Bibliographic note:


Abstract:

Thesis deals with the issue of the conceptualization of the post-Westphalia world system by using the New Middle Age theory with focus on its geopolitical aspects. First the theoretical concepts concerning state, sovereignty, and the basis of the neomedievalist world view are tackled. After creating a theoretical tool to assess the appearance of the neomedieval world order we apply the criteria on four selected case studies – Somalia as an example of failed state, Pakistan as failing state, the European Union as a supra-state entity, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea as a classical example of Westphalia-type state. In the conclusion the four case studies are brought together and our findings lead to the creation of an analytical tool which can be used for understanding basic geopolitical issues of different territories.

Keywords:

New Middle Age, failed states, post-Westphalia system, geopolitics, theory, non-state actors

Extent of the work: 208 966 characters
Declaration:

I declare that I have completed presented work independently and used only literature quoted in bibliography. I declare that this thesis was not used for obtaining another degree. I agree that this work might be published for research and study purposes.

In Prague on.......................... Bohumil Doboš..................................
Acknowledgement:

I would like to thank my supervisor Martin Riegl for insightful comments which to a large degree made the creation of this thesis possible. Beside I thank all my friends who highlighted interesting articles and other academic papers which further improved the quality of this work and would otherwise be omitted.
Charles University in Prague
Faculty of Social Sciences
Institute of Political Studies

The New Middle Age: Theory of Irregular

(Master’s Thesis Proposal – Geopolitical Studies)

Name: Bohumil Doboš

Supervisor: Mgr. Martin Riegl, PhD.

I agree with supervising:

Summer Semester 2011/2012
Aim:

Aim of the work is to assess validity of the New Middle Age Theory as a tool which can be used to explain appearance and predict behaviour of the new actors competing with the state over the territorial control, and as a challenge to classical state-centric view of the world.

Topic:

World politics is getting more and more complicated with the appearance of the new non-state actors making the international anarchy more unpredictable than in the past. Many theories about the outlook of the new setting of the international politics were created during the second half of the twentieth century, with one of the most ambitious, as well as unsettled, in the so-called New Middle Age Theory. Its ambition arises from the fact that it tries to make sense to the diminishing role of states in the international system as well as from creation of the completely new system loosely based on the power-setting during the Middle-Ages. The unsettledness is based on the fact that those authors who wrote something about the topic differed significantly in the evaluation of the impacts of this concept, creating different streams with different conclusions about the outlook of the post-state world.

In this work we will try to gather available materials written on the topic and compare them, creating some basic ground for the whole concept and then present the different impacts on the international politics and the control of the territory. Later on, we will try to assess the different approaches and compare their applicability by using four different chosen case studies (Pakistan, Somalia, the European Union and People’s Democratic Republic of Korea) to test their validity. In the end we will be hopefully able to create a working fusion capable of explaining the changes observable in the contemporary world with the accent to the role the assumed transformation based on this theory provides to territorial control and geopolitical setting alterations.

Existing literature:

Theoretical part of the work will be based on the works of the main authors dealing with the problematic of the New Middle Age. The original approach is presented by H. Bull and other main works basically follow this concept and bring in further ideas making the
rather limited amount of literature on the topic very varied in the results. We will deal with some critique of the context itself as well as with the catastrophic implication given to the major changes in the system of territorial control by some of the authors (P. Williams or R. Kaplan).

Case studies will be based on the broad amount of literature available on each of the cases. Each of the countries/regions is interesting from the point of social sciences so it is not a problem to find enough sources dealing with them.

**Outlook of the work:**

- First part will be dedicated to the introduction of the basic terms which will be used in the thesis – most importantly what is the state, sovereignty, Westphalia System (or state-system) in the international politics.
- In the second part we will examine papers written on the topic of the New Middle Ages and try to create a common ground on which we will be able to base our further research.
- The next part will be dedicated to Hedley Bull and his five points defining the New Middle Ages and try to examine our previously created theory by his criteria. His analysis is presented as an analysis of the most important factors crucial for the existence of the New Middle Ages world order and it is important to deal with his critique, otherwise the whole concept would be disqualified from further examination. In this part we will assess the degree in which irregularities in the world state system compete with this system as it is as well.
- Subsequently our focus will turn to the division of the New Middle Age Theory among different authors and to the importance of the variations in their ideas. After this part we will be able to define competing streams inside the New Middle Age Theory for later assessment of their validity. These streams will all be based on the previously presented common ground but differing in the consequences.
- After specifying the theoretical concepts we will test these hypothesis on the four case studies – Somalia (as a region representing the group of so-called failed states without any state control), Pakistan (as a region in the midst of evolution of the new geopolitical setting with the state playing the role of only one of the important actors), People’s Democratic Republic of Korea (as a totalitarian state with no
other inside actors competing with the official hierarchy) and the European Union
(as the special case with the states giving up their sovereignty willingly).

- Finally in the conclusion we will present results of the testing and form coherent
  synthesis of the concepts created by previous authors.

**Methodology:**

From the theoretical perspective the whole work, as the all classical
geopolitics, will follow the realist stream of thinking. First part of the work will be a
simple gathering of the works related to the work and summarizing them. We will than
find some pattern common to the concept as a whole and categorize the differences
into further sub-theories. These sub-theories will be tested afterwards using four case
studies which differ in the position of the state control over its territory. We will use
one case from the set of the territories which are not governed by state (Somalia), one
case where the role of state is significantly dropping without its approval (Pakistan),
third one will be the situation similar to previous one but this time the diminishing of
the state is approved by the states (the European Union) and finally the case where
state structure is dominant force in the territorial control and unchallenged by other
actors (People’s Democratic Republic of Korea). After describing these cases we will
test our previously defined sub-theories on each of them alternating them so they are
able to explain the real life examples and finally end with a coherent theory able to
embrace all of the cases presented.

**Provisional bibliography:**


Akgün, C., 2010. The Case of TRNC in the context of Recognition of States under

Akhtar, A. S., Amirali, A. & Raza, M. A., 2006. Reading between the lines: the mullah -


Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15278612
[Accessed 13 April 2013].


[Accessed 10 September 2012].


Basingstoke: Palgrave.


[Accessed 1 February 2013].

[Accessed January 19 2013].

[Accessed 10 February 2013].


[Accessed 13 April 2013].

[Accessed 10 September 2012].


[Accessed 31 March 2013].


[Accessed 10 September 2012].


[Accessed 28 March 2013].


Available at: [http://www.fpri.org/docs/alshabaab.pdf](http://www.fpri.org/docs/alshabaab.pdf)
[Accessed 12 March 2013].


[Accessed 8 March 2013].

Available at: [http://www.somaliland.org/somaliland/](http://www.somaliland.org/somaliland/)
[Accessed 13 March 2013].


Available at: [http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/terroristoutfits/group_list.htm)
[Accessed 10 February 2013].

Available at:


# Table of contents

List of abbreviations: .............................................................................................................. 5

1.  Introduction................................................................................................................................. 7

2.  Definitions and concepts ........................................................................................................... 11
   2.1.  European Middle Ages ....................................................................................................... 11
   2.2.  State ...................................................................................................................................... 13
   2.3.  Sovereignty .......................................................................................................................... 16
   2.4.  Westphalia system ............................................................................................................... 18

3.  New Middle Age: The Theory .................................................................................................. 20
   3.1.  Hedley Bull ........................................................................................................................... 20
   3.1.1.  Regional Integration of States ........................................................................................ 21
   3.1.2.  Disintegration of States .................................................................................................. 22
   3.1.3.  Restoration of Private International Violence .............................................................. 22
   3.1.4.  Transnational Organizations ........................................................................................ 23
   3.1.5.  Technological Unification of World .............................................................................. 24
   3.2.  Jörg Friedrichs .................................................................................................................... 24
   3.3.  Philip Cerny ........................................................................................................................ 27
   3.4.  David Rothkopf .................................................................................................................... 29
   3.5.  John Rapley .......................................................................................................................... 30
   3.6.  Phil Williams ........................................................................................................................ 32
   3.7.  Robert Kaplan ....................................................................................................................... 34
   3.8.  Durable disorder vs. Chaotic anarchy: Geopolitical consequences ............................... 35
   3.9.  Examined factors ................................................................................................................. 36

4.  Somalia: Vision of Catastrophe ............................................................................................... 39
   4.1.  History .................................................................................................................................... 39
   4.2.  Geography ............................................................................................................................. 42
      4.2.1.  Main geographical factors ........................................................................................... 42
4.2.2. Population ................................................................. 43

4.3. Breaches of sovereignty .................................................. 43
   4.3.1. Inability of state to keep order ................................. 43
   4.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement .................................. 44
   4.3.3. Dependence on external forces ............................... 45

4.4. Level of failure of Somalia ............................................ 45

4.5. Non-state actors ................................................................ 46
   4.5.1. Traditional actors ................................................... 46
   4.5.2. Pirate groups ........................................................ 47
   4.5.3. State-like units ...................................................... 49
   4.5.4. Islamist organizations ........................................... 50
   4.5.5. Business groupings ............................................... 51
   4.5.6. Other ................................................................. 52

4.6. Separation of politics and economy ................................ 52

4.7. Regional setting ............................................................ 53

4.8. Use of violence ............................................................. 53

4.9. Identity issue ............................................................... 54

4.10. Somalia vs. New Middle Age ........................................ 54

5. Pakistan: On the Crossroad ............................................... 56
   5.1. History ........................................................................ 56
      5.1.1. Durand Line ........................................................ 56
      5.1.2. New Pakistani state ............................................. 57
      5.1.3. Pakistan’s India strategy ....................................... 58
      5.1.4. Pakistan’s Afghan strategy ................................... 59
   5.2. Geography ................................................................... 60
      5.2.1. Main geographical factors .................................... 60
      5.2.2. Population ........................................................ 61
5.3. Breaches of sovereignty ................................................................. 62
  5.3.1. Inability of state to keep order .............................................. 62
  5.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement .............................................. 63
  5.3.3. Dependence on external factors ........................................... 65
5.4. Level of failure of Pakistan ....................................................... 65
5.5. Non-state actors ........................................................................... 66
  5.5.1. Terrorist groups ................................................................... 66
  5.5.2. Ethnic autonomy movements .............................................. 68
5.6. Separation of politics and economy ............................................. 71
5.7. Regional setting ........................................................................... 73
5.8. Use of violence ........................................................................... 73
  5.9. Identity issue ........................................................................... 74
5.10. Pakistan vs. New Middle Age ................................................... 75
6. European Union: Return of the Old Days? .................................... 76
  6.1. History ..................................................................................... 76
    6.1.1. European Communities ..................................................... 76
    6.1.2. Issues of the member states .............................................. 78
  6.2. Geography ............................................................................... 80
  6.3. Breaches of sovereignty ............................................................ 81
    6.3.1. Inability of state to keep order .......................................... 81
    6.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement ........................................... 82
    6.3.3. Dependence on external actors ........................................ 82
  6.4. Level of failure of the EU .......................................................... 83
  6.5. Non-state actors ........................................................................ 85
  6.6. Separation of politics and economy ........................................... 85
  6.7. Regional setting ........................................................................ 86
  6.8. Use of violence ......................................................................... 88
6.9. Identity issue................................................................. 89
6.10. The EU vs. New Middle Age............................................. 89

7. North Korea: Relict, or Alternative?................................. 91

7.1. History .............................................................................. 91

7.1.1. Major historical issues.................................................. 91

7.1.2. Development of ideology............................................... 92

7.2. Geography ....................................................................... 94

7.2.1. Main geographical factors............................................. 94

7.2.2. Population ..................................................................... 94

7.3. Breaches of sovereignty .................................................... 94

7.3.1. Inability of state to keep order ....................................... 94

7.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement .......................................... 95

7.3.3. Dependence on external actors...................................... 95

7.4. Level of failure of the North Korea ................................... 96

7.5. Non-state actors............................................................... 96

7.6. Separation of politics and economy .................................. 97

7.7. Regional setting............................................................... 98

7.8. Use of violence ............................................................... 98

7.9. Identity issue ................................................................... 98

7.10. The North Korea vs. New Middle Age ............................. 99

8. Conclusion ........................................................................ 101

Bibliography: ........................................................................ 106

Appendix .............................................................................. 118

Table of contents: ................................................................. 118

Contents: .............................................................................. 119
List of abbreviations:

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency
DPRK – Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EP – European Parliament
ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna
EU – European Union
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FSI – Failed State Index
ICU – Islamic Court Union
IRA – Irish Republican Army
ISI – Inter-Services Intelligence
LeT – Lashkar-e-Toiba
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NWFP – North West Frontier Province
RAF – Red Army Fraction
SAARC - South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
TFG – Transitional Federal Government
TNG – Transitional National Government
TRNC – Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UK – United Kingdom
UN – United Nations
USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1. Introduction

World is changing. States are failing. The age of uncertainty has become. These are the clichés we can observe in many works dealing with the geopolitics of the post-Cold War era. There are many ways to observe the processes taking place in international politics of the 1990s and 2000s, but all of them must take into consideration factor of widespread existence of areas and territories out of the state control, as well as the appearance of so-called failed or failing states\(^1\). Authors will differ in the way how to assess these “anomalies”, some will point out that the established Westphalia system is not threatened and that the new challenges are just minor lapses in a working system\(^2\). Others, on the other hand, think about the overwhelming evidence as a signal of a new world setting, new geopolitical paradigm which is not based on the sole premise of the existence of the national, sovereign, territorial states which are controlling – at least indirectly –, or have the ability to control, virtually everything what happens on its own territory and cover the entire globe’s land mass.

The supportive data for this later assumption are vast and convincing. Be it large number of prisoners and existence of city ghettos which police is afraid to enter, inside the USA; drug cartels destabilizing huge parts of the Central America with Mexico in the heart of the problem; guerrilla groups controlling massive part of Colombian territory; slams across the Latin America; non-existent borders in the Western Africa; collapsed states of Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, or both Sudans; Syria in the midst of a civil war; Europe with its supranational institutions; Russia not knowing what happens in Siberia; corrupted narco-states in the Central Asia; China with its pseudo-feudal local structure; Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq on the brink of total collapse; NGOs substituting for the state in Bangladesh; or just the mere fact that almost every profession or economic and social issue has its more or less influential transnational organization.

\(^1\) For the more detailed discussion see for example (Kolstø, 2006; Stanislawski, 2008; Riegl, 2006)
\(^2\) In the following text we will follow P. Kolstø’s terminology – failed state is a recognized state without inner sovereignty, quasi-state is an unrecognized entity seking statehood (without reference to its inner sovereignty however) (Kolstø, 2006).
\(^3\) e.g. (Jackson, 2007; Philpott, 1999)
From the geopolitical point of view, the most important question is who effectively holds the power over the territory. Even though the above-mentioned changes might not look so important from the international relations’ point of view – the international system can still pretend that the political map with every inch of the world belonging to some state is viable – from the geopolitical perspective this process of the state retreat must be reflected and conceptualised, if possible. This is why a creation of some theory seems to be very useful. In our further work we will try to focus on one of those theories, which seems to be viable and would help us understand the ongoing processes. The main motivation for writing this thesis is thus the possibility of understanding the transformation in the world politics in a little different manner than presented by the most of the authors.

In the geopolitical assessment, many processes must be taken into account. The two most important are regionalism on the one hand, and globalization on the other. Combination of these two, with the addition of the rise of non-state violence, spread of civil wars, rise of the power of supranational organizations, or realisation of different kinds of identities, leads to the emergence of a very confusing system. One of the ways this “system” can be interpreted is through so-called New Middle Age theory. This theory, originating from the work of Hedley Bull, brings into account historical parallel between the European Middle Ages and contemporary outlook of the world. Despite being created during the Cold War, the theory found its propagators (Philip Cerny, Jörg Friedrich, John Rapley, Phil Williams) no earlier than during the turbulent 1990s when political scientists tried to understand the newly emerged chaos. The theory itself afterwards evolved into the two major streams which will be further discussed in the third chapter. To sum up, in the thesis we will try to test the neomedieval hypothesis that fading state, or Westphalia, system will transform itself into a system resembling the European Middle Ages with the state as only one of many relevant actors.

In the following work we will look at the theory itself, the main authors dealing with it, and the distinctions inside the approach to the neomedieval system. After creating a set of presumptions about how should the world look like according to neomeditevalists we will test these hypotheses on four case studies. In the case studies we will first make basic points about historical development of
the given territory and about geographical and political setting of the examined area. Later on we will focus on the main points defining the neomedieval order as they will be examined in the third chapter. On the end of each chapter the conclusion about our findings in the given case will be presented. First case study deals with the problem of troublesome Somalia. Somalia as a classical example of failed state without any effective state power will be representative of the gloomiest ideas about the future world. Next one is Pakistan. Pakistan is a state which tries to look like an ordinarily working member of the international community, but is in fact on the edge of breakdown itself. Third one is the case of the European Union (EU), which is by many seen as a new format of a potentially strong geopolitical actor and as a set-up which, if successful, will be in the future embraced by the rest of the world. Another important fact is that European Middle Ages are pattern inspiring the whole concept which is being researched and the same territorial space holds one of the most significant examples of the changing geopolitical setting nowadays. Finally we will look at the case of the North Korea which is seen as a textbook model of a sovereign state and despite its economic problems seems to be pretty stable. In the end we will, hopefully, be able to create a coherent and tested theory which might add another angle to the broad academic discussion about the above-mentioned problems. In our research we will use basic historical literature about each of the given regions, failed state index (FSI) as presented by Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine, and literature concerning major issues connected to the main points studied in the given territories (e.g. insurgencies in Somalia and Pakistan, weakening of sovereignty under the EU, or economic issues in the North Korea). As a main source of information beside FSI, academic studies – articles in reviewed magazines, or books – will be used. For the data concerning population, geography, or economy, CIA Factbook will be used as a main source. All the examined cases will be studied on a time-scale concerning years after the 1990 even though we will note some important historical issues predating this moment.

Of course more case studies could have been added to the work. We have seen above that the number of issues and territories connected to the rise of

---

4 Interestingly both of the first two case studies are on the N. Fergusson’s list of the countries in the so-called Axis of Upheaval – see (Ferguson, 2009)
neomedieval way of thinking is much broader than the four selected topics. On the other hand it is much more useful to look deeply into just four of them, than to include huge variety, giving them much more space and not risking omitting some important detail. Creation of a coherent neomedieval theory should be a final product of the whole thesis. If we succeed in a creation of such a theory, we will not have much of a problem in an examination of the rest of the cases in some additional work.

First chapter of the work will be dealing with the definitions which need to be understood before proceeding to the core of the work. In this part we will, based on basic literature about the matter, explain our understanding of state, sovereignty, outlook of the European Middle Ages, and the outlook of the Westphalia system. In the following chapter we will discuss theoretical concept of the New Middle Ages. First we will look at the main authors dealing directly, or indirectly, with the issue (Bull, Friedrichs, Cerny, Rothkopf, Rapley, Williams and Kaplan) and later on we will conceptualise their thoughts and create a set of features defining the New Middle Ages. Then the four chapters dealing with our case studies will follow, using methodology described above. Finally the conclusion will summarize our findings and answer the main question of the whole thesis, whether the appearance of the neomedieval system is reality or just a myth and create an analytical tool for the research of other territories.
2. Definitions and concepts

Before we start to deal with the New Middle Age theory itself, it is necessary to introduce some of the important definitions and concepts from which this theory arises. First it is obviously the European Middle Ages structure. As the whole theory takes the European Middle Ages as its predecessor, it is vital for us to understand the power structure of that time. Afterwards we need to take a closer look at two important terms, state and sovereignty, which will be used throughout the rest of the work on many occasions. Finally, we need to introduce the basic logic of the Westphalia system, whose understanding is needed for the clarification of the studied changes.

2.1. European Middle Ages

Let us now briefly sum up the setting of the European medieval “international” system. It is important to realize, that during the Middle Ages we cannot speak about the modern state. There is thus much higher importance of personal contacts present, medieval state and society are basically the same thing, and there is a huge variety of contacts on both vertical (feudal) and horizontal level. On the lowest societal level we can observe the emergence of neighbourhood communities primarily based on the common use of the agricultural soil and other means of living (Müller, IX., 2011).

Furthermore we can observe the growing independence of cities, which was later formally recognised and the city councils were created. Power of cities is important and visible especially during the times of crisis. Moreover we can observe the higher level of local affinity and the importance of the local environment for the people mirroring in the creation of different local communities, or guilds (Müller, IX., 2011; Herold, 2011). Medieval Europe thus consisted of many mutually connected societies with different

---

5 For example the power of cities during the Hussite revolution in Bohemia (Herold, 2011).
competencies, aims and claims. Another important factor of the European medieval state is a presence of king on the top of a hierarchy. State was still understood as a personal belonging of a king. The power of an individual was not only important for the secular powers, but even for the Church. For example, appearance of weak popes enabled the existence of church schism (Müller, IX., 2011).

The importance of a strong monarch is a key to the strength of a medieval state. We can see, for example, that after the end of reign of Charles le Magne large and strong Frank Empire simply crumbled. This era can be furthermore seen as an example of unorganized medieval system with many small units competing with each other, leaving no possibility for effective rule. Another factor characterizing medieval system is feudal system which created a system of feuds so interconnected and fragmented that in some periods vast territories were, again, practically uncontrollable (Müller, IX., 2011). The map of Europe during the Middle-Ages was more a chaotic mixture of different personal and collective governments overlapping each other, than a clear system of territorially based units as we know it from post-1648 maps and the authority of the different “sovereigns” was limited by other actors (Philpott, 1999; Jackson, 1999).

