Bakalářská práce
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Social Structure of Cognition in the Philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel and L. Wittgenstein

Sociální struktura poznání ve filosofii G. W. F. Hegela a L. Wittgensteina

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At this point I would like to express my deep gratitude to Mr. Kolman, without whose inspiring lectures, responsive leadership, and the initiative to explore Hegel’s and Wittgenstein's epistemology simultaneously, this work would not have been possible.

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Prohlašuji, že jsem tuto bakalářskou práci vypracovala samostatně a výhradně s použitím citovaných pramenů, literatury a dalších odborných zdrojů.

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Key words:

Justified true belief; cognition; knowledge; social basis; sense-certainty; ostension; object; subject; private language argument; recognition; justifiedness; truth condition; sensory apprehension; objectual belief; propositional belief; direct/indirect acquaintance
Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to give a deeper account of Wittgenstein's epistemological view in Philosophical Investigations in the context of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Phenomenology of Spirit serves as a model structure with through the conception in Philosophical Investigation is being gradually outlined. The first chapters introduce some particularly influential streams in cognitive sciences that shall serve as a background for the new conception of justified true belief as a central term of contemporary epistemological discourse. After the sketch of Wittgenstein's account of knowledge in On Certainty compared to Kant's epistemological conception and Hume's sceptical doubts, the paper introduces Wittgenstein and Hegel as sceptics of particular kind. After such an extensive introductory part, the sole examination of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit commences. First, the author deals with the chapter on sense-certainty. It is argued that pure sensory experience without the intrusion of a concept cannot grasp any particular object in apprehension. Second, Hegel's account of force and understanding introduces the theme of conceptuality. Wittgenstein is being examined simultaneously, on the background of the analysis of Hegel's dialectical course. It is concluded that both Hegelian and Wittgensteinian conception imply that any kind of knowledge requires some social basis, i.e. that cognition is possible only when language, or conceptuality and propositionality respectively, intervenes. The thesis is shorty compared to John McDowell's concept of how a human mind approaches the world, for McDowell has been entangled with the discussions of both Hegel and Wittgenstein, and still belongs to the most influential group of contemporary epistemologists.

In the final chapter the concept of justified true belief is redefined in accordance with the argumentation, i.e. the term justified true belief is defined as a socially based concept, while sociality is an indispensable element of human cognition.

Abstrakt:

Cílem této práce je poskytnout hlubší vůdce do Wittgensteinovy epistemologie ve Filosofických zkoumáních v návaznosti na Hegelovu Fenomenologii ducha. Fenomenologie ducha slouží v této práci jako modelová struktura, pomocí níž je postupně přibližována koncepce Filosofických zkoumání s ohledem na problém podmiňnosti poznání. První kapitoly představují některé zvlášť vlivné prudy v kognitivních věd, které budou částečně odmítnuty a částečně budou sloužit jako podklad pro novou koncepci justified true belief jakožto klíčového pojmu současného epistemologického diskurzu. Po náčrtu Wittgensteina filosofického rozvrhu knowledge a certainty ve spisu On Certainty a jeho srovnání s Kantovou epistemologickou tezi v Kritice čistého rozumu, potažmo s Humovým radikálním skepticismem, jsou Wittgenstein a Hegel představeni jako skeptici zvláštního druhu. Po této rozsáhlé úvodní části, následuje samotné zkoumání Hegelovy Fenomenologie ducha. Nejprve je uvedena analýza Hegelovy smyslové jistoty (sense-certainty). Tvrdí se, že čistá smyslová zkušenost nemůže bez intervence pojmu zajistit jakékoliv konkrétní poznání věci. Dále je představeno Hegelovo pojetí síly a porozumění, přičemž se poprvé ustanovuje termín konceptuality a propositionality. Wittgenstein je zkoumán současně s analýzou Hegelovy Fenomenologie, na pozadí Hegelova dialektického kurzu. Usuzuje se, že z obou, Hegelova i Wittgensteinova, pojetí vyplývá, že jakýkoliv druh poznání vyžaduje určitý sociální základ, a tudiž poznání je možné pouze v případě, že jazyk, resp. konceptualita a propozicionalita, je vždy již ustaven jako nejen to, v čem se poznání komunikuje,
ale dokonce jako to, díky čemuž je teprve poznání umožňováno. Práce se krátce zabývá přednáškami Johna McDowella o vztahu vědomí ke světu okolo nás. McDowell je z hlediska tématu práce významný práv proto, že ve své práci do jisté míry integruje Hegelovo a Wittgensteinovo stanovisko a stále patří k nejvlivnějším současným epistemologům. V závěrečné kapitole je redefinován pojem *justified true belief*, a to v souladu s hlavními body argumentace, tj. *Justified true belief* je definován v závislosti na sociální bázi poznání.
List of abbreviations:

EHU – Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
CPR – Critique of Pure Reason
OC – On Certainty
M&W – Mind & World
PI – Philosophical Investigations
PLA – Private language argument
PoS – Phenomenology of Spirit
TLP – Tractatus Logico-philosophicus
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1 Main objectives of the paper

The aim to enquire simultaneously Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s epistemology may be considered controversial. The authors are separated not only for their spatial and temporal situatedness, but also for their different philosophical practices. Yet, as shall be exemplified in this paper, both the authors share significant standpoints concerning the nature of human cognition.

The objectives of this work are neither critical, nor comparative, but first and foremost argumentative. The aim is to make an attempt to offer a novel view concerning Wittgenstein’s idea of human cognition in relation to language. To introduce this, perhaps less revolutionary but nonetheless hopefully still quite currently relevant, point in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, there shall be offered certain dialectics based on Hegel’s phenomenological opus, the *Phenomenology of Spirit (PoS)*.

Hegel’s dialectical method of analysis and Wittgenstein’s dialogical form of writing in *Philosophical Investigations (PI)* both share the bivalence of basic cognitive structure. The aim of this paper is to clarify the problem of language and cognition in the philosophy of Wittgenstein’s, while also seeking for an argumentative structure in *PoS*, particularly the first two parts of the study called “Consciousness” and “Self-consciousness.” First of all, the concept of *justified true belief* as a basic concept for contemporary philosophies of knowledge shall be introduced, and further criticized in accordance with Hegel’s dialectics in *PoS* and Wittgenstein’s *PI*, as well as Wittgenstein’s early work, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, if in need.
1.1 Rejection of foundationalism and representationalism as bases for the concept of knowledge

Before contemplating the sole conception of cognition in the philosophy of Hegel's and Wittgenstein's that are believed to be somehow congenial in terms of understanding the concept of justified true belief, a brief introduction to some modern cognitive theories is made in order to settle a negative standpoint for the future argumentation.

1.1.1 Foundationalism; (overcoming) the obstacle of infinite regress

The first branch of cognitive theories that is to be introduced is foundationalism.

It is the kind of anti-pragmatic theory stating, that if there is some certainty at all, it should not be prescribed to the group of beliefs that is inferred, but only to such groups that consists of non-inferential and infallible beliefs. The conception suggests that if there is to be a justified belief that is inferred from another one, there shall be some non-inferential belief as a foundation of the particular chain of the beliefs inferred.¹ As there is no standard for referring to the group of non-inferential beliefs, some of the suggested shall now be briefly examined with the particular regard to their conditionality in the relation to the inferential beliefs. Ignoring the most trivial objections to foundationalism, to continue with the definition of the foundationalist standpoint, one should say it avoids the chain of dependence among particular inferred beliefs falling into an infinite regress by asserting a basic definition of belief that is most commonly taken as non-inferential. This rejection of the infinite regress in foundationalism, however, does not respond to the question any stable alternative. In order to avoid such a failure with foundationalist approach, it shall be claimed in the following chapters that there is no need to reject infinite-regress of the genealogy of beliefs, for infinite regress is basically a part of the principle Wittgenstein integrates into his explanation of the rule-following practice.

Obviously, the foundationalism seeking for non-inferential and infallible beliefs does not worth consideration while looking for a socially constructed theory of cognition for its conclusion seems to be far too transcendentally idealistic. But how about

the foundationalism claiming that there is no belief independent of sensory apprehension, and therefore, what remains to be enquired in this place, is indeed, the belief originating in certain empirical experiences strongly connected with the concepts of there and now, with the categories of place and time that is. As an empirically based theory overcoming the centuries of deep rationalism, such explanation of the concept of non-inferential beliefs shall also be held as the only valid one. Even such thought, however, is to be rejected after all. Suppose S has an *infallibly justified belief* \( p \) at time \( t_1 \). S is *infallibly justified* in believing that \( p \) iff \( p \) is immediately apprehensible\(^2\) at \( t_1 \). Problem with such a *justification*, however, remains, as the belief was justified as infallibly only in the time \( t \).\(^3\) For the rest of all the possible moments of time (time \( t_0 \)) the belief does not respond at all, or merely, as shall be discuss later, in an indefinite form that actually does not even possess the *propositional* character of the belief any more.

The introduction of foundationalism made so far requires some remarks given on the subject of the *theory of acquaintance* as well. The view, roughly described, as held for example by Bertrand Russell\(^4\), implies that what justifies S’s belief is the direct acquaintance with the content of the belief. The indirect acquaintance, or the so-called *knowledge by description* as Russell puts it, is, contrastingly, only built up on some contingent facts about the subject of the belief.\(^5\)

Another objection to the classical foundationalism is directed towards the nature of non-inferential belief itself. Richard Fumerton and Ali Hasan explain the problem as follows:

“[…] there can be no bearers of truth value without judgment and judgment involves the application of concepts. But to apply a concept is to make a judgment about class membership, and to make a judgment about class membership always involves relating the thing about which the judgment is made to other paradigm members of the class.”\(^6\)

Thus, if the group of the non-inferential beliefs relies on their character of informing about the mere *being* of a propositional subject, not even having a proper

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\(^2\)That \( p \) is *immediately apprehensible* means that it is *apprehensible* (acquainted through senses) at time \( t_1 \), i.e. *exclusively* in \( t_1 \), and in any other \( t \) time.

\(^3\)Fumerton & Hasan.


\(^6\)Ibid.
no judgment can be made, because in fact there is no conceptuality of the propositional subject whatsoever.

