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P ílohy

P íloha . 1: The Change of Romanian Attitude toward China before and after the Moscow Conference

P evzato z:

"Cable from the Chinese Embassy in Romania, 'The Change of Romanian Attitude toward China before and after the Moscow Conference'," December 24, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-01598-02, 32-34. Translated by Lu Sun. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117194>

The Change of Romanian Attitude toward China before and after the Moscow Conference

To the Foreign Ministry and the International Department, Central Committee of CCP:

Ever since the end of the Moscow Conference, there are some indications that the Romanian attitude toward us has warmed, which can be summarized as follows: First, for the Chinese Embassy bulletins, which were suppressed ever since the Bucharest Conference, the eighth and tenth issues were all of sudden printed on 30 November [1960]. (The seventh issue was not printed. We estimate that this is because its opinions were too confrontational.) [The two issues] were sent to our embassy before the ink was dry, [so] we can see that this was a rush job. Secondly, according to the cultural cooperation plan, we will hold a photo exhibition on agricultural construction. When we asked our Romanian counterparts on 7 November, they replied that they did not have the location for the exhibition. [They said that] it was difficult to materialize the exhibition in a short time, [and they would] make efforts to put on the exhibition this year. But on 29 November, they informed us all of sudden that they had probably found a location for the exhibition, and notified us to put on the exhibition, and it would officially open 6 on December. We can see it was a rush job as it was such a short time in-between. The location was quite good—at the center of the city. Besides, about the booklet for the exhibition, when we negotiated with Romania this September, they once insisted that they would not allow us to include the "People's Commune." But when the exhibition opened on 6 December, Romania printed our booklet as a whole without any abridgement. Then, the four central newspapers reported Chairman Liu [Shaoqi's] visit in the Soviet Union day after day in a conspicuous way. Among this, even though some opinions from Chairman Liu's speech were [only] partially reported, in general [the reports] reflected the situation that Chairman Liu was warmly received in the Soviet Union and the significance of Sino-Soviet friendship.

In the meantime, when Romania negotiated with us on business, it demonstrated a change of attitude. It was willing to help us solve problems. For example, on 12 December when we negotiated with the Romanian Foreign Ministry on the issue of [removing] the flag of the Jiang [Jieshi] regime in a Romanian painting exhibition, Romania removed the flag in two and half hours and repeatedly apologized to us. Before the Bucharest Conference this year, we once asked Romania to draft a topographic map of the embassy and it did not give it to us [trans. note—the meaning here is not clear]. We did not ask again. But this time when we went to the Foreign Ministry to negotiate about the flag of the Jiang regime, Romania took the initiative to give the topographic map to us. Recently we proposed to set a display window outside the embassy. We sent the proposal to Romania on 12 December, and it replied on 20 December and gave it full approval. One graduate student of China needed to go to the Soviet Union for study; the Romanian university will notify this student and ask the Chinese Embassy to negotiate with the Soviet Union directly. After the Moscow Conference, [the Romanian university] complained that this graduate student should not tell the embassy and said this problem should be solved by the university itself.

Besides, Romania began to take the initiative and show friendly gestures. For example, when the Romanian delegation of the party and the government went to the Soviet Union and accompanied Ambassador Xu back and forth, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej only shook hands [with the delegates] without saying a word, but showed warm feelings especially toward Ambassador Xu. When the delegation returned back to Romania, Ambassador Xu greeted him. The delegation showed friendly gestures. Besides shaking hands, they also exchanged a few words of greetings (on the same day among all the diplomatic envoys, only the Soviet ambassador and the Chinese ambassador exchanged greetings.) In the past, when Ambassador Xu visited the International Department of the Central Committee of Romanian Communist Party, they were extremely indifferent. We took the initiative to talk and they did not want to talk more. Since the Moscow Conference, they have been willing to have more conversations (but they still avoid politics.) On 12 December, the Romanian Foreign Ministry organized diplomatic envoys for hunting. The deputy minister also