On the other hand, in many ways, church hierarchy was able to work as a unifying element. Church was also based on a territorial principle of dioceses, while state was until the beginning of 11th century mostly defined by its population (Müller, IX., 2011). State and church were on the one hand still more resembling each other in a structure, while on the other were fighting over who will keep a major power in a contemporary society (Müller, IX., 2011; Müller, XI., 2011). Even before the well known Investiture Contest, there was a struggle between religious and secular power over the establishment of the supreme authority based on a Roman legacy. This led to the creation of Holy Roman Empire on one side and universal church structure on the other6 (Müller, IX., 2011).

---

6 We may observe that in an attempt to create a universal empire both sides failed. Holy Roman Empire reduced its claims over German “nation” only (Müller, IX., 2011) and Catholic Church was in its claims held back by reformation and spread of Protestantism.
Another important factor is a power of non-state and non-Church actors. As Stanislav Sousedlík writes: “...due to the weakness of the central power, war could have been quite easily waged by a persons or groups...called private” (Sousedlík, 2011, p. 538). Furthermore, with the growth of the wealth and power of the cities, these cities were able to create strong alliances which were able to effectively oppose the central power. Popular movements challenging legitimacy of both monarchy and Catholic Church emerged and even the importance and power of independent universities arose (Ţemla & Dostál, 2011).

To sum up, the Western and Central European Middle Ages were characterized by the struggle between universal claims of secular empire and Catholic Church; complicated structure of the territorial control by feudal masters; and a vast power of smaller actors. Society was strongly territorially determined with an exception of certain parts of elite with religious, political and university background. The private violence was nothing extraordinary and during significant periods of time, large territories were effectively ungoverned. Furthermore, the borders of these different actors did not respect those of others, so even those actors with some sense of territoriality overlapped each other’s claims, and population could have been quite easily caught in a system of multiple identity and loyalty.

2.2. State

Defining a modern state is a far-reaching task which would (as well as the other definitions) take much more space than that available here for its completion. We will thus only briefly summarize basic theses which will lead us in the following text in our understanding of this term. Modern state is usually defined by a set of objective and subjective factors. Objective factors are basically understood as a defined territory; permanent resident population; government; organized economy and a circulation system. Subjective are state sovereignty and recognition (Glassner, 1996, pp. 45-46). Furthermore, modern state is a basic component of the modern international system, with unique

---

7 All translations from Czech are made by the author of this thesis.
position on the international scene, with an ability of prime invention of the law system and expected behaviour patterns inside its territory (Krejčí, 2001). Main features of the modern state are according to Georg Sørensen (2005) these:

- Centralized system of rules based on administrative, police, and army institutions, confirmed by law order, and claiming the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence.
- People on a given territory are creating highly coherent community, connecting together a nation with a state.
- National economy consists of all major sectors needed for its own reproduction.

The understanding of the term state has changed dramatically before the contemporary consensus has been reached and according to Quentin Skinner, it is even nowadays impossible to present widely accepted, neutral definition of state. Word *state* was originally used for defining of a position of the ruler. Furthermore, during the 14th century, the term was used when referring to the obligation of the leading elite to keep the city in a good and prosperous *state*. Renaissance literature used this term in two senses – first in pieces which tried to help monarchs to stay in their privileged *state*, second as a term used for the types of government (republic, monarchy,...). In this context, the term *state* also referred to the territory control needed for a king to remain in office. Revolution in the use of the term *state* arrived in renaissance Italy, when the term was, in addition to previously mentioned characteristics, also connected to the governing institutions and repressive sector. Final abstraction, which led to the understanding of a state as we know it today, was the impersonalization of the concept. This final change was first clearly observable in a Hobbes’ Leviathan when the power of a state was clearly distinguished from the power of ruler or a mass of people, and the artificial state body was created. This artificial state is then represented by its sovereign who takes action in its name. This understanding is in a core of the thoughts about political systems since the 18th century and even though it is criticised from many positions, it remains the main understanding of the term *state* even nowadays (Skinner, 2012).
Other important factor connected to the state is the erosion of state observable in the past two or three decades. Martin Glassner defines as the most important factors contributing to this process these: internationalization of illegal activities; global health problems; global economy; devolution of internal power; cultural globalism; environmental degradation; international intervention in internal affairs; science and technology; growth of non-governmental/intergovernmental organizations; and spread of democracy (Glassner, 1996, pp. 139-140).

According to Robert Cooper, three types of states are observable in the post-Cold War world: pre-modern, modern, and post-modern. Pre-modern states are fragile and no longer fulfil their basic functions and this leads to the de facto return of terra nullius on the maps. Existence of these states destabilizes the world more than in the past, since the areas of chaos are not only connected to the rest of the world due to the effects of modern transportation capabilities, but they also enable a rise of potentially dangerous non-state actors. Modern state is a classical state as we know it inside a Westphalia system, and is closely connected to the institution of sovereignty. Post-modern system is defined by the collapse of a modern state towards a greater order. Post-modern part of the world is defined by a high level of openness and mutual interference. The post-modern world is thus defined by the breaking down of the distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs; mutual interference and surveillance; rejection of the use of force8; growing irrelevance of borders; and a security based on transparency and openness. Post-modern state is furthermore oriented on an individual rather than collective. These three kinds of states must, however, co-exist in some way and different territories may move from one type to another (Cooper, 2000).

Similar distinction is made by Georg Sørensen. His description of a modern state was presented above. He, furthermore, distinguishes two other forms of states – post-colonial and post-modern. Post-colonial is a type of state with weak institutional basis; without proper law system; with low societal coherence; and without proper national economy. Post-modern state is

---

8 between post-modern entities, not against the modern and pre-modern entities
on the other hand a state based on a multilevel governance; connected to the supra and international institutions; with identity of population shared between state, sub-state, and supra-state levels; and with developed transnational economy (Sørensen, 2005).

2.3. Sovereignty

Attempt to define sovereignty is another difficult task we have to perform on an inadequately short space. Sovereignty can be understood as an execution of power over population on a defined territory without any control from the outside. State power has forceful and peaceful segment. First is a classic military, police and other security apparatus, and the second is understood as ideological and economical power (Glassner, 1996; Krejčí, 2001).

Sovereignty is, furthermore, a juridical tool of states which enables them to escape a rule from the outside. Sovereignty is territorially limited norm, which lies as a basic principle of the modern state-system. It provides successfully sovereign states with a final political power over given community. Sovereignty is a status, a legal standing. This legal standing can be defined as constitutional independence which is crucial for this sovereign status (Jackson, 1999; Sørensen, 2005).

Robert Jackson distinguishes two forms of sovereignty. First is so-called imperial and is characterised by the rule of one state on a different state’s territory. This type of sovereignty was disregarded and ultimately made illegitimate by the notion of the immorality of the control of foreign territory and population. This claim led to appearance of currently approved type of sovereignty – popular sovereignty. This is a notion that sovereignty lies in consent of the population. Even though it holds many problems, as definition of the people who should consent, it is contemporarily the most approved way of determination of the sovereign state. On the other hand the final judge of who is, or is not, a sovereign state is still state-system so many states are not

9 “...state is that kind of a human community, which holds on a defined territory (...) monopoly for the legitimate use of violence” (Weber, 2009, p. 244).
10 The second type as a form of actual power is, however, more important on interstate level.
based on the above-mentioned principle due to inconvenience of strict use of that principle (Jackson, 1999). Another division of sovereignty comes from Alan James. He recognises three broad branches of the sovereignty – or rather ways how the sovereignty is understood. First is the sovereignty in a sense of the state doing what it wants, second is connected to the delimitation of the decision-maker, and third to the sovereignty as an expression of the nation’s trust in state which fulfils its duties to the nation (James, 1999).

It is important to add one other feature – sovereignty by no means defines, or is defined, the inner arrangement of the state and this domestic setting may change during the time without affecting the sovereignty of the state itself\(^1\) (Jackson, 2007). Furthermore, sovereignty should not be understood as a static set of rules, it is more a status which can be adapted to the given situation and is thus quite flexible. The main principles of constitutional independence remain at a core of the whole idea, but the implications and concrete application may differ according to the situation of the international politics. It is thus possible to use the defining signs of sovereignty and apply them any of the three types of states mentioned above (Post-colonial/pre-modern; modern; and post-modern) (Sørensen, 2005).

For closer understanding of the concept of sovereignty, it is necessary to, at least briefly, look into the sphere of political philosophy. We will just use a few examples which should make our understanding of sovereignty for the use of this thesis clearer. First, there is a problem of the law adoption. This is one of the important issues discussed in famous Hobbes´ Leviathan. For him “...the authority of the law (...) lies only in the command of the sovereign” (Hobbes, 2009, p. 190) and “(i)n all the states, the only legislator is sovereign, be it one person like in monarchy, or a gathering of people as in democracy or aristocracy” (Hobbes, 2009, p. 184). Than it is important to notice, that not only law-issuance gives some institution sovereignty. “Sovereign is he, who declares a state of emergency” (Schmitt, 2012, p. 9). Schmitt furthermore defines sovereignty as “...the highest, non-derived power of the leader...” (Schmitt, 2012, p. 9) and “(s)overeign stands outside the normally valid law

\(^{11}\) Meaning democratization, or appearance of the authoritarian regime, etc.
order, but still belongs to it, since he holds the power to decide, when the
constitution can be *in toto* suspended” (Schmitt, 2012, p. 10). For Carl
Schmitt, the sovereignty is thus “...not a monopoly of coercion or rule, but
rather a monopoly of decision...” with “...a monopoly of that last decision”
(Schmitt, 2012, p. 15). Last, but not least, it is important to point out an
observation made by Hannah Arendt: “Amount of the violence disposable for
a certain state does not have to be a reliable indicator of a power of that
country, neither a reliable safeguard against its destruction by a much weaker
and smaller power” (Arendt, 2004, p. 12) and that of the difference between
power and violence, making power (of the possible sovereign) independent on
the use of violence, with the use of violence as the sign of the perishing power
(Arendt, 2004).

When discussing sovereignty in the following text\textsuperscript{12} we will understand by
this term the ability of a state to create an order, be independent in its
decisions, and maintain security. By factors challenging states’ sovereignty
will be understood: inability of state to provide its defined law on the whole
territory; inability to maintain order and promote its decisions on the whole
territory; dependence on the external pressures; and the constant high level of
the use of violence against its own population in order to stay in power as a
sign of deteriorating sovereignty.

2.4. **Westphalia system**

Finally, it is important to briefly summarize basic factors of the Westphalia
system which dominated the international politics in the last three hundred
years or so. Westphalia system is based on an existence of sovereign states
which are independent in their decision-making. The system is decentralized
and no formal hierarchy exists. The anarchy in the relations among the states
is the basic principle of functioning of this system. Each state is responsible
for its own survival and other actions on domestic or international level.

Important characteristic of every state towards the system is its relative power

---

\textsuperscript{12} Of course not in parts where other authors’ ideas are presented as these authors might have
different thinking about the concept of sovereignty.
which delimits the scope of its respective area of interest. Balance of this system then lies in balancing of the power among the respective states (Kovářová, 2012). Westphalia defined state as a legitimate member of European, and later of global, international politics. Principle of sovereignty started to be the most important attribute of an international actor and up to nowadays any international organization aims primarily on the realm of states in a definition of membership (Philpott, 1999). For Robert Cooper, the main difference between the medieval and Westphalia system is its focus – medieval on universal Christendom, Westphalia on balance of power among modern states (Cooper, 2000).
3. New Middle Age: The Theory

Now it is time to examine the ideas of the most important authors, who can be connected to the New Middle Age theory and to create a way of examination of the following case studies. In this chapter we will first take a look at works of the main researches who studied the New Middle Age, or who are connected to the study of neomedievalism, afterwards we will try to connect those ideas and come out with a main streams inside the community of the neomiddlealist observers. Finally, we will create criteria which will be observed during the examination of the chosen cases.

3.1. Hedley Bull

Any attempt to deal with the New Middle Ages must start with the work of Hedley Bull. Bull, in his work The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Bull, 2002), presents the New Middle Ages as one of the possible future developments of the international system. Bull introduces this system, but on the same time is not convinced that the international politics will develop in this manner. First he declares, that the transition of one state type to another does not necessarily mean change of the international system per se. Another important factor is the importance of the secular version of the universal Christendom - some universal authority which would share its power with the lower units with overlapping authority and loyalty would have to be created in order to make new medievalism a feasible alternative. Finally, he argues that, at the time of the release of his book for the first time, states already share parts of the sovereignty with regional or sub-national actors, but their overall sovereignty is not challenged to the point we could speak about the neomedieval character of the international system. Supranational organizations are unable to concentrate enough power and sub-national actors are still heavily dependent on the state. He utters a statement that existing system has always faced anomalies and the mere existence of such anomalies does not mean the decay of the system itself.

---

13 All Bull’s ideas presented in this chapter are based on the text of this book.
14 1977
Bull also creates five prerogatives which need to be met in order for us to be able to speak about the spread of the neomedievalism. These features are for him important in challenging state power to the point it becomes only one of the actors in the power sharing and not the central one. These points are: the regional integration of states, disintegration of states, the restoration of private international violence, the importance of transnational organizations, and the technological unification of world. Let us take a look at each of the points and compare Bull’s assessment of each of these points with the reality observable today.

3.1.1. Regional Integration of States

According to Bull, the first criterion of neomedieval order is an advanced integration of the world regions. He sees first such an attempt in the European Community. Of the largest importance here is not the loss of sovereignty itself, but the shift of prime identification of the population from state to a supranational organization. The sovereignty issue is in this respect soften by the fact that states give up their power willingly and they have they say in all of the important matters the regional organization deals with. Important fact in this aspect is whether the member-states are free to leave the organization whenever they chose to. On the other hand the target of political union requires creation of supranational supra-state identity which weakens people’s affection towards the state. Simply put, state is still involved in the power politics, and only some means of politics are prohibited, but population might turn their loyalty to a supranational actor and feel higher level of affection towards such an organization in time.

Since the only regional organization which is closing towards some sort of political union is still the European Union, we will leave the current situation regarding this point for further examination in Chapter 6.
3.1.2. Disintegration of States

The disintegration of states is not a new phenomenon. The observation of the crumbling of the great empires as well as smaller units could have been made since the time such units exist. For the emergence of the New Middle Ages, it is important that this disintegration brings in a qualitative change for the whole system. For example in the case of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia no such change was observable since two new sovereign nation states were created. On the other hand the attempt of Kosovo province to gain full independence might provide such a qualitative change as a new unit which is not fully sovereign comes to life.

This point gets nowadays to the prominence as the disintegration leads not only to the split of the country but as well to a state failure leading to the creation of states which does not meet the criteria of full sovereignty. If we take a look at 2012 Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index, we can observe that thirty-three states are considered at least highly unstable. In addition many types and forms of quasi states emerged throughout 1990s and 2000s all across the world (Stanislawski, 2008; Kolstø, 2006).

3.1.3. Restoration of Private International Violence

Considering this point it is important to make a distinction between the use of force by non-state actors and use of force by international organizations. Bull does not apply the latter case in this feature, since international organizations are created by states and military power of these organizations is more or less controlled by the participating states. Furthermore Bull distinguishes non-state actor’s violence into two groups – partly or fully legitimised by international community or by part of it and that which is condemned.

It is important to notice that the use violence by supra/transnational organizations with the target of intervening into domestic affairs of certain states.

---

15 Mostly internal sovereignty. They remain recognized by the international community.
16 Cases of guerrilla or independent movements. Most recently for example support of Libyan or Syrian rebels.
17 E.g. piracy, terrorism, organized crime etc.
“state” is fully unknown for the Middle Ages. The second type, however, was known as the monarch was not the sole possessor of armed forces. Bull adds one other important note. The fight of non-state actors is usually supported by the international community only if it does not try to undermine the state system itself, but only tries to change the regime inside the country or create a new state.

Knowing these facts we must ask if the widespread non-state violence whose primary objective is different than that of change/creation of state exists and if the states are still the main possessors of means of violence. This point is hard to be unequivocally answered on such a short space so let us just say that the number of non-state actors possessing means of violence rise. As an example we can see the rise of terrorism which, if not supported or directly controlled by some state\textsuperscript{18}, can fall into the category of a state system threatening form of private violence. Huge transnational organization as Al-Qaeda possesses rather large military means and in some conflicts can work as a party of its own (Zalman, 2012; El Bahi, 2012). Another form which weakens the prerogative of the state having sole control over the means of violence is the use of private security companies not only by companies, but by the states themselves. Even a state with a largest military budget in a world, the United States of America\textsuperscript{19}, steps down to use the private contractors for the protection of its own personal (Bowman, 2011; Jones, 2012). To this point we can furthermore add different kinds of armed organized crime groups, drug dealing gangs, piracy groups, etc.

3.1.4. Transnational Organizations

Among the transnational organizations important for this particular attribute of the New Middle Age Bull counts multinational organizations, political movements, non-governmental organizations, religion organizations, intergovernmental organizations and others. Their common characteristic is the attempt to disregard national borders and to work independently on a state.

\textsuperscript{18} E.g. Pakistani Lashkar-e-Toiba. See for example (Bajoria, 2010) (BBC, 2010).

\textsuperscript{19} According to (Wheeler, 2012)
On the other hand, as Bull points out, most of them is still dependent on and controlled by state. States are guarantors of security for these organizations and they decide whether to let an organization in or not. These points, however, might be disregarded by the features 2 and 3 (states’ disintegration and spread of privately owned means of violence) mentioned above together with the ability of some organizations to maintain independent and vast capital and to act independently on a state in the sphere it is concerned in or even set basic principles for operating in such a sphere which states must respect (e.g. norms for trade of some commodity, basic principles concerning religious practises, and so on).

Current state of affairs concerning this feature will be further discussed in a chapter 3.4. as David Rothkopf’s work deals with some of the above mentioned processes in a greater detail.

3.1.5. Technological Unification of World

Last of the Bull’s features defining the New Middle Ages is the technological unification of the world. In Bull’s theory this technological unification leads to the shrinking of the world and a creation of the world village which is more connected while, on the other hand, creates new tensions emerging due to this closeness. As the world unifies and new division lines are created the world get both more connected and more fragmented. This leads to the creation of a complex structure of interest groups and identities. We will examine this point more closely in a chapter 3.3. dedicated to P. Cerny.

3.2. Jörg Friedrichs

Another author connected to the concept of the new medievalism is Jörg Friedrichs. His outlook of the New Middle Age theory is presented in a paper called The Meaning of New Medievalism (Friedrichs, 2001)20. His attitude towards the neomedievalist thought can be called a “historical

20 Presented Friedrichs’ ideas are all taken from the cited article.
neomediaevalism”, due to the emphasis he puts on a parallel between the actual processes inside the European Middle Ages and the New Middle Ages.

At the very beginning of his article, the following statement which is central for his whole concept is stressed out: “For the present purpose, medievalism is defined as a system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, held together by a duality of competing universalistic claims. Thus, the Middle Ages were characterized by a highly fragmented and decentralized network of sociopolitical relationships, held together by the competing universalistic claims of the Empire and the Church. In an analogous way, the post-international world is characterized by a complicated web of societal identities, held together by the antagonistic organizational claims of the nation-state system and the transnational market economy” (Friedrichs, 2001, p. 475).

Friedrichs, as an international relations theorist, points out that even though classical international relations theory dismissed possibility of something as a neomediaevalist international system 21, it is unable to create a theory suitable for the current situation. For the better understanding Friedrichs suggests to use the medieval analogy – not accurate comparison but rather a resemblance of the two.

Freidrichs presents three mainstream explanations of the current international politics. First is classical state-centric. Second focuses on the weakening of the state due to the pressures of globalization, making state power shrinking by different economic, social, technological and other transformations. Finally, there is a stream which concentrates on an issue of fragmentation of states along different internal cleavages. He argues that none of these discourses is able to explain the whole complexity of the current international politics, and a new approach, which is able to comprise all of these transformations, is needed to be found.

As a solution, the author presents neomediaevalist concept. In this concept Westphalia system will reach its end and a new system is about to replace it. It is as well able to explain the seemingly competing developments of

21 International politics is based on existence of modern states.
fragmentation and globalization. Another important factor vital for the neomedieval explanation, is a shift of personal allegiance towards different groups. This process will create a structure of multiple loyalties. He furthermore alters the original Bull’s idea by adding the factor of existing duality of competing claims and thus “stabilizes” the whole system. These claims are given to the nation state system and transnational market economy which are perceived as powerful enough to effectively counterbalance each other and bring some kind of relative stability into the whole system.

Given this premise, Friedrichs does not see neomedieval system as something horrific, as he points out, “equation of the Middle Ages with the Hobbesian state of nature is wrong” (Friedrichs, 2001, p. 485). The system will not be as rationalized as the modern state system, but it will not necessarily lead to the form of bellum omnium contra omnes. For the comprehension of the Friedrich’s theory it is furthermore important to understand his ideas about the two main powers in the New Middle Ages – nation state system and transnational market economy.

Author calls the first pillar of the structure as “political universalism”. State system is based on an existence of formally same sovereign units. This model has been through the time accepted worldwide and all across the world the units which try to, at least formally, fit into international community can be found. This system is self-preserving and survives by creating an image of a state being the only actor able to maintain order and having the ability to act independently on the international level. This system thus creates units of political action which seek for the control of territory, sovereignty and place in the international system.