It has been shown, that foundationalism is not to be rejected as such, especially concerning the contemporary followers of different forms of foundationalism, or those responding critically to their conclusions. What shall be rejected, however, is the rigid foundationalism seeking for the basis of justification in the empirical knowledge of the world, i.e. the kind of foundationalism coquetting with the acquaintance theory.

1.1.2 Representationalism; direct and indirect acquaintance

Representationalism, another characteristic approach towards the problem of human cognition, shall be introduced. The reason is that one of those holding the thought of mental representations, at the time dominating doctrine investigated among all the great fathers of modern analytic philosophy such as Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, developed quite a significant response, which influenced the whole generation of future critics in the area.

The sole idea of mental representation is an idea of the cognitive process of constituting a relatively stable depository of “information-baring structures”\(^8\), representations that is. Representation is, therefore, a cognitive construct possessing certain semantic properties, such as content, reference, truth-condition, truth-value, etc.\(^9\) Given the properties construed according to the object that is meant to be denoted, the representational picture itself may be understood as (mental) object. Such object may be a source of the so-called Representational Theory of Mind that postulates the existence of mental objects distinguished by having certain semantic properties. Representational object is usually referred to as sense-datum including various environmental features, such as color, shape, brightness, etc.\(^{10}\) The subject that shall be an issue for the general task of this chapter is, however, not the representation of the object itself, but the pre-condition for the problem concerning the nature of justified true belief and its social background. Donald Davidson makes a clever distinction between what representationalists would ask, and how would such question be altered for serving the

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\(^9\) Ibid.
purposes of the so-called ordinary-language theories. The representationalists’ “what is meaning” shall be replaced by “what would a speaker need to know to understand the utterances of another”. The latter anticipates what the paper shall be interested in among the several proceeding chapters. Such an account of language is deeply embedded in the broader context of human knowledge. Attitudes towards certain propositional frameworks that promise to carry some meaning in the particular situations do not rely only on the situational context but is rather to be described in terms of a triangular structure that requires interaction between two or more participants in a dialogue (in Wittgenstein’s terms of at least two participants of the language game), and between each of them being related to “a set of common objects in the world”\(^\text{11}\). The second condition implies that there is already a particular apprehension of the object denoted that is familiar to both the participants of the dialogue. This, of course, shall be enquired more deeply, as it is not clear, what the second condition actually means. Future chapters shall be dedicated to two possible dimensions of this problem. First, that the object is unknown to one of the participants; second, that though unknown to both participants, the object is still known at some stage. Despite the fact that Davidson is rather concerned with the case where both conditions are fulfilled, that is, the triangulation of knowledge of oneself, knowledge of the others, and knowledge of the world, is completed, it seems he also counts with something that Wittgenstein would treat as the omnipresent, or to use a phenomenological jargon the so-to-say always-already-present, rules of language based on the social practice in the particular society sharing certain form of life. This approach towards knowledge may be referred to as both holistic and externalist, and obviously shares the character of (possibly even triangular) interdependency between the participants, the object of knowledge and the shared world not only with Wittgenstein’s idea in PI\(^\text{12}\), but also with the most renown interaction between the master and the slave in Hegel’s PoS\(^\text{13}\).

“Davidson denies that the ‘Swampman’ could properly be said to have thoughts or its words have meaning — and the reason is simply that the Swampman would lack the


sort of causal history that is required in order to establish the right connections between itself, others and the world that underpin the attribution of thought and meaning.¹⁴

Though the note dedicated to the “Swampman” is a marginal one, it may be considered for the future seeking of the knowledge and language conditions as a fair trial that actually structures the problem of conditional relations among the participants and objects of participation in the structure of language games. So as Hegel in PoS, Davidson emphasizes that one’s knowledge only arises when related to a publically accessible world and to the knowledge of the world of others.¹⁵

Another idea of Davidson’s that in fact corresponds to Wittgenstein’s later claims about knowledge is the assumption that if the beliefs about the world one conditionally shares with others prove to be false, the entire possibility of knowledge would be severely undermined. Davidson holds that such skepticism would lead at least to a quite problematic, almost Humian, rejection of general possibility of human cognition, and consequently, of the possibility of shared language. The implication seems to be that the knowledge of the world would fall into a private kind knowledge that each of the “Swampmen” would hold as the one commonly shared, while the assumption of its general validity would be based on a mere first-person-based interpretation of the knowledge of the others. To rephrase the situation in Hegelian terms, the skepticism would get into regress towards the pre-social state of cognition, the state before establishing the objective view between the master and the slave that is.¹⁶ All in all, Davidson aims, especially in his later work, to reject the distinction between subjective and objective foundation of knowledge, subjective here referring to the knowledge coming from oneself, and objective as being based on the knowledge of the world coming from others. The two foundations of knowledge shall be always interconnected and interdependent in causal (that the knowledge of the others already presupposes the knowledge of the world as in Hegel’s PoS)¹⁷, semantic and epistemic sense. The idea of conceptual clarity is, therefore, replaced with the idea of conceptual relativity, i.e. the ability of conceptualization (or speech that is) already relies on the interpretation not only of the world itself, but first and foremost of the others as having their own

¹⁴ Jeff Malpas, “Donald Davidson”.
¹⁵ Ibid.
¹⁶ Hegel, 161 pp.
¹⁷ Ibid.
interpretation of the world. Precisely the kind of condition is formulated in the narration of the first four chapters of *PoS*.

It shall be clear now that at least the late Davidson\(^\text{18}\) does not favor the coherence theory of truth, but rather the holistic and relativistic idea that knowledge (and consequently its truth value) presupposes by an acceptance of the other’s interpretation of the world at some stage at least.

### 1.1.3 Dispositionalism, interpretationism, and protecting Wittgenstein against accusations of behaviorism

To clarify the position of the author’s among the latest philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of language and cognition, and her sympathies towards those at least seemingly congenial with the social foundation of language, a brief introduction to dispositionalism, interpretationism shall now follow.

The best way to comprehend the basic difference between the representationist and dispositionalist approach towards language puzzles is to imagine an alien, let us call it “Alfred”.\(^\text{19}\) Suppose Alfred finds itself in the middle of the American continent and starts to integrate among the existing culture. He becomes a respectable member of various political and social parties, a Democratic-party activist, a football fan, etc. – Now even if there was no possibility to scan Alfred’s mind, there is no doubt Alfred would be taken as a creature having exactly the same beliefs as all other members of the community. Therefore, dispositionalists would infer from the behavioral patterns of Alfred that he must have the same bulk of beliefs as any American in the area. Contrasting this thought with the thought of representationalism, one would need to say that unlike the representationalist, the dispositionalist does not need any evidence that what stands behind the behavior of Alfred is actually the ability to, as Choi and Fara put it, “manipulate sentences in language of thought or possess internal representational structures of the right sort.”\(^\text{20}\) Although dispositionalism might be theoretically distinguished from behaviorism by asserting that for someone to believe some proposition *P* means that the person possesses some particular dispositions related to the proposition *P*, it remains a theory based on certain behavioral assumptions.

\(^{18}\) Jeff Malpas, “Donald Davidson”.


\(^{20}\) Ibid.
Another typical objection to dispositionalism is based on the functionalist character of some of their propositions. Clearly, if one reduces behavioral patterns to inert disposition of a person, there is a short way to reduce the dispositions to an input-output systematization resulting in a functionalist theory of mind-processes reductionism. Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson, the major representatives of the so-called interpretationism, originally found on dispositionalist ideas, highlight the “indeterminacy” of belief ascriptions, and thus disavow themselves from the strong dispositionalist position endorsing the infallibility of attributing certain belief to the person based merely on the obvious behavioral traits.

1.2 To outwit Scylla and Charybdis

In the previous three chapters the theories of foundationalism, representationalism, and dispositionalism or interpretationalism were briefly presented in order to set a background for the discussion of human cognition that is to be enquired in the preceding chapters. Why are these important for the particular discussion of cognition in this paper?

First, foundationalism seems to be quite an intuitive theory seeking for a grounding of human knowledge. The objectives of this paper are the same; yet the argument of this paper would reject not only the whole idea of looking for a non-inferential belief, which seems to be an eternally elusive chimera, but also the most natural notion that the non-inferential is the what turns out to be the result of human sensory apprehension. But what is this belief after all? Even the term belief is most commonly understood as partly created by the human mind. It shall be, therefore, comprehended as concept constituted by both some piece of information taken from senses, and another piece of information based on the manner in which human cognition understands the sensory.

A similar supposition is held among representationalists, who merge these in the idea of sense-datum. In this case, the weakest point is the thought that human knowledge consists of these items referring to certain tokens in the outer world. If Russell holds this notion in Problems of Philosophy\textsuperscript{21}, he also need to presuppose what may be explicitly found in Davidson’s later theory, as has been commented on above.

\textsuperscript{21} Russell.
Davidson is associated with dispositionalism and interpretationalism. These two positions would be the closest to what shall be introduced in this paper. Yet, they also appear to be unsustainable as they are both in some of their propositions perilously close to behaviorism, which the faithful interpreter of Wittgenstein must, in accordance with the text of *PI*, vigorously reject.\textsuperscript{22}

The position that is to be held in this paper, therefore, needs to avoid any *transcendental, empirical, or behavioral* solution while explaining the basis of *cognition*, with all three theories appearing to be unsatisfying at least in one of their aspects. The founding texts on which the novel assumption of how is human *cognition* is structured shall be Wittgenstein’s *PI*, Hegel’s *PoS*, and Kant’s *CPR*, or McDowell’s *Mind & World* (*M&W*), if necessary. For all these works happen to be congenial in construing an alternative view of human *cognition* on the basis of *social practice* that appears to be the most promising one in terms of avoiding all the three obstacles above mentioned.

\textsuperscript{22} Passage that is suggested to be the most explicit one, within which Wittgenstein deprecates the position of behaviorism: 245: “[...] Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour, – for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.”
2 Preliminary concept of sense-certainty and the sketch of cognition conditions

To introduce the theme of this paper, there indeed is a need to instantiate the vocabulary that shall be re-used and criticized in the following chapters in relation to Wittgenstein’s and Hegel’s writings.

