

MIDDLE EASTERN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS:  
CO-DEPENDENT OR INDEPENDENT?  
THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

by

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## PROCLAMATION

I herewith certify that all work in this thesis is an original. I have written this thesis by my own efforts and given proper quotation when having used relevant sources.

Prague, the 29<sup>th</sup> of May 2007

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Prelude.....	8
2. Introduction.....	10
3. Middle Eastern Realities.....	14
3.1. Middle Eastern Realities: State of Constant Conflict?.....	16
4. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.....	19
4.1. The beginning of the Modern Middle East.....	20
4.2. The Sykes Picot Agreement.....	21
4.3. The Israeli-Palestinian Marriage.....	23
5. An Essential Definition: The State.....	26
5.1. The Palestine National Authority: State or Non-state actor?.....	29
6. The Emergence of Shadow States & Low Intensity Warfare.....	33
6.1. PLO Finances.....	35
6.2. Corruption in the Palestinian Territories.....	38
7. Maslow and the Hamas.....	41
7.1 The failed Palestinian Social Contract.....	45
8. Media, Terrorism and the Work of Lobby Groups.....	49
8.1. Manufacturing Consent.....	50
8.2. Creating Images.....	52
8.3. Terrorism.....	55
8.4. The History of Lobby Groups.....	59
8.5. Lobby Techniques.....	62
8.6. Pro-Arab Lobby Groups.....	64
8.7. Jewish American and Pro-Israeli Lobby Groups.....	66

9. Peace Proposals and Economic Incentives.....	71
10. Conclusion.....	74
11. Bibliography.....	77
12. Annexes.....	83

## LIST OF FIGURES

<i>Figure - Title</i>	<i>Page</i>
A – The MiddleEast	9
B – The Red Line Agreement	22
C – Organization of the PLO	40
D – Palestinian Refugees	76

## ABSTRACT

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has captured the attention of generations throughout the decades following World War II. What are the sources of this conflict? What are the reasons behind "*La revanche de Dieu*", especially in the Arab world? This thesis is providing the reader with an historical, social, and economical analysis of major deterrents that are often times neglected when addressing the modern Middle East. The aim is to give an understanding of what is a personal relationship to a region that will have an influential role in the future of international politics. The current U.S. administration is facing ever growing resentment in the Arab world; curing the roots and pressuring the influential factors that hinder the successful implementation of a peace process could change the perception of America amongst Arabs and Muslims around the world. A destabilized Middle East is of no benefit to the Western powers, both politically and economically. The economic benefits for both the Arab world and the West are of enormous magnitude, ignoring the potential of the Middle East is thus grossly negligent. This thesis is providing a condensed overview of the main obstacles facing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the modern Middle East.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## ABBREVIATIONS

ADL	Anti-Defamation League
AEI	American Enterprise Institute
AIPAC	American Israel Public Affairs Committee
BP	British Petroleum
IRMEP	Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LIO	Low Intensity Operations
LIW	Low Intensity Warfare
Memri	Middle East Media Research Institute
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MERIP	Middle East Research and Information Project
NSC	National Security Council
PA	Palestinian Authority
PACs	Political Action Committees
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
SAMED	Sons of the Palestinian Martyrs
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
WINEP	Washington Institute for Near East Policy

## 1 - PRELUDE

“Did you want to kill him, Buck?”

“Well, I bet I did.”

“What did he do to you?”

“Him? He never done nothing to me.”

“Well, then, what did you want to kill him for?”

“Why, nothing – only it’s on account of the feud.”

“What’s a feud?”

“Why, where was you raised? Don’t you know what a feud is?”

“Never heard of it before – tell me about it.”

“Well,” says Buck, “a feud is this way: A man has a quarrel with another man, and kills him; then that other man’s brother kills *him*; then the other brothers, on both sides, goes for one another; then the *cousins* chip in – and by and by everybody’s killed off, and there ain’t no more feud. But it’s kind of slow, and takes a long time.”

“Has this one been going on long, Buck?”

“Well, I should *reckon*! It started thirty years ago, or som’ers along there. There was trouble ‘bout something, and then a lawsuit to settle it; and the suit went agin one of the men, and so he up and shot the man that won the suit – which he would naturally do, of course. Anybody would.”

“What was the trouble about, Buck? – land?”

“I reckon maybe – I don’t know.”

“Well, who done the shooting? Was it a Grangerford or a Shepherdson?”

“Laws, how do I know? It was so long ago.”


“Don’t anybody know?”

“Oh, yes, pa knows, I reckon, and some of the other old people; but they don’t know now what the row was about in the first place.”

Mark Twain, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*

Figure A

Source: World Maps UK



## 2 - INTRODUCTION

How do you imagine people living on Mars? I admit this is not the all attention grabbing sentence I had in mind when beginning this thesis. I wanted to write something brilliant, something which would reveal wit, cognition, experience and well done research - to portray an evolution of the mind that one should expect from an additional two years at university. Yet all I come up with is: *How do you imagine people living on Mars?* The reason is simple, as university folk we naturally expect our *commilitos* – “fellow students” and professors to be informed about current issues and for them to understand why an event evolved as it did. We believe what concerns us should consequently concern everyone. The truth is that many of us are caught up in our own fields of specialization. We only step out of our faculty and students from other fields of study have a hard time to comprehend what we are talking about. We step out of the university field, and many people will have an even harder time to figure out the nature of events, which’s comprehension is a basic necessity to us. This holds true for the modern Middle East. While some people were able to afford a vacation to Morocco or the Red Sea, many have only seen the Middle East on television. Thus our image is formed to a great extent on what is broadcasted, or better yet what is prepared for us. It may come close, admittedly a bit out of proportion, to imagining how people live on Mars.

I once read “*the first casualty of war is truth*”. I came to think about that, and I find actual *truth* in that statement. However, renowned journalist John Pilger argues that *journalism* is the first casualty of war. Analyzing this thought even further, Pilger quotes novelist Zdenek Urbánek: “*In one respect, we are more fortunate than you in the west. We believe nothing of what we read in the newspapers and watch on television, nothing of the official truth. Unlike you, we have learned to read between the lines, because real truth is always subversive.*”<sup>1</sup> Even though the quote was made in the Czechoslovakia of 1970, most of it holds up today, and it brings me back to my question about Mars. I have lived in the Middle East for a good ten years, and have known the region ever since I was four years old. When I came back to Europe,

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<sup>1</sup> Pilger, John. “The real first casualty of war” [Online] Available <http://www.newstatesman.com/200604240013>, January 15th, 2007

children in school asked me if we rode on camels, or lived in tents. These may surely be the naïve images children have; but sadly many adults have not come much further in their imagination and formulation of an opinion about the Middle East. In addition to, they have to believe what the media tells them.

I started out this thesis with one central question to myself: What can I write about which would not only full-fill the academic requirements set forth by the university; but also: What will I write about that is not going to torture my reader, keep my motivation up, and will actually be of some kind of use. I suppose it is not far-fetched to say that the Middle East will continue to be in the limelight of international affairs. There are surely several reasons to be found to keep an eye on the region: it hosts an ancient culture which attracts thousands of tourists every year, foreign firms can target the desires of almost 200 million potential customers, the necessity to develop new industrial sites and service sectors will require foreign aid, modern state of the art trading hubs are being erected which facilitate international trade, and perhaps worth mentioning as well, is that the Middle East oil reserves account for roughly two-thirds of the world's proven reserves. As a logic outcome I would say then: for anyone involved in the field of International Economics and Political Science there exists a necessity to have some fundamental knowledge about the Middle East!

I have structured this thesis in a way in which I hope it will serve the demands of a wider audience. I found it practical to start out with a general historical, cultural and social background of the region for those that have little or no familiarity with it. It comes back to the old saying "*you must know the past to understand the present*". The essential aim of my thesis is then becoming to uncover the hidden and often times unaccounted for roots and realities in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I want to provide an understanding for issues such as why the PLO has never functioned as a state; how the disillusion of the 1967 war and corruption within the PLO opened the doors for an organization such as Hamas. In understanding these roots, I find it of great importance to highlight some of the never addressed issues, such as psychological and social needs of any human being, but also exemplifying the particularities of the Middle Eastern culture. In addition, the critical observer has to have an understanding of how the media plays an influential role in direct policy making processes, especially in the United States. Lobby groups are a further

influential factor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Highlighting the history and function of the lobby apparatus in the United States will shed additional light on the many hurdles to overcome when considering a serious peace initiative. It is thus my aim to highlight some of most hampering issues in attaining - or at least advancing - a peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In my home country we say: "*Eine Sache nüchtern betrachten.*" Literally it means "evaluating something with a sober mind". In English we say "keeping things in perspective". Which is how I try to approach issues personally, but moreover, it should also be the way in which one should approach the Middle East and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The region is marked by extremes: politically, socially, all of what one may experience when being there. It is easy to develop a degree of ambivalence, I personally have moments when I simply love it there, and those when I flat out hate it. This mood is often times palpable when it comes to international affairs. There are times when Middle Eastern countries are everyone's darling; when we admire their culture, enjoy their touristy sites, their beaches as well as their friendly and welcoming people. And there are times when we look at them with rage, abominate their beliefs and customs, and their once so admired countries become the "breeding grounds of terror" and belong to an "axis of evil". I think it is an aid not only to me, but also the reader, that I have personally seen the Middle East with many eyes, the good and the bad. I may have the right to claim that I know a little bit of its people, and may therefore propose possible solutions to the problems facing the region today, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Thus, a major source in reasoning in this thesis comes from within. From my own experiences, from friendships that I have had ever since I was a child, from days when I played basketball with a Muslim Arab, two Israeli, and an Afro American all in one team, from the hours I have wasted at Israeli borders on suspicion of aiding the Lebanese militia, and simply from the many years that the region has had an influence on me. I do not seek to paint a naïve and false image, one that is unrightfully positive or negative, for that I have lived and experienced the Middle East too long. I merely seek to provide an understanding, and suggest some ideas that may ameliorate some of the problems apparent in the seemingly never ending conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.

In addition to my own experiences and understanding, I of course had to refer to more recognized sources. I have about forty books in my shelf that cover the Middle East or deal with issues closely related to it. They range from well known journalists, economists, and historians whom can be found on either camp, either pro/anti Israeli, pro/anti Arab, and supporting their own ideal solutions.

In attaining a good historical overview of the Middle East, I read Robert Fisk's *The Great War for Civilization – The Conquest of the Middle East*. Robert Fisk is a British journalist and correspondent for the British newspaper *The Independent* and is often seen as critical to the politics of the United States and Israel. I do believe however, that Fisk who has spent decades in the Middle East, and who was able to gain the trust of Osama bin Laden for three interviews, is simply a reliable source that does not draw an extreme pro or anti American picture. He merely *keeps thinks in perspective*. A further valuable account of modern Middle Eastern history, especially in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, was Thomas Friedman's *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. Friedman, a Jewish American journalist, was the *New York Times* correspondent in Lebanon and Israel during the Lebanese civil war and has been stationed in both Beirut and Jerusalem. Friedman is not easy to be categorized, while some argue that he is pro-Israeli, I would argue that he often times draws a realistic picture and is not afraid to leave out harsh realities when it comes to depicting the politics of Israel. In my analysis of the role of media, I considered several books written by American theorist, political activist and professor at M.I.T. Noam Chomsky. Chomsky is also often times criticized in his portrait of American and Israeli politics, and the role of media. Chomsky was also an influential aid in the work of Janice Terry which provided me with great insight into the role of lobby groups in the United States. These four authors were my main source of information. I did however have various other authors of Middle Eastern history and society to my disposal and made frequent use of them. A full list of sources is given in the bibliography, often times offering personal accounts of politicians that had a direct involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as Jimmy Carter's *Palestine – Peace Not Apartheid*. Other sources of information came from the wide array of established internet portals of political actors, newspaper magazines, journals, data bases, as well as interviews held with experts on relevant fields.

### 3 - MIDDLE EASTERN REALITIES

Before I came to Prague in 2005 to attend Charles University I was working for a German multi-national cooperation in Cairo in the field of financial controlling and management. As we were a member of the German-Arab Chamber of Commerce, one of my duties was to attend the numerous conferences the Chamber (we simply called it so) held on either: business developments in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, inventions of new technologies in certain industrial sectors, or how one could enter the Iraqi market for example. For the most part these gatherings were not very entertaining, nor would I leave with some sort of enlightened feeling, as for on most occasions the best part would be having a decent lunch and perhaps making some sort of new and useful contacts with other firms as well as keeping old connections alive.

On one occasion however, it was a conference on the future of the Middle East, one speaker would catch my attention at last. What was original about him was that he was an Egyptian with no illusions about the future of the region; he had an honest approach and confronted the audience with realities rather than painting a rosy picture. One of the key points I can still recall was: *“If the Middle Eastern countries want to maintain the same unemployment rate, while keeping the same birth rate, they will have to create 70 million new jobs by the year 2020.”* I would later be reaffirmed by a report in the Economist which predicted *“the Middle East will have to create another 77m jobs – doubling the current number – over the next 20 years to accommodate all the new workers, requiring an annual economic growth rate of 6%, almost double the rate before the recent surge in oil prices.”*<sup>2</sup> 77 million new jobs! I have personally witnessed the situation in the Middle East, not only in Egypt, but also in various other countries that I have visited. There are sometimes entire graduate classes where only few find a job. To put it in perspective: Almost 500 students are supposed to graduate from Charles University’s Faculty of Law this year. Applying the scenario of many Middle Eastern countries, perhaps out of these 500, only 10 will find a job. What will happen to the rest? If they are lucky they may

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2 El Feki, Shereen. “A pumped-up market” The Economist – The World in 2006. Pg. 80



find a job in another field, some may be able to depend on the mercy of their families, but the rest may not find anything at all.

It is a very simple example, yet it may illustrate the scenario of many Middle Eastern crisis areas, and it helps us to find an understanding why so many youths are deluded and why it is easy for fanatics to attract many of them. I can't help but quote my own grandmother, who gave my mother the old fashioned advice to keep me busy by enrolling me in some sports club. She said: "*Let him do sports, that way he will be off the streets and not come up with stupid ideas*". I suppose it is a little bit like that. I can only generalize here (surely there are always exceptions), but you give someone a job, a role, provide a secure environment, an opportunity, and a chance to build a life and a family, then I would doubt that this person has the time, nor the willingness to go out on the street and be some radical and fanatic. The reader may wonder why these issues matter so much in the Middle East. Questions such as: "*Why do they have to turn radical?*", or "*Why do they have long beards, and what is this revival of Islam?*", and finally "*Why do they burn American flags and blame the West for what goes on around them?*", could now come to mind. The answer lies within an understanding for the Middle Eastern culture and society. For this purpose I would like to quote from a speech that particularly impressed me, which was made by James Zogby, President of the Arab American Institute in the United States, at the Forum 2000 Conference here in Prague last October. Mr. Zogby was referring to questions reporters had asked him: "*Why fundamentalism? Where does it come from?*" he was asked. "*And the point is, each circumstance is different. Look at Gaza for one moment because that's where the space issue comes from since the peace process began. Since the peace process begun, youth unemployment in Gaza has risen to 80%. Youth unemployment in Gaza is 80%, which means that a young man in Gaza today, 35 years old, has never had a job. He has never had a prospect of a job. Therefore he cannot marry. Therefore he cannot have children. Therefore in a traditional society, the source of honor, which is continuing the line, is ended. And so out of this despair, comes this perversion of life. Not just religion. Perversion of life. This cult of death, which sees honor in death. Yes, they are killing Jews, innocent Jews, but they are also murdering themselves. Suicide, which every religion is opposed to, has become a source of life and honor. That is sick. But we must deal with the reality. Now how do you end it? You radically transform the conditions of*

*daily life. You create hope in the future, you bring justice... And transforming reality gives hope, which will then change the other and make space for the other.”<sup>3</sup>*

In the first chapter of this thesis I will thus address what I referred to as “Middle Eastern Realities”. I would like to stress one important point, and make it very clear: I do not plan, nor will I write an in-depth report of the economic make-up of the Middle East; analyzing every aspect of the economies of Syria, Lebanon or Egypt; how they are set up and, -or how they function; how many citizens work in the service sector and how many in the agricultural; nor do I plan to apply any sort of formulas and finally entangle myself in complex approaches to solve the foes of the Middle East. In later chapters I then plan to give the reader an idea of why certain groups of people find themselves in the situation they are; what lead them to their current state of mind and their actions; what some of the past and current economical factors were and still are that influence this outcome; and in turn aid in painting a distorted picture many hold of the Middle East. As with any text, some readers will be familiar with a given topic, others not. In this respect I shall deal with several historical events in chapter four.