On the other side we will find so-called “economic universalism”. Friedrichs points out that the allocation of capital and production is still gradually more determined by the private non-territorial actors. Economic liberalism of the transnational market leads to the creation of strong actors which are able to interfere into the political sphere. By this process a class of businessmen promoting free trade and able to ignore state borders is created and they are capable of challenging the power of state just by using their
production potential. Anyway, Friedrichs points out that even though these two pillars are competing, they remain interdependent and must coexist.

To this scenario Friedrichs adds one more sphere which must be considered if the basic structure of neomedieval system is created. This area is society. These three realms than create above-presented system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties, but they each work on a different principle: state as a voice of popular decisions, market as a holder of the means for the superior efficiency and society as a promoter of substantial values. As the New Middle Ages does not create any ultimate authority, it is necessary that each of these spheres sticks to its own targets and advantages. For Friedrichs these are – society’s attempt to protect itself from being overcome by both other pillars, state control and market, economy’s attempt to remain independent and not being used by states for their political targets, and finally states’ attempt to keep its political power and stay alive and as powerful as possible between economical universalism and societal particularism. Friedrichs points out that nowadays the leverage is inclined to the larger power of the market over the remaining two but this balance can be changed.

In the end of the chapter let us briefly take a look at analogies Friedrichs finds between medieval and neomedieval system. There is a system of overlapping identities and multiple loyalties held together by two antagonistic forces – Church, Empire, or State, Market; there is a dominant class which is in a centre of each of the systems – feudal aristocracy, or international policy-makers and bureaucrats; both Church and Market are characterized by high level of spatial and social mobility; both antagonistic claims were and are propagated by its own set of intellectuals and writers; finally both of the challenging claims aimed for universalism but neither prevailed, and we can expect something similar to happen once again.

3.3. Philip Cerny

Next important author dealing with the New Middle Ages is Philip Cerny. In his works Neomedievalism, Civil War and New Security Dilemma, and The New Security Dilemma Revisited: Neomedievalism and the Limits of
Hegemony (Cerny, 1998, 2004), he sketches his vision of neomedievalism with the emphasis on the security aspect. We will examine his work just in respect to our studied subject and will leave his ideas of the new security dilemma intact.

For Cerny, it is important that not only state’s institutions are being replaced or overlaid by non-state organizations, but even the population of the country is more concerned about the transnational issues. Even more, states cease to provide the basic service they were created for – security. Traditional balance of power structure is weakening and even though the national armies of some states possess such a power as nuclear weapons these means are useless in a presence of low intensity conflicts, and it is apparent that such clashes as tribal or religious violence, terrorism, or drug trade are on a rise.

Cerny presents globalization as the main cause of a current change. In his work, it is presented as complex process which does not naturally creates homogenous world but rather as a process which makes interactions between the different groups much more often. And another interesting fact is pointed out. State system enabled the spread of globalization, but it is the same globalization which will ultimately destroy this system.

Even though the states are weakening they still have an important role in today’s world. They are needed for provision of basic welfare system and other forms of social net and for implementations of some of the regulations. Here Cerny points out that the easiest regulations for implementation are those created on the international level.

With the number of policies performed by states shrinking legitimacy fades as well and population starts to feel other forms of identity still stronger. In the neomedieval world there will be still space for states, but their legitimacy will be contested by a number of transnational organizations who are able to ignore state boundaries, and are more fluid in their activities. Cerny names few major features which are or will be significant for the neomedieval world. These are - the existence of competing organizations with overlapping

---

22 The following chapter will be based on his older article. The new one is merely a summary of the original one.
jurisdictions; appearance of much more fluid territorial boundaries; alienation between virtual global cities and fragmented hinterlands; increased inequality between those able to use the opportunities present from higher mobility and those who cannot; system of multiple and fragmented loyalties and identities; attempts to contest property rights and legal boundaries; and spread of areas of lawlessness.

Philip Cerny calls the New Middle Ages a durable disorder, meaning that the current, at least formally, orderly arranged world will become much more unstable but this situation will not lead to total chaos. The new system will contest right to live of every organization and will lead to the emergence of the survival of the fittest\(^ {23} \) strategy. Cerny, same as authors above, sees the future world as a system with overlapping set of different organizations. States will play just a role of “one among many” in the international politics.

The whole system will be able to survive because there will be no exogenous pressure on it and there is a possibility that the importance of virtual spaces will overcome the importance of actual territorial ones. People will remain localised on the micro-level but territoriality itself will be still less important. This world cannot be possibly captured by a single holistic vision and by no collective identity. Many shared identities will create a world of durable disorder, and it is important to point out once again that durable disorder is not a total chaos.

3.4. **David Rothkopf**

Now the time has come for us to look briefly at a work of David Rothkopf, who is dealing with a power of the transnational organizations. Even though these works are not dealing with a neomedievalism per se, the aspect of the weakening of states due to the increased power of globalized companies is surely important. His ideas might be easily summarized in a following statement: “Over the last century, the world's biggest private-sector

\(^{23}\) It is important that Cerny does not use the social darwinistic term survival of the strongest but rather the classical thesis about the survival of the fittest and thus gives a chance for smaller units to survive.
organizations have come to dwarf all but the largest governments in resources, global reach, and influence. At the same time, even wealthy countries are now struggling with overwhelmed bureaucracies, budget crises, and plummeting confidence in government. And governments everywhere are compromised by the limitations of their own borders in an era when the issues that affect their people are increasingly transnational” (Rothkopf, Inside Power, Inc., 2012).

He furthermore argues that countries are unable to perform effectively in the most of the tasks they were previously capable of accomplish. Transnational organizations are able to force states into accepting legislation which will help their goals, they have major effect on the currency system and are still less concerned about the drawn borders with effective ways of how to cross them without major difficulties. Corporations have a power to play one country against each other in a competition over the allocation of companies’ production facilities, headquarters, etc. The largest companies have larger budgets than the most of the world countries and some of them are even larger employers (Rothkopf, Inside Power, Inc., 2012; Rothkopf, Command and Control, 2012).

Rothkopf points out, that this disconnection between commerce, state and other institutions was in a history usually a beginning of some major change, or philosophical revolt (Rothkopf, Command and Control, 2012). Can this revolt turn out to be a neomedievalist international system?

3.5. John Rapley

Turning to another author we are slowly moving towards the more bleak visions about the neomedievalist system. John Rapley in his article for Foreign Affairs: The New Middle Ages (Rapley, 2006) presents his vision about the possible upcoming neomedievalist world system.

He starts his article with an example taken on the streets of Jamaica. He presents local gangs as a new kind of authority for the locals, having their own justice system and state-alike symbols they create an alternative form of bond,

24 All Rapley’s ideas in the following chapter are taken from the cited article.
other than the one of state. Among the other examples of the private takeover of the state functions this one is a case where the community can provide safety for its members when state cannot. He assumes that failure of state does not necessarily mean appearance of chaos\textsuperscript{25}, but often only reconfiguration of the societal relations.

Rapley uses parallel of the fall of Pax Romana. When Rome fell, the whole Europe became less safe; it created many forms of authority and political units, but did not completely shatter. On the other hand the fragmentation led to creation of localised economies, plural identities, and multiple authorities. The system was sustained by the cooperation and negotiation, or conflict.

This system was, however, destroyed by capitalism. The spread of trade and a growth of bureaucracy led to the appointment of the richest to the offices. Need for increased military force protecting trade routes led to the creation of centrally controlled armies with large portion of conscripts gathered around the patriotic symbols of states. To maintain the economic growth, countries started to force many kinds of regulation and other policies, increased education of their population, and built modern infrastructure.

Globalisation of capitalism, however, leads to impression of the re-appearance of medieval structure. States continue to decrease a number of provided services, and use private contractors for extending number of tasks. This is not a case of developing countries only, even though the situation there is more visible and the above-mentioned processes more developed. State’s role as a level between local and world economy is nowadays useless. Some parts of certain states are so dangerous, that no country’s official dare to enter them. Successful companies are able to effectively evade state control. Many former soldiers and fighters are now parts of gangs and mercenary militias providing security for those able to pay, or just controlling parts of a territory on their own.

\textsuperscript{25} Even though it often does.
Even though the outlook of the Rapley’s New Middle Ages is more violent\textsuperscript{26}, it is not always the case. He, for example, states, that in some parts of the world, where state never efficiently worked, non-state actors are able to provide services, which the population would have never received otherwise. This existence of local authorities and transnational actors then leads to re-emergence of the medieval coexistence of multiple identities.

3.6. Phil Williams

The last author directly dealing with the issue of neomedievalism who is mentioned in this study is Phil Williams. In his article From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age (Williams, 2008)\textsuperscript{27} the author presents an idea of a world which is not caught in Cerny’s durable disorder but rather in a total chaos.

Williams starts with the obvious note about the decline of the state and emergence of the neomedieval order, but continue to predict a future of a New Dark Age rather than somehow stable New Middle Ages. He challenges Friedrichs’ dualism as highly selective and sees globalized market not as one of the two stabilization pillars, but rather as a cause of the disorder. Furthermore he sees Cerny’s vision of durable disorder as an attempt to give the dark future a silver lining and predicts that the New Middle Ages are just an interim on a path to the New Dark Age.

For Williams the decay of the state might become self-perpetuating and the drivers causing this problem have a cumulative impact. Among the factors weakening the state the author counts: the inability of the most states to meet the needs of their citizens such as employment, redistribution, or security; the persistence of alternative loyalties which deteriorates the identification with a state, and empowers primordial division of a society\textsuperscript{28} giving those actors larger credibility than to state; the rise of “sovereign free” transnational actors which can operate without state control, providing network for illegal

\textsuperscript{26} Actors are likely to fight each other and the spread of violence is to be expected.
\textsuperscript{27} The whole chapter will be based on this article.
\textsuperscript{28} Tribal, religious, ethnic, etc.
activities established on a base of organized crime or above-mentioned primordial divisions which does not respect state borders; the rise of cities and the emergence of alternatively governed spaces, in an environment where more than a half of the population lives in cities and many of those cities are becoming ungovernable, with slums so dangerous that even a police forces are afraid to enter and with a self-made system of alternative governance, not forgetting another forms of alternatively governed spaces all around the world, with not even a prisons effectively under the states´ control; and porous borders which successfully undermine the states´ territorial claim, when state is not able to prevent a trans-border flow of goods, immigrants, etc. with state this claim further undermined by the possibilities given to people by the internet.

This set of challenges is creating highly unpredictable outcomes. Williams predicts that the limits of a state will be furthermore exposed by the struggle between forces of order and disorder. Most of the states will fail and become hollow. Formal emphasis on sovereignty will be only an illusion veiling the fact that state structure will be unable to contest the presence of violent non-state actors on its territory. This process will start in the developing world and will furthermore spread into the developed world. This disorder will not be only characterised by the emergence of warlordism and organised crime, but by the rise of religion and civilization wars as well. For Williams spread of transnational organized crime, terrorism and possible pandemics could turn durable disorder into a chaos. And even larger calamity would come, if there was a nuclear state among the collapsed states. This would lead to the emergence of “loose nukes” (Williams, 2008, p. 35) creating even higher level of insecurity.

The last part of Williams´ paper deals with proposed changes to the US strategy related to the possible emergence of a New Dark Age and we will not deal with this problem here.
3.7. Robert Kaplan

Last author we will be dealing with is Robert Kaplan and his Coming Anarchy (Kaplan, 1994). Even though he does not speak about the theory of neomedievalism, his work gives us clearer idea about how the New Dark Age would look like. Based on his experience from the Western Africa, Kaplan creates an image of the future world where most states are collapsed and lawlessness spreads across vast territories.

He compares the Western Africa in 1990s to pre-1648 Europe, when large portions of countries’ territories are not controlled by governmental forces, but by local militias independent on the state’s will or borders. Furthermore, governments in this area are unable to run basic infrastructure, or even control borders, which are becoming largely useless and imaginary. Money is being smuggled out of the area and this additionally impoverishes the whole area. States are, however, trying to keep an illusion of power and are requiring high standards for formal actions such as obtaining visa.

He saw the future of the region in Somalia scenario – ungovernable. The region would be left without any central power with many poor and uneducated people present and become largely violent. He predicted that Africa will become pre-World War One Balkan of the contemporary world and will predict the future world’s development. The world of the future was for Kaplan one full of authoritarian and failed states, with return of primordial anxieties, and only a few safe places where the well-being will survive. Conflicts will be de-politicized and large states’ militaries useless in a number of small scale conflicts. Even though his gloomy vision did not come true so far, this work has much of an importance for the understanding of the New Dark Age concept.

---

29 Presented Kaplan’s ideas are all taken from this article.
30 Even the Western Africa seems to be stabilizing, at least a little.
3.8. Durable disorder vs. Chaotic anarchy: Geopolitical consequences

From the summary of the works dealing with the New Middle Ages it is clear, that we have two major competing visions in the field - or at least competing at the first sight. On the one hand we have the idea of durable disorder. This is the image of a world full of minor identities which overlap with major universal claims balancing each other so that the system may remain relatively stable. On the other we have the same outlook just without major universalistic claims and the world is thrown into the chaotic anarchy – world Hobbesian in its nature.

Why are not those claims completely antagonistic? One can be easily turned into another – to be specific first can easily turn into the second one. Even if the durable disorder is established, some catastrophe, as presented by P. Williams, can turn it into the chaotic anarchy. On the other hand it is important to realise that such a catastrophe, if appeared in the state system, might lead to exactly the same outcomes even nowadays.

So what are the main geopolitical consequences of this process? We shall notice that state, as a territorially based organization, will probably remain the major geopolitical actor in the parts of the world where it is already well established. This might be probably changed by the process of regionalism which may, if successful, turn the major importance to supra-state organizations and local authorities. Where the state is not successfully established, alternative territorial authorities will emerge. States will furthermore suspend some of its powers and responsibilities, so the appearance of the alternative actors will take place even in the states which are now not considered as failed or failing. The allocation of the economic means and the economic authority will be probably to a high degree independent on the political power of a state. Non-territorial companies will move according to changes in favourability of the certain allocation of factories, and other means of production. As noted above, many non-state actors will emerge and overtake some of the responsibilities currently connected to the state and some of these will even claim the control over the territory itself. The weaker the state is the more of these responsibilities will be transferred and the more
important non-state actors will emerge. We will thus observe a mix of
different territorial actors competing with each other on the different basis and
justifications, with the transnational companies searching for the most
advantageous allocation of its capacities and other non-territorial actors
influencing the whole situation. To quote P. Williams: ”...we face a
combination of disorder similar to that of the Middle Ages, with modern
technologies that allow the dangers to spread and even to mutate in complex
and unpredictable ways” (Williams, 2010, p. 40).

3.9. Examined factors

Finally, it is time for us to define the factors we will examine in the
following case studies. Let us make a list first and describe each of the points
closer later. The examined issues are:

1. Breaches of the sovereignty of the state/states examined.
2. “Level of failure” of the state(s)
3. Existence, strength and territorial setting of the (possibly) state-
threatening non-state actors.
4. Separation of politics and economy.
5. Regional setting of the state(s).
6. Use of violence in the examined territory – both state and non-
state.
7. Multiple identity issue

What is meant by the breach of sovereignty was already examined earlier
so let us just remind ourselves with the basic points. There is inability of states
to maintain order on its own territory, inability to apply its own “law” on its
own territory, and dependence on the external factors.

For the establishing of the level of a failure of a state(s) we will use the
Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index and concentrate on the aspects which are
relevant for our study\(^\text{31}\).

\(^{31}\) For the FSI methodology check: http://ffp.statesindex.org/methodology
The third point is quite straightforward. We will make a list of the important actors which meet our conditions of at least potential threat to the state(s), elaborate on their strength and ability to challenge state authority, and examine whether they supplement state on the territorial level in some of the regions.

Separation of the politics and economy will be examined by the restrictions of the state against the free market. Even though we accept the principle of the primate of politics, the two does not have to be connected and as we have seen earlier, the separation of the two leads to the appearance of the two major neomedieval pillars.

Fifth point will deals with the level in which the state(s) is incorporated into the regional organizations. We will focus on the major organizations and elaborate on their influence on the state(s)´s policies.

Afterwards, we will focus on the use of violence on the given territory. We will focus on the use of violence from the non-state actors, the level of the conflict in the area, and finally on the level of the used violence from the side of state´s authority which signalize a loss of the actual power.

Finally, we will examine the problem of multiple identity issue. In this part we will look at the identification of the population and how strongly does this correlate with the identification with the state. We will furthermore look at the other identities present in the examined regions.

Based on these criteria the conclusion chapter will include the evaluation of the theory and we will create a graph which will illustrate the position of each of the examined territories inside a neomedieval world system. This graph will contain both important factors – strength of the state and the position of the theory on the neomedieval continuum\(^{32}\). Each of the criteria will be awarded by -1, 0, or 1 point according to their effect on the strength of the state which will be evaluated by -7 as absolute state collapse, and 7 as the absolutely strong state. Criteria of Regional Setting, Use of Violence, and Non-state Actors will be furthermore awarded on a scale ranging from -2 to 2.

\(^{32}\) Durable Disorder – Chaotic Anarchy
points and the following axis ranging from -6 to 6 points will illustrate the position of the territory on a neomedieval continuum, or in a case of the strong states it will point out to the nature of the region – whether it is violent or peaceful and cooperative. -6 points will represent Chaotic Anarchy/Violent environment while 6 points Durable Disorder/Peaceful environment. As the graphic display is static we will use the newest data possible for the plotting the cases into the graph.
4. Somalia: Vision of Catastrophe

In the first case study we will deal with the issue of Somalia. Somalia was chosen as an example of the failed state without any significant, even though officially existing, state structure and institutions and as a war-torn territory full of different combatants and other actors.

4.1. History

The independent Somalia was created in 1960 as a result of voluntary merge of the newly independent British (northern part) and Italian Somalia. Even though originally officially pluralist democratic, the regime was not very durable and was overthrown by the coup d’état led by Muhammad Siad Barre. During the Barre’s rule strong opposition appeared from the positions of marginalised clans with its centre in the north of the country in today’s Somaliland (former British Somalia). According to M. Murphy, Somalia started to indicate early signs of the state failure as early as in the 1980s. Country was in a state of civil war, government was highly corrupted, economy was in decay which led to the further strengthening of the clan identity and weapons proliferation was a wide-spread phenomenon. In 1991 various opposition groups managed to overthrow Barre and a new regime was about to be found. None of the groups was, however, able to gain legitimacy to rule the country and the whole country decayed into a state of failure and civil war (Murphy, 2011; Kubařová, 2008).

After the fall of Barre different parts of Somalia followed different trajectories. Northern province of Somaliland declared independence and created, in a context of Somalia, quite a stable and effective government. South, however, turned out to be a scene of long-lasting civil war and humanitarian crisis. Due to this issue many separatist tendencies appeared in different parts of territory during the 1990s and 2000s. The struggle between different clans and sub-clans led to the United Nations (UN) US-led intervention. This intervention was neither effective, nor successful and the United States decided to finally back up in an

---

33 Jubaland, Awdal, etc.
aftermath of the infamous Black Hawk Down incident from 1993. Since that period it seemed that the USA lost concern about what happens inside Somalia and the UN mission was without the US help completely useless. The country was left to its own faith (Kubařová, 2008; Kindl, 2010; Bruton, 2010).

Following years were marked by the wide-spread chaos, the emergence of Islamist movements, and the rise of piracy (mainly in Puntland province). For the case of our study two important events must be pointed out. First is a declaration of the autonomous Puntland from 1998. Puntland on contrary to Somaliland did not want to strive for the independence, but it sought for itself a special position inside a federal Somalia. Puntland is a region more centralised than the southern part, but still rather ineffective and having a reputation as a core piracy area. Second important event in the 1990s era was the terrorist attack on the US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya which left hundreds dead. This bombing from 1998 returned the US and the world’s attention to the Somali chaos and started the fear of a possibility that the chaotic environment could be used as a safe base for Islamist operations throughout the region. The attention given to the region in this sense even grew after the 9/11 attack on the targets inside the United States (Bruton, 2010; Murphy, 2011).

