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**China and the Notion of Responsibility in the  
Present International Society**

Diplomová práce

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## **Abstrakt**

Jednou z najčastejších otázok v rámci štúdia čínskej zahraničnej politiky je otázka, či je možné Čínu považovať za zodpovedného člena medzinárodnej spoločnosti. Cieľom predkladanej diplomovej práce je podrobne analyzovať správanie Číny v rámci súčasnej medzinárodnej spoločnosti z hľadiska zodpovednosti. Diplomová práca sa bude opierať o koncept medzinárodnej spoločnosti rozpracovaný Anglickou školou v medzinárodných vzťahoch a prepojí ho s konceptom zodpovednosti v medzinárodných vzťahoch s cieľom stanoviť súbor kritérií, ktoré musia bežný štát alebo veľmoc splniť, aby mohli byť považovaní za zodpovedných aktérov v súčasnej medzinárodnej spoločnosti. S cieľom určiť, či sa Čína na medzinárodnej úrovni správa ako zodpovedný bežný štát alebo zodpovedná veľmoc, diplomová práca využije metódu najpravdepodobnejšej a najnepravdepodobnejšej prípadovej štúdie. Analýza správania Číny vo Svetovej obchodnej organizácii a v rámci režimu nešírenia jadrových zbraní nám poskytne dostatočné dôkazy o tom, či Čína akceptuje primárne inštitúcie tvoriace chrbtovú kosť súčasnej medzinárodnej spoločnosti. Predstavené zistenia majú zásadný význam pre vnímanie súčasnej Číny ako štátu rešpektujúceho inštitúcie a pravidlá súčasnej medzinárodnej spoločnosti.

## **Abstract**

One of the most frequent questions in the study of Chinese foreign policy is whether China can be regarded as a responsible member of international society. It is the aim of the presented thesis to look more closely at China's behaviour in the present international society in terms of responsibility. The thesis utilizes the concept of international society developed by the English school of international relations and interconnects it with the concept of responsibility in international relations to determine

a set of criteria which an ordinary state or great power must meet in order to be regarded as responsible in the present international society. In order to determine whether China behaves as a responsible ordinary state or great power on the international level, the thesis utilizes the method of the most likely and the least likely case studies. The analysis of China's behaviour in the World Trade Organization and within the nuclear non-proliferation regime can provide sufficient evidence of China's acceptance of primary institutions forming the backbone of the present international society. The findings have serious implications for thinking of contemporary China as a status quo state respecting institutions and rules of the present international society.

### **Kľúčové slová**

**Čína, Anglická škola, medzinárodná spoločnosť, zodpovednosť, mocnosť, Svetová obchodná organizácia, nešírenie jadrových zbraní**

### **Keywords**

**China, English school, international society, responsibility, great power, World Trade Organization, nuclear non-proliferation**

**Rozsah práce:** 156 370 znakov s medzerami

## **Prehlásenie**

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V Praze dne 6. 1. 2013

Bc. Peter Mecko

## **Pod'akovanie**

Na tomto mieste by som sa rád poďakoval doc. PhDr. Janovi Karlasovi, M.A., Ph.D., za jeho cenné pripomienky a rady, ktorými prispel k vypracovaniu predkladanej diplomovej práce. Predovšetkým mu ďakujem za ochotu, ktorú prejavil pri záverečnej revízii diplomovej práce.

Ďalej by som chcel vyjadriť veľkú vďaku rodičom i ďalším členom rodiny, ktorí ma podporovali počas celého štúdia na vysokej škole a obzvlášť v poslednom období.

V neposlednom rade by som sa chcel poďakovať mojej Zuzke, ktorá mi napísanie práce uľahčila svojou prítomnosťou a starostlivosťou.

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## List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<b>AB</b>	Appellate Body
<b>CCP</b>	Chinese Communist Party
<b>CTBT</b>	Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
<b>DDA</b>	Doha Development Agenda
<b>DSB</b>	Dispute Settlement Body
<b>DSM</b>	Dispute Settlement Mechanism
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FTA</b>	free trade area
<b>GAO</b>	Government Accountability Office
<b>GATT</b>	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
<b>GDP</b>	gross domestic product
<b>IAEA</b>	International Atomic Energy Agency
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>MOFCOM</b>	Ministry of Commerce
<b>NNP</b>	nuclear non-proliferation
<b>NPT</b>	Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
<b>NSG</b>	Nuclear Suppliers Group
<b>NWS</b>	nuclear weapon state
<b>TPR</b>	Trade Policy Review
<b>TRM</b>	Transitional Review Mechanism
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UN SC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>USCBC</b>	US-China Business Council
<b>USTR</b>	United States Trade Representative
<b>WB</b>	World Bank
<b>WMD</b>	weapons of mass destruction
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organization

## Introduction

The speech of Robert B. Zoellick in front of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations in September 2005 can be interpreted as one of the defining moments in the Sino-American relations. By calling upon China to become “a responsible stakeholder in the international system”, Zoellick set the tone for arguably the most critical bilateral relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century for years to come. (Zoellick, 2005) In the speech, he briefly described what role China should play in international relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in order not to upset stability of the international system and avoid hostile relations with the U.S. as the most powerful actor on the international level. He triggered the debate about China’s responsibility with many American and other Western officials dealing with China referring to it with regularity. The most evident, frequent, and one must admit also justified, line of critique is that this concept can be regarded only as the way to tell China what it should and should not do in order not to interfere with the U.S. interests.

The aim of the thesis is to shed light on number of aspects related to responsibility of a state, namely China, in the present international society. The goal is to provide description of the contemporary international society based on which it would be possible to evaluate behaviour of a particular state. Furthermore, the goal is to analyze the concept of responsibility in international affairs in connection with the concept of international society as described by the English school of international relations and look at the criteria which a state or a great power must meet in order to be regarded as responsible. The aim will be to use the set of determined criteria to analyze behaviour of rising China in particular case studies in order to make general observations about China’s actions in the contemporary international society.

The motivation behind the thesis has various dimensions. The mere challenge of analyzing often unpredictable China’s foreign policy is a fascinating prospect. Due to increasing Chinese capabilities and power, a number of policy makers and scholars in the field of international relations have been debating about its intentions and direction of its development. The question which is at the forefront of all debates is whether China is and will be a status quo power respecting established institutions, rules and norms of the present international society or a revisionist power trying to overthrow them. By analyzing its present behaviour, we can at least determine the present state of its foreign policy and predict its short to mid-term development, excluding any critical

and game changing events which often shatter predictions and forecasts developed with the greatest precision.

As it has been indicated, foreign officials have been continuously calling upon China to behave responsibly and to assume responsibility for maintaining the current international system. A responsible behaviour has become something of a precondition for its peaceful rise. However, in order to judge China in the terms of responsibility, it is necessary to determine specific indicators of behaviour on which we can test responsibility of a state. Testing these indicators and analyzing China's behaviour in particular case studies can confirm or refute foundations of "China threat theories" and clarify China's behaviour with respect to established norms, rules and institutions of the present international society. If China could be deemed to behave responsibly in the contemporary society of states it would increase chances that it could develop peacefully without efforts to overthrow the existing system.

The main goal of the thesis is to empirically test whether ever growing voices of decision makers which call upon China to become a responsible state in the contemporary international society are justified and are supported by evidence in China's behaviour on the international level. Moreover, the thesis will distinguish between China behaving responsibly as an ordinary member state of international society and its behaviour as a great power which has somewhat more central and involved role to play within any international society.

Therefore, the main question stands as follows: Does China's behaviour in the 21<sup>st</sup> century meet the criteria in order for China to be regarded as a responsible state in the present international society? If China could be treated as a responsible ordinary state, the thesis will at the same time attempt to answer a question whether it acts also as a responsible great power and meets the higher standards which are connected to such position within international society.

As far as selected methodology is concerned, the thesis will present two case studies of China's behaviour in the present international society. After briefly outlining historical development of China's participation in the international society since 1970's, the thesis will focus on the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century until now and analyze how China meets established criteria in order to be regarded as a responsible state or great power. The thesis will predominantly work with qualitative methods, evaluate and analyze qualitative data in order to confirm or refute indicators of China as a responsible state in the present international society. The data will include documents and academic

works relating to China's foreign policy, data from international organizations and other evidences of China's behaviour in the present international society.

A selection of suitable cases will be one of the key parts of the thesis. In order to give higher credibility and relevancy to the thesis, presented case studies will be the most likely and the least likely which one could utilize to test the hypothesis of China behaving responsibly in the contemporary international society. In the end, the thesis will attempt to interpret results of the research and outline what China's responsible/irresponsible behaviour as an ordinary state or great power means for future of the present international society.

As far as the state of existing research on the subject of the thesis is concerned, the authors belonging to the English school tradition have come a long way and provided in-depth explanations of the existence of international society. The works of Bull, Buzan, Jackson, Wight, Watson, and other distinguished authors will provide foundation for the analysis of the contemporary international society. The thesis will offer a perspective on economic sphere of international society, an aspect that is often neglected in the English school tradition. In addition, the thesis aims to look more closely at the role of great powers as custodians of international society.

Last but not least, the thesis will draw on numerous debates about China acting as a revolutionary state or status quo state now or in the future. Presented thesis aims to contribute to this debate by offering an analysis of relationship between contemporary China and the present international society. The authors, such as Foot, Buzan, Zhang or Chan, who already attempted to interconnect concepts of international society and responsibility and applied them to the study of China's behaviour in the present international society, will be vital to indicated goals of the thesis. In both specific case studies, the thesis will draw on primary sources and academic works of leading authors, who have been analyzing China's behaviour in the WTO or nuclear non-proliferation (NNP) regime, and evaluate China's acceptance of institutions of international society.

In the first chapter, the thesis will describe the conception of international society as defined by scholars identified with the English school tradition. In the end of the chapter, the thesis will provide a description and characteristics of the contemporary international society. In the second chapter, the concept of responsibility will be introduced and important indicators will be established upon which state's behaviour can be judged. It will be there where the distinction between responsible behaviour of an ordinary state and great power will be made. Also, Chinese perception of

responsibility on international level will be introduced to provide different perspective. After briefly outlining China's position in international society since 1949 in the third chapter, the fourth chapter will present the most likely case study of China's responsible behaviour in the field of international trade epitomized by the WTO. The fifth chapter will present the least likely case study of China's responsible behaviour which will concentrate on the NNP regime as a significant element of the contemporary international society. Last but not least, the conclusion will summarize the findings, emphasize results of tested hypotheses and answer the main research question stated in the beginning while providing other general observations.


## **1. Concept of International Society in the English School of International Relations**

A school of thought whose concepts this chapter is about to introduce did not get its name until Roy E. Jones (1981) questioned the approach of some authors in his article *The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure*. Scholars who quickly became identified with this theoretical approach include most prominently A. W. Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, John Vincent, Adam Watson and most lately Barry Buzan who has attempted to revive this approach and offer a structural interpretation of the English school theory in addition to traditional normative Wightean approach.

If one had to characterize the central point of focus of the English school it would be the study of anarchical society of states and the concept of international society. It is not a coincidence that some authors label such approach as the international society approach. (Bellamy, 2005, p. 6) Moreover, the English school's approach is called rationalist or Grotian. (Linklater, 2004) All of these labels have their origin in three concepts of international system, international society and world society as developed by Bull and in the Wight's three traditions of international relations theory - realism, rationalism and revolutionism (See Figure 1). (Bull, 1977; Wight, 1991)

Realist tradition which can be labelled as Hobbesianism/Machiavellianism corresponds to the concept of international system. This approach to international relations is "about power politics amongst states and puts the structure and process of international anarchy at the centre of IR theory." (Buzan, 2004, p. 7) Balance of power and war are predominant institutions and states are presumed to behave as billiard balls

in a zero-sum game with no possibility of progress. (Bull, 1977, pp. 24-25; Hynek, 2005, p. 81)



**Figure 1.** Three traditions model as developed by the English School. (Buzan, 2001, p. 475)

Rationalist tradition (Grotianism) corresponding to the concept of international society recognizes that states must provide for their security in the condition of anarchy but rejects the realist conviction that states in international arena are in an eternal state of war. (Linklater, 2004, p. 104) The emphasis is put on the existence of order within international society in which states are bound by common rules and institutions in the dealing with one another. (Bull, 1977, p. 27)

Revolutionist tradition (Kantianism) embodied in the concept of world society ignores states as actors and focuses on the relationship among all men in the community of mankind which is based purely on cooperation. Conflicts of interests exist only on the level of states whereas goals of all individuals are the same, namely cooperation and prosperity. (Bull, 1977, pp. 25-26)

## 1.1 Bull's Concept of International Society

In his most famous book *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (1977) which many regard as the most influential work representing the English

school tradition, Hedley Bull strives to find answers to questions relating to order on the international level. He develops the concept of international society which has been brought up by Manning and Wight even though the latter utilized the term *systems of state*. (Wight, 1977; Buzan, 1993, p. 331)

The starting point in his analysis is the acceptance of states as the most important actors in international relations which he defines as “independent political communities with a government asserting sovereignty over particular portion of surface and respective population.” (Bull, 1977, p. 8) When there is a sufficient contact between two or more states and they have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions which causes them to behave as parts of a whole, Bull writes about the creation of a system of states or *international system*. (Bull, 1977, pp. 9-10) Existence of such foundation, a basic interaction between states, is a necessary condition for the creation of a society of states, or international society, which he and Watson define as follows:

“A group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in maintaining these arrangements.” (Bull & Watson, 1984, p. 1)

It is the perception of common interests in the elementary goals of social life which drives states to accept certain rules to sustain these goals. If we can presume that states share some common interests which may be as simple as survival or as complicated as cooperation beyond basic principles of coexistence, then they will attempt to develop rules prescribing the pattern of behaviour and institutions which will make the rules effective. (Bull, 1977, p. 65) In such circumstances order can develop on the international level despite the fact that the society of states is an anarchical society.