### *3.1. Middle Eastern Realities: State of Constant Conflict?*

There is not one day that passes in which I do not hear something new from the Middle East on television or the internet. The news is usually bad. “*Suicide blasts kill 40 in Baghdad*” or “*Palestinian militants attack school festival*”. I have to admit, unless it is something of outrageous dimensions it goes in one ear and out the other within seconds. I, and presumably many others, have become used to such news from the Middle East - it is nothing uncommon any more to be exposed to suicide bombings, killings and murders on a daily basis. There aren’t any clashes around Charles Bridge, no suicide bombing on the Old Town Square, and no one has fired a rocket into the National Theatre recently. The question then is, why should we concern ourselves with something that goes on some 3,000 kilometers away? I know it sounds a bit declamatory (perhaps lofty is the better word, in German we say *pathetisch*) to be talking about the Middle East in such a way (the last thing I want to

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3 Forum 2000 “Transcripts – Interfaith Meeting” [Online] Available <http://www.forum2000.cz/en/projects/interfaith-dialogue/2006/interfaith-meeting/transcripts>

do is raise sentiment) but it may be helpful to attain some background and familiarize us with some facts, in order to have a better comprehension of news next time.

The Middle East has been in turmoil ever since I can remember, and most likely, ever since anyone reading this thesis may remember. What we are facing in the Middle East today, is perhaps not so much of a “*Clash of Civilizations*”, but what I would call a “*Clash of Two Economic Perspectives*” which are creating one economic system – a system which is ill. On the one hand we have western capitalism - in the form of large multi-national cooperations and a small number of local “families” and oligarchs which dominate and set the rules – and on the other we have members of a society that has been failed, which tries to find an anchor by any means, which constitutes those that make up the “*Economics of Conflict*” – the class which ultimately revolts against the system. Before the terror attacks on the World Trade Center or the riots in the suburbs of Paris, we regarded terror primarily as a form of crime against individuals and their property - now it has become an instrument of fear and mainly protest. “*The Islamists per se are not the main obstacle for democracy, but the western-supported and more or less secular authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world*”.<sup>4</sup> What Olivier Roy (said to be the leading international expert on Islamism) argues, is that Islamism – the erection of an Islamic state - leaves many Muslims cold, at least in their base. The roots of the problem being, that the very secular generation which is now in its fifties and sixties - a generation which never came to politics because of religion, was a generation which ultimately failed. This generation was crushed in the war of 1967, would then turned to the Palestinian movement which was their uniting beacon of hope (which turned out to be an organization of nothing else than regular thugs - an ordinary militia) and when this cause seemed to fail as well, many of this generation turned their back to politics, and the small elites ended up selling their countries to the west. In our western societies we now turn to secularism as the all solving answer. We wonder why there is such a strong connection to religion, why does it have to be about Islam against the West, against Christianity perhaps. Professor Tomáš Halík of Charles University, provided me with a very fitting observation: “*Secularism that would like to remove everything that is religious from the public’s fear is itself becoming*

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4 Roy, Olivier. *Der islamische Weg nach Westen – Globalisierung, Entwurzelung und Radikalisierung*. Munich: Pantheon Verlag, 2006, pg. 16

*intolerant and dangerous to religion. Such a stance logically provokes and strengthens religious fundamentalism, fanaticism and extremism.*"<sup>5</sup> In other words, solving the problem of tensions in the Middle East by riding ourselves from religion will not solve anything. The roots of the problem are not to be found in religion (at least in my eyes), the roots are the economic conditions set up by politics, and part of the solution is in setting up favorable conditions in which people can live.

An additional obstacle in solving this problem is to be found domestically, in the way in which we are approaching the mental and emotional parameters which are being set for us. We are to believe that most Muslims are radicals; that they are largely angry people and that we should be scared of them. This is at least the image which is often portrayed in the media. I remember for example taking the train from Düsseldorf airport back to my home town in Germany. The train conductor asked everyone for their ticket – only some Arab-looking men were asked for their identification cards as well. What mattered were not the trivial procedures the train staff conducted, it was the looks the Arab-looking men got from the other passengers. "*What are you doing here?*" "*I hope you are not some kind of terrorist – are you?*" These questions were written all over their faces, especially the older generation. I agree, additional security is surely not a wrong measure, but it can also create additional fear and suspicion. I suppose that there are many people amongst us who can point out someone of presumably Middle Eastern origin. The question is, who can tell the many why a person is supposed to be feared, and why is this person supposed to be different from us? I acknowledge the tone in which these lines are written. They sound emotional, and they sound as if I am trying to make us "*Westerners*" feel bad about how we see Arabs. In a time which was not too long ago, the Czech Republic was not part of the "*West*" either. Once you crossed the German boarder you were in the "*Wild East*" as it was called. The following sections of this thesis are pointed towards this misunderstanding, and a perception that is not always right. They are aimed at helping to find the roots of the problem, which in turn help in solving it.

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5 Forum 2000. Transcripts – Interfaith Meeting. [Online] Available <http://www.forum2000.cz/en/projects/interfaith-dialogue/2006/interfaith-meeting/transcripts>

#### 4 - THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

*“What is Jerusalem worth?” “Nothing...Everything!”*

It was a French crusader who questioned Jerusalem’s worth in the widely criticized movie *“Kingdom of Heaven”*. After a strenuous battle, the worn out crusader confronts his adversary, the legendary Salah ed-Din<sup>6</sup>, to know: *“What is Jerusalem worth?”* And Salah ed-Din answers him: *“Nothing”* - then pauses for a moment - *“Everything!”* The question is ever significant. One may ask why these people (these people being the Israelis and Palestinians) are fighting over a small piece of land, for hundreds, for thousands of years. Anyone reasonable would say, there is no reason, it is just land – dry land on top, it is *nothing*, so why all the fuss, all the fighting and killing? On the other hand it seems that this land must mean *everything*. Which is the reason we are still looking at the Middle East; are looking at the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; and even though it is a bit cynical to say, nothing has really changed in this fight over land, only that the means to kill each other got more sophisticated.

In the coming sections I will confront the reader with my perception of issues that I think can aid in finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian, - and Israeli-Arab conflict at large. For me the trouble is to determine the starting point of this quest. In theory I could go back 4,000 years ago, when Abraham journeyed from Ur to Canaan, or when Moses led the Israelites’ exodus from Egypt. These events surely left a mark in history, but I doubt that they will lead us anywhere, at least in the context of this thesis. The land which is *everything* to so many has been under the control of different rulers ever since it existed. Judea, which was the home of Jews in ancient times, was once conquered by the Romans and renamed Palestine (*the Romans tried to erase the Jewish connection to the land, and thus named it Syria Palaestina, while Jerusalem became Aelia Capitolina*). As referred to in the opening paragraph, Palestine was later conquered and ruled by Turks, Kurds, and European

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<sup>6</sup> Salah ed-Din was a 12th century Kurdish Muslim general and warrior. Among other achievements, he called for and led a holy war to rid the Holy Land of Christians, and by doing so gave Muslims a common cause. He recaptured Jerusalem and provoked the Third Crusade. Salah ed-Din drew a Muslim buffer across the trade routes between Europe and the East.

Crusaders until the Ottomans incorporated it into their empire in 1516. When did the Middle East of our modern times begin though?

#### *4.1. The beginning of the Modern Middle East*

It is widely accepted that the modern Middle East began after World War I. The Ottoman Empire which had aligned itself with the Central Powers was defeated in the war, and ceased to exist in 1922 when it was dissolved. I would like to argue though that in addition to the break up of the Ottoman Empire; perhaps 1908 marked an equally important turning point in Middle Eastern history. A British lawyer and oil-entrepreneur named William d'Arcy was conducting oil drillings for a British consortium, already for a substantial amount of time and without success. A few days after his investors lost patience and had ordered him via telegram to stop his works, on "*May 26<sup>th</sup> drillers managed to tap an oil field which would supply over a billion barrels until the end of the 1970's.*"<sup>7</sup> A few months later the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded, which later became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and which we all know as British Petroleum or simply BP today.

The interesting story behind the foundation of BP (the largest European oil company in terms of reserves – if we leave out Russia's Lukoil and Gazprom), is that its early days stood in close relationship with British politics. When Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911, he gave impetus to reform efforts and switch in fuel from coal to oil, a massive engineering task, which also depended on securing Mesopotamia's oil rights." On June 17<sup>th</sup> he was even able to convince the British Parliament to become the main share holder of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Shortly after he signed a contract according to which the company would supply the Royal Navy with oil. Churchill was not only interested in the changeover of his fleet from coal to oil-powered ships, but also to increase and secure British interests in Persia and its oil, which he would wisely estimate to be of strategic importance in the future.

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<sup>7</sup> Seifert, Thomas., and Klaus Werner. *Schwarzbuch Öl – Eine Geschichte von Gier, Krieg, Macht und Geld*. Vienna: Deuticke. 2005, pg. 35

#### 4.2. The Sykes-Picot Agreement

With the end of World War I and the consequent dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, France and Great Britain were to divide the Middle East – and its prize - amongst themselves. Sir Mark Sykes (a British politician, officer, and diplomat) and Georges Picot (a French diplomat), had already negotiated an understanding in November 1915, which was signed in 1916 and became simply known as the Sykes-Picot agreement. “*With the assent of Russia, the agreement led to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire...the division of Turkish-held Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine into various French and British-administered areas.*”<sup>8</sup> In the 1920 San-Remo agreement - among other issues - the suspected oil reserves of Mesopotamia were affixed to be split between France and Great Britain. The agreement (the part which comprised the oil reserves) was not very popular in Washington to say the least, the U.S. press called it a “*backslide into imperialism*”<sup>9</sup> What worried the Americans was that the Europeans seemed to keep the U.S. oil industry out of the Middle East. In a move that would at times follow in the future, the British gave in to the Americans and told them that they could participate in the search for oil. What followed was the emergence of Mr. Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian, or “Mr. Five Per Cent”<sup>10</sup> and the infamous “Red Line Agreement”<sup>11</sup> (see Figure B, pg. 22)

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8 BBC News. “The Sykes-Picot Agreement.” [Online] Available

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in\\_depth/middle\\_east/2001/israel\\_and\\_the\\_palestinians/key\\_documents/1681362.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681362.stm)

9 Seifert, Thomas., and Klaus Werner. *Schwarzbuch Öl – Eine Geschichte von Gier, Krieg, Macht und Geld.*


Vienna: Deuticke. 2005, pg. 37

10 It is common practice in the Middle East, as well as in other parts of the world of course, that people which facilitate any kind of business, be it government tenders or international projects for example, receive a small percentage to make sure that “things work out”.

11 As a consequence of the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq fell under British mandate. The Turkish Petroleum Company which was granted exclusive oil exploration rights to Iraq in 1925 became the focal point of a struggle over who was allowed to invest in it and who not. On October 15th oil shoot 15 meters over drilling derrick, the drilling point would later be called “Baba Gurgur” (Kurdish for “Father of Flames” - in Arabic Baba also means father)”. After years of haggling, an agreement was made on July 31, 1928. The American consortium (Near East Development Company) was granted a combined 23.75 percent share, the same amount going each to Royal Dutch/Shell, Anglo-Persian, as well as the French (Compagnie Française Pétrole). The remaining five percent went to Gulbenkian. According to various sources, Gulbenkian took out a large map and put it on the table. With a thick red pen he then drew the borders of the former Ottoman Empire, within which the negotiating parties committed themselves in the future to exploit and convey together. All important oil fields of the Middle East lay within the “Red Line Agreement”, except those of Persia and Kuwait (where the British already commanded over concession rights).

Figure B

Source: Mount Holyoke University





### 4.3. The Israeli-Palestinian Marriage

*“The Bible says that when the first blood was shed among His children, God asked Cain, the slayer, ‘Where is Abel thy brother?’ And he said, ‘I know not. Am I my brother’s keeper? And the Lord said, ‘What hast thou done? The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth unto me from the ground. And now are thou cursed...’”<sup>12</sup>*

Jimmy Carter started out his latest book “Palestine – Peace not Apartheid” with this quote from the Bible. I admit it is an embellished way to portray a depressing profoundness – that *“the blood of Abraham, God’s father of the chosen, still flows in the veins of Arab, Jew, and Christian, and too much of it has been spilled in grasping for the inheritance of the revered patriarch in the Middle East”*<sup>13</sup> - a profoundness which is essentially true.

When the British issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which promised to build a national home for the Jewish people (with respect for the rights of non-Jewish Palestinian), history took an unfavorable path in the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire, part of the Central Powers, was defeated and dissolved. After the war, the League of Nations confirmed the British mandate over Iraq and Palestine, and a French mandate over Syria and Lebanon. Transjordan was separated from the Palestine Mandate, and thus the land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean became Palestine. Naturally the Arabs very much resented the idea of Jews coming in and taking their land which they had lived on for hundreds of years. In addition the Arabs felt betrayed by the British, who had promised them (*them* in the form of the Sharif of Mecca<sup>14</sup>) the creation of a large Pan-Arab state as a reward for helping fight the Ottoman Empire in the war. The Jews on the other hand, had been expelled from Judea - what is known as the diaspora<sup>15</sup> - and had sought to come back to Israel throughout the centuries which was part of fulfilling an interpretation of biblical prophecies (*aliya* is the Hebrew word for immigration to the land of Israel). *“Although exact data are not available, it is estimated that in 1880 there were*

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12 Jimmy Carter. Palestine – Peace No Apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006, pg. 19

13 IBID

14 The Sharif of Mecca was the traditional steward of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina (both in Saudi Arabia).

15 The expulsion of Jewish people from Judea - 8th to 6th century BCE.

*only 30,000 Jews in Palestine, scattered among 600,000 Muslims and Christian Arabs. By 1930 their numbers had grown to more than 150,000.”*<sup>16</sup>

The Arab population saw their land slowly being inhabited by an increasing number of Jewish migrants, and as a consequence revolted repeatedly (on occasions they were led by the Mufti<sup>17</sup> of Jerusalem Mohammad Amin al-Husayni<sup>18</sup>) – especially during the mid 1930’s. The relations between Jews and Arabs hence deteriorated and lead to a feeling of hostility between the two groups. The Christians and Muslim Arabs that had lived in the same land since Roman times were never committed to establishing an independent state, the idea only evolved with an increasing number of Jewish immigrants which bought land and seemed to have the idea of establishing their own nation. The British actually tried to limit immigration, proposed several ideas such as the Peel Commission<sup>19</sup> or the White Paper of 1939<sup>20</sup>, but nothing worked out. According to official British data *“the Arab population increased from 760,000 in 1931 to 1,237,000 in 1945...while the number of Jews during the same period increased to 608,000, primarily because of persecution in Europe.”*<sup>21</sup>

In the aftermath of World War II and its horrors, the United Nations General Assembly issued Resolution 181 in 1947 which established two entities west of the Jordan River – Israel and Palestine. Great Britain withdrew its forces in May 1948, and Israel declared itself an independent state and soon after recognized by the United States. A war broke out in which Arab troops from Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan united to attack Israel. The Israelis, which were fighting for their lives and nation, ended up causing serious damages to the uncoordinated Arab troops and the war ended in 1949 with an armistice agreement signed between Israel and the Arab countries. Israel accepted to divide Palestine (which meant 77 percent Israeli, and 23 percent Arab), East-Jerusalem and the West Bank fell under the

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16 Jimmy Carter. Palestine – Peace No Apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006, pg. 65

17 A mufti is an Islamic scholar who is an interpreter or expounder of Islamic law (sharia) and capable of issuing fataawa.

18 Al-Husayni was a Palestinian Arab nationalist and an extreme anti-Semitist. In addition to his role as the Mufti of Jerusalem, he fought against the establishment of a Jewish state and would collaborate with Nazi Germany for that cause.

