is not clear, I consider these seven resolutions regarding the situation in Southern Rhodesia to be blocked by the single negative vote of the United Kingdom.

Having examined the United Kingdom voting behaviour in the Security Council, I conclude that, in spite of the lower number of vetoes casted in the voting process than the USSR and the USA, the United Kingdom is the second power most frequently using the veto in order to block the issues constituting its national interests.

## ***2.4 France and China***

France and China are the least veto-wielding permanent members of the Security Council, what place them into a marginal position with respect to my analysis.

France has totally used the veto 18 times, but only in two cases its veto was the only one to block a resolution. By this means, France is the least blocking power with regard to the single use of veto. 13 times it exercised its veto power together with the United Kingdom and USA, two times with the United Kingdom (as mentioned above)

and once with the USSR in the Spanish question in 1946. Two resolutions blocked by the single French veto regard the situation in Indonesia and Comoros.

China has exercised its veto power 11 times so far, seven times together with the USSR and four times alone. The resolutions vetoed together with the USSR regard especially the situation in Syria, but also Zimbabwe, Myanmar and the Middle East. The resolutions blocked by the only veto of China are the ones considering the membership of Mongolia and Bangladesh in the United Nations and the situation in Central America and Macedonia.

## 2.5 Conclusion

After the examination of the Security Council permanent members' use of veto, following conclusions can be drawn. From the total number of 228 resolutions blocked by the permanent members' use of veto, 195 were blocked by the veto of one sole permanent member. It means, app. 85% of the blocked resolutions would be affected by the change of the Security Council voting procedure, and consequently adopted by the Council. As seen in the Table 3 below, the biggest part of this group is constituted by the resolutions blocked by the sole veto of Russia (USSR) (122 vetoes), what makes it the most frequent sole user of veto power among the five Security Council permanent members. The second most veto-wielding permanent member are the United States, which took a negative vote 60 times in order to block a resolution by its own. Less dramatically vetoing permanent members are the United Kingdom (7 sole vetoes), China (4) and France (2).

Table 3: Use of veto by the SC permanent members

	<b>Russia/USSR</b>	<b>USA</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>China</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Total</b>
Sole use of veto	122	60	7	4	2	195
Total use of veto	130	83	32	11	18	274

Source: List of UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

Issues covered in this numerous group of resolutions vetoed by one sole permanent member are various. From the previous examination of every single permanent member state it can be concluded that the issue most frequently blocked by one single veto is the Middle East question. This issue has been vetoed 52 times (42

times by the USA and 10 times by the USSR). It means, the situation in Middle East constitutes app. 27% of all Security Council resolutions blocked by one single veto. It makes it the issue most affected by the hypothetical change of the Security Council voting procedure. Less frequent issues affected by the this change would be the situation in Nicaragua, Southern Rhodesia, Spain, Greece, South-East Asia, India and Congo. In other issues, a seldom use of one single veto is observed and they form just a marginal part of the analysis.

The evidence above indicates that Security Council permanent member most affected by the voting procedure change would be the United States. Examining the resolutions vetoed by the United States, the US voting on behalf of Israel is obvious, as 42 resolutions out of 60 blocked by the sole US veto concern the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, app. 50% of the total use of US veto (and exactly 70% of the sole US use of veto) constitute the vetoes on behalf of Israel, the US's major ally in the region. Israel constitutes a vital interest of the US foreign policy and the USA is the only state protecting Israel against the rest of the international community. This leads to the conclusion that the USA is the permanent member most frequently using its veto power in order to further its national interest. The US national interest and its involvement in the Arab-Israeli peace process would be largely affected. Moreover, the USA would lose its ability to protect Israel through the UN Security Council. As a consequence, imposing the sanctions on Israel, which have not been adopted due to the US veto, would limited the US active involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the development of the peace process. USA is considered to be the United Nations leader and the world's superpower. Already since the first decade of functioning of the Security Council, it has used the United Nations to carry out its foreign policy. (Swift, 1958 p. 183) For this reason it is very interesting that a simple change of the Council's voting procedure would impose a big difficulty on the US ability to further its national interests.

#### *The US-Israeli relationship*

The special relationship between the United States and Israel has its origins in the crisis in Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan in July 1958. During the time of instability, Israel seemed to be the exclusive pro-Western power in the Middle East region. The relationship even expanded after the Six Day War of 1967. By the late 1990s, Israel became an important ally of the USA and the largest recipient of its foreign aid. (Lieber,

1998 pp. 13-16) In the Middle East, the USA continues exercising the policy of maintaining the balance of force in favour of Israel and it has played an important role in every step of the Middle East peace process. (Rouleau, 1977 p. 169) According to the US voting behaviour in the Council, they apparently aim to defend and further their national interest through voting in the UN Security Council, in other words, to protect prevent the Security Council from adopting resolutions sanctioning Israel. Even George Shultz, the US Secretary of State during 1982-1989, expressed in his document explaining the partnership between the USA and Israel, that the USA “must always make clear to the world, through its votes in the United Nations, that they are a permanent, steadfast, and unshakable ally of the state of Israel.” (Shultz, 1985 p. 123) Therefore, a stable Middle East and alliance with Israel constitute a fundamental US national interest.

To conclude, the data obtained indicate that Israel and the Middle East territory constitute the area most affected by the change of the Security Council voting procedure. In case of change of the voting procedure, 42 resolutions regarding the Middle East situation rejected due to the US veto (and totally 52 resolutions including the USSR vetoes) would be adopted by the Security Council. This change would imply a different evolvement of the Arab-Israeli peace process and adopting of resolutions sanctioning Israel. Moreover, such change would imply a difficulty for the USA in furthering their national interest, concretely the inability to exercise its role as guarantor of Israel's security. It means, that the United States are the power, whose ability to further its national interests would be affected the most. Finally, change of the voting procedure would imply a higher number of resolutions adopted by the Council. Concretely, 85, 5% of the blocked Security Council resolutions would be adopted. A consequence of such change would be higher effectiveness of the Security Council and its better ability to act, especially in the Middle East question.