The most basic concept is justifiedness and belief, i.e. the concept of justified (true) belief. Before beginning to do so, it may be remarked that belief is probably one of the most popular concepts in the discourse of contemporary cognitive science. However, there are some important difficulties, or rather controversies that the term, as defined, brings into the discussion of cognition as such. If the term of belief implies that for example whenever one undergoes some pain, one also has a belief that they feel the pain, the consequences are shocking, for under this notion the only creature able to feel pain would be a human, while all other kinds of living beings, such as animals, would be deprived of having such a property, because, presumably, only language users can have beliefs. In the following chapters, the term belief shall serve only as basic concept of cognition, for it shall enable the author to give particular examples without overusing the term cognition.

Robert Audi, while introducing the concept of justified true belief, emphasizes that justification is not any kind of process in which controversial beliefs are being justified, but rather a property of some beliefs being justified (justifiedness). These beliefs are those usually considered to be true as well, for imagining someone saying that their belief is justified but not true suggests rather a misunderstanding of the term justified. Of course it is plausible that one can have a justified belief that turns out to be false. Ed Gettier presupposes in his famous paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?,” that one can have a justified false belief. It is certainly open for debate though. Nevertheless, people will usually think their justified beliefs are also true, unless (and until) at a later time someone points out that their belief is false, or else their evidence changes, in which case they will drop the belief but perhaps say their belief was justified.

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24 Ibid.
before they found out it was false. Therefore, when someone believes a belief to be justified, they also believe the belief to be true. Moreover, having certain belief also implies that the believer possesses some justification for their belief; e.g. when one believes that the field is green, they also possess some kind of acquaintance with the field under which the field is characterized as being green.26

These concepts are fundamental for the broader concept of cognition. To hold a justified belief implies that one also know they justifiedly believe something to be true. Thus much of what one justifiedly believes they also know.27 There are several kinds of knowing something, e.g. the so-called self-knowledge according to Audi suggests that when someone is imaging something, for instance a green field, they know simultaneously that they believe they are imagining the object, the green field that is.28 Another example is the knowledge that serves to particular judgments, such as Alex is taller than Bernard, and Bernard is taller than Connor, then Alex is taller than Connor. What underlines these judgments is the knowledge that Kant would probably referred to as synthetic a priori, i.e. knowledge that represents an abstract pattern fundamental for specific judgments about the particular.29

Further on, one has to establish, for the purpose of this paper perhaps most importantly, the term testimony. Testimony might be founded on both observation, i.e. a direct acquaintance, or common-sense, the so-called testimony from others30, i.e. an indirect acquaintance.31 According to Audi, the testimony from others is, however, reducible to the basic knowledge by perception, or the so-called observational one. Nevertheless, this claim shall be doubted under the enquiry of Wittgenstein's theory of cognition in the following chapters.

Audi’s view, and perhaps the most common view in contemporary epistemology, definitely favors perception as major source of any kind of knowledge. There are four basic components of knowing: (1) the perceiver; (2) the object perceived; (3) the sensory experience; (4) the relation between the object and the subject, usually comprehended as

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26 Ibid.
27 Audi, 4.
28 Audi, 5.
29 Kant, 51.
30 Audi, 6.
31 Russell.
causally established. There are also three basic approaches or view-points of how to speak about perception. First, it is simply the approach concerned with the sole set of what can be perceived. Second, it is the focus on what people perceive the object to be. Third, it is the concern with the facts one might be acquainted with through perception, i.e. with the propositional character of knowledge based on perception. To illustrate this as a process, one may proceed as follows: First, I see a green field; second, I see the field to be rectangular; third, I see that the field is rectangular. From this example speaking for all sorts of perception is clear that the seeing would be marked as the basic source of perceptual knowledge. This is, indeed true even when speaking about how the perceptual process of getting to know something is described in both Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s; yet, one shall further see that this method of cognizing something proves to be insufficient after all.

All the three ways of treating an object through perception represent the basic ground for particular knowledge to be established. Though knowledge is terminologically used more often than cognition, cognition appears to be more accurate in terms of the objectives of this paper for its broader scope of the so-call process of acknowledging something.

Further on, one may distinguish between at least two, and two for the purposes of the future study of Hegel’s dialectics sufficiently, kinds of belief. The first is marked by Audi as propositional, and refers directly to the proposition one makes about certain object. For example when seeing a field, one may create a proposition saying the field is rectangular, with regard to the particular shape of the field. The second, let it be called with Audi an objectual belief, is the belief referring merely to the object itself. Interestingly, though the objectual belief is presented as the second kind, it seems to be primordial in terms of not only perceptual apprehension of an object, but also in terms of an intellectual apprehension. Yet, Audi seems, perhaps unintentionally, to articulate both the kinds in accord with what shall be emphasized with Hegel and Wittgenstein; that is that one is only capable of apprehending an object when the object is already distinguishable in terms of its properties. This also seems to be close to what Hegel

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32 Audi, 16.
33 Audi, 17.
34 Ibid.
35 Audi, 18.
36 Ibid.
formulates in his chapter on *sense-certainty* in *Pos.* The problem of *sense-certainty* in Hegel's *PoS* might be expressed in what Audi says about *objectual* belief:

“To see that there is no particular proposition, notice that in holding this objectual belief I need not think of what I see as a field, for I might mistakenly take it to be (for instance) a lawn or a huge canvas or a grasslike artificial turf, yet still believe it to be rectangular. I might think of it just in terms of what I believe it to be and not in terms of what else it actually is. Thus, although there is *some* property I must take the field to have – corresponding to what I believe it to be – there is no other particular way I must think of it. With objectual belief, then, there is no particular notion that must yield the subject of any proposition I believe about the object: [...]”

To put it shortly and even more controversially, one should say that *objectual* belief is that broad, that it actually makes one incapable of formulating any *particular* thought or belief about the object, i.e. that the *objectual* belief is actually empty, or, to put it with Hegel, simply *universal* [*allgemeine*].

What comes along with the emptiness of *objectual* belief, or Hegelian *sense-certainty*, is that what one believes about the object of perception becomes very permissible. The *objectual* belief leaves so much space for interpretation of what the object actually is, that it often creates a mere illusion. Contrarily, when one is already able to create *propositional* beliefs about object, the illusion as a result of this kind of judgment becomes a decisive and respectable *view-point*, which only may after all serve as a subject of justification and ascription of truth value.

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37 Hegel, 85 pp.
38 Audi, 18 – 19.
39 Hegel, 77 pp.
3 Wittgenstein and Hegel: Between skepticism and anti-skepticism

It has been anticipated that the main course of this paper is in mapping the conception of *cognition* in Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s epistemology (if there is a consistent one to be found in one or the other). Before giving the actual account of *cognition*, however, let there be a brief introduction to Wittgenstein’s latest work, which stands as probably the clearest evidence of what Wittgenstein understood under the concept of *knowing something*. The aim of this chapter is thus to give an account of Wittgenstein’s conception of *knowledge* and *doubt* in his latest text *On Certainty*[^40]. The starting points of the analysis are the axioms 341 and 342 that roughly summarize Wittgenstein’s position responding primarily to G. E. Moore’s anti-skepticism and Hume’s radical skepticism. Giving these rough remarks of Wittgenstein’s position in this shorter piece of his, the reader shall also obtain an approximate picture of Wittgenstein’s (anti-) skepticism, which is suggested to be very close to Hegel’s (anti-) skepticism, and which will also indicate the direction of the argumentation in the further development of this work.

To *know something* means to be *incapable of being wrong* (*OC*, 16). The *incapacity* does not entail that an individual person is *incapable of making a mistake*, i.e. making a statement that may be considered either true or false, but the *impossibility of even giving a proposition*. To *know something*, therefore, refers to an open set of certain *unquestionable* pseudo-propositions that do not rely on neither the subjective knowledge *that* of a particular person, nor on the actual state of affairs in particular situations. By the openness of the set the mutability of the pseudo-propositions is to be understood, while Wittgenstein’s examples including the possibility of man having been on the moon (*OC*, 108) shall be reconciled with the scientific and technological progressions that have been made since Wittgenstein’s death (*OC*, 452, 454).

To commence with an analysis of Wittgenstein’s concept of *doubt* in *On Certainty*, several terms need to be first explained. Under pseudo-propositions, the propositions merely *justifiable* in terms of *how* one acknowledges them that is, are those *propositions*

that are *conceivable* as propositions but do not take place within the so-called language of everydayness (OC, 638), i.e. within the usual discourse (OC, 40). Wittgenstein repeats throughout *On Certainty* that it makes no sense to state “I know there is my hand,” or any kind of such claim commencing with the *I know* where one may simply say “There is my hand,” and possibly add *how* did they get to such a claim (OC, 40). Daniele Moyal-Sharrock stresses that Wittgenstein follows Moore in rejecting to refer to his grounding propositions as to propositions in ordinary sense as they cannot be evaluated through the categories of truth-value, knowledge, or justification. According to both Moyal-Sharrock and Avrum Stroll, Wittgenstein here refers to *a grammatical rule* in *Tractatus* referred to as pseudo-propositions. Supposing these propositions cannot be evaluated through the categories usually prescribed to propositions, their propositional status becomes very dubious; yet, at this stage they shall be purposefully held in favor of the explanation of doubt. Following the axioms 58 and 59 in OC, this new concept of proposition, partly inherited from the Tractarian account, shall be understood as a specific form of language providing a logical insight, i.e. a logical coherence of each actual proposition. If lacking a specific context that would shape the utterance of the “I know” member of the proposition, the proposition “I know this is a tree” is to be rejected as senseless, and replaced by a real proposition such as “This is a tree”. Why the “I know” is being considered redundant, is precisely the question with which the analysis of an account of doubt in Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* shall begin.

Unlike the pseudo-propositions described above, the actual propositions are, so as in TLP (3), closely related to the states of affairs (OC, 95). The pseudo-propositions, however, represent a necessary logical system, or structure, without which the actual propositions would not be even conceivable (OC, 126). If, therefore, one started to doubt the content of pseudo-propositions, the possibility of propositions would be ultimately lost, i.e. the content of each actual proposition would be deprived of its sense (OC, 54 – 56). The inter-relation between pseudo-propositions and propositions is, however, not one-sided. To understand what the pseudo-propositions are, their relation to actual proposition shall be described as reciprocal. Why is that so? – The pseudo-propositions themselves cannot be expressed in language similarly as the logical form in *Tractatus* can only be shown, but not said (TLP, 4.121 and 4.1212; OC, 501).