19 The Peel Commission of 1937 came up with a proposal to create a small Jewish state, with an area of 1/5 of the total area of Palestine. Jerusalem would have remained under British control. Jewish leaders accepted the proposal, while the Arab leadership rejected the proposal.

20 The idea of Jews and Arabs sharing one government - strict quotas on Jewish immigration – For this reason the idea of partitioning the Mandate was abandoned.

21 Jimmy Carter. Palestine – Peace No Apartheid. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2006, pg. 66

control of Jordan, while Gaza was occupied by Egypt. The war started the major exodus of Palestinians which were either expelled from their homes or fled (about 726,000 refugees). In addition, the continuous tension caused many Jews living in other Arab countries to flee to Israel.

*“I am certain the world will judge the Jewish state by how it will treat the Arabs.”* Although Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, made this statement many years ago, the issue is ever prevailing. But what is a state? As scholars of Political Science we are familiar with terms such as sovereignty, institutions and general clauses of international law, but I find it relevant to briefly discuss the notion of state, and what it constitutes. Once we know what a state is, we can then move forward and examine if the Palestinians ever had a state, or are now on the path of creating one.

## 5 - AN ESSENTIAL DEFINITION: THE STATE

Christopher Pierson, and undoubtedly numerous others, argues that one “cannot understand modern politics without understanding what the state is and how the state operates and is controlled.”<sup>22</sup> That is an adequate definition, yet in the light of Middle Eastern countries it leaves out some important details. We often assume that whatever holds true for us has to universally hold true for everyone. This assessment may sound a bit confusing, thus a quick example to illustrate my thought behind it: The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was not even a state until 1932 when Abd Al Aziz Al Saud (or simply Ibn Saud) united the people living in this area. Ninety percent of the population is ethnically Arab, but what we have to note as well is that Saudi Arabia was largely inhabited by nomads which lived in tribes. These tribal roots still influence politics and the Saudi society today. When I asked Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi of Cairo University, why there was not a more homogenous feeling among Middle Eastern countries, why they could not present themselves as more united front, he said: “One of the problems of the Middle East is the fierce competition among Arab States themselves. In addition, tribal issues still dominate the political landscape today. Often times the situation is similar to that before Islam.”<sup>23</sup> These essentials may help us to understand the small, yet defining differences that can sometimes arise when assessing Middle Eastern politics.

I would argue that it is a time-consuming venture to consider all Middle Eastern states and to evaluate if they fall under the criterion of a state or not. But, as I will have regions of focus, it is of essential importance to at least briefly identify the parameters of politics, and more importantly define the features a state (Pierson aided me once again in setting the stage). He argues that even though not all political processes are about the state, this still holds true for most of the contemporary world. The defining elements of politics include:

- The formation and expression of groups or social identities, in competition with other groups and identities.

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22 Pierson, Christopher. *The Modern State*. London: Routledge. 2004 pg. 10

23 Interview with Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi, April 16<sup>th</sup> 2007, Cairo University Egypt

- A competitive struggle between individuals, groups of people or organizations for control of the state.
- A competitive struggle between different states (systems of government) for power, influence and the world's resources.

For as important as these elements may be, the concept of the state will play an even greater role in assessing the magnitude of politics and economics in the Middle East. I deem it of crucial importance, as one of my main points of focus (the Palestine National Authority) will illustrate the important interplay of economics and *politics in building a stable Middle East, especially when we consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the plan to establish a Palestinian state.*

Pierson writes that the state is a distinctively modern and western way of organizing political authority and the conduct of government. We could go as far as to argue that the state sets the boundaries of mankind. I look at the Middle East, and sometimes wonder what has happened since Thomas Hobbes wrote: *“Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man...wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no culture of the earth...no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”*<sup>24</sup> Would it be far-fetched to argue that life in some Middle Eastern regions still contains such characteristics?

The state, or the idea of it, is a single, unified source of authority in each area; drawing upon the loyalty of the population; in addition to it is well organized and is directed towards the interests of the whole society. I would once again like to refer to Pierson,<sup>25</sup> as he categorizes the defining elements (four) and associated features (seven) of the state:

- (1) *“The state is a set of organized governing institutions which are connected to each other or have some cohesiveness, so that it makes sense to describe what they do in ‘unitary’ terms, as though these institutions were a single*

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24 Ebenstein, William and Alan O. Ebenstein. Great Political Thinkers – Plato to the Present. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1991, pg. 408

25 Pierson, Christopher. The Modern State. London: Routledge. 2004 pg. 14

*actor.*” Pierson argues that states behave as a single actor only at some level, but that there are varying elements within the state that follow different goals. Thus ‘unitary’ accounts are always a shorthand description, capable of being filled out with a different, more detailed explanation.

- (2) *“A state must operate in a particular spatial area, where a substantial population lives as a distinct society.”* Pierson emphasizes that there can not be a state in an empty territory, without a significant population, this population having common bonds such as culture, language and way of living.
- (3) *“The role of state institutions must be to reach collectively binding decisions, and to ensure these decisions are obeyed.”* If there are no institutions to make such decisions, and to then enforce them, then it is not a state.
- (4) *“The existence of state institutions defines a ‘public’ sphere, a part of social life that appears as distinct and different from the ‘private’ sphere of individual or organized activity.”* The public sphere includes not only strictly governmental activities but also those ‘political’ activities directed to influencing state institutions.

The less important but none the less strongly associated features include:

- (5) *“It must claim ‘sovereignty’ (that is, unconstrained power over all other social institutions) and control all the legitimate use of force and coercion within its territory.”* Sovereignty means that the state is the highest source of authority in the territory, the final locus of decisions, with no limits on its scope of internal control. The state must also be able to operate independently, free from external control. I would personally argue this to be one of the core features in defining a state.
- (6) *“The state must be able to define ‘citizens’, those who are members of the society, and also non-members; and it must be able to control entry and exit from its territory by citizens and others.”*
- (7) *“To appear legitimate, any modern state must claim to be advancing the common interests of its society or to be implementing some ‘general will’ of its members.”* This would infer strong ideological or ethical justification of its existence.

- (8) *“The state must be accepted as legitimate by significant groups or elements in society.”* Pierson notes that not every state will receive majority support, but any state that is not ephemeral must create substantial support bases somewhere in its society. *“Modern states are organizationally distinctive in several ways. They are run by bureaucracies – formal, hierarchical organizations where agencies are ‘budgetary units’, financed from general taxation, which any state must be able to collect effectively.”* It is emphasized that the contrast with capitalist enterprises financed by sales and profits is one of the most important contemporary ways of identifying the scope of the state.
- (9) *“Modern states are also distinctive in the way they regulate social activities – using a legal apparatus to control civil society, and a constitution to control government agencies.”*
- (10) *“A regime must be recognized as ‘a state’ by other states before it fully qualifies for ‘statehood’.”* Recognition as a sovereign power by other countries implies rights under international law which greatly help constitute a state – such as non-interference by other countries in its internal affairs.

In having listed the elements and features of the state, and thus having set up a criterion which we can apply, I hope that we now have the essential tool to determine if governments fall into the category of state or non-state actor. As I had previously mentioned, having this tool will help us assess the actual condition a government is in, it will aid us in finding out what some governments are lacking, how some of these obstacles may be overcome, or how the international community can help in creating certain standards. In this respect I would like to assess one of the most crucial areas of the Middle East, the Palestinian territories, to give a quick historical overview and then see if we can apply the notion of a “state” or not.

### *5.1. The Palestine National Authority: State or Non-state Actor?*

In the upcoming paragraphs I shall discuss the emergence of what I call “Shadow States”. The idea is to define which role the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) played within the Palestinian territories, how it would later fail

most of the Palestinians, and by its own actions give reason for the eventual shift of power to the more radical Hamas. In the subsequent attempt to define such “Shadow States”, it may be of assistance to initially assess if the Palestine Authority ever fell within the definition of a state, or does so now (according to Pierson). Three dates, or better yet periods, will serve as focal points in this evaluation: 1964 – 1994, 1994 – 2003, and finally 2003 – present. To familiarize a reader unfamiliar with the topic, a quick and very general overview of events:

- The PLO was initially founded in 1964 by the Arab League and its imminent goal was the destruction of the State of Israel. In its original charter the PLO called for self-determination for Palestinian Arabs, though at first the question of statehood was not raised (Only later would the PLO adopt the idea of an independent Palestine). There have been various proposals as to establish such a state - or two-state solution as we will soon see, but many of the Palestinian leaders would declare “their goal is still ‘liberation’ of all of Palestine”
- In the infamous Six-Day War of 1967 (which nobody seems to remember if you ask any Arab), the Israeli army managed to overcome the armies of several Arab countries and then occupied the Golan Heights, Gaza, the Sinai, and the West Bank including Jerusalem. Six months later, the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (Annex A) was passed, confirming the inadmissibility of the acquisition of land by force and calling for Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories (as well as a just solution to the refugee problem).
- In 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel in the Yom Kippur War and after 16 days of fighting the U.N. passed Resolution 338 (Annex B). In 1974 at the Arab summit in Morocco, the PLO was proclaimed as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Camp David Accords (Annex C) which were approved by both Egypt and Israel, confirmed Israel’s compliance with Resolution 242, withdrawal of political and military forces from the West Bank and Gaza, and full autonomy for Palestinians.
- In 1987 a Palestinian *intifada* (uprising) erupted, and Israel responds to the violence with harsh retaliation. At the same time the militant Palestinian Hamas was established. In 1988 Jordan ceded its rights in the West Bank and



East Jerusalem to the PLO. Yasser Arafat acknowledged Israel's right to exist and renounced violence. The U.S. and PLO initiated dialogue.

- In 1993 Yasser Arafat went further and recognized the State of Israel in an official letter to Prime Minister Rabin. In return Israel would recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. In addition Israel and the PLO conclude a peace agreement in Oslo with mutual recognition and a five-year plan to resolve all remaining differences. Militant Palestinians and right-wing Israeli's being attempts to undermine the agreement. The Oslo Accords granted the Palestinians the right to self-government on the Gaza Strip, and the city of Jericho in the West Bank through the creation of the Palestinian Authority.
- In 1996 Yasser Arafat was elected president (in addition to Palestinians also elect the members of a legislative council). In Israel the Likud Party returned to power which stalls the Oslo process.
- While Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon after 22-year occupation in September 2000, peace negotiations at Camp David broke down. Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, and a second – much more violent - *intifada* was launched.
- In 2001 Ariel Sharon is elected Prime Minister of Israel, he rejected the Oslo peace agreement, and emphasized on national security. The Gaza airport runway, which was opened in 1998, is bulldozed.
- In 2003 the Quartet Group (The United States, United Nations, European Union, and Russia) agreed on a “road map for peace.” Palestinians pledged full support, but Israel rejected key points. Violence continued, and the security barrier (started in 2002) in the West Bank drew international criticism for undermining the peace process. An unofficial peace agreement negotiated by Israelis and Palestinians is released with extensive international support as the Geneva Initiative.
- Yasser Arafat died in 2004. Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian National Authority in 2005.
- Palestinians elected a new government in January 2006 from which Hamas emerged as the winning party, securing a majority of parliamentary seats. Israel and the United States isolated Palestine, cutting off funds.

- Ehud Olmert became Israel's new prime minister in 2006, promising that the dividing wall in effect be the new Israeli-West Bank border. Hamas and Hezbollah militants captured Israeli soldiers, and Israel forces attacked Gaza and Lebanon. Hezbollah missiles stroke northern Israel. U.N. Resolution 1701 established a fragile cease-fire.

I admit that this overview may have been a bit lengthy, but it should help in defining the question of State or Non-State status now.

#### 1964 – 1994

We can simply take the given time line and see that up till 1994, the PLO was by no means a state. It had no territory (criterion 2 under Pierson) The Oslo Accords granted the Palestinians the right to self-government on the Gaza Strip, and the city of Jericho in the West Bank through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. The PA even created a police and security force and managed to raise funds to finance itself from local taxation (also Palestinians abroad have to pay five percent of their income to the PA).

#### 1994-2007

Once again we can flip back a few pages to see that the PA was not recognized as a state by most other states (criterion 9). The PA was clearly under domination by Israel - Israel incurred into Palestinian territories on numerous occasions and flew airborne strikes against police forces and citizens (criterion 5). In addition the PA was not able to control entry and exit from the territory (criterion 6).

As we can see, the PA never functioned as a recognized state. There are steps in the right direction, such as appointing a Prime Minister who leads the PA's government independent of the State, or the election processes (despite its outcome). The PA is still far away from becoming a state however.

## 6 - THE EMERGENCE OF SHADOW STATES & LOW INTENSITY WARFARE

After the United States and its allies won the war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, many - primarily Western - nations committed themselves to donate funds for reconstruction and development. It may be argued that all the international community can do, is to try to establish a somewhat “normal” functioning country of Afghanistan, but that it may be limited to only creating a security zone in and around Kabul. If we consider the re-emergence of the Taliban there may actually be some validity to this speculation. What is important to note within this context, for as it could stand model for many other nations in similar conditions, is that: *“Twenty years of civil war have created an economy ‘sui generis’, its future existence is incompatible with domestic peace and the integration of the country in the regional and international economy.”*<sup>26</sup> Barnett R. Rubin further notes that: *“This criminalized economy funds both the Taliban and their adversaries. It has transformed social relations and weakened states and legal economies throughout the region. Sustainable peace will require not just an end to fighting and a political agreement but a regional economic transformation that provides alternative forms of livelihood and promotes accountability.”*<sup>27</sup> I personally like the “alternative forms of livelihood” part, which I will touch upon later however. The problem being, that Afghanistan is only one of many countries whose economy has been under long lasting influence from such “low-intensity” conflicts.

“Low Intensity Warfare” (also “Low Intensity Operations”) is a notion out of the military jargon. It refers to both a militarily and political strategy which is being used in so-called “Low Intensity Conflicts”, and can be defined as following: LIC (Low Intensity Conflict) is a confined political-military combat to achieve political, social, military, economic and psychological goals. LIC can often last throughout long periods and extents from diplomatic, economic and psychological pressure up to terrorism and uprisings. LIC is generally confined towards a certain geographical area, and is usually characterized by the limitation of military means, tactic and level

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26 Barnett, Rubin. “The Political Economy of War and Peace in Afghanistan” [Online] Available [http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/rubin\\_on\\_afgistan.html](http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/rubin_on_afgistan.html)

27 IBID

of violence. LIC includes the actual or considered use of military means up until the barrier of combat between regular armed forces (*from: Low-Intensity Conflict, FC 100-20, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth/Kansas; 1986*) There are other aspects of LIW (Low Intensity Warfare) which include: Counterinsurgency (preventing revolutions, civil wars and military conflicts), Counterterrorism (fighting terrorism) and Contra-operations (bringing about upheavals and downfalls). As we can see, the military aspect of LIW is only one element. "*LIW is thus a political strategy with military components (not vice versa)*"<sup>28</sup>.