Bull describes three elementary goals which drive states to pursue order within international society despite the condition of anarchy of international system - limitations of violence and the use of force, provision for the sanctity of agreements and respecting reciprocal property rights. He considers them to be elementary in the sense that they cannot be taken for granted and universal in the sense that all societies take account of them. (Bull, 1977, pp. 4-5)

However, the sense of these common goals does not precisely determine how the units should behave to achieve them. It is the function of established rules to guide

states towards accomplishing goals indicated above. Bull introduces three levels of rules which play crucial role in the maintenance of international order. First level of rules comprises fundamental normative principles setting out the basic ordering principle. For international society that key principle is sovereignty of states. Second level of rules establishes the minimum behavioural conditions for society and coexistence of its units. It includes rules which restrict the legitimate use of violence, a basic rule of international law *pacta sunt servanda* and unreserved respect for sovereignty of other state. Third level of rules contains advanced rules on which members of international society were able to reach a consensus and which facilitate cooperation not just on political but also economic, social and environmental matters which go beyond coexistence. (Bull, 1977, pp. 67-71; Buzan, 2004, p. 52)

Due to anarchical nature of international relations, it is the task of states to establish mechanisms, *institutions*<sup>1</sup>, which will oversee compliance with these rules. Interestingly enough, Bull regarded states and their sovereignty as the principal institution of international society. That means that states are the only actors that can create rules and protect them. Primary institutions which he regarded as the means of protection of rules include the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, managerial system of great powers and war. (Bull, 1977, pp. 71-74)

As far as Bull's conception of international society is concerned, there are certain points relating to the limits of cooperation amongst states which require further clarification. In his work *The Grotian Conception of International Society*, he defined two conceptions of international society which look at the limits of cooperation from two perspectives - pluralism and solidarism.<sup>2</sup> (Bull, 1966) Pluralists are convinced that international society is formed by states which are culturally and ideologically heterogeneous and therefore there are natural limits to cooperation.<sup>3</sup> They believe that states can at best achieve the creation of practical rules and principles to manage their interaction within a limited goal to coexist peacefully in orderly manner without excessive violence. They should not strive for reaching consensus on higher values such as human rights because their diversity presents an insurmountable obstacle for such

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<sup>1</sup> The term institution does not imply an organization or administrative body but rather a set of practices which help states achieve their goals. (Bull, 1977, p. 74)

<sup>2</sup> Buzan's approach to pluralism vs. solidarism debate differs significantly from Bull's understanding and it will be explained in the next part of the chapter. More on pluralism vs. solidarism debate can be found in Buzan (2004, pp. 139-160) or in Almeida (2003).

<sup>3</sup> For more detailed elaboration of pluralist international society see Jackson (1992, 2000) who is the strongest advocate of this conception.



deeper cooperation. (Suganami, 2010, p. 25) On the other hand, solidarists draw on cosmopolitanism and universalism of human values and claim that solidarity of all human beings requires cooperation on the international level which goes beyond mere coexistence.<sup>4</sup> Bull warns against exaggerated optimism and goes as far as to claim that support for universal values and emphasis on the life of individual and morality can weaken key institutions of international society (e.g. sovereignty and non-intervention principle) and therefore threaten international order. (Suganami, 2010, pp. 25-26)

The next distinction in debates about international society is closely related to sociological conceptions of *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society)<sup>5</sup>. It is mainly Barry Buzan who analyzes this distinction but it is essential to mention it now. The *Gemeinschaft* understanding views society as something organic which developed based on common sentiments, experience and identity. In this view, societies grow naturally rather than being developed by units of which they are comprised of. On the other hand, the *Gesellschaft* understanding views society as being contractual and purposely constructed. Its units deliberately develop rules of conduct which then oblige them to behave in a particular way. (Buzan, 1993, pp. 333-334) The conception of community is advocated most prominently by M. Wight who claims that “a states system will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members.” (Wight, 1977, p. 33) Bull as a proponent of functional conception insisted that cultural homogeneity is not vital and states will strive for order despite their diversities. Bull insisted that universal or global international society can exist even without common cultural background of its units as long as states share common interests. (Hoffman, 1986, p. 187)

Another factor that Bull regarded as very significant for the existence of international society is the contribution and role of great powers. Even though great powers are very likely to use their superiority in international relations to promote their specific interests, they also promote international order if it is in their interests to do so. Bull maintains that great powers contribute to international order in two main ways - management of their relations and directing the affairs of international society as a whole. (Bull, 1977, pp. 206-207) Examples of such conscious efforts include

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<sup>4</sup> For more detailed elaboration of solidarist international society sees Vincent (1986) who is the strongest advocate of this conception. Compare with his earlier work *Nonintervention and International Order* (1977) when he was a proponent of the pluralist conception of international society.

<sup>5</sup> These sociological concepts were elaborated by Tonnies (1957) and B. Buzan makes direct reference to it. Further analysis of these concepts can be found in the chapter written by Jacinta O'Hagan (2005).

preservation of balance of power on global level, crisis management and limitation of violence among great powers (e.g. Cold War). Their contribution towards order is not just the question of their special stake in existing distribution of power but also the question of gaining legitimacy for their special role. Bull acknowledges their rights and duties or even managerial responsibilities.<sup>6</sup> (Bull, 1977, pp. 200-229) Obvious undermining of order would threaten legitimacy of their position thus they attempt to avoid such actions. Also, satisfying some demands from members of international society can strengthen their position.

The aim of this part was to introduce a basic concept of international society as developed by the English school tradition and Hedley Bull in particular. In the next section, the emphasis will be on Buzan's elaboration of international society which will be critical for the aim of the thesis in order to answer the research question stated at the beginning.

## **1.2 Buzan's Concept of International Society<sup>7</sup>**

Buzan's goal in his book *From International Society to World Society* (2004) is to address weaknesses in the English school's approach and clarify neglected points in the study of international society. He offers more social structural approach in order to develop the English school theory so that it could rank with dominant theoretical approaches of realism and liberalism. It is impossible to give an exhausting account of the analysis he introduces so this section will attempt to point out only the parts relating strictly to his understanding of international society.


As far as international society is concerned, Buzan clearly separates global society of states and world society which includes transnational actors and individuals. He does not question central importance of states in international society and claims that it is the society which is constructed by units and reflects their domestic character. (Buzan, 2004, p. 92) On the other hand, he tries to eliminate the distinction between

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<sup>6</sup> However, he emphasizes that it cannot be taken for granted that great powers will behave in this way. Frequently they may promote disorder and fight wars to exploit their preponderant power and reach their egoistic goals. (Bull, 1977, p. 207)

<sup>7</sup> It is very important to clarify in the beginning that what will be referred to in this section, and consequently in the whole thesis as international society, is labeled by Buzan as interstate society. He makes this distinction in order to later develop concept of world society which includes also transnational actors and individuals thereby using the term interstate society to show that states are primary objects of analysis. The thesis is interested only in international society of states and other actors are not incorporated into the following analysis.

international system and international society. He incorporates it to the conception of international society albeit as the first level within the spectrum of international society calling it *Asocial international society* (See Figure 2).



**Figure 2.** International system incorporated to international society and categorization of international societies. (Buzan, 2004, p. 109)

One of the most influential elements in Buzan’s book is his contribution to pluralism vs. solidarism debate which has dominated the English school for so long. He rejects the notion that this debate should be about shared identity or common culture. For him it should be the debate about “the extent and degree of institutionalization of shared interests in systems of agreed rules of conduct.” (Buzan, 2004, p. 61) He stresses the principle of a positive law framework in which states can agree upon anything according to their will without bringing their sovereignty into question.<sup>8</sup> If states deem further cooperation and introduction of more comprehensive rules beyond the mere coexistence to international society to be in their interest they can do so and it has nothing to do with the question of culture. Culturally heterogeneous societies have the same chance to create more complex rules, values and institutions of international society as homogenous ones. In this view, pluralism and solidarism are not mutually exclusive and can be rather seen as two sides of a spectrum. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 45-62;

<sup>8</sup> In this way, Buzan disputes conviction of pluralist scholars who emphasize “non-developmental character of international society” (Mayall, 2000, p. 14) and claims that any development depends solely

Almeida, 2003) Buzan then characterizes the pluralism vs. solidarism debate as the distinction between *thin* and *thick* rules of cooperation. The more cooperation and rules on the issues besides survival and coexistence states agree upon, the more solidarist such international society becomes. Buzan indicates that such development towards solidarist international society is correlated with a sense of convergence amongst domestic political systems of members and establishment of common values which states strive for and thereby create appropriate rules, norms, institutions or even organizations.<sup>9</sup> (Buzan, 2004, pp. 139-157)


Based on the amount of pluralist or solidarist elements in an international society, Buzan recognizes six types of international societies with the type of international society labelled as *Coexistence* representing the pluralist conception of international society, realist side of Grotian tradition, and the type called *Convergence* representing the solidarist conception, Kantian form of solidarism. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 159-160; see Figure 3) The type of international society labelled as *Cooperative* which will be critical for describing the contemporary international society represents neither pure pluralist conception nor pure solidarist conception of international society. It consists rather of a mixture of deeply embedded pluralist institutions with solidarist elements in the form of joint projects undertaken by its members in an effort to broaden areas of cooperation and strengthen international order.

However, there is still another factor which Buzan introduces and which determines stability or durability of a particular international society or values that are at its heart. Buzan tries to answer not only what values are shared but also *how/why* they are shared. He concludes that shared values of international society may rest either on *coercion*, *calculation* or *belief* calling them *binding forces* underpinning these values. (Buzan, 2004, p. 152) If solidarist values rest on coercion and calculation they are more vulnerable. On the other hand, if states believe that respecting these values is in their interest it is more likely that these values will survive and continue to be respected within international society.

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on states which are sovereign members of international society and can decide whether to pursue solidarist projects or not. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 47-52)

<sup>9</sup> However, Buzan acknowledges that convergence of political systems is difficult to find on a global scale. States would have to accept that they are the same sovereign entities and a sort of “we-feeling” to abandon or go beyond pluralistic principles. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 146-148)



**Figure 3.** Six types of international society positioned on the pluralist and solidarist spectrum. (Buzan, 2004, p. 159)

As far as institutions of international society are concerned, Buzan insists that each type of international society which he identified (as shown on Figure 3) has a set of distinctive primary institutions which determine its particular nature. He is convinced that primary institutions are not permanent and can evolve, adapt, strengthen or weaken throughout the existence of any society. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 181-182) He also recognizes that there is a sort of hierarchy with a particular master institution being a fundamental cornerstone of society. Sovereignty can be easily regarded as such master institution of Westphalian/European international society with non-intervention principle or international law as derivatives. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 183-184)

What makes Buzan unique in his approach in comparison with other scholars belonging to the English school tradition is also his regional or sub-global approach to international society. He is convinced that some international societies can establish thicker principles of cooperation closer to solidarist spectrum even though global international society would be formed on purely pluralistic basis. (Buzan, 2004, p. 208)

This sub-global level which he incorporates into the English school thinking offers support for what he calls “vanguard theory of how interstate society expands.” (Buzan, 2004, pp. 222) In this way he analyzes the role which great powers play in the expansion of international society. He describes the role of European powers in the development of contemporary international society which through coercion introduced values such as sovereignty and international law which then became internalized and accepted by other states.

The aim of the next section will be to apply the concept of international society and especially Buzan's version to practice and describe the present state of contemporary global international society.

### 1.3 Contemporary International Society

As far as historical development of the contemporary international society is concerned, it would be hard to argue against the fact that most of the rules, institutions, norms and principles have European origin. During their domination, European states spread them by all the means at their disposal not only to promote order but also to pursue their interests. Buzan's vanguard explanation captures this process with precision. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 240-242) Watson adds that the contemporary international society is a result of evolutionary process, though not necessarily in the positive sense of the word. He is quick to emphasize hereditary elements and continuity of practices which the contemporary international society adopted from the past.<sup>10</sup> (Watson, 1992, p. 318)

Based on Buzan's categorization of different international societies, it is hard not to agree with his assertion that the contemporary global international society can be labelled as *Cooperative*, an international society characterized by a combination of pluralists and solidarist elements. (See Figure 3) It has far too many well established pluralist institutions for it to be categorized merely as international society labelled as *Coexistence* and there is still a high degree of ideological diversity in order for it to be labelled as *Convergence*. Yet, despite pluralist principles being currently dominant there is an increasing number of areas which states are willing to cooperate on and which incline towards solidarist spectrum presented above. Due to significant downgrade of war as a mean to reach state's goals and introduction of new projects leading to formation of shared values, the contemporary international society has all the necessary attributes in order to be regarded as *Cooperative*. Buzan rightfully insists that global support for liberalization of world economy and multilateral trade simply does not fit into pluralist conception of international society. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 231-232) Neither do complex mechanisms in the form of international organizations such as WB, IMF, and WTO, which enforce compliance in this area of cooperation. Suganami aptly observes

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<sup>10</sup> See Watson's *The Evolution of International Society* (1992) for a detailed analysis of how international society developed throughout the history up until the present.

the trend that military-political interaction takes a back seat and economic processes are a dominant form of interaction. (Suganami, 2010, p. 22-23)

On the other hand, there is a controversial debate whether universal acceptance of human rights can be regarded as a value or institution in the contemporary international society and whether their serious violations provide states with an option of humanitarian intervention as a tool to enforce compliance.<sup>11</sup> When describing the type of international society labelled as *Cooperative*, Buzan incorporates *Equality of people* as a master institution with *Human rights* and *Humanitarian intervention* as derivatives. (Buzan, 2004, p. 187) However, he shows some signs of hesitation as he talks about “*tentative* acceptance of *some elements* of human rights.” (Buzan, 2004, p. 232, emphasis added) He also admits that human rights as a solidarist value of international society can be attributed rather to a particular Euro-Atlantic international society on a sub-global level. To emphasize this point he claims that despite significant advances, human rights and humanitarian intervention remain contested and there is a controversy whether to count them as institutions of global international society. (Buzan, 2004, p. 233)

Therefore, even though there are significant developments in this area which give an indication that international society might be coming closer to incorporating intervention against serious human rights violations as a value the author of the thesis feels it is too soon to view such development as assured and already embedded. While the UN’s *Responsibility to Protect* initiative introduces a set of principles as a framework for action in such cases as determined by the UN SC, it may be premature to view it as an adopted solidarist element of the present international society. Problematic points include not only identifying scope of action and implementation but also selectivity of cases where the UN SC acts (e.g. Libya vs. Syria).<sup>12</sup> Therefore, sovereignty can be regarded as a master institution and defining norm of the contemporary international society in accordance with *Article 2* of the Charter of the United Nations which epitomizes the pluralist conception of international society.