took the initiative to converse with Ambassador Xu. After the [North] Korean ambassador and Albanian ambassador departed, Ambassador Xu went to depart, the deputy minister asked Xu to stay a bit more, and said: “we are friends and a big family.” One month before the announcement of the declaration, our journalist once asked a *Scinteia* (“Party Life”) team to talk about how the Romanian Communist Party leads economic work. They were indifferent and did not set a date for a while. But one day after the announcement of the declaration, they called us immediately and arranged talks, and their tone became friendlier. The Romanian Fine Arts Press did not send us pictorials ever since the Bucharest Conference. But on the third day after the announcement of the declaration, they started to send us pictorials again. Some professors and teaching assistants in Bahun University were scared to approach Chinese students after the Bucharest Conference, but recently they began to be friendly with Chinese students as they did in the past. At present our aesthetics education delegation, which is visiting Romania, is receiving more friendly treatment. The Romanians expressed that they would like to meet the needs of our delegate. They could see whatever they want to see. For a while before the Moscow Conference, Romania did not want to arrange visits and meetings [for foreign visitors]. This time they arranged visits to other places and three meetings, and told us that they would ask many questions at the meetings. When visiting a comprehensive art school in Bucharest, the delegate initially wanted to stay for an hour, but it turned out to stay for three hours. The school was extremely friendly.

On the aspect of reporting, after the Bucharest Conference, [the Romanian media] rarely reported news on China except a few reports on [China’s] National Day. But on 20 and 22 November, *Scinteia* published the news on the Chinese State Council’s resolution to pardon a group of the reformed POWs from the Jiang regime and the puppet Manchukuo regime, as well as the news of a short summary of the Chinese government’s statement of supporting the Laos government to establish friendship with China. On 12 December, [it also published] the summary of communique from the Sino-Cuban meeting, as well as the amount of Chinese aid to Cuba. Afterwards [it also] published a concise summaries of an editorial on the Chinese government’s announcement about the Moscow Conference and a letter to the people of the world, our people’s feedback to the announcement, our announcement on the situation in Congo, and our second announcement on the situation in Laos, as well as a few reports on King Norodom Sihanouk’s visit to China and the future visit of the [Chinese] Premier [Zhou Enlai] to Burma. [We] can see that, as a development of the Moscow Conference and the announcement of the declaration, there is an increase of reports on China. On the other hand, [the Romanian media] still avoids reporting on the achievements of our economic construction, the Three Red Flags, and other policies [trans. Note—the “Three Red Flags” refers to the Great Leap Forward, the General Line, and the People’s Commune].

Within one year, it is obvious that Romania’s attitude toward us has shifted according to the Soviet Union’s attitude. Thus by estimation, this shift of attitudes is due to the influence of the Soviet approach. From the perspective of Romania itself, even though it is scared of war, it is also scared of breaking away from 650 million Chinese people, thus it has to pay attention to Sino-Romanian friendship. As for some of the divisions on some major international issues with us, it’s hard to solve them in a short time. Especially on the issue of war and peace, Romania’s fear of war still exists. On the editorials on the Moscow Conference and the letter to the people of the world, and other reprints of editorials of other countries, it is obvious that Romania emphasized the aspect that war could be avoided, rather than the aspect that the danger of war still exists and [we should] heighten our vigilance.

The Chinese Embassy in Romania

24 December 1960

P iloha . 2: Cable from the Foreign Ministry. "indicating the Spirit of Ambassadors" Talks with the Romanian Side

P evzato z:

"Cable from the Foreign Ministry, 'Indicating the Spirit of Ambassadors' Talks with the Romanian Side'," November 22, 1963, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, PRC FMA 109-03901-01, 3-5. Translated by Max Maller. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/119326>

[...]

To the [Chinese] Embassy in Romania:

The cable dated 14 November [1963] was received.