We could argue that LIC has almost superseded the traditional interstate war. The Swedish research institute SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) has registered "*57 major armed conflicts since the end of the Cold War. Even though 2005 has had the lowest figure in the entire Post-Cold War period, there were still 17 major conflicts in 16 locations.*"<sup>29</sup> The violent conflicts we see in the Third World today are no novelty. The proxy wars of the Cold War era (with either American or Soviet supported camps) may be over, but Arthur Conolly's "Great Game" is still being played out in some parts of the world. In my interview with him, Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi of Cairo University agreed that: "*Beyond the obvious interest in securing Iraqi oil, the goal may not have been primarily in securing oil for the Americans alone (although surely to a large part), but to prevent the Iraqi market falling under the sphere of influence by other countries which are either in competition with the West (such as China and India) - or have a hostile sentiment towards it (such as Iran)*"<sup>30</sup>. I may ask then: "*Into what kind of diffuse political and social structures are such countries, especially Middle Eastern, then falling?*" Religious and irrational antagonisms seem to be dominating while extreme hate has replaced any comprehensible interests (for example the Arab-Israeli conflict). Not only has this antagonism defined the Middle East, but I would also argue that a trend of violent lawlessness in such countries could easily swap over to our Western societies (only see the Paris riots of 2006). In this respect we are then

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28 Heinzl, Sebastian and Dina Yanni. "Die Kriegsführung niedriger Intensität – Low Intensity Warfare – als politisch-militärisches Konzept" [Online] Available [http://evakreisky.at/2003-2004/staat-krieg/referat03\\_d.pdf](http://evakreisky.at/2003-2004/staat-krieg/referat03_d.pdf)

29 Harbom, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen. "Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990-2005" SIPRI Yearbook 2006 [Online] Available <http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap2/app2A>

30 Interview with Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi, April 16<sup>th</sup> 2007, Cairo University Egypt

often confronted with so-called “Shadow States”. “*The Israeli–Palestinian...conflicts illustrate how shifting perceptions of conflict—from decolonization and superpower dominance to the current preoccupation with international terrorism—have influenced international attitudes and engagement with these conflicts. Despite continuity in the insurgent groups’ ultimate objectives, the two cases also illustrate a changing trajectory of conflict owing to the particularities of contemporary non-state actor activity. While the Palestinian Authority continued to have problems in reining in militant elements, Hamas’ ascent to power through municipal and later parliamentary elections in Palestine cast the international community’s method of engaging with the conflict in a new light.*”<sup>31</sup>

### 6.1. PLO Finances

When Yasser Arafat was fighting for his life in 2004 (a battle he would lose later that same year), behind the scenes a major conflict came about: Not so much who would follow Abu Ammar’s role as a leader of the Palestinians, but who would inherit his fortunes. While U.S. *Forbes magazine* listed him as the ninth richest leader in the world with a personal fortune of \$264 million, other sources (and I believe them to be more appropriate) such as *Haaretz* estimate his fortune to be standing at a proud total of \$1.3 billion (the *Scotsman* went so far as to estimate at £2 billion). It may explain why his wife Suha re-emerged from the underground which had been the straining existence in Tunisia and the hardship of living in the finer arrondissements of Paris. It is said that she agreed not to demand an inheritance of her husband’s fortunes (much of the assets of the PA and PLO were directly in Arafat’s name), but that she will instead receive \$100,000 (*Wikipedia*) per month from the PA budget (the *Scotsman* says £100,000/month) as an allowance. What I find interesting about these assumptions, or perhaps facts, is that we can read about - and even see - many Palestinians struggling everyday for their minimum means of existence, while Mrs. Arafat goes about buying new shoes or a much needed handbag at Louis Vuitton on the Avenue des Champs-Élysées. The aim of this little interlude was meant to raise attention and be a bridge to my analyses of shadow

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31 Holmqvist, Caroline. “Major armed conflicts” SIPRI Yearbook 2006 [Online] Available <http://yearbook2006.sipri.org/chap2>

states, and how they become to exist. Taking a figure such as Yasser Arafat for example, we may wonder how it is possible for someone to accumulate such an immense amount of wealth, which means were used, and why his own people saw so little of that money.

The “*total assets of the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) in the year 1990 were an estimated \$8 to \$14 billion*”<sup>32</sup> according to the CIA. If we were to take this figure as the gross national product, than the PLO’s GNP was higher than that of small Arab countries such as Jordan or Yemen. Furthermore, the PLO was considered “the richest of all terrorist organizations” with \$8-\$10 billion in assets and an annual income of \$1.5-\$2 billion from “*donations, extortion, payoffs, illegal arms dealing, drug trafficking, money laundering, fraud, etc.*”, according to a 1993 *National Criminal Intelligence Service report*. And finally, when a computer hacker broke the security code of the PLO’s computer system: “*uncovering records of about \$8 billion the PLO held in numbered bank accounts in New York, Geneva, and Zurich...the newspaper also unearthed further secret holdings of the PLO -- including front companies, European real estate, and shares in Mercedes-Benz and the national airlines of the Maldives and Guinea-Bissau – in total about \$50 billion for the year 2000 (up from \$32 billion recorded in 1998). Naturally, Arafat and his men denied the report.*”<sup>33</sup>

Naturally the question arises how is such a thing possible, how can an entity that is not even a real state, accumulate so much wealth? The answer lies very much within Arafat’s personal skills but also in the Middle Eastern political rules of conduct. Numerous Arab statesmen sympathized with the cause of the Palestinians, but did not want to make their own hands dirty, nor make their actions public (in order to keep active relations to the West). What they did was to donate money, and not a couple of hundred thousand but billions. A far more interesting aspect deserves more attention though: SAMED. The Arab acronym SAMED stands for “Sons of the Palestinian Martyrs” and can be regarded as the economic arm of the PLO. SAMED ran small factories and workshops (these workshops produced items such as shoes, blankets, tents, civilian clothing, uniforms, toys and furniture). “*SAMED was originally established in 1970 to provide vocational training for the children of*

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32 Livingstone, Neil C. and David Halevy. *Inside the PLO*. New York: William Morrow. 1990. Chp. 5

33 Ehrenfeld, Rachel. And a Thief, Too: Yasser Arafat takes what he likes. *National Review*. [Online] Available [http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_m1282/is\\_14\\_54/ai\\_88990523](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1282/is_14_54/ai_88990523)

*Palestinian men and women killed in service to the Palestinian national cause. After 1976 SAMED decided to accept any Palestinian needing employment if work were available. Most SAMED workshops were in the refugee camps in northern Lebanon and thus were not affected by the Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in 1982.*"<sup>34</sup> In addition to supplying the PLO, SAMED would later expand its business and start exporting its products abroad (such as the Soviet Union). In 1981 SAMED employed over 5,000 full-time employees in Lebanon, 200 in Syria, and 1,800 in Africa. In addition, *"there were over 6,000 part-time workers in Lebanon, and over 12,000 persons would receive a professional education to establish their own company."*<sup>35</sup> *"SAMED maintained 35 factories in Lebanon and numerous branches abroad."*<sup>36</sup> *"In the agricultural sector SAMED had poultry and dairy cattle farms, to provide the catering of the Palestinian people. This sector alone earned about \$16 million annually. In addition SAMED established joint-ventures in several African countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Uganda."*<sup>37</sup> SAMED did not receive a set budget from the Organization, but when needed, it would receive interest free loans from the PLO. It is said at one point the PLO owned so many poultry farms that it could have supplied the poor of all Arabic states with eggs. The role of SAMED with the PLO was not a one-time phenomenon. There were plenty of other groups that were operated by similar means, either by legal or illegal means. In a non-biased statement I would assume that Middle Easterners can be found amongst the leading businessmen in the world. And for good reason; they do not shy away from forming uncommon alliances to attain a final goal. In January 1976, after calling in a 48 hour cease fire, a coup was conducted by Force 17 (joint commandos of Christian militia and Fatah, groups that usually fought each other) in which they robbed the British Bank of the Middle East. They managed to steal thousands of gold bars, millions of dollars in Lebanese and foreign currencies, as well as stock certificates and other valuables. *"In the following months the PLO sold many of the stocks and bonds found in the bank vault back to their original owners for 20 or 30 cents on the dollar. In many cases Arab governments and top officials were only too eager to buy back*

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34 The Library of Congress, CIA World Factbook. "Jordan – The Palestinians and the Palestine Liberation Organization". Photius. [Online] Available

[http://www.photius.com/countries/jordan/government/jordan\\_government\\_the\\_palestinians\\_and~336.html](http://www.photius.com/countries/jordan/government/jordan_government_the_palestinians_and~336.html)

35 Adams, James. *Geld und Gewalt – Wer finanziert den internationalen Terror?* Bergisch Gladbach: Luebbe Verlagsgruppe. 1990 pg. 123

36 IBID, pg. 121

37 IBID, pg. 122

*their assets since they had been illegally obtained in the first place, and disclosure of the fact that they possessed such large sums of money or owned companies doing business with their own governments would have been very embarrassing. So successful was the "fire sale" that in October 1976 a second shipment of funds and other valuables, worth an estimated \$250 million, were sent to Switzerland.*"<sup>38</sup> The biggest problem the PLO had (or has) is corruption. And this truth is why many of the Palestinians lost faith in the PLO and Fatah (the political party within the PLO which is secular), and found new hope in a more radical group such as Hamas.

## 6.2. Corruption in the Palestinian Territories

According to definition by Pierson, one of the main characteristics of a state is having a constitution, sovereignty and a set of rules which everyone obeys. In such a situation citizens find themselves in a surrounding which is undemocratic, in which they are ruled by people who adhere to a strict chain of command as well as nepotism. The rules of the game are set out by whoever is on top. It is the reason why it was hard for the Hamas to breach the system (before the elections), as they had to shift the political and economic power. Thus the question who is in power is not always a given answer, as without constitution or sovereignty a shadow state such as the Palestine Authority is build on fragile pillars. Those on top of the economic and military ladder are able to defend their status by having extended privileges and access to large amounts of money. Therefore it is without surprise that corruption is a main characteristic of the shadow state, and one of its biggest hurdles to overcome in achieving the recognition as a sovereign state.

When I was living in the Middle East, one observation was always stunning me: You could go out of your house and look into your *boab*'s (a sort of door and watchman) apartment (it was more of a room or garage in which the entire family lived), you could be on a street corner buying something to drink, you could literally be in the middle of nowhere, and you would always find a TV running somewhere. People have barely something to eat I wondered, but they have to have a TV. And even though I have not been to the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, I suppose it is no

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38 Lebanese Forces. "Historical Fact: Arafat's Bank Robbery" [Online] Available <http://www.lebaneseforces.com/blastfromthepast001.asp>



different, and news travel fast. News which sounds similar to: *“A secret 600-page report completed by the Palestinian Authority's auditing office last month found that \$323-million--which is almost 40% of the PA's annual budget--has been wasted or misused by PLO/PA officials, according to the Jerusalem Post.”*<sup>39</sup> *“The PLO has used at least \$47-million in foreign donations to illegally purchase property in Jerusalem, to buy private apartments for PLO bureaucrats, and to finance covert political activities, according to internal correspondence between PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and officials of the PLO's PECDAR agency, which handles donations from abroad (New York Times, June 30, 1995; Washington Times, Aug. 5, 1995).”*<sup>40</sup> *“An additional \$13 million in foreign donations for Gaza and Jericho was diverted by the PLO for other purposes in Lebanon (Jerusalem Post, March 22, 1995).”*<sup>41</sup> The list goes on and on, and I think the point is clear that there is a problem with corruption within the PLO.

An article in the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram noted the many Palestinian officials, activists and others, which were publicly condemning corruption, the state of chaos the territories were in and which were calling for reforms. After this observation, the ironic question being raised then, if so many voices within the Palestinian organization are calling out for reform: *“who are the corrupt officials everyone is talking about then (Al Ahram, July 29, 2004)”*<sup>42</sup>? In various surveys which were conducted in the Palestinian territories, between 80 to 90 percent of the local population thought that there was corruption with the PLO. It would be a tedious task to find evidence of whom in the PLO was directly involved in corruption, it is nonetheless a fact that corruption exists with the organization. Reports of favoritism, nepotism and corruption in the leading circles of the PLO are so common however, that aside from betraying their own people, the PLO is setting stage for the emergence of hardliners such as Hamas. Is corruption the only answer available to understand the raise of Hamas? *“Frankly, the Palestinian Authority, which is corrupt and cavorts with terror...is not the basis for a Palestinian state moving forward”* (at that time - National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, in the San Jose Mercury News on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2002).

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39 Jerusalem Post May 25th, 1997


40 New York Times June 30th 1995

41 Jerusalem Post March 22nd 1995

42 Al Ahram July 29th, 2004

Figure C

Source: Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre



## 7 - MASLOW AND THE HAMAS

The Hamas or Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Islamic Resistance Movement) has a two-sided image: in the West the organization is classified as a terror organization, while in Gaza it shines through its social commitments. The question is why? Why has an organization that “*is best known outside the Palestinian territories for its suicide bombings and other attacks directed against Israeli civilians*”; which still calls for the destruction of the State of Israel (written in its charter) and its replacement with a Palestinian Islamic state; which sees no other solution to the Palestinian question other than Jihad; why has it won the recent elections and now forms the majority party of the Palestinian National Authority? There are plenty of ways in which one can approach the question of explaining Hamas’ rise to power. In the following paragraphs I want to address the more psychological and social perspectives, before turning my attention to the role of media and lobby groups.

In a time that now seems long ago I first heard of Abraham Maslow. While earning a degree in Business Administration, I took a course titled “Behavior in Organization”, and it was then that my professor exposed me to Maslow and his “Hierarchy of Needs”. In trying to explain the Hamas it came to my mind that one of the possible explanations may be found in applying the theory that Maslow proposed in his paper *A Theory of Human Motivation*. In brief, Maslow stated that humans primarily need to attain a set of basic needs in order to later reach additional needs that he had placed on a set hierarchy. The theory was published some sixty years ago, and even though it is widely criticized I do believe there is some validity to it. According to Maslow (Greenberg and Baron<sup>43</sup>), the first of five stages is the physiological stage in which humans need to satisfy basic needs such as water, food and sleep. The second stage is that of safety, and here Maslow includes needs such as security of job, body, resources, family, health, a future and property. The third stage is that of love and belonging which entails friendship and family. The fourth stage is that of esteem, here Maslow includes self-esteem, achievement, confidence, respect

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43 Greenberg, Jerald and Robert A. Baron. *Behavior in Organizations*. Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall. 1997, pg. 145

of others and respect by others. The final stage of Maslow's hierarchy of needs is the self-actualization stage. Here we find morality, creativity, problem solving, and acceptance of facts and lack of prejudice.

Maslow's theory may explain my earlier quote of James Zogby quest in trying to find an answer to fundamentalism. In this attempt to explain the psychological and social perspective of Hamas' and other fundamentalist's success, I would like to refer to three articles which I found in *Der Spiegel*, tales which are all too common and which will serve as my real-life model; giving Zogby's example an actual face. The reason why I picked these specific articles, is that they illustrate the daily life of Palestinians and Israelis: for one the different fractions in Palestinian society, those that have already turned to the fundamental Hamas, and those which still resemble a seed of hope, which give reason to believe that with the right measures conditions could improve; and secondly what has become daily life for many Israelis as well, a story which may help to understand the deep rift between the two fractions.

The first article<sup>44</sup> tells the story of a widow and mother of seven. When Etidal's (the woman's name) husband got killed by Israeli helicopters, while flying an attack on the refugee camp of Jebalia in the North of Gaza-City, she became a welfare case and in addition a Hamas supporter overnight. The woman tells the reporters that her husband had actually been a supporter of the Fatah, and not of Hamas, but after his death the family would not have survived without the help of the Hamas. As her husband had officially become a martyr (a Palestinian killed by Israeli military), she was given the official pension of 100 Euros/three months. Considering that this amount is hardly enough to survive, Etidal states that the Hamas had hence adopted her children. She receives 15 Euros/month for every child as child allowance; in addition the children can visit the school of a Hamas organization for free. Despite the fact that the woman is illiterate, she managed to vote for the Islamic party which is presented on the ballots with a crescent as its symbol. In the article's conclusion Etidal speaks one last time of her support of Hamas and the future of her children: "*The Hamas is being beleaguered from abroad and domestically.*"<sup>45</sup> This fact only increases her solidarity with Hamas. Her oldest son had recently tried on the uniform of her late husband who was in a security unit of the Fatah; he wants to fight for the

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44 Putz, Ulrike. "Die Hamas hat meine Kinder adoptiert". *Der Spiegel*. [Online] Available <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,455490,00.html>

45 IBID

Hamas. *"I do not allow him to join the militia yet, he is only fifteen. That he can do when he is twenty."*<sup>46</sup>

The second article<sup>47</sup> is the depressing story of three individuals, two of whom I like to refer to; a young man who resembles the true face of James Zogby's example, and of a director of the UNRWA.<sup>48</sup> The story of Ahmed Kahlout resembles the life of numerous others. The reporters find Ahmed only with the help of his uncle, who had to wake him up at midday. The twenty-three year old has a bachelor in pedagogy and wanted to become a teacher; instead he is unemployed and sleeps away the days. *"I can't marry because I do not have the money to support a family; so I am wasting my time."*<sup>49</sup> We read that Ahmed is too apathetic to become radical, despite his misery. In that he is similar to the other 1.5 million people who live in Gaza; *"they live a life which is defined by poverty and desperation. An existence in which the bloody fight between radical Islamic Hamas and the corrupt Fatah is just an additional misfortune."*<sup>50</sup> The article then turns its attention to John Ging who works for the UNRWA. He informs the reporter about daily life in Gaza; how 89 percent of the people live in poverty, that they have less than \$2/day, over 60 percent are unemployed, and since the election of the Hamas international aid money has been held off – which made even more people drift into poverty, over 860,000 people are dependent on the food packages of the UNRWA, which is half of the population. John Ging states that Palestinians in Gaza live in one big prison; that an atmosphere of hope had arisen with the opening of the boarder to Egypt, hope which turned into desperation as the boarder remained de facto closed. Ging reports that because of Israeli pressure the boarder is only opened 14% of the time, that goods were only arriving in limited amounts – from the planned 400 trucks per day, only 14 arrived. In addition European observers which are meant to oversee the boarder are living in Israel, and Israel was hindering them from coming to work, a mean<sup>5</sup> to keep the boarder closed. Finally, people experience great difficulty in buying food. The markets are flooded with tomatoes, but there is no fish, despite having the sea on their doorstep, Israel imposes strict conditions which limit the Palestinian fishermen

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46 IBID

47 Putz, Ulrike. "Der Bürgerkrieg wird alles auffressen". Der Spiegel. [Online] Available <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,455111,00.html>

48 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East

49 IBID

50 IBID

from going out on the sea. Ging does not blame Israel alone however. He claims that the Hamas knew that international aid would stop if they would not comply with the conditions of the international community. The Hamas proceeded nonetheless and put up with the possibility that people would suffer – a move which was irresponsible. Ging argues further that the international community has the right to stop the flow of aid money, but has to consider that the Palestinian government had been dependent on foreign aid by over seventy percent – missing aid money turns into chaos. The most depressing analyzation being, that the people's moral is completely down, that there no light at the end of the tunnel, and that a lost generation is being brought up. Ging tries to illustrate this, by arguing that it is hard to motivate children to go to school: "*Try to animate youngsters to study, when they know that absolutely nothing is waiting for them when they graduate.*"<sup>51</sup>

I believe that these two articles give a good example of the disillusionment of many Palestinians, but I also know that they can lead one to a biased opinion. In this effort I want to give reference to my final article<sup>52</sup> about the small village of Sderot which is located close to the Gaza boarder.