### 3. UN General Assembly

In the last part of the thesis I extend the analysis with the security-oriented resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly. The General Assembly agenda includes issues such as budgetary matters, financial assessments, considering reports of other United Nations organs, admission of new members and also important questions on peace and security. As to the peace and security questions, “the General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.” (UN Charter, art. 11. para. 2) Despite the fact that most General Assembly resolutions are commendatory, and not binding such as Security Council resolutions, the functional separation between the Security Council and the General Assembly has become less strict. The Security Council’s inability to act in some issues led to the permanent members’ preference to make use of the General Assembly, which has adopted a more active role in the maintenance of international peace and security. (Goodrich, 1958, p. 276) An interesting fact is that some of the security issues discussed in the General Assembly do not appear in the Security Council. For that reason I aim to discover, whether there is any connection between these issues and the votes of the Security Council permanent members in the General Assembly.

To achieve this objective, I examine the security-oriented resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. I focus on the Security Council permanent members’ voting behaviour. The resolutions with negative vote of one single Security Council permanent member constitute the basic data for the analysis. I assume that these resolutions did not become a matter of the Security Council voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members in the General Assembly. Based on this presumption it is probable, that such permanent member would take a negative vote in the Security Council, as well. In this part I extend the implications of the Security Council voting procedure change. Moreover, I identify the topics of resolutions that did not become part of the Security Council voting process due to the structure of its voting procedure. By this means I extend the initial analysis and apply the consequences of the SC voting procedure change on another UN body – General Assembly.

In order to provide the analysis I examine a random sample of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The randomly selected part is constituted by 300 resolutions selected out of the total number of 17 246 resolutions adopted by the UN

General Assembly in 1946-2014. Observing these resolutions, I focused on their topics and the voting outcomes with respect to the votes of the five Security Council permanent members. The General Assembly agenda embraces a big variety of matters. The group of randomly selected resolutions includes issues such as procedural matters, financial matters, budgetary matters, assistance to developing countries, reports of the Secretary General or reports of commissions. In order to identify the security-oriented resolutions, I defined following key words related to the “security” concept: *security, peace, sovereignty, conflict, (dis)armament* and *violence*. I believe these key words are appropriate for distinguishing the security-oriented resolutions from the others. The presence of any one of these key words (in a security context) in the text of these 300 resolutions (corresponding to app. 600 pages of text) would mean that such resolution is security-oriented.

Having examined all of the 300 randomly selected resolutions, I conclude that 65 of them are security-oriented. Among these 65 resolutions, there are issues concerning for example South Africa, Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East, Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, regional disarmament, human rights and terrorism. In four of the security-oriented resolutions the negative vote of one sole Security Council permanent member was taken (Table 4). Furthermore, in all of these four resolutions, as seen below, the negative vote was taken by the United States. Moreover, three of them regard the Middle East question, which is a matter most frequently blocked by the USA in the Security Council, as well.

Table 4: GA security-oriented resolutions with the veto of one SC permanent member

Year	Resolution	Topic	Negative vote	Present key words
1983	A/RES/38/9	Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations	USA	security, peace
1988	A/RES/43/87	Need for a result-oriented political dialogue to improve the international situation	USA	security, peace, conflict, disarmament
2001	A/RES/56/36	Peaceful settlement of the question of Palestine	USA	peace, conflict
2012	A/RES/67/73	Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East	USA	security, peace, disarmament

Source: List of UN GA adopted resolutions (<http://www.un.org/documents/resqa.htm>)

### ***3.1 Conclusion***

In this part I aimed to extend the initial analysis of Security Council vetoed resolutions including the security-oriented resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Many of the security issues discussed in the General Assembly did not become a matter of the Security Council voting process. I presume that it is caused by the negative vote of one Security Council permanent member in the General Assembly. It is probable that such permanent member would take a negative vote in the Security Council as well. Its negative vote in the Security Council would mean immediate blocking of the resolutions. That is why these resolutions became an issue only of the General Assembly agenda.

Considering the findings obtained, it results that approximately 22% of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly would be security-oriented (around 3700 resolutions). In more than 1% of them only one of the Security Council permanent members took a negative vote (around 230 resolutions). It can be presumed that approximately 230 security-oriented resolutions adopted by the General Assembly did not become part of the Security Council voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members. This would be caused by the presumption of its negative vote in such matter in the Security Council voting process, as well, and the consecutive blocking of such resolution.

According to the data obtained from the random sample of resolutions, 1% (around 170 resolutions) of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly would regard the Middle East question. Moreover, the USA appears to be the only Security Council permanent member casting a negative vote in the security-oriented General Assembly resolutions.

To sum up, with regard to the results of the analysis of randomly selected General Assembly resolutions, I assume that more than 1% of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly (around 230 resolutions) would be affected by the change of the Security Council voting procedure. It means, these resolutions would become a matter of the Security Council voting process, whereas the negative vote of one Security Council permanent member would not cause blocking of the resolution anymore. 75% of the affected resolutions would regard the Middle East question. These findings contribute to the first part of the analysis. They support the argument that the situation in Middle East would be the most affected issue by the change of the Security Council

voting procedure. Moreover, these findings indicate that the United States aim to defend their national interest through voting both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. It results, that change of the Security Council voting procedure would not affect only the UN Security Council and its voting outcomes, but it would have a considerable impact on the security issues discussed in the General Assembly, as well.

## Conclusion

In my thesis I aimed to apply a hypothetical change of the United Nations Security Council voting procedure. This change would consist in establishing the requirement of at least two or more negative votes of permanent members for a draft resolution to be rejected. Adopting such change would affect all the Security Council resolutions blocked by the negative vote of one sole permanent member. Thus, it would imply the adopting of app. 85% of blocked Security Council resolutions.

The goal of this thesis was to answer following research questions: *What would be the consequences of the hypothetical change of Security Council voting procedure on voting outcomes? How would change the ability of the Security Council permanent members to further their national interests?* Additionally, I aimed to discover which permanent member would be the most affected, and which issue persistently blocked by that permanent member would be influenced the most, as well.