If the Romanian foreign minister or some other leader arranges to meet with an ambassador, we are in principle in agreement with the ideas brought up in the previous cable, with the addition of the following:

(1) If the other side yet again suggests stopping the open polemics, try to point out that Khrushchev's so-called "appeal to stop public quarreling" is merely a form of deception, and that his goal is to conceal his rash anti-Chinese activities. On the one hand he says, do not [engage] in open polemics; on the other, he attempts still more crudely to attack our party. Following the release of this "appeal", between 28 October and 10 November the Soviet press published more than 80 anti-Chinese editorials and articles. Khrushchev's speeches go back on his word, they are not credible. We already have experience with this: we need to listen to his rhetoric and watch his behavior.

(2) If the other side mentions the issue of divergence, in addition to the points already espoused in our publications, it will be sufficient for you to make some short statements, simply stating your position. Based on the conversational situation, we can fluidly and naturally oppose the Romanian side's thoughts and ideas, explaining our outlook on a few of the issues. The following are some issues we have thought of:

(i) That our revelation of the traitorous action of Khrushchev's in signing the "Three Countries Treaty" [the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty signed by the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States] would mean that Romania is also at risk to betray us. You may point out that our criticism is based on facts and only concerns Khrushchev. We do not consider Khrushchev and the other socialist nations that attended the signing ceremony to be a unanimous faction, and we certainly do not consider the Romanian Communist Party leadership and the Soviet Communist Party leadership as a unanimous faction.

(ii) That we must, as it is said, "adopt a patient, cautious attitude." You may point out:

a) We were always "patient" and "cautious" about a Sino-Soviet divergence. For example, it was not until four years after the Sino-Soviet divergence, one year after the Soviet leadership began attacking us publicly, that we finally wrote three documents. And it was not for another two years, after Khrushchev reached a new anti-Chinese high tide at the "European Five Parties Summit", that we were finally forced to write eight more documents. This July, after the Soviet Communist Party published an open letter in which they attacked our party, naming names, and launched even rougher anti-Chinese activities, we finally rose in our defense. Consider that recently when our branch secretary and 10 fishermen were injured by gunfire on the Sino-Soviet border, leading us to give out arms and mobilize a patrol, we did not retaliate, nor have we to this day levied any public criticism.

b) The revisionist road implemented by Khrushchev brings major harm to the socialist infantry and the international movement. Romania believes that it can keep silent. We do not wish to contradict them, but we believe, in the interest of the socialist infantry and the international movement, that we cannot keep silent, otherwise history will never forgive us.

c) Based on the facts, Khrushchev has occasionally demonstrated a momentary convergence on some issues. This is the outcome of struggle, not patience. If we do not uphold our struggle with him, the sufferers will be made greater, not fewer.

(iii) That our propaganda documents should avoid "sharp [class struggle]", "offenders", "excess", and other topics. You may point out that we are already very restrained and discerning. However, we have spoken up about the honest situation as well as the original appearance of things. Moreover, we have not spoken as comprehensively as we might have, such that there are still things left over.

(iv) Regarding the issue of "calling a state that is socialist in nature with a socialist government 'non-socialist.'" If the other side brings up this saying of the Soviets', you may express that we have not said that the Soviet Union is not a socialist state. If the other side bases their views on our newspapers' revelations of capitalist movements within the Soviet Union, you may point out that our newspapers are merely circulating a few select pages from the Soviet press, so as to more conveniently raise our own awareness: we have not made any allegations against the Soviet Union. If the other side is referring to Yugoslavia, you may express that we have already published a document regarding this issue. Our point of view has full factual support and is completely accurate.

Aside from the foreseen questions and answers listed above, we ask the ambassadors to do some planning of their own and prepare answers, so that in conversation you may conveniently confront the opposite side's thoughts and explain the issues.