The story of Sderot is quickly told: Sderot's population of 24,000 lives only kilometers away from Gaza and many of the former residents have either left temporarily or for good. Since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000 more than 4,500 Qassam rockets<sup>53</sup> have hit the city, which cost the lives of seven and injured many others. The article confronts the reader with the seven-year-old Ariel, whose schoolmate has been killed by a rocket attack, and who now tends to hide under the kitchen table once he comes home. His thirteen-year-old sister is still a bed-wetter, while his father suffers from nervous twitches; the family sleeps closely together in a room without an outside wall to prevent being hit by glass splinters in case of an explosion. The family is no exception, due to the constant attacks; a psychologist stated that almost half of the cities population suffers under post traumatic syndromes. The deputy major of Sderot Tal Nachshonov complains about the lack of support from the government, in his opinion not enough is done to

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51 IBID

52 Heumann, Pierre. "Palästinenser Ziel Sderot". Der Spiegel. [Online] Available <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,483779,00.html>

53 Qassam rockets are simple home-made steel rockets filled with explosives, and are produced by the Palestinian Hamas. They can vary in size from 80 to 200cm; have a weight up to 90 kilograms; and a range between three to ten kilometers.

prevent the terrorist attacks from Gaza. Nachshonov has immigrated to Israel in the nineties from the Caucasus, and in his opinion the Russian handling of Chechnyans should serve as an example: *“I know how to deal with terrorist...taking Russia as a model...so that nothing remains of the Palestinians that attack us.”*<sup>54</sup> Nachshonov concludes that Israel has to erect a ten kilometer buffer zone between its territory and Gaza; that Palestinians only understand the language of violence and to demonstrate that they should be cut off from the supply of water and electricity – the Hamas has no interest in the end of the conflict, *“for terrorists war means business.”*<sup>55</sup>

The overriding themes of these articles: basic needs of food and water, security of job and family, confidence and the respect of others, can all be found in Maslow's hierarchy of needs. They are merely one mean in trying to find an understanding however. I would argue that the psychological dimension is only the first step towards finding an understanding of humans in general, but a necessary step which will enable us to find an understanding of the essential social and economic measures which need to be taken. If we re-read the story of Ahmed Kahlout; the twenty-three year old unemployed Palestinian, and take into account Maslow, how may we draw up a potential picture of his character? Could he be frustrated? May he feel left out, left out on the prospect of family and gaining honor and respect in his society? What can he expect of the future? The question becomes what should he *expect* from his government?

### *7.1. The failed Palestinian Social Contract*

When the Hamas came out victorious in the January 2006 Palestinian Legislative elections - elections which gave it a majority in the Palestinian National Authority - many outsiders were caught off guard. Condoleezza Rice for one, admitted that nobody in her staff saw it coming; while the U.S. State Department, President Bush and other observers concluded that much of Hamas' victory was due to the frustration with the corrupt Fatah governance of the Palestine National

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Authority, they had neglected other crucial factors why the Palestinian Authority under Fatah failed (San Francisco Chronicle, 8<sup>th</sup> of February, 2006<sup>56</sup>).

These decisive reasons may be brought in perspective by exploring the concept known as a social contract. A social contract typically refers to an agreement between a government and its people, or in more general terms between members of a society, and defines and limits the rights and duties of each. The term social contract has been in use throughout the centuries, an earlier reference was for example made to Thomas Hobbes, who argued that people in a state of nature would give up their individual rights to create government/security.<sup>57</sup> *"In the MENA countries, the social contract encompasses a wider array of factors than is commonly held in Europe. Conceptualized not solely as an institutionalized bargain among collective actors, it encompasses norms and shared expectations for the overall organizations of a polity."*<sup>58</sup> *"Shared expectations"* – I consider this to be part of the vital component of Middle Eastern culture, that the collective feeling towards government, is not only that of an individual towards the state, but that the government/head of state takes the role of a father figure and the people that of children/rest of the family, thus explaining the perhaps still existing tribal society. In addition to the naivety of large fractions of the population (bearing in mind that in many MENA countries large parts of the population enjoyed only limited education), many believe in the projection created from and about leaders. Michael N. Barnett quotes Harvard professor Stephen M. Walt in this regard: *"In the Arab world, the most important source of power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the image of one's rivals in the minds of other Arab elites."*<sup>59</sup> It may also explain the disappointment with Yasser Arafat: Middle Easterners tend to be more forgiving with corrupt and inefficient governments - the rulers as I said are seen as father figures - but it became evident that Arafat had let his people down, hope was fading away, which lead towards a disappointment similar to that experienced in family affairs. The statement: *"He is a crook – but he is our crook"*, can easily be applied here, but Arafat went too far, and that partially opened the door for Hamas. If we are

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56 San Francisco Chronicle, February 8th 2006

57 Yousef, Tarik M. "Employment, Development, and the Social Contract in the Middle East and North Africa" [Online] Available

[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLM/Resources/390041-1103750362599/MENA\\_paper.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLM/Resources/390041-1103750362599/MENA_paper.pdf)

58 IBID

59 Barnett, Michael N. "Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab State System". International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer, 1995), pg. 489



to label the election of Hamas as a setback, then we should investigate the roots – and might as well agree that someone is to be put at fault. Although Yasser Arafat and the Fatah can be held responsible for their failure to a large extent, they can not be blamed alone.

In an article published on the MERIP<sup>60</sup> webpage, professor Joel Beinin explains the victory for Hamas: *“The Bush administration's simple faith in elections has distracted it from comprehending the realities that Palestinians live with daily. What they have not understood is that an election is only a formal procedure. Substantive democracy requires the rule of law, protection of civil liberties and minority rights, physical security, a reasonable standard of living, sovereignty and political independence. The Palestinians have none of these. This is a source of Hamas' popularity that President Bush fails to grasp.”*<sup>61</sup> Professor Beinin further notes part of Hamas' victory can be explained by the corrupt and ineffective Fatah, but that the most crucial problem is the continued Israeli occupation. *“concerted efforts to destroy the infrastructure of the P.A., the expansion of settlements, construction of a separation barrier effectively annexing large parts of the West Bank, military raids and many internal restrictions on movement. The Bush administration's unwillingness to press Israel to ease the occupation and thus allow Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas real political successes meant that Abbas could not present a credible alternative to Hamas.”*<sup>62</sup> In taking Beinin into account, we may thus argue that it was not only the Fatah which is to put to blame, but that in general the conditions were not set to enforce a social contract between the P.A. and the Palestinians, that it simply had to fail, and that this failure lead to the victory of Hamas. In addition we have to consider the fact that there is no actual Palestinian state, or representative body, to enforce such a social contract if it is constantly confronted with an occupying Israel.

The Palestinians have drawn up a constitution as far back as 1997, but it was signed only in 2002 (a third draft has been revised in March 2003). The Basic Law enshrines democracy, separation of power and judicial independence – it defines the powers of the P.A. and will serve as the constitution until the establishment of a

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60 The Middle East Research and Information Project

61 Beinin, Joel. “Why Hamas Won and Why Negotiations Must Resume” MERIP [Online] Available [http://www.merip.org/newspaper\\_opeds/oped020806.html](http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped020806.html)

62 IBID

Palestinian state. I would also argue that the Israeli state has to have an interest in the facilitation of a social contract, and the ability to enforce it. The German-British sociologist and politician Ralf Dahrendorf argues that the ones that have (the Israelis) have to include all (the Palestinians) in the general society in their own interest, not because they need them, but in order to protect their own lives and values. I would thus go as far as saying, that primarily the state of Israel is hindering the successful implementation of a social contract, in addition to the corrupt Palestinian officials which have to a large extent only enriched themselves and left the general Palestinian society to its own. The scenario which arose as a consequence, that the power given to the P.A. was misused, and with the election of Hamas the Palestinians reacted to this misuse of power, is aptly formulated by Dr. Karma Nabulsi: *"What happens when a people place their sovereignty into the hands of their leadership, and their leaders' own hands are then tied, and they are lost in a terrible prison, as if trapped in a dark enchantment?...The people eventually take their force back, for it is sovereign...For authority is only lent, and only for as long as the leadership can find a way to represent it: sovereignty, since it is nothing less than the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated, and that the Sovereign, who is nothing but a collective being, can only be represented by himself: the power indeed may be transmitted, but not the will"*<sup>63</sup>.

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63 Nabulsi, Karma. "Being Palestinian" University College London [Online] Available [http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/Being\\_Palestinian.html](http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/Being_Palestinian.html)

## 8 - MEDIA, TERRORISM AND THE WORK OF LOBBY GROUPS

*“Terrorists, terrorists, terrorists. In the Middle East, in the entire Muslim world, this word would become a plague, a meaningless punctuation mark in all our lives, a full stop erected to finish all discussion of injustice, constructed as a wall by Russians, Americans, Israelis, British, Pakistanis, Saudis, Turks, to shut us up. Who would ever say a word in favour of terrorists? What cause could justify terror? So our enemies are always ‘terrorist’. In the seventeenth century, governments used ‘heretic’ in much the same way, to end all dialogue, to prescribe obedience...you are either with us or against us. For decades, I have listened to this dangerous equation, uttered by capitalist and communist, presidents and prime ministers, generals and intelligence officers and, of course, newspaper editors.”<sup>64</sup>*

The chapter’s title *Media, Terrorism and the Work of Lobby Groups* may confront the reader with an illogical amalgamation, but to a large extent I believe it to be a combination that makes very much sense as I would like to elucidate now. I have pointed out in earlier paragraphs, that much of the common citizens’ opinion is based upon what is seen and read in the media. This fact becomes especially evident when confronting any ordinary pedestrian in the street, asking how one would imagine a “terrorist” to look like (I have given the example of the train ride I took to my home town, and the perception of Arab-looking men). There are various voices in the political and media science sphere which have spoken out over this development, of an evolution of media misuse to achieve political goals. In this effort I would like to comment on the role of media; how it shapes our minds and creates perceptions; how apt the term terrorism is in defining the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; and finally defining the scope of work by lobby groups. Much of the following paragraphs are based on the work and research of M.I.T.<sup>65</sup> professor Noam Chomsky; despite’ being accused <sup>by</sup> from many of constructing conspiracy theories in regard to the role of media in society and politics, I would attest that Chomsky too keeps “things in perspective”, and is a credible source. by

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64 Fisk, Robert. *The Great War for Civilization – The Conquest of the Middle East*. London: Harper Perennial. 2006, pg. 74

65 M.I.T. – Massachusetts Institute of Technology

In preparing the reader for an analyses on the “war on terror”, how the terminology is used in the context of modern media and opinion building, Chomsky introduces the concept of propaganda and its role in influencing society. The first modern propaganda operations were conducted under the Wilson presidency, at a time when much of the American society was rather pacifist and the idea of being securely isolated from the rest of the world was still prevalent. The Wilson presidency had decided to enter the war however, and now needed to find a mean in order to change and win the public’s approval to go to war. For this matter the so-called Creel Commission<sup>66</sup> was formed, and within six months it managed to turn the population enthusiastic about the war. “*All of a sudden people wanted to destroy everything German, to rip the Germans into pieces, and to go to war to save the world.*”<sup>67</sup> Chomsky adds that this method was also successful after the war in spreading the “Red Scare”, which refers to a fear of the spread of communism. The usage of such tactics is what Chomsky refers to as “manufacturing consent”, a catch phrase which he derived from the title of a book by Walter Lippmann.

### 8.1. Manufacturing Consent

In knowing how to successfully raise consent over future political actions, decision makers have to know into which camps voters and potential decision makers fall. In this respect it is useful to explore the concept of “doves and hawks”. In the political context “doves” represent those factions which maintain a more moderate, perhaps even pacifistic standpoint, and are hence equated to liberal policies. The “hawks” on the other hand, are those we would attest to hold conservative policies (please refer to Appendix D for further explanation). Walter Lippmann brought up an earlier notion of a concept similar to that of doves and hawks. Lippmann argued that “*a ‘revolution in the art of democracy’ could lead to ‘manufacture consent’, which meant that by using new means of propaganda techniques it was possible to manipulate the public’s opinion on events it initially*

Annex

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66 Creel Commission – The Committee on Public Information, also known as the CPI and the Creel Committee, was intended to influence U.S. public opinion regarding American intervention in World War I. It was established under President Woodrow Wilson as an independent agency by Executive order 2594, April 13, 1917. The committee consisted of George Creel (Chairman) and Secretaries of State (Robert Lansing), War (Lindley M. Garrison), and the Navy (Josephus Daniels) as ex officio members.

67 Chomsky, Noam. Media Control – Wie die Medien uns manipulieren. Munich: Serie Piper. 2006, pg. 29

rejected.”<sup>68</sup> He actually argued that the interest of the polity is excluded from public opinion, meaning that only a few responsible men who possess the necessary knowledge are capable of taking the right steps for the greater good. The process of dividing society into classes, leaves two essential groups: those of specialist, a small percentage of the population which is able to analyze, and make decisions on the political, economical and ideological system; while the other group is that of the confused and large herd, from who’s “stamping and noise” the specialist have to protect themselves. Noam Chomsky rephrases this theory and concludes: *“Behind this theory lays logic and even a compelling moral principle. It states that the masses are too asinine to comprehend larger coherences. If it (the population) attempts to participate in governing its own matters, it only disturbs a smooth development. Therefore it would be immoral and irresponsible to demand such. We have to tame the herd, so that it does not trample down everything. To permit its participation in governing its own matters, would be as foolish as to allow a three-year old to cross the street on its own, because it would endanger itself and others with this freedom.”*<sup>69</sup>

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What Chomsky is arguing, is that we as citizens are exposed to an apparatus which, not necessarily in all areas of the world, but especially in the United States uses the media to influence public opinion. One of the important elements of such tactic is also to be found in finding the appropriate technique to get the right message across to an audience. It is said for example, that to comprehend a common yellow press paper, one has to have a vocabulary of only 200 to 300 words. This explains why the headlines are easily understood. It explains further why in the political jargon, statements such as *“You are either with me or against me”* find large approval in wide society. Noam Chomsky explains this by referring to the well known PR-slogan: *“Support our troops”*. Chomsky argues that the question could as well be: *“Do you support our politics?”* *“Good propaganda invents a slogan to which all can agree without having to know what it means, because it does not mean anything. Its value and purpose is to turn the attention away from the really meaningful question: »Do you support our politics?« Instead people think about the question whether or not to support the troops. »Of course I am not opposing to do*

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68 IBID, pg. 30

69 IBID, pg. 31

so.« *Thus propaganda won.*” The idea is to aim at the subconscious, to a point where the slogan’s real message does not need be questioned. Of course we support our troops - after all we do not want to stand on the other side.