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Now the two axioms (OC, 341 and 342) get a word in edgeways:

“The questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.” (OC, 341)

“That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed [in der Tat] not doubted.” (OC, 342)

Now Kantian conception of forms of intuition shall be taken to account and serve as an explanatory analogue to what Wittgenstein means by the “propositions exempt from doubt” (OC, 341). As Kant asserts in The Critique of Pure Reason (CPR, B143), to perceive and understand the world as appearing to a human mind, there already needs to be a structure in the mind, certain form of intuition that shape the character of human perception and knowledge, so that the world presents itself as coherent realm of appearances. To put it crudely, yet in accordance with Kant’s words, the form of intuition is a necessary precondition for apprehending the world as a framework of relations that are mutually coherent and consistent, and furthermore, are thus capable of being shared by the plurality of human minds. This remark is no less crucial, as both later Wittgenstein and Kant reject the solipsistic concept of a world, i.e., speaking with Wittgenstein, the argument of private language. The common ground is precisely, what cannot be doubted, nor expressed, but being certain about, and believe in it.

Wittgenstein states, “[it] is always by favor of Nature that one knows something” (OC, 505). Moyal-Sharrock explains the striving for such grounding as follows:

“We experience the world and its regularities, but we do not come to our foundational world-picture by reasoning from this experience. That is realism without empiricism. Our behavior, our language and, our certainties are conditioned by the world we live in, indeed by regularities in the world – and that draws a causal connection, not a justificatory one. Our foundational hinges – the beliefs that make up the scaffolding of our language-games – are not rationally, but causally pegged in reality [–].”

Moyal-Sharrock claims the sole possibility of sharing the world in human experience and language requires this kind of foundation that Wittgenstein refers to as hinge propositions, the so-called pseudo-propositions that is. Hinge propositions hold the

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44 Moyal-Sharrock, 82.
whole world-picture that lie beneath every actual proposition. If this picture were doubted, i.e. if some of the hinge propositions were doubted, the entire language of everydayness would lose its sense. Quoting Andy Hamilton, “it is a way of making sense of reality.”\textsuperscript{45} The certainty as a bottom-less package of hinge propositions is by Wittgenstein associated with the concept of form of life (OC, 358) that is to be found already in the PI. It shall be subjected to the proceeding chapters, whether the fact that there are any different forms of life, there may be many different world-pictures, many different frameworks of unquestionable pseudo-propositions or hinges that is, entails the plurality of different, even contradicting, groundings of language being held at the same time. Here, merely the sole interpretation of pseudo-propositions as the Kantian forms of intuitions and the twelve categories as their implications shall be conceived.

Deepening the suggested analogy between Wittgenstein’s hinge propositions and Kant’s forms of intuitions implying the twelve categories, it is to be added that both the conceptions are built up to stand against the position of radical skepticism, the bases of which may be traced back to Hume’s radical empiricism (EHU 4, 5)\textsuperscript{46}. While Hume rejects human experience as a reliable source of acquiring knowledge of the nature of the world, Wittgenstein and Kant bestow it quite considerable trust. For Kant the objects experienced are identified with the material objects themselves, the real objects, that is (excluding now the discussion of the so-called noumena). Wittgenstein counts the basic experience of the world, including human behavior, relations, and language, as a vital source of human certainty and beliefs as well. However, Wittgenstein considers experience as resourceful only when being substantially verified in time, in various situations shared by the plurality of human minds (OC, 275). The beliefs are here “hung together with the grammar of the proposition believed” (OC, 313), i.e. are nurtured by the hinge propositions, the legitimacy of which is gradually strengthened or weakened (possibly up to complete disappearance) in the temporal nature of human, i.e. social, existence.

Now, the axioms 341 and 342 are to be brought back to the discussion.

Considering the last remark it shall be emphasized that by the experience being verified in time is primarily meant the process of the scientific investigations being gradually attached to and integrated into the human mind. Referring first to the latter of the two axioms, the distinction between merely empirical, i.e. subjective, and socio-empirical temporal acquaintance with the world shall be evaluated, so that the nature of the hinge propositions is understood.

In the axiom 105 Wittgenstein points out that the hinge propositions create a system that serves as a base for making the individual conditioned propositions. By the conditioned propositions Wittgenstein means the elements of language that only have their life within this system. For to be certain about having two hands, i.e. the kind of subjective knowledge that does not imply the basic objective knowledge, one needs to find a justification among other people. Contrarily, the objective knowledge does not require any kind of justification as it itself already entails the indisputability of the statement. Therefore, if the objective knowledge consisted merely of purely experiential knowledge, the subjective knowledge that is, there would not be any kind of common language, i.e. any kind of shared knowledge, as the entire acquaintance with the world would be based on the perceptions of individual minds consisting of unconnected sense-data. Clearly, this Cartesian or Humian account of objective knowledge Wittgenstein strongly disagrees with. The picture of the world has to be consistent, intrinsically inter-linked, and thus function rather as normative than descriptive grammar of how the particular human language works. Moyal-Sharrock gives a sympathetic claim on this account:

“Hinge ‘propositions’ function like norms of description, like statements that cannot be falsified by experience. And we know that a ‘statement, which no experience will refute’ is ‘a statement of grammar’ (AWL 16). I cannot be mistaken or be prey to an illusion or deception when I say (e.g. to someone on the telephone): ‘I am sitting at my desk right now.’ The logical impossibility of being mistaken does not result from my having made absolutely sure that I am sitting at my desk, from my having correctly described reality, but from my not having described it at all.”

The problem of subjective and objective knowledge is related to the possibility of making a mistake, i.e. to the problem of doubt itself. To doubt something presupposes certainty that cannot be doubted in any conditions (OC, 115). If one makes a doubt about

47 Moyal-Sharrock, 91 – 92.
being of a certain gender, the possibility of such a doubt lies beneath the sole questioning it. Conversely, the game of questioning something is related to the particularity of a language game, i.e. allow mistakes in propositions. Certainty is rooted in action, i.e. in practice in time that allows reconsiderations of what has been practiced yet. However, those propositions that cannot be subjected to reconsideration are precisely those Wittgenstein wants to exclude from the ring of relative propositions fighting for its truthfulness, so that he may call the hinge propositions and prescribe them an ultimate value, pronounce them norms or grammatical rules of language that is. To exemplify the difference between the unquestionable hinge propositions and the propositions allowing doubts as being possibly mistaken, Wittgenstein says: “Doesn’t "I know that that’s a hand", in Moore’s sense, mean the same, or more or less the same, as: I can make statements like "I have a pain in this hand" or "this hand is weaker than the other" or "I once broke this hand", and countless others, in language-games where a doubt as to the existence of this hand does not come in?” (OC, 371)

The proposition “That is a hand” serves as a stem from which all other possible propositions may grow in all the possible language games as its branches. Given Moyal-Sharrock’s example that delineates where the boundary between indubitable and dubitable propositions lies, one should agree that a mistake is something made out of ignorance or carelessness, but to call someone’s assertion that “motorcars grow out of the earth” a mistake sounds at least as a fatal error, and even remotely as a mistake.48

If there is something to be concluded about On Certainty with at least a seeming certitude, it is Wittgenstein’s rejection of the so-called transcendental certainty (OC, 47). His account of certainty and knowledge entails two different categories, yet neither of them implies anything even remotely similar to Kantian noumena. The major distinction between the two lies within yet a partly mystical account of doubt through which knowledge may be assessed, but certainty not. As was suggested, the grammatical rules, i.e. the hinge propositions or pseudo-propositions, seem more reasonably to be understood as a normative apparatus, rather than a descriptive one. One cannot describe the situation allowing mistake in terms of certainty, for the result would

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48 Moyal-Sharrock, 73.
contain a contradiction. Wittgenstein gives a following example: “I know” has a primitive meaning similar to and related to “I see” (“wissen”, “videre”). And “I knew he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room” is like “I saw him in the room, but he wasn’t there”. “I know is supposed to express a relation not between me and the sense of a proposition (e.g. “I believe”) but between me and a fact. (OC, 90)

The last example also justifies the assumption that Wittgenstein’s conception of knowledge coincides considerably with the Kantian close relation between what is perceived from the world and what is actually known about the world. Knowledge in either Kant’s and Wittgenstein’s view traces the steps of an empirical experience, and at the same time already preconditions the shapes of it. In the context of Wittgenstein’s theory, the element of preconditioning belongs to the logical grammar or form, which each particular proposition related to some particular state of affairs necessarily responds to.

One the hand, Wittgenstein seems to be suggesting that this grammatical form is complete and ultimate. On the other hand, as remarked in the introduction of this paper, hand in hand with the scientific discoveries made in the past fifty years, at least some of Wittgenstein hinges would have to be re-evaluated (such as the “indubitable” fact of the impossibility of travelling on the moon). More reasonable apprehension of such ruptures in Wittgenstein’s otherwise very solid theory of knowledge might be one close to Kuhn’s theory of scientific revolutions that tolerates an emergence of inconsistencies and doubts even within the sole groundings of the socio-scientific paradigms. To assess such a suggestion, however, would require at least another argument to be composed, and anther paper to be written.

This chapter is first and foremost important in characterizing the skepticism of Wittgenstein’s, and as is believed, Hegel’s. It shall be made clear shortly that both the philosophers have certain doubts about acknowledging the sole reality of the things outside of human minds; yet both also seem to believe that what one acknowledges through their senses is reliable enough in order to serve as a ground for founding what they would assert to be the nature of cognition. Consequently, empirical experience is necessary, but not a sufficient source of human knowledge. Let this last sentence be taken as praemissa maior.
4 Hegel’s critique of *sense-certainty* as absolute basis for cognition

Before proceeding with the sole problem of justified knowledge, it is to be examined, what kind of individual is in need, in order to achieve such a justification. It shall be known already, from the previous chapters, that the individual would be neither any kind of mentally pre-determined creature, as representationalism seems to suggest, nor any kind of creature always inferring from the only certainty it can get, as suggested by the theory of foundationalism embedded in rationalism of a Cartesian kind, or even, contrarily, any modern or contemporary empiricism.

