Abstract

This thesis focuses on the answering whether photographic representations exist or not. The answer is searched for in discussions of Roger Scruton and some of his critics. According to Scruton’s argument presented in the essay entitled *Photography and Representation* a photograph cannot be a representation. Scruton claims that only such medium can become a representation that has a certain intentional relation to its subject, however a photograph is defined merely by its causal relation to such object. Scruton's critics believe that a photograph is a representation and criticize him for: i) underestimating the role a photographer's intentions play in a photograph; ii) disregarding a photograph's ability to provide a new way of seeing and thus becoming representational; iii) equivocating between the subject of a painting and the subject of a photograph. It is demonstrated that arguments of Scruton's critics are not able to show Scruton's concept of photography to be false. However, an alternative approach to representation provides a basis to demonstrate in what sense a photograph may be a representation. For that reason it is suggested to consider a photography as an essentially paradoxical medium merging into itself the intentional and causal.

Keywords: photograph, representation, intentional relation, causal relation, subject