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<sup>11</sup> The debate on humanitarian intervention has been ever-present within the English school and almost every author belonging to the tradition has something to add to this debate. Solidarists defend the concept of humanitarian intervention as a moral responsibility within international society whereas pluralists refuse any interference in domestic affairs fearing it would disrupt order on international level. (Dunne, 2001; Vincent, 1977, 1986; Wheeler, 2000; Jackson, 2000)

<sup>12</sup> For more information on the UN’s *Responsibility to Protect* initiative see the report of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001).

Primary institutions of the contemporary international society and their derivatives are summarized in Table 1. It is clear that despite significant elaboration, Buzan's list of primary institutions is very similar to Bull's list. Sovereignty and territoriality remain present as master institutions and principle of non-intervention is still dominant even though it has been violated mainly by the Western powers which seek to modify it. International law has been elaborated to incorporate and regulate new areas of cooperation. Diplomacy, and especially its multilateral form embedded in numerous international organizations, is a cornerstone of everyday interaction of states within international society. Great powers have still a major role to play although not in the same way as during the Cold War.<sup>13</sup> Market and environmentalism are also included in the list of primary institutions with the former being a strong solidarist element with multilateralism and trade liberalization as its significant derivatives, with the latter being regarded as a shared value on the boundary between the logic of coexistence and the vision of joint project. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 222-223)

Master Institution	Derivative Institutions
Sovereignty	Non-intervention International law
Territoriality	Boundaries
Diplomacy	Bilateralism Multilateralism
Great power management	Alliances War Balance of power
Market	Trade liberalisation Financial liberalisation Hegemonic stability
Nationalism	Self-determination Popular sovereignty
Environmental stewardship	Species survival Climate stability

**Table 1.** Modified list of shared institutions in the contemporary international society  
(Buzan, 2004, p. 187, edited by the author)<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Buzan is questioning unilateral approach of the U.S. in recent years and regards it as a threat to the contemporary international society. (Buzan, 2004, p. 256)

<sup>14</sup> As it has been already mentioned, in spite of his doubts, Buzan would add *Equality of people* as another master institution with *Human rights* and *Humanitarian intervention* as derivatives but for the reasons



As far as binding forces of the contemporary international society are concerned, a conception introduced by Buzan, it is safe to say that its principles, values and institutions rest on a mixture of coercion, calculation and belief. Buzan admits difficulty in choosing just one characterization which would be dominant mainly due to high number and variety of actors in international society and scope of institutions. Nevertheless, he is convinced that institutions related to the pluralist conception of the contemporary international society are held in place mostly by belief. (Buzan, 2004, p. 234) It means that they can be regarded as having deep roots and therefore being stable. Thus, it is reasonable to presume that they will not be contested even if international society undergoes some dramatic development such as significant changes in distribution of power. On the other hand, solidarist elements are at the moment incorporated in international society through calculation, belief or even coercion and therefore more prone to changes. In the event of unexpected or substantial changes within international society, trade liberalization principles can undergo significant changes or even be abandoned.

As it has been shown, the role of great powers holds a meaningful place in Buzan's analysis. So called *vanguard* explanation for the expansion of international society may be aptly adopted to explain also the contemporary international society. The U.S. as a pre-dominant power has been spreading values it has regarded as essential for either achieving its interests or maintaining international society. One can reliably point to a number of examples to see that the U.S. has been using binding mechanisms of belief, calculation and coercion to project those values. Spread of liberal market principles is a valid example of the U.S. trying to get states on its side by belief and calculation to maximize absolute gains for the global international society. On the other hand, its post-2001 behaviour with elements of unilateralism, pre-emptive operations and effort to spread Western values, such as human rights and democracy, which some regarded as universal, may violate primary institutions of the contemporary international society and may disrupt international order. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 263-270)

Based on the discussion in the whole chapter and for the purposes of the thesis, the contemporary international society can be assumed to be *a global pluralist international society with solidarist elements* resting on consensus of its member states.

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explained above it can be argued these institutions are not established on the global level just yet. The table has been therefore modified and does not include these institutions.

This more or less corresponds to the type of international society described by Buzan and labelled as *Cooperative*.

## 2. Concept of Responsibility in International Society

After outlining the approach of the English school to international society, the next couple of pages will focus on the concept of responsibility in international relations, or more precisely in international society. By defining responsibility and analyzing the way the English school tackles the issue we will be able to determine indicators of responsible behaviour both for an ordinary sovereign state which is a member of international society and great power which has somewhat “superior” position within international society in terms of responsibility. We will try to answer two questions: what is meant by responsibility in international relations and how to assess responsibility of an ordinary state or great power in international society. In order to evaluate responsibility it is important to establish a set of as objective indicators as possible to decrease the amount of subjectivity which is especially high when states judge behaviour of other members of international society depending on whether their behaviour is in line with their interests.

Without engaging in profound philosophical debates regarding the term responsibility which could give rise to more obscurities than provide clear answers, one could define responsibility in more than one way. Monolingual English dictionaries provide several supplemental definitions.<sup>15</sup> *Responsibility* can be regarded as answerability, accountability and liability for the consequences of one’s actions or inactions. Different aspect of responsibility includes *responsibilities* as obligations or duties one has to fulfil in order to be regarded as responsible. There is still a third aspect which is responsibility to/towards someone/something prescribing expected way of behaviour towards certain individual or entity while respecting certain customs, established practices and agreed rules. British political scientist Andrew Heywood regards responsibility as a stronger form of accountability and answerability with repercussions for not meeting one’s duties and obligations.<sup>16</sup> (Heywood, 2000, p. 145)

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<sup>15</sup> Definitions of the term “responsibility” can be found at web pages of Oxford dictionaries or Merriam-Webster dictionary.

<sup>16</sup> However, Heywood concentrates more on domestic, inward responsibility of government towards its own citizens and its moral dimension. (Heywood, 2000, pp. 145-147)

When we apply the concept of responsibility to the level of sovereign states, it is clear that primary responsibility of every state lies with its people, citizens. Each state has certain duties or obligations which its citizens expect it to meet in order to be regarded as legitimate while listening to their demands. (Chan, 2006, p. 8) On the other hand, citizens also hold the state accountable for the consequences of its actions and inactions. If citizens deemed state to behave irresponsibly towards them they might deduce consequences and halt their support of the state.

As far as the international level is concerned, international responsibility of states has its origin in the fact that states, even though living in the conditions of anarchy, are nonetheless members of international society in which all states mutually recognize sovereign status of one another. Therefore, besides their responsibility towards their citizens, they are also responsible and have responsibilities towards other actors within international society and one can claim that also responsibility for existence of international society as a whole. Due to the fact that each international society has developed particular rules, institutions and norms influencing and prescribing behaviour of its units, responsible members are expected to act in accordance with them or otherwise acquire an image of an irresponsible actor and face exclusion from international society. Responsible behaviour and responsibilities of each state can be influenced by number of internal and external factors, such as capacities, position within international society, nature of interests, domestic policy, and external expectations placed upon it by other members of international society and so on. Based on these factors each state can assume several different sets of responsibilities. Just to give an example, a state can have responsibilities as an ordinary sovereign state or great power, developed or developing country, member of a particular international organization (e.g. EU, WTO, IMF, and NPT) and many others. (Chen, 2009, p. 9) The most evident responsibilities which all states are bound by are obligations arising from the international law (e.g. legal responsibilities) and agreements which they are contractual parties to.

## **2.1 English School and the Concept of Responsibility**

Looking at the works of authors belonging to the English school approach, it is clear that the concept of responsibility is not a natural point of focus such as order or justice in Bull's works. In spite of this, one can find many references which contribute

to the debate on international responsibility. In line with the three traditions introduced by Martin Wight and described above, each of them focuses on certain aspect of responsibility. Responsibility in realist tradition is emphasized as state's primary responsibility to its citizens. On the other hand responsibility in the revolutionist tradition emphasizes global responsibility to protect all humankind regardless of their location and citizenship. The rationalist tradition draws attention to the rules and norms that govern international society. (Bellamy, 2005, p. 284) It assumes that states should abide by rules which were agreed upon and developed institutions should be respected because otherwise order within international society would be undermined. Robert Jackson contributes to the debate by identifying layers of responsibility confronting statesmen in the conduct of foreign policy. In realist view of the world, statesmen give priority to national responsibilities and welfare of its citizens, in rationalist view to international responsibilities meaning compliance with international law and in revolutionist view to humanitarian responsibilities and welfare of individuals across borders. (Jackson, 1995; Jackson, 2000, pp. 169-178)

The biggest emphasis within the English school regarding the concept of responsibility is put on the role of great powers. Bull points out that great powers have certain rights and duties, in other words responsibilities, which stem from inequality in terms of power in international relations. If behaving responsibly, they should "play a role in the promotion of international order by pursuing policies that work for it rather than against it." (Bull, 1977, p. 207) They contribute to international order by managing their mutual relations, such as preserving general balance of power, controlling crises and limiting utilization of violence. Also, they give a degree of central direction to development of international society as a whole.<sup>17</sup> (Bull, 1977, pp. 200-229) As Watson concludes, responsible great powers should have some sense of *raison de système* and act in order to support international order and win legitimacy for their role. (Watson, 1992, pp. 319-325)

The motivation to be a responsible great power stems from the fact that for great powers it is very difficult to secure and preserve the consent of other states with the predominant role they play in international society. If a great power behaved irresponsibly and misused its position, it could lose support of other actors and

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<sup>17</sup> Bull concedes that sometimes great powers behave as "great irresponsibles" and do not play constructive role in international relations promoting disorder rather than order, upsetting general balance of power and fighting wars between each other. (Bull 1977, 1980)

legitimacy for its leading role and in the longer term be substituted by other great power with another vision for central direction of international society. Due to the fact that each great power has important stakes in preserving international society, it often struggles in situations when acting in the interest of international society does not go hand in hand with its national interests. Chen Zhimin correctly points out that in situations when international responsibilities run into conflict with the core national interests of states, not only great powers, they may “shy away from undertaking those responsibilities.” This kind of struggle is ever present in international relations. (Chen, 2009, p. 22)

Even though the English school does not devote much attention to the role of small and medium powers, or one could say ordinary sovereign states which are members of international society, in relation to the concept of responsibility, it is one of the aims of the thesis to shed more light on this issue. Despite not playing a critical role in international relations, each state as a member of international society is accountable for its actions and inactions and has certain responsibilities. Since there is a sense of common interests in every international society, be it only an interest to survive, to coexist peacefully with other members or to cooperate in areas of international relations that go beyond coexistence, each state can be held responsible for actions which help the whole society achieve these goals or on the contrary prevent it from achieving them.

As it has been already mentioned, to achieve these goals states develop sets of rules which prescribe what kind of behaviour within international society is consistent with them. (Bull, 1977, pp. 67-70) The Charter of the UN is a pertinent example of a document specifying rules of coexistence between states in the areas such as legitimate use of violence, respect for sovereignty of states and even reflects the managerial role of great powers within international society. The most ambitious sets of rules which states agree upon can facilitate cooperation in the fields of security, economy, environment, energy, communication and many others. It is responsibility of each state to contribute to order in international society by following the rules and institutions which by custom, practice, consensus or activity of great powers became vital constituents of a particular international society.

Because of the fact that international society of states is an anarchical society, it is the sovereign states themselves which perform a function of creating rules and making them effective. They oversee compliance with established rules or create mechanisms which are assigned a role to do it in their name, such as institutions or

international organizations. Therefore, responsible states should not only accept rules, or organizations overseeing that states act according to those rules, but should show a relevant, consistent pattern of compliance with them and abstain from violations on a regular basis. Satisfactory compliance is thus an inherent part of responsible behaviour.

Responsible states should show some level of respect to adopted rules and institutions of international society and their actions should promote their acceptance thereby legitimizing their existence in international society. Promotion of rules is not just about their acceptance. In addition to accepting rules of international society, responsible states use diplomacy and other foreign policy tools to persuade states outside international society to act in accordance with its institutions.

If circumstances in international relations change responsible states should adapt their actions and demonstrate acknowledgement of new rules and practices which promote order. Due to developing nature of every international society, adaptation is a significant element of responsible behaviour. If any state fails to adapt to new rules within international society, there is a risk it will soon become a pariah state outside international society.

As there is no higher authority above states, they are the only actors that can protect existing rules and institutions. Responsible states protect existing rules and institutions of international society by using all tools at their disposal, such as diplomacy, “carrots and sticks”, accommodation of reciprocal interests, peaceful conflict resolution and many others. It will be shown later that it is great powers which are chiefly responsible for protecting the rules and institutions of international society due to their advantage in terms of power. Responsible states should also contribute to enforcement of the rules. They should do so not only in the sense of positive responsibility that they will fulfil their obligations thereby leading by example but also in the sense of negative responsibility by facing and accepting repercussions for misconduct relating to rules and institutions of international society.

Whereas ordinary members of international society are in general expected to comply with the rules and institutions of international society through their actions, behaviour and pursuit of policies that work for international society, great powers must obviously meet tougher criteria if they are to be regarded as responsible. Authors within the English school often emphasize in accord with the popular saying that “with great power comes great responsibility.” (Buzan, 2010, p. 19) Brown adds that “simply by virtue of their capacity to act, they are commonly and understandably held to a higher

standard of responsibility than are small or medium powers which, however well meaning, have only a limited capacity to affect the course of events.“ (Brown, 2004, p. 6) In addition to behaviour and actions regarded as responsible as far as small or medium powers are concerned, responsible great powers should pursue policies which further strengthen global order and maintain security while dealing with various threats to international society. By executing these policies they increase the chance of survival of the whole society and prevent it from falling into disarray. Such behaviour is in line with the role of responsible great powers as providers of public goods at the international level, such as security and open global economy.

Furthermore, responsible great powers strengthen order within international society by actively seeking to deepen cooperation in areas in which consensus within international society exists. By deepening international cooperation and broadening scope of areas where common interests appear, responsible great powers contribute largely to creation of new rules and institutions which further strengthen international society. Such actions help them to be recognized as legitimate great powers in international society.

Last but not least, responsible great powers play a greater role in enforcing compliance with the rules and institutions of international society. Using either positive or negative tools in its foreign policy, responsible great powers fulfil the role of custodians. Directly or indirectly, through established international organizations, they oversee if all members of international society comply with established practices or bear the consequences for breaching their international responsibilities.