Following the year 2000 there were two major attempts to create a stable and effective central government. First was the Transitional National Government (TNG) which was dominated by Hawiye clan and which was recognised as a central government between 2000 and 2002, and consequently, after the brief attempt to establish a government of national unity, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which took over the power in 2004 and was dominated by Darood clan and is perceived as a Somali government ever since even though it was forced into exile shortly after its establishment. TFG officially transformed into the regular – non-transitional - government in August 2012. These groupings were, however, perceived as an alien entities backed by Ethiopia and the United States and for the most of their existence did not hold any actual power (Murphy, 2011; Somalia Report, 2012; Menkhaus, 2007).
During the time many alternatives to the “official government” appeared. Puntland and Somaliland governments were already mentioned\textsuperscript{34}. Second important set of alternative territorial actors is a traditional clan-based structure dominating lives of the ordinary Somalis. Third there is the rise of pirate groups which establish important economic elite especially in the Puntland province. Finally there are the Islamic movements which strived for power since the fall of Barre’s regime. First of these groups was Al-Ithihaad Al-Islaam which dominated among other Islamist groups especially in the early 1990s. Second important group was the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)\textsuperscript{35} which briefly held effective power over the most of the southern Somalia during 2006 just before the Ethiopian invasion. It is noteworthy that it is the only group which was able to hold effective power over the most of the territory of the southern Somalia during the last decade of twentieth and the first decade of the twenty-first century and simultaneously it was the one group denounced by the external players (the USA, Ethiopia, etc.) and was never acknowledged as a central government even though it was able to implement law and order on its governed territory. Its inner decay after the factual gain of power might be seen as typical story for any Somalia cross-clan political movement. Strengthening of the positions of extremists was used as an excuse for the Ethiopian invasion into Somalia backed by the TFG and the USA. This 2006 invasion might be seen as a point leading to the radicalization of the Somali Islamist opposition as the militant wing Al-Shabaab de facto took over the ICU movement and continued with the armed struggle against the TFG. Years between 2006 and 2009 were marked by the insurgency against the Ethiopian invasion and the rise of piracy in the neighbouring waters. The Ethiopian invasion can be seen as one of the largest mistakes leading to the deterioration of the situation in the country in a time the stabilization seemed to be achievable. Not only that Somalis rejected TFG for its support by their historical rival Ethiopia and by the United States, but the rise in the use of violence was significant. Since the 2009 African Union (AU) mission is taking place and quite recently large successes were observable in a governmental fight against Al-Shabaab which was largely aided

\textsuperscript{34} It is worth noticing that these two entities struggle over the control of the disputed territory of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (Kubařová, 2008).

\textsuperscript{35} In the literature we can find different names and the organization remained itself during its duration as well but for lucidity of the argument we will use this name throughout the further text whenever referring to this organization no matter what the actual name at that time was.
by the military forces of neighbouring Kenya operating as a part of the AU mission (Bruton, 2010; Murphy, 2011; Somalia Report, 2012; Bruton, 2009).

This brief overview should have shown us that the history of Somalia since 1991 is full of chaotic development with many more or less relevant inside and outside actors present. We will look at the developments of these actors more in depth in the chapter 4.5. For now it is important to remember that Somalia is a state without effective central government with many differently organized entities which fight each other over the territorial control of parts of Somalia or the riches achievable by piracy, smuggling, or regular trade.

4.2. Geography

4.2.1. Main geographical factors

Let us now examine the main geographical aspects of Somalia\(^{36}\). Somalia, bordering with Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, is the forty-fourth largest country in the world. It is located on the Horn of Africa and its coastline stretches from the Gulf of Aden on the north down the Indian Ocean to the Kenyan border. Somalia thus holds the longest coastline of all African states. The most important cities are the capital Mogadishu and the important pirate ports as Kismaayo in the south of the country or Haradheere. Somalia is effectively divided into three parts – Northern Somaliland, North-Eastern Puntland and South without clear authority. The level of efficacy of the central institutions of these entities decreases in the same order as well. Somalia’s natural resources are mostly uncovered and unexploited and consist mainly of uranium, ores, natural gas and possibly oil. Somalia’s long coast and strategic location makes it a perfect place for the pirate attacks on the frequently used trade lines located in the nearby waters. Most of the country is a desert with mountains located in the north-western part (CIA, 2012; Kaplan, 2010).

\(^{36}\) See the map in the appendix
4.2.2. Population

Somalia’s population consists of approximately ten million inhabitants. Population is largely ethnically homogenous with about eighty-five per cent of Somalis belonging to the Somali ethnicity. The most frequently used language is Somali and the major religion is Sunni Islam combined with Sufism and traditional influences - Somalia does not keep a history of Islamic fundamentalism. The average age is only about eighteen years and the level of literacy is assumed at some forty per cent. Despite being homogenous ethnically, Somali society is to a high degree divided on a clan base. Main clan families are Hawiye, Darood, Digil-Rahanweyn, and Dir and each of these is further divided into numerous sub-clans which often oppose each other. In recent years radical Islam and political Islam has been brought into the Somali society, but these influences are largely ineffective in a quest for acceptance from the local population as the Somali society is largely hostile to foreigners and foreign influences. Its ethnic homogeneity combined with mistrust to foreigners also accounts for the hardships any foreign power willing to operate in Somalia encounters – no matter whether Middle-Eastern radicals, the UN, or the AU troops (CIA, 2012; Murphy, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007; Shinn, 2011).

4.3. Breaches of sovereignty

After a brief examination of the basic factors connected to the history and physical geography of Somalia, it is time for us to deal with the first of the neomediavalist characteristics – breaches of sovereignty. As the holder of sovereignty, internationally recognised TNG and TFG will be selected even though their actual power is highly limited.

4.3.1. Inability of state to keep order

The ability of the state institutions to keep order is virtually non-existent. Not only that they have no influence in the two de facto autonomous regions in the north of the country, they are also unable to control most of the southern Somalia. We can observe that since 2000, when the first of these organizations was created,
the level of stability never rose due to their independent actions. TNG was for some time able to control parts of Mogadishu and TFG’s leadership was after the establishment of this organization forced into exile and all of its power stems from the support of the outside powers. Because of this lack of efficiency, alternatives to state power appeared - be it Islamic Courts or the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism. Most of the country, however, remains stateless and order is kept in a traditional fashion or is not kept at all (Bruton, 2010; Murphy, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007).

This lack of order enforcement thus leads to the appearance of such groupings as the pirate groups which are not only able to survive central government’s attempts, no matter how weak, to suppress them, but even the similar attempts from the side of Puntland government, although Puntland authorities might be actually part of the whole piracy problem. Next we can see the appearance of warlordism or radical Islamism. On contrary, as noted above, many of the territories simply developed alternative forms of maintaining order as Islamic Courts or traditional clan structures (Murphy, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007; Kaplan, 2010). To sum up, Somali government is unable to maintain order neither gain support among locals, establish security forces, or institute control over significant portion of territory on its own.

4.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement

Inability of the Somali government to implement its law is closely connected to the previously examined issue. Not only that the Somali government is unable to enforce any of its possible law structures and the traditional or Islamic forces are able to keep their own law framework in 2009 the process reversed and TFG was pressed to introduce the sharia law as a basis of the official Somali law structure. Inside Somalia we might thus observe a situation when every region and sometimes even different cities accept at least a little different law. This central-law vacuum is furthermore misused by different interest groups which exploit the economic opportunities by illegal (pillage, protection money, labour exploitation, theft of humanitarian aid, etc.), or legal (trade, army support, etc.) means (Murphy, 2011; Williams, 2009).
4.3.3. Dependence on external forces

TFG’s survival and the current successes of the government in its fight with Al-Shabaab are closely tied to the support it earns from the outside actors. The most prominent supporter of TFG was Ethiopia. It gave it material and intelligence support and in 2006 stepped in with an invasion which was supposed to bring TFG to the effective power over the southern Somalia. Recent success in the war with Islamic fundamentalists is on the other hand connected to the Kenyan forces which try to protect their own territory against the Al-Shabaab threat. The third main power standing behind different groups in Somalia with TFG in its scope as well is the United States. Without the support of these three actors TFG would fall into insignificance. It is, however, important to at least notice that the support might bring more problems than solutions. As noted earlier, Somalis are highly reserved when it comes to interaction with foreigners. Furthermore, Ethiopia is perceived as a major enemy of Somalis especially since the Ogaden war in 1970s and a large population of Somalis is located inside the Ethiopian territory which causes major grievances. TFG’s survival is thus maintained by the foreign support, but on the other hand, due to this support, it is unable to stay in power on its own and it cannot win the support of the majority of Somalis (Murphy, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007; Bruton, 2010).

4.4. Level of failure of Somalia

Let us now examine the level of failure of Somalia based on selected criteria from the 2012’s FSI. In the last version of the FSI Somalia ranked at the first place with a score of 114.9 out of the 120 points achievable. The situation of Internally Displaced Persons is ranked with the maximum number of points – 10. This means that the large portions of population are forced out of their homes and they have only a little possibility of readapting into the society. Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance is ranked high as well with 9.6 points meaning that the most of the groups inside the state are unsatisfied by their position inside the state.

37 FSI consists of 12 categories, maximum 10 points each. The higher the score is the worse the situation.
State Legitimacy is marked by 9.9 points which portrays a virtual non-existence of the central government and its irrelevance for the population. Security Apparatus received 10 points – meaning that there is lack of any state’s security forces which would keep some kind of order and enforce the law. Level of Factionalised Elites was put up to 9.8 leaving us with a picture of different groups unable to communicate with each other and to reach even a basic consensus. Finally, External Intervention column was filled with 9.8 points indicating a high relevance of the outside forces operating on Somali territory. Overall Somalia is together with the Democratic Republic of Congo put into the category of failed states in the highest degree of state collapse (Fund For Peace, 2012).

4.5. Non-state actors

In the following chapter we shall discuss existence, prominence, and territorial relevance of the non-state actors present in Somalia. Due to the nature of the Somali environment, we will discuss these actors in five broader units – traditional actors, pirate groups, state-like units, Islamist organizations, and business groupings, with the “others” category designed for the remaining actors.

4.5.1. Traditional actors

As noted previously, the most important organizational unit inside the Somali society is clan. Clan structure and traditional laws are the main causes preventing any political solution of the chaos spreading throughout the country. It is important to notice that any nation-wide cross-clan organization was usually sooner or later split on the clan cleavage and the authority of the clan leaders remains the highest authority for many of the Somalis. This clan identity is historically even more important than the religious affiliation. On contrary we cannot perceive clan structure as rigid and homogenous. The conflict lines between different clans and sub-clans are often fluid and due to the tradition of customary law and blood payment the actual strategies and affiliations of different actors are rather short-termed. Somalia is thus a culture based on highly decentralized tradition which leads to further problems with establishment of the

38 And it does not matter whether we mean AU forces or Al-Qaeda or actors affecting the situation without direct presence on territory.
central government. In the recent years the traditional structure is somehow weakened by the huge migration inside the country but nevertheless the clan affiliation still remains the most important one (Murphy, 2011; Bruton, 2010; Menkhaus, 2007).

4.5.2. Pirate groups

Second set of non-state actors is connected to the piracy which is rather widespread in the coastal waters of Somalia. Somalia was traditionally an outpost of piracy. For a long time trade routes were present in the waters surrounding Somali coast and locals used the piracy methods to get some share of the wealth passing these paths. The beginning of the spread of the modern piracy can be dated to the end of 1980s and has two basic roots. First is so-called political piracy which was connected to the struggle of rebels fighting against Barre’s regime and had its aim in preventing trade and other ships from entering the ports controlled by government. Second is the non-political and primarily connected to the protection of the coastal waters against exploitation of its natural resources – yet another duty Somali authorities failed to fulfil – as the foreign ships often used these unguarded waters for illegal fishing and other forms of exploitation and illegal activities (Murphy, 2011; Kaplan, 2010).

The official explanation of the piracy as a way of protecting the natural resources located in Somali Exclusive Economic Zone became soon just an excuse for attacks on all kinds of ships and consequent demands for ransom in return for their release. Having safe haven mostly in Puntland, but even in the southern part of Somalia and parts of Somaliland, piracy became a very viable way of living. During the past decade we could have located major pirate groups on the shore of Gulf of Aden, in Kismaayo, Marka, and Haradheere – Hoboyo region. What makes the situation of the solution of the whole issue even more complicated is the likely cooperation of pirates with the local authorities and the Puntland government which is both unwilling and unable to launch any effective anti-piracy campaign (Murphy, 2011). Combination of these measures, however,

39 E.g. split between so-called Mogadishu group (formal TNG) from Hawiye clan and TFG based on support from Darood clan (Menkhaus, 2007)
leads to the decline of the pirate activity in the last year or so (International Chamber of Commerce, 2012).

The decline in the pirate activity was observable in the short period of the ICU’s reign in the south of the country due to its relative efficiency and anti-pirate Islamic ideology. It is thus not surprising that after its fall the activity of pirate groups arose with another steep increase in 2009. In 2008 the main pirate bases were located in Eyl, Gar´ad, Hoboyo, Haradheere, Mogadishu, and on the coast of Gulf of Aden where the pirate activity is often supplemented by smuggling. The rise of piracy had two major consequences. First is the international response. Many different nations sent their navies to the area with the aim of patrolling the waters against pirates and protecting the civilian ships passing the region, which was completed with some limited success. Second is the profitability of the piracy for the region. Due to the large amounts of ransom money paid for liberation of the ships, piracy is becoming a regular career choice for many men living on the coast of Somalia. In addition the influx of the money into the area in addition to enhancement of the living conditions alters the traditional way of life. The pirate towns are struck by the rising levels of prostitution, use of violence, alcohol consumption, and, as many piracy efforts end un成功fully, by the loss of many lives of the young men who are needed for the proper functioning of the community (Murphy, 2011).

Despite the UN resolution enabling anti-piracy operations inside Somali territorial waters and on its territory, the growth of the number of ships protecting the trade routes, and the dependence of piracy on weather – especially monsoon winds – piracy still seem to be a viable and profitable way of earning living and it seems safer for the locals to spend time on sea as a pirate than on land. It is important to point out that even though pirate groups are somehow connected to almost every power group inside Somalia, there is no clear evidence of the extensive connection between piracy and Islamist groups. We can observe that the most efficient actions taken against pirate activity were taken by these groups, be it ICU operations in 2006, or the attack on Haradheere from 2010 performed by Al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam which cleared the area of pirates which fled north to

\[40\] Most of the cities are located in the north and north-east of the country.
Puntland. Motivations of the Islamic groups are quite clear. First there is the ideological refusal of piracy\textsuperscript{41} and second is the disruption of the coastal trade on which the Islamist groups are largely dependent for their own funding (Murphy, 2011; Kaplan, 2010).

4.5.3. State-like units

Inside Somalia we can find two state-like units which are, however, not recognised as state entities and thus act like non-state actors. First of these territories is Somaliland\textsuperscript{42}. Somaliland as a centre of resistance against Barre’s regime proclaimed independence as soon as in 1991 and struggles for international recognition ever since. Somaliland is located on the north of the country in an area originally colonized by the Great Britain. Even though it disputes the eastern part of its territory with Puntland, it is the only unit in the whole Somalia with a prospect of creating a working central authority. The government derives its authority from the fact that the province was briefly independent after the decolonization in the 1960 and thus should be given a status of recognized state after its breakup with the federation. Somaliland manifests some attributes of the working state structure, while on the other hand some authors see it as a criminal and pirate state. Keeping the dispute about the nature of this entity aside, Somaliland is the most stable part of Somalia and acts as a feasible alternative to the Federation of Somalia itself (Kaplan, 2010; Kolstø, 2006; Somaliland.org, 2008).

Second entity fitting in this category is the autonomous Puntland\textsuperscript{43}. Puntland was officially created by the Garowe Declaration from 1998 and its establishment was backed by Ethiopia. Even though Puntland manifests more effective state characteristics than the southern Somalia it is, however, still a malfunctioning unit even in comparison with neighbouring Somaliland. The region does not seek full independence but only a special status inside federative Somalia. Puntland authorities beside their ineffectiveness lack willingness to combat the major issues of the region. The creation of Puntland security forces led to the rise of levels of

\textsuperscript{41} This nonetheless did not prevent these groups from occasional use of pirate money.

\textsuperscript{42} See the map in the appendix

\textsuperscript{43} See the map in the appendix
violence in the area and the autonomous government is probably involved in the pirate activities which are wide-spread in the area. Some change was expected after the 2009 governmental alteration, but despite its promises the new rulers stepped only against the groups still supporting the previous leaders and left the remaining alone. The autonomous tendencies of the north-east are also displayed in the division between TFG and so-called Mogadishu Group – first being secular and federalist\textsuperscript{44}, while the later Islamist and centralistic (Murphy, 2011; Kaplan, 2010).

4.5.4. Islam\textsuperscript{3}ist organizations

Even though the Islamic radicalism is alien to the Somali society, external influences led to the creation of rather strong Islamic based opposition which arose from originally moderate system of the Islamic courts providing basic system of justice in the ungoverned territories. Even though it is pointed out that the territories of the failed states are unsuitable for the operations of the terrorist organizations\textsuperscript{45}, there is quite a large activity of local Islamist groups in the southern Somalia.

Although predominantly Sufist, some parts of Somali society started during the 1970s to accept elements of Wahhabism and Salafism and created the first Islamic organization which later in 1980s transformed into Al-Itihaad Al-Islam. This group, however, fell into insignificance during the 1990s. It was nonetheless the first organization to accept foreign Al-Qaeda’s experts who later established their first training camps in the area. Foreign operatives were in Somali environment largely unsuccessful but the local Islamic groups came into prominence as a force capable of bringing order into the war-torn region where warlords just fought each other without any respect for the local population. The importance of these Islamic groups and Courts led to the creation of the ICU which in 2006 gained rather large power in the southern Somalia with the aim of being cross-clan pan-Somali umbrella-type organization based on Islamic principles and law. Even though the ICU was able to bring at least some sort of

\textsuperscript{44} And Ethiopian backed
\textsuperscript{45} See for example (Menkhaus & Shapiro, 2010).
order into the country, its rule was a reason by which Ethiopia argued when invading the country. 2006 invasion, nevertheless, led to the prevalence of the radical wing inside the ICU comprised of Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. These groups – with the supremacy of the former – led sustained struggle against the invaders and the TFG adopting imported terrorist tactics as suicidal bombings and use of remote-controlled explosives. The ideological and strategic interconnection between Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab was still larger during the future years but unlike Al Qaeda, the local Islamists held in mind only local goals of establishing pan-Somali Islamic state on contrary to the global aims of Al Qaeda. Most of the Al Shabaab’s fighters are locals and the foreign, or foreign-trained, fighters are mostly in a position of leaders or advisors. Al Shabbab’s fight against Ethiopia was highly effective as a recruiting tool for gathering of supporters from inside the Somali diaspora across the world, but many of these fighters abandoned Al Shabaab once the Ethiopians left Somalia in 2009. Despite its efficiency on a battlefield Al Shabaab proved to be weak governor and its cruel methods were despised by the most of the locals – reason for its weak governance on territory controlled by this organization after 2009. It is moreover a strange coalition of different interest groups similar to other power-seeking groups. This inability of gaining local support combined with the inner divisions and attacks on Kenya led to the sustained campaign led by TFG (and later the federal government) together with, and mainly by, Kenyan army which successfully marginalizes the amount of territory under the Al Shabaab’s control and makes it slowly fall – especially after the loss of the last important city - Kismaayo - into the insignificance (Shinn, 2011; Bruton, 2009; Murphy, 2011; Menkhaus, 2007).

4.5.5. Business groupings

The Somali anarchy does not only bring violence and danger but also opportunity for creating any possible economic activity as there are no barriers standing in a way of business. This does not only mean illegal activities mentioned above but also quite regular entrepreneurship interests. Businessmen in the lack of the state protection, however, seek for alternative ways of obtaining

---

46 Not only because of the Islamic pan-Somali ideology, but also because of the support of Eritrea to any Islamic groups in Somalia as they were used as a proxy in its fight against Ethiopia.
security. They usually support other groups and militias to do so but we can also see the creation of their own organizations aiming for the protection of their economic activities. The most prominent one, connected to the political sphere as well, was the US supported Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism, which, however, turned out to be just another warlord-alike grouping once in position of power (Menkhaus, 2007; Murphy, 2011).

4.5.6. Other

Among the other groups we must add countless number of the warlord\textsuperscript{47} militias operating across the country and other minor groups usually created for the profit of some group. Because of the complexity of the situation in Somalia we will leave this category opened to any other possible group which does not fit in any of the preceding ones.

4.6. Separation of politics and economy

We can tackle the topic of this chapter in two ways. First is to completely dismiss it as the state authority is literally non-existent and so there cannot be any connection of its political sphere and economy. Second is to try to examine the connection of the alternative political actors to the economic sphere. We have identified these actors, as well as economic actors, in the previous chapter. The political actors are the state-like units, Islamic organizations, and the traditional structures. We can see that all of these actors are somehow connected to the economic sphere – no matter whether legal, or illegal – but we cannot say that they control this field. Puntland gains some of its funds from the pirate activity; Islamic organizations are connected to the trade and in a limited scope even to piracy; and the clan structures are attached to the traditional economic structures. Nevertheless we can see that the economic actors usually operate independently and they only cooperate with the political units for some benefits – mostly security.

\textsuperscript{47} According to William Reno we can define warlords as „political entrepreneurs with self-interested goals“ (Reno, 2010, p. 63).
4.7. Regional setting

Somalia is a member of many international organizations, but the actual participation is due to the lack of the central government in effect just declaratory. The participation has no actual effect on the Somalia itself beside the actions of these outside actors on the Somali territory\(^{48}\) which, however, would probably occur even without the membership. Effects of regionalism on Somalia are thus directly virtually non-existent and other aspects related to globalisation as spread of terrorism, smuggling, or international trade are more important.

4.8. Use of violence

As weak, or non-existent, as the state structure seems to be their efforts to establish an effective centralised government brought a huge amount of violence into the already war-torn country. Even though it is in the Somali context hard to count the exact number of dead and injured, it is undeniable that the efforts leading to the establishment of the central authority were always violent. Creation of the TNG led to the combat in Mogadishu, some of whose parts were the only part of Somalia controlled by the new government. TFG’s leadership was forced to sit in exile in neighbouring Ethiopia. Ethiopian invasion which aimed to promote TFG as the ruler of Somalia was met with a large-spread opposition led by clan structures and Islamic organizations and the three years were affected by the large-scale violence on the both sides of the conflict. After the withdrawal of the Ethiopian forces the TFG was caught in a hopeless struggle against Al Shabaab militias. Finally the recent operation of federal and Kenyan forces against the same organization is highly violent as well (Menkhaus, 2007; Murphy, 2011).