Even the structure of Hegel’s *PoS* suggests that there is no subject, until the other subject becomes fully recognized by the other, i.e. until both of the subjects confirm [...] the existence of the other as existence of a fully established self-consciousness. Therefore, though all the three chapters preceding the Master-Slave analysis give some account of subjectivity, they actually do not speak about the subject proper that shall only be revealed with the Slave’s realization of its own consciousness, and thus with the breakdown of the Master-Slave relation.

In the following chapters, the author is going to open the analysis of the dialogue between Hegel and Wittgenstein by a brief introduction to the *objectual cognition*. Both Wittgenstein and Hegel commence their analyses with an ostensive approach towards the which is established so far as the opposite of the “I”, the object (of sensory cognition) that is.

Wittgenstein’s *Philosophical Investigations* commences with an analysis of an ostensive teaching of language. To point to an object, however, turns out to be a great philosophical issue. First, one might not be sure what exactly is the object pointed to. The color, the shape, and even the use of the object are hardly predictable, since the language has not been established yet. Wittgenstein’s analysis of the ostensive act reveals that language needs to be primordial in terms of human knowledge of objects. It shall be argued that Hegel’s first three chapters of the *PoS* imply the same conclusion. While the object of Hegel’s dialectics becomes a substance, i.e. a concept that is no longer blurred with the surrounding world, Wittgenstein’s object resists such a treatment. Yet,

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49 Hegel, 163.
it shall be argued that Hegel’s holism is preserved to a certain extent, with this preservation coming in virtue of Wittgenstein’s notion of “language games”.

Hegel’s dialectical movement within the first three chapters of the PoS is a three-staged process of consciousness becoming self-consciousness, through which simultaneously an object becomes a concept [Begriff]. The object of the consciousness is yet far away from what shall later be called reason. The object of the consciousness is what is immediately given to the seemingly empty consciousness, that reflects the object not yet as sense-datum, i.e. as a mental image of a property of a certain object that is, but remains merely mentally presupposed and basically unaware. The object given is not even an object in the sense of a thing outside of human mind that may be experienced through sensory reflection and certain mental activity. The object will play an important part in the sole process of the subject evolving as consciousness at the first stage, and becoming self-consciousness at the second stage, i.e. opposing itself to itself and rediscovering itself through the opposition.

To summarize the first-stage, the so-called stage of sense-certainty, of an object, one may simply say the object represents a not-yet concept, described by Hegel as universal, i.e. as a mere being. Through perception, the second stage of the development of consciousness, that already works with the distinct properties of an object, the object as a potential concept reaches the status of particularity. Finally, the object becomes fully a concept because (and the condition here shall be crucial for further argumentation) the Master-Slave relation has reached the objective view [objektiv Anschauung] after all.\footnote{Hegel, 161 pp.}

The first problem that Hegel encounters in the chapter on sense-certainty concerns the immediate knowledge [...]\footnote{Hegel, 86 pp.}, or the immediateness as such. What is considered immediate for Hegel turns out to be mediated by an ostentatious return from the particular to the universal, i.e. immediate. The particular grasped as immediate is always negated by another particular, and the latter by another one, etc., ad infinitum. The sense of an infinite regress, however, implies precisely that the immediate experience of an object is possible only under the condition of the existence of space and time.
The true, i.e. the real so to say, at the stage of sense-certainty, is the immediateness that has come about with the subject positing itself as opposed to the object. The subject and object becomes equal; the subject representing the certainty and the object representing the truth.

Truth, therefore, is first established as a sense-certainty, i.e. as an immediate knowledge, not yet reasonable, as not yet conceptual. Sense-certainty, in terms of the concluding stage of spirit (the last and the highest form of the consciousness) shall be, however, understood as both the highest truth and the greatest error

Why is this so? Because the knowledge of the immediate is the knowledge of being of something existing that is. It is an activity of mind referring to a mere “here is”, or “now is”, even though not yet articulated. Jean Hyppolite comments on this stage of knowledge as follows: "What I experience but am unable to express in any way has no truth. Language is truer." The specific approach towards object, i.e. the mediation of the object as a substance through its properties, is, therefore, only possible in language. The being of the object in the first stage is prescribed to the consciousness as its essence, while knowledge of the object itself remains inessential. It does not depend on the knowledge of the consciousness, whether the object is or is not. The independence of being is to be preserved, through all the proceeding stages. (Though the status of an existing changes in terms of becoming a substance at the third stage, i.e. at the stage of understanding.)

A ticklish question arises while facing the puzzle of the content of sense-certainty. What is the content of the knowledge, which the being of the object is not dependent on? Comparing the idea of pre-conceptual knowledge with Kantian intuition one may better understand what the nature of the pre-conceptual is. Both Wittgenstein and Hegel seem to be holding the same idea (with which the author of this paper sympathizes): that such knowledge is precisely the kind of knowledge that shows the child not only feels the pain, but also understands the pain as something, i.e. as something that is or is not the case. The pre-conceptual has to be understood as a spatio-temporal intuition in the

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53 Hyppolite, 82.
Kantian sense.\textsuperscript{54} To stress the assumption of Wittgenstein’s and Hegel’s here, it is to be emphasized that there shall be some kind of pre-reasonable knowledge for grounding the sole possibility of one’s becoming a speaking entity, i.e. an entity experiencing the world through concepts.

In §31 and further Wittgenstein argues that to understand something in order to be capable of asking its name (i.e. its concept), one need to know what to do with the object enquired already. In §33 he adds that one should know, what characteristic of the object is meant to be pointed out. It seems, with regard to the paragraphs from §148 to §155 that summarize the issue of understanding, that the major problem with the ostensive method of identifying the object is its indefiniteness in terms of properties and the inseparability from its background. Both the criteria have been already discussed in the context of Hegel’s account of object in the first chapter of the Phenomenology. Regarding these criteria it is to be claimed that the ostensive method of identifying an object corresponds to Hegel’s description of the knowledge of sense-certainty, and consequently, fails to become a satisfying knowledge of the world as such.

Hegel comments on the ostensive discourse of this, or specifically there and now, i.e. the universal terms referring to the object as graspable at the stage of sense-certainty, in the following terms. If one points to the night sky and says, “the now is nighttime,” the term “nighttime” does not designate anything specific because the meaning of it lies on the universality of the word “now”. At another nighttime the same observation may be stated, and either in another nighttime the “now” will preserve its truth and immediateness, i.e. designating but a mere being of the status quo.\textsuperscript{55}

The nature of the now is always ambiguous – the now may be both night and day. As such night is something mediated, something always negated that is. Hyppolite quoting Hegel’s own words summarizes the passage on sense-certainty as follows:

“This, precisely, is the first definition of the universal. ‘We call a simple entity of this kind, which is through the mediation of negation, which is neither this nor that but can be equally this or that, a universal’ (PE, I, 84; PG, 82; PM, 152). In point of fact then, the universal is the true of sensuous certainty.” (Emphasis added.)

\textsuperscript{54} Kant, A99 (153 pp.)

\textsuperscript{55} Hyppolite, 91.
The same definition applies to this as there. This remains dimmed in terms of indeterminacy of properties of an object; any there subjected to some predication (like “there is a tree”) is blurred with any other there that is a house, or a dog, etc. For the subject perceiving each particular this as there or now is always positively specific, though simultaneously held by the subject as universal.

Having depicted both the subject and the object of the sense-certainty, Hegel closes the chapter by returning to the pre-objective and pre-subjective view, which both proved incapable of resulting in a fully evolved reasonable knowledge, i.e. in the knowledge of concepts. The last dialectical movement is already a leap towards the following stage of consciousness, the knowledge of perception that is. It is the ability to reach the object no longer as immediate but as mediated through double negation. ‘A’ negated results in ‘¬A’, so that ‘¬A’ negated again equals A’, which is not quite the same ‘A’ as the first one. This is what the knowledge of perception will reveal fully by positing an object as a bulk of multiple properties. Property turns out to be the essence of negation and difference, and as such an essence of an object becoming thus a unity of being, or being involving negation within. What the negation is brought about by, is the subject perceiving the object through each of the properties separately.

The linguistic problem in sense-certainty is that there cannot be formulated any judgment, since the stage on which the consciousness distinguishes one object from the other, i.e. is given the knowledge of properties, has not yet been reached. The second reason for which the stage of sense-certainty remains non-conceptual is that even if one was able to give a name of the object, the name as such will not be capable of standing for any reasonable proposition. The motivation for rejecting propositions consisting of a name only seems to be the same reason for which Wittgenstein rejects the possibility of understanding one-word propositions. For Wittgenstein there is no understanding of the proposition without the circumstances already given and understood, and without the other speaker sharing these circumstances and their understanding. As understanding for Wittgenstein refers to the particular social practice, the understanding of the Word “slab” would mean that both the speaker A and B are aware of the conditions and modes of use of the word “slab” (§2). The word “slab” will be, therefore, interpreted by both A and B differently in the situation 1, in which A and B are two builders working on a site, and in situation 2, in which the teacher pictures a slab on
the blackboard and pronounces the word while pointing out to the picture.

The next step in this paper is to give a taste of the situation of the subject being already established as *self-consciousness*, referring to the third chapter of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* called “Understanding”\(^{56}\), and encountering another subject in the dialog. Trapped in the discourse of Wittgenstein’s *Investigations*, the author is going to call the basic situation of the dialog a *language game*.