There is one more important point to make regarding the relationship between membership in international society and responsible behaviour in international society. Responsibility of a state within international society automatically presupposes its status as a member of international society. Membership in international society can be regarded as the lowest level of state's inclusion in international society. Whether a state is recognized as a member of international society is not just the question of accepting rules and institutions of international society but also the question of whether other members regard it as a legitimate member. Bull says that a state becomes a member of international society when it conceives itself to be bound by a set of rules and respects its institutions. (Bull, 1977, p. 13) Clark adds that other members of international society judge its compliance with the rules before accepting it as a legitimate member. (Clark, 2003, pp. 84-85) On the other hand, for a state to be regarded as a responsible

member of international society, it must not only comply with the rules and respect institutions but also make visible efforts to protect them, promote them and voluntarily assume further duties and obligations which support international order.

Table 2 below summarizes indicators of responsible behaviour in international society for ordinary states and also indicators for great powers to emphasize already mentioned differences and document higher standards if great powers are to be regarded as responsible. These indicators will be used later in both case studies to assess China's behaviour in terms of responsibility in the present international society.

<b>Indicators of responsible behaviour for ordinary states</b>	<b>Indicators of responsible behaviour for great powers (in addition to indicators for ordinary states)</b>
Acceptance of rules and institutions of international society	Giving a degree of central direction to international society as a whole
Compliance with rules of international society	Creation of new rules and institutions contributing to international order
Adaptation to new rules and institutions which strengthen international order	Enforcement of compliance with rules and institutions of international society
Protection of existing rules and institutions of international society	Maintenance of order and security within international society
Promotion of rules and institutions of international society	Deepening and broadening the scope of cooperation to strengthen international order
Peaceful conflict resolution not upsetting international order	Preservation of the general balance of power
Fulfilment of assumed obligations and duties in international society	Control of relations and crises among great powers
Acceptance of repercussions for misconduct relating to rules and institutions of international society	

**Table 2.** Summary of indicators of responsible behaviour in international society for ordinary states and great powers.



## 2.2 China's Perspective on the Notion of Responsibility in International Society

Even though the term responsibility has already been explained in the beginning of the chapter, it is important now to look at what it means in Chinese eyes to be a responsible state in international society and how Chinese officials in the foreign policy field understand and utilize the term responsibility.

Equivalent of the term responsibility in Chinese is *zeren*. It is understood as duties and burdens of individual in hierarchically-structured society. Within any kind of community there are "certain duties which one is expected to perform and burdens that one has to shoulder." (Chan, 2006, pp. 12-13) Chan emphasizes that these are things that a member of community *ought to* do and that the expression *ought to* is more about a moral conviction rather than a legal obligation. Due to hierarchical structure, the sense of responsibility is also very closely tied to one's position of power. (Chan, 2006, pp. 15-16)

If we apply this meaning to international level and follow this logic, China's responsibilities in international society should very much depend and be determined by its relative power position compared to other members of international society. In other words, weak and developing China can be expected to take on less duties and burdens within international society while rising China reaching the position of great power within international society should assume corresponding responsibilities. China's own perception of its capacities and position within international society should therefore influence whether it will be ready to assume more responsibilities connected with great power position.

Taking another perspective on China and the notion of responsibility we can ask ourselves a question why would China want to act responsibly in international society. If we want to provide simple and clear answer to this question we can say that acting responsibly within international society serves to China's core national interests. In Zhang's words, continuing integration into international society and acting responsibly is a rational policy choice for China. (Zhang, 2011, p. 243) Regime survival and territorial integrity are always at the forefront on the agenda of China's foreign policy making bodies and the CCP. For the current regime to survive and Chinese state to remain undivided and prevent secessionist moves, China critically needs to continue in uninterrupted economic growth. It would be impossible for Chinese authorities to

sustain current economic growth if international society would find itself in the state of disorder. For China, to behave responsibly, it means contributing to international order which at the same time is a critical precondition for Chinese economic miracle to continue.

As far as perception of responsibility is concerned, we can raise another important question. Why should China strive for assuming more responsibilities in the sense of duties and obligations within international society? In accordance with the English school explanations, besides higher expectations and standards of responsible actions regarding behaviour of great powers, assuming greater responsibilities and achieving the status of great power provides a state with more benefits of leadership. (Chin & Thakur, 2010, p. 134) Being recognized as a responsible great power in international society would give China a sort of bigger mandate to participate in rule-making process and shape further development of international society. Of course, one must understand that if assuming further international responsibilities opposes China's sectoral interests, it is likely to often find itself in internal struggle what is the best policy to pursue and can act contrary to expected responsible behaviour.

In a direct reaction to Western discourse on responsibility in international relations being continuously interconnected with China's international behaviour, Chinese foreign policy officials have begun to utilize the concept of responsibility in an effort to explain Chinese actions and future intentions. In his study of utilization of the term responsibility in Chinese foreign policy circles, David Scott observed several trends relating to expression of responsible behaviour. The terms such as *responsible great power*, *responsible big nation* or *big responsible country* are deliberately utilized at international diplomatic setting to cultivate the image of China as a responsible state within international society and to alleviate fears emanating from China threat theories presenting the rise of China as a security threat to global order. (Scott, 2010, pp. 83-84) In the eyes of Chinese officials, the use of the term responsibility to describe China's behaviour should imply that China is a status quo power ready to assume more responsibilities in international society. On the other hand, Scott emphasizes that it can be also be understood as a way of China staking a claim to shape rules of international society and maximize the benefits connected to the great power status within international society. (Scott, 2010, p. 76)

This short section served only as an illustration of Chinese approach to responsibility. As far as case studies are concerned, China's behaviour will be evaluated on the basis of indicators presented in Table 2.

In the end it suffices to say that in judging responsibility of any state in international society, one must first and foremost analyze its actions and not judge it by the words of foreign policy establishment. That's what the thesis will attempt to do also in China's case in the following chapters.

### **3. China and International Society since 1949**

After covering theoretical aspects which will be important for the rest of the thesis, now it is the time to devote some space to description of China's position within international society. It is not the aim to provide exhausting historical account of China's development within or outside of international society. The aim is to rather focus on important developments in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and significant change which took place regarding China's position in the contemporary international society.<sup>18</sup>

With the establishment of the People's Republic of China on 1<sup>st</sup> October 1949, Chinese state went through a great transformation vis à vis its relation with international society. The communist regime under the leadership of Mao Zedong openly denounced obligations inherited by the China's Nationalist government in relation to international society and quickly assumed the position outside international society. In the words of Zhang, who is the author of perhaps the most complex account of China's relations with international society since 1949, China entered the period of decades lasting *alienation* from international society. (Zhang, 1998; Zhang, 2012, p. 11) It obviously did not respect the rules and institutions of international society in that period. As a proof, majority of Western countries forming the backbone of international society did not even diplomatically recognize the newly found state and imposed economic sanctions as another sign of China's exclusion from international society.

In this period China openly revolted against standard rules and institutions which have been set by the West and did not respect post-World War II order epitomized by

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<sup>18</sup> For more in-depth historical analysis of China's relationship and interaction with international society see Gong's article *China's Entry into International Society* (Gong, 1984a, pp. 171-183) and Gong's book *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*. (Gong, 1984b) Suzuki's contribution also introduces interesting points and examines the influence of international society on China and its relations with Japan in the end of 19<sup>th</sup> century. (Suzuki, 2009)

the UN and Bretton-Woods institutions. China rejected institutions of sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, rules limiting the use of force or emerging foundations of new economic order. By promoting disorder and supporting communist fractions in other states in South East Asia, China openly behaved as a challenger to established order and wanted to overturn the existing order and to articulate new conceptions of international society which would reflect its own political-economic experiences and communist ideology. (Foot, 2001, pp. 6-7)

China's behaviour and its position within international relations in this period are reflected also in the works of scholars representing the English school tradition. China has retrospectively and most commonly earned a label of *revolutionary state* in the international society (Armstrong, 1993), *revisionist state* in the struggle against the core of international society (Alderson & Hurrell, 2000, pp. 135-136) or *radical socialist revolutionary state* (Foot, 2001, p. 7). During the Cultural Revolution (1966 – 1976) China was even regarded by Coral Bell as “the most determined and implacable revolutionary enemy of the existing international order.” (Bell, 1984, p. 255)

With the end of Mao's era and accession of Deng Xiaoping to the head of the Chinese Communist Party in the late 1970's, China entered the path of normalization of relations with members of international society. Throughout its “reform and open door“ policy China has become more integrated into international society, albeit in the beginning of the process both sides, China and members of international society, were very cautious regarding this development. China abandoned much of its revolutionary resistance to Western states within global international society and began to accept its rules and institutions. Domestic changes have been step by step reflected in China's international behaviour and its foreign policy. Qin particularly emphasizes the impact of internal developments, such as profound change of national identity, strategic culture and definition of China's security interests. (Qin, 2005) China was becoming gradually, voluntarily and proactively integrating into international society. In Buzan's view, it was very important that China accepted the state-based discourse on international society and downgraded the class-based discourse present during Mao's era. (Buzan, 2010, p. 12)

In this period, China re-established diplomatic relations with majority of states in international society including the U.S. and after re-joining the UN it re-gained its position as a permanent member of the Security Council even though it still fell short of fulfilling responsibilities imagined for great powers. In the early 1980's it became a

member of the IMF and WB in a symbolic step of accepting institutions epitomizing global economic order. It kept up with the process of accepting pluralistic rules and institutions represented by the Charter the UN. Within the scholarship, China was slowly beginning to be seen as *a status quo power* or *system maintainer* rather than system challenger.<sup>19</sup> (Foot, 2001, p. 8) Armstrong wrote about being aware of integration of once revolutionary China into the international society through the effort “to conform to the norms of the society of states.” (Armstrong, 1993, pp. 183-184) Buzan described “impressively quick shift from Mao’s policy of revolutionary rise, deeply antagonistic to the Western-dominated status quo, to Deng’s policy of peaceful rise within the status quo.” (Buzan, 2010, p. 12) Other authors belonging to the English school tradition, namely Bull and Watson, were rather cautious about this development and preferred to wait longer before making a categorical judgment. (Zhang, 2012, p. 14)

In the late 1990’s and even more so in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, due to unprecedented economic development and China’s increasing capacities as its natural consequence, the question of China’s role in international society has become a very complex issue. Authors identified with the English school tradition offered different views on China’s interaction with international society and the question of membership. The most evident cleavage has been connected to the pluralist vs. solidarist debate which has remained one of the most contentious talking points within the English school theory. Solidarist scholars, such as Wheeler, Vincent, and Dunne, underline that universal values of human rights, humanitarian intervention and liberal democracy have become inseparable reality of the contemporary international society through the process of evolution and therefore in their opinions China cannot be regarded as a legitimate member of international society. (Wheeler, 2000; Vincent, 1986; Dunne & Wheeler, 1999) On the other hand, pluralist scholars, such as Jackson and Roberts, put the emphasis on pluralistic institutions of international society and the importance of diversity in international society thereby being more optimistic regarding China’s membership within international society. (Jackson, 2000; Roberts, 2008) Representing the third dimension of the discussion, Buzan’s rather unique approach in which he does

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<sup>19</sup> However, the debate on China’s position in international relations has been ongoing ever since. Discussions and works analyzing its behavior and predicting its future actions have been boosted by its rapidly growing capacities. The *China is a status quo/revisionist power* debate can be claimed to dominate not only the part of academy in the field of international relations focusing on China, but also debates in the field of foreign policy making. Both camps are represented by numerous scholars and policy makers arguing for one or the other. See for example Johnston (2003) for argument that China is a status quo power and Mearsheimer (2001, 2005) for the opposite argument.

not view pluralism/solidarism as dichotomy but more like opposite sides of a spectrum has been already explained and seems to offer a way out of this never ending debate.<sup>20</sup> Such approach seems to be relevant to study of China's membership and responsible behaviour in the present international society.

#### **4. Case study: China and the World Trade Organization**

In the first case study of China's behaviour in the contemporary international society, the thesis will focus on the area where China is the most likely to act as a responsible state - international trade epitomized by the WTO. The time scale of the case study will be from China's accession to the WTO in 2001 until the present. As it has been already mentioned, uninterrupted and stable economic development is a precondition for China's peaceful rise, territorial integrity and regime survival. Due to still relatively low level of domestic consumption, China can be characterized as an export dependent country whose economic growth rests on foreign investment and access to foreign markets within open international multilateral trade system.<sup>21</sup> If there is one spectrum of international society where China can be presumed to behave responsibly, it has to be the international trade which brings multiple benefits to the whole nation. Being a responsible WTO member would mean that China could participate in formulation of rules that govern international trade and would be able to defend its interests using the WTO dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). Furthermore, it would make China far more attractive for foreign investors, open more markets for Chinese exporters and benefit domestic consumers. (Bhat, 2007, p. 3)

Replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which had been an important pillar of international trade since 1948, the WTO was established in 1995 to supervise, liberalize and facilitate international trade in rule-based environment resting on agreement between its member states. As a direct evidence of the principle of positive law in international relations, states have gradually given up part of their sovereignty, decided to cooperate and agreed upon complex rules and procedures to liberalize international multilateral trade creating the most advanced and developed

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<sup>20</sup> Hurrell could be also put into this category sharing Buzan's view that international society can comprise some pluralistic and solidarist elements at the same time depending on the will of states to broaden areas of cooperation. (Hurrell, 2007)

<sup>21</sup> Even though domestic consumption has been growing rapidly, according to the World Bank statistics its share of GDP has decreased from 44% in 2002 to 34% in 2011. (World Bank 2012) Therefore even

global trade organization. Thanks to the effective DSM, the WTO has multilateral adjudicatory system which oversees compliance and penalizes members violating their duties and obligations.

As far as the present international society is concerned, members' activities leading to establishment of the WTO and actions within the organization draw on number of master and derivative institutions which are dominant on the global level. In a global pluralist international society with solidarist elements, the WTO is an organization resting on institutions such as market with trade liberalization being the dominant derivative institution and diplomacy with multilateralism being universally accepted as customary institutions. Buzan considers the WTO to be the result of solidarist project in the present pluralist international society because it fulfils one of his proposed conditions - it is an organization established on the basis of common interest among states which goes beyond survival and coexistence on which states agree and pursue it by coordinating their policies. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 146-147)

What is more, analysis of China's behaviour in the WTO in relation to the concept of responsibility can tell us more about China's general behaviour in the contemporary international society. There has been a prevailing consensus in the literature on international society that China is a proponent of pluralist conception with sovereignty, territoriality and non-intervention as the main institutions.<sup>22</sup> By analyzing its behaviour within solidarist project which can be viewed as a higher step and further progress in development of international society, one can make a stronger case whether China is a responsible actor in general.