If we think about this category in a neomedievalist way, we can see that the extensive use of violence is another sign of the weakness of any attempted government. The other important signal we get is the dependence on the external

\(^{48}\) As UN or AU missions
actors. Not only that any territorial control is reached by use of force, this force usually has to come from the outside. And finally we cannot forget about the extensive use of violence by non-state actors which hold the most of means of violence.

4.9. Identity issue

Finally we get to the issue of multiple identities. In case of Somalia, as noted earlier, the main identification leads towards clan. Even though this clan identification is weakening due to the mass migration and disintegration of the traditional structures, any attempt to create cross-clan organization usually fails. The clan identity is not only complicating creation of governmental structures, but even the possible influx of foreign Islamist organizations. For any jihadist group a very frustrating fact occurs – for the most of Somalis the loyalty towards clan, no matter how the clans themselves are fluid, is more important than religion. Beside clan and religious identity even the Somali identity appears but is not based on state-structure but rather on a pan-Somali idea and connected with the hostility towards neighbouring Ethiopia. We can thus observe that one of the most important characteristics of the New Middle Ages – multiple overlaying loyalties and identities – is clearly present (Menkhaus & Shapiro, 2010; Murphy, 2011; Bruton, 2009).

4.10. Somalia vs. New Middle Age

Let us now some up the factors we examined in the previous text and make some conclusions towards the Somalia’s relation to the neomedievalist theory. We can clearly observe that there is nothing as a sovereign government present in Somalia with the possible exception of the Somaliland which is, however, not recognised as a sovereign state. Somalia is clearly a failed state with a large number of relevant and often fluid non-state actors. With a non-existing state structure the economy is completely independent even though it is often connected to the political ambitions of the different actors, but these connections are not permanent. Effects of regionalism on Somalia are weak and the foreign
invasion and presence of the foreign fighters on Somali territory is a much more pressing issue. The use of violence by pro-government and other forces is high and Somalis are bound by multiple identities with different strength which are usually overlapping. To sum up Somalia can be seen as a clear example of the “chaotic anarchy” vision of the New Middle Ages.
5. Pakistan: On the Crossroad

5.1. History

The history of Pakistan is full of violent clashes both inside and outside the state. The whole history is also significantly affected by the disputes between military and civil powers. Despite the interesting nature of Pakistan’s history we will, for the case of our study, focus only on some important segments. We will take a look at the establishment of so-called Durand Line, deal with the creation of Pakistan itself, briefly discuss some important strategic decisions made in relation to the dispute with India, and finally we will be interested in Pakistan’s activity in Afghanistan.

5.1.1. Durand Line

Durand line is the outcome of the 19th century Great Game between Russia and the Great Britain which took place in the Central Asia. Russia simply tried to get south to the warm ports on the coast of the Indian Ocean and Brits were afraid of the possibility of losing India to the tsar’s forces, and contemporary Afghanistan happened to be in a centre of the struggle between these two powers. None of the powers was, however, able to control the area and British attempts to pacify the tribal regions in contemporary Pakistan’s north-west ended in a deal: “do not attack British positions eastwards and we will not bother you”.

Furthermore, British were unable to strengthen their presence in Afghanistan to a point they would be controlling the region, so in 1893 Sir M. Durand agreed with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan to establish a border between British India and Afghanistan on so-called Durand Line leading from the contemporary North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the southern Baluchistan. Creation of this border might be seen as one of the biggest problems of the contemporary South Asia. It successfully divided British from Afghanistan, but it cuts right through the Paschtun tribal area dividing it in half. This border was never fully functional and it is hard to protect it, or get it closed (Synnot, 2009).

49 Not only that the Durand Line cuts the Paschtuns into two parts – one in Afghanistan and one in Pakistan -

49 See the map in the appendix
British furthermore divided the Paschtun population on its territory into another two segments – most of them remained in the NWFP, while minority ended up in Baluchistan (Bennett Jones, 2009).

5.1.2. **New Pakistani state**

Complications connected to the creation of the independent Pakistan are important for our study in two aspects. First is the basic idea hidden behind the division of the British India, second is the actual way the division was performed. We shall discuss on the both issues in a short summary.

Pakistan, created in 1947\(^{50}\), was based on two basic ideas - first one was an idea of unification of Muslims inside the former British India. In fact it was one of the only two states created primarily on a religious basis\(^{51}\) (Salik, 2009). Second was that of a common use of Urdu as a main language inside Pakistan. The idea of the founder of Pakistan Mohammed Ali Jinnah, presented to the British, was basically introducing the concept of two nations living on the Subcontinent. Each of these nations thus should be able to create its own state. Despite the long-lasting struggles between modernist and conservative or moderate and radical elements inside the Muslim community the idea was accepted. Furthermore, nor Jinnah nor any other of the major founders of Pakistan envisioned Islam as a major bound uniting the whole country, even though it was presented this way. They planned wide-scale modernisation of the entire state and its secularization, but this idea started to fade away with the death of Jinnah in 1948. Pakistan’s leaders later on used Islam as a force against intense ethnic struggle for autonomy. The Islamic note was further strengthened by the policies of General Zia ul Haq, ruling from 1977 to 1988 - policies reinforced by the anti-Soviet struggle in bordering Afghanistan. Last but not least the idea of promoting Islam into the daily life of Pakistan and to its law code was made in the late 1990s by Nawaz Sharif and ended by the army coup in 1999 (Bennett Jones, 2009).

---

\(^{50}\) See the map in the appendix

\(^{51}\) Second one being Israel
As it turned out these ideas were just not strong enough to create a stable environment given the huge differences among the population\textsuperscript{52}. Originally, Pakistan consisted of two parts divided by the hostile Indian state. Not only that the Western part took advantage of the Eastern Pakistan, which resulted in bloody partition in 1971, the Western Pakistan was equally unable to homogenize its own population both on religious, or language principle. In fact the only part of a population which originally believed in the Pakistani state were so-called Mohajirs, refugees from India, who at the beginning occupied the most important offices in a country. But even these became later on discontented with the situation in this country (Bennett Jones, 2009). As pointed out by Robert Kaplan, “Pakistan’s problem is more basic (...), the country makes no geographic or demographic sense” (Kaplan, 1994).

What is important for our study from this part of Pakistan’s history? State created as a safe haven for the Muslim population of the British India failed from its beginning to provide satisfaction to all of its ethnic groups. Another important fact is that many Muslims actually stayed in India and nowadays the Muslim population of India is almost as large as a population of Pakistan itself\textsuperscript{53}, keeping in mind that Bangladesh keeps a population of a similar size as well (CIA, 2012). Another important factor is that inside Pakistan the ethnic affiliation remained stronger than the religious bound and the country was, despite many efforts, from a beginning a divided one (Bennett Jones, 2009).

5.1.3. Pakistan’s India strategy

Another important historical fact is related to one part of Pakistan’s strategy against its fierce rival, India. The struggle with India lasts since the times of partition and crystallized in struggle over one main issue, the dispute over the control of Kashmir. The whole relationship is of course more complicated than this, but it is not a purpose of our study to analyze it. What is important is a fact that Pakistan’s policies are pre-occupied by this long-lasting conflict and most of its strategies are evaluated with a consideration about and fear of India. Pakistan

\textsuperscript{52} We will discuss this later on

\textsuperscript{53} Approximately 160 million in India and 190 million in Pakistan (CIA, 2012).
thus created one of its own most fierce potential rivals itself just by trying to fight India. Pakistan historically uses either foreign, or its own, radical groups and independent movements to accomplish its goals in neighbourhood. It is widely accepted, that Pakistani military and more importantly its secret service Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) trained and supported many different groups, and among them many terrorist groups as well\textsuperscript{54}, in their struggle to undermine India’s position in the whole conflict. By supporting such groups Pakistan built a set of well-trained and well-equipped soldiers which are nowadays turning against Pakistan itself. We will discuss this issue later in chapter 5.5. (Bennett Jones, 2009; Synnot, 2009; Salik, 2009).

Pakistan’s obsession with India is, furthermore, clearly visible in its strategy towards Afghanistan which is seen as a strategic space for Pakistani defence. We will briefly examine this factor in the next chapter.

5.1.4. **Pakistan’s Afghan strategy**

Afghanistan is of a great importance for Pakistan. Not only that these two countries share the Paschtun tribal areas and the border between them is rather fluid, but Pakistan also fears that possible Indian influence in Afghanistan would not only encircle Pakistan, but would rob it of the possible strategic space provided by friendly Afghan government. No matter how are these fears and hopes justified, they steer the Pakistan’s Afghan strategy (Bennett Jones, 2009; Siddiqa, 2011).

We can consider the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan in 1979 as a breaking point in Pakistan’s relation to Afghanistan. With aid from US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Pakistan’s government trained and equipped militants, who afterwards fought Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In this era, Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) developed into a gateway to Afghanistan and the movement of the militants underwent on a daily basis. After the war ended, the area turned into a point of entry for weapons and drug proliferation, and as a starting point for the Islamic radicalization of Pakistan. The whole region became militant and was slowly overtaken by the same militants who were originally

\textsuperscript{54} e.g. Lashkar-e-Toiba, or Jaish-e-Mohammed
trained by Pakistan and the USA to fight Soviets in Afghanistan (Farooq, 2011; Synnot, 2009; Siddiqa, 2011).

But this is only a part of a story. The support of Pakistan’s authority for mujahedeen did not simply end with the withdrawal of Soviet army. Pakistan chose Paschtun dominated Taliban as its preferred “interest group” and very much helped it to get to the power in Afghanistan. It preferred, and still prefers, having highly radicalised, but overall friendly, regime in the neighbouring country to the possibility of existence of a more democratic and secular regime, which could, however, possibly cooperate with India (Bennett Jones, 2009; Farooq, 2011). We will examine implications of this choice later on.

5.2. Geography

5.2.1. Main geographical factors

Let us now take a look at the major geographical factors of Pakistan55. The country is the thirty-sixth largest country in the world and it is bordering with Iran, Afghanistan, China and India. After the secession of the Eastern Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh, Pakistan consists of 5 parts: NWFP and FATA56, Baluchistan, Sindh, Punjab and part of the disputed Kashmir. Each of these provinces consists of its own different ethnic groups and has a little different historical background. Capital city is Islamabad, and other important cities are Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, Hyderabad, Rawalpindi57, or Gwadar58. Parts of Pakistan located in Baluchistan and along Indus are mostly flat, on contrary North and North-West of a country is highly mountainous. The most important natural resource available in Pakistan is its natural gas, mostly located in Baluchistan. In the North-West, important passes leading to Afghanistan and then furthermore to the Central Asia are located, and the South of the country is located on a shore of the Arabian Sea, thus having a great potential for the future trade relations, or for military strategy of Pakistan and other actors. The geographical profile of the

55 See the map in the appendix
56 With FATA further internally divided into lower units – Khyber, Kurram, Orakzai, Mohmand, Bajur, and North and South Waziristan (Bennett Jones, 2009)
57 Location of military headquarters
58 As the possible future most important Pakistani port
country makes any attempt to control the area very hard – this is especially true in a case of some FATA regions, mainly Waziristan, which were for the most of their existence ungoverned and created so-called black spot\textsuperscript{59} (CIA, 2012; Bennett Jones, 2009; Kaplan, 2010).

5.2.2. **Population**

Pakistan’s total population consists of about 190 million inhabitants and is fabricated from five major ethnic groups: Punjabis, Paschtuns, Baluchis, Sindhis, and immigrant Mohajirs. Punjabis are the largest and the most important ethnic group for the Pakistan state. Punjabi is also the most spoken language in a country, while the official language Urdu is spoken by only about eight per cent of the population and the second official language, English, is used just as a lingua franca among the elites. The dominant religion is Sunni Islam, but a large community of Shia Muslims also exists inside the borders. Another important fact is that the average age of Pakistan’s population is only about twenty-two years. Only fifty-five per cent of the population is literate\textsuperscript{60} (CIA, 2012; Bennett Jones, 2009).

Inside Pakistan two major religious groups can be identified – Barelvis and Deobandis. Only about ten to fifteen per cent of a total population belongs to Deobandis. This grouping is the more extreme one. It can be found at the beginning of the Taliban movement and it from time to time tries to propagate its views in Pakistan itself. This grouping is highly conservative and anti-Western. On the other hand, approximately sixty per cent of Pakistanis find themselves inside the Barelvi camp. This branch is less extreme and follows more moderate view of Islam. Barelvis try to combine Islam with the ancient subcontinent rituals and in Sufi tradition incorporate local traditions into their religious practise (Bennett Jones, 2009). This is very interesting point for the future study demonstrating that the most of the population tends to practise the moderate version of Islam.

\textsuperscript{59} Areas without any control and usually out of outside attention, see for example (Stanislawski, 2008)

\textsuperscript{60} Combination of these two facts gives large potential for the rise of radicalism.
5.3. Breaches of sovereignty

5.3.1. Inability of state to keep order

First let us look at a way Pakistan’s security forces are able to keep peace on their territory. The fulfilment of the law-enforcement duty is in demographic and geographic context of Pakistan highly problematic. Not only that the existence of a heterogeneous population complicates any attempt of the state to keep peace in all of the regions, but the existence of fluid and virtually non-existent border with highly unstable Afghanistan furthermore complicates the situation. Especially existence of Paschtun area inside Pakistan, with its history of large autonomy, is almost an unsolvable issue. This region is used to its own moral code and traditional justice system with only a little space for any outside attempts to change this issue\(^{61}\) (Synnot, 2009; Siddiqa, 2011; Farooq, 2011).

Pakistan’s security forces ultimately fail to provide order in the country as it is. Even though they were successful in dealing with some issues as Baluchi separatism, they are unable to prevent sectarian violence in a country and furthermore are no longer in control of some of the terrorist outfits they helped to create. Despite the ban on some of the problematic groups (beside Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, we can speak about Shia Sippah-e-Mohammed Pakistan, or Sunni Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), these groups did not dissolve - they operate under new names – and, furthermore, the number of dead killed by suicidal attacks which are connected to the sectarian violence arose from 102 in 2003 to 441 in 2007 (Bennett Jones, 2009).

For an example of the failure of the security forces to control its own militants we will briefly take a look at the history of the prominent Pakistani terrorist group Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Existence of this group is a direct consequence of the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan. Founded in 1990, LeT was formed of the former mujahedeen which were determined to continue fight for a causes presented to them by the Pakistani government – especially ISI. Its first attack in Kashmir was recorded in 1993 (Bajoria, 2010; Akhtar, et al., 2006; Business Monitor International Ltd, 2011; South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2012; Zalman, 2007). LeT since its creation conducted many large and small-scale

\(^{61}\) To be more closely examined in the next part
attacks on mainly Indian targets and did not stop to do so even after its ban by P. Musharaf in 2002. Currently it operates under a new name and is probably split, but its focus is kept unchanged and its activity is furthermore stretching to the other parts of the world even outside the South Asia. What is important for our topic in this chapter is the fact that the security forces are unable to effectively deal with a possible treat from this group, which is for Pakistan mainly existent in a connection of LeT and Al-Qaeda, and in a fact that LeT brought wide use of the tactic of suicidal bombing into the Pakistan environment. It is furthermore unclear, whether some parts of ISI still support LeT despite the great security risk it posses. Some of the large attacks as the train bombing in Mumbai in 2006, or “invasion” into the same city in 2008 suggest so (Bajoria, 2010; Business Monitor International Ltd, 2011; South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2012; Zalman, 2007).

We can thus conclude that despite the importance of military and ISI in the Pakistan’s system, these organizations are not only unable to prevent the rise of violence inside the Pakistan; they are also unable to cooperate in any effort to do so. This disagreement may lead to grave consequences if a group like LeT, supported by a part of ISI, decides to carry out attacks against Pakistani government and population.

5.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement

Pakistan also fails as an expected creator of the law inside its own territory. Not only that it is unable to force its law on the whole population without creating any formal possibility of an existence of the formal law structure which would, with the exception of FATA, be different for the different groups\(^62\), it also fails to make all the schools follow state norms in the system of education, and finally it is in a cases of disaster or distress so dependent on the action by non-state actors, that it fails to give its own population any reason to follow state-based norms.

The first issue might be illustrated on two provinces historically mostly outside of the central authority – Baluchistan and NWFP. Widespread Baluchi resistance historically interprets presence of any Pakistani authority as a sign of the colonialism and from its core despises all of their norms. The case of

\(^62\) As in the Republic of South Africa
Paschtuns is even more interesting. With their experience of autonomy these areas are highly conservative and the traditional code - Paschtunwali⁶³ - is in a core of any judiciary system inside the Paschtun tribal areas. Even though the Pakistani authorities tried to replace it by its own law outlook, or at least present this system to the locals, they were effectively unsuccessful and the more extremist vision of Islamic law coming from Afghanistan with Al-Qaeda and Taliban is more flourishing in doing so (Bennett Jones, 2009; Synnot, 2009).

The second issue is mostly connected to the existence of free education in madrasas. These schools remain still highly uncontrolled and the education is quite backward in all subjects beside the study of Quran. Despite the facts that only about five per cent of the students visit this kind of schools, that on the other hand the number of students in private schools is somewhere around thirty-six per cent, and that the most of the suicide bombers and other terrorist acts is carried out by better educated attackers⁶⁴, the existence of uncontrolled, conservative, and possibly fundamentalist system of education is a threat to the Pakistan´s state and the lack of education about the Pakistan´s law⁶⁵ in these schools is a massive problem for the existence of the whole state (Bennett Jones, 2009).

The lack of social programmes and inability of quick reaction is another reason undermining efforts of Pakistani state to promote its law inside its own borders. Not only that the lack of poverty-relief policies makes the Islamist actors inside the country stronger as they are able to provide such service, the inability of huge and important military to react in a case of a natural disaster is striking⁶⁶. We will focus on this issue in the chapter 5.5., now it is only important to acknowledge this problem for our understanding of the difficulties the Pakistani state has with the issue of law-enforcement (Farooq, 2011; Bajoria, 2010; Bajoria, 2011).

⁶³ To learn more about the effect of Paschtunwali on the control of Paschtun areas see (Groh, 2010)
⁶⁴ Simply because under-educated volunteers are unable to carry out any massive and sophisticated attack.
⁶⁵ Together with other non-religious subjects
⁶⁶ e.g. 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, or 2010 floods in the same region
5.3.3. Dependence on external factors

Pakistan is historically dependent on two important actors – the USA and China. The dependence on the United States is long-lasting. Pakistan long held the role of a balancer to the Soviet-supported India in the region. The amount of aid flowing to Pakistan rose after the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan and afterwards again in the aftermath of the attack on the USA from September 2001. It is noticeable that the Pakistan’s economy almost collapsed in the era between those two events. P. Musharaf’s anti-terrorist policy was rewarded by the huge amounts of the US help which brought Pakistan from its deepest economic trouble (Farooq, 2011; Bennett Jones, 2009; Anwar & Baig, 2010).

Chinese influence can be seen in two areas. First is strategic importance of Chinese hostility towards India for Pakistan’s foreign policy. Second are the investments connected to the construction of Gwadar port – new possible trade hub of the Western Indian Ocean and important military base as well – and infrastructure which creates possibility of transporting resources from the Middle East to China via land route. Especially Chinese role in Gwadar construction proves to be crucial for the development of Pakistan’s economy (Kaplan, 2010; Bennett Jones, 2009).

5.4. Level of failure of Pakistan

Assessing the level of failure, we will once again turn to the Failed State Index from the year 2012 and check our chosen categories. Overall Pakistan ended at thirteenth place located between Guinea and Nigeria. Situation of the Internally Displaced Persons is marked with the number 9.0 meaning that there is a huge number of such people and the possibility of their re-adapting into the society and availability of needed help is low. Level of Group Grievance is scored 9.6 – almost the maximum number. State Legitimacy is rated 8.3 which is better result than in previously examined Somalia but is still rather worrisome. Security Apparatus rates 9.3 showing the inability of the state to keep the monopoly on the use of violence. Factionalized Elites climb to the score of 9.1 giving us the picture of the deep differences between the ethnic and religious groups. Finally External
Intervention level is on 9.4 proving the huge foreign pressure on the Pakistani state with the main issues of US attacks on Pakistan’s soil and large influx of foreign radical Islamist fighters to the Pakistan (Fund For Peace, 2012; Crawford, 2011). Data presented above clearly point to the fact that the Pakistani state is very close to becoming a failed state. This is unambiguously proven by the fact it is rated as a state on the highest level of warning before the state collapse (Fund For Peace, 2012).

5.5. Non-state actors

In the following chapter we will focus on two types of non-state actors important for Pakistan – terrorist groups and groups affiliated to them, and ethnic autonomy movements.

5.5.1. Terrorist groups

According to J. Bajoria we can find six types of terrorist organizations inside Pakistan: sectarian, anti-Indian, Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, Pakistan Taliban, and other not fitting in any of the categories (Bajoria, 2011).