## 8.2. *Creating Images*

The influence which media has in creating images and perceptions is omnipresent and has existed ever since; especially when this “reality” about non-westerns is manufactured in the United States. I experienced this personally when attending the American school in Cairo and later on graduating from high school at a boarding school in Connecticut. Fortunately I never much cared for such wisdoms, but I was always astonished how Arabs (as I had arrived from Egypt I was placed, to my surprise, in this class), Europeans, but especially Germans were seen. Of course there were exceptions, but the often times not too charming illustrations of Germans in American movies did not necessarily help me much (if it is not a Russian that wants to take over the world, it must be a German). In *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, Norman Daniel convincingly demonstrates that the negative portrayals of Islam date back to early Christian exegesis and are therefore deeply imbedded in western culture. These negative depictions are often passed on from one generation to the next; perhaps oneself has made this experience as well, being advised that some people can not be trusted simply because *grandfather already said so*.

It is also worthy to evaluate the importance given to news coverage on domestic or international issues, the task has now become to evaluate what is deemed as newsworthy and what is not. “*Because a handful of individuals or international corporations now own and control media communications, including cable and large television networks, motion pictures, radio stations, magazines and newspapers, a near ‘unanimity of view’ has emerged in the presentation of all issues, not only those dealing with the Middle East. In addition, some analysts have argued that corporate ownership of most media sources has made the media more conservative and prone to support the established and powerful elite.*”<sup>70</sup> What Janice Terry simply points out

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70 Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 15

to, is that debate in the media over issues related to the Middle East has become limited to a small group of commentators (in Germany there are about three of such experts which are constantly questioned in the media when trying to find an explanation to events occurring in the Middle East). Although there are about 1,000 academic specialists on the Middle East at universities in the United States, only few of them are ever asked to discuss contemporary issues. *“Those that contradict the prevailing wisdom or offer ‘hard truths’ about the region and U.S. policies quickly find themselves dropped from the guest lists.”*<sup>71</sup>

The often times slanted articles, books and media coverage deserve a brief observation as well. The dichotomy of cultures, dividing the world into different and competing societies, has been emphasized perhaps most prominently by Samuel P. Huntington in his *Clash of Civilizations* (others have published similar works). *“On both sides the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a clash of civilizations. The West’s ‘next confrontation,’ observes M.J. Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, is definitely going to come from the Muslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from the Maghreb to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will begin...they will attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional culture and values...this will require the West to maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its interests in relation to this civilizations.”*<sup>72</sup>

I do not disregard everything Huntington argues for, after all he also concludes that we have to learn to coexist with each other, but his work serves two deeds which we should consider: It corresponds to the political ideology of some radical Islamist that only search for grounds to further isolate their societies from the West, and further helps them to paint a demonic picture of western society; in addition this portrait of the “sick” Arab/Muslim world was marshaled by the neo-conservatives to justify the 2003 American led war against Iraq. We may speculate that sources as such justified President Bush’s led mission to “break the chains of tyranny”, because as Marcus Tullius Cicero once said *“men of good will, mindful therefore of the Law laid down by God, oppose governments whose rule is by men, and if they wish to survive as a nation they will destroy the government which attempts to adjudicate by the whim of*

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71 IBID

72 Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations” *Foreign Affairs*: Summer 1993, v72, n3, p22(28)

venal judges.”<sup>73</sup> The debate over a “*Clash of Civilizations*”, additionally aids in using a powerful tool in changing the attitude of society - the element of fear. “*Neoliberalism has generated new forms of insecurity, marginality and precariousness that reinforce an individualized, privatized sense of responsibility for the management of risk, and undermine the micro-solidarities that tied people to family, community, and work. At the same time, the neo-conservative side of New Right ideology has capitalized on these fears and uncertainties to promote more coercive forms of social control as the panacea for solving a whole range of social problems.*”<sup>74</sup> After all Machiavelli already suggested that “*it better to be feared than loved*”, an idea that certainly plays in the hands of politicians.

It is important to evaluate the role of media, especially in regards to the recent terminology we have been confronted with, such as the “war on terror”, “the axis of evil” and “breeding grounds of tyranny”. In addition we have to remind ourselves about the actual truths, reminding ourselves to “keep things in perspective”. Renowned British journalist Robert Fisk wrote: “*They want their people to see war as a drama of opposites, good and evil, ‘them’ and ‘us’, victory and defeat. (the image portrayed in the media) But war is primarily not about victory or defeat but about death and the infliction of death. It represents the total failure of human spirit (The truth).*”<sup>75</sup> It is a principle of broad culture that we like to carefully examine the faults, mistakes and crimes of others, but never our own. Which also explains why some world powers do not adhere to any authority and neither accept any demands to supply evidence. Finally we should also consider that one-sided media images can serve multiple functions and are able to have “*a damaging impact under presidents such as Roland Reagan and George W. Bush, who are not widely read and who pay little attention to detail (which is also applicable to the average citizen); and by forming the cultural backdrop that made the abuses against Arabs and Muslims in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and elsewhere possible, if not probable.*”<sup>76</sup>

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73 Ebenstein, William and Alan O. Ebenstein. *Great Political Thinkers – Plato to the Present*. Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1991, pg. 144 ff.

74 Knight, Graham. “A review on Creating Fear – News and the Construction of Crisis” *Canadian Journal of Sociology* [Online] Available <http://www.cjsonline.ca/pdf/fear.pdf>

75 Fisk, Robert. *The Great War for Civilization – The Conquest of the Middle East*. London: Harper Perennial. 2006, pg. xiv

76 Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 28



In this respect I would like to give a last quote of Noam Chomsky, which very much describes my own perspective of evaluating matters with a sober mind: *“The self proclaimed leaders against the war on terror endorse that they are faithful Christians, which hold the New Testaments in honor. Thus they will also know whom the Gospels identify to be hypocrite – a hypocrite is a human that raises moral standards for others, but does not accept them for himself.”*<sup>77</sup>

### 8.3. Terrorism

*“The Middle East is commonly considered to be a region especially vulnerable to terrorism and the chief exporter of terrorism to other parts of the world. Some have argued that Islam, unlike Christianity or Judaism, has a special propensity to violence against nonbelievers. Moreover, Israel, the United States, and “the West” are often portrayed as the primary victims of terrorism emanating from the Middle East*<sup>78</sup>”. Professor of Middle East history at Stanford University, Joel Beinin touches upon a fact which is all too common. Professor Tomáš Halík argues that in today’s world we are worried about the conflict between parts of the Arab world and the West; in addition a number of people in our Western societies are incapable or differentiating between Islam and terrorists which shield themselves behind Islam. The media certainly accounts for a large share in this development. We associate terrorism with Islam, while Muslims associate the mainly American influenced media to Western society as a whole. The question I would like to address is, what *exactly* is terrorism? I suppose the best source for an adequate definition has to be derived from a respected authority which originates from the country that dominates the current debate over terrorism.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) states that: *“Terrorism is the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws of the United States for purposes of intimidation, coercion, or ransom. Terrorists often use threats to; create fear among the public, try to convince citizens that their government is powerless to prevent terrorism, get*

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<sup>77</sup> Chomsky, Noam. *Media Control – Wie die Medien uns manipulieren*. Munich: Serie Piper. 2006, pg. 29  
<sup>78</sup> Beinin, Joel. “Is Terrorism a Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?” [Online] Available  
<http://why-war.com/files/85.1beinin.pdf>

*immediate publicity for their causes. Acts of terrorism include threats of terrorism; assassinations; kidnappings; hijackings; bomb scares and bombings; cyber attacks (computer-based); and the use of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons.*"<sup>79</sup> So much to the definition, but how are we supposed to protect ourselves from terrorism then? According to FEMA, some of the precautions we can take is being aware of our surrounding; being aware of conspicuous or unusual behaviour and by being prepared to do without services (such as electricity, telephone, gas, and cash) one normally depends on. I would argue that FEMA's recommendations help us understand the impact of terrorism, and especially the consequences which occur when it is mentioned in the media. At one point it went so far that American citizens build bunkers in their backyards in fear of a possible Russian nuclear attack, whereas today this "created feeling" of fear and paranoia leads much to the suspicion of what is foreign, unknown and not comprehensible (page 36). I would like to come back to the usage of terrorism in a purely political form. In his book, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* - Benjamin Netanyahu<sup>80</sup> defines terrorism as: "*the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.*" Joel Beinin argues that Netanyahu's definition is provisionally serviceable if applied to both states and nonstate actors, that is does however beg the question of who is innocent and what constitutes innocence in conflictual situations. In this light terrorism has been going on in the Middle East throughout the modern era, and the politically motivated violence directed against civilian populations can essentially be classified into eight types according to Beinin. I do not wish to elaborate on all types; I shall briefly list them and proceed with finding an answer in which degree terrorism has to be considered in the context of modern discussion. According to Beinin<sup>81</sup> the eighty types of political motivated violence are:

- Atrocities committed by European states in the course of imperial expeditions.
- Atrocities committed in the course of repressing anti-colonial rebellions.

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79 Federal Emergency Management Agency. "General Information About Terrorism" [Online] Available <http://www.fema.gov/hazard/terrorism/info.shtm>

80 Benjamin Netanyahu was the ninth Prime Minister of Israel, and is currently the leader of the conservative Likud party – the official leader of the opposition in the Knesset/legislature of Israel.

81 Beinin, Joel. "Is Terrorism a Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?" [Online] Available <http://why-war.com/files/85.1beinin.pdf>

- Riots against European settler populations.
- Organized violence by nationalist politico-military organizations directed at either civilian settlers or civilians in the apparatus of colonial rule.
- Counterattacks by colonial settlers.
- Acts of states against foreign enemies.
- Acts of states against those perceived as internal enemies.
- The final type being defined by the last two or three decades in which the United States and European states have been targeted by Arab nationalists or political Islamists opposed to the role of the United States and Europe in the Middle East. While in the same period, Islamist radicals have assassinated political figures, civilians, and Europeans in Egypt, the state apparatus has responded with massive violations of civil and human rights, including the torture of suspected militants.

Joel Beinin makes another important observation in this respect. He notes that the most prominent locales of politically motivated violence against civilians in the Middle East, Algeria and Israel/Palestine, are linked to their histories as sites of the most extensive European colonial settlement in the region. Islam is not the decisive factor, despite its significant role in mobilizing resistance; rather that contention is a product of postcolonial anxieties about U.S. global supremacy and the regional dominance of the U.S.-Israeli alliance in the Middle East.

*“The Bush administration’s adaptation of Ariel Sharon’s specious argument that Yasser Arafat and Osama bin Laden are equivalents demonstrates how easily the term can be abused to obscure the disparate histories of events that appear superficially similar.”*<sup>82</sup> The Palestinians have surely carried out horrible attacks on Israeli civilians, but the comparison between the al-Qaeda and the Palestinian intifada holds no weight. At the same time Israeli civilians (such as the orthodox Barukh Goldstein<sup>83</sup>) and the Israeli army (only consider the conduct of the Israeli army during the 1982 Sabra and Shatila refugee camp raids<sup>84</sup>) have committed

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82 IBID

83 Barukh Goldstein gunned down twenty-nine Muslim worshipers in the middle of Friday prayers at the Cave of the Patriarchs/Ibrahim Mosque in 1994. It is the burial site of Abraham in the Jewish and Muslim traditions. To avenge Goldstein’s act the Hamas launched the first suicide bombings in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

84 An act carried out in September 1982 by a Lebanese Forces militia group against Palestinian refugee camps. The number of victims of the massacre is estimated at 700-3500. The camps were externally surrounded by Israeli Defense Forces throughout the incident, although the Israeli military personnel who were there stated that they had no idea of what was going on inside.

similar acts of violence which have only spread further hate. The principle issue in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not the abstract form of terrorism, but the Palestinian struggle to establish their own sovereign state.

In his conclusion Beinín raises the question if *“the term terrorism can be rescued from its imbrication in such as web of propaganda? Is it worth doing so?”*<sup>85</sup> The problem in assessing terrorism is after all found in determining who sets the measure, what are *acts of terrorism* and what are *acts for freedom*. The old saying that *“one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”* is ever prevalent, not only in the Middle East. Throughout the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we are able to find arguments which defend the actions of one’s own side, while condemning those of the opposing camp. The media too portrays history or current events in different lights, depending on its origin and ideological makeup (despite claiming to be neutral). I remember being thought *“that history is written by the victors”*, and I believe that Winston Churchill was the author of this still customary tradition. What has to be considered moreover is that the process of radicalization is not to be comprehended by solely looking at the crisis in the Middle East. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict in addition to the invasion of Iraq surely stirred up strong anti-American and anti-Western sentiments, but the connection remains symbolic. In assessing the attitude after September 11<sup>th</sup> in Arab countries, the media noted that sympathy for the attacks was found in opinion polls in the Middle East. Nobody has conducted such polls in Buenos Aires or Mexico City. In the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, the media and public prematurely concluded that Arabs or Muslims were responsible for the death of 168 and the injury of 800 civilians (until September 11<sup>th</sup> the deadliest act of terrorism in the United States). Only afterwards did we hear of Timothy McVeigh; the media had not labelled him as a “Christian terrorist” however.

*“Attacking civilians in any conflict is morally indefensible and politically counterproductive, but the case of settler colonialism proves more complex than most...Colonial settlement involves the dispossession and disenfranchisement of indigenous populations, even when it does not entail direct violence. Hence attacks on civilians are a common feature of struggles against settler colonialism...The*

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85 Beinín, Joel. “Is Terrorism a Useful Term in Understanding the Middle East and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict?” [Online] Available <http://why-war.com/files/85.1beinin.pdf>

*reprehensible attacks on civilians by Palestinian extremists should not annual the national rights of the Palestinian people.”*<sup>86</sup> The role of media is thus an important element when considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As outsiders we have to remain critical in trying to establish and understanding of what we hold to be true. The final topic of this influential triangle is that of the work of lobby groups. Lobby groups are well acquainted with the influence and proper use of the media (to support their means). It is of noteworthy significance to explore the history and role lobby groups have in the United States - especially with emphasis on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the way they are able to alter U.S. foreign policy - and to then focus on the work of the Arab and Israeli lobbies.

#### *8.4. The History and Role of Lobby Groups*

To understand the role of lobby groups; to which extent they take influence on the decision making process especially in the politics of the United States; one has to have an equal understanding of developments in the code of conduct in this particular field. *“Since World War II, Congressional involvement has generally declined while that of the President, his close advisers and, in particular, the NSC has grown.”*<sup>87</sup> The National Security Council (NSC) is *“the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. Since its inception under President Truman, the function of the Council has been to advise and assist the President on national security and foreign policies. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.”*<sup>88</sup> The important factor in regards to NSC advisers is that they are appointed to office, they report directly to the president and are not hindered by the duties of regular politicians. We have to consider that even though the U.S. Congress holds substantial power in major areas of foreign aid formation (such as foreign aid, arms deals, etc.), it is the president and his advisers that like to place key decision making in their domain. We are thus confronted with a small elite group which makes foreign policy,

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86 IBID

87 Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 4

88 The White House. “National Security Council” [Online] Available <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/>

and it is this field in which lobby groups try to tap in. The question becomes what the exact role of a lobbyist is, what defines a lobbyist's *scope of work*, and what real influence does he or she have. Operating within the constraints of the system, lobbyists (and pressure groups) manipulate and make use of the prevailing cultural milieu, first to gain access to, and then to convince, policy-makers to adopt policies that are favorable to their specific agendas (for example the strong farmer lobby in many EU countries). Specifically, they want a comfortable competitive advantage over other industries "Under United States law, a lobbyist is defined as an individual or organization whose job is to 'influence the passing or defeat of legislation' and who receives money for that purpose. By the 1990's, there were over 80,000 registered lobbyists in Washington."<sup>89</sup> Thus a lobbyist's role can be summed up in being able to influence and possibly change a decision makers' choice in favor of the lobbyist's interest.