In order to achieve these objectives, I provided the analysis of the Security Council permanent members' voting behaviour. Concretely, I focused on the resolutions with the veto of one sole permanent member. Gradually, I examined the use of veto of every permanent member state and I defined the topics of the blocked resolutions. Having considered the findings obtained in the analysis, following conclusions were drawn:

- 195 out of 228 blocked resolutions would be adopted by the Security Council;
- by adopting such a high number of blocked resolutions, the total effectiveness of the Security Council would increase;
- the Security Council permanent member most frequently using the veto power on its own is Russia (USSR);
- the issue most frequently blocked by the use of veto of one sole permanent member is the Middle East question;
- the Security Council permanent member most frequently using the veto power in order to further its national interest are the United States.

To conclude, these findings show that change of the Security Council voting procedure would lead to a different situation in the Middle East region. Moreover, it would dramatically affect the United States' ability to further their national interest. Finally, it would increase the effectiveness of the UN Security Council.

In the last part of the thesis I aimed to discover, whether there is any connection between the structure of the Security Council voting procedure and the security issues discussed by the General Assembly. In order to reach the conclusion, I examined a randomly selected part of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Essential data for such analysis were the security-oriented resolutions adopted by the General Assembly with the negative vote of one sole Security Council permanent member. I based this analysis on the presumption that such resolutions did not become part of the Security Council voting process due to the negative vote of one of its permanent members in the General Assembly. Its negative vote on such matter in the General Assembly does not prevent the body from adopting the resolution. However, its negative vote in the Security Council would mean immediate blocking of the resolution.

Provided the analysis of the General Assembly resolutions, I conclude as following:

- app. 22% of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are security-oriented;
- more than 1% of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are security-oriented and with the negative vote of one sole Security Council permanent member;
- the only Security Council permanent member taking a negative vote in the security-oriented resolutions are the United States;
- 1% of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly regard the Middle East question.

To summarize, the General Assembly resolutions related to the Middle East question containing a negative vote of the United States constitute the group of resolutions that did not become part of the Security Council voting process due to the structure of its voting procedure. In general, it results that the Security Council voting procedure change would have a considerable impact on the security issues discussed in the UN General Assembly.

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## **List of Annexes:**

**Annex I:** The UN Security Council vetoed resolutions in 1946-2014 (table)

**Annex II:** The Middle East resolutions blocked by the sole US veto (table)

**Annex III:** Resolutions blocked by the sole veto of Russia/USSR (table)

**Annex I:** The UN Security Council vetoed resolutions in 1946-2014 (table)

Resolution	Year	USA	Russia (USSR)	UK	France	China	Veto	Topic
<b>S/2014/348</b>	2014	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2014/189</b>	2014	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Ukraine
<b>S/2012/538</b>	2012	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2012/77</b>	2012	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2011/612</b>	2011	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2011/24</b>	2011	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2009/310</b>	2009	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Georgia
<b>S/2008/447</b>	2008	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Zimbabwe
<b>S/2007/14</b>	2007	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Myanmar
<b>S/2006/878</b>	2006	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2006/508</b>	2006	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2004/783</b>	2004	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2004/313</b>	2004	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Cyprus
<b>S/2004/240</b>	2004	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2003/980</b>	2003	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2003/891</b>	2003	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2002/1385</b>	2002	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2002/712</b>	2002	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>S/2001/1199</b>	2001	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2001/270</b>	2001	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/1999/201</b>	1999	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	Macedonia
<b>S/1997/241</b>	1997	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/1997/199</b>	1997	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/1997/18</b>	1997	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	Central America
<b>S/1995/394</b>	1995	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/1994/1358</b>	1994	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Bosnia and Herzegovina
<b>S/25693</b>	1993	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East

<b>S/21326</b>	1990	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/21084</b>	1990	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/21048</b>	1989	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Panama
<b>S/20945/Rev.1</b>	1989	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/20677</b>	1989	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/20463</b>	1989	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/20378</b>	1989	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Libya
<b>S/20322</b>	1988	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/19868</b>	1988	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/19780</b>	1988	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/19585</b>	1988	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	South Africa
<b>S/19466</b>	1988	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/19434</b>	1988	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/18785</b>	1987	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	Namibia
<b>S/18705</b>	1987	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	South Africa
<b>S/18428</b>	1986	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/18250</b>	1986	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/18163</b>	1986	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	South Africa
<b>S/18087/Rev.1</b>	1986	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	South Africa
<b>S/18016/Rev.1</b>	1986	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Libya
<b>S/17796/Rev.1</b>	1986	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/17769/Rev.1</b>	1986	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/17730/Rev.2</b>	1986	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/17633</b>	1985	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	Namibia
<b>S/17495</b>	1985	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/17354/Rev.1 (Amendment)</b>	1985	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	South Africa
<b>S/17172/para. 2</b>	1985	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/17172/para. 1</b>	1985	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/17172/Preambular para. 8</b>	1985	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua

<b>S/17000</b>	1985	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/16732</b>	1984	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/16463</b>	1984	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/16351/Rev.2</b>	1984	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/16077/Rev.1</b>	1983	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Grenada
<b>S/15966/Rev.1</b>	1983	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>S/15895</b>	1983	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/15347/Rev.1</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/15255/Rev.2</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/15185</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/15156/Rev.2</b>	1982	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	Falkland Islands
<b>S/14985</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/14943</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/14941</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Nicaragua
<b>S/14832/Rev.1</b>	1982	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/14664/Rev.2</b>	1981	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	South Africa
<b>S/14462</b>	1981	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Namibia
<b>S/14461</b>	1981	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Namibia
<b>S/14460/Rev.1</b>	1981	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Namibia
<b>S/14459</b>	1981	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Namibia
<b>S/13911</b>	1980	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/13735</b>	1980	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	USA
<b>S/13729</b>	1980	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Afghanistan
<b>S/13162</b>	1979	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	South-East Asia
<b>S/13027</b>	1979	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	South-East Asia
<b>S/12312/Rev.1</b>	1977	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	South Africa
<b>S/12311/Rev.1</b>	1977	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	South Africa
<b>S/12310/Rev.1</b>	1977	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	South Africa
<b>S/12226</b>	1976	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Viet Nam]
<b>S/12211</b>	1976	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Namibia
<b>S/12119</b>	1976	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East