In the following case study, two hypotheses will be tested. The first one will concern China behaving responsibly in the WTO as an ordinary member of international society. It means that the thesis will attempt to assess China's behaviour on the basis of indicators of responsible behaviour for ordinary sovereign states. The second one will evaluate China's behaviour against the higher benchmark with additional indicators which a great power must meet in order to be acknowledged as a responsible great power in the WTO. The hypotheses that will be tested are formulated as follows:

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nowadays, China remains an export oriented country with investment-led growth benefiting from liberalized multilateral trade under the roof of the WTO.

<sup>22</sup> China is known for exhibiting a preference for the traditional Westphalian conception of pluralist international society while being reluctant to comply with its solidarist elements. (Linklater, 2010, p. 10; Chin & Thakur, 2010, p. 127; Zhang, 2011)

*H1: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible ordinary member state in the World Trade Organization since its admission in 2001.*

*H2: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible great power in the World Trade Organization since its admission in 2001.*

In the beginning of each of the two following sections it will be vital to establish a set of indicators which we can use to validate or refute hypotheses stated above. We will take into account the indicators of responsible behaviour for ordinary states and great powers presented in the previous chapter (Table 2) and determine a set of indicators which any state, China in this case study, must meet in order to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state or great power in the WTO.

#### **4.1 China as a Responsible Ordinary State in the WTO**

*H1: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible ordinary member state in the World Trade Organization since its admission in 2001.*

As far as actions and behaviour of ordinary member state in the WTO are concerned, acceptance of rules and principles forming a backbone of the WTO is the first step for an actor to even be considered as a responsible member. Therefore, membership and commitment to duties and rights as well as acceptance of rules and principles in the WTO provide a useful starting point.

A study of member's compliance with rules, principles and obligations it has committed to is perhaps the best way to evaluate state's responsibility in the WTO. After a state becomes a member of the WTO, its activities and practices within the organization provide a relevant evidence of its goals and intentions. It is important to consider two levels of compliance with the WTO rules and principles - implementation and enforcement. Whereas implementation can show us state's determination to be responsible and implement requested policies, successful enforcement is rather a question of having sufficient domestic capacities to enforce abidance of established rules. Open support and promotion of the organization, or values which it epitomizes is vitally important as well. Protection of existing rules and behaviour within the framework of agreed principles also proves one's commitment to the cause. Respecting the institutional framework and accepting decisions and adjudications of decision



making and judiciary bodies which means bearing the consequences for violations of obligations is also an important indicator of states' responsible behaviour.

In 2001, after a 15-years long process of ongoing negotiations, China became the 143<sup>rd</sup> member of the WTO in an event which can be considered as arguably the most significant change in the global political economy in the post-Cold War world. Admission to the WTO capped of Chinese efforts to further integrate into the international society of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In line with the institution of sovereignty and principle of positive law, China voluntarily accepted what various scholars emphasize to be very severe admission conditions with unprecedented number of obligations for a state entering the WTO.<sup>23</sup> (Bhat, 2009, p. 216; Chan, 2004, p. 48; Singh, 2011, p. 3)

In the process of being admitted to the WTO, China unambiguously accepted rule-based multilateral global trade system which has contributed to order in the contemporary international society and made another step towards transition from socialist economy to market-driven economy. In the first ten years within the organization, China has not shown any signs and attempts to overthrow principles of the WTO but rather has shown respect and ability to adapt. Xiaozhun Yi observes that "the country has fully embraced the rule-based spirit upheld by the WTO." (Yi, 2011, p. 2) As another proof of its readiness to comply with its WTO obligations, China committed itself to the unique review process in the form of the Transitional Review Mechanism (TRM) requiring it to provide additional detailed information about how successful it is in meeting conditions in the Protocol on the Accession.

Before moving to the next part to evaluate China's activity in the WTO and actual compliance with its obligation and commitments, it can be stated that China can be regarded as a responsible ordinary state due to the fact that it entered the WTO in a sign of belonging to the contemporary international society and unreservedly subscribed to embedded rules and principles of the WTO. China has not been acting aggressively and "its entry to the WTO has not made the WTO a different organization." (Stoler, 2006, p. 11)

One of useful ways to determine whether China behaves responsibly in the WTO is to analyze its actual actions and correspondence between agreed commitments and its

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<sup>23</sup> In July 2002, after China's admission to the WTO, the U.S.-China Security Review Commission issued a report to the U.S. Congress stating that "China's accession documents are unprecedented within the WTO or its predecessor, the GATT, in terms of their complexity, range of specific commitments and number of deviations permitted at the time of accession." (U.S.-China Security Review Commission 2002, chapter 3)

actual behaviour. Even though *compliance* is a legal concept it can serve pretty well to assess China's implementation and domestic enforcement of rules included in the Protocol on the Accession. If China can be determined to comply with the WTO rules, a pretty strong case could be made for it to be considered as a responsible state. Even though it is hard to expect any state to comply all the time, and the same goes for China, it is essential to acknowledge the trend, view of other member states and third parties.<sup>24</sup>

In the beginning, it may be useful to mention Penelope B. Prime's observation which she emphasizes in evaluating China's WTO compliance. According to her, we have to consider the fact that the issue of compliance has various levels. Even though China may revise necessary laws to comply with its WTO commitments, in reality it may struggle to enforce those revisions at the local level. She already noticed this trend during the first two years of China's membership in the WTO when analyzing the U.S. criticism of China's non-compliance in certain areas. (Prime, 2006, pp. 44-45)

As it has been already mentioned, China was admitted to the WTO under very strict conditions whose fulfilment all member states were eager to oversee due to their concerns over China's preparedness to comply unconditionally by the end of the transition period.<sup>25</sup> Just to give an example, besides general commitments to openness, transparency and numerous other provisions, the Protocol on the Accession obliges China to<sup>26</sup>:

- Provide non-discriminatory treatment to all WTO members.
- Eliminate dual-pricing practices as well as differences in treatment accorded to goods produced for sale in China in comparison to those produced for export.
- Remove price controls for protecting domestic industries or services providers.

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<sup>24</sup> Gerald Chan points out to imperfections related to the study of states' compliance. Due to anarchical nature of international politics there is no authority capable of making a definitive judgment on when states comply or violate established rules. For him, "what is compliance to some may not be regarded as such by others." (Chan, 2006, p. 66)

<sup>25</sup> Report on the EU-China trade mentions exceptional character of China's accession commitments in a way that China was asked to agree to number of WTO-plus commitments while respect WTO-minus rights regarding Chinese exports which later lead to dissatisfaction voiced by Chinese officials and even official complaints to the DSB. (European Parliament, 2011, p. 35)

<sup>26</sup> The illustration of commitments was borrowed from Gerald Chan's article (Chan, 2004, p. 53). For more detailed information see the full version of the Protocol on the Accession on the WTO website.

- Implement the WTO Agreement in an effective and uniform manner by revising some of its domestic laws and enacting new legislation fully in compliance with the WTO Agreement.
- Allow all its enterprises to import and export all goods, and trade with them throughout the customs territory with limited exceptions, within three years of accession.
- Stop maintaining and not to introduce any export subsidies on agricultural products.

As far as control mechanisms are concerned, upon accession to the WTO, China agreed to the unique TRM<sup>27</sup> review procedure and since the end of the transition period in 2006, it has been also subject to the Trade Policy Review (TPR) in accordance with the WTO review rules. Since 2001, it has passed ten annual reviews under TRM and four bi-annual procedures under the TPR. Under each review mechanism China has been obliged to provide extensive information on economic data, economic policies, policies affecting trade in goods and services and other specific information as requested by the WTO or any member. China was lauded for cooperation with the TPR Body and WTO members by providing the Government Report and addressing a substantial number of issues brought up by other parties. (Kong & Zheng, 2009, p. 8)

Other important bodies which have overseen China's behaviour in the WTO were established mainly by the U.S. which has had arguably the largest stake in China's compliance and also raised most concerns in the beginning. On the level of the U.S. Government, these include Trade Policy Review Group chaired by the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative who submits annual reports to Congress specifically on China's WTO compliance, Subcommittee on China WTO Compliance within the Trade Policy Staff Committee and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission which, even though deals with more broad agenda, devotes some space to China's behaviour within the WTO. There are other U.S. organizations in the third sector which monitor China's behaviour in the WTO whose analyses are pertinent to evaluation of China's compliance because they are likely to be more unbiased than governmental bodies mentioned above. The most familiar of them include the U.S. Chamber of

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<sup>27</sup> Section 18 of the Protocol on the Accession of People's Republic of China.

Commerce, U.S.-China Business Council and American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai.

It is unfeasible to make analysis of all relevant documents that either the WTO or bodies and organizations mentioned above published relating to China's compliance since its admission to the organization. It would be also pointless to attempt to draw a black-and-white picture in which China either complies or not. The reality is unsurprisingly more complex. Due to the extent of China's commitments, planned economy and questionable legislative capacity to meet them but also due to the scope of rules and areas covered in the WTO, it was clear in the beginning that China will face many challenges and the first decade after its admission will be a learning process.

After browsing through the reports resulting from TRM and TPR mechanisms within the WTO and academic literature, one has to admit that China's record in implementation of its WTO commitments is *satisfactory* even though the term mixed occurs frequently. (Sally, 2011, p. 23; Bhat, 2009, pp. 234-235; Chan, 2006, p. 205; WTO, 2012a) On the positive side, during the last decade China revised and amended more than 3,000 laws and regulations at the central government level through a special body established under the State Council in a dramatic change of its legal system in order to conform to WTO principles. China also continued in its trend to reduce average MFN tariff rates even beyond its WTO accession commitments to average level of 9.6% in 2011. (WTO, 2012b) Majority of non-tariff barriers was eliminated and clear progress can be tracked in agriculture-related trade. Comparing the first three Trade Policy Reviews there is a clear indication of higher transparency in trade-related matters and better foreign investment climate. (Yang, 2011) The most problematic areas include enforcement of intellectual property rights, restriction of market access to some services, standardization and product safety. (Bhat, 2009, p. 234)

Even though the U.S. controlling mechanisms are sometimes more critical to China<sup>28</sup>, they can shed further light into the question of China's behaviour in the WTO. The two latest U.S. Trade Representative's reports to Congress in 2010 and 2011 emphasize that China implemented a set of sweeping WTO accession commitments to deepen its integration into international trading system. They praise China's progress

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<sup>28</sup> The latest report of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in 2012 which is in general more "hawkish" towards China in all matters relating to economy and security than other U.S. bodies states that "China's adherence to the WTO principles and its Protocol of Accession remains spotty". (U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2012, p. 46)

mainly in the period until 2006 but also point out to tendency of slower implementation and worse compliance since then. (U.S. Trade Representative, 2010 & 2011)

In 2006, the U.S.-China Business Council performed a survey among the U.S. companies in China regarding their opinions on China's compliance with its WTO commitments. 82% of respondents answered that China has done a "fair" or "good" job in implementing its WTO commitments with only 4% convinced the implementation was "poor". Market openings in various sectors, tariff reductions, less restriction on foreign ownership and investment were cited as the most important areas where China has met its obligations. Intellectual property rights enforcement, openness of financial sector and lower transparency were considered as most significant shortfalls. (USCBC, 2006, pp. 1-2)

According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, in the period from 2002 to 2007 there were around 180 compliance issues. One quarter of these issues was resolved in this period but no progress was detected on one third of them. In the remaining cases some progress was detected but these issues have not been solved completely. (GAO, 2008, pp. 10-12; Bhat, 2009, pp. 227-228) Even though in 2007 there remained more than 78 cases where no progress have been made, compared to the overall number of 685 commitments in China's Protocol it is certainly not a dramatic number which would prove that China does not comply and openly opposes to meet its obligations.

The latest available U.S. Trade Representative's report to Congress on China's WTO Compliance offers a compact table with summaries of China's WTO compliance efforts. Out of ten areas which cover the issues of trading rights, distribution services, import regulation, export regulation, internal policies affecting trade, investment, agriculture, intellectual property rights, services and legal framework, China is evaluated as "being in compliance" or "making substantial progress" in eight of them. Only two areas, intellectual property rights and export regulations are evaluated negatively and give impression that China is not doing enough in these areas. (US Trade Representative, 2011, pp. 11-15)

To sum up this part which has attempted to assess China's compliance with its WTO commitments, China's record really is mixed but one must keep in mind a long way China has come since its accession. It is also important to differentiate between legislative implementation where China did a remarkable job and enforcement

dimension of compliance where Chinese officials have been frequently unable to oversee compliance with national policies on a local level.

Complexity of China's WTO commitments and overall extensiveness of international trade regime have provided serious challenges and therefore some non-compliance issues seem natural. While meeting its commitments in majority of areas and making significant progress in other, it was clear in the beginning that China would struggle to satisfy all WTO members. Progress may not seem satisfactory mainly to those with unrealistic expectations at the beginning of China's integration to the WTO rule-based trade system.

Moving into another area which can help us determine whether China is a responsible member of the WTO, we will switch our attention to internal rules, practices and tools which the WTO offers its members in dealing with trade-related matters, namely the DSM. After a decade in the organization, one may find multiple pieces of evidence which indicate whether China plays by the rules or not.

On the day when China became a WTO member it gained access to the DSM - the most praised feature of the WTO. The DSM not only offers China a mechanism to legally protect its trade interests and enforce compliance of other WTO members with their WTO commitments but also forces China to respond to accusations brought by other trading parties. As a responsible actor, China must accept and implement final decisions of the DSM in cases where its policies are found to violate WTO norms or suffer consequences determined by the DSB or AB.

