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Party Politics in Intercivilisational Encounters: The Modernity Cleavage

Diplomová práce

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Abstrakt

Diplomová práce rozšiřuje Lipset – Rokkanův model stranické politiky založené na konfliktních liniích. Práce využívá konceptů civilizační analýzy, zejména konceptu mnohačetných modernit Shmuela Eisenstadta, k popsání vzniku proti-Západních fundamentalistických hnutí v Rusku a Egyptě na počátku 20. století. Úvodní kapitola rozebírá existující literaturu a současné trendy v hlavním proudu studií politických stran a zdůrazňuje hlavně metodologický rozchod výzkumů Západních a ne-Západních politických stran. Druhá kapitola se zaměřuje na rokkanovský proud stranickopolitického výzkumu a použití konceptu konfliktních linií mimo politický region Západní Evropy. Ve třetí kapitole je představen koncept „konfliktní linie modernity“, který je založen na shodných teoretických předpokladech rokkanovské politologie a civilizační analýzy. Čtvrtá a pátá kapitola jsou empirickou analýzou dvou případů, Ruských komunistů a Egyptských Muslimských bratrů, s cílem získat z empirie teoretické poznatky pomocí jednoduchých výzkumných nástrojů komparativní a zakotvené teorie. V poslední kapitole je diplomová práce zakončena teoretickou diskuzí o obecných vlastnostech „stran modernity“ a o celkovém výzkumném přínosu práce.

Abstract

The thesis presents an extension of the Lipset – Rokkan model of cleavage-based party politics. It employs concepts of civilisational analysis, particularly the concept of multiple modernities as devised by Shmuel Eisenstadt, to describe the emergence of anti-Western fundamental movements in Russia and Egypt at the start of the 20th century. The introductory chapter discusses the existing literature and recent trends in mainstream studies of party politics, noting particularly the divergence between research into Western and non-Western political parties. The second chapter focuses on the Rokkanian branch of party studies and the use of the cleavage concept outside the political region of Western Europe. In the third chapter, the concept of 'modernity cleavage' is presented, based on theoretical assumptions common both to the Rokkanian agenda and to civilisational analysis. The fourth and fifth chapters deal with the empirical analysis of two cases, the Russian Communists and Egyptian Muslim Brothers, respectively, with the goal to extract findings from presented historical data through a basic-level comparative and ground-theoretical approach. In the final chapter, the thesis is concluded with a theoretical discussion about the common features of 'modernity parties' and about the thesis's general research contribution.

Klíčová slova

civilizační analýza; konfliktní linie; modernita; mnohočetné modernity; stranická politika; Rusko; Egypt; Muslimské bratrstvo; Komunistická strana

Keywords

civilisational analysis; cleavage; modernity; multiple modernities; party politics; Russia; Egypt; Muslim Brotherhood; Communist Party

1. Research Theme and the Assumptions of Civilisational Analysis

In the modern liberal tradition, political party is widely considered to be one of the most important tools for the creation and preservation of democratic rule. In the United States of America, political parties transformed the political regime from a "small experiment in republicanism" into a nation-wide democracy by drawing masses into the decision-making process (Schattschneider 1942: 3). Even though the original Madison-Jeffersonian idea of a republican institutional framework was to make away with all "factions" united by "some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community" (Madison [1787]1982: 43), political parties remained entrenched in the American system and since then reappeared in every democracy on earth. Already the British conservatives in the 18th century maintained that parties are formed "from promoting by their joint endeavours the national interest" (Burke [1770]1839: 425). The democratisation of Western European countries in the second half of the 19th century brought with it new historical experience together with a new analytical understanding of the partisan life (e.g., Ostrogorski 1964[1902]; Michels 1962[1911]; Weber 1968[1922]).

Soon, the original distrust of liberals withered away and political parties have become accepted by the majority of both practitioners and theoreticians of politics (Key 1942: 17-20). Indeed, in the post-Second World War era, many political scientists have even called for a strengthening of parties and seen them as endemic to democracy. The legislative politics of modern representative systems is carried out by parties – legislators who want to get something done and who want their preferences to prevail will form parties in the parliament; a similar tendency to form like-minded groups is natural to voters and mostly via parties are today people's interests aggregated and articulated.

Political parties have over time also become the focus of many a social scientific inquiry. Even though Elmer E. Schattschneider in his seminal volume complained that theorists of politics are mainly silent on parties (1942: 2), seven decades later,

the literature has since grown considerably. The topic is approached from many different angles and in different disciplinary agendas; yet, the tradition of scientific inquiry into parties may be roughly divided into two broad categories: in the first category scholars champion the sociohistorical determinants of party politics (e.g., La Palombara – Weiner 1966; Campbell et al 1960; Almond – Verba 1963; Lipson 1964; Lipset – Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1970; Nohlen 1978; Beyme 1985), in the other institutional determinants (e.g., Duverger 1951; Rae 1971; Blondel 1973; Sartori 1976; Taagepera – Shugart 1999; Lijphart 1994; Tsebelis 2002). Both traditions strive to explain the birth of political parties, the functions their perform, their linkage to other social groups as well as parties' mutual relationships. While the first tradition, however, emphasises the wide sociological and cultural background behind these analytical problems, historical paths political parties take and their entrenchment in complex social processes, the second tradition asserts the critical role that one political institution unique to the Western civilisation plays in the origins and life of parties: the institution of popular elections. The study of institutions and electoral studies in particular have over time developed into "the" field of research in party politics and become, arguably, also its most advanced and mature field (Shugart 2005: 25). Taken together, it cannot be today denied that, "the scholarly literature that examines political parties is enormous" (Strom – Mueller 1999: 5) and that the study of parties and party systems is one of the major and most progressive research themes in political science.

What may, however, be considered a comprehensive approach towards the field, with its tens of thousands of articles, books and monographs published, may also be severely lacking in terms of geographical and spatial coverage. Since modern political science is a discipline predominantly concerned with the Western liberal democracies of the last two centuries, also the scope of party literature has always been limited to the 'Occident', how it was formed during the first era of democratisation in the 19th and early 20th century. The relative advancement of the field of electoral studies is only symptomatic of this prevailing focus on Western European and North American multiparty democracies. Up until the 1980s and the 'third wave of democratisation' (Huntington 1992), research into political systems

in most of the world had been the domain of students of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. The democratisation literature and the party literature were two coexisting but largely separate branches of political science and methodological approaches towards these two respective fields of study diverged; political parties in non-democratic regimes were seen as completely different "animals" from parties in liberal democracies (e.g., Arendt 1951; Brzezinski – Friedrich 1956; Neumann 1957). Students of multiparty and one-party political systems did not talk to each other.

The methodological separation between the Western democratic and the non-Western non-democratic world has also contributed to the always widening divide between students of the modern Occidental civilisation and those studying other cultures. The diverging approaches of social scientists towards the West and towards 'the rest' has in many fields led to the formulation of concepts and entire theories that cannot travel well across the different parts of the European and North American continents, let alone across different world cultures. The situation in political party studies might indeed be just a reflection of the more general 'Occidentocentric' nature of modern social sciences (see, e.g., Pye 1958; Venn 2000); however, the Western bias is even more consequential in this field as it often weighs in on actual politics around the world and contributes to real policy making.

That is not to say that many a student of political parties has not shown the ability to reflect the inherent Western bias in their work. With the start of the third wave of democratisation in the 1960s, party research has acknowledged the need to come up with new concepts and construe classifications wide enough to apply also to the newly democratised countries in Southern Europe (e.g., Sartori 1976; Beyme 1985; Panebianco 1988), in Africa (Hodgkin 1961; Morgenthau 1964; Coleman – Rosberg 1964) or in Latin America (Huntington 1968; Nierkerk 1974; Alexander 1988; MacDonald – Ruhl 1989). The watershed of global democratisation that came in 1990 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet bloc brought about a large amount of literature that dealt with the conceptual problem of how to apply Western party terminologies and typologies also to post-communist settings (e.g., Gunther –

Montero – Linz 2002; Luther – Mueller-Rommel 2002; Biezen 2003; Webb – White 2007).

The general research aim of the following pages is to add up to this new branch of literature; the work should to enrich the field of comparative party politics by bringing in original concepts from a distinct but not necessarily distant agenda of social scientific inquiry: the agenda of civilisational analysis. Primarily a historical-sociological approach, or a 'paradigm in the making' (Arnason 2007), towards global phenomena, civilisational analysis offers a challenging theoretical framework which has so far lacked applications in research fields that deal with specific, detailed, spatially and temporarily bounded phenomena of the social reality. The case in hand concerns exclusively political parties; it is, however, easy to imagine future research going in directions of various other political scientific agenda, capturing in a newly built theoretical structure more and more of the modern political space.

For the new entrant into the field, the first directive of civilisational analysis in the tradition of Max Weber says: take a step back and look at the West as only one of several 'life paradigms' that have existed on earth since the birth of the human civilisation. This approach is not a direct criticism of the Western 'cultural imperialism' nor an attempt to overcome the inherent, insurmountable bias of Western education and life experience. It is a premeditated effort to analyse social phenomena with a greater "coefficient of expansion and internationalization… than those lodged in society or the nation-state" (Durkheim – Mauss 1971: 812).

Civilisation analysis not only operates with the plural of the term 'civilisation' and thus implicitly makes the step back to facilitate geographically wide comparisons, it has also introduced the notion of 'multiple modernities' into the mainstream social scientific dictionary. Scholars of this newly (re-)discovered field are always wary of any inherent anti-Western bias and tendencies of, e.g., the postcolonial studies, and endeavour to weigh and assess world cultures and civilisations without a predetermined, prepared agenda (Arnason 2003). For the purposes of civilisational analysis, cross-cultural comparisons are stripped of normative connotations:

stripped not only of a conscious favouritism of the Western world, but also of any residual Hegelian preference of "progressively dynamic" Occident over a "stagnating and backward" Orient; at least stripped as much as it is possible in the limits given by the language used (Derrida 1967). If, indeed, this approach is still to be accused of any bias (as, at the end of the day, all research may be), it ought to be the "bias of deliberately assumed neutrality": firstly, there is the argument that even though social constructs from the West have had invaded and pervaded realms of other cultures, they have also been significantly influenced by these cultures and transformed. Secondly, for civilisational analysis, there is no bad or good Westernisation, neither there is a uniquely progressive 'geist' of the Occident. In the terms coined by Benjamin Nelson, there are only the 'encounters' of different cultural paradigms, different civilisations, different 'structures of consciousness' (Nelson 1981); and since the West has in the past for three or four centuries dominated through the means of its technological advantages, the Western encounters were more frequent, thicker and deeper than other encounters in history.

When Lucian Pye in 1958 published his seminal political science article on the differences between Western and non-Western political processes, he also proposed that future research should be centred around two general theories of political systems: one relating to the West, the other to the 'rest' (Pye 1958: 468). As I note above, this has also been for a long time the normal situation in political science. Students of politics, and students of political parties in particular, get used to grouping nation-states into sets with similar cultural and institutional background. Instead of developing hypotheses and theories capable of travelling between continents, they have tended to focus in their majority on the most similar cases and use the corresponding logic of comparative scientific inquiry. Such an approach is not wrong per se as it allows for a better control of variables. However, its potential is exhausted when trying to account for changes in party politics that are caused by newly occurring variables such as shifts in supra-national institutional frameworks, rise of supposedly anti-modern fundamentalist movements or inter-civilisational migration. Or, and this is a very recent phenomenon as well, when previously non-Western countries start to democratise and decide to follow the Western liberal

democratic political model. The moment of transition from a non-democratic into a democratic regime and the subsequent political turmoil have in the last two decades challenged the classic theories about political parties and they keep being challenged also after the latest wave of democratisation that swept old dictatorships inside the traditional areas of the "backward" Orient.

In the present work, I explore these phenomena that has not originally come up from the West and assess the possibility of applying on them originally West-based theoretical concepts. By widening the geographical scope of research into party politics, I want to improve on our existing understanding of the nature of partisanship in general and explain some new phenomena that came with the globalised world. I am concurrently following two lines of inquiry: the first is a path into the European history, the latter a journey to other, non-Western civilisations.

These two lines of inquiry are theoretically grounded in a set of three implicit assumptions; these assumptions mirror the paradigmatical tenets of civilisational analysis as understood in the late-20th century tradition of Nelson (1981), Huff (1985), Eisenstadt (2002) or Arnason (2003): first, there is the assumption of the 'longue durée' nature of the observed phenomena. 'Longue durée' is a concept common to the majority of, if not all, studies dealing with civilisational continuity. As many authors note (Knöbl 2003: 96; Lee 2012: 2), it is a concept with complicated history and a rather vague use. Its widely (non-)defined nature helps it to travel over the boundaries of nations, continents, cultures and even over time. From the original use by the Annales School in France, it has analytically travelled well from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern and Modern periods, to both Western as well as Eastern European nation-states, to the Americas, Asia and even to former colonial domains. In this work, I primarily use it to emphasise the observable continuity of both the Occidental (in this work used synonymously to Western) as well as other, non-Western (Oriental) civilisations.

This continuity is matter of some disagreement among historians and sociologists, since it can be traced via various cultural, political and economic phenomena that have emerged and been transformed in the course of human history. Christian Meier

(2009) traces the origins of the Western (more specifically, European) civilisation deep into the era of the Greek *agora*, while Richard Miles (2011) even deeper to the ancient cities of the Euphrates. John Hobson (2004), on the other hand, argues that a truly 'Western' civilisation had not developed before the Early Modern era, when the West finally overtook in its development other civilisations, i.e., the Arabs and the Chinese, who had been the technological innovators of the world until that time. In the present work, as is later shown, I do not in fact need to argue about the origins of the longue durée processes I deal with; I merely argue the existence of these longue durée processes that had at the time I focus on in the empirical chapters (the time of the late 19th and early 20th century) already distinctively shaped civilisations for some two to ten centuries, depending on the particular process. This distinctive shape of various unique civilisational processes and their organic inter-state and inter-national continuous transitions should be observable in all world regions: not only in Western Europe but also in Eastern Europe (and Russia) or the Middle East.

The second assumption is the existence of 'multiple modernities', a concept introduced by Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000) to describe the possibility of diverging adaptations to modernisation in different parts of the world. The concept offers a theoretical approach that avoids the strong implications of the 'clash of civilisations' (Huntington 1996) perspective; it highlights persisting cultural patterns in modernising societies and, crucially, does not consider modernisation and Westernisation to be synonymous. For Eisenstadt, modernity is a distinct new civilisation that originated, but is not exclusive to the West. It has its core, i.e., the new paradigm of 'opening' towards the world and of striving to change the old traditional ways; the precise manner of this process, however, varies and does not have to follow the Western way of modernisation; rather it is a "continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs" (Eisenstadt 2000: 2). Modernity is a new ontological vision or a response to the structural challenges that the progress of human history had brought about. Institutions and ideas of all civilisations are modernised according to the same adaptive, modernising premise, but within the old sociocultural framework that has been

characteristic of the particular civilisations. When the focus is on this responsive feature, it may be easily argued that Eisenstadt's concept of modernity shares a lot with the recently popularised notion of modern 'reflection' (Beck – Giddens – Lash 1994). Two recent applications of the 'multiple modernities' approach demonstrate its ability to span centuries, analyse large geographical areas and still deal with current political and social questions that are also relevant to the present work: the question of transforming European identities (Spohn 2009) and of partisanship based on a common resistance to the West (Roniger – Waisman 2002).

Finally, there is the third assumption, one related to the classical sociological trichotomy of culture-politics-economy and thus rather more methodological than the previous two: it says that cultural variables may sometimes be equal or even superior to political and economic ones and may therefore be treated as the independent variables in a chain of causation. Such an understanding of a shifting causal weight of factors of culture, politics and economy is characteristic of civilisational analysis in the tradition of Max Weber; the best example of it is Weber's own cultural explanation for the economic success of the Protestant West (Arnason 2010: 80). It is sort of a middle-ground approach in the conflict between 'strong' and 'weak' explanations of sociocultural phenomena (Alexander 2008) and in the present work, its result is the starting equal treatment of all cultural, political and economic variables. The lately following empirical analyses of two selected cases, on which the theory presented here is tested, start with no preconceived design as to the relative weight of factors; unlike in the 'strong programme' cultural sociology, I do not emphasise the role of culture in shaping the politicoeconomical sphere. Since this work is concerned with bringing civilisation analysis closer to the science of politics, I discuss mostly the political connotations of the new civilisational approach; however, I still do not consider politics to play the dominant role in the complex picture of the historical narrative of civilisational encounters. My argument, as fully presented later on, even points to the potency of cross-civilisational encounters to produce tensions and discrepancies inside the trichotomy of politics, economy and culture; these three types of variables may in fact differ substantially in their ability to adapt phenomena transferred from other

civilisations. The transfer of technology may be accelerated in the economic sphere and at the same time lacking in the realm of culture (see, e.g., the failures of welfarism in Africa, the clash between socialism and tribalistic structures in Arab countries). Or, the politics of some civilisations may prove to be unable to accommodate some political institutions that come hidden in primarily cultural objects (e.g., the impact of Hollywood on the Middle East and the liberalisation struggles of women in Saudi Arabia after the 1991 Gulf War).

At the end of the day, the present work does not focus on answering all the problematic question related to the trichotomy, or the even more knotty questions of research methodology, but focuses solely on the narrow issue of political parties and how they can be better understood by mainstream Western political science with analytical tools offered by the studies of civilisations. It is an exploratory work that neither fully exhausts all the different possibilities of research into the issues and concepts here presented, nor makes ultimate statements about the analysed phenomena. It merely tries to show a way how to overbridge existing gaps between research agendas and how to conjoin theories of different politicosociological subfields. With this task in mind, a theoretical framework popular in current political science is introduced in the following chapter, with a particular focus on the open joints to which concepts of civilisation analysis may be attached.

2. The Theoretical Framework of the Rokkanian Model

While Shmuel Eisenstadt can undoubtedly be already counted among the classics of civilisational analysis, a similar position of high esteem is in comparative political science assigned to Eisenstadt's sometime collaborator, the Norwegian social scientist Stein Rokkan (1921-1979). Rokkan is one of the most cited and most popular author in the modern European political science. The scope of Rokkan's work is overwhelming (see, e.g., Rokkan 1964; 1965; 1967; 1968; 1973; 1981; 1987) and even though he never got to publishing his own *opus magnum*, he co-authored seminal volumes in cultural, historical and political sociology (e.g., Campbell – Rokkan 1960; Rokkan – Lipset 1967; Rokkan – Eisenstadt 1973; Rokkan – Urwin 1983). Shortly after his death, in 1981, the International Social Science Council established in his name the highly prestigious Stein Rokkan's Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. In the research into political parties, Rokkan's theoretical models and concepts, finally collected and summarised long after his death by the Austrian sociologist Peter Flora (Flora et al 1999), serve today as one of the cornerstones for analytical understanding of the political development in (Early) Modern Europe.

In a nutshell, Stein Rokkan's theory is "an attempt to integrate crises in state- and nation-building processes with conditions for democratic survival such as the extension of citizenship rights and the establishment of stable political cleavages in parliaments and amongst the voting population" (Aarebrot – Berglund 1995: 211). It is a historical-sociological interpretation of primarily political processes: the originally geographically homogenous society of the European continent is becoming divided along religious (the Reformation era) and national lines (the National Revolution). Soon, also the stable vertical hierarchy of the Medieval society is being transformed by the growing urbanisation and industrialisation of the new nation-states. The structuralism of this part of Rokkan's theory reflects its Parsonian origins and, quite understandably, resembles the structuralist approach of Eisenstadt and civilisational analysis.

Central to Rokkan's theory is the concept of 'cleavage': a division on issues in the electorate, that provides the voters with a sense of shared identity, is identifiable in the demographics in sociostructural terms, and ultimately leads to the development of an organised effort by enfranchised individuals (Bartolini – Mair 1990: 215). Since its conception, there has been a prolonged, wide ranging academic debate over the factual meaning and definition of 'cleavage' (Römmele 1999). From Rokkan's works and those he co-authored with Seymour Lipset, it appears that these two researchers thought of a cleavage as originating in a bottom-up process: from observable divisions in the society that are of a structural socioeconomic and cultural nature to its superstructural mirroring in national politics. Sociostructural factors preceded the factors' political representation.

Rokkan himself identified four cleavages in the political development of Western Europe (Flora et al 1999: 277-412). They were the result of long-term historical processes that were happening (or has already in their largest part happened) in European societies. First, there was the Reformation, during which the religious dominion of the Catholic church was diminished and in many European countries taken over by national churches. This first division of the then homogeneous medieval society subsequently gave rise to religious conflicts not only between various denominations in Europe, but also between secular and religious leaders. According to Rokkan, in the era of mass politics, the division was transformed into one cleavage on the functional axis of society: the cleavage Church vs State. The second functional cleavage emerged later, with the technology of manufactories and with the gradual revocation of the feudal rights of *corvée* and serfdom. The unleashed labour force was absorbed by the new capitalist industries and large-scale factory production. The interests of this labour force had been ignored for a long time, but when the era of mass politics came in the second half of the 19th century, the new 'economic' cleavage between labour and employers would become the most prominent cleavage of mass politics.

While the Church vs State cleavage and the Labour vs Employers cleavage divided the society on the functional, or vertical, axis, two cleavages formed along the

territorial, or horizontal, axis: first, the (re-)birth of cities in the high-medieval Europe brought about the development of a new class: the bourgeoisie. On-going urbanisation soon started to challenge the previously unshakeable position of production of the agricultural countryside. The traditional agricultural society, represented by both the labour itself (peasants and small-holders) as well as the agricultural employers (gentry and landed nobility) held a common ground of conservatism and tradition and this division in the time of mass politics translated into the specific cleavage between the city and the country. The second territorial cleavage resulted from the processes of nation- and state-building. The usually forced formation of nation-states in the 18th and the 19th century left many small nations culturally and politically subjected to their larger counterparts. These nations, if not completely assimilated, often became centres of resistance to the cultural imperialism of the capital and were the reason of frequent unrests and violent clashes on the peripheries of European states; that is where the cleavage Centre vs Periphery originated.