<b>S/12110</b>	1976	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Angola]
<b>S/12022</b>	1976	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/11967</b>	1976	0	0	0	1	0	<b>1</b>	Comoros
<b>S/11940</b>	1976	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/11898</b>	1975	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/11833</b>	1975	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam]
<b>S/11832</b>	1975	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of South Viet-Nam]
<b>S/11796</b>	1975	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam]
<b>S/11795</b>	1975	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of South Viet-Nam]
<b>S/11713</b>	1975	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	Namibia
<b>S/11543</b>	1974	1	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>	South Africa
<b>S/11400</b>	1974	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Cyprus
<b>S/10974</b>	1973	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/10928</b>	1973	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/10931/Rev.1</b>	1973	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Latin America
<b>S/10805/Rev.1</b>	1972	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/10805/Rev.1 (Operative para. 5)</b>	1972	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/10805/Rev.1 (Operative para. 1)</b>	1972	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/10786 para.2</b>	1972	0	1	0	0	1	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/10784</b>	1972	1	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/10771</b>	1972	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	Membership [Bangladesh]
<b>S/10606</b>	1972	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/10489</b>	1971	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/10446/Rev.1</b>	1971	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	India-Pakistan
<b>S/10423</b>	1971	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	India-Pakistan
<b>S/10416</b>	1971	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	India-Pakistan
<b>S/9976</b>	1970	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/9696</b>	1970	1	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/8761</b>	1968	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Czechoslovakia

<b>S/7575/Rev.1</b>	1966	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/6113</b>	1964	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/5973</b>	1964	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	South-East Asia
<b>S/5425/Rev.1</b>	1963	0	0	1	0	0	<b>1</b>	Southern Rhodesia
<b>S/5407</b>	1963	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/5134</b>	1962	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	India-Pakistan
<b>S/5033</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	India
<b>S/5006</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Kuwait]
<b>S/4985/Rev.1 (Amendment)</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Congo
<b>S/4985/Rev.1 (Amendment)</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Congo
<b>S/4855</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Kuwait
<b>S/4733/Rev.1 (Amendment)</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Congo
<b>S/4733/Rev.1 (Amendment)</b>	1961	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Congo
<b>S/4578/Rev.1</b>	1960	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Congo
<b>S/4567/Rev.1</b>	1960	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Mauritania]
<b>S/4523</b>	1960	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Congo
<b>S/4409/Rev.1</b>	1960	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	USA-USSR
<b>S/4411</b>	1960	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Telegram - ZSSR
<b>S/4130/Rev.1</b>	1958	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Viet-Nam]
<b>S/4129/Rev.1</b>	1958	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of Korea]
<b>S/4055/Rev.1</b>	1958	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/4050/Rev.1</b>	1958	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/3995</b>	1958	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	USA-USSR
<b>S/3885</b>	1957	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Viet-Nam]
<b>S/3884</b>	1957	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of Korea]
<b>S/3787</b>	1957	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	India-Pakistan
<b>S/3730/Rev.1</b>	1956	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Hungary

<b>S/3713/Rev.1</b>	1956	0	0	1	1	0	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/3710</b>	1956	0	0	1	1	0	<b>2</b>	Middle East
<b>S/3671 (Operative para. 2)</b>	1956	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Suez Canal
<b>S/3510</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Japan]
<b>S/3509 (Amendment)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Japan]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Spain]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Laos]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Japan]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Cambodia]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Libya]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Nepal]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ceylon]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Finland]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Austria]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Italy]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Portugal]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ireland]
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Jordan]

<b>para.2)</b>								
<b>S/3502 (Preambular para.2)</b>	1955	0	0	0	0	1	<b>1</b>	Membership [Mongolia]
<b>S/3502 (Amendment)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of Viet-Nam]
<b>S/3502 (Amendment)</b>	1955	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of Korea]
<b>S/3236/Rev.1</b>	1954	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Cablegram - Guatemala
<b>S/3229</b>	1954	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	South-East Asia
<b>S/3188/Corr.1</b>	1954	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>3151/Rev.2</b>	1954	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East
<b>S/2760</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Cambodia]
<b>S/2759</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Laos]
<b>S/2758</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Vietnam]
<b>S/2754</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Japan]
<b>S/2483</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Libya]
<b>S/2688</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Bacterial warfare
<b>S/2671</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Bacterial warfare
<b>S/2443</b>	1952	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Italy]
<b>S/1894</b>	1950	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>S/1894 (Preambular para. 4)</b>	1950	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>S/1894 (Preambular paras. 1-3)</b>	1950	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>S/1752</b>	1950	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	China
<b>S/1653</b>	1950	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Republic of Korea
<b>S/1431 (Para. 5)</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Indonesia
<b>S/1431 (Para. 1-4)</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Indonesia
<b>S/1408/Rev.1</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Armed forces
<b>S/1399/Rev.1</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Armed forces
<b>S/1398</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Armed forces
<b>S/1337</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ceylon]
<b>S/1336</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Austria]