During the transition period until 2006, WTO members were reluctant to use the DSM against China which has found itself in the position of respondent only in two matters. In the first case, the U.S. as a complainant was able to agree on a solution with China of which the WTO was informed. In the second case, China appealed against the Panel Report and in the end complied after the final decision was made in 2008. China itself made a formal complaint only once as a co-compliant but a positive experience in quick resolution of the matter contributed to positive attitude towards the DSM. (Ji & Huang, 2011, p. 5)

Lisa Toohey observes an interesting trend in the first years of China's involvement in the WTO. China showed genuine interest in being involved as a third party in the consultation phase and during the panel proceedings of almost every ongoing dispute in the WTO. The most likely explanation confirmed also by Chinese officials is that China wanted to get valuable experience in the dispute settlement

process so that it could later skilfully use it. (Toohey, 2011, p. 790) Tong Qi identifies areas such as personnel training, learning from other parties, information collecting and participation in WTO governance as the main reasons behind such behaviour which then contributed to China's transformation from reluctant and easy-to-compromise respondent to hardened and sophisticated litigant. (Qi, 2012, pp. 161-162) This undoubtedly documents China's efforts to adapt to customary practices far from challenging them, respect for mechanisms within the organization and a degree of belief in their effectiveness.

Since 2006 until now, after becoming familiar with the WTO DSM, China has become more active and assertive player in trade disputes. Due to expiration of transition period and compliance issues in some areas, China has been often challenged by the U.S. and the EU mainly in matters relating to intellectual property and trade in services.<sup>29</sup> The assertiveness showed in China's tendency to not reach solution in the phase of consultations but rather to proceed to the Panel and even the AB. For example, in the period of 2008-2011, China decided to challenge 8 out of 13 disputes in the panel proceedings mainly regarding anti-dumping measures. (Thomas, 2011, pp. 11-12) Even though such actions postpone the final decision, it is China's legal right to defend itself. The literature offers a proof that China handled disputes on case-by-case basis not attempting to overload the DSB in order to postpone the final decision. (Ji & Huang, 2011, p. 37)

In accordance with prevailing opinion in the literature on China's participation in the WTO we can conclude that China embraced principles of the dispute settlement system and has expressed confidence in using the DSM either as a respondent or complainant, as well as accept the final decision.<sup>30</sup> (Vickers, 2012, p. 267) Henry Gao adds that any time China attempted to challenge some rules of the WTO DSM they were exclusively issues viewed as discriminatory against China and never general WTO rules.<sup>31</sup> (Gao, 2011, p. 162) What is even more important is that China still has

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<sup>29</sup> It is important to realize that the overall number of cases in which China was a respondent is not a fundamentally decisive factor. It was always clear that China will be participating in majority of cases, either as defendant or compliant, due to its sheer trade volume and strict accession commitments. Historically, the U.S. and the EU have always been the most active users of the DSM. (Gao, 2011, p. 162) Bourgeois even claims that China's use of the DSM is relatively low when compared to its strategic trade interests and he expects a natural increase. (Bourgeois, 2011, p. 33)

<sup>30</sup> The USTR Reports to Congress list cases in which the U.S. used the DSM to enforce compliance on Chinese side. There is no example of China failing to comply with the final decision in the WTO DSM. (US Trade Representative, 2010 & 2011)

<sup>31</sup> Jacques Bourgeois concludes that majority of cases where China was complainant dealt with the interpretation of obligations in the Protocol on the Accession. He claims it is understandable due to often

confidence in the mechanism despite numerous decisions in its detriment accepting the jurisdiction of the WTO bodies. (Toohey, 2011, p. 798) Last but not least, a report prepared for the European Parliament EU's DG also commends China for not being just a rule taker but also a rule user of the WTO's legal instruments. (European Parliament, 2011, p. 35)

Based on the evidence, China can be regarded as a constructive and responsible user of the WTO DSM that complies with final decisions of the DSB or AB independently of positive or negative consequences for its trade interests.

Looking at China's behaviour in the WTO as analyzed above, we can say that China has done enough to fulfil indicators stated in the beginning of the case study to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state in the WTO. Upon accession, China unconditionally accepted the WTO rules and principles and in the first decade showed it respects them and does not wish to challenge them. Despite some anticipated problems in compliance with its WTO commitments, China made some commendable progress earning restrained satisfaction of WTO members. Furthermore, by actively using the DSM and complying with final decisions in individual cases in reasonable time, China showed confidence in the rule-based multilateral trade regime epitomized by the WTO. One can always say that China could have done more but surely it has done enough to dissociate from the image of irresponsible WTO challenger.

## **4.2 China as a Responsible Great Power in the WTO**

*H2: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible great power in the World Trade Organization since its admission in 2001.*

Now it is time to move forward and evaluate China's behaviour in the WTO while treating it as a great power. It is unnecessary to devote much space to discussion on China's "great powerness." Its nominal GDP statistics and volumes of exports and imports speak clearly at least regarding its economic power and position in international trade.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, it is reasonable to subject China to analysis of great power behaviour and expect it to behave in the WTO in such a way.

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imprecise language of the Protocol and China's aim to push for more restrictive interpretation of its broad WTO-plus obligations. (Bourgeois, 2011, p. 32)

<sup>32</sup> According to the latest IMF, China is the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest economy in terms of nominal GDP, 2<sup>nd</sup> largest importer (3<sup>rd</sup> if the EU as a whole is taken into account) and the largest exporter (2<sup>nd</sup> if the EU as a whole is taken into account) of goods and services in the world. (IMF, 2012)



As far as actions and behaviour of a great power in the WTO are concerned, it has to meet certain higher criteria in order to be regarded as responsible in line with the argument of the English school regarding managerial position of great powers in international society. Responsible great powers could be expected to give a sort of central direction to the organization looking for ways to strengthen it. In addition to indicators for ordinary states, great powers in the WTO can be expected to contribute more to preservation of the organization and principles on which it stands. The will of responsible powers to strengthen institutions of international society reflects in the WTO in such way that they should attempt to deepen cooperation in multilateral global trade to increase common gains which the liberalized trade brings. Ongoing negotiations within the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) provide a useful setting in which one can monitor behaviour of great powers in the WTO. Last but not least, responsible behaviour of great powers can be judged by their ability to control crises in the organization trying to diffuse possible intense trade disputes and limit negative consequences for international society.

As a newcomer to the WTO, China could not be realistically expected to assume leadership within the organization immediately after its admission. While the previous analysis showed China's efforts to comply with the Protocol on the Accession, it has to be said that China has been reluctant to move further and beyond its accession commitments. Its approach in the first decade in the WTO can be characterized as four "L's" strategy, namely "less" requests to liberalize further, "lower" obligations than traditional developed members of the WTO, "longer" transition periods to implement any further changes and "later" liberalization in general. (Lim & Wang, 2010, p. 1319) For one reason or another, China assumed "a back seat role" and is yet to play more active part in deepening cooperation in the WTO with a view to further strengthen multilateral trading system. (Gao, 2011, pp. 141-142) Multilateral trade negotiations within the DDA provide a pertinent example of China's behaviour in the WTO and document its low-profile behaviour.

Despite repeated efforts to revive and successfully conclude the DDA negotiations, any deal seems to be doomed. (Schwab, 2011, p. 104) In the aftermath of financial crisis which has troubled global economy since 2008, even a low-key deal would be a welcome sign in contrast to increasing protectionist measures. Lack of progress in trade liberalization since the Uruguay Round in 1994 has been posing a risk of weakening this important solidarist element of the contemporary international

society. A responsible great power would be expected to use its position and make visible efforts to reach consensus in the DDA negotiations in order to strengthen cooperation in the area of multilateral international trade.

It was understandable that China played a marginal role in the early stages of DDA negotiations. After all, the negotiations have began it the same period when China was entering the WTO club and in addition to implementing its commitments it had to get familiar with internal proceedings in the organization. As it has been indicated, China has been reserved to undertake further obligations but as Paul Blustein concludes China certainly was not a deal breaker and could not bear a substantial portion of blame for the deadlock in the early stages. (Blustein, 2011, p. 7) Various analysts confirm that until 2008, China, even though trying to be constructive, was a low key actor neglecting the WTO negotiations and not fulfilling its potential to become a leading player. (Stoler, 2006, p. 11; Vickers, 2012, p. 261; Kong & Zheng, 2009, p. 12)

Ministerial conference in Genève in 2008 can be identified as the moment China changed its approach towards ongoing trade negotiations. For the first time China became a part of negotiations within the G-7, a group of the most influential WTO members, potentially indicating its willingness to be a central player and assume the role of a leader. China also became a part of G-20 and G-33 negotiating groupings. However, despite some noticeable changes in its approach, China very often tried to hide behind India or even Brazil drawing criticism mainly from the U.S. Observers were pointing to such China's efforts and describing them as "elephant's effort to hide behind a mouse." (Schwab, 2011, p. 108) After this series of negotiations ended in failure, China was blamed and accused of playing hardball.<sup>33</sup> (Lim & Wang, 2010, p. 1320) Michael Punke, U.S. permanent representative to the WTO, later challenged China to accept more responsibility for the DDA negotiations and use its growing power and influence to contribute to successful conclusion of the Round. (U.S. Mission to the WTO, 2010)

Despite possible explanations of the need to digest WTO commitments from the Protocol on the Accession, the lack of expertise, maneuvering between developed and developing WTO members, China does not give impression of being a responsible great power in the WTO. Up until now, it has given up on the opportunity to become a leader

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<sup>33</sup> Blustein questions the amount of blame attributed to China citing the lack of agreement among all the major players participating in negotiations. Nonetheless, he is convinced that China could have and should have done more to avert failure of this round of negotiations. (Blustein, 2011, pp. 9-10)

reflecting its position of important economic power. A general conclusion is that it still has a long way to go to become a respected agenda-setter and at the moment is viewed rather as a veto player showing lack of willingness to strengthen global trade governance from within the organization. (Vickers, 2012, p. 262) Due to significance of the WTO for its economic growth, China was expected to take greater initiative and offer further concessions in terms of trade to global international society but such expectations have not materialized yet. If the WTO system is to survive it must have the support of its most powerful members. Therefore, if China wanted to act responsibly it would not leave it to others to maintain multilateral trade system and would contribute more than it has done so far.

Turning our attention just very briefly towards another indicator of responsible behaviour of great powers, an ability to control escalation of disputes among great powers, China has done pretty well and has not started or engaged in any trade war with other major trading powers, such as the U.S., EU, Japan or India. However, this is not to say that on diplomatic level Chinese officials have been timid.<sup>34</sup> Even though it is not responsible from China to threaten its trade partners, strict language has always been part of trade rivalries and unless it results in tangible actions not much should be read into it.

At the moment, there is an issue regarding China's export restrictions on variety of raw materials and rare minerals which has potential to grow into serious conflict of interests between China on one side and the U.S. and EU as the major players on the other. In March 2012 in *China-Raw Materials* case, the WTO AB confirmed that China violated its WTO commitments. The decision encouraged the U.S., EU and Japan to seek similar adjudication in *China-Rear Earths* case as it is an issue of utmost importance to the global trade community. In July 2012, a panel has been established to examine the complaints. This has been a very sensitive issue for China which has been on the WTO agenda since 2009 and it will be interesting to observe China's compliance after anticipated decision in its detriment.<sup>35</sup>

Due to general compliance with the DSB or AB adjudications, China can be regarded as a responsible great power in terms of controlling potential trade crises with

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<sup>34</sup> For example, in October 2011 China warned the U.S. of a potential trade war in the light of anti-China currency bill being passed by Senate (yet to be passed by the House of Representatives). However, experts did not expect China to retaliate in response and so far nothing happened to suggests otherwise. (Hong, 2011)

other great powers, mainly the U.S., thereby maintaining a functioning WTO-based trade system and order in international society.

Even though China has largely acted as a system-maintainer in the WTO and did not provoke any serious crises which would threaten the rule-based multilateral trade system epitomized by the WTO it has to be admitted that it has not done enough to be regarded as a responsible great power in the WTO. Due to its inactivity and lack of leadership in the DDA negotiations it contributed to failure of the effort to further strengthen multilateral international trade. Such behaviour will most probably lead to unsuccessful conclusion of the DDA negotiations which can in turn weaken the WTO as members look for other options to diminish trade barriers and increase their trade volumes, such as bilateral FTAs and regional deals. To the contrary on expectations placed upon responsible powers, China has not attempted to place itself into leadership position trying to manage direction of the WTO. Until it does so, China can be considered as responsible only on the lower level as an ordinary WTO member.

## **5. Case Study: China and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime**

Proceeding to the second case study of China's behaviour in the contemporary international society, the thesis will concentrate on the area where China is the least likely to act as a responsible state - the nuclear non-proliferation regime.<sup>36</sup> The time scale of the case study will be from China's accession to the NPT regime in 1992 until the present with primary focus on the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Having history of acting as a nuclear proliferator<sup>37</sup> since the 1970's, one would not expect China to rapidly transform its policies and embrace the norm of nuclear non-proliferation in such a short spell of time. On the contrary, realists would presume that China could use the policy of strategic proliferation to undermine a globally dominant position of the U.S. to advance its own goal of becoming a regional hegemon.

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<sup>35</sup> For more information about importance of this case in relation to China's Protocol on the Accession see Baroncini's article (2012).

<sup>36</sup> The case study will concentrate only on nuclear non-proliferation and will not cover the issues of missile proliferation, disarmament as defined in the NPT or proliferation of biological and chemical WMD. The author has decided that including also the other categories of proliferation would not be contributive to the thesis.

<sup>37</sup> More information about China's proliferation behavior during the Cold War can be found in Lieggi's or Malik's articles. (Lieggi, 2010; Malik, 2010)

In addition, if China had adopted a responsible approach to nuclear non-proliferation, it would have had to voluntarily put significant constraints on its sovereignty regarding own nuclear weapon development and manipulation with nuclear technologies while re-articulating some of its security and economic interests. As Medeiros and Kent state, in addition to China accepting a thorough verification process and on-site inspections it would also have to reassess some of its assistance to key allies and give up an opportunity of gaining interesting profit from selling nuclear technologies to them. (Kent, 2007, p. 77; Medeiros, 2009, p. 4)

Last but not least, the issue of nuclear non-proliferation is a strategic national security affair belonging to the sphere of “high” politics and presumed irresponsible members of international society are very likely to behave irresponsibly also in this area. However, if found that China behaves as a responsible ordinary state or even great power within the NNP regime, it could have significant impact on conclusions about China’s overall behaviour in the present international society and be a further evidence of China’s policy of being a status quo power or revisionist challenger.

The NNP regime is a very well-respected and established regime on a global level whose roots date back to the Cold War era. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the regime. Even though the NPT entered into force in 1970, China became a signatory party only in 1992. Three fundamental pillars of the NPT include prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the organization which, besides its own activities relating to nuclear use, oversees compliance of states with the NPT. Other pillars of the regime which will be later relevant for the case study of China’s behaviour include the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)<sup>38</sup> and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

As far as the contemporary international society is concerned, the NNP regime rests on multiple of its primary and derivative institutions (Table 1). While respecting sovereignty as a primary institution, actors in the NNP regime have opted to constrain it in order to establish supervision regarding proliferation of WMD thereby strengthening order and security of international society. Through diplomacy, multilateralism and balance of power as its derivative institutions, states cooperate towards that common

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<sup>38</sup> Even though not yet in force, all signatory parties comply with its provision, including China despite not ratifying it.

goal. Great power management is another important institution at the heart of the regime because of the fact that nuclear weapon states (NWS) are the ones responsible for upholding the NPP regime.

Similarly to the previous case study on China's behaviour in the WTO, the NNP regime can be regarded as a solidarist project in the contemporary global pluralist international society because it represents a deeper form of cooperation going beyond survival and coexistence in which states pursue a common goal by willingly coordinating their policies. (Buzan, 2004, pp. 146-147) They pursue this common goal because they are convinced about its benefits for global security and stability of international society.

In the following case study, two hypotheses will be tested. The first one will focus on the question whether China behaves as a responsible ordinary state within the NNP regime. It means that the thesis will try to analyze China's behaviour on the basis of indicators of responsible behaviour for ordinary sovereign states. The second one will discuss China's behaviour against the higher standards with additional indicators which a great power must meet in order to be regarded as responsible within the NNP regime. The hypotheses that will be tested are formulated as follows:

*H1: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state within the nuclear non-proliferation regime.*

*H2: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible great power within the nuclear non-proliferation regime.*

In the beginning of each of the two following sections it will be vital to establish a set of indicators which can help us validate or refute hypotheses stated above. We will take into account the indicators of responsible behaviour for ordinary states and great powers presented in the previous chapter (Table 2) and determine a set of indicators which any state, China in this case study, must meet in order to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state or great power within the NNP regime.

## 5.1 China as a Responsible Ordinary State within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

*H1: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state within the nuclear non-proliferation regime.*

As far as behaviour of an ordinary state within the NNP regime is concerned, acceptance of rules, norms and principles forming the backbone of the regime is a starting point for any state to be considered as responsible. Therefore, being a signatory party to pivotal treaties, such as the NPT, or member of leading organizations on this issue, such as the IAEA or NSG, is an essential precondition to being regarded as a responsible actor. As in the previous case study, analyzing state's compliance with rules and obligations it has committed to is a useful way to evaluate state's responsibility. Besides legislative implementation of the commitments on a national level and enforcement of the rules, respecting the role of the UN SC is another aspect of state's compliance with the regime. Last but not least, state's efforts to support and promote the NNP regime are an important indicator of its responsible behaviour.

In the beginning, it is essential to mention that under Mao's rule and before Deng Xiaoping launched the policy of reform and opening, China undertook politically motivated proliferation activities due to its general disagreement with principles of the non-proliferation regime. Any nuclear arms control efforts were dismissed by China as attempts of two superpowers to strengthen their strategic superiority. (Lieggi, 2010, p. 41) Its assistance at that time to countries such as Iran, Pakistan and North Korea has been well documented.<sup>39</sup> However, since the 1990's, China embarked upon the path towards general acceptance of existing principles of the NNP regime and this process has been a success story so far and China can be acknowledged as an integral part of the regime.

As it has been already mentioned, China became a signatory party to the NPT in 1992. Even before that, it became a member of the IAEA in 1984 but continued to breach the norm at that time. In 1995 it supported the indefinite extension of the NPT and a year later it signed the CTBT.<sup>40</sup> In 1997 it joined the Zangger Committee (also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee) and later in 2004 also the NSG to express

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<sup>39</sup> Analysis of China's assistance to Iran, Pakistan and North Korea is described in detail by Malik (2010).

<sup>40</sup> Together with the U.S., China has still not ratified it. However, China has so far complied with the self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing which we will talk about in the latter part of the chapter.

its acceptance of export control systems of WMD materials and international supplier regime standards. In the UN, China voted in favour of the UN SC Resolution 1540 (2004) and Resolution 1887 (2009), the former aiming to increase efficiency of national export control mechanisms and the latter committing UN members to stronger measures regarding the non-proliferation agenda.

This brief illustration of China's adoption of treaties and integration to organizations forming the core of the NNP regime shows what is consensually, though in different words, described in academic literature as China's "internalization" of the NNP norm (Kent, 2007), "a transition from staunch opposition to participation in and advocacy of international non-proliferation efforts" (Medeiros, 2009, p. 2) or committed participation in non-proliferation community. (Gill, 2010, p. 1) Furthermore, even though results of Medeiros's research suggest that the U.S. diplomatic pressure played the most significant part in this evolution, China's genuine acceptance of the NNP norms has been an indispensable intervening variable. (Medeiros, 2009) Ann Kent even identifies China's evolution from instrumental participation in the regime based on calculations to embracing the NNP norm and regarding it as a priority. (Kent, 2007)

Acceptance of principles, treaties and organizations epitomizing the NNP regime clearly indicates China's goal to be a responsible state in relation to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. A degree to which it has been willing to adapt its policies shows a deep commitment and also how important a priority it has become for Chinese political elite.

Moving further, a more useful way to evaluate responsibility of China's behaviour is to study its compliance with commitments it assumed when it became a part of pillars of the NNP regime mentioned above. If China can be determined to positively comply with substantial number of its commitments in the NNP regime, it would be valid to regard it as a responsible state. Even though it is hard to expect any state to comply all the time, especially when considering China's ongoing adaptation, it is essential to acknowledge whether Chinese government is doing enough to face potential challenges regarding compliance or fails to show sufficient efforts in terms of adopted legislation or policies and their enforcement.

As far as the NPT is concerned, China promised to be transparent and open regarding its nuclear capabilities and non-proliferation policies. China's record in this field is very mixed, making it difficult to take a single position. As an example of praiseworthy compliance, in 1999, China signed an additional protocol within the IAEA



to allow it to conduct more intrusive inspections into its civilian nuclear program. Chan emphasizes that by 2002 China implemented its obligations under the Protocol and was the first NWS to do so indicating a clear determination to comply with the NNP regime. (Chan, 2006, p. 129) However, China remains very secretive regarding its military nuclear capabilities worsening the security dilemma mainly for its neighbours and the U.S. In general, China is less transparent about matters related to its military, such as its increasing budget substantial portion of which is dedicated to the nuclear modernization program. So far it has resisted revealing basic information on its strategic weapons and fissile material stockpile. (Gill, 2001, p. 275)<sup>41</sup> However, there are signs that China is capable of finding a compromise on this issue and Kent regards publishing of White Papers on non-proliferation and arms control in 2004 and 2005 as a significant improvement. (Kent, 2007, p. 94)

Moving on, China's compliance record is better as a signatory party to the CTBT. Even though China did not ratify the treaty meaning that it is not bound by its provisions, it has nonetheless acted responsibly and complied with its commitments as a signatory party halting its nuclear testing. Such compliance is commendable in the light of Chinese official's remarks that absence of further testing will freeze China's nuclear inferiority in comparison to other nuclear powers. Such self-limitation regarding own nuclear capacities and compliance with moratorium on nuclear testing significantly contributes to China's image of a responsible state. (Foot, 2011, pp. 150-151)

A study of China's compliance with multiple forms of nuclear export control systems represents a worthwhile area to analyze. As a member of the NSG and UN SC member that voted in favour of the Resolution 1540, China committed itself to establishing viable export control systems in order to prevent exportation of nuclear proliferation-related materials from its territory. Since 2002, China has begun to dramatically change domestic regulations so that they correspond to international supplier regime norms. The lists of products whose export had been prohibited were formed and delineation of responsibilities in Chinese export control system became more clear. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) became primarily responsible for overseeing compliance. There are evidences of improved transparency with the

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<sup>41</sup> Interestingly enough, Gill explains this perceived failing as different interpretation of transparency in the West and in China. Whereas Western countries regard transparency as a way to reduce uncertainty in international relations, China questions its universal benefits claiming that it may expose vulnerabilities of weak states prompting stronger states to take offensive action. (Gill, 2001)

MOFCOM willing to publicly comment on export violations of Chinese companies. (Lieggi, 2010, pp. 44-46)

Compliance on the level of adopted legislation is documented by the 2010 U.S. Department of State's report which claims that "Chinese policy and nuclear export control systems contain all the elements necessary to permit China to implement its obligations under Article I of the NPT." It also praises amendments which enable the MOFCOM to administratively and criminally penalize violators. (U.S. Department of State, 2010, p. 60-61) Furthermore, even RAND's report on China's implementation of the NNP principles talks about a comprehensive collection of laws, regulations and measures which incorporate standards for international export control. (Medeiros, 2005, p. xi) As far as implementation and legislative dimension of compliance is concerned, China is a responsible state adopting policies and laws with the aim to prevent nuclear proliferation.

On the other hand, in relation to compliance with the export control systems, unsatisfactory enforcement is a problematic aspect which appears far too often in the literature. Lieggi describes enforcement as the weakest link in this area.<sup>42</sup> (Lieggi, 2010, p. 46; also Medeiros, 2005, p. 77) In his testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Dr. Yuan explains that it is not unwillingness on China's side which is an obstacle to flawless compliance but rather *lack of capacities, insufficient infrastructure and commercial interests of some companies* which create gap between commitments and reality. (Yuan, 2007, p. 5, emphasis added) Since there is a lot of money to be made in trade with nuclear materials, private and even state-owned Chinese companies have significant incentives to evade laws and sell abroad despite Government's efforts to prevent such export. It is then debatable to what degree the Government is aware of such sales but Lieggi observes that in cases where sufficient intelligence was offered to the Government, it acted responsibly, halted such exports and fined the offenders. (Lieggi, 2010)

Mentioned RAND's report differentiates between implementation of government policies which is more or less successful and more problematic aspect of

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<sup>42</sup> Nonetheless, she emphasizes that Chinese government is making a lot of effort to address this issue caused also by the lack of human resource by educating relevant officials in enforcement apparatus. (Lieggi, 2010, p. 47)

enforcement when officials are unable to identify violations and hold violators accountable.<sup>43</sup>

Despite some significant problems in enforcement, China's compliance with its commitments in the NNP regime is viewed rather positively. Even though Chan finds China's compliance more problematic than compliance within the WTO, he still regards it as satisfactory. (Chan, 2006, p. 205) For Lieggi, the progress on compliance on the nuclear exports issue is impressive even though there is still a lot to be done. (Lieggi, 2010, p. 58) Overall, China's record in compliance has been improving steadily in the 21<sup>st</sup> century in the light of its effort to be regarded as a responsible stakeholder.

In accordance with its evolution as a supporter of the NNP regime, China has been promoting and supporting the regime verbally and practically. (Foot, 2011, pp. 165-166) In its white paper on *Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures*, China perceives itself as being an active and responsible proponent of nuclear non-proliferation, being proud of its progress in this field and urging international community to strengthen the regime. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2003) China's position paper on the UN reforms is an exemplary document in which the official policy emphasizes China's commitment to opposition to any forms of proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. China also expressed its support to the IAEA in preventing nuclear weapon proliferation and reconfirmed its support of the CTBT despite the fact that it has struggled to ratify it. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2005) Another evidence of China's promotion of the NNP regime is its support of nuclear weapon free zones. As soon as 2003, it signed and ratified relevant protocols establishing nuclear-free zones in Latin America and Caribbean, South Pacific, Africa, South East Asia and supporting establishment of the Middle East nuclear weapon free zone. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 2007)

Looking at China's behaviour within the NNP regime as analyzed above, we may just incline towards labelling China as a responsible ordinary state within the NNP regime. Despite some transparency-related problems and compliance failings caused mainly by the lack of enforcement capacities, the turnaround in its non-proliferation policies has been remarkable. From a revolutionary state engaged in proliferation

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<sup>43</sup> In her article, S. Lieggi names a couple of cases in which Chinese authorities acted on the basis of the U.S. intelligence due to insufficient domestic intelligence capacity to prevent shipment of nuclear-related material. (Lieggi, 2010) This underline the fact that China's non-compliance in majority of cases is caused by lack of human capacity or experience and cannot be regarded as deliberate efforts to violate principles of the NNP regime.

activities, China became a committed supporter of the NNP regime and documented it by undertaking significant obligations that it did not have to adopt in order to be regarded as a responsible member of international society. By joining numerous international forums epitomizing the NNP regime, it expressed its support to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and became an integral player willing to contribute to that goal. It is reasonable to expect that by increasing its capacities to deal with compliance problems and being given time to absorb rapid changes, China will become even more responsible adherent to the NNP regime.

## **5.2 China as a Responsible Great Power within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime**

*H2: China meets the criteria to be regarded as a responsible great power within the nuclear non-proliferation regime.*

After analyzing China's behaviour within the NNP regime as an ordinary state, it is now the time to proceed further and evaluate its actions while treating it as a great power. China has a nuclear weapon capability since 1964 and is one of the five NWS recognized by the NPT. Also, it has the seat in the UN SC which is largely responsible for dealing with violations of the NPT to address potential threats to global order and security which are connected with nuclear proliferation. Furthermore, it is also a member of other important organizations, such as the IAEA, NSG, which provide China with ample opportunities to act as a responsible great power and shoulder more responsibilities for preservation and strengthening of the NNP regime.

As far as behaviour of a great power within the NNP regime is concerned, it has to meet certain higher standards in order to be regarded as responsible in line with the argument of the English school regarding managerial position of great powers in international society. Responsible great powers are expected to assume leadership on the issue of non-proliferation and act as "norm makers". In addition to indicators for ordinary states, great powers within the NNP regime can be expected to contribute more to deepening and strengthening the regime thereby stabilizing international order. Great powers have an important part to play in the UN SC as far as enforcement of compliance is concerned to prevent further nuclear proliferation, at the moment namely in relation to issues of North Korea and Iran.