In having an understanding how lobbyists function, we must also consider the decisive factors in the policy-making process (I will focus solely on the United States here). Opinion polls are one of the most important elements in weighing out popular sentiment; a trend which has also swept over to Europe. In the United States opinion polls are used on a regular basis to determine into which direction a politician should stir his program in order to gain a maximum number of voters/support. In the 1976 elections for example, one insider suggested (on the basis of opinion polls) to Ford that: "*From the perspective of the coming elections, it is apparent that a policy which hurts or appears to hurt Israel and appeases the Arab demands will carry a stiff political price in the United States, and a price which the Republican party should not be asked to pay. But it would also be a lost opportunity to rally the American public behind a country widely perceived as a reliable, democratic ally at a time when we have so few allies left around the world.*"<sup>90</sup> I suppose similar advises have been made in recent years in considering U.S. politics towards reliable allies. It also portrays how carefully politicians need to assess the possible outcome of measures they would like to incorporate in their program; they can ultimately cost voters, and it would thus be an avoidable mistake not to alter political choices to the most favorable outcome in elections. The U.S. elections of the year 2000 resulted in an

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of advice

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89 Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 29

90 IBID, pg. 7

incomprehensible outcome for countless observers from the outside; how a candidate could lose that actually managed to attain the most votes baffled many around the globe. The answer is to be found in the voting system and procedures of the United States, which is yet another useful mean in understanding the role of lobbyists.

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The outstanding feature in respect to voting and the role of lobby groups in the United States, is that essentially only two ethnic groups have persistently supported favorable lobbying efforts for their respective camp; the anti-Castro Cuban Americans and the Jewish Americans. Other ethnic groups only take a stand on lobbying efforts on a case by case basis (such as the Greek lobby group in the case over Cyprus for example). In addition it is noteworthy to comment on the small number of American citizens that vote, not to mention those that are informed about the political landscape. According to the Pew Research Center, *“in 1999, 56 percent of Americans could not name one Democratic candidate for the president in the 2000 election.”*<sup>91</sup> A similar stunning observation was by the National Election survey which stated that *“in 2000, 53 percent of electors were not aware that George W. Bush was a conservative, 30 percent thought he was a moderate.”*<sup>92</sup> These statistics are not meant to paint a negative image on the American public, I am convinced that we have similarly *well informed* voters in Europe, but it leads me to an essential observation. According to Janice Terry only 70 percent of the U.S. population is eligible to vote. Out of those 70 people (if we take 100 people as 100%), only 60 percent – or 42 people actually register. In a best case scenario only 50 percent or 21 people, actually vote. The important consideration, a candidate only needs 50 percent, plus one, or simply 11 out of 100 to win. In other words, a politician only needs to appeal to 11 out of 100 people. It explains why a small, well-organized, and influential lobby group can determine the outcome of an election to a substantial degree. In consideration of lobby groups, we must also note that most of American Jews and American Arabs live in states that have a determining influence in the outcome of U.S. elections, states such as Florida, Michigan and California. The determining difference being that Jewish Americans are far more active and better organized. *“Of all the ethnic groups in this country, Jews take the most active interest in elections and vote more assiduously than almost any other population group. They*

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91 Online Opinion. Selected Finding of Voter Knowledge in the United States. [Online] Available [http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/images/article-images/tucker\\_voter\\_knowledge\\_usa.gif](http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/images/article-images/tucker_voter_knowledge_usa.gif)

92 IBID

*also contribute heavily to campaigns and engage actively in work at both the national and state level...though less than three percent of the U.S. population, Jews comprise between four to five percent of the total vote. In contrast, African Americans – eleven percent of the population – only account for five percent of the total vote.*”<sup>93</sup> In an effort to shed further light on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I thus find of great importance to evaluate the role of Jewish and Arab lobby groups in the United States, and in which way they take an influence on the foreign policy making process of this country. Before I discuss the individual lobby efforts of the pro-Arab and pro-Israeli lobby groups, a few notes on the techniques lobbyists use in influencing decision-making processes.

### *8.5. Lobby Techniques*

Paid lobbyists operate under the common set of rules that do not necessarily deem to effect pressure or interest groups. Rules that lobbyists profess to live by include: tell the truth, only promise what you can produce, listen and work with government personnel and, most importantly, do not surprise politicians with unexpected proposals or demands. Lobbyists and pressure groups must clearly define their agendas and know the influential decision-makers. Access in this respect is essential. Lobbyists can sometimes be successful on the basis of a close, personal relationship with just one powerful senator or representative (remember Mr. Calouste S. Gulbenkian). Embassies, diplomats, business functionaries, and other representatives can all function as lobbyists. The role of lobbyist is to inform, educate, and provide information to policy-makers on issues relevant to the lobbyist's interest. Sometimes lobby groups are the only source of information when operating in a new field, or a field in which insider's knowledge and access are essential. As for the pro-Arab and pro-Israeli lobby groups in the United States, it encompasses supplying government officials with monthly information packages, hosting dinners, sponsoring flights to respective countries; all to ensure that exchange of vital information retains to the utmost standard. However, the pro-Israeli pressure

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<sup>93</sup> Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 29



and lobby groups are much more consistent and persistent in these information campaigns - in addition they present a much more coherent front. Once again we can note that the pro-Arab lobby groups, presumably based on their heritage, have difficulties in presenting a more unified front in respect to Arab issues. A further important aspect in the lobby groups' sphere, is that pro-Israeli lobby groups see the lobbying efforts as a zero-sum game. In a zero-sum game there is a fixed pie, which means that if one group manages to get a piece of the pie, less is left for the others. Instead of enlarging the pie in general (increasing everyone's influence), the philosophy behind the zero-sum game is that only one party can remain maximum access. It is seen as essential not to lose a piece of the pie, and to prevent increased influence of the other group. Thus lobby groups of different interests can often stand in conflict with each other.

Presidents are particularly vulnerable to political pressures in election years. Because first term presidents enter office already running for a second term, each must frame his foreign policy during the first four years in office within the constraints of domestic political considerations. In this respect Janice Terry quotes an interview she held with President Carter over his presidency and notes that: "*Had he been elected to a second term, Carter would have pursued the unresolved portions of the Camp David agreement with 'tremendous vigor'. After leaving office, Carter publicly and correctly stated that he feared Prime Minister Begin had decided to ignore Camp David and would continue to confiscate property and land in the West Bank. Carter believed that some Arabs were ready to negotiate but were waiting for signs that Israel would do so in good faith. On this basis he anticipated that in his second term he could push through agreements involving Palestinian right without the 'political constraints...of a first term president in these areas'*"<sup>94</sup>. As we are able to see once again, weighing out the population's sentiment is of crucial importance in politics. The influence of lobby groups is thus a serious factor to consider.

A final feature in the lobbyist's scope of work is pressuring individual congressional representatives and senators to support specific legislation. Such efforts are operated by so-called PACs or Political Action Committees. PACs have been one of the most effective ways for individuals and groups to help politicians

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94 IBID, pg. 39

who support their causes get elected. PACs will be discussed in further detail in the subsequent paragraphs and I shall now turn my attention to the respective lobbyists.

### 8.6. Pro-Arab Lobby Groups

The important factor in determining the role of the pro-Arab lobby efforts in the United States is to consider the history of Middle Eastern countries. Middle Eastern countries have always stood on a different supporting leg in Washington, many Arab officials for example thought that lobbying was illegal and that all their efforts should be directed solely through their diplomatic officers. *“In the 1950’s, Gamal Abdel Nasser actually had to ask an aide, who lived in the United States, ‘What is a lobby?’ He also asked for a definition of ‘picket lines.’ Neither term existed in Arabic in the manner applied to U.S. politics. Although Egypt – in contrast to many other Arab states – had a well-established Foreign Service, it did not have a full-time lobbyist in Washington until the 1970s.”*<sup>95</sup> It is perhaps also an assertive feature of Arab mentality that many Arabs in the early stages of lobby efforts believed, that the only effective way to influence policy was to have access and good relations to the top man – meaning the president.

The League of Arab states<sup>96</sup> for example would seem to be the appropriate organization to spearhead Arab lobby efforts, but it has also failed to come up with effective means to capture the attention of the American audience. This is also due to the wide spread ignorance of the American political system in the Middle East, understanding what the driving forces are behind decision making. Studying the history and culture of the United States is only offered by few schools, mainly private ones; in addition there are only few universities that offer American Studies programs. This has put the Arab countries to a great disadvantage over Israel, which from an early stage on had understood how vital it would be to know their potential allies and enemies. A further example is offering simply services such as language courses; while in Israel there are centers to learn about Arab history and culture as

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95 IBID, pg. 50

96 The League of Arab states - Is an organization of predominantly Arab states headquartered in Cairo, Egypt. The League's charter states that the League shall co-ordinate economic affairs, including commercial relations; communications; cultural affairs; nationality, passports, and visas; social affairs; and health affairs. The Charter of the Arab League also forbids member states from resorting to force against each other.

well as Arabic language (*not to mention about the U.S. and English*), many Arab countries remain reluctant to offer similar services (*in respect to Hebrew and Israel*). This is an investment which has paid out for the Israelis. The same discrepancies have been occurring in understanding to successfully use the media, a mean which I touched upon earlier. Edward Said<sup>97</sup> noted in an interview in 2001 “...since Israel was established [over 50 years ago], the Israelis and their supporters in this country have put untold amounts of effort and money into propaganda, in regards to which not one single Arab regime or even the [PLO] has understood the power of the media and propaganda in this country. And that, I think, is a major crime of responsibility for every Arab leader and intellectual who considers himself to be serious. We still have no understanding of the power of the media and what you might call the ‘cultural work’ of civil society...And Israel has just announced another \$100 million campaign to improve its image. And we do nothing.”<sup>98</sup> Establishing degree programs for American studies in the Arab world; offering language course in Hebrew at cultural centers; and having an understanding of the driving factors of U.S. policy making, are all steps in the right direction for the Middle Eastern countries, their problem being that Israel has a fifty-year head start.

To point out the essential shortcomings and future tasks of the pro-Arab lobby groups, I would like to summarize that:

- Arab regimes and some Arab Americans often operate too independently from one another, an aspect that they need to improve if they want to successfully increase the Arab voice in Washington.
- Pro-Arab publications such as the *Washington Report on the Middle East*, the *Gulf Wire Digest* or the *Middle East Policy* have to find means in attracting a wider audience, in aiding to inform the public and break down misconceptions. In addition more think tanks such as the *Institute for Research: Middle Eastern Policy (IRMEP)* have to be established.
- Pro-Arab lobby groups need to establish campaigns which portray the Middle East in more positive light. Many Arab-Americans are afraid to speak out for

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97 Edward Said - Was a Palestinian-American literary theorist and outspoken Palestinian activist. He was Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University, and is regarded as a founding figure in postcolonial theory

98 Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 52

the interest of their native countries. Instilling a sense of pride among Arab-Americans will not only increase support and financial aid, but help in producing constructive aid (instead of having a timid minority which is too afraid to offer valuable advice).

The most important task for pro-Arab lobby groups however, is to find means in attracting additional funding. *“A comparison of Arab American/Muslim PACs with pro-Israeli PAC’s demonstrates this disparity. In 1984, pro-Arab PACs raised \$17,350 in contrast to pro-Israeli PACs that raised \$3,772,994, or a ratio of 147-1; by 1996 the figures had improved only marginally from \$20,625 to \$2,738,647 or a ratio of 133 to 1. Without major financial support, no protracted lobby effort or media campaign is possible<sup>99</sup>.”* Without substantial increases in the amount of funding, pro-Arab lobby groups will forever remain in the shadow of the strong pro-Israeli lobby groups.

#### *8.7. Jewish American and Pro-Israeli Lobby Groups*

The strong pro-Israeli standpoint on many critical issues of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East is a direct result of the successful work of the Jewish American and pro-Israeli lobby groups in the United States. Israel has recognized the importance of lobbies and interest groups from an early point on, and has spent considerable funding into studying the U.S. political system. Janice Terry notes that: *“Unlike the Arab states, from 1948 onward, Israel has supported institutes such as the Jaffee Center<sup>100</sup>”*. Israeli academic experts routinely advise Israeli prime ministers, while centers for strategic studies based in Israeli universities keep the Israeli government informed on the ebb and flow of domestic policies in the U.S. as well as on matters pertaining to the Middle East<sup>101</sup>.” In addition, the Israeli embassy

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99 IBID, pg. 66

100 Jaffee Center - The purpose of the Jaffee Center is, first, to conduct basic research that meets the highest academic standards on matters related to Israel's national security as well as Middle East regional and international security affairs. The Center also aims to contribute to the public debate and governmental deliberation of issues that are – or should be – at the top of Israel's national security agenda. The Jaffee Center seeks to address the strategic community in Israel and abroad, Israeli policymakers and opinion-makers and the general public. The Center relates to the concept of strategy in its broadest meaning, namely the complex of processes involved in the identification, mobilization and application of resources in peace and war, in order to solidify and strengthen national and international security (Source – The Jaffee Center Online)

101 Terry, Janice J. *U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 68

and various other Jewish American organizations assure the steady flow of information exchange between Israeli and the United States.

There is one interesting observation to be made about Jewish Americans and their lobby efforts, an issue which to some degree stands in contrast, but does not affect the work of lobby groups. What I am referring to, is that many American Jews feel emotionally sympathetic to Israel, but do not share the hard-line Likud party approach towards questions involving Palestine or the Occupied Territories. In addition many American Jews (also most Israelis) are not extreme Orthodox, rather moderates. Two thirds of Jewish Americans for example say that they are emotionally attached as just mentioned, but that only about thirty-five percent have visited the country. Despite the sometimes strong acts of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, which lead to the confusion and alienation of many American Jews towards their perception of Israel (Thomas Friedman noted this phenomena concerning the Sabra and Shatila massacre in his book *From Beirut to Jerusalem*), many remain loyal supporters. As Thomas Friedman notes: "*Israel in the mind of American Jews always touched two emotional chords – one pride, the other fear. As such, Israel has traditionally played two roles for American Jews – one as a visible symbol which places the Jew in the world and integrates him with dignity, and the other as a haven that could protect the Jew from a world turned hostile.*"<sup>102</sup> Despite the existence of numerous pro-Israeli lobby groups and think tanks in the United States (among others the Conference of American Rabbis, Hadassah, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League [ADL], American Enterprise Institute [AEI], the Middle East Media Research Institute [Memri] and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy [WINEP]) I would like to focus my attention to one specific group which deserves the most attention, AIPAC.

The synonym for successful Jewish American lobby efforts - and unquestionably one of the major political players in Washington - is AIPAC, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. "*With its proven ability to deliver votes and channel money to candidates and punish its enemies, AIPAC is a 'star' performer...using AIPAC and pro-Israeli think tanks have formed an alliance with both the Christian right and the neo-conservatives and have what is commonly*

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102 Friedman, Thomas. *From Beirut to Jerusalem*. New York: Anchor Books. 1990, pg. 454

*considered the inside track in the White House...AIPAC's collective mobilizing ability is unsurpassed in terms of the quality and quantity of political communication that can be triggered on specific perceived to be critical of Israel.*"<sup>103</sup> AIPAC, a registered lobby in Washington, evolved out of the American Zionist Council and was founded in 1954 by I.L. Kenen. Kenen's interpretation of AIPAC's role was to "tell the president to overrule the State Department."<sup>104</sup> The role of AIPAC has also to be seen as a sort of clearing house for other pro-Israeli lobby groups, coordinating and bundling the efforts of all (an organizational structure that for example is totally lacking from the incoherent pro-Arab lobby groups). "In the 1990's, AIPAC was considered the second most effective lobby in the country, ranking only behind the American Association of Retired Persons; thereby exceeding the power and clout of even organized labor."<sup>105</sup> To get an idea of the current issues AIPAC focuses on, one can simply refer to their webpage, it states that "AIPAC has worked with Congress and the Executive Branch on numerous critical initiatives, including"<sup>106</sup>:

- Reiterating standards for the Palestinian government through letters signed by 259 House members and 79 senators urging the EU and United States not to provide aid or grant recognition to any Palestinian government until it fulfills internationally backed requirements.
- Securing critical foreign aid to Israel, which totaled \$2.52 billion in 2006 and will provide military and economic assistance.
- Prohibiting U.S. aid and contacts with the Hamas-led PA until its leaders recognize Israel's right to exist, renounce violence and ratify previous Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements.
- Extending U.S.-backed loan guarantees to Israel until 2011 and renewing the authority to transfer U.S. military equipment to be stored in Israel for use in a potential crisis.
- Increasing military aid to Israel by working for \$1 billion in government grants that will help cover the escalating costs of the war on terrorism.