At the second stage of the evolving consciousness in the *Phenomenology* the knowledge of the object turns out to be knowledge of a substratum of sensual properties.\(^{57}\) *Understanding* arises from the substance, i.e. the subject, as *cause*; from a thing the *understanding* comes out as *force*.\(^{58}\) *Force* is defined as a concept, as a thought of the sensual world reflected in consciousness. In the section of *understanding* Hegel seeks for a *force* unifying the entirety of perceptual experience. Knowledge of the things themselves, i.e. the universals, and knowledge of their properties, i.e. referring to the particular objects, needs to be separated by these *forces* that turn out to be *natural laws*, i.e. in the Kantian sense the “forms of intuition”\(^{59}\). *Understanding* enables mind to become directly acquainted with the *representations* of the objects rather than the objects *themselves*. At this stage, the analogies with both the Kantian and Wittgensteinian theories fail, as Hegel remains a strong idealist at this point. Yet, following Terry Pinkard’s interpretation of Hegel’s *PoS*\(^{60}\), the *understanding* does not describe as much the supersensible world, i.e. the unifying world of the individual objects as perceived, as its own structures of describing the world. “To use Wittgenstein’s metaphor, it is describing the frame around the picture all the while thinking that it is describing the picture itself.”\(^{61}\)

*Understanding* is the stage of consciousness in which the social dimension of Hegel’s dialectics functions at last, as it is grounded in the subject itself, and it provides the subject with the account of the world now open to the possibility of being shared within a group of subjects. Among more subjects the consciousness becomes self-

\(^{56}\) Hegel, 115 pp.
\(^{57}\) Hyppolite, 118.
\(^{58}\) Ibid.
\(^{59}\) Kant, B44/A28 (83 pp.).
\(^{61}\) Pinkard, 42 – 43.
conscious and for the first time enters the relations with other subjects that are, according to Hegel, proved to be necessary for the genesis of a concept.

Making one last but most important remark on Hegel’s three-fold dialectics in the first part of PoS, it shall be stressed that the social basis of understanding, i.e. the forces connecting the objects in the world into a meaningful framework within which any conceptual apprehension of the world is only possible, reveals itself to be always already present, so as the society and its historicity are always already present as well.

To elucidate this thought, one might remember the definition of object from Tractatus, and compare, how it is defined in contrast with the definition in PI. Quite interestingly, later Wittgenstein seems to reject the so-called form of the objective units from TLP in order to supply it by the social participation on things. In PI Wittgenstein does not ask the Socratic question what is X, but rather, what do I mean by X, resp. what do we mean by X. Under this question, one shall primarily understand the premise that there is no objective cognition as such. Humans only apprehend the world through themselves, i.e. with certain interests and with the participation of the particular facts they make. However, Wittgenstein indeed will not allow any kind of pure subjectivism. Wittgenstein’s position is somewhere between radical objectivism or representationalism, and radical subjectivism or solipsism. In these terms, therefore, Wittgenstein refutes the Tractarian theses. Neither Hegel, nor Wittgenstein accepts any difference between apprehending the rules and using the rules. Rules are here meant to be equivalent with what Wittgenstein formerly (in TLP) describes by form of object. For in TLP objects and concepts corresponds thanks to the logical structure they share, this analogy seems to sound at least plausible. However, in TLP the form of an object is always complete, though not actualized in each and every propositional frame explicitly, while in PI, and relatedly in PoS as well, the form is never perfectly exhausted; one may still find some new meaning of the word so to say. This implies that the form of things, concepts respectively, is both founded on certain natural rules based on sensory apprehension, and created by the speakers themselves.
5 Introduction to the first two hundred paragraphs of *PI*

In the previous chapter the question of knowledge conditions has been touched upon. Now, to immerse more deeply into the problematic of cognition between Hegel and Wittgenstein, that has so far been presented as very close, there is a need to continue with the key concept of Wittgenstein’s, the so-called private language argument, that is believed to clarify the position the author is further going to hold.

Before proceeding to the sole argument, however, it might be of use to summarize the highlights of the last chapter, and desirably elucidate those thoughts that have not yet come to light.

First, the so-called subject and its evolution and conditionality have been interrogated. It has been shown that the so-called subject, i.e. self-consciousness that apprehends the so-called object through sensory perception, is not capable of forming a propositional belief. At the same time for the kind of belief there need to be language already established, and so far the only possible kind of language would be the private one. At this stage, self-consciousness has not yet reached the stage of recognition by the other. Second, it was suggested that besides particular conditions of particular language games that would constitute the basis of the meaning-creation, language shall stand as a kind of primordial and always-already-present form of understanding, and therefore, needs to be comprehended as being related in some important manner to the concept of cognition itself.

The main target in the following chapter shall be the first puzzle as rephrased in the introductory paragraph. To support the notion that for any kind of cognition there needs to be some language established, the first in need is to set up an argument that would deny the idea of private language (§§243–315) as such.

Though the PLA (private language argument) is often marked by the paragraphs 243 – 315, it may be useful to begin with the paragraph 241 saying:

241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life."
The concept of *form of life* is to be emphasized here as the key point through which the author shall later constitute the novel definition of *justified true belief*. It is the starting point of the argumentation against the *idea of private language*, though not against *private language* as such. This needs to be clarified. According to the first lecture of the *M&W (Mind & World)* collection of McDowell’s, the main point of the PLA is to disclaim that “judgments of inner sense” are founded on “the bare presences.” while he aims to suggest that these judgments shall be rather grounded in “the bare presences into words”63. This would, however, be again a misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s argument, or rather a partial understanding. There needs to be another basis of what sort of judgments people make, sometimes even unconsciously, as if automatically. Of course, and here is the explanation of what is meant by rejection of the *idea of private language*, Wittgenstein does not deny that private language is possible. What he denies is that the private language may be a source of some kind of knowledge. Let there be a brief summary of why that is going to be a problem.

In accord with what shall be claimed in this paper, McDowell basically asserts that Wittgenstein undermines the *idea of private language* by the general moral that *a bare presence cannot be a ground for anything*64; i.e. any kind of cognition. Relating this premise to the premise in the enquiry of Hegel’s chapters on *sense-certainty, perception,* and *force*, one should say that the conceptualization of an object does not suffice for grounding the belief in a coherent bundle of beliefs, because in order to gain such a bundle, one would need to join the common ground of language, i.e. the language shared, not private.

Wittgenstein commences his argument with an example of a person marking their feelings by a sign $S$. Anytime the feeling reappears, the person put another mark $S$ into the particular date and time of its occurrence. Now, let this be a subject to a short dialectical analysis. The question is what does this *belief* about some reappearing phenomenon consist of? First, it is by all means the occurrence of the phenomenon itself. One could blink into the chapter on *sense-certainty*, where the sensation of some object awakes certain reaction, i.e. the change of light, the reappearance of a cat, etc. is

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63 McDowell, 18.

64 Ibid.
introduced. The object is here not defined as object, but as mere instantiation of the universal idea of yet an empty concept. In the stage of perception, the object is already established as an object, but the stage of conceptuality is only on the level of marking the objects apprehended. This is the stage of ostension, as Wittgenstein describes it. In the paragraph 257 Wittgenstein warns against the thought that by giving name to a particular object, the sense of the name is given simultaneously.

“And whatever he did, what was its purpose? – When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense.”

When someone marks their feeling into the calendar, they actually made an empty sign. The sign fills itself with a particular sense only when it is justified by the understanding of other people (§§261). And these others would be precisely those sharing the same form of life. In this example is also well observable the impossibility to make a propositional belief is also well observable. For by marking the feeling as, it is not yet clear, what the S stands for in the relation to the subject. Indeed, one would say it means that he or she has S, e.g. pain. But is this really possible at the stage of perceptive cognizing of objects? How would another person understand the sign S if they did not know this rule, i.e. that by inscribing the sign S into the calendar, one means he or she has a pain at the particular moment? For all that the possibility of cognition seems to be necessarily dependent on language, and consequently, for language and language grammar in its broadest sense differ, on the particular form of life, and finally, to zoom closer to the occurrence of specific situation, on the particular language game. The consequence of the revealed need to put the names given in the ostention to the context of a proposition, is basically what Wittgenstein urges in the paragraph 262. A private definition of a word, i.e. the one reached above (S meaning he or she has a pain at the particular moment), however, require more than the definition. It needs to be repeatedly used, or put into praxis.

An interesting consequence of this claim brings about further meaning of what Wittgenstein offers here. Even though the person defines and uses the criteria in order to behave in such-and-such a way, there still would be a question of its usage in more normative terms. Why would the person cause themselves these troubles, if they did not
want to share the rules brought to the use with any other person?⁶⁵ And even if they did want to make the rules just for their own use, the content of their propositional beliefs would still not be legitimately called knowledge, because there would be nobody to judge it.

The last sentence is rather speculative, so first, there shall be made some space for further remarks on what happens in the paragraphs 243 – 315 (alternatively, 241 – 315). To allude to the main conclusion in the previous paragraph once again, let there be quoted Wittgenstein’s paragraph 265 that results in an almost dogmatic remark: “But justification consists in appealing to something independent.” So what the PLA suggests in general is not the impossibility of having private experience, but the impossibility having a coherent cognition is to be facilitated by others. That is, if the language remains private, one would not reach the stage of justification of their judgments, while they would not have the certainty that other people have the kind of belief or not (272).

In the paragraph 275 Wittgenstein gives a provocative statement saying that if one points at anything, i.e. a blue sky, one does not refer to themselves at the same time, though one would hold that the apprehension of the “naming of sensation” and the “feeling of pointing-into-oneself” usually come up simultaneously, because the language is still private, i.e. has not yet been established as shared. This is what turns the attention back to the birth of subject as was briefly outlined above, and it also radicalizes the interpretation of the PLA in this paper. It has been argued with Hegel that though the subject or the “I” becomes self-consciousness already at the stage of conceptualizing its sensory observations, they still lack the recognition or appreciation of another self-consciousness. What Wittgenstein describes in the paragraph 275 thus seems to correspond to this lacking recognition of the subject in Hegel’s.

Why is that so? – Imagine someone having a pain. If the person only holds their private language rules, all their experience corresponds to the general notion of what the nature of the actual world looks like. What is being suggested here is that this stage within the development of the consciousness is in accord with Wittgenstein’s account of the objective and private world in TLP. It shall be clear that to say objective and private is rather misleading. The conception of the world in TLP is, indeed, described as though

⁶⁵ Here the paragraph 268 is being recalled: “When the left hand has taken the money from the right, etc., we shall ask: "Well, and what of it?" And the same could be asked if a person had given himself a private definition of a word; I mean, if he has said the word to himself and at the same time has directed his attention to a sensation.”
“the limits of my language mean the limits of my world.” (TLP, 5.6) As a consequence, the criteria of justifiedness and truthfulness would fall into the particular ostensive expressions of having such-and-such sensation, with the condition that the subject would need to have the rules of marking each phenomena in the particular way, that is for example as in the example with marking the having a pain sensation as S. This is, however, as shall be clear, the stage that Hegel describes as sense-certainty, and it has been already argued that this kind of certainty does not actually represent any certainty, because it is lacks any content. The correspondence between my world and the world outside, or my language and my world, so as to stay in Wittgenstein’s vocabulary, shall be understood as the key interpretation of Wittgenstein’s objections against the idea of PLA.