Sectarian groups are mainly involved in the intra-state violence. We have seen earlier that the number of deaths caused by the sectarian violence in a past decade is overwhelming and groups inside this category are the main actors responsible for the high death toll. As Sunnis hold the majority inside Pakistan, most of these groups are Sunni-based, but even Shia minority has its own militant groups. Among these groups, responsible for massive turmoil inside Pakistan, we can count units as Sipah-e-Sahaba, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Sunni), or Tehrik-e-Jafria (Shia). Some of these groups have even their political wings, and they are usually spread inside all, or most, of the provinces (Bajoria, 2011; Bennett Jones, 2009).

Anti-Indian groups are primarily connected to the Pakistan’s government. Even though they nowadays mostly operate independently, ISI and army involvement in their activity cannot be overlooked. To this category we can add for example Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, or Harakat-ul-Mujahedeen.

67 For the further details concerning any of the mentioned terrorist groups see (South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2013)
Even though these groups were originally concentrated on the Kashmir struggle or dispute with India in general, some of them are adopting wider scope of operations nowadays, both outside and inside Pakistan (Bajoria, 2010; Bajoria, 2011; Bennett Jones, 2009).

Third is Afghan Taliban. Operations of Afghan Taliban are targeted on Afghanistan and this organization uses Pakistan just as a hideout for its leadership. FATA is used as a safe haven for the members who afterwards cast attacks on Afghan soil. This group is not directly involved in Pakistan it just enlightens the inability of Pakistan authority to control the border region (Bajoria, 2011).

Al-Qaeda is originally non-South Asian group. It is mostly present in FATA and does not cast many operations itself. It mainly provides technical expertise to the local groups, brings new strategies, and works as a coalition-builder among the different groups. It is another factor providing for the radicalization of not only FATA, but of Pakistan in general (Bajoria, 2011).

Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) is another group primarily located in FATA. It is the group most responsible for the radicalization of FATA and NWFP as it both propagates the enforcement of Sharia law inside those areas and kills the traditionally strong local leaders who dare to resist such a radicalization. Pakistani Taliban wages defensive jihad against the Pakistan’s army in FATA and takes care about keeping the area a safe haven for any group willing to fight NATO soldiers in Afghanistan, or promote Sharia law and Islamic radicalization in Pakistan. It, for example, claims responsibility for 2011 attack on paramilitary academy in Pakistan, or even failed bombing from 2010’s New York (Bajoria, 2011).

Among the others Bajoria counts such different outlooks as Baluchistan Liberation Army – kind of a liberation movement – or Punjabi Taliban. Punjabi Taliban is a lose network of different groups created in Punjab as a reaction to the deteriorating social and economic situation of the population and to the overall radicalization of the society. These groups claim responsibility for numerous attacks in cities of Lahore, Islamabad, or Rawalpindi (Bajoria, 2011). This category can be furthermore enlarged by the paramilitary organizations almost
every political party created during the history for its political needs (Bennett Jones, 2009).

The above-mentioned groups also hold important social role. Their connection to the radical imams is not only used as a way of raising some funds for their activity, they are also able to redistribute some support among the poorest. Because of following the principles of Islam, these groups are participating in one of the important pillars of this religion, giving money to the poorest - charity. They thus supplement the role of the state in many areas and bring important social relief. Another factor is that the mobility of these “underground” groups makes them more able to react in the events of any disaster, so they are often the first to bring aid to the affected area (Bennett Jones, 2009; Farooq, 2011; Siddiqa, 2011).

It is important to point out that many of these groups were in past supported by Pakistani state and now decided to fight it. We can perceive the Red Mosque incident from 2007 when Pakistani commando killed Abdul Rashid Ghazi – prominent radical cleric – and his students as a major turning point. Since then the number of suicidal attacks rose significantly and some radical groups which were previously moderate started to fight the state with full force (Bennett Jones, 2009).

Terrorist groups and groups affiliated to them undermine the sovereignty of the state in two major ways. First is the direct fight and acts of violence which are on the rise since 2001 and even more significantly since 2007, second is the fact that these groups supplement the functions of the state and the state is thus further alienated from its citizens. If the state was more effective in providing economic and social relief, the importance of these groups would be much lower.

5.5.2. Ethnic autonomy movements

Each of the four original large ethnic groups shows some signs of struggle for autonomy, or independence. These struggles are weakest among Punjabis, who

---

68 Between 2002 and 2006 there were average four attacks per year, in 2007 there were forty-five of such attacks (Bennett Jones, 2009).
are the strongest group in Pakistan, they are stronger in Sindh, and are the most visible among Baluchis and Pashtuns. Let us examine each of these cases.

Baluchi and Paschtun autonomy movements are dating back to the time of the creation of Pakistan. Paschtun nationalism and attempts to create independent Paschtun movement date over a century back. The division of Paschtun areas by the Durand Line led to the cry for the reunification of this region either as an independent unit (propagated by Pashtuns) or as a part of a Greater Afghanistan (propagated by Afghan governments). In the time of partition Abdul Ghaffar Khan, spokesman of Pashtuns inside the British India, worried about the role Paschtuns would have in the future Pakistan and about the possibility of their role being marginalized by other Muslims inside the country. He thus advocated creation of independent state – Paschtunkhwa. Despite his efforts, Pashtuns had to decide whether to join Pakistan or India and the majority who turned out voting chose Pakistan. Since that time Pashtuns seek as great autonomy as possible. Pakistan agreed to give FATA a sort of semi-autonomous status, and similarly to British before the independence, did not interfere with the region if not necessary. This policy, however, changed in 1979 with the Soviet invasion to Afghanistan. After this moment Pakistan started to interfere with the region due to its strategic needs and, furthermore, the area became radicalised by the influx of mujahedeens coming from Afghanistan. Since then the prevailing nationalistic character of the Paschtun resistance is still more and more radicalised and its overall secular notion is becoming more religious. This is not only given by the way young Paschtuns are appealed by the heroic nature of the Islamic movement contrasted to the conservative nature of the economic backward traditional tribe culture. Radical Islamists also systematically kill the tribe leaders who refuse to join their movement and thus there is a potential of future merging of the ethnic and radical Islamic groups (Bennett Jones, 2009; Farooq, 2011; Siddiqa, 2011; Synnot, 2009).

Baluchi separatism has similar roots. Being divided among three countries – Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – Baluchis feel the similar need for independence as for example Kurds. Baluchi separatism in Pakistan is further strengthened by the feeling of injustice given by the fact that Baluchistan is the richest part concerning the amount of the natural resources present. Huge amounts of natural gas available in the region are exploited by the central government and
the region itself sees almost nothing from the wealth obtained this way. Baluchi independence movement is furthermore discontented by the current development in Gwadar, which is turning into one of the major Pakistani ports, but yet again without major profits flowing into the rest of the region and to the Baluchi population. Even though the Pakistani army was so far able to crush any rebellion in the area, further turmoil in the region might proof fatal to the existence of Pakistan when combined with troubles elsewhere in the country (Bennett Jones, 2009; Kaplan, 2010; Synnot, 2009).

Sindh and Punjab issue is less of an ethnic self-determination struggle and more of the socio-economic one. Sindhis are since the partition discontent about the powerful immigrants – Mohajirs – who arrived into their province from India. They for example took power in the city of Karachi and in the years after the partition effectively ruled Sindh. The issue combined with the frustration from a lack of autonomy promised before the 1947 was not of a minor importance and Sindhis started a rebellion during 1980s. Their displeasure was, however, eased by the achievement of the high office by Bhutto family which originates from Sindh. It is important to point out that the discontent with the status inside Pakistan leads some Sindhis to think about creation of independent Baluchi-Sidhi confederation of mineral-rich Baluchistan and industrially developed Sindh (Kaplan, 2010; Bennett Jones, 2009; Business Monitor International Ltd, 2011).

Punjabis, as a dominant force in Pakistan, never had a need for seeking larger autonomy. Contemporary discontent is thus more connected to the inability of a state to provide basic social and economic assistance than to the problem of self-determination. The trouble of economic deterioration is also clearly visible in Sindh. Due to these tendencies are the Southern Punjab ad Northern Sindh seen as a safe haven for any terrorist or extremist group. Furthermore, we can observe the rise of large cities as potential new territorial actors inside Pakistan (Bennett Jones, 2009; Business Monitor International Ltd, 2011; Siddiqa, 2011).

---

69 Punjabis as the dominant force in Pakistan and its army are according to R. Kaplan perceived by other ethnic groups as badly as Serbs in former Yugoslavia (Kaplan, 2009).
Province[al]ly set issues connected to the importance of the non-state actors in Pakistan are grave. No matter whether we speak about the nationalistic movements in NWFP or Baluchistan, or more socio-economically based groups from Punjab and Sindh, these groups have the potential of merging the radical Islamic groups as presented earlier with the nationalistic feelings and thus possess enormous danger to the whole region. Issue of state-threatening non-state actors is thus in whole Pakistan very serious and these groups have a potential to possibly tear the whole country apart.

5.6. Separation of politics and economy

Regarding the point of separation of political and economical sphere, we get to the ambiguous results. It is important to point out, that the official Pakistan’s economic strategy is largely liberal. According to Ishrat Husain, we can identify nine main points defining the official Pakistan’s economic policy:

1. Central planning and bureaucratic judgment are poor substitutes for the market’s judgment in the allocation of scarce resources.

2. Licensing to open, operate, expand and close business by government functionaries should be discouraged.

3. Public sector ownership and management of business, production, distribution and trade leads to inefficiency, waste and corruption.

4. Over-regulation, controls and restrictions of all kinds on the private sector hike up the cost of doing business.

5. High tax rates on individuals and corporations are counterproductive as they discourage effort and initiative.

6. Banks and financial institutions owned and managed by the public sector offering cheap credit and/or directed credit have a pernicious effect on economic growth.

7. Administered prices of key commodities are the worst possible means of insulating the poor segment of the population from the onslaught of market forces.
8. Subsidies on inputs such as fertilizers, seeds, water, etc., incur heavy budgetary costs and benefit the well-to-do classes rather than the poor.

9. Foreign investment and multinational corporations are to be encouraged as they are important conduits for the transfer of technology, managerial skills and organizational innovation (Husain, 2009).

On the other hand there are issues of large-scale control of land by the local feudals and large importance of the army in the economy. Local major landowners are not only large holders of proprieties; they are also holders of the power on the local level and often members of the parliament. They are always connected to the power elite and try to protect their interest inside the state no matter the ruling elite. In this case we cannot speak about absolutely independent economic actors; on the other hand they are fully under state control and do not try to undermine its existence. Their affiliation is more state than market oriented (Bennett Jones, 2009).

Agriculture, which holds for about twenty-one per cent of Pakistan’s GDP (Global Finance, 2012), is mostly dominated by the local feudals, but what about other sectors of the economy? First we cannot overlook the strength of the army. Its assets account for about three per cent of the Pakistan’s GDP and the army is involved in all segments of economy. Army can be also called accountable for slowing down of the growth of private sector in Pakistan (Bennett Jones, 2009). On the other hand, the wide-scale reforms and privatizations made by gen. Musharraf’s government decreased the number of the state owned companies and the state owned enterprises nowadays count for some ten per cent of the outcome of the enterprise sector (Akhtar, 2012).

This brief overview leaves us with a scene of an economy in transition. This transition is, however, constant. The army does not want to lose its grip over some segments of Pakistan’s economy and the attempts of government to privatize its economy assets are to some extent jeopardized by the army’s fear of losing power. This struggle is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
5.7. Regional setting

The case regionalism in South Asia is so far full of problems. In a case of Pakistan, its membership in different organizations cannot be so far viewed as an issue which could lead us to the conclusion that it gives any important powers to the supra-state level. Even though it is a member of many organizations even the most important does not take off any important powers from the state. The UN tries not to interfere into the domestic issue and even though the UN did get involved in the Kashmir conflict and some other issues, it cannot be seen as a major threat to the sovereignty. Another important organization is South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The slow progress of the development of this organization is mainly given by the perceived threat that India possess to the other states in the region and the whole attempt of further connection of South Asia seems to be in the current conditions unachievable. Pakistan also seeks full membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization which is seen as a way to get more involved in the Central Asia, but not even this organization demands any sacrifices of the sovereign rights. The major pressure related to the outside factors is thus not coming from the membership in any inter or supra-national organization, but from the side of the United States and their allies, fighting in bordering Afghanistan, and from the foreign militants (Sahasrabuddhe, 2008; Ashraf, 2012; Bennett Jones, 2009).

5.8. Use of violence

Use of violence by the state security forces against its own population is nothing new in Pakistan. Even if we omit the Bangladeshi case, force was often used against the Baluchi separatist movement and quite recently and very fiercely against radical groups in NWFP and FATA as well. It is hard to estimate the number of killed by the Pakistan’s security forces, but both operations in Baluchistan and attacks on positions of Islamic radicals in tribal areas\(^70\) cost hundreds of lives and many thousands people were displaced. Huge budget of Pakistan’s military is one of the reasons why many conflicts and other issues are solved by the use of force and thus undermine the stability of the whole country.

\(^{70}\) e.g. great offensive in Swat Valley in 2009
Beside, many cases of the extrajudicial killing and collective punishment have been observed in the NWFP since 2009 re-establishing of control by the army over the region. Despite the massive use of force, many threats remain unchallenged and thus the attacks of the NATO, and mainly the US, forces are not uncommon in the region. Even without drone strikes the number of killed in armed conflicts in Pakistan was between 2005 and 2010 calculated to approximately 34,000 (Crawford, 2011; Bennett Jones, 2009).

5.9. Identity issue

We have dealt with the issues related to the topic of the identity before, so let us just summarize the important facts. Pakistan is strongly ethnically divided. Even though the strongest opposition came from the Eastern Bengal which gained independence in 1971, the case of Baluchistan or Paschtun territories cannot be overlooked. The only group which was originally completely devoted to the Pakistani state was the group of immigrant Mohajirs. Second important group which was historically content in the Pakistani state were Punjabis. Even these two “privileged” groups are, however, highly discontent with the current situation inside Pakistan. The fact that most of Baluchis feel stronger the Baluchi identity than the Pakistani one is not surprising. In a case of Paschtuns, the ethnic identity is merging with the religious one, and the feeling of belonging to the Islamist movement is still stronger even in the other parts of Pakistan. This feeling is, however, not unification bound of the groups inside the state, but rather another mean to despise the state. Other groups inside Pakistan also feel stronger their ethnic identities as the state fails to provide basic goods as security, or economic and social development. We can thus observe that the feeling of belonging to the Pakistani society as a whole is still weaker and only minority of the population feels like Pakistanis and not like Baluchis, Paschtuns, Punjabis, or Sindhs. State structure is thus often used by the members of the groups to bring some advantages to their own groups, or themselves, and not to the Pakistan itself. (Bennett Jones, 2009; Salik, 2009; Synnott, 2009). To conclude, level of identification with the state is inside Pakistan very low.
5.10. Pakistan vs. New Middle Age

So how well stands the Pakistani example in a comparison with the neomedieval theory? First to sum up the points examined – we can clearly locate the breaches of sovereignty in all three parts, not only that are the Pakistani security forces unable to keep peace and stability inside the state, the state promoted law framework is highly undermined by the ineffectiveness of its promotion, and outside actors – be it the US army, or radical Islamists – play great role in the Pakistani politics. Pakistan is, furthermore unable to control its borders and the frontier with Afghanistan is literally non-existent. Pakistan is almost a failed state and the non-state actors like terrorist groups, ethnic movements, or even cities play important role in a day to day life. Even though the economy is not firmly in state’s hands, we cannot, so far, see any major clash between economic and political elites, mainly due to one important reason – large amount of the economic activity is in hands of military, local feudals, or other prominent political figures, however, outside the direct state control. Effect of regionalism on Pakistan can be considered as low. Pakistan uses high level of violence to keep the country in one piece, as the major strategy against any insurgency a military reaction is used and other non-military programmes are carried out ineffectively and sporadically. Finally the identity issue proves that Pakistan is a divided country where local or religious identities play more important role than the identification with the country itself.

We can observe that the importance of state in Pakistan is diminishing. Local and non-state actors take many responsibilities of the state and are more effective in doing so. They are even able to compete with the state on the territorial level and effectively control some parts of land. The case of Pakistan is closer to the idea of chaotic anarchy with many actors fighting each other with state focused on its military capacities to survive in this struggle. We cannot observe the emergence of the two major pillars under which the other actors struggle and the possibility of the future breakdown of the state and appearance of a sort of the New Dark Age is quite high.
6. European Union: Return of the Old Days?

The EU is seen by many as a new form of political organization which will eventually overcome current state-centric system. On the other hand it is criticized for ineffectiveness and some authors predict its fall. In the following chapter we will discover how are the European institutions changing the nature of the Westphalia system, and how is the whole region fitting into the neomedievalist theory.

6.1. History

Historical part will be divided into two sections. First will be dealing with the development of the European institutions and with the European integration, while the second will focus on some important issues in the history of its member states.

6.1.1. European Communities

History of the European integration is rather complicated and the thorough examination would take a space unavailable to this work so let us just briefly refer about the most important points concerning the whole process.

The idea of European integration in its current form started to materialize in the aftermath of the Second World War as the ideas of Jean Monnet were promoted in the so-called Schuman plan from 1950. Idea of sector integration as a way towards peace and prosperity started to take place when the Paris Treaty was signed in 1951 and European Coal and Steel Community was created consisting of France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Other attempts from 1950s to create political and defence unions were, however, unsuccessful. Further propagation of the primarily economic integration was stipulated in 1957 Rome Treaties when European Economic Community with the aim of creating common market with free flow of people, services, goods, and capital, and Euratom aiming for creating a common market and control for the
nuclear technologies used for peaceful purposes were created (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

Consequent period was marked by the problems inside the integration process which were mainly caused by the French position countering enlargement and further integration. Despite this fact, the aims of the original treaties were almost met during the 1960s as the Tax Union was created. In 1965 the Merger Treaty was signed and the new institution – European Communities – was created out of the original three. 1970s were the decade when the issue of financing of the European institutions was dealt with and partially independent financing was established. In this era the powers of the European Parliament (EP) were enhanced as it gained some control over the creation of the European budget and other financial activities. In 1973 after many problems a first enlargement took place and the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the Community. In 1974 the European Council was created and in 1979 the first direct elections into the EP were held (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

1970s and 80s were marked by institutional issues which in 80s led to the idea of creating a union. Meanwhile Greece (1981), Spain, and Portugal (1986) joined the Community. The pressure for further integration was embodied in 1985 Schengen Treaty with a goal of dismissing the national borders. This treaty, however, stands outside of the European Community and the membership does not necessarily overlap. Second important document was the so-called Single European Act signed in 1986 which was a milestone in a path towards establishing the common currency, common market, and cooperation in the foreign policy area. This whole process culminated in 1992 Maastricht Treaty which created the European Union. In the treaty the monetary union plan was drafted, EU citizenship providing some rights for all citizens of the EU countries was established, and the three pillar structure was presented. First pillar was supposed to be the supranational one and it should have coordinated the issues connected to the European Community, common market, or EU citizenship, the second and third were intergovernmental with the former dealing with the foreign

---

71 European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and Euratom
72 Portion of import taxes and VAT taxes were transferred on European institutions.
and security policy and the later with justice and interior affairs (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

In 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the Union. In 1996 the Maastricht Treaty was revised by Amsterdam Treaty which dealt with the institutional issues and enabled so-called flexible integration which led to the possibility of countries abstaining from certain common policies without vetoing them. Another revision was brought in by the 2001 Treaty of Nice which adjusted the EU institutions in a way more countries can be accepted into the EU which happened in 2004 when Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, and Cyprus73 joined the EU. Attempts to further integrate the member states led to the draft of the European Constitution which was, however, refused by the referenda in France and Netherlands. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania entered the Union. The previously refused document dealing with the further integration was recreated and went into force in 2009 as Lisbon Treaty. This treaty established another institutional reform. It became legally binding, ended the pillar system, and gave more powers to national parliaments. It also established the possibility of departure from the EU (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

6.1.2. Issues of the member states

In the second part we will briefly point out some important historical issues of the EU member-states which are, however, not directly connected to the process of the European integration. First of these issues is the existence of so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Cyprus gained independence on the United Kingdom (UK) in the 1960. The post-independence setting of the state was a result of negotiations among the UK, Greece, and Turkey which mostly dealt with the coexistence of the Greek and Turkish community on the island. The result was a federal republic with a Greek president and Turkish vice-president, both having the veto right over certain issues. In 1963, however, Greek president proposed the revision of the Constitution which would marginalise the role of Turkish Cypriots which ultimately led to the spread of communal violence. The

73 Only the southern „Greek“ part
deployment of the UN forces aiming to prevent this violence was unsuccessful. The continuation of the violence led to the creation of the Temporary Turkish Administration in 1967 which protected the Turkish minority on the island. The whole situation escalated to the point when in 1974 Greek junta ordered a coup on Cyprus which was countered by the two consequent Turkish invasions and the partition of the island in a way observable today was instituted. This whole issue led to the proclamation of independence from the side of TRNC which is up to now recognised only by Turkey even though it is able to maintain some unofficial diplomatic ties with other countries or the UN and its territory is since 1974 stable (Akgün, 2010).