[Chinese] Ministry of Foreign Affairs

22 November 1963

**P fiola . 3: Note on Issues Prepared by Romanian Side for the Conversations in
Moscow, Bucharest, 6 July 1964**

P evzato z:

"Note on Issues in Romanian-Soviet Relations Prepared by the Romanian Side for the Conversations in Moscow," July 06, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, Fond C.C. al P.C.R., Sectia Relatii Externe, dosar 36/1964, filele 9-13; Document No. 3 in Buga (2012), pp. 32-36. Translated by Larry L. Watts and published in CWIHP e-Dossier No. 42. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117991>

Note on Issues Prepared by Romanian Side for the Conversations in Moscow,

Bucharest, 6 July 1964

1. Issues in RWP [Romanian Workers' Party] – CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] and RPR [Romanian People's Republic] – USSR Relations

a. The Creation of an Anti-Soviet Atmosphere in Romania

- Evaluating the RWP CC Plenary Declaration of April 1964
- * The SOVROMS;
- * Model of common enterprise
- How compensation of the SOVROMS was regulated
- Evaluating the position of the RWP and RPR in the USSR
- The measures taken by us with the changing of some names: the Russian Book Store, the Maxim Gorky Institute, mandatory Russian language [training], etc. – measures of an internal character falling strictly within the competence of the Romanian government, cannot be interpreted as anti-Soviet manifestations.
- Diminishing the role of the Soviet Army.
- The role of internal factors in accomplishing the insurrection of 23 August 1944.
- The atmosphere that has been created by the position of Romania.
- The position of the Soviet press and radio towards the RPR (ignoring the activities of the RPR, misrepresenting some realities, insinuations).
- Soviet materials, works, plays and films in the RPR.
- The position towards Romanian students and doctoral candidates.
- The position of Soviet representatives in different international organizations towards the representatives of the RPR (in the IUS, FDIF they are not consulted etc.)

b. The Problem of Soviet Citizens in the RPR

- The manner of regulating the situation of foreign citizens in the USSR and in other countries.
- Occupying functions of responsibility in educational institutions in the RPR – professors.
- Having children born in the RPR and registered in the USSR as Soviet citizens (the problem of double citizenship).
- Inability to participate in community life.

- Inability to benefit from all the rights of citizenship.
- Those who have requested Romanian citizenship have been labeled traitorous.
- The intervention of Soviet parties in this problem, direct interference in our internal affairs.

c. Espionage Networks – The Organization and Maintenance of Intelligence Networks on the Territory of the RPR

- They were justified before power had been completely taken and we supported them.
- After taking over full power they no longer had any justification.
- The discussions on this problem between delegations of the RWP CC and the CPSU CC in June 1963.
- We do not conduct espionage activity in the socialist countries.
- Why place trust in such sources of information – the lack of trust in the party and in the government.
- We consider the immediate cessation of this activity an imperious necessity.
- In the future we will take measures, conforming to the laws of the RPR, against those who undertake such activity.

d. The Issue of Borders – Bessarabia and Transylvania

- The declaration of N. S. Khrushchev – Leipzig 1959
- The Yugoslav response to the speech at Leipzig.
- The message of 31.XII.1963 with regard to the resolution of territorial differences.
- Raising the issue of Bessarabia in the meeting at Gagra.
- [Moscow] raises the issue of Transylvania, although the leadership of the HPR [Hungarian Peoples Republic] does not raise it.
- The INTOURIST map published – 1963.
- The concept of wiping away frontiers.
- The Valev proposals for creating the Lower Danube regional economic complex.
- Sovereignty as historical notion.

e. The Situation of Commercial Relations between the RPR and the USSR

- The dynamic of increasing exchanges in the last five years.
- The requests presented by us that were not satisfied.
- Contracts concluded for the RPR to supply to the USSR which the Soviets have unilaterally reduced (cement, chemical equipment etc.)
- The request of the RPR for equipment for the hydroelectric plant at the Iron Gates, which has not yet received any response.
- Late deliveries to the RPR.
- Incomplete deliveries of equipment or deliveries of equipment of lower quality [then that contracted].
- The position of the Soviet organs towards Soviet-Romanian collaboration during 1966-1970.