Probably the most famous example shaping the PLA is the example of all people having a box with a “beetle” in it (§293). Indeed, it is possible each of them has something different in their boxes, or maybe even nothing at all, or something constantly changing. The name “beetle” cannot, therefore, be used as a name of something, for the something changes or does not refer to the same object in time. It becomes, to put it in with Hegel, the universal marker, an indefinite this that refers merely to the being of one or the other object perceived, i.e. it gives no information whatsoever.

Let another example of Wittgenstein’s be examined under the interpretation that has already been reached. In the paragraph 303 the following situation is under interrogation. The premise states that one can believe that someone else feels pain, but concerning oneself, they know they are in pain (§303). Wittgenstein is here outlining the redundancy of the framing clause in the proposition I believe he is in pain. The target for the purposes of this paper is, however, of a different kind. The target is the emphasis of the difference between knowing and believing something is the case. One shall see that in the case of referring to the first-person’s experience, the belief seems to be already both justified and true. In the case of referring to the other person’s pain, the belief is not yet justified, nor true. So what is the criterion in the former and the latter case? And is there any common criterion at all?
In the latter case, it is obvious, that there needs to be already established some common sense of what it is *to be in pain*. It has been shown that this cannot be reduced to the *name* and *description* of the phenomenon, but requires some *behavioral* signal, that is what has been referred to as language *practice*, or *using* the word in such and such a way. But how about the former situation that suggests the *belief* is always already both *justified* and *true*? The answer to this question shall now be clear. Yet, a brief reminder would do no harm.

The argument runs as follows. There are several stages at which the possibility of reaching a *justified true belief* was enquired. In all the following cases it is to be dealt with one *subject* only.

(I) First, it is, as was argued, the stage of *sense-certainty*. One *ostensively* highlights some *phenomenon*, i.e. not yet an object, from the misty background of their sensory apprehension. What is here highlighted, the phenomenon as *brought into consideration* respectively, is, however, not given any predicate that is of need so as to reach the level of particularity. Consequently, the result of this kind of *cognitive* apprehension is *empty*, i.e. with Hegel so to say *universal*.

(II) Second, it is the stage of a subject recognizing particular properties of an object. This stage promises that some *cognition* would be possible, if the subject came up with certain rules how to refer towards various objects or feelings, and put them into practice. Yet, the promise is never fulfilled. The reason was expressed by quoting the axiom 5.6 in *TLP*, saying that at this stage the *objective* realm and the *subjective* realm of the *cognition* falls into one, i.e. the whole thought here results in a deep *solipsism* that after all does not allow any kind of *justification*. *Truth* and *falsity* are only marked by e.g. saying *it is night*, when it is not the case; or saying *that is a cat*, when the object pointed at barks.

It seems that as a consequence of this claim, the possibility of inscribing *truth* or *falsity* to certain propositions describing some state of affairs would actually be undermined. For when there is no space for comparison, there cannot be any criterion of *truthfulness*, i.e. *truthfulness* becomes an empty concept.
(III) Third, although this is the stage, in which the subject has already been established as self-consciousness, it has not yet been recognized and appreciated by another subject. This aspect of the self-conscious subject is important in the relation to Wittgenstein’s concept of form of life. Form of life is to be an alternative to the solipsistic world of TLP. The unification of the private language and the state of affairs that are supposed to correspond to the propositions of the language shall be disrupted in order to get to the sociality of language that is required as a condition for any cognition being possible. To elucidate the parallel between TLP and PI in order to strengthen the idea of the social basis of cognition as a necessary condition, it shall be argued that the so-called structure (TLP, 2.15) of the world in TLP is in the PI conception with the concept of form of life. The consequence of such a claim is indeed a multiplication of the possible grounds for evaluating truthfulness of propositions.

In order to get to the turnover of what shall serve as a basis of cognition complete, there needs to be settled another parallel point. In the axiom 2.0122 of TLP and further Wittgenstein gives an account of the “form” of a thing or an object. Axiom 2.014 describes the concept of “form” as being the possibility of the object occurring among certain atomic fact. If one applies this premise to the structure of language as argued in TLP, one might find the form of an object corresponding ideally to the form of the object as a picture given in a proposition. If they were not equalized, the object would lack the possibility to become mirrored in language. Now, a similar mode of how the world, and it has been said already this world is a novel concept of the social reality in PI, relates to its depiction in language is in need to clarify the social turnover completely. Let the king in the game of chess serve as an example once again. It indeed has certain functions among the game, and one can say these are somewhat echoing the concept of the form of an object from TLP, i.e. the bulk of possibilities in which the figure of the chess king may be used. In the conception of PI, the use of certain object both in practice and in language is determined by rules revealing themselves in particular among varieties of language games. Rules are to be followed in order to achieve a justified and truthful proposition, i.e. in order to achieve a justified true belief.

Next chapter shall indeed work with what it means to follow a rule in Wittgenstein’s account. At the same time, McDowell’s notes about this feature of Wittgenstein’s later work shall be on the agenda.
6 Following Master & Slave

What the last chapter brought into the discussion was the phenomenon of rule-following. The most important observation is that precisely these rules, among other theses that were made within the comparison of TLP and PI, were not possible until the subject became fully self-conscious, i.e. until the subject became recognized\(^{66}\) by another self-conscious subject. These rules are at the same time a necessary condition for the possibility of cognition. What happens socially, or what is required to happen socially in order to make cognition possible, is to be illuminated in the following pages. Indeed, once more Hegel needs to take his part here.

Tom Rockmore in his introductory words towards his chapter on Force and Understanding in PoS expresses precisely what is the motivating delusion of this paper.

> “Perception, which cannot explain the unity of the perceptual object, bequeaths an unresolved dualism between sensation and perception. Empiricism founds knowledge on what is given in experience. Since the unity of the object necessary for a theory of knowledge cannot be explained solely within perception, empiricism of all kinds is forced beyond perception in order to explain it theoretically.”\(^{67}\)

This “beyond perception” shall in this paper be equated with the social. Hegel seems to shape his examination of consciousness in a similar way. Before explaining the most explicit reference in Hegel’s, i.e. the Master & Slave relation, there is to be given several lines about the previous two chapters.

So as Kant, Hegel maintains that knowledge is grounded in experience, meaning in sensory apprehension. But both Hegel and Kant causally proceed towards another ground of knowledge. In Kant’s CPR it is the \textit{a priori} concept. In Hegel’s, however, it is not anything in the self-conscious subject itself. In this sense Hegel seems to be a revolutionary, because what he means by this realm \textit{beyond the perceptual} is the realm of the social.

At the stage of perception, the object is still unrecognized as concept, i.e. as something on which the subject participates. Force is meant to dissociate the unity of the

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\(^{66}\) Hegel, 163 pp.

object in order to see the object as difference in unity and unity in difference. On the one hand, it is an important concept because it resolves the puzzle of how the world outside of the human mind, and the world socially structured and somehow responding to the outer world cooperate. Rockmore suggests that the concept of force is similar to Kant’s conception of cognition, which requires both the intuitions and the concepts, i.e. both the sensory experience and the understanding forming the experience into a more or less coherent knowledge. On the other hand, if the force serves as the glue between the mind and the object apprehended, there emerges a question, whether this would lead to an infinite regress as in the problem of a third man, or whether the force represents the utmost basis of cognition. This question shall be later on addressed once again at a later stage. 

Another crucial outcome of this chapter of PoS is the phenomenological turn from the object in-itself towards the object as represented in concept, or more precisely, to the subject as having the object in representation. It is not entirely clear, what the concept in Hegel’s phenomenology means, shall be more than a pure appearance of an object, but it is not yet an understanding in its full sense, i.e. in its propositional form. This has not been mentioned before, but intuitively should have been presupposed from the very beginning. Why is it important at this moment?

One may see that Wittgenstein made the similar phenomenological turn in PI. In this case, Wittgenstein shall for the purposes of this paper complete Hegel’s attempt to dig out the fundamental out of the experientially shared. Under the urge of this objective, Hegel is forced to make another dialectical step from consciousness [Bewuttssein] to self-consciousness [Selbstbewusstsein], for without the analysis of the latter no cognition can be comprehended. And self-consciousness presupposes for Hegel social interaction.

In the Truth of Self-Certainty Hegel prepares the ground for communicating the social background of knowledge after all. Of course, it is not the end of the analysis, but for the aims of this paper, the stage of Master & Slave is sufficiently rich in order to achieve the coveted, i.e. the answer to the question, of what the nature of human

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68 Rockmore, 52.
69 Rockmore, 60.
70 Rockmore, 61.
cognition is. In accordance with Kant, Hegel thus links the objectivity of the world with the sociality of the subject.\textsuperscript{71} It is suggested that the chapter on the Truth of Self-Certainty culminates in asserting that one may only become aware of oneself through active relations to the other. That is, knowledge as such is, as Rockemore puts it, “inherently social, since it centrally depends on the relation among individual human beings.”\textsuperscript{72}

The conclusion that the Master-Slave relation is fundamental for reaching any kind of knowledge has been formulated as a necessary condition. Now, the most interesting form of the relation would here be the form in which both the subjects are mutually recognized in the acknowledgement of one by the other. The triadic relation reached when the relation between Master and Slave becomes mediated by their relation towards the object. The Master relates to the Slave through the object, here perhaps more appropriately the thing, and conversely to the thing to the Slave, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{73}

To turn the discussion back to Wittgenstein and the general purpose of this study, the concept of objective view [objektiv Anschauung], that has already been touched upon in the fifth chapter, shall now be examined further.