In the era of democratic politics, that was gradually established in most of the countries in Western Europe in the second half of the 19th century, the partisan life of the enfranchised masses formed along these four cleavages; parties developed so as to advocate the interests of the groups featuring in the aforementioned conflicts (i.e., the Bourgeoisie, Church, Employers, Farmers, Labour, National Minorities, etc.) and original Western European party families may summarily be classified according to Table 1. This table presents what might be called the 'Rokkanian model of Western European party politics':

Table 1: Cleavages of Western Politics	*Territorial Dimension*	*Functional Dimension*
Reformation/National Revolution	Centre X Periphery	Church X State
Industrialisation/International Revolution	City X Countryside	Labour X Employers

For the purpose of finding a common ground between civilisational analysis and the Rokkanian model, two important things need to be highlighted: first, it is the temporal longevity of historical processes behind cleavages. Lipset and Rokkan came in the 1970s under a strong criticism from fellow scholars not only for the arguable definitional vagueness of the notion of cleavage, or for the failure to account for the many empirical variations between the party systems of European countries (Abrams 1982: 172-4), but also because they apparently underplayed the role of short-term political agency and the importance of political decision-making. Douglas Rae and Michael Taylor (1970) argued that there is a difference between a 'latent' and 'manifest' cleavage and political science should be predominantly interested in the occurrence of the latter.

However, such an action-focused approach is not very useful if the research goal is to blend aspects of civilisational analysis with political party analysis. The requirement of 'longue durée' that is assumed to be present in the observed phenomenon is synonymous to long-term historical processes. Agency has its role in the model: it creates the sequence of choices that moves the whole social construct forward, albeit along the line preconfigured by structural patterns. As I argue in later chapters, actors in the political arena are often more rigidly than not constrained in their choices by limits set by historical precedence and institutions; for political parties, i.e., collective actors with complex internal organisation, the rigidity of these limits is even reinforced by the parties' own institutional nature.

The second matter of importance is the chronological succession of cleavages as theorised by Lipset and Rokkan: first, the Religious Reformation, second, the National Revival, third, the Industrial Revolution. This particular succession suggests the longer continuation of the cultural, i.e., religious, over the political, i.e., national, and the economic, i.e., industrial cleavage, respectively. Since most of the longitudinal research of civilisational analysis is in its vast majority concerned with the religious background of societies and their world-views, the Rokkanian notion of the development of the religious cleavage fits into this model well. The political and economic cleavages are, in comparison, less rigid and more susceptible to

short-term changes; the role agency plays in them is therefore arguably more substantial. While the cultural symbolic frameworks may take centuries to bend and modify, actual institutions of the state and sub-state governance may be changed in a matter of months, weeks, even days. The temporal dimension of religious and non-religious institutions is also designed differently: while the first are thought to span many lifetimes and practically last till the end of times, politics has often been the target of deliberately provisional, temporary decisions. This temporal primacy of culture corresponds to the assumptions of the ‘strong programme’ of cultural sociology (Alexander – Smith 2003), which is not the paradigm endorsed by this work in any case but, more importantly, also follows the Weberian tradition of research into civilisations as primarily the functions of culture (Arnason 2003: 250-80).

While these temporal and cultural aspects of the Rokkanian model favour its blending with civilisational analysis, one other aspect complicates it. It is the Western European background of the model; Rokkan himself confessed that he based his theory exclusively on the experience of Western Europe and stopped short from including the development behind what was in the 1970s the Iron Curtain (Rokkan 1975: 579). Even in its most evolved form, Rokkan's map of the political development of Europe from the Middle Ages to the modern era, covers only the territories of the two most eastern medieval Catholic kingdoms, i.e. Poland and Hungary. Eastern Europe and the Balkans, during the Late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period regions of the Orthodox and the Islamic dominance, were in Rokkan’s original draft omitted. Rokkan did this consciously: focusing exclusively “on the Celtic, the Latin, and the Germanic people”, he defined Europe as comprising at the most the nation-states of the “Roman Catholic Church part of Europe after the Schism of 1054” (Flora 1999: 86). Undoubtedly, a full consideration of Eastern Europe and the Balkans would complicate his model-building, mainly because of the different cultural basis of Eastern nation-states and their problematic experience with external empires.

However, an idea central to Rokkan's work is to base explanatory theories about political development on large-scale comparisons of cases and subsequent induction; this use of the 'grounded-theory' methodology has so far proven very useful for the European political scientists that followed up on the original work by Lipset and Rokkan. In spite of Rokkan's own reluctance to go beyond the boundaries of Western Europe, many scholars have transcended these boundaries both in the geographical as well as in the theoretical sense. After all, many believe that a major task of modern social sciences is to make their models travel and to produce open, not spatial-specific hypotheses.

There has been a strong opposition from those who deem the concept of cleavage unique to Western European settings (e.g., Cammack 1994; Randall 2011; Biezen – Caramani 2007); despite that, Lipset and Rokkan's theories has since their conception also been used in research into Latin American party systems (e.g., Coppedge 1984; Dix 1989; Mainwaring – Scully 1995), Indian and East Asian party systems (Chibber – Petrocik 1990; Heath – Yadav 1999; Lye – Hofmeister 2011) and considered even in African settings (Chabal – Daloz 1999; Tordoff 2002; Lindberg 2006; Osei 2012). By far the most frequently has the concept travelled into post-communist countries and the common historical heritage shared by Central and Western Europe has been especially welcoming and targeted in research by many studies using the Rokkanian model, most of them focusing on the re-emergence of cleavages in post-communist party systems (e.g., Evans – Whitefield 1995; Gibson – Cielecka 1995; Wade et al 1995; Markowski 1997; Mateju et al 1999; Whitefield 2002). More extensive comparative studies went even further to the East and assessed the development of cleavages in Bulgaria (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 1999; Evans – Whitefield 2000), the Baltics (Evans 1998; Evans – Lipsmeyer 2001), or Ukraine (Birch 1995; Birch – Wilson 1999; Kubicek 2000) and Moldova (Evans – Need 2002).

What the post-communist studies have in common with works on cleavages in Africa, Latin America or Asia is their short-term focus. They are concerned primarily with the current development of politics, which is not wrong per se:

however, as the Rokkanian model is based on the analytical recognition of the importance of long-term processes, disregarding these processes may be considered a serious methodological flaw. Even though the era of communist rule may have ruptured the long-term development of cleavages in Central and Eastern European societies, many works show that at least until the Second World War, mass politics in non-Western European regions had been shaped by structural patterns also found in the original Rokkanian model (e.g., Kommisrud 2009). And, what is even more interesting, these cleavages in many countries even survived the communist intermezzo and pre-communist and post-communist party systems therefore show striking similarities in the behaviour of both parties and voters (e.g., Cotta 1994; Markus 1994; 1996; Tworzecki 1996; 2002; Rivera 1996; Lewis 2000; Lindstrom 2001; Sitter 2001; Zielinski 2002; Kostelecky 2002; Toole 2003; 2007).

In short, the Rokkanian model has already many times been used in its original form, that is grounded in Western European settings, also in research into the mass politics of other regions. Its temporal division has been extended and its endpoint moved from the 1970s to the early 21st century. Moreover, the concept of cleavage has been the target of many a theoretical reconsideration (or, more cynically, hijacking), similar to those that I present in this work. These theoretical reconsiderations may be classified broadly into three types as follows:

First, the push for more "agency-oriented" content of the concept led to a particular theoretical branch of literature that practically abandons the sociostructural grounding of cleavages. Authors of this branch argue that a high volatility of the electorate in the last three or four decades makes for all purposes the original meaning of cleavages irrelevant. These authors are inclined to emphasise, on one hand, the important role of elections (e.g., Duverger 1951; Rae 1971; Taagepera – Shugart 1999; Tsebelis 2002), and, on the other hand, the ever more important role that political parties play today in the structuring of political choices (Blondel 1973; Sartori 1976; Lijphart 1994). The electorate is divided from above through gradual specification and clarification of party ideologies and programmes. Traditional electoral blocs disappear via various social processes related to modernisation (i.e.,

increased horizontal and vertical mobilisation), but also via a deliberate pressure from the partisan agency. This is especially true for new democracies in the post-communist region, where the society is even more dynamic and shifts in its respective stratum are more turbulent (see. e.g., Agh 1998; Kitschelt et al 1999). Beyme (1994) and Hlousek and Kopecek (2008) as the typical "political" cleavage created by parties in Central Europe see the residual conflict of Communism vs Anti-Communism that, even after the regime transition, cuts across older, more "sociological" cleavages and, at least temporarily, replaces them.

Second, there is a "moderate" camp of scholars who look for the middle-ground between the "agency-oriented" understanding of cleavage that is produced by political parties and the "traditionalist", primarily historical-sociological understanding. This camp mostly discusses the issue of 'new politics' (Inglehart 1977; Baker et al 1981; Müller-Rommel 1984; Franklin 1992; Dalton 2004), i.e., the situation of the post-industrial society where the significance of value orientations for individual voting choices has overgrown the significance of structural variables. Values are also hypothesised to be more individually stable than sociodemographic characteristics and therefore the backbone of stable party systems (Tóka 1998). Knutsen (Knutsen –Scarbrough 1995; Knutsen 2004) assessed this question by looking into electoral surveys and electoral results and found inconclusive evidence that neither supported not firmly refuted this hypothesis. Values matter, but structural basis of political conflict, rather than being eroding, appears quite resilient in Western European countries. Even today, it continues to have a considerable impact on political choices – either directly, or indirectly by affecting the value orientations which depend on it. Political parties have come up with new issues and themes in their programmes, but the overall shape of party systems is still straightjacketed by social structures; cleavages appear to be unmoved by the pro-active approach of the 'new politics' parties.

Last but not least, there are those who want to maintain the "traditionalist" full sociological-political content of the concept and merely extend it to new social divisions in European societies; divisions that are not directly connected to the

processes captured by Lipset and Rokkan. For instance, in Western Europe, the shift from industrial employment to service employment created jobs characterised by less employment security and lower wages for medium and low-skilled workers. Subsequently, it brought about a division inside the labour class and these two constituencies are now represented by two different leftist and centre-leftist party families (Kriesi 1993; Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi 1998; Oesch 2006). Even more recent is the rise of the 'new right' parties who seem to be anchored in an emerging traditionalist, small bourgeois stratum of voters who negatively perceive the symptoms of a globalised world such as economic migration (Jackman – Volpert 1996). Authors who adopt such a historical-sociological approach may then arguably be in a comparatively better position to explain the emergence of new parties; on the other hand, it is harder for them to account for shifts in the ideological positions of older parties with traditional electorates.

It is not the task of this work to judge which of these three types of theoretical reconsiderations are moving research ahead the most; all feature some advantages and some drawbacks for an analytical understanding of the recent transformations of party politics in Europe. Moreover, some important issues of politics in Europe, such as the 'Europeanisation' of national politics, voters and parties, evade the classification as a 'cleavage' any way the concept is used (Külahci 2012). For the goal of blending research into political parties with civilisational analysis, the use of a "full" sociological content of the concept of cleavage ought to be the preferred one, at least at the start of an empirical analysis. The data gathered on the way may lead to a necessary loosening of the tight boundaries of the sociological version and, once again, a theoretical reconsideration, but the original design should include it for its conceptual depth and also for its commonalities with the civilisational agenda. The reflection of 'longue durée' in Lipset and Rokkan's work has already been noted; agency in this model is the dynamical factor that creates a sequence of historical choices inside preconfigured structural patterns. It is the 'path-dependent' model of critical historical junctures (Collier – Collier 1991), where actors are still firmly constrained by structure and long-term processes are not easily affected by political choice.

The sociological understanding and 'path-dependent' approach to the concept of cleavage is characteristic also of the now trendy research agenda into a specific new phenomenon in the society of the late 20th and early 21st century: the phenomenon of a globalising world. The possibility of existence of a new cleavage in Western Europe has been kicked around already for several decades by European political scientists and many times debated in connection with various new divisions in national party systems (see also above Kriesi 1993; Kitschelt 1994; Jackman – Volpert 1996). Sociologists note that developed post-industrial societies have been transforming since the Second World War by multiple social developments that have put traditional social classes in motion, changed their living conditions, life chances and patterns of socioeconomic inequality. These developments include reducing national barriers for labour, trade, and capital mobility, reducing social protection and the shrinkage of the welfare state and the decline of local communities and traditional formal organisations (labour, cultural or political). Only those with sufficient educational and cognitive skills, geographic mobility and professional career flexibility to take advantage of the new opportunities in affluent post-industrial societies benefited largely from these developments (Esping-Andersen 1999).

3. The Middle Ground in Approaches towards Modernity

The new sociological cleavage in European party systems, that is outlined at the end of the previous chapter, has not yet been the subject of civilisational analysis; it has, however, been the subject of many an academic discussion among sociologists of other subfields and among political scientists. Undoubtedly, the post-Second World War era is a time different from the time before the War. The human civilisation and its societies has been undergoing processes that are new to human history and since these processes are still open-ended and many only now growing in their magnitude, social scientists have quite understandably difficulties analysing them.

Among these processes and their analyses may arguably even be found a common ground between research into party systems and the agenda of civilisational studies. It requires a rethinking of certain key theoretical terms of these two social-scientific subfields, or, to put it in another, maybe more precise way, it requires a detailed look of how these two subfields approach the issue of analysing recent global phenomena. There are broadly speaking two methodological positions from which political scientists and political sociologists in Europe approach it:

The first position is focusing solely on the West, cutting out the bloc of Western civilisations from the global aggregate and ignoring the rest. The analysis then takes the form of disentangling processes within the Western society, tracing long-term changes and also differences between those processes in different Western geographical settings. A classic example of this position is Ronald Inglehart and his post-materialist/post-modernist thesis about advanced industrial societies (1977; 1990; 1997). The thesis integrates several aspects of changes in the economic, political and cultural settings of the Western society. Sociostructural changes are related to changes in a distinct ideological or value dimension and these are expected to have a direct impact on political preferences. Inglehart attempts to identify the sociological and psychological bases of post-materialist values that leads to the recent rise of 'post-materialist', 'new-left' and 'alternative' non-mainstream political parties. What is different in Inglehart's thesis is the already mentioned 'middle-ground' in the understanding of cleavage: it is not a cleavage

firmly anchored in the sociostructural characteristics of a certain demography, but it is a cleavage of values, which themselves alone may have causal effects on the political preferences of voters (Inglehart 1977: 182-4; Knutsen 1986). This thesis has subsequently also been picked up by other researchers into political parties (Baker et al 1981; Dalton 2004) and also prominently by researchers looking for a common theoretical explanation for the rise of new political parties and new social movements (Offe 1985). Logically, these authors also form the "moderate" camp of researchers that understand cleavages as anchored in the intersection of a particular social stratum (e.g., well-educated with a relative economic security) and specific values (e.g., social liberal). The primary characteristics of this methodological approach, however, are first, its dominant focus on the West, i.e., a pool of very similar countries and cultures, and second, treating the new sociostructural processes as mostly specific to the Occidental civilisation.

The second position looks at the global society as a whole and discusses the ever so overused but never truly defined notion of 'globalisation' and how it changes Western European politics. Here, it might be feasibly argued that the processes of post-modernisation, post-materialisation and post-industrialisation on one hand, and the process of globalisation on the other, are in fact distinctly different processes; however, definitely in the party politics literature, and perhaps also in social reality, these processes are practically indistinguishable, their indicators intertwined, concepts interchanged and data intercorrelated. Compared to the debate on the post-materialist cleavage, the debate on the cleavage of globalisation is younger by one or two decades: it came to the research agenda on political parties via other fields, such as the democratic theory (Held et al 1999), international relations (Ruggie 1993) or media studies (Zurn 1998). It also discusses new, post-Second World War developments in the West; the point of departure with the post-materialist research is the notion of 'unbundling' (Ruggie 1993) of national boundaries, denationalisation of the world and structural divisions on supra-national and trans-national level. From denationalisation, it is a short step to the analysis of political developments caused by global-wide sociostructural processes. Hanspeter Kriesi summarises the assumptions that such analyses today usually make (Kriesi et al

2006: 921-2): first, they assume that the impact of globalisation is politically mostly manifested at the level of national party politics as the democratic political inclusion of citizens is still predominantly an affair of the nation-state. Second, they also assume that globalisation creates two opposing groups of 'losers' and 'winners' of globalisation in socioeconomic terms. Third, these new groups create political potentials for new types of parties which aggregate and articulate the interests of either the 'winners' or the 'losers'. Fourth, the unbundling of national boundaries is a political issue by itself, where the demand of the 'losers' is to regress at some levels back into the pre-globalised era.

These four assumptions create a theoretical space where the Rokkanian model can be blended with the concepts of civilisational analysis: first, there is the paradoxical binding of the globalisation research to national party systems. Many influential studies show the enduring primacy of domestic over transnational problems at the level of national politics; voters seem to be still strongly "nationalised" and not "Europeanised" or "globalised" in their thinking and electoral preferences (e.g., Mair 2001; 2004; Caramani 2004; der Brug – Spanje 2009). Since the left-right economic cleavage between the labour and the employees is even today (in the year 2012) the dominant cleavage in European societies (Knutsen 1988; 1995a; 1995b; 2005; 2006; Dalton 2009) and it is the states who still have the largest say in economic matters, party systems evolve differently in different European countries. This variance can then be explained both in terms of longue durée processes within long-term sociostructural cleavages as well as by a sequencing of critical historical junctures; these explanations and their combinations bring in both the paradigm of civilisational analysis as well as the original Rokkanian model. Also the various configurations of the significance of economic vs political vs cultural cleavages leave a gap for the comparative concepts of civilisational analysis. The intersections of these configurations is where the groups of 'losers' and 'winners' of globalisation form: the traditionalist, conservative, economically insecure of the first group at one intersection, the pro-modern, liberal, economically well-off of the second group at another. These groups then articulate their demands via parties that form around these culturosocial intersections.

At this point, a certain “middle-ground” approach how to look at the post-Second World War developments might be thought of: an approach based on more “classical” sociological, non-political concepts and concepts of civilisational analysis. Instead of focusing on postmaterial/postmodernist values in the Occidental society at one end of the methodological spectrum, or the (assumed) effects of the world-wide phenomenon of globalisation on the other, the “middle-ground” may constitute a framework comparing the various ways how different nations, cultures, or even civilisations adapt to these (post-)modern processes. Instead of looking at one part of the whole, or on the whole, it may look at two and more parts and at their interactions. At the start, such an approach is a change of focus in the analysis, but at the end, it may also bring a refinement in the understanding of the analysed processes; I build this approach up on a new cleavage of ‘modernity’.

I make a rather bold, but theoretically feasible decision to conceptualise 'modernity' as a term directly and inseparably linked to the terms 'globalisation' and 'post-materialism' as they have been used in political sociology and research into political parties. I do not strictly differentiate between the common terms of 'modernity' and 'post-modernity'; I rather think of them as a gradual, roughly two-phase process of emerging “objective” modern sociostructural phenomena (i.e., secularisation, urbanisation, etc.) and the subsequent individual and collective “subjective” adaptive response to them. I understand 'modernity' as the one subjective concept of 'reflexive modernity' (Beck – Giddens – Lash 1994), or and endpoint, in which a civilisation responds, through the aggregate of shifting paradigms in various spheres of life, to the objective processes of modernisation; the concept overlaps in its most significant aspects (i.e., significant for their use in the present work) with the 'modernity' as conceived by Shmuel Eisenstadt.

Eisenstadt himself (2009) thought about modernity mainly in the terms of how different traditional communities answer to the new 'openness' paradigm that modernisation brings. In other words, modernity was actually the core of the new ideological paradigm that was to be adapted in various world cultures. From the notes made in the previous chapter on cleavages that are structured as answers to

new processes of 'globalisation', it should be clear that 'reflexive modernity' is actually the voluntary sociopolitical response to modern economic, demographic and social processes to which 'globalisation' also belongs; post-materialism is then a part of the Beck-Eisenstadtian 'reflexive modernity'. Continuing on this line of thought, all the original four Rokkanian cleavages may actually be thought of (if one does not forgets about the original 'longue durée' nature of the concept) primarily as answers to specific processes of modernisation; arguably better defined processes than 'globalisation' or 'materialism'. The new cleavage presented here belongs to the same type of cleavages, but features a different substance: not specifically religious, not specifically territorial, not economic, but modernity in its totality. From a methodological point of view, such an approach is quite similar to the mainstream party politics approach to 'globalisation'; while the concept of modernity conflates many distinguishable processes into one, as does globalisation, its use in research in party politics may result in identifying new sociopolitical groups (and parties) that would have been missed otherwise missed in older, original Rokkanian or other classifications. However, unlike the use of globalisation, which is founded on a rather shaky theoretical basis, the use of modernity as an issue of cleavage politics should be theorised in more detail in the present work.

‘Modernity’ itself is a precarious concept for social scientists, one that has long been debated, criticised, rethought and debated again. Its hallmark is the notion of development and progress over time. As Lucian Pye, however, notes “[t]he problem, crudely put, is whether the very concept of modern may not be culture-bound according to a particular level of technology;…” (Pye 1979: 35); in other words, whether it is analytically sustainable to label as ‘modernity’ one particular epoch of one particular human civilisation: specifically, to label thus exclusively the highly urbanised, highly industrialised, secularised and nationalised era in the history of the West (Venn 2002: 19-21). Not only that this approach creates a very suggestive but also a rather false yardstick for the comparison of other civilisations, both extinct and existing, it also problematises the analytical understanding of the current, so-called ‘post-modern’ era, where further advancement of society is not

done via the four ‘modern’ processes, but by other, that sometimes even go against them. Indeed, ‘modern’ is today considered a knowledge-based society with a strong service sector, regulated urbanisation, transnational networks and openness to multiculturalism.