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103 IBID, pg. 74

104 IBID, pg. 71

105 IBID, pg. 72

106 AIPAC webpage - <http://www.aipac.org/>

This short list clearly indicates the commitment with which AIPAC tries to alter foreign policy decisions in favor of Israel. The final two features of the scope of work of pro-Israel lobby groups that I would like to touch upon are PACs and means to raise congressional support as well as financial aid.

PACs are political action committees which give money to usually both parties (Democratic and Republican), usually however more to the one in power. In the United States PACs function in the way that they help in either electing or defeating government officials, or to promote legislation. In the 1980's, election laws restricted the spending on presidential campaigns, but the House and Senate remained privately funded with no spending limits. In the mid 1980's for example, Janice Terry writes that pro-Israeli PACs had financial contributions of \$3.8 million, while from 1990 to 2004 pro-Israeli PACs gave an estimated \$41.3 to federal candidates and political parties. By 2003 there were about 100 of such pro-Israeli PACs. *"The success of pro-Israeli PACs is a sensitive issue for Zionist supporters as well as politicians. If the American public were to perceive PACs as exercising undue influence on the legislative process, a backlash against all PACs could result. Consequently AIPAC has recommended using their influence 'with measured discretion', or risk incurring negative fallout. In particular AIPAC does not want to imperil the flow of foreign and military aid for Israel that Congressional support had hitherto ensured."*<sup>107</sup> PACs are thus another useful tool in the work of lobby groups.

The final and perhaps one of the most important tasks of pro-Israeli lobby groups is to raise congressional support as well as financial aid for Israel. What is important to note, is that since the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign military and economic assistance has declined but aid to Israel has continued to rise; an outcome also due to the successful work of lobby groups. During the 1990s U.S. aid to Israel was at least \$3 billion per year, \$1.2 billion in economic aid and \$1.8 billion in military aid quotes Janice Terry. This was more than the amount for all of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean. Thus to conclude the illustration of the successful work of pro-Israeli lobby groups, I would like to quote Janice Terry one last time. She stated that: "As a direct result of Congressional support, U.S. aid to Israel from 1948 to 2001 totaled over \$91 billion and by 2003 the total U.S.

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107 Terry, Janice J. U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East – The Role of Lobbies and Special Interest Groups. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press. 2005, pg. 79

financial aid, including special advantages/indirect costs, was estimated to be as high as \$1.8 trillion...In large measure owing to the successes of pro-Israeli lobby forces, Israel has been the single largest recipient of U.S. aid since World War II.”<sup>108</sup>

In my effort to explain the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, I have come all the way from the origins of the state of Israel; the emergence of the PLO and later Hamas; and how media and lobby groups have an influence on the political decision making. I would now like to discuss and explore potential peace proposals.

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108 IBID, pg. 81



## 9 - PEACE PROPSALS AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

Identifying the requirements for success in implementing a peace process in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are important steps towards a Palestinian state. Throughout the conflict, different proposals have been made towards a peace process, many of which have been mentioned already. Despite the continuing violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a majority of Palestinians and Israelis want nothing more than peace, and are simply weary of the ever ongoing violence. The Roadmap initiative which is officially supported by the United States, the European Union, Russia, the United Nations as well as the Palestinians and Israelis had already called for the establishment of a Palestinian state in 2005. President Bush has recently revised the timeframe of this undertaking and pushed it back to 2009. Regardless of the uncertainties of this being a realist date, the importance of having a concrete and realistic plan is vital. In this regard it is important to consider the particularities of the Middle East; even though the Palestinians are a much more coherent people, not implementing the right kind of institutions to provide security, employment and a general vision can result in to a similar scenario as in Iraq. Regardless of the successful implementation of a peace process, we must consider that the same people will live next to each, thus much focus has to be spend on finding measures to build trust amongst Israelis and Palestinians.

To achieve success, a potential Palestinian state must be able to provide many of the fundamental features which I have referred to in chapter seven (those of a social contract). In *Helping a Palestinian State Succeed*, the Rand Corporation defines the four fundamental challenges to success as<sup>109</sup>:

- *“Security: A Palestinian state must improve the level of security for Palestinians, Israelis, and the region.”*
- *“Governance: A Palestinian state must govern effectively and be viewed as legitimate by both its citizens and the international community.”*
- *“Economic development: Palestine must be economically viable and, over time self-reliant.”*

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<sup>109</sup> Rand Organization. *Helping a Palestinian State Succeed*. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation. 2005, pg. 4

- “*Well being of its people: Palestine must be capable of feeding, clothing, educating, and providing for the health and social well-being of its people.*”

It would require an actual thesis to discuss the various peace proposals which have been offered and posed by the various sides involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Amongst the most important ones were:

- The 1967 UN resolution 242
- The 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles
- The 1998 Wye River Plantation Talks
- The 2000 Camp David Summit
- The 2001 Taba Summit
- The 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative
- The 2002 Road Map to Peace

These proposals serve as a good base, but they only have an effect if the parties truly abide to the suggested implications. “*The War Against Terror is connected with the War on Poverty*” Former Secretary of State Colin Powell was right with this assessment. The main issue of Palestinians is that they do not have an independent state in which they can peacefully live in. In addition, their harsh economic situation is driving many to the extremists. When I asked one of my closets’ friends who had served in the British army in Basra/Iraq of what he thought of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and his personal assessment of the situation in Iraq, he simply said: “Desperate people will do desperate things”. It is a very dry answer, yet it explains many of the issues happening still today.

What has to be remembered, when considering the massive amounts of funding that seems to be available, is that a conviction has to be reached that more money can be made from a peace between Israelis and Palestinians than from conflict and continuing acts of war. Perhaps it is this essential strategy that could ultimately lead to an end of the conflict. Dr. Lucie Hindlsová of the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested that “*the first steps have to be made by giving small concessions to both sides*”<sup>110</sup>. Israelis need to see serious efforts in the increase of their domestic security, being able to envision that their citizens are able to move free

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110 Interview with Dr. Lucie Hindlsová, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 9th 2007

and without fear. The Palestinians need to have a vision that they will be able to attain an independent state. Small steps to success can be achieved by riding tedious procedures at boarder crossings, free movement of goods or freeing the tax income held back by Israel which is owed to the Palestinian Authority. *“Only when primary care in infrastructure and human capital is provided, markets are driving forces in development. Without these preconditions markets can turn in a state of permanent poverty. Collective actions, through the creation of the aforementioned factors can lead to economic success.”*<sup>111</sup> Jeffrey Sachs only reaffirms the overriding argument of this thesis, that economics and politics are closely interlinked, especially in the Middle East. Only by allowing small steps towards economic improvement can real political stability be achieved.

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111 Sachs, Jeffrey D. Das Ende der Armut – Ein ökonomisches Programm für eine gerechte Welt. Munich: Pantheon. 2006, pg. 15

## 10 – CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have tried to shed light on the most prevalent features of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These factors are often times underestimated, and through my personal experience by living in the Middle East, I have given an explanation as to why they need to be considered. I have first familiarized the reader with an understanding of the modern Middle East, roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which date back hundreds, if we want to thousands of years ago. In explaining the short comings of decisions made by outside forces, I showed how hostility and a feeling of betrayal grew not only amongst Palestinians, but also Middle Easterners at large.

I have then defined the terminology of what a state is, if the PLO ever fell into this category and from providing this insight I was able to explain to the reader what the Palestinians are lacking if they are to succeed with an independent state. Because of such shortcomings I have also explained what can happen when no formal institutions exist, and how a so-called shadow economy is able to take over the role of an actual state. This phenomenon was further illustrated in explaining elementary needs of human beings in connection with the rise of the fundamental Hamas.

The final part of my thesis included the role of media and lobby groups in the formation of perceptions and policy making. It may be seen as one of the most important factors in influencing the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Misinterpretations and clichés need to be avoided in keeping things in perspective. The media is having its fair share of responsibility in the increased hostility towards the Middle East, a topic which was thoroughly discussed. *“No Peace without Justice, no Justice without Peace”*. Peace is always better than war argues Noam Chomsky, but peace is not an absolute measure. *“We must always ask what kind of peace we are dealing with. If Hitler would have conquered the world, his dictated peace would not have been the kind which we would prefer”<sup>112</sup>*. A just peace has to be found in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a peace that benefits both sides and enables both Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and prosperity.

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112 Chomsky, Noam. *Offene Wunde Nahost – Israel, die Palästinenser und die US-Politik*. Hamburg: Europa Verlag. 2003. pg. 317

*“For me, the land, the stones, are what will create the redemptive quality for this society,” says Hartmann. “The important thing is what kind of human love and kind of daily life I live. Gush Emunim believe that if they redeem the land then God will redeem the people. My view is that you have to redeem the people, period. Where the redemption of the people will lead I don’t know, but it can’t be bad. I believe tomorrow will be better than today if today I treat my barber and my grocer and my taxi driver better, not because I sit on a hill in Hebron. I believe tomorrow will be better than today if I expand ethics, expand morality, expand coexistence among people of diverse cultures, expand quality of life – but not by expanding boundaries. I can’t bring the Messiah by abusing 2 million Palestinian Arabs today. I can’t say that what I am doing now is going to bring universal redemption. That is what Stalin said, so he killed 20 million people. All people who think they are redeeming the world don’t see the evil that they are doing every day. If your eyes are on eternity you can be blind to the person sitting next to you. ‘Remember,’ concluded Hartmann, ‘the holiness of the people precedes the holiness of the land. There is no mystical significance to land. There is only a significance to what human beings do. Holiness in Judaism does not come from stones or books. It comes from you and me and how we live here and now.’<sup>113</sup>”*

It was also the aim of this thesis to mainly keep *cool heads and warm hearts* in analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I know from personal experience how much the different culture of the Middle East can have a confusing effect on people alien to the region. The region is close to me, and I will always come back to it. Knowing both sides, having Arab and Jewish friends is a particular factor which always reassures me that peace in the Middle East is possible. Martin Luther King used to say, *“Jesus said, love your enemies. Why, love your enemy? Because if you love your enemy, your might come to know your enemy. Your enemy might come to know you and if you know your enemy and understand your enemy, you might understand why your enemy is your enemy, and you might also understand what you might have done to make your enemy your enemy and then you can change that.”* If this thesis was meant to achieve anything at all, then to provide the reader with an understanding of what some of the driving forces are in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.


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113 Friedman, Thomas. From Beirut to Jerusalem. New York: Anchor Books. 1990, pg. 321

Figure D

Source: UNWRA

**Palestinian Refugees - Area of UNRWA Operations**



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Dr. Kamel El-Menoufi. Held at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University on April 16<sup>th</sup> 2007.

Dr. Lucie Hindlsová. Held at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 9<sup>th</sup> 2007.

*Secondary Web Source*

Al Ahram - [www.ahram.org.eg](http://www.ahram.org.eg)

Jerusalem Post - [www.jspost.com](http://www.jspost.com)

New York Times - [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com)

San Francisco Chronicle – [www.sfchron.com](http://www.sfchron.com)

*Annex A*

*Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

**U.N. Security Council Resolution 242  
November 22, 1967**

*Following the June '67, Six-Day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security Council. After lengthy discussion, a final draft for a Security Council resolution was presented by the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, on November 22, 1967. It was adopted on the same day.*

*This resolution, numbered 242, established provisions and principles which, it was hoped, would lead to a solution of the conflict. Resolution 242 was to become the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades.*

**The Security Council,**

**Expressing** its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

**Emphasizing** the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

**Emphasizing** further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
  - o Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
  - o Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
  - o For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

- For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
  - For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
  4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible

## *Annex B*

*Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs*

### **U.N. Security Council Resolution 338**

**October 22, 1973**

*In the later stages of the Yom Kippur War -- after Israel repulsed the Syrian attack on the Golan Heights and established a bridgehead on the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal -- international efforts to stop the fighting were intensified. US Secretary of State Kissinger flew to Moscow on October 20, and, together with the Soviet Government, the US proposed a cease-fire resolution in the UN Security Council. The Council met on 21 October at the urgent request of both the US and the USSR, and by 14 votes to none, adopted the following resolution:*

#### **The Security Council,**

1. Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;
2. Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;
3. Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

## Annex C

Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs

### Camp David Accords

September 17, 1978

*After twelve days of secret negotiations at Camp David, the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations were concluded by the signing at the White House of two agreements. The first dealt with the future of the Sinai and peace between Israel and Egypt, to be concluded within three months. The second was a framework agreement establishing a format for the conduct of negotiations for the establishment of an autonomy regime in the West Bank and Gaza. The Israel-Egypt agreement clearly defined the future relations between the two countries, all aspects of withdrawal from the Sinai, military arrangements in the peninsula such as demilitarization and limitations, as well as the supervision mechanism. The framework agreement regarding the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza was less clear and was later interpreted differently by Israel, Egypt, and the US. President Carter witnessed the accords which were signed by Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin.*

### THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

#### The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

#### Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the



peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

## **Framework**

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

### **A. West Bank and Gaza**

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:
  - a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these

arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

- b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.
- c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
  - ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
  - iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.
  - iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.
- d. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.
  - e. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.
  - f. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

## **B. Egypt-Israel**

1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

## **C. Associated Principles**

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.
2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:
  - a. full recognition;
  - b. abolishing economic boycotts;
  - c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.
3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.
4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.
6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect for the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

For the Government of Israel:  
Menachem Begin

For the Government of  
the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

Witnessed by  
Jimmy Carter,  
President of the United States of America

### **Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel**

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

**It is agreed that:**

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

**Stationing of Forces**

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:

1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and
2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

### **Interim Withdrawal**

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government of  
the Arab Republic of Egypt:  
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat

For the Government of Israel:  
Menachem Begin

Witnessed by:  
Jimmy Carter,  
President of the United States of America

*Annex D*

*Source: The Observer (The Guardian)*

*Of Doves and Hawks*

**THE DOVES SAY:**

But Europe and most of the Islamic world do not agree and you risk alienating Muslims all over the world.

**THE HAWKS SAY:**

There is a clear and present danger to the West and Muslim anger is a price worth paying to eradicate it. Anyway most governments will come on board.

**THE DOVES SAY:**

But you risk destabilising the entire Middle East and will hand a massive propaganda victory to extremists everywhere. On top of that you could get involved in a long, vicious and nasty war in which thousands of civilians and soldiers will die, it will seriously damage our economies, it will be hugely expensive, no one has any idea of what will happen afterwards and, even in the best case scenario, we will have to have peace-keeping troops stuck there for years.

**THE HAWKS SAY:**

There are always whingers and doom-mongers. Sometimes decisive and brave action is called for. This is an opportunity to change the whole shape of Middle Eastern politics for the better. We take out Saddam, put in a new pro-Western government, get its oil on line, cut down our strategic dependency on Saudi Arabia and other unpleasant regimes. And if we do not do it now we will have to do it when Saddam has got a nuclear bomb. You make the call.

**THE DOVES SAY:**

But we have done all right with our containment policy for the past 10 years. There is no proven link to any terrorist act outside his country. Why change now when there is no link between Saddam and 11 September.

**THE HAWKS SAY:**

Refer to my previous answer.

**THE DEBATE**

**THE HAWKS SAY:**

Saddam has or will soon have nuclear, biological and chemical weapons

**THE DOVES SAY:**

The only evidence we have seen of this is from American intelligence. Why not let the inspectors back in and let them find out?

**THE HAWKS SAY:**

That is just what Saddam wants us to do, delaying him to build support in the Arab world. We need a regime change to solve this problem once and for all.

**THE DOVES SAY:**

But you cannot just go around invading countries you do not like. There is no UN mandate. It is illegal.

**THE HAWKS SAY:**

Saddam is in flagrant violation of the 1991 ceasefire that was under the authority of the UN. That is enough. Anyway, no one was particularly bothered by the legality of attacking Afghanistan and if we had listened to the lawyers in Kosovo it would have been a disaster.