<b>S/1335</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ireland]
<b>S/1334</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Finland]
<b>S/1333</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Italy]
<b>S/1332</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Transjordan]
<b>S/1331</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Portugal]
<b>S/1385</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Nepal]
<b>S/1305</b>	1949	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Republic of Korea]
<b>S/PV. 384</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ceylon]
<b>S/1048</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	situation in Berlin
<b>S/PV.351</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ceylon]
<b>S/836</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Atomic Energy Commission
<b>S/PV.3038</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Czechoslovakia
<b>S/PV.303</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Czechoslovakia
<b>S/PV.279</b>	1948	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Italy]
<b>S/PV.206</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Italy]
<b>S/PV.206</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Finland]
<b>S/552, S/PV.202</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Greece
<b>S/552</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Greece
<b>S/513 (Amendments)</b>	1947	0	0	0	1	0	<b>1</b>	Indonesia
<b>S/PV.190</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Austria]
<b>S/PV.190</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Italy]
<b>S/486</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Greece
<b>S/471 and Add.1</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Greece
<b>S/PV.186</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Portugal]
<b>S/PV.186</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ireland]
<b>S/PV.186</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Transjordan]
<b>S/PV.170</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Greece
<b>S/PV.122</b>	1947	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Corfu Channel
<b>S/PV.70</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Greece
<b>S/PV.57</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Portugal]
<b>S/PV.57</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Ireland]

<b>S/PV.57</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Membership [Transjordan]
<b>S/PV.49</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Spain
<b>S/PV.49</b>	1946	0	1	0	1	0	<b>2</b>	Spain
<b>S/PV.49</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Spain
<b>S/PV.45</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Spain
<b>S/ PV.45, p.326 (Para. c)</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Spain
<b>S/ PV.45, p.326 (Para. b)</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Spain
<b>S/ PV.45, p.326 (Para. a)</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Spain
<b>S/PV.23</b>	1946	0	1	0	0	0	<b>1</b>	Middle East

Source: List of UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

**Annex II:** The Middle East resolutions blocked by the sole US veto (table)

<b>Year</b>	<b>Resolution</b>	<b>Topic</b>
1972	S/10784	Call on the parties concerned to cease all military operations
1973	S/10974	Israel's lack of cooperation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
1975	S/11898	Israeli attacks against Lebanon
1976	S/11940	Inalienable national right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
1976	S/12022	Israeli occupation of Arab territories
1976	S/12119	Inalienable national right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
1980	S/13911	Inalienable national right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
1982	S/14832/Rev.1	Israel act of aggression in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights
1982	S/14943	Measures taken by Israel with regard to the Palestinian population and the Golan Heights
1982	S/14985	The sacrilegious acts perpetrated against the sanctity of al-Haram and al-Sharif in Jerusalem
1982	S/15185	Withdrawal of all Israeli military forces from Lebanon r
1982	S/15255/Rev.2	Withdrawal of all Israeli military forces from Lebanon
1982	S/15347/Rev.1	Demand to the States Members of the UN to refrain from providing Israel any military aid until the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory
1983	S/15895	Israeli practices in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories
1984	S/16732	Call upon Israel to respect the rights of the civilian population in the areas under its occupation in Southern Lebanon
1985	S/17000	Israeli practices and measures against the civilian population in Southern Lebanon
1985	S/17459	Measures taken by Israel against Palestinian population
1986	S/17730/Rev.2	Israeli acts of violence and abusive practices against the civilian population in Southern Lebanon
1986	S/17769/Rev.1	Israeli act violating the sanctity of the Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem
1986	S/17796/Rev.1	Piracy act of the Israeli airforce against a Libyan civilian aircraft
1988	S/19434	Israeli attacks in Southern Lebanon
1988	S/19466	Israeli practices violating the human rights of the Palestinian people
1988	S/19780	Deportation of Palestinian civilians by Israel
1988	S/19868	Invasion of Southern Lebanon by Israeli forces
1988	S/20322	Israeli attack against Lebanon
1989	S/20463	New Israeli measures leading to deaths of Palestinian civilians
1989	S/20677	Israeli policies violating the human rights of the Palestinian people

1989	S/20945/Rev.1	Israeli policies violating the human rights of the Palestinian people
1990	S/21326	Recognition of any planned act of violence in the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel as a blow to peace
1995	S/1995/394	Declaration of Israeli expropriation orders of land in East Jerusalem
1997	S/1997/199	New settlement activities of Israel in East Jerusalem
1997	S/1997/241	Cessation of Israeli settlement activities in the occupied territories
2001	S/2001/270	Promotion of dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian sides
2001	S/2001/1199	Promotion of dialogue between the Israeli and Palestinian sides
2002	S/2002/1385	Killing of UN employees by Israeli occupying forces
2003	S/2003/891	Recent dangerous deterioration of the situation in the Middle East
2003	S/2003/980	Principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force
2004	S/2004/240	Escalation of violence in the Occupied Palestinian territory
2004	S/2004/783	Military attacks by the Israeli occupying forces in the area of Northern Gaza strip
2006	S/2006/508	Military operations of Israel in the Gaza strip
2006	S/2006/878	Military operations of Israel in the Gaza strip
2011	S/2011/24	Settlement activities of Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory

Source: List of UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

**Annex III:** Resolutions blocked by the sole veto of Russia/USSR (table)

Issue	Year	Resolution	Topic
UN Membership	1946	S/PV.57	Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal
UN Membership	1947	S/PV.186	Transjordan, Ireland, Portugal
UN Membership	1947	S/PV.190	Italy, Austria
UN Membership	1947	S/PV.206	Finland, Italy
UN Membership	1948	S/PV.279	Italy
UN Membership	1948	S/PV.351	Ceylon
UN Membership	1948	S/PV.384	Ceylon
UN Membership	1949	S/1305	Republic of Korea
UN Membership	1949	S/1385	Nepal
UN Membership	1949	S/1331	Portugal
UN Membership	1949	S/1332	Transjordan
UN Membership	1949	S/1333	Italy
UN Membership	1949	S/1334	Finland
UN Membership	1949	S/1335	Ireland
UN Membership	1949	S/1336	Austria
UN Membership	1949	S/1337	Ceylon
UN Membership	1952	S/2443	Italy
UN Membership	1952	S/2483	Libya
UN Membership	1952	S/2754	Japan
UN Membership	1952	S/2758	Vietnam
UN Membership	1952	S/2759	Laos
UN Membership	1952	S/2760	Cambodia
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (as amendment to preambular para. 2)	Republic of Korea
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (as amendment to preambular para. 2)	Republic of Viet-Nam
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Jordan
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Ireland

UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Portugal
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Italy
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Austria
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Finland
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Ceylon
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Nepal
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Libya
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Cambodia
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Japan
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Laos
UN Membership	1955	S/3502 (Preambular para.2)	Spain
UN Membership	1955	S/3509 (as amendment to preambular para. 2)	Japan
UN Membership	1955	S/3510	Japan
UN Membership	1957	S/3884	Republic of Korea
UN Membership	1957	S/3885	Viet-Nam
UN Membership	1958	S/4129/Rev.1	Republic of Korea
UN Membership	1958	S/4130/Rev.1	Viet-Nam
UN Membership	1960	S/4567/Rev.1	Mauritania
UN Membership	1961	S/5006	Kuwait
Middle East	1946	S/PV.23	Withdrawal of all foreign troops from Syria and Lebanon
Middle East	1954	S/3151/Rev.2	Observation of the General Armistice Agreement between Syria and Israel

Middle East	1954	S/3188/Corr.1	Complaint by Israel against Egypt (restriction on the passage of ships trading with Israel through the Suez Canal)
Middle East	1956	S/3671 as amended (Operative para. 2)	Free and open transit through the Suez Canal without discrimination
Middle East	1958	S/4050/Rev.1	Interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon
Middle East	1958	S/4055/Rev.1	Interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon
Middle East	1963	S/5407	Cooperation of the Syrian and Israeli parties in the exchange of prisoners
Middle East	1964	S/6113 (as amended)	Israeli military assault in West Bank, Israeli and Syrian full participation in the Mixed Armistice Commission meetings
Middle East	1966	S/7575/Rev.1	Refraining from any action of Syria or Israel that might increase tension in the area
Middle East	1984	S/16351/Rev.2	Withdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon
Spain	1946	S/PV.45, p. 326 (Para. a)	Condemnation of the Franco's fascist regime
Spain	1946	S/PV.45, p. 326 (Para. b)	Condemnation of the Franco's fascist regime
Spain	1946	S/PV.45, p. 326 (Para. c)	Condemnation of the Franco's fascist regime
Spain	1946	S/PV.45	Condemnation of the Franco's fascist regime
Spain	1946	S/PV.49	Condemnation of the Franco's fascist regime
Spain	1946	S/PV.49	Condemnation of the Franco's fascist regime
Greece	1946	S/PV.70	Complaint by Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic
Greece	1947	S/PV.170	Greek frontier incidents
Greece	1947	S/147 and Add.1	Greek frontier incidents
Greece	1947	S/486	Greek frontier incidents
Greece	1947	S/552	Situation in northern Greece
Greece	1947	S/552, S/PV.202	Situation in northern Greece and Yugoslavia
South-East Asia	1949	S/1431 (Para. 1-4)	Indonesia
South-East Asia	1949	S/1431 (Para. 5)	Indonesia
South-East Asia	1954	S/3229	Thailand
South-East Asia	1964	S/5973	Armed incidents in Malaysia
South-East Asia	1979	S/13027	Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Democratic Kampuchea

South-East Asia	1979	S/13162	Armed intervention in the internal affairs of Democratic Kampuchea and attack against the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
India	1957	S/3787	Dispute between India and Pakistan
India	1961	S/5033	Use of force by India in Goa, Damao and Diu
India	1962	S/5134	Dispute between India and Pakistan
India	1971	S/10416	Dispute between India and Pakistan
India	1971	S/10423	Dispute between India and Pakistan
India	1971	S/10446/Rev.1	Dispute between India and Pakistan
Congo	1960	S/4523	Unsatisfactory economic and political situation in the Republic of Congo
Congo	1960	S/4578/Rev.1	Unsatisfactory economic and political situation in the Republic of Congo
Congo	1961	S/4733/Rev.1 (Amendment)	Unsatisfactory economic and political situation in the Republic of Congo
Congo	1961	S/4733/Rev.1 (Amendment)	Unsatisfactory economic and political situation in the Republic of Congo
Congo	1961	S/4985/Rev.1 (Amendment)	Unsatisfactory economic and political situation in the Republic of Congo
Congo	1961	S/4985/Rev.1 (Amendment)	Unsatisfactory economic and political situation in the Republic of Congo
Republic of Korea	1950	S/1894 (Preambular paras. 1-3)	North Korean aggression upon the Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea	1950	S/1894 (Preambular paras. 4)	North Korean aggression upon the Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea	1950	S/1894	North Korean aggression upon the Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea	1983	S/15966/Rev.1	Korean Air Lines shot down by Soviet military aircraft
USA	1958	S/3995	US bombs in direction to the frontiers of the Soviet Union
USA	1958	S/4411	US Air Force plane brought down by Soviet military forces
USA	1960	S/4855	US Air Force plane brought down by Soviet military forces
USA	1980	S/13735	US hostages in the Islamic Republic of Iran
Czechoslovakia	1948	S/PV.303	Events in Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia	1948	S/PV.303	Events in Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia	1968	S/8761	Troops of the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia
Cyprus	1974	S/11400 (as amended)	Situation in Cyprus
Cyprus	1993	S/25693	Restructuralization of UNFICYP

Cyprus	2004	S/2004/313	Termination of the mandate of UNFICYP, maintaining the settlement implementation mission UNSIMIC
Armed Forces	1949	S/1398	Regulation of armed forces
Armed Forces	1949	S/1399/Rev.1	Regulation of armed forces
Armed Forces	1949	S/1408/Rev.1	Regulation of armed forces
Bacterial Warfare	1952	S/2671	Investigation of alleged bacterial warfare
Bacterial Warfare	1952	S/2688	Investigation of alleged bacterial warfare
Former Soviet Republics	2009	S/2009/310	Georgia - extending mandate of the UN mission
Former Soviet Republics	2014	S/2014/189	Ukraine - territorial integrity of Ukraine, invalidity of the Crimea referendum
Corfu Channel	1947	S/PV.122	Incidents in the Corfu Channel (United Kingdom-Albania)
Atomic Energy Commission	1948	S/836	System of international control of atomic energy
Situation in Berlin	1948	S/1048	Berlin blockade
China	1950	S/1752	Bombing by airforces of the Territory of China
Guatemala	1954	S/3236/Rev.1	Interference of the Inter-American Peace Committee in the internal affairs of Guatemala
Hungary	1956	S/3730/Rev.1	Use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights
Kuwait	1961	S/4855	Threat by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait
Afghanistan	1980	S/13729	Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1994	S/1994/1358	Military activities of local Serb paramilitary forces