\textsuperscript{71} Rockmore, 63 – 64.
\textsuperscript{72} Rockmore, 65.
\textsuperscript{73} Rockmore, 71.
7 Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox: What presupposes the possibility of creating a justified true inference

Terry Pinkard makes the leap towards the social in Hegel’s PoS even more explicit, when he says:

“Self-consciousness is this awareness of our taking things as such and such; in terms of our original metaphor, it is assuming a position in “social space,” that is, assuming a whole set of inferences that license the agent to move from one position in that space to another. A “move” in a “social space” is an inference licensed by that space. To know oneself in this sense is knowing one’s position in that “social space” – that is, knowing where one stands in terms of what one is licensed to believe. Consciousness requires that we have a position in “social space,” and self-consciousness is the awareness of this position, of what we are and are not licensed to infer.”74

By this Pinkard highlights the key role of the subject, now self-consciousness in particular, that always already finds itself in some kind of social space, one may say with Wittgenstein, some form of life. This claim anticipates the last problem of the analytic part of this paper. In order to make this last point understandable under the scheme of knowledge that has been reached so far, let a question (that would link this chapter with the introductory chapter on the variety of cognitive science approaches) be formulated as follows: How does the concept of social structure of cognition function? Does Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox threaten the validity of such a concept of cognition? To make an attempt to answer both the questions, John McDowell’s lectures shall serve as catalyst.

Perhaps the most famous discussion of the skeptical paradox is the discussion between Saul Kripke and John McDowell. Kripke follows David Hume’s skepticism in order to argue the paradox is true, yet does not undermine the validity of ordinary beliefs creation. The rule-following paradox75 implies that there can be no such thing as meaning, for language is constantly facing the threat of interpretation. Kripke’s skeptical solution is in accord with the solution asserted above, i.e. that the rule-following is justified by the so-called conditions accompanying its occurrence. These conditions are according to Kripke primarily the behaviors surrounding the particular instance of following certain rule. Consequently, meaning of propositional belief is not dependent on some inner image of the individual subject, but on the outer conditions accompanying its

74 Pinkard, 47.
particular utterance. This seems to be after all endorsed by McDowell, who takes the concept of the outer conditions to be the crucial one to make rule-following possible.

John McDowell introduces the fifth print of his collection of lectures in *Mind & World* from the year 2000 by listing his major sources of inspiration: Donald Davidson’s, Robert Brandom’s, and Immanuel Kant’s works. Having these authors behind him, McDowell asserts that precisely the Kantian thought that empirical knowledge is the cooperation between receptivity and spontaneity, while spontaneity can be understood as the “involvement of conceptual capacities.”76 Because it has been agreed that experiences always already possess conceptual contents, McDowell stresses that the active constituent of the ability to apprehend the external world in beliefs and judgments is the spontaneity itself, i.e. the conceptual capacities,77 while Donald Davidson posits experience outside the conceptual.78 Arguing that experience is “causally relevant” to the subject’s beliefs and judgments, Davidson holds the claim that each belief may be granted by nothing else but another belief. Here the infinite regress becomes a real threat. McDowell commences his enquiry of the skeptical paradox in *PI* in the sphere of the conceptual.

Whatever a particular language can embrace, has to lie within this language, and therefore, may be evaluated in terms of its justifiedness and truthfulness. McDowell argues that though a belief of someone formulated in a proposition may be comprehended in terms of its conceptuality, it could be misunderstood in terms of its content. This is, however, to be rejected for it has been shown, that the conceptual in both Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s is not only a result of naming something, but is necessarily restricted even on the level of beliefs. It has been noted that Davidson argues that each and every belief depends on some other beliefs, etc. This claim is to be borrowed in order to show that, indeed, there is no such belief that would count as a foundation of all the other beliefs. But Davidson seems to be right about the interdependency of beliefs. So if the conceptual includes both the capacity of naming things, i.e. holding certain objects as objects, and of forming beliefs, it needs to rely on the social, otherwise, the claim would either end up in Davidson’s regress, or digress back to the hypothesis that the conceptual may depend on the bare presence of the object

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76 McDowell, 9.
77 McDowell, 10
78 McDowell, 14.
perceived, which has been rejected. Furthermore, if the conceptual depended on the empirical instead of the social, the argument would result in solipsism, which is the least desirable, if the rejection of private language idea is to remain valid. Contrarily, indeed, it may be concluded with McDowell as follows:

"We could not credit a subject with a capacity to use, say, the concept of pain in judgments of "inner experience" if she did not understand how the circumstance that those judgments concern fits into the world at large. What that requires is that the subject must understand her being in pain as a particular case of a general type of state of affairs, someone’s being in pain. So she must understand that the conceptual capacity drawn on in the relevant "inner experiences" is not restricted to its role in "inner experience" and judgments of "inner experience": not restricted, that is, to its first-person present-tense role." [...] She understands that the very same circumstance is thinkable-by someone else, or by herself at different times-s-otherwise than in a thought expressive of "inner experience."79

So meaning is not a mystery coming from outside of nature80, but is integrated with nature by the social that ascribes it to particular objects and events in accord with the natural appearance of how things are.

79 McDowell, 37 – 38.
80 Ibid.
8 Justified True Belief Redefined

The concept of cognition proved to be quite a stubborn one, though examined in many various contexts. In order to proceed with a conclusion, a brief recapitulation of what has been suggested so far shall do no harm.

The paper went through approximately three stages of the process of cognizing an object, while the term object has been denoted in three different ways in accordance with Hegel's dialectical move in PoS. First, as a thing without any particular property coming to awareness; second, as a things with particular bulk of properties that the consciousness was able to conceptualize; and third, as the sole concept of object that the self-consciousness was able to verbalize in propositions and communicate with some other self-consciousness.

It has been argued that some common basis of communicating beliefs is necessary in order to establish certain criteria of truth and justifiedness of beliefs. Instead of transcendentalism and idealism, or contrarily, any Hume-like empirical theory, it has been the social ground that has been offered as a solution of what the cognitive theories, mentioned in the first chapters, were not able to solve.

The first obstacle has been shown on the background of foundationalism that seeks for a belief, infallible or non-inferential, that would ground the dependence of all the justified true beliefs. The following paragraph taken from Wittgenstein's PI shows, that this ambition is in fact redundant, for if the grounding for all possible beliefs, i.e. for all possible knowledge, is of a social character, the last infallible or non-inferential belief cannot be found ex definitione, otherwise one would have to say that the last language rule can be found as well, which of course is a false belief. Why is that so? – Because the parallel between the hypothetically last belief and the hypothetically last language rule indicate that to think about beliefs in such a way results in positing beliefs in certain meta-epistemological level. Rules cannot be described or addressed similarly as a table or a cat. One may follow a rule, but not explain it; and to follow a rule is to apply the rule in practice. Beliefs are of similar character in a sense that one can follow them, but not describe them, for in saying I believe I can repeat what you have said, the I believe, is obviously to be redundant. What is even more interesting, the proposition is actually entirely redundant, because the message may be replaced by an ostensive following the rule, i.e. by using the rule correctly.
29. "Perhaps you say: two can only be ostensively defined in this way: "This number is called 'two' ". For the word "number" here shows what place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word. But this means that the word "number" must be explained before the ostensive definition can be understood. – The word "number" in the definition does indeed show this place; does show the post at which we station the word. And we can prevent misunderstandings by saying: "This color is called so-and-so", "This length is called so-and-so", and so on. [... But is there only one way of taking the word "color" or "length"? – Well, they just need defining. – Defining, then, by means of other words! And what about the last definition in this chain? (Do not say: "There isn't a 'last' definition". That is just as if you chose to say: "There isn't a last house in this road; one can always build an additional one").

Whether the word "number" is necessary in the ostensive definition depends on whether without it the other person takes the definition otherwise than I wish. And that will depend on the circumstances under which it is given, and on the person I give it to." [Emphasis added.]

The excerpt just quoted indicates that so as it is impossible to find the last infallible or non-inferential rule, it is impossible to find the last infallible or non-inferential belief, for all rules and beliefs are socially construed, and therefore, create open sets of rules and beliefs in an open set of various language games, i.e. fallibility and the possibility of inference as such are the basic characteristics of the novel conception of socially-base cognition.

There is, however, indeed a question, whether there are some beliefs that hold the most basic ground of human knowledge. In the chapter on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, it has been agreed, that the conditionality is rather inscribed in the sole nature of human mind, i.e. in the fact that most people have similar experiences of the outer world, share certain cultural and social backgrounds, and long for similar things. This condition shall be metaphysically sufficient for the explanation of for example why most of humans believe that Japan lies eastwards from China – and, who knows, even this proposition may change in time.

Now, redefining the concept of justified true belief, on behalf of what has been argued in the paper, requires two separate definitions. The first definition concerns the problem of truth. As has been agreed, one may not know, what things in themselves are, or how sense-data correspond to the true nature of things. What one, contrarily, may know is that other people perceive the same things in an approximately same way, that other people share certain beliefs, such as that what is under one's feet is a ground, and what remains above one's head is the sky, no matter in which language. These are beliefs
commonly shared all around the world of humans, and for that reason they shall also suffice to explain other things, such as that some things are capable of flying towards the sky, or that most of the things in the world tend to fall to the ground. They are very close to what Wittgenstein seems to understand under the term hinge-propositions; yet, in order to avoid misinterpretation of Wittgenstein’s concept, let them be called complex belief, for they obviously require consistent consideration, so as to avoid a collapse of all other beliefs interrelated. Socially, these beliefs has to do with the so-called form of life, in Hegel’s, they would correspond with particular stage of the historical development of consciousness.

The second definition echoes the introductory chapter on the concept of justified true belief. Sensory evidence plays usually the key role when justifying certain belief. It has been suggested, however, that the key role may belong to testimony that is often taken as merely a second-order system of evidence. The question concerning the type of the subject has already been answered; in order to make a proposition that is to be justified, one always already needs the social background to be established, i.e. the type of the subject required is a subject sharing certain form of life with other subjects. Not only justifiedness implies that a belief is consistent with the content of one or more complex belief(s), but it also implies that a belief is capable of being directly verified through the situational circumstances. These circumstances may consist of other people sharing certain language game, following thus certain rules, etc. The directness of the process of verification, or so-to-say justification, contrasts with the indirectness of complex beliefs. Not is shall be clear that Russell’s terms of direct and indirect acquaintance has been alluded, and intentionally redefined, so that the difference between these two is not a difference between a belief or acquaintance acquired and verified through empirical experience, and a belief or acquaintance acquired and verified through testimony, anymore. In accordance with the re-definition offered, both the direct and indirect belief shall be understood as socially based and conditioned.
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