f. The Problem of Relations with Capitalist Countries

- The USSR's attempts to monopolize the relations of the socialist countries with the capitalist countries.
- The independence and sovereignty of the socialist countries in relations with other countries.

g. The Modification of Article 20 of the Danube Convention Referring to the Joint Romanian-Soviet Administration of the Lower Danube

- Joint participation only on riparian territory.
- Writing the Romanian administration of the Lower Danube into the Convention.

h. The Uranium Issue

i. The Rescheduling of Payments of Credits for Armament

- The military expenditures of the RPR are calculated by the Soviet side as reduced.
- The relative place of the RPR in terms of level of expenditures among the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact.
- The Unified Command proposals for supplying the Armed Forces of RPR.
- The economy of the RPR cannot support such expenditures.
- The effort that we make at present, the level of our military expenditures.
- If the effort must be greater, it could be increased only on the condition of rescheduled military credits.
- The conditions under which armaments are supplied in the West.

2. Problems in Connection with Collaboration within the CMEA

a. The Situation Created after the Meeting between the delegations of the RWP CC and the CPSU CC in June 1963

- The accord reached to limit the damage [and] to not advertise the problems.
- Restating all of the initial proposals:
 - * Creating a single planning organ
 - * A single plan
 - * Interstate unions according to branches
 - * Joint property enterprises
 - * Internationalizing the forces of production
 - * Regional industrial complexes.
- The coordination of the foreign trade (export-import) of the CMEA countries in capitalist countries.

b. The Position expressed in the April 1964 Declaration of the RWP CC regarding the problems of collaboration within the CMEA

c. Clarifying the formula "interested parties"

- We do not accept the creation of supra-state forms within the CMEA.

- Interested parties can create any forms they wish outside of the CMEA.
- The principle of unanimity holds within the CMEA.

d. The position of the RPR regarding the thesis “relying [bizuirea] in the first place on one's own forces”

3. Issues of the World Communist and Workers Movement and of the international situation in general

a. The position of the RWP towards the problems of the International Communist and Workers Movement

- The manner of treating divergences
- Public polemics (the actions undertaken by the RPR to stop public polemics)
- The preparation and convocation of a new congress of communist and workers' parties.
- The path to realizing socialist revolution: peaceful or non-peaceful.
- Provisions of the 1960 Declaration that must be reexamined.
- Manifestations of lack of trust.
- Presenting the position of some parties in a deformed manner.
- The role of the journal “Problems of Peace and Socialism” in the public polemic.

* Who establishes the political line of the journal

* The role of the editorial college

* The role of the representatives of the parties in the college

b. The position of the RPR towards the fundamental problems of the contemporary period

- Peaceful coexistence
- War and peace
- General and total disarmament
- The struggle against imperialism
- Economic competition between the two systems.
- The position of the RPR delegation at the UN (1963) and at the Conference for Trade and Development [UNCTAD].
- The defective position of the USSR delegation at these international meetings.
- The independent position of each country does not exclude coordination.

c. The issue of the Warsaw Pact

- The activity of Political Consultative Committee
- * Who decides its convocation
- * The manner in which the agenda is established.
- The lack of consultations in problems which engage the member countries.

- The obligation to discuss all of the problems connected with this treaty.
- The treaty is limited to the European countries.
- The attempts to revise the provisions of the Treaty, or to attribute tasks to it that transcend its provisions. For example:
 - * N. S. Khrushchev's speech – at Miskolc [Hungary].
 - * The creation of a permanent organ for the coordination of foreign policies (the letter of 2 January of this year and our response of 14 January).
- Consultations on all major international issues, but not within the framework of the Political Consultative Committee, but in bilateral and multilateral meetings on a case by case basis.
- One should not bring problems regarding the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact to public attention without first obtaining the agreement of the respective countries.
- The independent position of each of the countries in foreign policy issues – the sovereign right of each of the countries to establish its foreign policy (freedom of action).
- The right of each of the countries to propose the convocation of the Political Consultative Committee and the obligation to make known beforehand – in a timely fashion – the problems proposed for discussion.

4. Other Problems (diverse)

6.VII.1964

P ȩloha . 4: Protocol No. 5 of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP, on the situation in Czechoslovakia

P evzato z:

"Protocol No. 5 of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP on the situation in Czechoslovakia," August 21, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, ANIC, CC RCP, Chancellery, File No. 133/1968, ff. 2-4. Translated by Delia Razdolescu <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110454>

Protocol No. 5 of the Meeting of the Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP, on the situation in Czechoslovakia

Participants in the meeting, comrades: Nicolae Ceasescu, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Bȩrladeanu, Emil Bodnaras, Chivu Stoica, Paul Niculescu-Mizil, Virgil Trofin, Ilie Verdet, Maxim Berghianu, Florian Danalache, Constantin Dragan, Ianos Fazekas, Leonte Rautu, Vasile Vȩlcu, Stefan Voitec, Iosif Banc, Petre Blajovici, Dumitru Coliu, Mihai Gere, Petre Lupu, Manea Manescu, Dumitru Popa, Dumitru Popescu, Gheorghe Stoica.

Invited to participate in the meeting, comrades: Mihai Dalea, Vasile Patilinet.

The meeting opens at 6:30 a.m.

AGENDA: The situation created after the penetration of the armed forces of certain socialist countries into the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Upon listening to Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's briefing on the very serious situation created after the penetration in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic - without the knowledge and approval of that country's Party and State bodies, of the armed forces of the URSS, the Polish People's Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic - the Executive Committee of the CC of the RCP, decides as follows:

1. The Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall address a note to the five socialist countries whose troops occupied Czechoslovakia and express its concern about and disapproval of this act, the fact that it does not share at all the views stated in the TASS Communiquȩ, alleging that a counter-revolutionary situation was obtaining in Czechoslovakia which might have justified a military intervention.
2. The Central Committees of the five parties in those socialist countries shall be informed about the fact the Central Committee of the RCP is utterly astonished and disapproves of the manner in which our Party has been informed about the decision and measures taken relative to the military intervention in Czechoslovakia.

At the same time, they shall be told that the Romanian Communist Party considers the military intervention in Czechoslovakia a flagrant violation of the national sovereignty of a fraternal socialist, free and independent state, of the principles underlying the relations between the socialist countries of the unanimously recognized norms of international law and that the interference in the internal affairs of the communist party and Czechoslovak people, the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia are a heavy blow dealt to the unity of the world socialist system, to the international communist and workers' movement, to the prestige of socialism in the world. They shall also be explained the firm belief of our Party and Government that the sole way of eliminating the serious consequences of the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia is the urgent withdrawal of those five countries' troops and the assurance of the necessary conditions for the Czechoslovak people to solve its domestic affairs by itself.

3. The leaderships of all socialist countries and of the communist and workers' parties shall be informed about the stand of the Romanian Communist Party on the intervention made in Czechoslovakia by the five socialist countries' armed forces.

4. An extraordinary session of the Grand National Assembly shall be summoned on August 22, 1968 to discuss the situation obtaining in wake of the military intervention in Czechoslovakia and to adopt a statement on the basic principles of Romania's foreign policy.

5. The armed patriotic guards, formed of workers, peasants and intellectuals shall be immediately reorganized in order to assure the Romanian people's peaceful work, the homeland's national sovereignty and independence.

6. The Party bodies, the trade-union and LCY organizations, the managements of enterprises and institutions shall take the necessary measures for the normal unfolding of activity, to prevent any possible anarchical actions and to strengthen the guarded protection of all enterprises, State and civic institutions.

7. The measures adopted by the Executive Committee concerning the situation obtaining in Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia in wake of the penetration in Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the five socialist parties shall be submitted for approval to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, the State Council and the Council of Ministers.

The meeting ended at 8:10 a.m.

Nicolae Ceausescu

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