Source: List of UN SC vetoed resolutions ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

## **Voľba témy**

Vo svojej práci sa budem venovať hlasovacej procedúre Bezpečnostnej rady OSN a konkrétne tomu, aké dopady by mala jej hypotetická zmena na presadzovanie záujmov jej stálych členov. Táto zmena by spočívala v tom, že na zablokovanie rezolúcie by bolo potrebné veto nie jedného, ale minimálne dvoch stálych členov Bezpečnostnej rady.

Hlasovanie Bezpečnostnej rady (BR) upravuje čl. 27 Charty OSN, podľa ktorého sa pre prijatie uznesenia vyžaduje kladné hlasovanie kvalifikovanej väčšiny, tj. deväť hlasov, pričom sa rozlišuje medzi procedurálnymi a neprocedurálnymi otázkami. Pre túto prácu budú kľúčové práve neprocedurálne otázky súvisiace s udržiavaním mieru a bezpečnosti.

O neprocedurálnych otázkach sa rozhoduje kladnými hlasmi deviatich členov vrátane hlasov stálych členov BR, čo stavia päť stálych členov BR do zvláštnej pozície a udeľuje im tzv. právo veta. Právo veta umožňuje mocnostiam zablokovať prijatie rezolúcie BR bez ohľadu na hlasovanie nestálych členov a stalo sa tak dôvodom pre návrhy na zmenu hlasovacej procedúry BR a obmedzenie vplyvu mocností na hlasovaní. Jedinou dosiahnutou zmenou bolo rozšírenie počtu nestálych členov v roku 1965, právo veta stálych členov však zostalo nedotknuté.

Právo veta od vzniku OSN v roku 1946 využil každý zo stálych členov BR, avšak v počte vetovaných rezolúcií jednotlivými mocnosťami je výrazný nepomer. Najčastejšie právo veta využilo Rusko, resp. ZSSR, a to celkom 130-krát. USA vetovalo 83-krát, Veľká Británia 32-krát, Francúzsko 18-krát a najmenej využíva právo veta Čína, ktorá použila veto 11-krát. Zo všetkých 228 prípadov, kedy bolo na hlasovaní BR použité veto, je 195 takých, kedy rezolúciu vetoval iba jeden zo stálych členov a zablokoval tak jej prijatie. Zmenou hlasovacej procedúry a rozšírením práva veta na ďalšieho člena by bolo ovplyvnených približne 85% neprijatých rezolúcií BR. Nasledujúca tabuľka zobrazuje prehľad využitia práva veta stálymi členmi v rokoch 2009 - 2014.

Rok	Návrh	Vetujúci štát	Hlasy (áno/nie/zdržanie sa)	Téma
2014	S/2014/348	2 Rusko, Čína	13/2/0	Sýria
2014	S/2014/189	1 Rusko	13/1/1	Ukrajina
2012	S/2012/538	2 Rusko, Čína	11/2/2	Sýria
2012	S/2012/77	2 Rusko, Čína	13/2/0	Sýria
2011	S/2011/612	2 Rusko, Čína	9/2/4	Sýria
2011	S/2011/24	1 USA	14/1/0	Palestína
2009	S/2009/310	1 Rusko	11/1/4	Gruzínsko

Zdroj: Zoznam vetovaných rezolúcií BR OSN ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

Jedným zo základných teoretických konceptov práce bude *národný záujem* vychádzajúci z realistickej teórie medzinárodných vzťahov definovaný prostredníctvom moci. Primárnym záujmom štátu je podľa realistov jeho fyzické prežitie a základným nástrojom k jeho zaisteniu je snaha o dosiahnutie moci (Morgenthau 1948: 13). Ďalším konceptom súvisiacim s inštitucionálnou zmenou hlasovacej procedúry je *dizajn inštitúcií* ako základný mechanizmus usmerňujúci vývoj medzinárodných inštitúcií. Vzniká ako výsledok racionálnych interakcií medzi štátmi a inými medzinárodnými aktérmi za účelom riešenia špecifických problémov (Koremenos, Lipson, Sindal 2001: 762-767).

## Cieľ práce

Cieľom mojej práce je na základe analýzy hlasovania stálych členov BR OSN **definovať situácie, v ktorých stáli členovia presadzujú svoje záujmy prostredníctvom využívania práva veta, a ktorých vývoj by sa zmenou hlasovacej procedúry výrazne zmenil**. Konkrétne pôjde o zmenu, kedy by na **zablokovanie rezolúcie bolo potrebné veto aspoň dvoch alebo viacerých stálych členov BR**. Cieľom je postupne vypracovať nasledujúce body:

- identifikovať všetky prípady, na ktoré by sa vzťahovala inštitucionálna zmena hlasovacej procedúry BR,
- definovať témy, ktoré by sa v dôsledku zmeny hlasovacej procedúry vyvíjali odlišne,
- určiť, konkrétne ktorých mocností sa jednotlivé prípady týkajú, aký majú vplyv na ich národné záujmy a ako by zmena hlasovacej procedúry ovplyvnila ich presadzovanie.