The ‘modernity cleavage’ reflects the unbalanced character of the concept itself. The modernity analytically captured by this cleavage is one that

a) answers to all (or most of) the processes of “objective” (see above) modernisation as an ultimately indivisible aggregate and

b) consciously strives to be as “subjectively” removed from the Western way of modernisation as possible.

These are the two identifying characteristics of the 'modernity' cleavage presented in this work. This cleavage is founded on the methodological underpinning of the Lipset-Rokkan framework, but build with the theoretical and empirical blocks brought by civilisational analysis.

Shmuel Eisenstadt (1987) argues that modernity is something more than the West; even though it is of Occidental origins, it transcends the Occident. Then, as it spreads from its cradle into the world and into the spaces of other civilisations, it is transformed by sociostructural patterns that are inherent to these civilisations. Modernity is not a rigid, fixed matter, but it takes on the shape of the environmental features it encounters; it is a transition from a traditional into a new world and this transition, even though firstly happening in Europe and North America, is not limited to Western settings. Neither it is happening in a form identical or necessarily similar to the West. It is a fundamental shift of cultural, political and economic patterns that is in this work defined identically to the definition used by the emerging paradigm of civilisational analysis: in Johann Arnason’s (1993: 14) words: “…the transition to modernity can be defined in terms of new, more dynamic and more rationalized forms of accumulating wealth and power, together with a cultural context that can generate new frameworks of legitimation as well as new ways of questioning and contestation, [and] it must be added that the

successive Western configurations do not exhaust the possibilities inherent in this epochal shift."

On the following pages, I consider 'modernity' itself to be in reality a highly-contested concept that for different national, cultures and civilisations may mean substantially different things. Based on an evidence from the field of partisan politics, I argue that this variance between civilisations is also noticeable in how people aggregate and articulate their demands, how they politically organise and, ultimately, how they understand the space of public politics. Since the key term of my work is the Rokkanian concept of cleavage, this argument is focused narrowly on political parties of the modern era.

I adopt the middle-ground not only in my understanding of the concept of modernity, but lean closely towards the middle-ground approach also in the understanding of cleavage; as discussed above, I follow the works of Inglehart (1977), Müller-Rommel (1984), Franklin (1992) or Dalton (2004). The cleavages I trace are partially created by the processes of modernisation how they have been happening in different civilisations and therefore, they are based on observable sociostructural lines. However, they also form on the values that each different nation, culture, or civilisation holds as its own, and these values are the cause of variance among cases, where potentially similar sociostructural factors would otherwise produce similar patterns in party politics. Various civilisational features imprint themselves into a core of the transition into the new paradigm of modernity that is shared by all civilisations.

What is actually the 'shared core' of modernisation and modernity and what are the specific civilisational features (e.g., what is 'Westernisation') I cannot assert at this moment. This question should be more than partially (even though not at all exhaustively) answered by the analysis presented in the next chapters of this work. The analysis is devised from the methodological viewpoint as a grounded theory and therefore designed to come up with both questions and answers during the process of data construction and analysis; it follows the original Rokkan's approach towards social reality and its scientific understanding. Unlike the predecessor, it

does not, firstly, focuses exclusively on the Western settings – quite the contrary, its goal is to compare the experience of the Occident with other civilisations – and, secondly, it does not by far reaches the same level of complexity. Neither it exhausts the research topic as much as Lipset and Rokkan did. It only proposes a theoretical civilisational extension to the Rokkanian model and offers an example how it may be filled with data.

More precisely, it offers two examples how the proposed extension may look: first, the case of the Russian Communist (aka Bolshevik) party, and second, the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The selection of these cases is based on the following premise: the Russian Communist party was an offspring of the encounter of two civilisations, the European Occidental one and the Russian Orthodox one at the start of the 20th century. The originally uniquely Occidental phenomenon of an organised political party that articulates in a parliamentary setting demands of the individuals it represents travelled eastwards; the Russian environment, however, lacked many of the cultural features (such as the concept of liberal parliamentary democracy) and quite a few of the important sociostructural features (such as a developed powerful bourgeoisie) of the West. Consequently, the Occidental phenomenon morphed into a completely new "beast", a mix of its European heritage and new, uniquely Russian features. The Russian Communist Party from its birth onwards thus differed from the Occidental concept of political party and it is a question – that is also targeted in the following chapter of this work – whether it is right to include it in comparisons in mainstream political science as casually as it is today done.

The second case concerns the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The phenomena of Communism and Islam has already been compared by sociologists as aggregates of ideas and institutions (e.g., Monnerot 1949), but not yet from the point of view of party politics and the Lipset-Rokkan model. The Muslim Brotherhood is a younger phenomenon than the Russian Communist Party, of a different geographical origin, but the process behind its birth and early development may be presumed to be in general terms quite similar. It is also a blend of different civilisational features,

European and Islamic ones, and its comparison to political parties originating in Occidental liberal democracies is therefore necessarily to be made using the concepts of civilisational analysis. Moreover, unlike the Russian Communist party, that has already had a history long enough to make it distinguishable for scholars from other types of Communist parties (such as the Chinese, or the East Asian type), as is shown in the next two chapters, research into Islamic parties and the Muslim Brotherhood particularly has not as yet produced enough literature to set firmly up a paradigmatic classification. Islamic parties have spread rather violently throughout the Islamic world in the 20th century, but, compared to communist parties, their contact with the West was infrequent and their workings fairly removed from Europe and the Americas. Hence, Western scholars of party politics have not had the space to debate Islamic parties as much as they debated communists and even today, the analytical approach towards Islamic parties must be less paradigmatic and more cautious. In the following chapter, the first case to analyse is then the "easier" one, that has been by Western political scientists researched already many times over: the case of the Russian Communist Party.

4. The Russian Communist Party

4.1. Introduction

During Stalin's era, the penetration of society in the Soviet Union with the structures of the Communist Party was so extensive that fundamentally the entire society reflected the ideology the Party was built upon. This on one hand facilitates the application of a Rokkanian-type of analysis as it is in fact the closest possible relationship between a party and its “voters”. On the other hand, this proximity was from a large part created by artificial, totalitarian measures after a prolonged violent struggle, which differentiates the case from the common Rokkanian settings of highly pacified, non-violent politics. In this chapter, I focus on the development of the Bolshevik, later Communist, Party to show how Rokkanian-like social divisions and their cultural, economic and cultural manifestations shaped profoundly the foundations of the Soviet regime; despite that this development took place in an environment quite different from Western Europe, in an environment of heightened violence and underdeveloped political representation.

Even though the Soviet regime lasted until the early 1990s, its foundations were laid during Vladimir Lenin’s leadership of the Bolshevik Party and subsequently perfected by Joseph Stalin; the contours of the regime and of the Party, which, as I argue, represents a party of the 'modernity cleavage', are therefore best fit for a summarising analysis as they existed during Lenin’s and Stalin’s era; this analysis should illuminate clearly both commonalities as well as the radical differences between Western political parties – including Marxist ones – and the Russian Communists.

The principal commonality is rather obvious and almost banal: Russian Communism at the time of Lenin and Stalin was also described as “an ideology of authoritarian bureaucratic party discipline, of superstate chauvinism, of unprincipled pragmatism” (Kopelev 1977: 227). Even if such a description might arguably be biased, when looking at Lenin and Stalin’s writings and their actual policies, one may indeed notice a lot of pragmatic, opportunistic thinking. Both

leaders not only pragmatically interpreted the original Marxist ideas, on which the Communist Party and the Soviet State were based, they even sometimes chose to clearly contradict them. The form of the Soviet state administration, economic, social and cultural policies of the Communist Party, they were all enacted by Lenin and Stalin with the aim to secure the victory of their party, with the aim to seize and hold on power. As shown below, the Bolsheviks of the late 19th century promoted doctrinaire Marxism in their early public appearances mostly because it helped them to define themselves against other Russian reformist groups. Once the Bolsheviks found themselves in a position when they were backed with sufficient popular support, they unabashedly defied Marx and Engel's theses. This pragmatic attitude was not exclusive to leaders but common to party rank and file, too. In this pragmatism, the Communist Party in Russia most resembled opportunistic political parties in Europe, particularly those parties that were looking for their popular support across diverging social groups. Since the Soviet State was designed to capture all the strata in society, pragmatism was a necessary part of its politics.

Yet, this layer of shared pragmatism ought not to obscure certain unique features that set Russian Communism apart from other political parties, be it political parties in the early 20th century Europe or anywhere else. While there is a tradition of focusing on these features from a Marxist analytical viewpoint (see, e.g., Zinovev [1924]1973), a new civilisational viewpoint should also offer fresh insights. For the Bolshevik pragmatism to work, it had to be based on a set on specific values and concepts outlining its political message that would appeal to people and also a set of political tools disseminating the message. The following paragraphs describe both sets in a historical narrative that emphasises the critical junctures of the long and complex story of Communism in Russia.

4.2. The Roots of the Party

For most disinterested observers at the start of the 20th century, the emergence of Russian Communism was as surprising as was its fall surprising for observers at the end of the century. However, ex post facto analyses (as usual) show that both the emergence and the fall are explainable in many a different theoretical frameworks,

including those frameworks that consider long-term sociostructural cleavages in the Russian society and compare Russian Communism to previous Russian historical epochs. The power of traditional culture and religious convictions cannot be discarded if the impact of Communism in Russia is to be fully understood. Since the end of the 10th century, Russia has been an Orthodox Christian country, but with many remaining pre-Christian traditions (Fedotov 1966): these were later, in the second half of the 19th century, rediscovered, reconceptualised and “modernised” by intellectual elites as the notions of 'Slavism' and 'organic collectivity' transcending individual experience. These two notions were considered the most important for the historical development of the Russian culture and particularly well-established in the vocabularies of the *Narodnik* movement (see below) and many a prominent author of Russian scholarship and literature such as F. Dostoyevsky, N. N. Strakhov, A. A. Grigorev or N. A. Berdyaev; even if these authors did not use them in the same manner. Especially Slavism was a peculiar concept that seem to gradually progress from a form of pan-tribalistic identity (the 1840s) into an expansionist ideological attitude towards neighbours (the 1940s). Russian authors connected these notions to the success of early Russian politics, when the originally dispersed ethnic groups in Russia managed to set up a united state and even expand beyond the boundaries of Russia proper. (Hosking 2001: 313-15; Shlapentokh 2007: 23-5; Paddock 2010: 8). The philosophy of organic collectivity of Russian people aided this trans-national expansion with bringing in a sense of historical mission, a sense of shared *narodnost* that stood in opposition to both European and Asian non-Russian influences (Hunter 2004: 167).

Another significant feature of the long-term development of culture in Russia was the local ambiguous role of organised religion. While the Russian Orthodox Church was better positioned vis-à-vis the common folk and more influential than the petty secular Russian rulers in the Early Middle Ages, in the Early Modern period, the Imperial State became the dominating partner in the Church-State relationship; this led to the Church’s full nationalisation and, since the reforms of Peter the Great in the 1700s, also to its subordination to the State (see, e.g., Bushkovitch 1992: 3-10). Peter’s original goal to secularise Russia after the Western European model (Raeff

1966: 8) nevertheless failed since his successors chose to retain the power over the clergy but at the same time do not renounce their own Divine Right to sovereignty. That was a significant early divergence from the path of modernity as it happened in Europe. The sacral-secular authority of the Empire shielded its subjects from the ideas of the French Revolution, never allowed them to become citizens, and Christian mysticism would be then firmly tied to the Russian Tsarist regime even in the 19th century, with Emperors venerated as men chosen by the Divine Hand to lead and guide their people (see, e.g., Krasikov 1998: 75-85; Fanning 2001: 45-74). Berdyaev (1937) and Voegelin ([1959]1968) show that the same religious charge of authority had in fact for a long time been inherent to the image of the ruler in Russia and would eventually belong also to the Communist Party as the leader of the nation. The long traditional presentation of Moscow as the Christian 'Third Rome' has been found immensely present in the Soviet regime, its practices and imagery (Berdyav 1937; Treadgold 1997: 853; Duncan 2000; Kalb 2008). Despite the forced ostensible secularisation of the Soviet Union that was started by the Bolsheviks in the 1910s, the Russian Communists would in reality manage to fill in the space left by the Russian Orthodox traditional belief in a divine, omniscient authority with the belief in a “scientific” authority of Marxism; they would create a new ‘secular religion’ (Aron 1957: 265-94)

Eisenstadt’s notion of ‘multiple modernities’ seem to hold well particularly for long-term processes in the history of modern Russia. From the start, many historians and philosophers have argued (e.g., Berdyaev 1937; Lane 1975; Confino 1984; Duncan 2000) that Russian Communism was a unique phenomenon, an amalgam of perpetrating Western ideas and technologies that were being adopted and adapted by actors in Eastern realities, something quite unlike anything seen before. That is why the roots of Russian Communism are so often linked to the phenomenon of modernisation as something originating in the West but gradually impacting the rest of the world; the roots are indeed traced deep to the first modernising efforts of Peter the Great, to the early industrial and bureaucratic progress of the state during the reign of Catherine the Great, and to the development of the first elite clubs (e.g., the *Decabrists*) and later political organisations and to

the growth of general political activity in the 19th century; all these advancements led a to European-like image of Russia, where technologies, ideas and know-how of the West penetrated the original realm of the Orthodox Tsarist Russia. If approached from the Rokkanian perspective of cleavages, it ought to be stressed that the perpetration also entailed the increase of internal pressures inside the society and the growth of social divisions.

Most importantly for further historical development, modernising elements were purposefully and deliberately imported to Russia by Russian Emperors from other monarchies of the European continent. The top-down nature of modernisation, where each step was strategically planned and whole processes were at many levels controlled by the state, resulted in a situation called by Nikolai Bukharin 'organised capitalism' or 'a new Leviathan' ([1915]1925: 30). The notion of modernisation in the West was closely connected with two specific sociopolitical phenomena: firstly, the gradual dissipation of the power of landed aristocracy and of the absolute power of the monarch and, secondly, the emergence of a strong, politicised, liberal bourgeoisie. That was at least the "ideal path", the liberal model that in reality was approximated only in a handful of countries, like the United States or the United Kingdom, while the cases of France, Italy or Austria were already more complicated; still, as is shown below, these cases were also quite unlike the Russian one. The structures of political power during modernisation were arguably the result of different standings of the landed aristocracy and the haute bourgeoisie in different countries: where both these social groups were weak, the state filled the political space. Germany appeared to come closer to the latter situation, since the bourgeoisie did not seem to matter much, and among historians in the 20th century was indeed quite common the belief that the German *Sonderweg* contradicted the liberal model (Dixon 1999: 7). Further research on the issues of political standing of citizens of the British Empire and of the *Bürgertum* of the German-speaking Europe nevertheless showed that the relationship between the stratum of 'public state officials' and the stratum of 'private bourgeois capitalists' varied in European countries, with private entrepreneurs noticeably dominating in the United Kingdom

and in North America and strata more or less politically balanced in France but also in the German-Austrian Central Europe (Blackburn – Eley 1984).

In Russia, on the other hand, the situation was much less balanced and much less complicated: state officials in the Empire had never actually allowed urban classes to enter the space of political decision-making. Meritocracy of state managers, bureaucrats and specialists supplanted the role that the individualist bourgeoisie played in European countries and this 'New Class of the State' dominated other social classes in the Russian Empire. The weakness of the bourgeoisie meant that in Russia more than anywhere else in the world, the society in the second half of the 19th century "was developing more according to Max Weber than to Karl Marx" (Daniels 2007: 7). Autocratic, bureaucratic and technocratic are the adjectives that best describe the regime of the Russian Empire after the reforms of Catherine the Great. Moreover, in the outward image of the Empire as well as in its existential legitimacy, these features were accompanied by the uninterrupted traditional sense of Orthodox Christian righteousness and a sense of Messianism in the character of the ruling sovereign (Duncan 2000: 11-9); the sovereign, who was since Peter the Great's reforms not only the head of the State but also the de facto head of the Church (Krindatch 2006).

Despite the unrelenting efforts of the state to control political life and the import of political ideas from the West into the country, many Russian intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century turned away from the existing autocratic/bureaucratic model of government and started to look for inspiration elsewhere. It was a rare case of modernising process in Russia that was not initiated by the state; the more surprising is how consequential this process would eventually prove to be. The fashion of acquiring foreign liberal ideas had long been enjoyed among the Muscovite and the Petersburgian intelligentsia, but it was not until the emancipation and educational reforms of the 1860s that intellectuals began to think in terms of real world changes and not merely academic debates (see, e.g., Clowes – Kassow – West 1991). The "literally" intelligentsia of aristocratic origins expanded with the arrival of a new "working" intelligentsia that graduated from universities in

the 1860s and 1870s and whose origins were in lower social classes. These two classes of intellectuals constituted the first division inside the country's elites based on sociodemographic differences; as is, however, shown in next sections, they would later unite under their shared cultural values.

In addition, the geographical basis of the intelligentsia broadened, with the most liberal members often born and later working in Ukraine or in Belarus (Daniels 1961: 272-4), close to the influence of Western development and economic, social and political changes happening at that time in Europe; here, on the Empire's periphery, they learned that thinking about 'the nation and its destiny', about the lot of man and the rule over masses is not an exclusive domain of the gentry, but it also belongs to the people (Clowes – Kassow – West 1991: 19). Liberal, democratic, socialist and Marxist ideas poured from the 1860s onwards into Russia.

The new, non-aristocratic intellectuals were not only intimately familiar with the poor economic and political situation of the lower classes, they also proved themselves to be more determined in their resolution to change it. Original thinkers in the Russian intelligentsia such as Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolay Chernyshevsky or Nikolay Mikhaylovsky were accompanied by a plethora of more dogmatic revolutionaries like Sergey Nechayev, Pyotr Tkachev or Giorgi Plekhanov and it was the latter group who transformed the reform movement from an intellectual revolt into a force capable of violent opposition against the Imperial government. This group of lower-class revolutionaries took over the political struggle against the Tsar after the middle- and upper-class intelligentsia failed to instigate a successful popular revolution under the programme of *Narodnism* in the 1870s (Laue 1954: 20).

The early Narodniks movement is worth mentioning as it was a significant breakthrough in the thinking of the Russian intelligentsia: instead of salon debates and controversies between liberal Westernisers and conservative Slavophils, Narodnism targeted the people and in the first place the countryside, since the common folk of the Russian Empire was still predominantly rural. It was a unique Russian attempt for a social reform that called on the nation as a whole, not only on

the elites, to protest against the regime and change the old ways. It gave an original twist to the idea of socialism as it professed a deep distrust towards scientification of the human destiny and towards gnostic designs of an utopian future. Instead, Narodnism offered a more humanist, spiritual method of mass emancipation based primarily on the protection of individual liberty and the rights of small-scale, organic communities. Deeply interested in the folklore and Slavic mythologies, they idealised the Russian peasant as the bearer of the national purpose and a freedom – fighter. In their real-world impact, the Narodniks may have overestimated the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, but at least showed that the Imperial regime did not enjoy loyalty and support of the people (Berdyaev 1937: 58-71; Stokes 1995: 144-6).

4.3. The Rise of the Party

The Russian Social Democratic Party, that formed also in reaction to the Narodniks' ideas, was from the start based on the new working intelligentsia, distrustful towards bourgeois intellectuals and not willing to adapt original Western ideas to Russian settings. Despite its apparent incongruity with the agrarian nature of the majority of the Russian labour class, the Social Democrats followed doctrinarily the ideas of Marx and Engels, without giving much consideration to the fact that revolutionary Marxism was almost exclusively interested in factory workers. When Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov – Lenin in 1893 began to organise his Social Democratic group in Petersburg, he was aware of that incongruity (Kingston-Mann 1983: 46-51), but theoretically overbridged it in an 'Erfurtian' (Lih 2008) manner: European-like Social Democracy was to be only one phase in the overarching narrative of the whole Russian transformative modernisation. Lenin in his urban revolutionary agenda calculated with a steady, but rapid pace of urbanisation that was indeed present in Russia in the 1890s. He was also approaching the issue from the viewpoint of a revolutionary political party leader, already devising a rigid hierarchical party model more suitable for dogmatic followers than free-thinkers who would have had the potential to jeopardize Marx's position as the intellectual forefather as well as Lenin's position as Marx's devoted pupil. In this consequential

decision-making point in time, real goals and abstract values stood in contradiction: in Lenin's violent anti-intellectualism (aimed against non-Marxist intellectuals), that he had probably taken up rather for its significance in political struggle than for its questionable anti-proletarian nature, may be seen more a reflection of the Russian autocratic tradition than of progressive European liberalism.

Lenin's forced break from active politics during the years of his exile in Siberia and in Western Europe (1895-1905) gave him enough time to expand his political and economic theories. *Draft and Explanation of A Programme for the Social Democratic Party* (1896), *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899) and *What is to be Done* (1902) formed not only the theoretical and ideological basis of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, but also drafted the practical organisation of a new, revolutionary Social Democratic Party. For Lenin, the party was the key to a successful revolutionary struggle, the vanguard leading workers towards the future dictatorship of the proletariat. That was the real cornerstone of Leninism from which, unlike in issues of economy or social policies, the Russian Communists would in the future never deviate. Even though Lenin only rarely used the terms 'party' or 'vanguard' in his works (Daniels 1953: 23), he and his partisans never considered the working class to be capable of a revolution on their own; to carry out a successful revolution, the workers' movement necessarily needed the leadership of a small number of single-minded, professional revolutionaries tested by experience (Lenin [1902]1929: 208). Episodic proclamations of Lenin's faith in the masses were not reflected in his constant endeavour to maintain rigid discipline inside the party, in the centralisation of all decision-making powers and his refusal of the liberal principle of elected leaders; instead, he preferred his fellow partisans to dogmatically follow his orders and the partisans in their turn to be the unquestioned leaders of the workers' struggle. The stern hierarchy inside the party was from the start a target of criticism for many Lenin's intraparty rivals and at times, Lenin's authority was not only challenged, but altogether suspended (Lih 2008; Elwood 2011: 37-55). Leon Trotsky would come to rival Lenin in leadership during the war years and this major rivalry even outlived Lenin himself. The first serious clash between the two leaders came already at the Second Congress of the

Russian Social Democratic Party in 1903, when Trotsky, paradoxically later known for his staunch militaristic view of partisanship, was by a surprising twist of intra-party power situation forced to support the 'minority' (Menshevik) position of soft-liners; they argued that the partisan structure of the Russian Social Democrats should be loose and federative, instead of Lenin's (Bolshevik) "hard-line" vision of a tight, centralised, autocratic party body. As is well known, the Mensheviks lost at the Second Congress, and even though they soon managed to substantially recuperate in terms of political influence, their position would be from then on always weakened by their split with Lenin and by their continuing internal squabbles. Trotsky would be also eventually removed from power by Lenin's devoted follower Stalin in 1927.

Lenin's victory at the 1903 Congress and his revolutionary work between 1903 and 1917 turned out to be consequential for securing the position of the Communist Party (the name the Bolsheviks adopted in 1918) as the sovereign tribute of the proletariat and, after subsequently to the events of 1917, the sovereign of the state. Through its functions of direction, arbitration, integration, coordination and supervision, the party would in the 1920s become the pinnacle of politics, the command centre of all constituent institutions of the state: the bureaucracy, the armed forces and the mass organisation. Lenin's writings clearly show that he had designed the model of the party-state long before the 1917 Revolutions, and later developments, including the continent-wide implementation of the model, were only extensions of the original idea (see e.g., Ionescu 1972; Beck 1973). Lenin studied assiduously the histories of France in the 1790s and 1870s and realised the revolutionary potential of one unified party on one hand, and the contra-revolutionary dangers of a multi-party system on the other.

It is important to note both the vision that Lenin offered his partisan followers in 1903 as well as the characteristics of the followers themselves. There is a question whether the vision was specifically devised and carefully tailored to attract in the first place people of certain sociodemographic character and individual skills, or whether Lenin wrote "honestly", without a prepared agenda; there may be some

truth in both. The documented result, however, was that the revolutionaries that flocked under the Bolsheviks' banner were mostly the frustrated, resentful members of the lower-class who moved from villages to towns, achieved there a certain level education that opened their minds to new ideas, but did not secure them any substantial improvement on their economic and political standing. It was the disgruntled, rebellious, youth with education but without means, who did not see many prospects for themselves in the society; a situation quite resembling the lot of the youth today elsewhere in the world, in South Asia or in the Middle East (Daniels 2007: 54). They had become privileged by some processes of modernisation, but let down by other. These young people were the pool from which the Bolsheviks drew most of its revolutionary cadres: in 1907, 60 per cent of all 46,000 Bolsheviks were under the age of 24 and 80 per cent under the age of 30 (Ascher 2004: 4). Four fifths of them were either industrial workers or uprooted peasants who migrated to cities in search for work (Pipes 1990: 364-5, 385-6). They all were economically disadvantaged by the introduction of capitalist practices into the country and zealously listened to the visions of new utopias disseminated in Russian cities by reformist groups. One fifth of the Bolshevik Party in fact belonged to the educated gentry or middle-class, the majority of them impoverished or sociopolitically handicapped by their Jewish origins, who were the first teachers of Marxism to their fellow partisans. They played the role of an intellectual authority for the young members and together with those from the youth who were also literate formed the original Bolshevik revolutionary intelligentsia. Those of these men who would in the following years remain loyal to Lenin’s and Stalin’s leadership (and avoid thus untimely death) would also occupy the highest echelons of the Party until the post-Second World War era. Even when the well-educated engineers that would eventually become the Soviet technocratic leadership of the 1950s, began to climb the ranks of the Communist Party in the 1930 and 1940s, they still had to hold their heads down and bow to the old, less educated original Bolshevik intelligentsia that were the first beneficiaries of the October Revolution.

Lenin’s vision was particularly attractive for the “quasi-intellectuals” of Russia because it blended two images: first, the overthrow of the regime that had long

oppressed its people and based its legitimacy on the now-questioned ‘Divine Right’ of Tsars, and second, at the same time, the continuation of the traditional Russian mission to be the Messiah for other nations (McDaniel 1996: 86-95). The attitude towards modernity in Russia was ambivalent mostly because of, as I stress above, modernity's original 19th century exclusive link with the West. The traditional Russian historical mission to lead other nations, strengthened by the calling of the Russian Orthodox Church to save the souls of the misguided, clashed with the effort to resist all non-Russian influences. For the majority of prominent Russian thinkers and politicians (but not for the exception of Leon Trotsky, see below), modernity was good if taken as a synonym of general progress, but less good if it was an evidently non-Russian modernity. Both Alexander II. and, to a lesser extent, Nicholas II. followed Peter the Great in introducing gradual cultural, economic and political modernising measures into Russia, even if not at the same rapid pace as did their great ancestor; more consequential, however, proved to be the fact that neither of them managed to promote their rule as one of progressive modernisation. Among other indirect causes of the assassinations of Alexander II. and Nicholas II. was the spreading desire for liberal reforms – first among the elites, then among the population – that had come always ahead of the actual reforms as they were carried out. Those were the key differences from Peter’s reign: the Emperors’ tardiness in reaction to external developments and their inability to present to their people the institution of the Empire as an element crucial for purposeful national progress; something that most of their ancestors, including the 'mystic Jacobin' Alexander I. (Palmer 1974), managed sufficiently well. And that was the cultural opening that Marxists – and supporters of related paradigms of civilisational progress such as anarchism or nihilism – saw and worked to fill in.

The Marxist idea of progress towards Communism attracted the Russian people for it not only provided them with a theory legitimising their struggle for better living conditions, it also gave them once again the belief that they could and would be the nation ahead of others in civilisational progress. The interpretation of Marx and Engels's *Foreword to the Russian Translation of the Communist Manifesto* (1882) by a majority of Russian thinkers was that Marxism had not yet succeeded in

Europe because the continent was too tied up in the struggle between the ancient feudal order and the new capitalist one. Russia, on the other hand, was not buried in this struggle and therefore Communism might have gotten a head start there (Korsch 1938). Lenin and Trotsky believed that the proletariat would come to play the dominant role in the modernising process sooner than in the late bourgeois stage as it could have been seen in Europe, unhindered by the corruption that the European bourgeoisie brought into the proletarian revolutionary movement on the continent (Lukacs 1924). The Russians wanted to throw off the chains of the Tsarist regime but at the same know that there was the certainty of future progress ahead. Lenin and his Bolsheviks aimed to take over the reformist's image that had previously belonged to the Empire and been based on the weakening myth of Tsar's providence. Marxism, instead, championed a new version of civilisational advancement that justified anti-regime changes in favour of equality, a version based on "scientific rationality". Of course, the scientific model, when applied to Russia, required some modifications of the original Marx's teachings, but that was a challenge readily taken up by Lenin.

First of all, Lenin was well-aware that compared to Western Europe, Russia was a greatly under-developed country. Marx formed his ideas on the realities of the highly industrialised and urbanised Germany, while Lenin had to calculate with the predominantly rural Russian people. The German social democratic vision envisioned socialism and then Communism as a direct consequence of an advanced stage of modernisation, where the accumulated wealth will topple the capitalist society and redress the balance in political and economic relations. Lenin's idea of a uniquely Russian progress varied over time as he changed it flexibly according to events taking place in Russia and abroad (and also according to his own individual progress in his studies of Marx and other European thinkers), but noticeably in his writings, he gradually emphasised more and more his belief that, quite contrarily to developed European countries, imposing the collectivist economic relation first, even before the stage of advanced capitalism, will itself bring modernisation into Russia (Kautsky 1994: 34-47). Undoubtedly, there was present an apparent incongruity between Marxism and Russian realities when he started the Social

Democratic Party in Petersburg, but Lenin put his trust into the party itself and thought about the party as actually the best tool how the incongruity could be overcome; a party thought of not in the liberal parliamentary sense, not even in the Kautskyian social-democratic form, limited in its scope (Lih 2008: 91-102), but as a banner-bearer for the masses in every part of their life.

Lenin's idea may be contrasted with the designs of another prominent Bolshevik thinker, Nikolai Bukharin, who in 1915 presented his theses on the development of socialism in *Towards a Theory of the Imperialist State*. Bukharin distrusted "the state power [that] sucks in almost all areas of production; it not only embraces the general conditions of the exploitative process; the state becomes more and more a direct exploiter, which organizes and directs production, as a collective capitalist." Socialism was the contraposition to the 'militaristic state capitalism' and to the totalitarian bureaucratic apparatus of "a new Leviathan, in comparison with which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes seems like child's play" ([1915]1925: 21, 30). Bukharin was only one of many pre-1917 Russian authors who presented his own alternative how Russia might progress into modernity (and even post-1917, there were many dissenters, see, e.g., Burbank 1986), but his alternative, thanks to its popularity, particularly amounted to a challenge to Lenin himself. Lenin personally considered Bukharin's model too leftist and feared that the Revolution might spin out of control if there was no directing authority. In reaction to Bukharin's and other works and also to the general rise of anarchist tendencies among Russian revolutionaries, he wrote in 1917 *The State and Revolution*, where he insisted on the need of a state, but a radically different one from the Western bourgeois model. The new state was to be based on 'the dictatorship of the proletariat', where political representatives would be strictly subordinate to the will of the masses and the masses themselves would be in control of all administrative tasks. However, there would still be a chain of command in place and an identifiable channel of decision making.

In this (albeit in the actual text mostly implied) insistence on the continuation of a powerful, in reality totalitarian, state, Lenin diverged radically from Marx and

Engels's original cautious attitude towards any powerful political institution. For Marx and Engels, an important element of the future political utopia was the "protection of society against the dangerous impendence of the state machinery" (Daniels 2007: 66). Election of all officials, the possibility of their immediate recall, statutory limitations on terms of offices, subsidiarity and local autonomy, these were the cornerstones of a new proletarian state described by Marx in *The Civil War in France* ([1891] 1977). Lenin's party-state was the opposite to Marx and Engels's vision, it was a design permeated with the belief in strong institutions, central authority, loyalty and discipline: "… a factory, a railway, a vessel on the high seas.. not one of these complex technical units, … could function without a certain amount of subordination and, consequently, without some authority or power" (Lenin [1917] 1932: 52). It is a question whether he realised this anti-Marx contradiction in his theory or whether he deliberately chose to challenge Marx; in any case, Lenin's design followed the imperative of further modernisation of Russia and the nation's desire to find a way to progress that would be alternative and ultimately better than the Western liberal capitalist way.

4.4. The Revolution of the Party

It is not surprising that Lenin's vision resonated well with the young membership of the Bolshevik party; they believed it was their opportunity to become the winners in the new, changing world and they had practically nothing to lose. The relatively speedy wide popular acceptance among some major social groups of the Empire (urban labour) and the subsequent successful spread of the Bolshevik Revolution across the domains of other groups (rural nationalists) may be explained, as always when it comes to complex social phenomena, as a concurrence of certain socio-economic, -political and -cultural variables.

The socioeconomic determinants of the Russian Revolution have been discussed and analysed many times over and the majority of scholars agree on several points (e.g., Blum 1961; Skocpol 1979; McDaniel 1988; Goldstone 1994): first, the rapid industrialisation of urbanised centres (Petersburg, Moscow) concentrated the impoverished industrial proletariat in a handful of places where they could be both

controlled by the military power of the state on one hand as well as easily reached by the propaganda of revolutionary leaders on the other. Second, the Tsarist reforms between the 1860s (Alexander II's Peasant Reform of 1861) and 1910s (Stolypin's Agrarian Reform) destroyed traditional autonomous economic collectives and their structures of authority, increased class differentiation in rural areas (where around 85 per cent of the population still lived) and created a minority of rich peasants and a majority of poor peasants who were largely indebted to the state and to wealthy rural landlords. During the last decade of the 19th century, the population of Russia grew by 20 million and migration from the countryside to cities between 1890 and 1910 doubled the populations of the largest cities of Moscow and St Petersburg and tripled those of the smaller cities of Baku, Ekaterinoslav, Kiev and Odessa (Mitchell 1993: 72). Even though some new estimates show that the overall inequality in Russia before 1905 was lower than in most of the British Empire, yet, lower than in the Great Britain itself (Nafziger – Linder 2011), the overall economic standing of the working class was comparatively worse than in developed Western European countries (Mironov 2012); it is not surprising that the economic deprivation, particularly in the newly industrialised cities, led to a widespread frustration with the Empire, particularly among the poor urban and rural classes, that only waited for an opportunity to burst.

This opportunity presented itself twice during the first two decades of the 20th century: after Russia's defeat in the war against Japan in 1905 and after the first two difficult years of the First World War in 1917. In both cases, the Empire's military power was weakened by its conflict with foreign powers and could not therefore hold its grip on the domestic situation. While in 1905, the weakening was substantially smaller and the Tsarist regime managed to curb the spread of peasants' revolts and factory strikes by shooting and arresting people and making several concessions in the direction of further constitutionalisation and democratisation, in 1917, the regime fell apart. The strike rate that had considerably decreased after the promise of reforms in 1905 rose again sharply when Russia began to suffer from wartime exhaustion in 1915 (see, e.g., Haimson – Tilly 1989: 101-217). The political opening for a regime change was taken up by the major Russian reformist

and revolutionary groups: in 1905, it was taken up by the liberals in the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets), the moderate Trudoviks and the Social Revolutionaries (Esers) – successors of the Narodniks, while the February and October 1917 revolutions were dominated by the coalition of the Kadets with the Mensheviks and the Esers and in October by the Bolsheviks. While economic and social determinants had shaped the field of the political battle, the battle itself, as has been argued by agency-oriented students of Russian revolutions (e.g., Koenker – Rosenberg 1989; Shakibi 2006), was won by the determination of revolutionaries and among them most determined proved to be – ex post facto – the Bolsheviks. The political variable that allowed for both the Menshevik and the Bolshevik revolutions to occur was their supreme ability to concentrate their striking power at one place at the right time: in Petersburg, when the soldiers of the city garrison were demoralised and susceptible to anti-Tsarist propaganda (Bookchin 2004: 154-5); later, the Bolsheviks managed to strike again, this time against the irresolute Mensheviks, who strove for moderate politics even in times of heightened radicalisation. The message as developed and presented by Lenin in the autumn of 1917 did not need to appeal to all the people of Russia – it merely needed to speak to those able enough to make the key difference between the Bolsheviks and all the other revolutionary groups in the late 1910s; not only to instigate the overthrow of the existing regime, but also to secure and maintain their power for years to come. The hardened discipline of the Party and its militarised structure was undoubtedly undemocratic and dictatorial – but these were the features that mostly helped Lenin and his supporters to win the day and triumph not only over the Tsar but also over other popular factions; most importantly, the Esers and the Trudoviks.

Both the Esers and the Trudoviks were popular parties representing in the Duma the interests of the peasantry and a part of the petty bourgeoisie. They were the successors of the Narodniks movement, linked to them both ideologically as well as personally and presented a challenge for Lenin, since with their focus on agrarianism, they also largely carried in the 1905-1917 Duma elections the vote of the peasantry. Lenin considered them both 'bourgeois parties', despite their predominantly leftist policies, and had no place for them in his future revolutionary

plans (Treadgold 1955). From a Rokkanian point of view, however, both parties indicate the presence of an emerging urban-rural division in the pre-1917 Russian society that might have developed further if it had not been for the October Revolution. Curiously enough, neither the urban-rural division between the Esers, the Trudoviks and the Bolsheviks, nor their different origins (the Trudoviks' were at first formed practically as the Weberian type of 'party of notables') precluded them to assume largely similar anti-Western modernity political stance.

Facing these formidable opponents, carrying out the revolutionary action was not to be easy for the Bolsheviks, despite the fervent determination of their leaders and the discipline of the party body. Moreover, in 1917, there were still major conflicts of opinion between individual Bolshevik leaders and the Party was only on its way to the full totalitarian unity of the Stalin era. For the October Revolution to happen in the first place, Lenin and Trotsky had to overcome their differences and rally the various factions in Petersburg (Nelson 1988; White 1999). Moreover, the Revolution won them at first only Petersburg (Rabinowitch 1976), where they shared popularity with the Mensheviks, but the Bolsheviks were not by far the largest party in the rest of Russia. In the December 1917 national elections to the Constituent Assembly, after they had already seized power in the largest cities of the Russian Plain, the Bolsheviks won less than 25 per cent of the popular vote, far behind the Social Revolutionary Party's 42 per cent. Other, non-Marxist school of thoughts were still popular in Russia, among the elites still lived nihilism and among the population anarchism. The latter would prove to be a real obstacle in the Bolsheviks' road to victory, leading to the Ukrainian counter-movement of Nestor Machno's anarchists (Sysyn 1977) and ultimately also to the well-known violent revolt of Kronstadt sailors in March 1921 (where sometimes the role of anarchism is questioned, but see, e.g., Avrich 1970). For the two years of their rule in Russia, the Bolsheviks were in fact 'a mass minority' (Schell 2003: 180), maintaining power by commanding the major military and industrial centers Petersburg and Moscow and bringing other areas of Russia under their control step by step by means of aggressive physical and psychological force. When Masaryk ([1925]1927) and Trotsky ([1930]1932) describe the practically nonviolent overthrow of the

Petersburgian Provisional Government in October 1917 and conclude that it was possible only because of the popular support that Lenin and his followers enjoyed, their conclusions do not apply for large parts of the Baltics, Belorussia, Central Asia, Crimea, South Russia or Ukraine. Here, rightist and leftist opposition amassed armies totalling over time more than 2 million against the 3 million that was in total mobilised by the Bolshevik Red Army (Krivosheev 1997: 7-38) and with the support of the Allied powers started in March 1918 a regular civil war.

Even though the changing fortunes of the war over the following three years several times threatened the Bolsheviks' rule in Russia, most dangerously perhaps in the summer of 1919, the violence and large-scale wartime terror in the long term paradoxically strengthened the regime that Lenin and his supporters had set up in October 1917. If as the sociocultural variable decisive for the February and October 1917 events might be considered the popular desire for a change, the Civil War of 1918-1921 brought into the formula another cultural factor: the "necessities" of war against ideological enemies that threatened the very existence of the new Soviet state allowed the Bolsheviks to introduce a dictatorial regime that legitimised itself as the only way to the survival of the proletarian revolution. It was the programme called 'War Communism', not only an organisational model of the first three years of the Bolsheviks' rule in Russia, but effectively a psychological moment of long-term consequences. Even though its origins were that of a military strategy and of necessity, it would develop into an important instrument of political culture. From 1918 on, the war mentality would constitute an inseparable part of the Soviet Leninist ideology (Tucker 1971; 1987). It justified the coercion of masses in their own name and it all but made impossible any dissent inside the party. When shortly before the Bolsheviks' seizure of power in October 1917 Grigory Zinovev and Lev Kamenev expressed their reluctance to engage in an armed revolt, Lenin let them know his displeasure very loudly; and it was not so much because of his undying revolutionary Marxist fervour, that may be profoundly doubted given his pre- and post-war policy decisions, but rather because he realised the importance of discipline and goal-oriented determination of the anti-regime struggle. Into many of the dangerous political and economic policies of War Communism, such as rapid

collectivisation, nationalisation of business and requisitioning of food from peasants, the Bolsheviks under Lenin's leadership were pushed by the circumstances of full national economic collapse and the need to support the Red Army. The Bolshevik Party assumed a visibly militarist format: the Marxist model of 'the international proletarian army' (Marx [1891]1977) was in Russia taken literally, not only in political manifestos, but also in the structure and organisation, first of the Party and later of the State. From 1918 till 1921, the popular support of the Bolshevik regime was secured predominantly by the military power of the Red Army and the success of Communism in Russia depended on the success of the military campaign.

While the Civil War radicalised the situation of the nation and put the people in a real danger of famine, it also helped the Bolsheviks to get rid of their enemies and paved their way to the dictatorial nature of the Soviet party-state. The extreme nature of civil war accelerated the transformation of the Bolshevik party from a Marxist Social Democratic party, that had already started at the 1912 Prague Party Conference, into a disciplined, authoritarian Jacobinist entity that would, eventually, become totalitarian during Stalin's era. The Bolsheviks suppressed the leftist Socialist Revolutionaries in July 1918 by purging soviets of the Eser leaders and taking over the Eser ranks. They also broke off any remaining links that yet existed between them and the Mensheviks; when Lenin already in his 1904 work *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back* embraced the Jacobinist part of the revolutionary agenda, he set out on a journey that would lead him and his party into a direction different from the right-wing Georgian Mensheviks and different even from the left-wing supporters of Julius Martov; the harsh realities of war between the years 1914 and 1919 finalised the breakup. While the Bolsheviks were preparing for a violent overthrow, the Mensheviks got pulled deeper and deeper into political debates with the Cadets, Progressists and other liberal parties, which would turn out to be ultimately fruitless in the turbulent months after October 1917. The Mensheviks retained power in Tbilisi and in most of Georgia, where they began to develop their own unique political regime; this Menshevik stronghold at the end also fell under attacks of the Red Army in the late months of 1920 and early 1921.

However, the fact that they stood at opposing sides during the Civil War did not prevent Lenin from making use of some of the Mensheviks' ideas when the power of Bolsheviks in Russia was secure. The adoption of the New Economic Policy was a brilliant move on Lenin's part that proves his opportunistic political skills and also says something more about the true nature of Leninism; an ideology flexible enough to adopt economic policies ostensibly contradicting original Marxist theses, but also increasing popular support for the Party that was understandably dwindling among starving peasants. Also in this instance, Lenin and the Bolsheviks proved themselves to be masters of political improvisation. That was an important factor on their way to success: whenever they found themselves in a position they had not anticipated, they were quick to adapt and often this skill turned out to be the decisive difference between them and other groups in Russia. That was the case in October 1917 and also when dealing with the outfall of the Civil War.

The New Economic Policy was an economic agenda supposed to increase the post-war production by temporarily deviating the country's course towards Communism. After the Tenth Party Congress of the Bolsheviks (now the All-Russian Communist Party) in March 1921, the Soviet government issued a series of decrees that halted nationalisation of certain industries, changed the food requisitioning system into a fixed tax system and opened agricultural production for free trade. The new programme delivered results over the course of the next five years and helped the country to relatively well recover and return to its pre-war levels of industrial outputs and agricultural production (Service 1997: 124-5); apart from the policy's actually development, it is also important to understand the reasons and the political agency that first led to its adoption.

Lenin publicly in his writings showed preference of 'state capitalism' as perhaps the right economic model for Russia soon after the October revolution ([1918]1972: 279-313), but the outbreak of the Civil War delayed his, as always very vague and mostly improvised, plans by three years. The rough wartime experience as well as the on-going failures of proletarian revolutions in European countries may have indeed changed also Lenin's economic preference to a more controlled,

authoritarian model, but, in any case, the circumstances for once overtook him. At the Ninth Party Congress in September 1920, when the war finally seemed to be decisively turning into a Bolshevik triumph, Lenin and Trotsky, whose star had risen sharply thanks to his organisational prowess as the head of the Red Army, were unpleasantly surprised by calls from the Party's left wing to allow for independent trade unions and independent soviets. These calls were in fact a reaction to Trotsky's hard-line partisan proposal to incorporate the unions directly into the party-state and convert them from 'unions of profession' to 'unions of [plain] producers', dismissing all potential criticism to this model as 'Kautskyian-Menshevik-Eser prejudices' (Daniels 2007: 160). Neither Lenin nor Trotsky were at the start prepared for much opposition from the advocates of workers' unions who, after their success in defying the Party's leadership in September 1920, organised themselves between the Ninth and Tenth Congress into a faction and rallied under a reform proposal. The proposal was co-written by a former union leader Alexander Shlyapnikov and his mistress Alexandra Kollontai and called *The Workers' Opposition*.

Lenin, however, proved again his political genius and took this chance to neutralise at the same time both the threat of syndicalism of the unions and the threat coming from Trotsky's wartime popularity. In November 1920, Lenin and his supporters at the Party Central Committee rejected Trotsky's hard-line proposal by a majority of one vote and allowed Trotsky's enemies in the Party, Joseph Stalin and Grigory Zinovev, to publicise their anti-Trotsky criticism (Trotsky 1930: 462). Trotsky in a way presented an easy target for his critiques as he had been known for his previous Menshevik activities and his sometimes radically Western, "anti-Asian" and even "anti-Russian" philosophies; a trait even more emphasised later by Stalinist critiques (Smith 1973: 136). At the end of 1920, Trotsky's and Bukharin's designs ([1920]1971) to militarise the working class and practically continue without significant changes in the programme of War Communism were dropped, while at the same time, Lenin managed to appease the unions with his proclamations about the unions' importance as 'schools of communism' and their crucial role in the implementation of a new comprehensive economic plan. By balancing between the

Trotskyists, the Bukharinists and the unions at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921 and colluding with each of them on different issues, Lenin and his supporters managed to push through not only the New Economic Policy but also Resolution No 12, a ban on factions that formally completed the ideological unification and disciplination of the Party, oust the most vocal of Lenin's critics, like Trotsky or Nikolay Krestinsky, from the leadership and replace them with more dutiful Lev Kamenev, Zinovev and Stalin.

4.5. The Rule of the Party

The Tenth Congress was a momentous event in the history of the Russian Communist Party that cemented its lasting historical legacy; after the Congress, the chances of long-term survival of the Bolshevik regime rose several fold as it freed itself from major internal conflicts that even in 1921 still had the potential to ruin the new Soviet state. It was the swan song of Lenin's, who soon afterwards retired from politics because of his health problems to which he would succumb in January 1924. Lenin left behind a new state of the Soviet Union (promulgated 1922) and a highly centralised and ideologically united Communist Party that now not only controlled the State but was, in many meanings of the word, the State itself and waiting for a man who would fill in the position of absolute authoritative leader that Lenin originally prepared for himself.

This man was Joseph Stalin, who emerged victorious from the intra-party war of Lenin's successors in 1935, after he patiently eliminated all his major rivals in the Party, including Trotsky (exiled), Bukharin (executed), Kamenev (executed) and Zinovev (executed). The era of 'Stalinism' that followed and ended only with Stalin's death in 1953 may be considered the culmination of the development of the Russian Communist Party; the post-Stalin era of Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Gorbachev afterwards was not only a gradual decline of the power of the Communist Party, it was also a gradual dissipation of the unique blend that formed the Party in the first place. Only Stalin alone embodied the messianistic Russian idea of progress that was supposed to challenge and one day ultimately prevail over Western liberalism and only Stalin led the Party as an undisputed leader and a

personification of the Soviet state. In his economic and administrative policies, he was even more Leninist than Lenin himself, halting the New Economic Policy in 1928 and turning to rapid nationalisation and collectivisation, and extending the heaven-storming mentality of 'War Communism' from domestic environment to international arena.

Stalin's personal characteristics also brought the Communist regime closer to Russian – and, in many ways, Caucasian – traditions than to original Western influences (see, e.g., Szamuely 1974). Stalin was a member of the revolutionary quasi-intelligentsia that followed dogmatically Lenin during the first years of the Bolshevik Party and was also relatively well-versed in Marxist teachings. Before that, he was educated in a Georgian Orthodox seminary and for Stalin, as are for most people, his school days were a very formative phase of his life (Tucker 1990: 50-9); before he discovered the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, he was an avid reader of Russian legends and histories. He was fascinated with the majestic aura of Russian Tsars such as Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great and even if in his school days, he would quite despise the Russian oppressors of his Georgian ancestors, he would later channel his childhood fascination into the method of his own self-promotion and in building his own cult of personality. Moreover, ancient heroic tales were in Stalin's mind – although this was common to many Bolshevik leaders in the 1920s – mingled with violent images of the modern warfare. Mass violence appeared to be a requisite for the greatness of leaders (Hutch 2001: 113-24). This individual psychological turn in Stalin may be considered symbolic for the post-Bolshevik era of Communism in Russia: in the 1930s, there was much of the ancient Tsarist tradition back in how the Soviets ran the country and not much of the 1910s proclaimed desire to establish the workers' rule.

The scope and depth of Stalin's personal power that he enjoyed for at least two decades even led some prominent historians to describe his rule as a 'revolution from above' (Tucker 1990); however, unlike other such "revolutions" (see, e.g., Trimberger 1978; Payne 1987), Stalin's rise to power did not lead to a historical rupture and a breakup of the established political regime; even if the changes he

introduced were dire in their consequences, oppressive and profoundly violent. He did not however need to invent, only to adopt. A vast majority of the tools needed for the construction of a totalitarian dictatorial regime were there for taking and Stalin picked them up. He merely improved on the regime that had already been established by Lenin and the Bolshevik Party and gradually introduced reforms that changed some but far from all parts of the Soviet state.

He drew on the knowledge of the two French Revolutions, his own previous revolutionary experience and in matters of state that came new to the Bolsheviks he did not even shrink from traditional Imperial know-how. The official introduction of Leninism as a 'secular religion' of the country and the Communist hagiography (*l'histoire sacrée*) were mostly the product of Stalin's undeniable invention in the sacral-ritualistic sphere of the regime (Leonhard 2010), but many Stalin's policies were new only in the scale of their adoption and their effective execution; the ideas behind them, including the religious utopia (Riegel 2005), as well as the administrative and organisational channels, through which they were implemented, had already been in place from the closing revolutionary era. He rewrote the history of Russia, using the dictionary of Marxism and at the same time borrowing heroes from Russian history and shaping miraculous stories after the mythologies of the Orthodox Christian Church. His campaign against kulaks and the interpretation of the Russian peasantry as a natural ally of the urban proletariat were originally political ideas of the Narodniks movement (Rezun 1981: 28; Day 1982: 55). Sovnarkom, the centrist system of political and fiscal management, was an institution of the old Tsarist regime (Rowney 2005: 91). The Bolsheviks already in 1917 resumed the tradition of Secret State Police, that assimilated the practices of the Tsarist predecessor (Laver 2002: 84). Stalin retained the plan of modernisation and development spearheaded by the Party under the programme of War Communism. Even in times of peace, he kept the country militarised, under constant economic pressure and reign of arbitrary terror. Between 1928 and 1932, he transformed the economic landscape of the country, accelerating industrialisation and forcing agricultural collectivisation with his First Five-Year Plan. Between 1935 and 1940, he replaced the personnel of the State by carrying out large-scale

purges, repressions and persecutions of political, military and administrative officials as well as of economists, technocrats and other intellectuals; however, he never purposefully targeted them as a group (like Mao Zedong would do), thus keeping the state (and somehow also the military) functioning (Shlapentokh 1990; Dunn 2006). During the two decades of his personal rule, he also managed to forcibly transfer some 6 million people across Europe and Asia to achieve his political and economic plans. In total, Stalin's national policies and personal revenges (not counting international conflicts) cost the Soviet Union some 20 million people; even though there is recently a tendency to lower the estimates (Courtois 1999; Naimark 2010), the sacrifice of the Russian people was colossal.

The crucial element in Stalin's construction of dictatorship was still the Bolshevik – now the Communist – Party. During Lenin's times the vanguard of the Revolution, the Party in the post-revolutionary period became the centrepiece in the institutional structure of the Soviet State. Stalin was appointed General Secretary of the Party in 1922, originally with the purely administrative mandate of oversight over the party's ranks. However, this position would also allow Stalin to collect party members' personal data of considerable blackmail potential and also to promote in ranks exclusively his loyal supporters. Since he had already in 1919 been elected a Member of the Politburo, the position of Secretary, coupled with the principle of 'democratic centralism', gave Stalin both the information and the executive power he needed for neutralising his opponents before they would even become real threats to him. This mechanism Stalin during the 1920s and 1930s for all purposes extended nation-wide: the party was simply a conveyor belt of Stalin's personal authority with strict bottom-up hierarchy and no top-down accountability. Stalin did not need party to be a provider of legitimacy, support or counsel, he needed it to deliver his directives from the highest level of leadership all the way down to the ranks on the ground, where the directives would be executed.

Despite this top-down only, authoritarian nature of the Party, and even despite the dangerousness of being a party member during the purges of the 1930s, the attraction of membership in the Party was apparently growing under Stalin.

Between March 1918 (the 7th Party Congress) and March 1921 (the 10th Party Congress), the membership rose from some 300,000 to 700,000 and the early 1920s recruitment programme of 'Lenin's levy' brought another half a million of new members into the ranks. This programme was in fact a replacement policy after the first wide-scale purge of the Party that came in 1921; a purge declared as a necessity to get rid of all "non-proletarian undesirables" who joined the Party from opportunism and not true conviction (Ulam 1973: 241; Fitzpatrick 1999: 192). Opportunism was, in fact, home with the Bolsheviks – not only in the case of post-Civil War entrants, but during the entire history of the Party. The Party structures in the 1920s already paralleled that of the State, i.e., that of all local, regional, national and federal soviets. Moreover, local Party organisations were attached to every workplace and every social organisation such as a school, a youth group or a hobby club. The Party penetrated the society at all levels and no substantial improvement of an individual's social position was possible without joining the Party and rising in its echelons.

As the previous sections showed, the Bolshevik Party was a unique blend of Russian tradition, military-revolutionary organisation and Marxist ideology, but, particularly during the era of Stalinism, it also embodied the opportunistic character of all political parties; in that did not at all differ from Western political parties, too. Despite Lenin's insistence on the need for a new, non-bourgeois party, Michels's ([1911]1962) 'iron law of oligarchy' applied in the 1920s not only to Social Democrats in European countries but also to the Russian Communists. In fact, in Russia, this oligarchic tendency was strengthened by five factors:

1) the old tradition of purposeful collectivity that would seek and install a providential ruler with the vision of a future Christian utopia;

2) the wartime experience and the direct involvement of the Party in the extreme violence of the Civil War that militarised the partisan structures and cemented the rigidity of discipline of the party ranks.

3) the requisite to shadow each level of state administration with party cells that forced the Party into activities for which it had not originally prepared and where it was forced to draw on the previous Tsarist regime;

4) the Party's source of legitimacy as the modernising element bringing a specific design of modernity into the country that required the nation to obediently follow the directives of the design and of its executives;

5) the defence of the Russian world against negative Western influences and the Party's role as a screen that would allow into the country only the "good" progressive elements from the outside world and filter out all the "bad".

The combination of these factors made the Russian Communist Party in the 1920s different from both Western political parties as well as from other Russian political parties that partook in the Revolution. From a Rokkanian point of view, it was a combination that clearly distinguished the Bolsheviks from other Russian and non-Russian groups by their stance on five cultural divisions and this stance was indeed exclusive of a particular social group of specific socioeconomic characteristics. The divisions were:

1) collectivism vs individualism

2) revolutionarism vs reformism

3) statism vs anarchism

4) progressivism vs conservatism

5) anti-Westernism vs Westernism

The Russian Communists during their formative years clearly took the first positions on these five divisions. The latter development of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union during Stalin's rule, however, showed tendencies to violate these basic positions and arrive at certain anti-theses: for instance, Stalin's autocratic conservatism or the adoption of the long-term reformist belief in 'perpetual revolution'. On other divisions that are associated with Marxism, which was the

Bolsheviks' original ideological inspiration, they had later even less clear positions: the Stalinist programme of ‘Socialism in One Country’ and the Soviets’ foreign policies since the 1920s defied the Marxist concept of proletarian internationalism, while the scientistic nature of Marxism was in Russia often blended with traditional Imperial and Russian Orthodox mythologies. These violations of Marx and Engels’s teachings were understandable in view of the Bolshevik regime progress towards securing sufficient support among the population. Despite its growing military might, the regime in the 1920s still needed the loyalty of both urban and rural masses to develop new structures of power and therefore had to shift the focus of its political appeal from the narrow group of underprivileged educated revolutionary youth to a much wider audience. Socioeconomic characteristics varied in the pre-1917 masses much more than in the original Bolshevik revolutionary group, but it is quite certain that in their majority they were:

1) part of the relatively low-skilled labour, economically worse off and with no economic securities;
2) socially unprivileged and with little prospects of advancement in the hierarchy;
3) disenfranchised, politically insignificant both in law as in fact.

Since similarly dire socioeconomic conditions may have, however, been found all around the world at the start of the 20th century, two other types of variables played a significant, if not decisive, role in igniting the Revolution:

Firstly, even though the present work deals exclusively with the Russian domestic political system and its political parties, external geopolitical factors needs to be discussed at least briefly. The importance of international settings favourable to a revolution in Russia was noted already by Max Weber in *Economy and Society* and the difference between the two international situations in 1905 and 1917, respectively, is one of the major factors that, according to Weber, decided about the success of the revolution (Collins 2005: 313-3). It was not only the response of Great Powers to Russian revolutions that mattered, it was the international activity

of Russia itself that before 1917 played often the role of a very zealous but failing actor. After the fall of the Tsar, international environment was treated with considerable respect by the succeeding regimes (Wade 1969; Naarden 1992; Kowalski 1997). Arguments similar to Weber's on the prominence of external factors have been put forward by other prominent authors (Wallerstein 1991; Schild 1995; Calvert 2010) and without asking after the empirical evidence behind these arguments and their overall strength, it seems that 'geopolitics' is one variable affecting domestic party politics, but substantially missing in the Lipset-Rokkan theoretical framework; at the least an interesting thing to note.

Secondly, more in accordance with the Rokkanian agenda, decisive were also sociocultural variables as described above in the narrative of the Russian Communist Party, particularly those brought about by the processes of modernisation and their adoption in the Russian settings; they can be summarised as follows:

First of all, the people of the Russian Empire desired a change. While Russian intellectuals in the second half of the 19th century were looking with hope at the new developments in Western Europe and thinking about new reformist and revolutionary agendas, the common folk of Russia was losing trust in Tsar as their socioeconomic situation was worsening. When the mind-sets of the intelligentsia and the common people met, this creative moment gave birth to uniquely Russian reformist and revolutionary agendas that were inspired by the West but focusing on Russian problems. Narodnism was perhaps the most balanced programme that came out of this moment, but as it turned out, the future belonged to a more radical agenda.

Second, the desired change was actually the desire for a re-start of the progressive process that would bring the people of Russia into a utopian future. The Russian Messianism formed a part of this plan: the Russians were to be the first but not the last nation to achieve the paradise-like state on earth. The Russians were in fact supposed to be the leaders of other nations, saviours of misguided souls. Already the pre-Christian Slavic tradition was filled with this historical mission of the

Russian people and it was only strengthened by the Orthodox Christian mythologies.

Third, whatever the future road to progress in Russia was to be, it could never lead in the same direction as other, Western and Eastern roads. It had always been a progress towards modernity but towards a modernity like none else. As E. H. Carr puts it: “The same ambivalence which ran through Russian 19th century history marked the Bolshevik revolution. In one aspect it was a culmination of the westernizing process, in another a revolt against European penetration” (Carr 1947: 105). This ambivalence, the present thesis argues, can, however, be found also in other political groups that were formed along theorised 'modernity cleavage'; for instance, in the movement of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, on which focuses the next chapter.

5. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

5.1. Introduction

If the chapter on the Russian Communists is already full of a detailed historical narrative, the focus on historical events is even pronounced in the following sections discussing the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. It is for the same reason as in the previous chapter: the Muslim Brotherhood has figured on the list of research topics of mainstream political science in Europe even in to a lesser extent than the Russian Communist Party; drawing a historical picture that is to frame the application of the Lipset-Rokkan theory I therefore deem to be the necessary first step. Rokkanian concepts are applied through the course of the narrative even more cautiously than in the previous chapter: while communists were to a certain extent covered by the Lipset-Rokkan theory, since they feature also in the European history, Muslims have not until recently played any role neither in the real domestic politics of Europe nor in European political theories. Moreover, the perceived necessity of the Cold War to study in detail the politics of the Soviet system, that posed a real civilisational threat to the Western world, may have advanced further the Western study of Communism than the study of the 'Orient'. The latter was largely put on the agenda only as long as it was thought to help in understanding how Communism around the world might be contained. It may have also been the language and arguably larger cultural distance of the Arabs than that of the Russians that divided scholars of parties in the Occident and scholars of parties in the Arab world. Whatever were the reasons, the following chapter is much more an explanatory work than is the previous one and the reader is kindly ask to take that into consideration when reflecting upon all that is here written.

There are two more reasons why the historical picture is presented here in such a detail. First, it should draw attention to some of the disagreements among authors and mutually challenged conclusions of research. When reading the recent literature on the Muslim Brotherhood, there appears to be an increasing amount of Arab and Israeli authors who question older Western classics. Many important moments in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood are today being reinterpreted and new

evidence is being presented, casting new light on the decisions of leaders of the movement. This factor needs to be also taken into account when applying a theory. Second, the historical narrative describes the differences between the Russian Communist Party and the Muslim Brotherhood in their dynamical form. A dynamical comparison may arguably answer not only the question in what features the two compared cases differ, but in addition show the development behind and answer also the question why the features differ. The development of four characteristic features of the Muslim Brotherhood should particularly be noted:

First, the Brotherhood was at its birth conceived as a reformist movement and both first Supreme Guides of the Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna and Hassan Ismail al-Hudaybi, put a lot of effort into keeping the Brothers on the track of the reformist agenda, not letting them slide in either revolutionary or conservative direction. It was an agenda claiming the legacy of the older, 19th century reformist tradition of Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (Hassan al-Banna's personal mentor), but containing a speck of 'utilitarian pragmatism' too (Laoust 1932: 190) that would allow the Brothers some leeway when transposing older concepts into new settings. The next section of the present chapter discusses the roots that the Brotherhood had in the Egyptian confrontation with the British Empire at the start of the 20th century, but there may be traced an even longer tradition of Islamic confrontation with the West and of continuing adaptation to Western influences. As is also noted in the next section, Banna never intended to return Egypt and other Muslim countries into the state that existed in the past, at the times of the ancient Caliphate. He accepted the progress that the human civilisation had since achieved and believed that "the existing constitutional parliamentary framework in Egypt, if reformed, would satisfy the political requirements of Islam for a 'Muslim state'" (Mitchell 1969: 103). This belief he shared with many previous *Salafi* thinkers, who thought of an Islamic state as a 'third way' type of government between democracy and socialism (Kurzman 2002). and also with Abul Mawdudi, the prominent Pakistani philosopher and founder of the Islamic Party (*Jamaat-e-Islami*). The Brotherhood from the start belonged to the group of reformists who rejected the pronounced sectarian nature of the *Wahhabis*, confessed

themselves 'Neo-Hanbalites' and sought the right to reinterpret matters of theology and law; however, it was also critical of the original narrow scope of Salafist reform, limited to religious and moral issues, and presented a comprehensive sociopolitical programme (Clarke 2006: 170-1). Into the core ideology of the Muslim Brothers belonged the demand for a social change that would bring on one hand the return to the oldest principles of Quran and Sunna, and, on the other hand, the dismissal of many conservative Islamic jurisprudential traditions. Islam would thus get rid of some the encumbering baggage that limited scientific and technological progress in Muslim countries, while at the same it would stay true to its origins (Ayoob 2007: 228). That being said, already during Banna's time in the office of Supreme Guide, it became clear that the movement would not be an ideological monolith: it is, after all, only one group in the long Wahhabi and later Salafi reformist tradition. The Brotherhood shares the Wahhabi and Salafi belief that the first three generations of Muslims (Muhammad's companions, the Sahaba) show the ideal way of practicing Islam. However, from this founding principle, the particular doctrines and activities of Wahhabi-Salafi groups diverged across time and space and it was so also with the Brotherhood and its various local and national branches. Banna himself over time turned in his writings from Egyptian Sufi traditions more to Saudi Salafi ideological sources (Tadros 2012: 10-1), which are largely critical of Sufism, and brought thus even more confusion into the fluidity and flexibility of the Brothers' teachings (Euben – Zaban 2009: 49-78).

Second, also the focus and the tools of the anti-Western agenda of the movement has been changing over time and flexibly reacting to impulses from the outside. In many studies that do not go into much detail about the nature of the Brotherhood, the adjectives anti-Western, anti-colonialist, anti-democratic and anti-modern are used in one sentence with no regard to the differences between these anti- policies and between different figures and different phases of the movement. The original Banna's idea was directed much more against the "decadent" Muslim society of Egypt and neighbouring countries than against Western culture as such; the anti-Western thrust would be later more prominent in the writings of Sayid Qutb and other radicals, but Banna and Hudaybi were far from condemning the West from

which in certain aspects, such as parliamentary politics, the future Islamic state might have even learned. Banna undoubtedly felt humiliated by the British occupation of Egypt and disgusted by the corruption that existed in the pro-British administration of his country. He wanted Egypt back in the hands of Egyptians and, even more importantly, in the hands of true Muslims, not in the hands of the liberal regime that existed in the interwar era. However, he still believed in a gradual, peaceful change; the violent breakup with the British was more the work of army officers and some of the leaders of the Special Section, who started military training and stockpiling weapons in the early 1940s, than of the official leadership (General Guidance Bureau) of the Brotherhood. Banna was willing to negotiate with the British and with other political opponents, including the liberal nationalists, conservatives, the fascist-like Green Shirts, the Wafd, the King and foreign leaders (Tariq 2002: 98). The Political Committee of the Brotherhood even included the representatives of the Egyptian Copts (Abdelkader 2011: 168). With its Brothers' involvement in the Palestinian conflict, the organisation's foreign policy radicalised, but on the domestic scene, violent demonstrations of the Brothers' rising influence would not come until the mid- or late-1940s. That was, however, a general trend in the society and there is again the question how much control over the various parts of the Brotherhood, most importantly the Special Section, Banna exercised. While Sanadi or Talat were unquestionably radically anti-British and anti-regime, the General Guidance Bureau many times favoured negotiations over violence and that policy was shared by Banna and Hudaybi. Not only that the policy turns sometimes made by the official leadership thus makes the tracing of the Brotherhood's development confusing, it was also the leadership's disunity on many important issues.

Third, continuing on the previous paragraph, factionalisation itself has been an important characteristic feature of the Muslim Brotherhood. From the very early time, the Brothers would disagree on a whole range of matters: sometimes, these were purely matters of political tactics, other times deeper conflicts over religious and ideological interpretations (see, e.g., Zollner 2009). Internal clashes between factions would be a staple of the life of the movement. Already the founding father

Hassan al-Banna was many times criticised and his authoritative position challenged: in Ismailiya, after his move to Cairo, in the later 1930s, after the Second World War, all the time until the moment of his death; his successor Hassan al-Hudaybi was even less successful in keeping the Brothers united, but it was still nothing compared to the post-1954 era, when the officially banned Egyptian branch of the organisation disintegrated into many mutually independent groups that sometimes cooperated, but often worked against each other (Peretz 1994: 230-66). The death of Banna also affected the Brothers abroad, who now felt a lack of ultimate authority and had to choose which leader to follow (Khadra 1985: 116-9; Wieviorka 1988: 5ème partie, Chapitre V/IV). To the times of Banna's leadership still many Brothers look up and the question "what would Banna do" resonates in them even today (Meijer 2012: 242). When Sayid Qutb managed to unite major factions of the Egyptian branch and even draw closer to the central authority in Egypt branches from abroad in the early 1960s, following his death in 1966, this union did not last and the organisation again split. Ideological divisions even deepened since many Brothers started to feel the need to choose between the original moderate doctrines of Banna and the radicalism of Qutb; others left politics and returned to the welfare mission of the Brotherhood; while yet others shunned society as such and turned wholly to the study of the Quran (Clark 1995: 173). This shows the weakness of the Brotherhood's formal structure and a strong desire for informal personal authority of leaders, not only in Egypt, but also in other Middle Eastern countries where the Brothers have been present. During the periods of factual interregna in the General Guidance Bureau or when official leaders were considered weak by mid-level officials and by the ranks of the Brotherhood, many moderate branches came under heavy influence and control of militant Islamic groups: in the late 1960s Jordan under the control of Fatah (Khatib 2011: 47-50) or in the 1980s Egypt under the Salafi Call (Anani 2012: 32) and in Palestine under the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Hroub 2006: 9-10). In addition, many radical branches were at the founding of infamous terrorist cells in the Middle East and there have been many contacts between (ex-)members of the Brotherhood's Special Section

and violent Islamic fundamentalists (see, e.g., Esposito 1999; Moghadam 2008; Mockaitis 2010; Guidere 2012).

Last, for the entire duration of its existence, since its 1920s origins until today, the Brotherhood's banner has been carried mostly in the hands of a particular sociodemographic group: the self-conscious urban middle class. This largely educated group of artisans, civil servants, local merchants or skilled labour was the backbone of the movement in Banna's times; today, even if the Muslim Brothers are employed in modern workplaces and technologically advanced positions, they still form a group of certain sociodemographic characteristics that perceives Western capitalism and its affluence in their home country as a threat to Islam and 'national unity' (Moaddel 1993: 181). The appeal of the Brotherhood's message also extended to some level to lower urban classes, where they competed for support with leftist groups of the Wafd Party and the Communists, as well as to landlords and wealthy merchants and financiers. It had, however, difficulties establishing in Egypt's rural areas. When Mitchell studied official lists of the charged and condemned Muslim Brothers (1969: 163-83) in the 1950s, members from unskilled industrial labour and urban proletariat comprised a small minority, while rural Muslim Brothers were nothing more than an exception. An important innovative element of Banna's idea was to actually take the reformist agenda, on one hand, from the traditional conservative Islamic jurisprudence that had great religious sway over uneducated masses, and, on the other hand, from the closed and removed academic centres of the al-Azhar University and Sufi orders, and give it to the literate, more independently thinking bourgeoisie (Ramadan 1993: 155). "The archetypical Muslim Brother was … urban, middle class, literate only in Arabic, politically aware, strongly nationalistic, pious, and had uncertain career prospects" (Clark 2004: 16). While today, the Brotherhood draws support from middle-class professionals such as doctors, lawyers or engineers, in Banna's times, his followers were mostly those whose upward mobility was halted by the global economic depression of the 1920s: petty civil servants, schoolteachers and skilled labour. The common theme that links the early 20th century and early 21st century Muslim Brothers across all Middle Eastern countries is their contempt of the dominant class

that prevents them from further advancement in their profession and in the socioeconomic hierarchy.

5.2. The Roots of the Brotherhood

The origins of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood differ from the Russian Communists in two important factors: first, at its birth, the Brotherhood's purpose was not a violent revolutionary political struggle. It was above all a reformist religious movement that, at least in the first years, wished to promote social changes exclusively through the means of nonviolent, bottom-up effort. Founded on Sunni Islamic principles, the Brotherhood stressed the overriding influence Islam should have on the everyday life of a person as well as of the state (Owen 2000: 183). Second, the Brotherhood's ideological base was a traditional religion that had for long been established among the Egyptian people. The Brothers wished to strengthen this religious tradition, not to spread new teachings. At the time when Hassan al-Banna founded the movement, in the late 1920s, the Egyptians were predominantly (from nine tenths) Islamic already for some twelve centuries and the religion was still, despite certain secularising tendencies, officially treated as the state religion by the governing regime (Hatina 2007: 276).

These two factors set the Egyptian Muslim Brothers and the Russian Communists apart and had substantial impact on the groups' respective goals, strategies, external actions and internal developments. In other matters, the groups demonstrated significant similarities, sharing many cultural and sociostructural characteristics. Hence, they invite a Rokkanian-type of comparison that would also employ concepts from civilisational analysis when exploring their differing historical backgrounds.

Both the people of Russia and of Egypt commonly believed in their respective national uniqueness. Such a belief may probably be found among the majority of nations, but in these two cases, there also existed a specific tension between the religious and ethnic definition of the nation that was only aggravated by the coming of modernity. These two nations were largely defined as an amalgate of religious and ethnical roots, that usually complemented each other, but often stood apart or

even in political opposition. While the Russians at the start of the 20th century derived their historical national tradition from Slavism and Orthodox Christianity, the Egyptians at the same historical period found their singularity in a mixture of an old pharaonic legacy and Islam. The latter case was apparently more mismatched: Slavism and Orthodox Christianity, for various reasons of both substance and timing, managed to found common positions in their respective worldviews, but Pharaonism and Islam in Egypt were often contradictory cultural layers that, when used as tools of political legitimacy, competed rather than complemented each other. For Islamic reformers, including Banna, ancient pharaonic Egypt represented only a secondary layer of the Egyptian cultural identity and as such constituted an ideological division with pro-Pharaonic national revivalists (Colla 2007: 241-253).

For both the Russians and the Egyptians, the belief in national exceptionalism and the historical responsibility to protect it had also been a major reason to try to resist any influences from abroad that threatened to corrupt it. In the 19th and 20th century, with the increasing penetration of the West into other world regions, it naturally led to strong anti-Western sentiments. In the 1920s Egypt, the time of the Muslim Brotherhood's birth, these sentiments were moreover fortified by perceived grievances that had been accumulated during the previous British rule over the country. Before the British came in 1882, Egypt had been for more than three centuries controlled, with various degrees of centralisation or autonomy, by the Ottoman Empire. Also during that time, a strong resentment arose against the Ottoman overlords and thus, at the start of the 20th century, many Egyptians were turning nationalist, in an effort to distance themselves at least culturally from both their Western as well as Eastern neighbours (Gershomi – Jankowski 1987: 365).

At the same time, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 brought into the country not only the abstract cultural aspects of modernisation, but also its palpable physical indicators: modern agricultural and industrial equipment, instruments and technologies. Technological modernisation – particularly agricultural – had in fact begun in the country already at the start of the 19th century, during the reign of Muhammad Ali, the 'father of modern Egypt' (Dodwell 1931) and it continued

under his grandson Ismail Pasha, who wished to abandon the African heritage of Egypt completely and Europeanised his country. He promoted Western style of life and culture, later the issue of contention for many Islamic reformers (see, e.g., Mostyn 1989); however, it was still the British administration who introduced into Egypt economically most important modern technologies of production: assembly line and large-scale factory production and turned the country's account books from red to black numbers (Zvi 1980: 121). Because of their lavish lifestyle and spending, previous Egyptian rulers had accrued large debts, particularly to the British government and British-owned companies, and the increased industrial production and export of raw materials, mainly cotton and cotton seeds, during the era of British administration was used mainly to pay these debts off. Investments into education, health care or any social security programmes were minimal and the socioeconomic situation of the vast majority of Egyptians around the turn of the century was not noticeably improving (Owen 1993: 220-6).

For the lot of the common Egyptian as well as for their sentiments was very important the impact of the policies of the British consul general, Sir Evelyn Baring (made Lord Cromer in 1891). Lord Cromer represented British interests in Egypt between 1882 and 1907 and became the very personification of the "Western oppression". During Lord Cromer's administration, the majority of Egyptians turned quite xenophobic, especially in relation to the British and the French, whose financiers they blamed for the country's poor economic performance and their own atrocious working conditions (Zvi 1980: 118). The xenophobia was even shared by a large part of the Egyptian elites, who started to incite the masses for a revolutionary action. In 1907, the National (*Watani*) Party was founded by Mustafa Kamil under the motto 'Egypt for Egyptians'. It distanced itself not only from the British but also from pro-Ottoman nationalists, calling together the Muslims and the Copts of Egypt (Gershomi – Jankowski 1987: 12). Their political stance did not prevent the National Party's tactical allegiance to the Ottoman interests in the future, but their ideology helped to form a strong tradition of exclusively Egyptian patriotism.

What is particularly interesting from the point of view of civilisational analysis was the development of the feeling of "being Egyptian" at the start of the 20th century as something almost synonymous to "being civilised". Those authors, journalists and pamphleteers who called for the country's independence at the turn of the century, like Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid or Ali Yusuf, saw the progress towards an autonomous Egypt as a gradual reform that also meant remembering the old pharaonic greatness of the ancient Egyptian civilisation. The Western presence in the country was seen as an element of backwardness that at the end hindered the full modernisation of Egypt. While advanced technologies in agriculture and industry may have helped economic production, Egypt's potential as a civilised nation could not be reached unless the masses and domestic elites worked towards one unitary aspiration (El Shakry 2007: 55-60; Gasper 2008: 191-7).

A vast majority of the Egyptian population, as in Russia, was at the start of the 20th century still working in agriculture; yet, the pace of urbanisation and industrialisation considerably quickened from the 1880s onwards. Between 1880 and 1939, the proportion of rural population in Egypt decreased from 90 to 70 per cent (Richards 1980: 56) and this sociodemographic change led to outcomes very similar to the comparable process in Russia. The new urban class came to produce a new urban intelligentsia that proved to be of similar importance and implications for the Egyptian rural masses as was the Russian urban intelligentsia for rural Russians: the urban intellectuals were seeking a place for the Egyptian peasant in the reformist agenda and with a renewed call for national unity, they found it. As Thompson (2000) writes about the Syrian and the Lebanese people under the French rule, also the Egyptians under foreign (British) administration were transforming, particularly in the expanding cities like Cairo or Alexandria, from 'passive subjects' into 'active colonial citizens' that would soon engage also in mass party politics.

At this moment of national revival, the First World War engulfed Europe and soon spread also to European colonies. Egypt, still de iure a part of the Ottoman Empire, was proclaimed a British Protectorate by its de facto rulers and drawn into the war as a source of material and (mostly auxiliary) troops for Britain. The war years also

presented an opportunity for nationalist Egyptian political elites, particularly after the proclamation of the principle of national self-determination by the Allies in April 1917 (Vatikiotis 1992: 240-3). Apart from the opposition against Egypt’s post-war independence expressed by the Brits, a major obstacle in the Egyptian elites’ struggle for national independence were, however, their domestic squabbles and divisions.

The broadening of the national movement in Egypt and the radicalisation of its demands resembles in some aspects Hroch's model of national awakening (Hroch 1985): the movement was divided into three successive generations, of, first, aristocratic intellectuals linked and loyal to the royal family, second, representatives of the autonomous landholding class and third, middle-class bourgeoisie, liberal professions or officials in the developing state administration spreading the nationalist message in the masses (Whidden 2005: 21).

While full independence was mostly the goal of the youngest 1870s generation, such as Mustafa Kamil or Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayid, older conservatives were still giving preference to a formal relationship of dependence on the Ottoman Empire. A Mannhemian clash between generations of cultural and political dominance ensued. The wartime weakening of the Ottoman state rendered the conservatives’ design similarly weak and they were forced to start looking for political allies. They could choose from both sides of the other significant domestic political division, the division between the Nationalists’ radical policy of a national revolutionary change and the evolutionary policy of the Islamic People’s (*Umma*) Party, who called for an orderly gradual social reform (Whidden 2005: 22-3).

Unlike the radically anti-British Kamil's Nationalists, Sayid's Umma Party, founded in 1907, were also capable of a certain degree of cooperation with the British administration. They claimed the legacy of the prominent Egyptian legal theoretician and scholar Muhammad Abduh, an advocate of cordial relationship with the Brits, and under Sayid's leadership adopted a gradual cooperative approach in all of their activities. The party's ideological basis was based in Abduh's writings and formed from a mix of Islamic and Egyptian pharaonic tradition, which

evidenced the spreading popular remembrance of the pre-Islamic national heritage. The party encouraged and promoted among its followers visits to museums, public lectures and the general study of Egyptian history (Reid 2002: 210). According to Abduh, Egypt's ancient history was to be judged even higher than the history of the Ottoman period, since it showed the greatness of the country as a unique political unity; Lutfi al-Sayid subsequently argued that the people's loyalty to Egypt should supersede any other, even religious loyalty (Tessler 1994: 117). Egypt was a separate nation from the Islamic Umma and Sayid was to the same extent concerned about the imperialistic tendencies of the Ottoman Empire as about the British colonialism. He emphatically "reject[ed] the suggestion that religion is a suitable basis for political action in the 20th century" (Maghraoui 2006: 72), standing thus in direct opposition to many Egyptian Islamic reformers.

In March 1919, popular demonstrations started in large Egyptian cities and large-scale social unrest erupted through the countryside. During the next three years, the British administration would put a lot of effort into maintaining at least the resemblance of social and political order in the country, but the situation did not improve and in February 1922, London finally sanctioned the Egyptian proclamation of independence. The differences between domestic political parties were not, however, forgotten even at the times of national revolutionary struggle. Potential coalition formulas were still complicated by lingering policy divisions. The Umma Party developed into a champion of gradual liberalisation that was to be achieved via non-violent means. This put them into a favourable light vis-à-vis the Brits who sought to retain their advantageous trade and military relations with the country and control over the Suez Canal. For the Brits, the Umma liberals were definitely a better choice than the newly born Delegation (*Wafd*) Party, who called for a more radical revolutionary and nationalist turn in Egypt's policy. The Wafd Party's prominent leader, Saad Zaghlul, was even thought to be so dangerous to the interests of Britain that the British exiled him in 1919 and during his absence sought to form a new coalition of political elites in Egypt that would weaken the position of the nationalists (Whidden 2005: 24-30).

The party of Liberal Constitutionalists, who finally formed in October 1922, was a fusion of different class and religious groups that were united only by the desire for patronage-based pro-British policies. They were also the first vocal parliamentary opposition against the new regime that was constituted after the Wafd Party had dominated the first popular national elections in 1923. The Liberal Constitutionalists soon realised that even though the Wafd presented itself as the representative of the interests of the masses and an advocate of a leftist programme, like the Liberal Constitutional Party, it also included many opportunistic groups of flexible policies. The Liberal Constitutionalists and the British managed to drive a wedge into the Wafd leadership: shortly after the parliamentary convention in March 1924, Saad Zaghlul was on the floor of the parliament accused of being too lenient to the British demands and the Wafd Party disintegrated into several factions ranging from national monarchists through Coptic liberals to feminists. To make matter worse, King Fuad, who resented the arrangements of the new constitution of 1923, started to work for a constitutional reform and against all parliamentary parties (Whidden 2005: 28-36; Thompson 2008: 273-6).

To complete the picture of party politics in Egypt in the 1920s with a link to the previous chapter, it should be noted that the Egyptian Communist Party was also formed in 1922, even though its organisation started already in 1920 under the name of the Socialist Party. In 1922, the party changed its name because of its admission into the Comintern and acceptance of the Comintern's '21 conditions' (Laquer 1956: 33). The party was quickly accused by Zaghlul and the Wafd of dividing the national unity in its struggle against the British colonialism and targeted by a defamatory campaign. During the 1920s, the Communists remained a small party with several hundred members, most of them foreigners and many of them Jews. Their numbers started to rise only in the 1930s, with the continuing corruption in the Wafd Party and spreading popular disillusionment over its rule, when also some of the Marxist members of the Wafd, the so-called 'Wafdist Vanguard', defected to the Communist Party (Botman 1988: 20). As is discussed in the next section bellow, the Communists would rise to further importance during the time of the Second

World War and represent then a more significant camp in the Egyptian political party system.

To come back to the early 1920s, arguments about provisions of the constitution and a constant power struggle between parliamentary parties, King Fuad and the Brits continued to dominate Egyptian politics at that time; and the whole situation became yet even more complicated when the parties started to discuss religion. Monarchists inside the Wafd Party defected in 1924 to a new, pro-King Islamic (Ittihad) Party that drove from the Wafd away many young student supporters. Among them were most religiously radical students of the Al-Azhar University in Cairo, who called for a religious reform in the country and specifically for an increased control of the Ministries of Justice and Education by orthodox Muslims. These students were also among the most loyal supporters of the King, who, thanks to his direct supervision over the Ministry of Religious Endowments (*awqaf*), was expanding his political influence by the means of a patronage-like distribution of the Ministry's considerable material resources. In Cairo alone, the King set up several charitable facilities and provided material as well as religious support to unprivileged classes and to the youth (Whidden 2005: 28-37).

One of the groups that also received royal support in 1927 was the Young Men's Muslim Association (*Jam'iat Al-Shubban Al-Muslimin*), a youth organisation modelled after the Young Men's Christian Association. The YMCA had already been present in Cairo since 1923 and its idea and basic structures served as an inspiration for the men who founded the YMMA. One of these men was also Hassan al-Banna, a twenty-one year old school teacher, who came to Cairo four years ago from his childhood life in a village in the Nile delta and saw a deep contrast between the strict disciplined teachings of Islam, that he was taught from his father and his teachers, and the attacks on religious traditions that marked the 1920s in Cairo. Banna spent in the capital five years, studying at the Dar al-Ulum school for high-school teachers and also reading widely the literature of Sufism, attending lectures of the Islamic Society for Nobility of Character and debating with

his friends on possibilities how to improve the state of the Islamic society in Egypt (Mitchell 1969: 4-7).

5.3. The Rise of the Brotherhood

When Banna in 1927 graduated from Dar al-Ulum, he accepted his first teacher position in Ismailiya, where he immediately began to conduct classes and public lectures on the teachings of Islam. Still in contact with his friends in Cairo, he noted the growth of the YMMA but did not believe that its focus on the youth was enough to promote a radical change in the practice of Islam among the public; instead, in Ismailiya, he set out to influence specifically the opinion of the Muslim intelligentsia, particularly the scholars (*ulama*), Sufi ideological leaders (*sheiks*), community elders and the organised clubs and religious societies. In March 1928 (or several months later, see, e.g., Harris 1964: 150), he officially founded the Society of the Muslim Brothers (*Ikhwan al-Muslimin*), an organisation that was to serve 'the message of Islam' by preaching and teaching. Similar to Lenin's Social Democrats (later Bolsheviks), the growth of the movement was relatively slow in the first years, but unlike in Lenin's case, it had the advantage of crossing class divisions. Among the first material support that the Muslim Brothers received in 1928 and 1929 were thus also financial contributions from the Suez Canal Company and from local merchants that helped to finance the building of a mosque in Ismailiya (Mitchell 1969: 9). These donations and generally good relations with many financiers in the Nile delta did not, however, mean that the Brotherhood was formed along elitist lines. Quite the contrary, in the movement's leadership were from the very start involved members of the labour class, artisans and small tradesmen (Lia 1998: 39) and in later years, the Muslim Brothers would be seen as the champion of the Egyptian labour class.

Between 1928 and 1932, the Brotherhood established branches on several places in the Delta (Port Said, Abu Suwair, al-Bahr al-Saghir), following the model that had proved successful in Ismailiya: lectures and discussions on Quran were accompanied by building projects that were for the good of the local community, be it a mosque, a school (both boys' and girls'), a club or a workshop . At that time, the

movement also came under first criticism, mostly from liberals and Christians, and Banna himself was for the first time investigated by the Ministry of Education for alleged misconduct and financial fraud. Cleared of all charges, in 1932, Banna obtained a teaching position in Cairo. His younger brother Abd Al-Rahman was at that time heading there the Society for Islamic Culture, which Banna incorporated into his new Cairo branch of the Brotherhood. In the capital, the Muslim Brothers set up their new main office.

In connection with this move, Banna had to resolve first internal power struggles in the movement, that threatened to undermine his leadership. The clash involved the selection of a new deputy head of the Ismailiya branch. According to Banna's own accounts, the only detailed accounts known, the true reason behind the clash was Banna's wish to promote more labour class members into the high ranks of the movement (Mitchell 1969: 13). Promotion was merit-based and the Brotherhood's programmes and activities in the first years targeted mostly the lower classes. The movement provided education, job opportunities, social services and entertainment and called for political equality between the rich and the poor. Public positions or religious offices were not open to members of the lower classes in Egypt at that time, even if the applicants were the exception and were actually literate. The most dedicated and fervent of the Brothers were thus, once again as in Russia, those who sensed a chance for improvement of their own personal situation and joined the ranks in order to socially advance. Moreover, in Russia, promotion in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party was effectively an anti-regime activity, even after the Party entered the Duma. The Muslim Brotherhood, on the other hand, did not actively oppose the ruling regime; compared to the Bolsheviks, promotion in its ranks was less risky and for many presented a way to social advancement parallel to that in the state bureaucracy. These "upstart" Brothers were then the most active in public projects and they also loyally followed the teachings of Islam how Banna interpreted them.

The background of the 1932 power struggle may, however, be viewed also from another angle: with the increasing membership and the number of the Brotherhood's

clients, the structure of the movement was understandably getting more complicated and more politicised. By silencing the opposition in 1932 and ousting some of its leaders, Banna created a situation when an organisational reform was necessary. Such a reform could strengthen Banna's official authority and prevent potential challenges to his leadership in the future.

In 1934, Hassan al-Banna for himself formally created the position of General Guide (*Murshid al-Am*) and for his close supporters the collective organ of General Guidance Bureau. Typically for his attitude towards some Occidental ideas, the organisational structure Banna adopted for the Brotherhood was Westernised and noticeably different from the traditional Sufi orders. The Muslim Brothers became a *jamiyya*, an association with a rigid constitution, departments and committees, strict hierarchy, elected bodies, periodical congresses, official publications and auxiliary organisations for the youth or women (the Muslim Sisters). No uniform was adopted and the majority of high-ranking and sufficiently well-off Brothers kept wearing Westernised dress; there was also an official emblem and even the motto 'Be Prepared' (Kupferschmidt 1995: 50).

Heads of local branches were during the first decade of the Brotherhood's existence largely independent in their workings and Banna would address this issue in 1938, when he ended the existing policy of elections of local officials and instead introduced a system of appointments through directives of the General Guidance Bureau. In the meantime, Banna controlled the general direction of the movement via the official journal of the Brotherhood, his own published writings, auxiliary youth and athletic organisations, and bi-annual general conferences (Lia 1998: 69-71). These conferences mostly served for members from outside Cairo to learn about Banna’s new works and goals set for the near future. At the Fifth conference in January 1939, Banna rebuffed all dissidents to his teachings and policies in the Brotherhood as led “only by irresponsible rashness and emotional zealotry” (Lia 1998: 251) and presented his comprehensive framework for the future of the movement: “The idea of the Muslim Brothers includes in it all categories of reform…, a Salafiya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an

athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea" (Mitchell 1969: 14). The Brotherhood was to promote Islam as a total system, complete unto itself, applicable to all times and to all places, and the 'final arbiter of life in all its categories'. Banna felt that the movement, after the first decade of its existence, was already strong enough to spread its ideas among the general public in Egypt and elsewhere in the Muslim countries and to work politically for the goal of bringing about a large-scale social change. It was "a new light which shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God" (Mitchell 1969: 30). In January 1939, a new political group representing a new sociopolitical cleavage officially completed its formative period.

Shortly after his move back to Cairo in 1932, Banna also started to correspond in the name of the Brotherhood with state officials in Egypt and abroad. Banna offered their services as Islamic missionaries to King Fuad and supported in letters and donations Muslim movements in Palestine. These were undeniably political activities and the Brotherhood started to profile itself in politics even before the official proclamation at the 1939 Fifth conference and had to choose their sides and loyalties in political clashes. After the death of King Fuad, the Brothers publicly proclaimed their allegiance to his successor, King Faruq, and distanced thus themselves further from the ruling Wafd Party. Since the King and his closest advisers, Ali Mahar Pasha and Sheikh Mustafa al-Maraghi, were Egypt's foremost representatives in the series of international conferences on the future of Palestine in 1936 and 1937, the Brotherhood forged strong links with the royal party; that policy, however, also led to new internal clashes in the movement-turned-organisation. Before Banna stabilised the situation and bolstered his leadership position at the Fifth conference in 1939, several dissatisfied high-ranking members had left the Brotherhood and formed the Society of Our Master Muhammad's Youth. These members believed in a more radical, violent means towards the salvation of Egypt and other Islamic countries and represented a shift in the thinking of some Muslims from constructive towards a confrontational form of *jihad* (Heyworth-Dunne 1950: 27-30).

The Fifth General Conference may be ex post facto considered not only a symbolic end of the childhood years of the Muslim Brotherhood, when its fundamental material structures were being developed and its hierarchy and organisational channels formalised, but also as a completion of its fundamental ideological basis. Banna in 1939 was unchallenged in his position of leader and his writings were authoritative for the Brotherhood. In the second half of the 1930s, these writings were moving away from their original issues of small-scale welfare projects and work among the poor to tenets of a large-scale project of a comprehensive sociopolitical reform in Egypt and abroad. In Banna's view, Muslims in every country had a duty to embrace *jihad*, the everyday struggle to strengthen Islam in its every form. While in the private sphere, it meant largely living according to the teachings of Quran and Sunna, in the public sphere, it referred to the loyalty that every Muslim owed to the Islamic nation. The Brotherhood's Islamic nationalism was inspired by the triple principle of 'Godliness, humanitarianism, and internationalism' and transpired national boundaries (Mitchell 1969: 269). On a smaller scale, it could also serve as a justification for militarisation and serving the limited national interests of Egypt and other Muslim states, but that was an ideological line developed later, at the time of the post-1947 Arab-Israeli conflict (Waardenburg 2002: 346). The original, pre-Second World War writings on politics by Banna and his followers are in fact very removed from calls for radical violent actions that would start to appear only from the mid-1940s onwards. The concurrence of the Second World War and the radicalisation of the Muslim Brotherhood may be in fact compared to the radicalisation of the Bolshevik Party during the Civil War: it was the general, almost global turn towards violence in the late 1910s and in the 1940s, respectively, to which these two political groups had to react and become likewise more ruthless. Since Banna's first texts were not as revolutionary as Lenin's, the shift in tone is, however, understandably more conspicuous in the case of the Muslim Brothers.

It should be stressed that central to the original Brotherhood's ideology was also the notion of a modern nation. Similarly to Lenin, Banna too attacked some propositions of the existing ideological framework of the regime and accused them

of holding Egypt back in its way to progress. He called into question the traditional authority of conservative ulemas and offered a reformist vision that would, on one hand, directly appeal to Quran and Sunna, without any intermediaries, and, on the other hand, embrace some elements of the Western modernisation. The West was to be opposed on principle issues (such as law or morality) where its incompatibility with Islamic teachings was apparent (Laoust 1932: 190), but could be followed, for instance, in technological progress. Banna challenged the decadent Europeanised Egyptians, whom he want persuade to abandon their Western habits; on the other hand, he did not challenge the West as such, accepting his right to existence somewhere outside the realm of Islam. His plan was that of "slow revolution" or a gradual reform that would ultimately overhaul the tenets of Egypt and other Westernised Muslim countries of the 1920s and 1930s; thus also challenging the Occidental methodological and practical dialectics between a reform and a revolution, a trait similar to the writings of Lenin or Trotsky's 'perpetual revolution'.

Sometimes, the ideology of the Brotherhood appeared a bit schizophrenic: Banna first in his design of 'Islamic state' reiterated the concepts of Western philosophers, such as the conception of a state as a 'social contract' between the ruler and the people as between a 'trustee' and a 'trustor' (Ayoob 2007: 71), to insist later on that the ruler is also chosen by God and a man is not to question God's will. Banna also drew sharp dividing lines between communism, "which is for the Soviets", democracy as the Anglo-American government, and every Muslim state's right to build its government on 'Islamism' (Mitchell 1969: 242). It is relatively difficult to understand this division and contradiction's in Banna teachings without taking into account the full socioreligious meaning of Islam on one hand and the realities of the Egypt in the 1920s on the other. The first Islamic state of the Prophet Muhammad was Banna's ideal, but in the 1920s, he knew that to return to it was not realistically possible; for an Islamic state reform, it was necessary to accept some of the modern elements coming from the West. Yet, some of the 'scientific and practical programme' of the Western political life could be used even to the Brotherhood's advantage, as Banna argued when writing about liberal Christian welfare societies or about the ground structure of communist parties (Moaddel 2005: 210-1). The

new Egyptian Islamic state sought by the Brothers was to be a negation of the then ruling culture of liberal nationalism in Egypt, not a denial of progress in general. The Brotherhood in fact considered themselves the inheritors of older reformist currents of Islam and distrusted the limits imposed by rigid traditional doctrines (*taqlid*) that were introduced by the decadent Islamic jurisprudence that had been in power in Egypt and elsewhere. Banna spoke in support of personal educated interpretation of holy texts (*ijtihad*) and general tolerance towards competing arguments among different Islamic schools of thought; with the condition that these arguments were true to the original texts of Islam. An agreement on the interpretation of Quran and its real-world application was to be achieved gradually, by reaching a wide consensus among all Muslims. If modern Islam was to be united and strong, it had to opt for moderate, temperate ways in its existence and diffusion (Marechal – Lewis 2008: 21-2).

Already in the mid-1930, however, there appeared some changes in this moderate attitude, even though not as radical as those that would be seen during the Second World War. They were closely connected to the process how the Brotherhood spread from Egypt to other Muslim countries. Even though Hassan al-Banna was the head of the movement and enjoyed authority among all Muslim Brothers in Egypt and abroad, in practice, the actual working of branches of the movement outside of Egypt was largely independent. Local conditions shaped often the form and the actions of the Brothers: where the long-term relations between Muslim and other religious groups were good, the Brotherhood's new presence did not cause much stir, but where the relations were already tense, in those countries, the establishment of a new Brotherhood branch may have aggravated the situation. The first of these tense cases was the Palestinian revolt, during which the Egyptian Muslim Brothers decided to carry out propaganda activities on behalf of the Palestinians and for that purpose also established students' committees to explain the issue to the Egyptian public. However, abandoning the moderate course that Banna practiced on the domestic front in Egypt, already in 1936, a few members of the Brotherhood actively joined the ranks of the Palestinian opposition and participated in armed attacks on Jewish installations (Abu Amr 1994: 2). Banna's

role in the Egyptians Brothers' direct participation in Palestine in the 1930s has never been clearly established; his involvement in the Egyptian Rover Scouts, at that time a military-like trained organisation, and his later actions indicate that he may have approved a direct action, his restriction on any military training in the Brotherhood, however, contradict that (El Awaisi 1998: 106). Whatever Banna's original plan was the fact is that after the Second World War, the Brotherhood's further direct participation in the Palestinian conflict with the Israel helped the organisation's popularity in the Middle East, where it would be involved not only in the Islamic education of the people, but also in the training of local paramilitary troops.

More moderate examples of the Brotherhood's international diffusion were for a long time its Jordanian and Syrian missions. In both countries, the organisation firstly became known through the intermediary of students who were returning from schools in Egypt. In the late-1940s, the Brotherhood was officially sanctioned by the two respective national governments, carrying out the usual model of charitable communal work and preaching of Islam (*dawa*). In both countries, the Brotherhood's leadership did not prevent the formation of radical groups inside its membership, but these were minor enough not to disrupt the peaceful coexistence with other organisations and the good relationship with official authorities. That peaceful development lasted until the 1970s in the case of Syria and until the 1980s in the case of Jordan, when the respective Brotherhoods' policies began to differ on important issues (such as the establishment of Hamas in Palestine) from the policies of the governments of that time (Roy – Sfeir 2007: 239-42).

In the late 1930s Egypt, the original home and still the leading authority for the Muslim Brothers abroad, Banna and his supporters, i.e., the vast majority of its 300 local branches and some 100,000 members (Lia 1998: 152-4), kept carrying out their strategy of steady development towards a gradual social change and Egypt's liberating from the Western dominance. In 1937, following up on the activities in Palestine, Banna formally created the auxiliary organisation of the Battalions of Supporters of God, the Brotherhood's "brightest", troops whose sole purpose was to

be trained by the Brotherhood both spiritually and physically, in two years some 12,000 strong. Some authors argue that with these highly disciplined monk-soldiers Banna may have started on his assumed plan to secure Islamic rule over the country in an open war (Carré 1983: 30-1; Rinehart 2008: 145), while others see in the Battalions more a training ground for leaders of the future Islamic state (El-Awaisi 1998: 110) . Again, as with the Palestinian question, it is not clear what Banna had in store for the Egyptian domestic politics at that time; whatever it was, it lost its relevance in 1939, when, for once, the outside development overtook the Muslim Brothers' designs.

5.4. The Revolution and the Brotherhood

The Second World War led to a further escalation of the conflict between Egyptians and the British colonial presence. Between 1937 and 1942, radical Muslim groups staged a series of major terrorist attacks, including several bombings of government offices and the assassination of the British Resident Minister in the Middle East, Lord Moyne (Zahid 2010: 75). The Muslim Brotherhood had not at first join in the attacks against the British, but were soon drawn into the conflict by their own policies – even if these policies had originally been non-confrontational.

Firstly, the Muslim Brotherhood was now deeply involved in domestic politics, battling for the support of the middle and lower urban classes with the Wafd Party. The Wafdists were disunited and factionalised, its conservative members in the country's government not very popular among the masses, but its progressive leftist wing drew substantial support from the poorer dwellers of Cairo, Alexandria and other cities. Later developments would drive the Brotherhood and the Wafd in different directions, but in the early 1940s, the Muslim Brothers managed to find a common ground with the Wafdists in their fight against the rising popularity of the Communist Party, who threatened to win the vote of the lower classes, until now the domain of the Wafd and the Brotherhood (Mitchell 1969: 39). A lot had changed since the 1920s, when the Communists had been a largely insignificant actor in the Egyptian political space. The 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, that had granted the British control over the Suez Canal, meant a significant loss of popular support for

the Wafd, and the Muslim Brotherhood was not the only group that benefited from it by increased membership. The escalation of the Palestinian conflict on one hand drew the Jews away from the Communist Party, on the other hand drew anew a stable native Egyptian mass support. The Muslim Brothers started to feel a certain threat from the anti-religious Communists and began to cooperate with other non-communist parties (such as the Wafd or the Young Egypt) against them. The Communists at the end proved too be to weak and too factionalised to play a more decisive role after the end of the Second World War and thus a 'communist cleavage' in Egypt before the 1952 formation of dictatorship would not fully materialise (Beinin – Lockman 1998).

Secondly, as already mentioned above, the conflict in Palestine in the 1940s escalated and became a centre stage of the 20th century 'clash' (Findlay 1994: 20) between the Western and the Arab world. While during the first half of the decade, crucial moments in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt were played out primarily on the home scene, international activism drove the organisation's development in the second half, with the Palestinian question dominating the agenda. The first branch of the Brotherhood was established in Jerusalem in 1945 and in two years, there were already 25 branches in Palestine with some 20,000 members. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood itself was greatly involved in its Palestinian offshoot and supported it with material, personnel and propaganda. Many Egyptian Muslim Brothers believed that the new 'Special Section' of the organisation (also known as the 'Secret Apparatus' in Western literature), a paramilitary organisation that formed in the early 1940s, was created as an army to solve the Palestinian question in the Arabs' favour once and for good (El-Awaisi 1998: 116). The importance of the Palestinian question on the Egyptian Brothers was greater than that of other international confrontations as the situation in Palestine had a direct impact on Egypt's national policies and indirectly on the Brotherhood's relationship with the Egyptian government. When the respective parties followed different policies regarding the acknowledgement and support of the Palestinian Arab movement, it was a major dividing factor between them and also precluded any cooperation in solving domestic problems. That proved

particularly unfortunate in the second half of the 1940s, when the divisions among major Egyptian parties led to a civil-war-like state in the country. In February 1942, British troops in Egypt forced King Faruq to accept a British-leaning Wafd government under Faruq's personal enemy Prime Minister Nahas, which, on one hand, only increased the King's old aversion to the Wafd, and, on the other hand, decreased the Wafd Party's popularity among the masses. For the next ten years, the King, the Brotherhood, and the disintegrating Wafd would be clenched in a struggle for the popular support, still exacerbated by the continuing presence of the Brits and the perceived threats of Communism and Zionism.

At the end of the Second World War, Egypt was swept by a wave of terrorist attacks aiming at high-ranking members of both the government and oppositional political parties. Two Egyptian Prime Ministers were assassinated in 1945 and 1948 and in both cases, the government (even though in each of the two instances formed by different parties) blamed the Brotherhood's Special Section for the murders and subsequently retaliated against the Muslim Brothers. The first assassination of Prime Minister Ahmad Mahir followed his declaration of war on the Axis powers and therefore it appeared credible to point the finger on Banna and his supporters, who were said to admire Nazism and Fascism even before the war (even though some modern authors question the substance of that claim, see, e.g., Gershoni – Jankowski 1987: 280), and who also believed that Mahir had rigged the results of national elections just a few weeks earlier (Patterson 2011: 67-70). Even though the accounts have never agreed on who was actually behind Mahir's death (Mitchell 1969: 33-4; Rejwan 1998: 64; Rinehart 2008: 65), the Muslim Brothers were put under strict surveillance and some of its structures made illegal by the passing of Law 49/1945 on charity and social work. In the second case, the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nuqrashi followed the impoundment of the Brotherhood's assets, the official dissolution of the organisation and a roundup of the Brotherhood's leadership. The dissolution was defended by the government as a necessary step towards both domestic and international security, since the Brotherhood had been suspected of storing large numbers of firearms and explosives to be used in Egypt and in Palestine. At that time, the Brothers in Egypt

numbered some 200,000 members in 2000 branches (Farah 2009: 107). Only three weeks after the governmental action, in December 1948, an-Nuqrashi was shot; and, despite his public condemnation of the Prime Minister's assassin, in less than two months, the same fate awaited also Hassan al-Banna.

Banna's death struck the Brotherhood deeply. It did not stop its further growth and rise of popularity abroad, but it worsened the serious internal conflicts in the organisation that plagued the last years of Banna's leadership. In fact, new investigations of the available evidence (Zahid 2010: 216-7) indicate that the death of Ahmad Mahir in 1945 may have indeed been instrumented by the Muslim Brothers, but without the knowledge of Banna himself. The Special Section of the Brotherhood had since the 1940s been becoming more and more independent and its commander Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi may have acted according to his own radical beliefs, unsanctioned by the Brotherhood's leadership. Whatever the truth was in 1945, for the two years after Banna's death, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood was in a state of relative disarray, operating clandestinely and mostly through the networks of their supporters in the YMMA, Muhammad's Youth, Young Egypt, or the Free Officers. Finally in 1951, the second General Guide, Hassan Ismail al-Hudaybi, was elected. This former judge, personally opposed to the politics of heightened violence spreading in Egypt, wished to follow Banna's moderate post-war policy of reconciliation with the Wafd Party and the King. However, his authority in movement was from the start limited and his policies only further alienated from the Brotherhood its radical factions, including the Special Section.

While the Muslim Brotherhood was outlawed and the Wafd Party was struggling to secure the cooperation of King Faruq on one side, and the support of the masses on the other, the political vacuum was filled with various groups trying to get the upper hand in domestic politics. The most important for the future history of Egypt among these groups would prove to be the movement of Free Officers, a military group not rallied under the banner of religion (even though all of them were Muslims and none of them a Copt) or any other ideological framework, but rather united in their

hatred of the Brits, distrust towards the King and, maybe most of all, desire for power. Some of them were Marxists, some former members of the Brotherhood and they all operated in perfect secrecy, stirring public opinion with their pamphlets about corruption among politicians and accusing all parties in the government of greed and incompetence (Dekmejian 1971: 19-21). Given their ideologically colourful membership, the Free Officers had complex relationship with other groups, alternating between cooperation and opposition at their own convenience. Even though they were of mostly middle-class origins, they presented themselves to the masses as 'sons of the people', since in comparison to the ruling conservative Wafdists, they were in terms of birth and wealth indeed less privileged. On the other hand, they had the advantages of the direct command of the military, military training and many, including the leader Abd al-Nasir, experience with the planning of terrorist activities from the Special Section of the Brotherhood (Zahid 2010: 78). The practical training, however, was apparently all what Nasir took from his years among the Muslim Brothers. As the 1950s would show, his ideological indoctrination was not strong enough to secure for the Brotherhood's a place in the post-1952 political system and Nasir, after his rise to power, very soon started to contradict the Islamic teachings of Banna by his culturally liberal, nationalist and left-leaning policies.

In 1950, after five years of a grudging opposition, the Wafd Party returned into the office, led once again by Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahas. The government started policies that would in consequence turn the violence of the almost-civil war, that had been raging in the streets of Egyptian cities since the end of the Second World War, away from Egyptian officials and focus it on the Brits. University campuses, where political activity had previously been dampened by the directives of the Saad-liberal governmental coalitions, renewed their anti-colonialist propaganda, workers' strikes multiplied through the country and lower-class parties began to rebuild their strength (Botman 1998: 305). Nahas in October 1951 declared null the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and unleashed thus mass nationalist movements that started to attack British troops in the country, in particular in the Suez Canal Zone. In the quickly spreading guerrilla warfare participated all Egyptian political groups,

including the Muslim Brothers, who were equipped by firearms provided by their networks in the Free Officers movements (Farah 108: 2009). Hudaybi's leadership officially denounced the violence, but many radicals in the organisation no longer recognised Hudaybi as a legitimate leader and followed rather the commanders of the Special Section. In January 1952, Egyptian insurgents attacked Tall al-Kabir, a large ammunition arsenal and the centre of British military presence in Egypt, provoking a chain reaction all over the country. On 26 January, amidst the prevailing chaos, downtown Cairo burned down in a fire for which each party blamed the other parties (Kerbouf 2005). The following day, King Faruq dismissed Nahas's government and during the next six months appointed four cabinets, each of them, however, unsuccessful in re-establishing public order in the country. When the King decided also to address the perceived problem of the growing independence of military officers and to regain the government's control over the army, his action backfired and the Free Officers between 23 and 28 July took over the country. They sent troops to large Egyptian cities, where they were mostly cheered by the masses as saviours, rounded up key government officials and dethroned Faruq in favour of his infant son, Fuad II. After consolidating power and securing support on the domestic as well as the international scene, the Free Officers finally proclaimed a republican government under the first President, General Muhammad Naguib, on 18 June 1953.

The role of the Brotherhood in the 1951-3 revolutionary events was ambiguous due to two factors: first, the organisation had been divided into factions even before Banna's death, and after this charismatic leader died, none of his successors, Hudaybi included, managed to retain authority over all of the Brotherhood's branches and auxiliary groups. Hence, while the official head of the organisation might have been calling for an end to violence in Egypt, other authoritative figures, such as the leaders of the Special Section, Sanadi and Yusif Talat, disregarded Hudaybi and acted according to their own beliefs and interests (El Awaisi 1998: 120-1). Second, Hudaybi was already before 1952 aware that the goals of the Brotherhood, the establishment of the sharia law and an Islamic constitution would only improbably be reached under a regime led by the Free Officers. He was

distrustful of Nasir and other military leaders, whom he suspected of being too culturally liberal for his traditional Islamic standards; his suspicions proved to be true early after the coup d'état. The official line of the Brotherhood still included the rejection of organised party systems and political parties in general (not, however, of parliamentary bodies), while the Free Officers actually wanted to establish a new party. The Brotherhood did not agree with the proposal of a radical land reform or with the new regime's leniency towards the symbols of Western culture, such as cinemas, theatres or unveiled women (Choueiri 2010: 62-3). Many of the interests of the Free Officers and those of the Brotherhood simply did not meet, the first one often taking the more popular, left-wing or culturally liberal choice, while the latter always favouring the more Islamic option.

Moreover, Naguib and his first a conspirator, then an opponent Nasir, soon realised that leaving strong political groups in the country to operate without the new regime's direct control and tight supervision might destabilise the regime. In January 1953, political parties in Egypt were banned and the Free Officers – or the Revolutionary Command Council, how they renamed themselves after the coup – established a one-party system headed by the Liberation Rally national movement. The Muslim Brotherhood was not a political party and therefore not de iure affected by the new law, but de facto it meant that for the Brothers, the doors into the new political system were closed. The land reform of 1952 and the foundation of the Liberation Rally took Egypt further away from the ideal Islamic state, which was the Brotherhood's design, than it had been during the former regime. The official leadership of Hudaybi and his liaison in the RCC, the future influential ideological leader of the Brotherhood Sayid Qutb, fell out with Nasir and pursued their own policy of secret negotiations with the British about the lingering problem of the status of the Suez Canal (Choueiri 2010: 61-2). That, however, not only infuriated Nasir, who found out and would soon act on it, but also led to a culmination of the General Guide's conflict with the leaders of the Special Section, who had always been radically anti-British. The Special Section was formally dissolved by Hudaybi, driving many of its former members into the ranks of the ruling regime (Mitchell 1969: 116-25) and the weakening of the factionalised Brotherhood soon would

prove to be fatal for its very existence. In the second half of 1953, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasir, the real instigator of the 1952 revolution, moved to oust his rivals in the new regime and establish his personal dictatorship. Realising the danger that General Naguib, the figurehead of the revolution and now both the President and the Prime Minister of Egypt, might present if backed by the still popular Brotherhood, Nasir started to call meetings of the RCC without Naguib's presence, leaving him out of the loop on many important decisions. In February 1954, Nasir implicated Naguib in a show trial of a large Wafd-communist-nationalist-Brotherhood conspiracy and, to get rid of all opponents in one wide sweep, also extended the law banning political parties to include the Muslim Brothers. While in February, the evidence against both Naguib and the Brothers was yet not strong enough to completely discredit them in the eyes of the law and of the public, the assassination attempt on Nasir, that was either sanctioned by Hudaybi (Perlmutter 1974: 51) or staged by Nasir (Safi 2003: 78-9) in October 1954, provided the colonel with a great political opportunity and resulted in Naguib's resignation from all offices, the roundup of thousands of Muslim Brothers and, ultimately, the factual neutralisation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt for more than four decades.

6. The Modernity Cleavage and a Theoretical Discussion

Since the Muslim Brothers did not lead a national revolution in Egypt as did the Bolsheviks in Russia, there is no phase of the Brotherhood's rule to be assessed by the present work. Instead of discussing such a phase, the analysis here moves on through a comparison of the Egyptian case with the Russian one and through a wider theoretical discussion that is linked to the first three chapters of this work. With this part, the present work is also concluded.

The Muslim Brothers are since the 1980s in Egypt once again a significant political actor, playing an almost dominant role since the early 2000s. This new Brotherhood is a group so diverse, broad, disunited and complex that it is very difficult to critically explore it. For the purposes of the following paragraphs, I adhere to discussing the Brotherhood of the first half of the 20th century, as is presented in the previous chapter; likewise, I adhere here to the discussion about the Russian Communists as they functioned during the Lenin and Stalin eras.

The previous two empirical chapters differ significantly in their form and sources used for the reasons listed above, at the start of Chapter 5. Even though ideally, the two chapters would look alike, employing both the method of a detailed historical narrative, shown in the chapter on the Muslim Brothers, as well as an in-depth analysis of primary ideological and theoretical works of the leading historical figures, used in the case of the Russian Communists, I argue that there is a sufficient material in the data interpreted on the previous pages to draw from it several generalising conclusions that may fill the theoretical construct presented in the opening chapters.

First, even though particularly in the narrative about the Muslim Brotherhood, I refrain from using the term 'party', as it was not the organisation's official status, the activities of both groups under analysis were, with higher or lower degree, characteristic of political parties; not the least because of their entrance into the electoral contest for seats in the Russian and Egyptian parliament, respectively. If some of the strict criteria of liberal democratic partisanship, as they have been

developed in Western political science literature (Duverger 1951; Neumann 1956; Ware 1987), may be in line with the set theoretical assumptions rejected as too Occidental-biased, both the Russian Communists and Muslim Brothers were standard cleavage-based political parties, representing and socialising their supporters and aggregating and articulating their demands. Moreover, the two analysed cases fulfil the criteria that make them possible to classify as not only cleavage-based parties but also, more specifically, as 'modernity cleavage'-based. They were multi-issue parties, presenting social groups that challenged not only other groups and their interests in the national spectrum, but also challenged a politico-cultural threat coming from abroad: the Western-like modernisation. They formed an answer to several processes of ‘objective’ modernisation, such as capitalism, nationalism, education, urbanisation or cultural liberalisation, and strove to remodel these processes, inject them with domestic civilisational matter and weed off some or all of its original Western charge. In this broad approach towards social, political, economic and cultural issues, 'modernity cleavage' parties resemble totalitarian parties; while Western broad-sweeping parties are typically liberal or willing to negotiate on one or more issues (conservatives more in economy, social democrats more in culture), modernity cleavage parties have their unique, total designs, of varying level of strictness, with every issue a human society may encounter.

The two analysed cases were also prone to political violence, the Russian Communists maybe more than the Muslim Brothers, and did not shrink from using violence in their activities. The question then arises: are modernity-cleavage parties (or modernity parties, for short) as here conceptualised in fact synonymous to totalitarian movements? The best answer perhaps is: No, they are only related, as modernity parties form a larger set of which totalitarian movements may be a partial sub-set. Theoretically can be easily imagined a case of a modernity party that is not truly totalitarian, does not employ political violence or has liberal attitudes towards some (but not to the majority of) issues. On the other hand, totalitarian movements, as they are most often conceptualised in literature (Brzezinski – Friedrich 1956; Neumann 1957; Tormey 1995; Linz 2000; Roberts 2006), always use violence to

achieve their goals and this difference in the level of pacification arguably also differentiates modernity parties and totalitarian movements.

In any case, the present work focuses on the Rokkanian tradition of Western political science and the previous paragraph is therefore only an excursion towards another potential research agenda. From a Rokkanian point of view, modernity parties differ from the original four cleavages in their challenge to more than one modernising process: they do not challenge them only through the referential grid of national issues but, in addition, through referencing international situation as the threat comes from abroad, from the West.

This is an innovation of the original Lipset-Rokkan framework, where cleavages were mostly conceptualised on the domestic level, despite the international diffusion of processes that created the cleavages in the first place. One originally Rokkanian geopolitical cleavage can be recognised in the 'international revolution' of communist parties and the present work continues in this research direction.

The modernity cleavage is distinct not only in its international dimension, but also in its longevity: in comparison to all the other cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan, its temporal division is decidedly longer. In fact, ironically for the term I use, the modernity cleavage has roots in the time before the coming of modernisation, in the era of relative isolation of world civilisations, when their respective unique features were being formed and their historical paths were diverging instead of converging. The Slavic-Orthodox heritage of the Russian culture and the Pharaonic-Islamic heritage of Egypt created the base matter from which, after the cultures' encounter with the Western type of modernisation, sprang up modernity cleavage parties.

The West was in both analysed cases the target of criticism and challenge. Chapter 4 and 5 show a relative difference in the goals and strategy of the Russian Communists and Muslim Brothers: while the first group, especially under Stalin, actively sought to challenge the dominance of the West and ultimately replace the Western model of progress all over the world, the latter group under Banna and

Hudaybi merely demanded the return of non-Western tradition into Egypt and, in extension, other Muslim countries. This statement of difference is, however, still weaker if read together with the fundamental Islamic principle of *jihad* that some Muslim scholars interpret as an imperative towards global expansion; even though the Brotherhood's actions were spatially limited to Muslim countries and also Banna in his writings professed a belief not unlike the 16th century European *cuius regio, eius religio*, the true scope of the Brothers' intentions may be questioned in view of the previous historical narrative. The Brothers in the first half of the 20th century did not have the resources for expansion beyond the realm of Islam; once that changed, the Brotherhood would indeed enter Western countries (Marechal – Lewis 2008; Meijer 2012). It might be even argued that international expansion of the Brotherhood was just a matter of time and opportunity, much like it was the case with the Russian Communists, particularly when accounting for the increased autonomy of the radicalised Special Section.

The historical narrative used widely throughout Chapter 5 also shows the important role political agency plays in the development of political groups.. Especially the issue of factionalisation is addressed in large detail in the case of the Muslim Brothers; it would be, however, quite wrong to assume that the Russian Communists suffered substantially less from internal quarrels and power conflicts. Both under Lenin and, to a lesser extent, under Stalin, the Communist Party always featured factions and cliques in conflict, challenging each other and the central authority. Despite the 'totalitarian' nature of the Russian Communists, the party leader was not totally omnipotent. Joseph Stalin came arguably closest to omnipotence in Russia and it is interesting to juxtapose this fact with Stalin's tendency to revert back to many previous, time-tested authoritarian institutions of the old Tsarist regime and to rely on technologies of power and mass ideological manipulation that had been a staple of the Russian culture already for some centuries.

From both the Russian and the Egyptian case it indeed might be inferred that the prevailing cultural patterns structured the political choices of leaders the most,

relatively strongly than formal economic or political institutions. Banna's strategy was to enhance the living Islamic culture of Islam, Stalin's strategy to reintroduce parts of the old Russian sacralism and mythology back into the Soviet system and both leaders used these instruments of culture as political tools to their great advantage; again allowing a comparison with the religious aspect of totalitarian movements (Gentile 1990). Lenin, who was the most innovative thinker of these three and also the most anti-traditional, had great problems in changing the folk culture of the Russian peasantry and never really accomplished it. The political situation in Russia and Egypt at the end of the 20th century was proving Karl Marx's old fear of the conservative peasant (Marx 1852) justified as the rural population in both cases still opposed the 'progressive' ideas of the urban classes.

The Russian Communists and Egyptian Muslim Brothers indeed profiled themselves to a certain level on the original cleavage City vs Countryside, where they represented the urban group, but to no lesser extent they were profiled on the cleavages Employers vs Labour, Centre vs Periphery and Church vs State, too. While the Communists were typically representing the labour class, the Muslim Brothers were more distinctly formed along the Church vs State cleavage, opposing further secularisation and promoting Islam (which is sufficient for mainstream political literature to classify them, despite the factual non-existence of a Muslim 'church', as a Rokkanian 'church' party, see, e.g., Tomsa – Ufen 2013). As was shown in the previous chapters, the cores of the supporters of the two groups were of certain socioeconomic characteristics, slightly different in the two cases but sharing the specific 'loser of modernisation' status.

'Loser' is another problematic term that has recently spread through social-scientific literature with no consensus as to its conceptualisation or definition. Neither the present work offers a definition, but shows the common characteristics of the Russian and Egyptian people who felt disadvantaged by the advancing Western-type modernisation of their countries and sought an opportunity for their own individual advancement. The socioeconomic characteristics, nevertheless, overlapped largely with the characteristics of losers as discussed in the globalisation

literature (Kriesi et al 2006), which is a finding that might help in the future more precise conceptualisation of the 'loser' term.

What distinguishes the two analysed cases of modernity parties from the majority of the more recent groups of losers of globalisation was, once again, the dominantly cultural message they carried as their banner. Even though this work starts with no assumption as to the primacy of cultural factors over others, in the course of the analysis, variables of culture prove themselves to be of quite a resilient nature, sustaining longue durée processes more than variables of political or economic regimes, that had changed and transformed in Russia and Egypt several times during the last few centuries. The cultural message that both the Russian Communists and Egyptian Muslim Brothers brought is one of non-Western progressivism; they sought to resist certain Western influences (cultural, political or economic) and wanted to modernise in ways unique of their respective civilisations.

In both cases, the parties did not reject the Occident in its totality and accepted some of its technologies or ideas that penetrated their countries. The Communism had itself in fact originated in Western Europe and the Soviets never distanced themselves from this non-Russian legacy, always crediting Marx (as Chapter 4 argues, quite erroneously) as a major inventor of the economic and political regime they had adopted. Similarly, the Muslim Brothers embraced many aspects of the Western culture, including the Western dress and manners, ideas on education, mass organisation and parliamentarism. This partial acceptance of some Western know-how, advancements and achievements still did not prevent them from presenting their own vision of the future, a vision of a modernising path different from the West. Eisenstadt (1999) offers a general concept for the comparison of such visionary political groups, calling them 'modern Jacobin movements', which share the goals of radical mobilisation and transformation of society using utopian models of the future. Eisenstadt himself distinguishes between 'pristine' fundamentalist movements, which have universalistic ideas and a transformative agenda, and movements 'particularistic and primordial', which do not promote a universalistic reconstruction of society.

Chapter 4 and 5 shows that the Eisenstadtian difference may, however, be very difficult to establish, since the plans of both the Bolsheviks and Muslim Brothers varied over time, progressing and regressing on the scale of their visionary demands and goals according to the changing political situation. Instead of distinguishing between these two types of fundamentalism, I argue that it is more important to trace the 'alternative modernity' moment in these groups, which defines them against groups lacking any anti-Western, visionary message. It is the modernity cleavage that divided in Russia the Bolsheviks and the Kadets with the Esers, who might have shared with the Bolsheviks a part of the electorate as well as a part of the political programme, but stayed largely pro-Western in terms of the vision of modernity. In Egypt, comparably, the modernity cleavage divided the Muslim Brothers and the Wafd, which also led to their fight over the electoral support of the urban lower-middle and lower classes.

Eisenstadt's Jacobin principle may still be useful for the present work for another reason: it is its inherent aspect of belief in the power of political agency and politics as such. As I note in Chapter 4, many a prominent author convincingly argues that it was the political mastery and fervour that ultimately tipped the scales in favour of the Bolsheviks in the 1917 revolutionary events. Similarly, it was the political skill of Banna's that kick-started the Brotherhood in the late 1920s. The Eisenstadtian Jacobinism is a firmly held belief by fundamental movements that with decisive political action and the resulting ultimate power and control over the situation, a political group may as an *avant garde* (a term originally claimed by French trade unions precisely for its military meaning) defeat the prevailing deep-rooted mass culture and set up new structures for a nation and a state. Neither the Russian nor Egyptian leaders ever fully succeeded in their transformative designs, but the belief was always there, in the writings of Lenin and Banna and in the actions of the two parties.

The Jacobin principle again brings closer the early-20th century modernity parties to 'new politics' parties of the early-21st century, who repeatedly profess their desire to change the existing globalised 'capitalist culture' (Kleinfeld 1995: 227-30; see also

Sennett 2006). These ‘new politics’ parties, that have been emerging in the Occident since the 1970s, may be considered late successors of non-Western modernity parties in Russia, Egypt and elsewhere. Unlike their predecessors, however, they do not call for an alternative way to progress and modernity ex-ante but ex-post facto. They react to the advanced Western-type modern restructuring of society, they do not seek to prevent it. Both the old Oriental group of modernity parties and the new Occidental group of new politics parties are groups of losers; identifiable as such by our socioeconomic indicators, that classify losers in accordance with the goals of Western-type modernisation (formal education, high salary, medical care); in their own perception, however, the much more significant mark of these losers is their call for a different modernity and progress as, in their opinion, it ought to be.

The hypothesised conception of supporters of modernity parties as losers of the modernising process implies that there is the possibility of emergence of modernity parties in every civilisation affected negatively by its encounter with the Western modernity; there is the ‘latent’ cleavage (Rae – Taylor 1970) that may be acted upon by political actors to transform it into a full, ‘manifest’ political cleavage. It may also be considered a one-level-up alteration of the classical Centre vs Periphery cleavage, on which nationalist parties form. Instead of a nation, the rallying issue is in this case the defence of a civilisation. However, the civilisational substance gives to the political group a much more ‘fundamental’ nature than it is possible for the nationalists, who, after all, seek to distance themselves from other ethnics of largely the same or similar cultural background. The political drive needed for the civilisational transformative task makes modernity parties, as is shown in the previous chapter, vulnerable to ideological and *realpolitik* intraparty factionalisation to which the parties’ overall fundamentalism is always highly sensitive. The civilisational agenda may thus be at times partially deemphasized, in favour of moderate international politics or Western-type economic reformism. That gives modernity parties a relatively large space for political manoeuvres among issues of culture, politics and economy, which is something that one-issue nationalist parties cannot normally afford.

This manoeuvrability may lead to new cross-cutting variances on modernity parties, in which different ideologies and worldviews meet. For instance, this work presents more empirical evidence, specifically in the realm of political parties, that supports Ernest Gellner's (1983; 1991) comparison of the mirroring characteristics of Islam and Marxism. Despite their not insignificant differences in both ideology as well as political style, the Russian Communists and Muslim Brothers shared several important features that should be stressed in the conclusion of this work and hypothesised as the general features of modernity parties that is to be tested in future research into other individual empirical cases. These were the features of:

a) multi-issue political focus,

b) emphasis on long-term civilisational uniqueness,

c) challenge against a major part of Western-type modernisation,

d) design for a fundamental reform of society,

e) sacral connotations of political ideology,

f) Jacobin belief in the strong transformative power of politics.

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