Another important phenomenon is the decentralization which took place in some EU countries in the last third of the twentieth century. Countries most influenced by this process are arguably Spain, Belgium and the UK. Spain started its decentralization in the first post-Franco years with the creation of so-called historical and non-historical regions with the first elections to the autonomous parliaments taking place in 1983. The devolution process was thus from the beginning uneven. We could have furthermore observed the increase in the autonomous regions´ competencies during the 1990s. Belgian process of decentralization began in the 1960s and 1970s with the adoption of the language laws giving rights to Flemish and German-speaking communities at the same level as the French-speaking one. The ongoing process led to the adoption of further decentralization laws and to the federalization of the whole country in 1993. The process was, and is, very problematic and complicated and led to the creation of very confusing system of governance. Finally the UK passed first devolution laws in 1979 but the process was then stopped until the 1997 when Welsh and Scottish autonomous parliaments with the different powers were created. Situation in the Northern Ireland was due to the security problems more complicated. The whole process is possibly incomplete and we can expect further transfers of competencies or maybe the independence of Scotland (Čepová, 2002; Říchová, 2002; Jaňovková, 2002; Borgen, 2010).

---

74 See the map in the appendix
Last, but not least, we must briefly look at the development of the terrorist activities inside the EU countries. Even though the domestic terrorism\textsuperscript{75} is mostly a historical issue it should be at least briefly mentioned. Among the most prominent groups political groups like RAF (Red Army Fraction) whose goals were mainly political, and those like ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) or IRA (Irish Republican Army) with the main focus on the nationalistic goals can be counted. The politically oriented groups were active mainly during the Cold War and used as the Soviet bloc’s proxies with for example the RAF definitely ending its activities in 1998. The nationalistic terrorist groups were, or still are, active in the areas facing the nationalistic struggles. These groups are usually active until some political solution of the ethnic issue is found as we could have seen in the case of IRA which was disarmed and ended its operation during the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century (Archick, 2013; Princeton, 2012).

6.2. Geography

The EU comprises of twenty-seven member states and stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of Russia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, Turkey, and the Black Sea; from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea\textsuperscript{76}. The EU is about to be enlarged by Croatia in July 2013. Its size is about one half of the USA, but its population consists of about five-hundred million inhabitants. The population is diverse due to national and regional characteristics. The EU recognizes twenty-three languages as official with German as the most spoken first language and English as the most spoken foreign language and the de facto lingua franca. The most spread religion is Christianity in its Catholic, or Protestant form. The EU is divided into the member-states and other regional units defined by the EU or national laws. The main reason for diverting the EU into artificial regions is for the proper allocation of the funds to subsidize the underdeveloped regions. European Commission thus recognises six types of deprived regions – underdeveloped; affected by industrial decline; periphery regions; border regions; regions affected by urban issues; countryside regions. The geographical setting of

\textsuperscript{75} Meaning the existence of terrorist groups, terrorist acts are still present, but are coordinated by foreign groups, or individuals.

\textsuperscript{76} See the map in the appendix
the EU displays huge differences between its diverse parts (CIA, 2012; Fiala & Pitrová, 2009; Anca, 2011). The geographical setting of the EU would deserve to be examined in a more depth but due to the limited space we will leave the characterization here and return to some of the important factors in a later text when needed.

6.3. Breaches of sovereignty

When dealing with the breaches of sovereignty our focus will be state-centric rather than EU-centric for the sake on this chapter’s analysis.

6.3.1. Inability of state to keep order

With certain exceptions the EU states can be called effective in this category. What are these exceptions? First there was the historical issue of different terrorist organizations operating in the European states, be it RAF and other political groups, or nationalists like ETA or IRA. This problem is nonetheless in the current conditions almost non-existent. Second issue is the above-mentioned issue of TRNC which is somehow extraordinary in the EU context. Third is the issue of the unrests in large cities and socially excluded areas. Among these we can count the problems with the suburban areas of cities like Paris, London, Marseille, etc. where police is highly ineffective and the violence and crime are wide-spread. Additionally there is an issue of the excluded areas as different kinds of ghettos, or refugee camps which is spread throughout the whole EU – be it issue of immigrants in the southern Europe, or Roma areas in the eastern Slovakia. Nevertheless these issues are so-far not threatening the security in the EU member countries to the point we could speak about deterioration of the inner sovereignty in any significant scale.

77 The problem of regionalism and the existence of diverse sections will be more closely discussed in the following chapters.
6.3.2. **Inability of law-enforcement**

The issue of law-enforcement and law-creation is one of the important issues of the European integration. In the EU environment we are not as concerned with the states powers to enforce its legislative as much as with the power of the European institutions in the sphere of the law-creation. And beside there is the TRNC case again.

When dealing with the EU’s influence on the domestic legislative of the member-states we must keep in mind two important facts. First is that the important European institutions are either state-appointed – European Commission or European Council – or directly elected from the member-state parties by the citizens of these member-states – European Parliament. This means that the legislative produced by the EU institutions is both state-controlled and often state-originating. There is additional set of checks from the side of the national parliaments who can furthermore object to the European legislative, and beside other control mechanisms, usually based on state-appointed organizations, are present (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009; Karlas, 2011; Nicola, 2011).

Second problem is connected to the law-enforcement from the side of the EU institutions. Not only that the European Commission is insufficiently funded to control the whole scope of the possible violations due to the number of directives, their different implementation in different states, and the number of these states, the possible penalization is limited as well. The process is very complicated and the Commission can at the first instance only send a letter to the government and afterwards put the case to the European Court of Justice which can consequently penalize the member-state with a financial sanction (Smith, 2009).

As we can see the import of the EU directives is highly affected by the member-states both in the process of their creation and in the process of implementation. Furthermore, the possibility of control from the side of EU institutions is so far quite limited.

6.3.3. **Dependence on external actors**

Dependence on external actors in the EU context can be understood in two categories – direct and indirect. First set of actors which are directly important for the EU countries are the countries important for the energy security – mainly oil
and natural gas exporters – with the largest one being Russia. Russia has largely monopolised state-owned natural resources sector which is used for its geopolitical goals. On the other hand Russia’s income is dependent to a high extent on the export of its natural resources so this dependence is mutual (Kovačovská, 2007). Nevertheless this kind of dependence might be decreased by the continued efforts to diversify the imports among different exporters and by decreasing the dependence on unavailable resources by technological advance.

Second direct actor is the Eurozone as a financial support for the countries on a brink of bankruptcy. Due to the ongoing economic crisis and the consequent crisis inside the Eurozone, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and most recently Cyprus received certain amounts of finances to support their budgets, or banks, and to keep the countries away from economic collapse in return for certain reforms. These countries are thus to some degree dependent on the rest of the Eurozone for their economic survival (Morss, 2011; The Economic Times, 2013).

Among the indirect influences we must count economic interdependence inside the EU. Another factor is the dependence on the other states in the EU legislative process, which is, however, undermined by the rather strong competencies member-states have in implementation of the policies they disagree with. Finally there is security interdependence of the Schengen member-countries which are mostly the EU members as well (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

6.4. Level of failure of the EU

As for the level of failure, we will need to adapt our previously used methodology to the fact that FSI operates on a country level and so the EU as a unit does not have its own category. We will thus take results of all twenty-seven member states and count an average value. Because it is not a perfect way to deal with the issue we will also look at the highest and lowest rating among the member states to get a clearer image as well.

The average rating of the total rating is at 39.4 which would put the EU between the Czech Republic and South Korea inside the category of the stable

---

78 For more information see for example (Financial Times, 2013)
units closest to the sustainable group. The highest overall score has Cyprus with 66.8 – it is thus located inside a set of countries near the warning category – the lowest one has Finland with only 20 total points and on the last place in the board as the most sustainable country in the world from the FSI perspective. The indicator dealing with Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons is averagely on 2.8 with the highest score in Malta’s case with 5.1 and the lowest in Slovenia with only 1.5. The scores can be explained by the migration waves from the third world countries into the EU with Malta as an important target in many attempts to reach the EU from the Northern Africa compared to its size. Group Grievance is averagely on 4.1 with the highest score on Cyprus – 7.3 – and the lowest in Sweden with only 1 point. The scores are mostly indicating ethnic and religious issues which European countries deal with. State Legitimacy scored 3.1 points on average with the highest score in Romania with its 6.3 and the lowest number of points assigned to the three Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Sweden, and Finland – with only 0.8 point. This category in European perspective mostly expresses issues the EU states have with high corruption, political participation of its citizens, or government effectiveness. Security Apparatus ranking is on average of 2.9 points with the highest score occurring once again on Cyprus with its 5 points and the lowest in Finland scoring just 1.3 point. This category is connected mostly to the issue of protests and riots combined in the case of Cyprus with the existence of internal conflict. Next examined indicator is the existence of Factionalized Elites. Average rating is in this case 3.3 with the highest in the Cyprus case – 7.9 – and lowest in Denmark with 1 point only. This issue is mostly connected to the power struggles inside the countries and in Cyprus with the issue of the existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Finally we move to the category of the External Intervention with the average score of 3.1. The highest number of points was once again achieved by Cyprus, exactly 8.8, while Finland was awarded with the lowest score of 1.2 point. In the case of the EU countries this issue is connected mostly to the categories of the credit ranking and possibly foreign assistance with the exception of Cyprus which deals with direct military intervention in the north of the island and the existence of the UK military bases outside the Cyprus’ jurisdiction and sovereignty on its territory. To sum up, despite some deviations the EU as a whole would be ranked as a stable entity (Fund For Peace, 2012).
6.5. **Non-state actors**

First important non-state actors in the context of the EU are the regional actors – be it regions themselves, or large cities. It is disputable whether the sub-state level might be called non-state actor but their potential to become independent entity is high so we add them to this section as the potential non-state actor. Importance of regions differs according to the level of federalization, or decentralization of the state, which is factor varying largely among the EU member-states. Another set of regions are the ones created on the EU level for the case of regional development. This distribution, however, differs according to the member-states regulations\(^\text{79}\) (Anca, 2011).

Second non-state actor is the EU and its institutions. The level to which we can speak about non-state actor is disputable and even the actual power of the union is arguable. We will deal with this problematic later on.

Other non-state actors are different companies as identified by D. Rothkopf, non-governmental organizations, etc. In past the issue of domestic terrorist organizations was of an importance but this actor has been almost eliminated.

6.6. **Separation of politics and economy**

Issue of separation of political and economic sphere is in the EU environment a tricky one. On the one hand we can observe the concept of free competition as it is presented by the EU institutions, on the other there is a problem of subsidizing some sectors from the EU funds and meddling with the economic sphere from the side of the member-states. We can see that the EU guarantees prices of different, but mainly agricultural, products while on the other hand tries to create a free market conditions which should be pursued in the following economic policies as to reduce the involvement of the politics in economy (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

Furthermore there is an issue of the state-owned companies which in some cases dominate their respective fields and of course of the different types on

---
\(^{79}\) We will deal with this issue to the more detail in the chapter 6.7.
interventionism taking place in different countries according to their political setting. The issue of the relation of economic and political sphere is thus complicated. In the recent years there is a trend towards further regulations mainly due to the economic crisis and so the actual separation might be only observed in some sectors and in a limited scope. On the other hand we can find evidence that in some respects – as in agricultural policies – the EU is moving, or tries to move, towards more free market relations. What will be the actual outcome of these contradicting streams is disputable (Floru, 2007; Fiala & Pitrová, 2009).

6.7. Regional setting

The issue of regional setting must be dealt with in two ways. First is the relation towards the international institutions – in our case we will deal only with the EU issue even though there are many other groups as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, NATO, or the UN who are relevant in the European context. Second is the issue of empowering the regions on the sub-state level.

When we deal with the effect of the European integration on the member-states we can take two different approaches. First was already examined earlier so we will just briefly summarize it. The European integration was started by the states, its main institutions are appointed by states, or by citizens of these member-states, and state institutions have the main say. So even though some of the EU legislative might be incompatible with the concrete interest of some single member-states, it can be blocked, this state can obtain an exception, or accept it, but not as a dictate of some obscure institutions but as a collective decision of its member-states. Even the supranational pillar which was set in the Maastricht Treaty was heavily influenced by the member-states’ appointees. The EU is created by states and it involves states as main actors (Fiala & Pitrová, 2009; Belling, 2012; Philpott, 1999).

Second approach sees member-states in much weaker position. The European institutions are taking some part of sovereign rights from its member-states and there is an alternative system of governance outside the borders and control of states which nonetheless affect their respective territories. The EU creates institutions which are dealing with the issues connected to the integration and thus
takes some of the responsibilities out of the state-competencies. This means that even though states affect the decision-making they are not the sole creator of the law framework and thus their sovereignty is undermined. In the consequence the European integration creates a system of overlapping and interlocked governance where the Council of Ministers works together with directly elected European Parliament and more or less autonomous European Commission. The EU is empowering many non-state and sub-state actors which are further weakening the states’ powers as they are directly represented in Brussels. We have furthermore the supra-state judicial institutions which can over-rule the state’s decisions. States are thus losing part of their sovereignty even though they still possess some important elements of it as control over security forces, etc. This leads us with the image of ambiguousness about the sovereignty and centrality of the state inside the EU. Some authors go as far as to call states in this situation quasi-state (Wallace, 1999; Camyar, 2005).

On the sub-state level we can observe the issue of so-called new regionalism which is founded on the basis of growing power of regions in a context of the European integration that establishes a new level to which are the regions connected (Čepová, 2002). Many of the independence-seeking and separatist movements come together in a context of the European integration as they promote their rights on the supra-state level. The growing power of the regions creates paradoxes like the Spanish example – Spain as a unitary state grants its regions larger autonomy than many of the federative states of the EU (Borgen, 2010). The most prominent European institution created in order to bring the idea of “Europe of Regions” closer to the reality was a Committee of Regions established by the Maastricht Treaty. This institution is, however, only advisory and its impact is limited. Nevertheless the importance of consulting the sub-state institutions when discussing the new European legislation was promoted by the Lisbon Treaty and the principle of subsidiarity brings the decision-making process closer to the regions. The idea of the greater efficacy of the regions over the national institutions is strongly resonating in the context of the European integration. There is, however, a great issue when dealing with the asymmetry among the different regions inside the Europe given the political system and historical development as well as geographical and social context in the different
countries. Even though the EU created its own regional division, the actual importance of different regions is given by their position inside the state which is given by the historical and political development. Anyway, there is a great potential lying in the regions of the Europe which can, in the future and at least in some parts of Europe, overcome the power of the national parliaments. The fact influencing to a large extent the possible future development are the rules the newly created independent states will have to follow in order to enter the EU – whether it is automatic when the new unit used to be a part of a member-state, or whether the former sovereign will be able to block the entrance of its former region into the EU. The effects of regionalism are disputable, but the relevance of sub-state actors is growing and regions hold a potential to become an important force inside the EU development – at least in some parts of Europe where there is some historical, or geographical foundation for their influence (Borgen, 2010; Anca, 2011; Nicola, 2011).

We briefly examined the effects of regionalism on the states in the discussed area. We must take into consideration that there are two ways in which regionalism works in Europe – on supra-state and sub-state level. Even though the states are the most important players in the EU they are not the only one and the powers of the remaining are growing. The effects of regionalism are thus quite strong with the possibility of decreasing the importance of state from the “first among many” to “one among many”. Besides, we can observe emergence of many institutions which are bound to the European level – from the political institutions as the Schengen Treaty to the more basic projects as the common sport events like the Champions League which attracts attention across the whole continent.

6.8. Use of violence

The use of state-violence in order to achieve some goals is currently not as much of an issue in the EU context. This phenomenon was observable in the past during the fight against domestic terrorism and nowadays is mostly connected to the issue of protests and riots control. Anyway, even in the case of Greek protests

80 See for example (Smith & Roberts, 2008; Encarnación, 2007)
which were the most severe and durable deaths of some protesters were only isolated incidents. We cannot make other justified conclusion than that the EU states are able to propagate their policies without a need to use overwhelming means of violence even though there are situations and areas where this violence is sporadically employed.

6.9. Identity issue

The issue of identity in the EU context becomes more and more complicated. The identification with the supra-state institutions is so far quite low despite the predictions made by H. Bull. According to the Eurobarometr only twelve per cent of the EU citizens look forward to the advantages of the EU citizenship and expect such a citizenship from the supra-state level. None of the examined factors in a standardised set of questions dealing with what the population expects from the EU got over the fifty per cent in the fall of 2012 proving that people do not care about the supra-state level as much as feared/awaited by many (Eurobarometr, 2012).

In the different direction, the regional identity takes initiative. We have dealt with this issue earlier so let us just sum up that the regions are growing stronger and the identification of population with their respective regions is still stronger. Beside this we cannot forget about the issue of the ethnic minorities which often feel closer to the state in which their ethnicity is dominant in than to the state they are currently living in\textsuperscript{81}.

6.10. The EU vs. New Middle Age

In dealing with the connection of the EU to the New Middle Age we must observe that the state is so far the most important unit inside the given territory. The breaches of sovereignty are mostly insignificant and if so they are usually brought in by other states of, or outside, the Community and not by the European institutions. Level of failure is low. Non-state actors are growing in their importance but are so far less important than states. Economy is in a process of de-politicization but this process is uneven and revertible. The regional setting

\textsuperscript{81} E.g. Hungarian minority in Slovakia, Romania, or Catholic population of the Northern Ireland
holds a potential of weakening the states and in some areas and sectors are states already keeping back. Use of violence from the side of states is, compared to the rest of the world, insignificant. Identity issues arise mostly from the sub-state or state level, even though this process is enhanced by the European integration. To sum up the EU is in a process of moving towards the neomedieval system but this move can regress. When dealing with the issue of the type of the New Middle Ages the EU is about to embrace, it looks as a classical example of the Durable Disorder so far with many overlapping institutions and territorial players which are able to co-exist without the use of unnecessary violence.
7. North Korea: Relict, or Alternative?

7.1. History

Chapter dealing with the history of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will be separated into two parts. First sub-chapter will deal with major historical issues of the North Korean past, second with the development of its ideology.

7.1.1. Major historical issues

History of the North Korea starts by the end of the Second World War. After the division of the Korean peninsula, the Northern part found itself in the Soviet sphere of influence and the Soviet Union quickly installed a “friendly regime” on the territory. The tense relations with the South Korea led to the sparking off the Korean War which took place between 1950-1953 with the result of no changes in border setting and signed armistice between the North and the South which, however, never led to peace treaty. As for the inside development, it was not until the end of 1950s when Kim Il Sung consolidated his power over the different factions inside the regime and started his personalised socialist rule under the Juche ideology. Ever since the mid-1970s Kim Il Sung prepared his son Kim Jong-II for the succession of power and the younger Kim slowly gathered power to be able to take his father’s place after his death (Ahn, 2012; Kim, 2006; BBC, 2013).

During the Cold War the DPRK stood on the side of the communist bloc and was heavily dependent on its economic subsidies. Due to this dependence, the North Korea fell into the economic depression following the collapse of the USSR. This issue was furthermore combined with large-scale famine, caused by large draughts followed by exceptional flooding, killing two to three million people. The economic problems were in the process of undermining the regime’s stability furthermore deepened by the death of the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung in 1994. These events combined led to the period known as the Arduous March which symbolises the hardships the Korean people had to come through
during the 1990s. During the mid-1990s the DPRK started first of its nuclear crises and even called off the armistice with the South Korea. This led to the large-scale influx of the humanitarian aid into the country which consequently saved many of its inhabitants and possibly even the regime itself. Beside, the DPRK together with its southern neighbour entered the UN in 1991 thus receiving the full outer sovereignty (Kihl, 2006; BBC, 2013; Kwon, 2010; Park, 2009).

In 1998 Kim Jong-Il officially stood up as the new leader of the North Korea, while simultaneously naming his father an eternal president of the DPRK. The end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s was in the name of attempted economic reformation – for example so-called special economic zones were introduced in 2002 – and of the militarization of the country. The economic reforms nevertheless turned out to be just short-lived attempts than long-term efforts. North Korea thus remained a closed state largely dependent on the humanitarian aid and occasionally destabilizing the region with its excessive military potential and the ownership of the nuclear weapons. Kim Jong-Il’s political changes led to the replacement of cadres in the top ranks of the North Korean politics during 2004-2005 which consequently led to the further strengthening of the army inside the system. Another important milestone was the 17th December 2011 when Kim Jong-Il died and his son Kim Jong-Un took his place. Kim Jong-Un was much younger and spent considerably less time in the high North Korean politics than his father in the time of succession which leaves us with a question of to what extent was he able to take over the important segments of the North Korean politics – most importantly the army. Recent tension and another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula thus might be just an indication of the internal struggle inside the DPRK’s political elite as the new actors appear due to the power succession (Ahn, 2012; Kihl, 2006; BBC, 2013; Kim, 2006; Park, 2009; ČTK, 2013; Aoki, 2012).

7.1.2. Development of ideology

In the North Korean case the understanding of the regime’s ideology is a key to understanding the whole political environment and the changes which took place in the 1990s. According to Kenneth Quinones, the ideology was one of the
main reasons the regime did not collapse during the famine which followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Quinones, 2006).

After its creation, the DPRK adopted the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. This ideology, however, did not suit the rule of Kim Il Sung and it was supplemented by the so-called Juche ideology which can be translated as self-reliance. This idea combined the socialist approach with the neo-Confucianism which emphasizes the leader’s qualities and strong work ethics based on the idea of the existence of the self-reliable closed political system. This ideology was first introduced in 1955 and was later used to distance the North Korea from both China and the USSR during the Sino-Soviet split. The Juche ideology led to the appearance of the God-like worship of the country’s founder Kim Il Sung and subsequently helped to justify the dynastic succession on Kim Jong-Il after his death. Wide acceptance of this ideology moreover leads to the stabilization of the whole country despite the grave economic problems it faces. The acceptance of Juche came so far that the note about Marxism-Leninism as a part of the official ideology was deleted from the constitution in 1992 (Kihl, 2006; Kwon, 2010). Furthermore the North Korea created “the four major military lines” in its military policy in 1962 which stood on the following pillars – creation of a fortress out of the whole country; armament of the population; increase of the sophistication of the military; modernization of the army (Kim, 2009).

The economic problems and change in a leadership which took place during the 1990s led to another ideological shift. At the beginning of his rule Kim Jong-Il presented the military-first system as an answer to the economic issues his country faced. The idea is that a strong military which stands above the state must stand as a main pillar supporting the regime and as a strongest economic actor which will produce enough goods to lead the North Korea to the prosperity. This is the main reason why the DPRK sustains such a large military forces and why the Kim’s relation to the army is the most important issue tied with his rule (Kihl, 2006; Kim, 2006; Haggard & Noland, 2011).
7.2. Geography

7.2.1. Main geographical factors

DPRK is located on the Northern part of the Korean peninsula between the Republic of Korea and People’s Republic of China with a short border with Russia on its north-east. Its coast stretches along the Korean Bay and the Sea of Japan. DPRK is the ninety-ninth largest country in the world and its geographical profile is mostly mountainous. Country holds some interesting natural resources – mainly ores and coal. North Korea also suffers from dangerous drought and flooding which are the main geographical causes of the repeating famines in the country (CIA, 2012).

7.2.2. Population

DPRK’s population consists of approximately twenty-five million inhabitants. The whole country is ethnically and linguistically homogenous – Korean – with the small minorities of Chinese and Japanese present. All the religions are despite the facade of official religious organizations banished and the religious life is dominated by the Juche ideology and the worship of the Kim family. Almost whole population is literate and the average age is around thirty-three years (CIA, 2012; Kwon, 2010).

7.3. Breaches of sovereignty

7.3.1. Inability of state to keep order

In the case of the DPRK we cannot speak about any major issues attached to the ability of the security apparatus to keep order inside the country. Due to the strength of the military and the wide-spread repressions the population is kept in constant fear and no major security issues connected to the massive inner disobedience with the target of overthrowing the regime or rebel activity are present (Quinones, 2006; Kim, 2006).

---

82 See the map in the appendix
7.3.2. Inability of law-enforcement

Despite the law being rather arbitrary with many imprisoned for dubious reasons we cannot speak about any major issues in this category as well. With the temporary exception of the 1995-1996 breakdown of the law enforcement inside the country the state apparatus was able to promote any of its regulations. With the deteriorating economy, however, this might become an issue for the future. We can see that the borders are more penetrable and the opposition activities from the abroad are still more affecting the domestic population. The officials and security apparatus are more bribe-prone as they are badly paid and the regime’s control is thus not as tight as was the case in the past (Lankov, 2009; Kihl, 2006; Gersham, 2012).

7.3.3. Dependence on external actors

North Korea was for its whole history dependent on some form of external assistance. During the Korean War the DPRK as a state survived only thanks to the involvement of the Chinese army. Later on during the Cold War the North Korea was heavily subsidized by the countries of the Communist bloc – most importantly with the cheap Soviet oil. After the dissolution of the USSR, the DPRK fell into the economic crisis which was combined with large-scale famine. Ever since the country is, despite proclaimed self-reliant economy and closed door policy, dependent on the outside actors in two ways. First is the humanitarian aid which is mainly obtained through blackmail often connected to the possession of the nuclear weapons. The three major shortages the DPRK needs to replenish with the foreign assistance are the scarcity of foreign exchange, energy, and food. The foreign aid is originating mainly from the neighbouring China and South Korea, and the USA. It takes forms of food aid, fuel donations, or technology support and it is estimated that about a third of the country’s revenue is generated by this international aid. Second important external assistance is the protection from China which until recently protected the DPRK from any harsh sanctions by the virtue of its membership in the Security Council of the UN. This stance, however, changes in the context of the latest nuclear crisis. Chinese support is nonetheless the main factor for the North Korean economic survival. It is important to point out that the influx of foreign capital and goods is not connected to the trade
relations which are not considered a breach of sovereignty; in this case we can see
the straight-forward dependence (Quinones, 2006; Ankov, 2009; Park, 2009;
Habib, 2011).

7.4. **Level of failure of the North Korea**

North Korea is with the total score of 95.5 put on the twenty-second place on
the FSI right between Myanmar and Eritrea. Situation of Internally Displaced
Persons is awarded with 5.3 points. Vengeance Seeking Group Grievance is given
6.6 points pointing to the issue of the existence of the large number of people
discontent with the situation in the state. Legitimacy of State is up to 9.9 points –
almost the maximum possible – indicating that the regime is sustained only by the
strong security apparatus. Security Apparatus is despite its strength granted 8.1
points which is connected mostly to the issue of unlawful imprisonments and the
existence of many political prisoners. Rise of Factionalized Elites is awarded with
7.7 points and is connected to the issue of defectors and inner competition mainly
between the party and the army. Furthermore the North Korean elites are divided
to a high degree along the regional line. Finally the issue of External Intervention
is given 8.7 points due to the high levels of the humanitarian aid sent to the
country and sanctions imposed by the international community on the North
Korean regime. DPRK is placed in a warning category near the alert part of the
spectrum and can be thus called a failing state (Fund For Peace, 2012; Kihl, 2006;
Mansourov, 2006).

7.5. **Non-state actors**

The influence of the non-state actors on the North Korea is quite weak. Their
activity is connected to the anti-regime activities such as finding the real
information about the life in the DPRK, help to the North Korean defectors, and
broadcasting of the news into the North Korea. Their effect is so far narrow but
they have potential to mobilize the population against the regime in case the facts
reach the broad public. Their importance is thus long-term. Furthermore we can
identify organizations working with the emigrants, helping them to get education and to integrate into the new environment. These emigrants hold the potential to help the North Korea in change towards a stable and opened country once the current regime falls (Gersham, 2012; Lankov, 2009).

Furthermore we can identify non-state actors from inside the North Korea. These actors are mostly connected to the spread of the illegal economic activity and black market which rise due to the dire economic situation and the weakening security apparatus which becomes still more corrupt. These actors, however, does not hold any significant territorial aspirations (Gersham, 2012).

7.6. Separation of politics and economy

Originating from the socialist economic system and mutating into the military-first policy, the economy of the North Korea is highly centralized, most of its production sites are directly state-owned and military has a huge say when it comes to the economic questions. Following the economic crisis in 1990s the DPRK intended to make certain reforms which were supposed to open the economy and make it more effective. We can see that some of these measures as the creation of the Special Economic Zones did actually materialize and are effective up to today, but the most of the reforms were just short-termed and no major modification appeared as the anti-reformist stream took charge in the mid-2000s. The ideology is probably the major obstacle in a way of privatizing the economy and opening it to the foreigners. The emphasis on self-reliance combined with the weakness of the regime in face of any potential competition leads to the tight control of the economy with a goal of regime survival. In case of the North Korea the economy is fully subjugated to the politics and economic development and actors are fully dependent on the will of the Kim’s regime. About three quarters of the economic activities are estimated to be controlled by the military. The appearing black market related to the food and goods shortages seems so far too small to become a major issue but holds a huge potential for the destabilization of the regime in the future (Park, 2009; Nanto, 2006; Gersham, 2012; Habib, 2011; Haggard & Noland, 2011).
7.7. Regional setting

The North Korea is a member of certain international organizations, but it cannot be said that these have any major effect on a country itself. Probably the most important forum which can be to some extend called regional is the so-called Six Party Talks. This platform embraces North and South Korea, Japan, the USA, mainland China, and Russia. These talks are mostly connected to the issues of the DPRK’s nuclear programme and to the increased tensions on the Korean peninsula caused by the North Korean foreign policy. It cannot be, however, clearly said that these negotiations are having any major effect on the North Korean politics itself as they are more of a forum where the DPRK can voice its demands and use it as a bargaining tool in its survival strategy (Habib, 2011).

7.8. Use of violence

DPRK is a highly repressive and violent regime. It does not have to deal with any insurgency or violent opposition but its rule is based on fear and oppression. Fear combined with the belief in the official ideology is probably the main reason for the regime survival. The extensive use of violence is probably best seen in a case of the concentration camps spread across the country which are places of extreme brutality, combined with slave labour, and torture. The regime dwells on use of violence and the weaker it feels the more repressive it arguably becomes (Kihl, 2006; Fidyk, 2008).

7.9. Identity issue

Due to the effect of the long-standing ideological education and repression, the inhabitants are very loyal and identified with the regime. They did not even rebel during the large-scale famine in the 1990s when the security apparatus started to fail.83 It cannot be unambiguously determined to what extend is this

83 “Terrified and isolated, the North Koreans did not rebel; they died quietly” (Lankov, 2009).
caused by the identification with the leader figure and to what extent is this connected to the fear of repressions, but the calm with which the population goes through even the most difficult problems is fascinating. The important role of the ideology might be explained by the context of the Confucian tradition of the region which is exploited by the Kim dynasty ever since it turned away from Marxism-Leninism and presented the Juche ideology. Yong Soo Park illustrates this on an incident from 22th April 2004 when a large number of people were killed during a train explosion just because they tried to save the portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong-II from the burning train. We can see that the identification with the state is due to the different causes high (Park, 2009; Kihl, 2006; Quinones, 2006; Kwon, 2010).

7.10. The North Korea vs. New Middle Age

When dealing with the North Korean relationship to the New Middle Ages we may observe, as Young W. Kihl presents it, “...a failing state, led by a repressive regime...” (Kihl, 2006, p. 3). The breaches of sovereignty are connected to the dependence of the regime on the outside donors and humanitarian aid which combined with its closed politics and economy leads to the politics of destabilization of the region by the nuclear threats and aggressive behaviour in order to get this aid. Ever since the Korean War, the inner sovereignty was not directly challenged and ever since the 1991 accession to the UN, the North Korea holds the full outer juridical sovereignty as well. As stated earlier the DPRK is a failing state with the strong security apparatus which is, however, getting more corrupt and with the fractionalized elites underneath the god-like Kim on the top, who must nevertheless struggle for his own power as well. Non-state actors do not have any resolute effect so far but might help to speed up the regime’s fall in the future as they provide information for the population, train the new potential elites, and create the black market inside the North Korea. North Korean economy is, beside the black market which is so far not very extensive, fully controlled by the state and most importantly by the military which is the most important institution of the DPRK regime. Regionalism does not affect North Korea in any important degree beside the regional threat the North Korea itself possesses. Use
of violence is one of the main means of the regime’s survival strategy. The identification of the population with the state is due to the different factors high. In conclusion the state itself is rather weak, but the regime’s tactic for staying in power and the control of its territory and population are so-far successful. We can thus rate the DPRK as a region with strong territorial control by the state but with a clear potential to become a place of chaotic anarchy once the regime crumbles – this will be nonetheless to a high degree affected by the reaction of the regional powers to such a collapse.
8. Conclusion

How well stands the New Middle Age Theory in a light of our research? We have established that the neomedieval world order is characterized by the shrinking power of the state, existence of overlapping actors holding various territorial, functional, or societal roles and holding different amount of power. Above all there are numerous non-territorial units which are less stable but in many ways more efficient than the territorial ones. This, however, does not mean that the state itself disappears. State will, in the parts of the world where it is well established, remain the main territorial unit and the strongest actor. It will nonetheless have to share some of its formal powers with other actors. On contrary in places where the state is an alien institution, it will survive mainly due to the outside support and the power it holds will be stimulated more by the international community than by the local factors. In these areas the state will probably lose its dominant position. It is probable that in these parts of the world the state will be weak, or non-existent as the alternative forms of government, or areas without any government, will appear. This, however, does not mean that the other actors will not be able to some extend supplement the state’s role (e.g. traditional structures, or rich cities – possibly modern city states).

In the literature dealing with the New Middle Ages, we have discovered two main streams – Durable Disorder and Chaotic Anarchy. The former is a traditional image portrayed on a basis of the European Middle Ages where many actors on a different level exist, these actors are overlapping in both territorial and functional level and the complicated structure of mutual dependencies is in place. Despite the lower level of stability compared to the Westphalia system these actors do not usually act violently against each other. Furthermore, we can distinguish two major pillars which stand at the core of the system – political and economic one. Political pillar – now represented by the institution of state – is territorially based, providing some basic functions for its population, and acting as a more stable part of the system dealing with such an issues as security, or basic social services. On contrary the economic pillar is highly mobile, very effective when it comes to the production levels, but less stable and without major responsibilities. In return population feels usually more identified with the territorial units than the non-
territorial. This creates a system of two mutually dependent parts of the system – economic actors cannot work without political environment and political units will collapse without economic support - under which many smaller actors operate on low-scale level, in a limited scope, but in a similarly mutually dependent and overlapping way.

The later stream – Chaotic Anarchy – presents a vision of the world where no security guarantor exists and the actors are unable to cooperate or coexist more or less peacefully. The reasons for this inability may be various – geographical, ethnic, social, historical, or institutional. The world under a chaotic anarchy is thus highly violent, often succumbing into the violent acts based on primordial affiliation, primitive prejudice, or simply economic incentives. The line between economic and political pillar is not clearly visible as the different actors usually act as both on their respective controlled territory. The region caught in the Chaotic Anarchy is thus highly unstable – even more than in the case of Durable Disorder - and violent.

We must understand these two streams as Weberian ideal types – two ends of the neomedieval continuum. The New Middle Age is a system with natural level of instability and this instability lies in the core of its functioning. This instability is not only observable in the division of the power, functions and territorial control among the actors, it can be also observed in a position of the different region on this continuum. Another important factor which distinguishes the effect of the New Middle Age on different territories is the strength of the state(s) which can enhance the movement to one or another direction and the intensity of the effects of the emerging world system. This creates a two-dimensional analysis which could give us an idea about where the different regions, or countries, stand when it comes to the neomedieval analysis.

As noted earlier, for the purpose of this study I have created a two axis graph which will show the position of each of the examined cases in the neomedieval system. The horizontal axis is so-called State strength axis. It goes from the minimum of -7 points (non-existent state) to 7 (strongest state). Each of the criteria examined in the previous case studies was awarded with -1, 0, or 1 point. The explanation of the points awarded goes as follows:
• Breaches of sovereignty: -1 - state threatening, 0 - important, but not state-threatening, 1 – none important
• Level of failure: -1 – failed, 0 – warning, 1 – sustainable/stable
• Non-state actors: -1 – strong and state-threatening, 0 – important, but not immediately state-threatening, 1 – none/weak
• Separation of economy and politics: -1 – (almost) absolute separation, 0 – partial separation, 1 – (almost) absolute control
• Regional setting: -1 – important wide-scale effect, 0 – limited effect, 1 – no effect
• Use of violence: -1 – wide-spread, 0 – some, 1 – rare
• Identity issue: -1 – mainly towards non-state actors, 0 – towards state and non-state actors, 1 – mainly towards state

The vertical axis is so-called Neomedieval character axis. This axis reaches from -6 (Chaotic Anarchy) to 6 (Durable Disorder). For the case of the examination of this axis only three criteria were chosen and each was given points ranging from -2 to 2 as follows:

• Non-state actors: -2 – highly violent, -1 – violent, 0 – no important effect, 1 – mostly peaceful, 2 – peaceful
• Regional setting: -2 – regional war affecting the examined territory, -1 – regional hostilities affecting the examined territory, 0 – no important effect, 1 – regional cooperation, 2 – regional integration
• Use of violence: -2 – civil war/wide-scale killing, -1 – common state/civil violence on lower level, 0 – occasional violence, 1 – peaceful coexistence of the different actors/state and society, 2 – peaceful cooperation of different actors

When applied on the previously examined case studies the final results came as follow – Somalia (-6; -5)\textsuperscript{84}, Pakistan (-3; -3)\textsuperscript{85}, EU (2; 6)\textsuperscript{86}, DPRK (3; -

\textsuperscript{84} Breaches: -1 Failure: -1 Non-state: -1 Separation: -1 Regional: 0 Violence: -1 Identity: -1; Non-state: -2 Regional: -1 Violence: -2
\textsuperscript{85} Breaches: 0 Failure: -1 Non-state: -1 Separation: 0 Regional: +1 Violence: -1 Identity: -1; Non-state: -1 Regional: -1 Violence: -1
\textsuperscript{86} Breaches: 1 Failure: 1 Non-state: 0 Separation: 0 Regional: -1 Violence: +1 Identity: 0; Non-state: +2 Regional: +2 Violence: +2
2)\textsuperscript{87}. Graph below presents the findings in a visual form. First quadrant represents territories with more or less strong sovereign state which does not depend on oppression for its survival as it operates in a peaceful environment. Second quadrant represents the territories closing to the Durable Disorder version of the New Middle Ages. Third quadrant includes territories in a Chaotic Anarchy or those closing to this type of neomedievalism. Finally the fourth quadrant comprise of states dependent on their survival by means of violence and oppression – strong states which are, however, operating in a violent environment which is hostile to their survival and even thought the state is stable it needs to fight outwards for its survival. The weaker the state is in the third and fourth quadrant the more violent it is inwards.

What do the results tell us? Somalia, Pakistan, and the DPRK are shifting towards the Chaotic Anarchy part of the spectrum while the EU can be so-far seen

\textsuperscript{87}Breaches: 0 Failure: 0 Non-state: +1 Separation: +1 Regional: +1 Violence: -1 Identity: +1; Non-state: 0 Regional: -1 Violence: -1
as potentially classical example of the Durable Disorder. In cases of the DPRK and the EU the effects of the New Middle Ages are to some important extend soften by the presence of the state, in a case of Pakistan this power is on a decline, and in Somalia case state provides virtually no shelter from the effect of the anarchy. When trying to make some predictions we can observe that the EU is on a way towards rather stable and peaceful environment even after the weakening of the state. North Korea is shifting towards the chaos but we must not forget about the potential stabilization effect of the neighbouring countries which might turn this development around once the North Korean regime collapses. Pakistan is on a brink of collapse and the diminishing of the state will probably turn its territory into further instability. Somalia is a collapsed state with almost “ideal” version of Chaotic Anarchy taking place. We can see that all of the researched territories shift towards some kind of the neomedieval setting and it can thus be concluded that the neomedieval hypothesis is relevant for the future observation of the world system.

This analysis is somehow simplified but it gives us an overall idea about the major trends of the examined territories at the given time. It is important to keep in mind that the New Middle Age is a dynamic system and so the static explanation is just short-lived and can in some cases shift in a short-term horizon. The precision of the criteria and creation of the way to record the predicted shift, or a dynamic model might be seen as a main focus of the further research in this area. This work is just a beginning on the path towards creation of a comprehensible analytical tool for the understanding of the post-Westphalia system.
Bibliography:

Monographs:


Chapters in monographs:


Academic articles:


**Online sources:**


Available at: http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/al-qaeda-in-syria
[Accessed 10 September 2012].

[Accessed 31 March 2013].

Available at: http://www.ft.com/intl/indepth/euro-in-crisis
[Accessed 28 March 2013].

Available at: http://www.global-vision.net/files/downloads/download388.pdf
[Accessed 29 March 2013].

Available at: http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings-2012-sortable
[Accessed January-April 2013].

Available at: http://www.gfmag.com/gdp-data-country-reports/204-pakistan-gdp-country-report.html#axzz2KWQozzLP
[Accessed 11 February 2013].

[Accessed 2 April 2013].

Available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/our-silent-partners-private-
security-contractors-in-iraq
[Accessed 10 September 2012].

[Accessed 28 March 2013].

[Accessed 28 March 2013].

[Accessed 29 March 2013].

[Accessed September 14 2012].

[Accessed 12 March 2013].

[Accessed 8 March 2013].

[Accessed 13 March 2013].


**Other:**

*Příběhy z Jodoku.* 2008. [Film] Directed by A. Fidyk. Norway, Poland
Appendix

Table of contents:

Appendix no. 1: Somalia (map)
Appendix no. 2: Somaliland (map)
Appendix no. 3: Puntland (map)
Appendix no. 4: Durand Line (map)
Appendix no. 5: Pakistan in 1947 (map)
Appendix no. 6: Pakistan (map)
Appendix no. 7: Division of Cyprus (map)
Appendix no. 8: The European Union (map)
Appendix no. 9: North Korea (map)
Contents:

Appendix no. 1: Somalia (map)

(source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9f/Somalia_map_states_regions_districts.png)
Appendix no. 2: Somaliland (map)


Appendix no. 3: Puntland (map)

(source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/3/3c/Puntland_map.png)
Appendix no. 4: Durand Line (map)


Appendix no. 5: Pakistan in 1947 (map)

(source: http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-5Tr8R0eqLPIT/ToHzW_VxpPI/AAAAAAAAGY/mVR63_e6ly0/s1600/pak%2Band%2Bindia%2Bmap.jpg)
Appendix no. 6: Pakistan (map)

(source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/images/asia/political-map-of-Pakistan.gif)

Appendix no. 7: Division of Cyprus (map)

(source: http://www.windowoncyprus.com/images/General_Cyprus_map.gif)
Appendix no. 8: The European Union (map)

Appendix no. 9: North Korea (map)

(source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/maps/images/maps/northkor_map.gif)