Pre rozšírenie rozsahu tém ovplyvnených hlasovacou procedúrou BR využijem aj rezolúcie prijaté Valným zhromaždením. Pozorovaním hlasovania stálych členov BR o bezpečnostných témach vo Valnom zhromaždení môžeme predvídať ich hlasovanie v BR. V prípade, že stály člen BR hlasuje vo Valnom zhromaždení o určitej téme negatívne, môžeme predpokladať, že by o tejto téme hlasoval rovnako aj v BR, využil by právo veta a zablokoval tak prijatie rezolúcie. Dôsledkom by bolo, že daná téma sa do BR vôbec nedostane práve preto, že bola jedným zo stálych členov zamietnutá už vo Valnom zhromaždení a pravdepodobne ním bude zamietnutá aj v BR. Znamenalo by to, že hlasovacia procedúra BR nepriamo ovplyvňuje aj rozsah tém, o ktorých sa v BR hlasuje. V tejto časti by som chcela zistiť, či je počet tém, o ktorých sa hlasuje v BR, obmedzený z dôvodu štruktúry jej hlasovacej procedúry.

## **Výskumná otázka**

Aké dopady by mala zmena hlasovacej procedúry BR OSN na presadzovanie záujmov stálych členov BR OSN?

*Hypotéza:* Inštitucionálna zmena hlasovacej procedúry by mala za následok zvýšenie počtu prijatých rezolúcií BR OSN. Ďalším dôsledkom by bola zmena vývoja v oblastiach, ktoré spadajú do sféry záujmu iba jedného z piatich stálych členov BR.

## **Metodológia práce**

Vo svojej práci sa budem snažiť aplikovať deskriptívnu štatistiku, na základe ktorej vykonám analýzu hlasovania stálych členov vo vetovaných rezolúciách BR. Analýza bude pozostávať z troch častí, ktorými budem postupne rozširovať počet prípadov, na ktoré by sa vzťahovala zmena hlasovacej procedúry. V každej z nich sa budem sústreďovať na skupinu rezolúcií, v ktorých bolo použité veto iba jedným zo stálych členov BR.

V prvej časti sa zameriam na rezolúcie, ktoré neboli prijaté kvôli vetu jedného štátu, a to napriek kladnému hlasovaniu zvyšných 14, resp. 10 členov BR. V nasledujúcej časti budem brať do úvahy rezolúcie, v ktorých jeden alebo viac členov BR využili možnosť zdržať sa hlasovania. V poslednej skupine vyčlením rezolúcie, proti prijatiu ktorých hlasoval aj jeden alebo viac nestálych členov BR. Vo všetkých prípadoch sa zameriam na témy jednotlivých rezolúcií a na ich význam pre vetujúce štáty. Na

základe získaných informácií najskôr identifikujem všetky prípady, na ktoré by sa vzťahovala inštitucionálna zmena hlasovacej procedúry a v ďalšom kroku definujem konkrétne mocnosti, ktorých sa tieto prípady týkajú a ich záujmy by boli touto zmenou ovplyvnené. Nasledujúca tabuľka zhrňuje použitie veta stálymi členmi BR v každej z troch častí analýzy.

Použitie veta stálymi členmi BR OSN v jednotlivých častiach analýzy

	USA	Rusko/ZSSR	Veľká Británia	Francúzsko	Čína	Celkom
<b>1. časť</b>	21	32	0	0	1	<b>54</b>
<b>2. časť</b>	39	28	7	1	3	<b>78</b>
<b>3. časť</b>	0	62	0	1	0	<b>63</b>
<b>Celkom</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>195</b>

Zdroj: Zoznam vetovaných rezolúcií BR OSN ([http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml))

V poslednej časti rozšírim dopady zmeny hlasovacej procedúry prostredníctvom analýzy hlasovania stálych členov BR vo Valnom zhromaždení, pričom kľúčovými pre mňa budú rezolúcie týkajúce sa bezpečnostných tém, a teda spadajúce aj do kompetencií BR. Predmetom analýzy budú rezolúcie, v ktorých jeden zo stálych členov BR hlasoval proti ich prijatiu, a o ktorých zároveň nebolo hlasované v BR. Z doterajšej analýzy náhodného výberu rezolúcií Valného zhromaždenia vyplýva, že z celkového počtu 13 643 prijatých rezolúcií sa 18% týka bezpečnostných tém a 2% tvoria prípady, v ktorých iba jeden zo stálych členov BR hlasoval proti ich prijatiu.

Po identifikácii týchto prípadov určím, v akých témach hlasovali jednotlivé mocnosti negatívne a aké sú ich záujmy v danej oblasti. V tejto časti budem vychádzať z predpokladu, že absencia daných tém v BR je zapríčinená práve negatívnym hlasovaním jedného z jej stálych členov vo Valnom zhromaždení a je pravdepodobné, že by bola zablokováná na hlasovaní v BR. Touto analýzou sa pokúsim definovať témy, ktoré sa na hlasovanie do BR nedostanú z dôvodu štruktúry jej hlasovacej procedúry.

## **Predpokladaná osnova**

### Úvod

1. Teoreticko-metodologický rámec: štruktúra hlasovacej procedúry a problém nízkej akcieschopnosti BR OSN
2. Identifikácia prípadov ovplyvnených zmenou hlasovacej procedúry
  - 2.1. Veto jedného zo stálych členov BR
  - 2.2. Využitie práva zdržať sa hlasovania
  - 2.3. Negatívne hlasy nestálych členov BR
  - 2.4. Rozšírenie o rezolúcie Valného zhromaždenia
3. Definovanie tém a oblastí zasiahnutých zmenou hlasovacej procedúry
4. Vplyv zmeny hlasovacej procedúry na konkrétne mocnosti a ich záujmy

### Záver

*Poznámka:* Bakalársku prácu by som chcela písať v anglickom jazyku z toho dôvodu, že magisterské štúdium by som rada absolvovala v zahraničí.

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**Dokumenty:**

*Charta OSN*

*Rezolúcie Bezpečnostnej rady OSN*

<http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml>

*Zoznam vetovaných rezolúcií BR OSN*

[http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact\\_veto\\_en.shtml](http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_en.shtml)

*Rezolúcie Valného zhromaždenia OSN*

<http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm>