Abstract
This Thesis attempts to be an overview of the so far achievements accomplished in the fight against the Afghani rebels and in the reconstruction and state-building in Afghanistan. The author seeks to analyse strategies applied by the Soviets during the Cold War invasion (1979-1989) and the Western allies under the U.S. leadership in cooperation with NATO (2001-present). The paper describes tactics of the invaders in the two wars and identifies “tipping points” when the conventionally stronger invading powers had to resort to counterinsurgency tactics. The author applies counterinsurgency warfare theory presented by David Galula and others in those phases of conflicts in order to evaluate the success or failure of given strategies. The theoretical framework consists of the theory of asymmetrical conflicts, insurgency warfare and counterinsurgency theory with special focus on its implications when applied in Afghanistan. The main goal of the work is to analyse the weaknesses of the Soviet strategy and to inquire whether the Western allies are not repeating the same mistakes their Cold War counterparts committed.