Despite considerable positive evolution of China's behaviour within the NNP regime as documented above, a question of leadership within this spectrum of international society is a bar too high for China at the moment. Despite having important tools, such as the UN SC seat, the IAEA seat, hard and soft power instruments, there are numerous examples which indicate that so far China has refused to take more prominent role and has obviously adopted a wait-and-see approach. (Gill, 2010, p. 1) One particular example which is quite striking can be found in China's position paper from 2005 which emphasizes that China "supports the strengthening of the current international non-proliferation regime and calls for the resolution of proliferation issues within the framework of international law by political and diplomatic means." (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005) What it does not mention is what China could do to strengthen it besides adopting adequate domestic measures. It means that China has so far not been active in proposing relevant solutions to strengthen the NNP regime with having stability of the whole contemporary international society in mind. NPT Review conferences in 2005 and 2010 confirmed that China is a follower rather than a leader and is waiting to join the deal rather than actively seeking to reach the deal. (Müller, 2010)

Xia Liping's article on nuclear proliferation from Chinese perspective offers a fitting example of how China has so far abandoned an opportunity to lead as a responsible great power. He states that the U.S. should naturally take the lead and is solely responsible for strengthening the regime via bringing the CTBT into force, achieving good results in the NPT Review Conference and negotiating a global treaty to stop production of fissile material for weapons. (Xia, 2008, p. 2) Illustrating the lack of leadership efforts on China's side this statement fittingly corresponds to China's image of a "norm taker" rather than "norm maker" within the NNP regime.<sup>44</sup> (Foot, 2011, p. 168)

In the UN SC, China has so far confirmed its reactive behaviour as far as the NNP regime is concerned. Even though voting in favour of the UN SC resolutions and complying with them, up until now China has not sponsored any of numerous UN SC resolutions against Iran's nuclear program (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, 1929, 1984, 2049), resolutions against North Korea's nuclear-related violations (1540, 1695, 1718,

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<sup>44</sup> Rosemary Foot also points out to the fact that during G. W. Bush's presidency when the NNP regime was weakened by the U.S. not very responsible approach of aiding India's nuclear ambitions, China had a great opportunity to assume a more leading role in the NNP regime but failed to do so. (Foot, 2011)

1874, 1985) or resolutions 1540 and 1887 which also relate to the NNP regime. A responsible great power would be expected to contribute to agenda setting in the UN SC and not only react to what has been put on the table. Up to this point, China has failed to do so.

As far as the CTBT is concerned, in spite of verbal support and compliance with its provisions, China has been reluctant to be active in this matter and ratify the treaty. Instead, it is widely known that China will not ratify it unless the U.S. does so in the first place. Even though it is not a critical issue in judging its behaviour in terms of responsibility and compliance is far more important, it nonetheless shows the reactive nature of China's policy to that of the U.S. While the U.S. reluctance to ratify the treaty is explained by concerns over China's nuclear ambitions, China's reluctance rests on its unwillingness to commit itself before the U.S. does so. The fact is that China's first step would not only help to solve this security dilemma but would also positively contribute to its image of a responsible great power in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. (Xia, 2010, p. 11)

Last but not least, China's role in promoting export control systems in accordance with provisions of the NSG or UN SC Resolution 1540 is a further proof of China's reluctance to assume greater responsibilities of a great power. Due to its substantial progress in export controls of nuclear-related material, China could have easily become a model for other countries in the Southeast Asia region which now face many similar problems in this area that China had in the past decade. Despite marginal effort on China's side to host conferences and share its "best practices", Chinese policy makers have so far failed to act proactively and take the initiative. (Lieggi, 2010, pp. 55-57) China's contribution to such capacity building in the region would surely lead to stronger NNP regime and regional stability which is essential for general order in international society.

All of the above mentioned examples suggest that China is a long way of being prepared to accept greater managerial responsibilities of a responsible great power. Despite internalizing the NNP norm and being a strong proponent of nuclear non-proliferation, China remains to play a reactive role in most of the areas acting as a rather passive follower on a path cleared by other great powers.

Continuing in the analysis of China's behaviour as a great power, we move to the issue of enforcement of compliance with the NNP rules on international level. Due to the fact that preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons is a critical element in

maintaining global order and security, China as a responsible great power should show its willingness to deal with blatant violations of the NNP principles epitomized by the NPT and overseen by the IAEA. Such responsible behaviour would be even more anticipated in the time of “crisis of compliance” within the NNP regime with Iran and North Korea advancing their nuclear programs. (Clegg, 2011, p. 454)

As far as Iran’s nuclear ambitions are concerned, China has been facing a difficult task of managing to balance on the issue as a responsible member of international society and at the same time protect its increasing economic interests in Iran.<sup>45</sup> Even though in February 2006, China endorsed the IAEA’s decision to report Iranian non-compliance with the NPT to the UN SC and later repeatedly voted in favour of resultant multiple rounds of sanctions, it failed to persuade the international community that it takes Iran’s challenge to international security seriously and is prepared to handle it responsibly. China supports Tehran’s right to civilian nuclear energy and it views sanctions as a tool to promote resumption of negotiations not as a way to punish Iran for non-compliance. (Swaine, 2010, p. 7) China has so far resisted adopting any unilateral sanctions against Iran as the U.S., EU, Japan or other countries did, and denounced such steps as arbitrary interpretation of the UN SC resolutions.<sup>46</sup> (Weitz, 2012) Furthermore, in his report for Congress, Shirley A. Kan emphasizes that it takes a lot of negotiations and “arm twisting” to get China to support more severe sanctions which goes in line with the argument stated above about China being a follower rather than a leader. (Kan, 2012, p. 22) China has been in favour of sanctions adopted by the UN SC in order to prevent military escalation from the U.S. and Israel but it must also do more as far as implementation of sanctions is concerned in order for them to be effective. On the level of legislation, China seems to be doing enough but enforcement on the national level is problematic with numerous examples of individual Chinese companies violating established export regulations. (Swaine, 2010, p. 6; Yuan, 2007, p. 5) Overall, China is not doing enough internationally or domestically to contribute to finding a solution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

As far as North Korea’s nuclear program is concerned, this has been a real conundrum for Chinese foreign policy makers albeit they have showed a more active

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<sup>45</sup> Due to limited space, this section does not attempt to be an in-depth analysis of China’s approach towards Iran and its nuclear program but rather to make some general observation on China’s behavior. For more detailed explanation of China’s stance see Michael. D. Swaine’s article (2010).

<sup>46</sup> As far as the latest U.S. sanctions on oil imports are concerned, China was given an exception due to the fact that its purchases fell by 25% in the first five months of 2012. (Johnson, 2012)

and positive approach than in Iran's case.<sup>47</sup> North Korean nuclear program has more far reaching consequences for Beijing's core interests than Iranian one. Unstable regime with possession of nuclear capabilities at its doorstep compels China to be engaged on the issue and work towards sustainable solution while maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula.

Since 2003, China has been playing an active role within the Six-Party talks to showcase its multilateral diplomacy as a proof of recognizing seriousness of the issue. Susan Shirk goes as far as to say that "Chinese government assumed an unprecedented leadership role in resolving the crisis." (Shirk, 2007, p.123) Having all the tools to play the role of mediator and having greater amount of influence over North Korean policies than any other international actor, China has been working through the UN to change the course of North Korea's actions. At first, China was reluctant to use sanctions as a tool but after North Korean missile tests in 2006 it supported the UN SC resolutions 1718 and 1874 that included sanctions and condemned the regime in the strongest terms.<sup>48</sup> Again, questions have been raised about China's enforcement of sanctions. Despite indisputable evidence that China has violated some aspects of sanctions, such as export of luxury goods, the UN report underlines that since then there have been no violations involving transfer of nuclear-related material or technology. (Kan, 2012, p. 53; United Nations Security Council, 2012, p. 27) The UN SC resolutions indicate that in addition to condemning North Korean nuclear program, China emphasizes primarily the need to preserve stability and security on the Korean peninsula and sustain dialogue with denuclearization being long term goal very far in the distance. (Swaine, 2009, p. 5)

It is fair to admit that a responsible great power would do more to solve the issue besides trying to maintain a fragile status quo. However, due to North Korea's proximity and complexity of the issue, China's approach can be characterized as a cautious approach of a mediator which uses a limited pressure and prefers to wait rather than rise to the challenge by actively demanding compliance with the NNP regime.

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<sup>47</sup> Due to limited space and complexity of their bilateral relations, this section does not attempt to provide exhausting analysis of China's approach towards North Korea and its nuclear program but rather to make some general observation on China's actions. For more detailed explanation of China's policy see D. Swaine's article (2009).

<sup>48</sup> Shirk states that both of the UN resolutions adopted in 2006 were the most strongly worded resolutions ever that China was willing to sign as a member of the UN SC. (Shirk, 2007, p. 126)



Overall, China's approach to both critical infringements of the NNP regime indicates its unpreparedness to play a central role in enforcement of rules of the NNP regime. Despite its advantageous position to fill the role of influential actor, China has so far maintained a passive position in Iran's case and constructive but fruitless position in North Korea's case. One can feel that even though there are no signs of a dramatic change in China's approach to both cases, issues such as these are the ones that will determine whether in future China is regarded a responsible great power in international society or not. And external expectations for China to act will only rise.

Based on presented analysis, we can conclude that at the moment China does not meet the criteria in order to be regarded as a responsible great power. Lack of leadership initiative and reactive nature of its behaviour in upholding rules of the NNP regime suggest that while largely playing by the rules, China is not trying very hard to contribute to rule-making process and deepen thereby strengthen the NNP regime. Following the course set by others, namely the U.S., China did not rise to the occasion to play more significant role when opportunities arose. Be it the NPT Review Conferences, UN SC resolutions, CTBT, Iranian nuclear program or North Korean nuclear activities, China is willing to accept measures contributing to global order and security of international society but disinclined to be a responsible initiator.

## **Conclusion**

The goal of the thesis was to describe international society and its contemporary form on the basis of the English school approach to international relations and to interconnect it with the concept of responsibility of states on international level. Such approach provided a perfect platform to analyze China's behaviour in the present international society and evaluate it in terms of international responsibility.

With respect to international society, it was determined that its contemporary version can be labelled as a global pluralist international society with solidarist elements. Based on Buzan's classification we were able to identify primary and derivative institutions of the contemporary international society. The thesis questioned validity of the universal human rights as a primary institution of the present international society and concluded that such claims are premature.

By introducing the concept of international responsibility, we were able to define a set of indicators which an ordinary state or great power must meet in order for us to be

able to label them as responsible actors within the contemporary international society. Identified indicators were crucial for studying China's behaviour and finding answers to questions raised in the beginning of the thesis. A pivotal question was whether China's behaviour in the 21<sup>st</sup> century meets the criteria in order for it to be regarded as a responsible state in the present international society. Additional question, related to the pivotal one, was whether China acts also as a responsible great power and meets the higher standards which are connected to such position within international society.

The thesis utilized the method of two case studies - the most likely and the least likely areas in which China could be expected to behave responsibly both as an ordinary state and great power. China's behaviour in the WTO was determined to be the most likely area documenting its responsible behaviour whereas the NNP regime was identified as the least likely area in which China could be expected to fulfil indicators of responsible behaviour. Based on results of both case studies, we can make general observations of China's behaviour in the present global international society.

In the light of frequent criticism and fears of revisionist China attempting to overthrow the present global order and foundations of the contemporary international society, results of the analysis include an element of surprise. In both case studies, it was found out that China sufficiently meets the indicators in order to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state within the contemporary international society. Even though one could have expected China to do well as far as the WTO is concerned due to its unquestionable and substantial benefits for Chinese economic growth, it was not anticipated that China could be a responsible actor within the NNP regime. However, despite all the odds, analysis of China's behaviour showed a satisfactory level of responsibility within the NNP regime. With nuclear non-proliferation being a serious national security matter and a "high politics" issue, it provides a strong evidence of China's general responsibility in the present international society.

Results of the analysis provide sufficient evidence to answer the research question positively in a way that China acts as a responsible ordinary state in the present international society. Meeting majority of indicators in both case studies proves that China accepts rules and institutions of the present international society, adapts its behaviour to comply with them, supports and promotes them. These findings are significant in that they put a serious dent into heart of China threat theories. China's responsible behaviour as an ordinary member of international society offers no signs of China's ambitions to overthrow its primary institutions. Lack of evident violations and

more than satisfactory adherence to the norms of the contemporary international society are a clear signal of status quo behaviour with revisionist signs largely absent. What is more, both case studies analyzed areas which can be categorized as solidarist elements of the present international society. China was found to behave responsibly in both cases meaning that it accepted one of the most advanced projects within the present international society. Therefore, it seems that appeals directed at China to reform dramatically in order to rise peacefully within the present international society are largely unjustified.

Such responsible behaviour and acceptance of institutions and rules of the present international society indicate that China is sufficiently satisfied with the status quo. Present international society and its institutions have provided more benefits to China than would efforts to develop outside it with a goal of overthrowing it in the future. China has been developing strictly within the present international society and it was arguably its decision to integrate itself into it that launched its unprecedented economic growth. Despite not necessarily being in agreement with all the contemporary rules, China's responsible behaviour shows that it is prepared to change them from within and not outside of international society. A pursuit of key national interests requires China to continue to pursue policies that work for the present international society rather than against it.

Of course, it is very likely that there will be areas, or institutions of international society, which China cannot be regarded as a responsible adherent to. If democracy and universal human rights become globally accepted institutions, going beyond pluralist form of international society and moving further towards solidarist form, China can be expected to struggle to act as a responsible actor. Playing catch-up with adoption of rules and primary institutions of the contemporary international society due to the fact of alienation from international society just half a century ago, China has come a long way to accept and adapt to the present form of international society. It will take some time and further domestic changes before China is capable of keeping up with solidarist developments within international society.

As far as China's behaviour as a great power is concerned, the analysis showed that at the moment China cannot be regarded as a responsible great power in the present international society. Results of both case studies indicate that China has so far been reluctant to take up more responsibilities, assume more central position within international society and contribute to global order more than just an ordinary state. Its

actions in the WTO or NNP regime have been falling short of its power position, capacities and external expectations. China's behaviour has been of reactive nature, catching up with new developments within international society rather than being a devoted instigator. On the one hand, China's behaviour can be justifiable in a sense that as a newcomer to the WTO or NNP regime, or other aspects of international society for that matter, it has needed more time before trying to assume more responsibilities. On the other hand, its dramatically increasing hard and soft power capacities and growing interest in preservation of global order dictate to China to move into a leading position. This observation is in line with appeals for China to become a responsible stakeholder in the contemporary international society bearing the costs connected to its maintenance rather than being just a responsible ordinary member.

As it is usually the case, the above mentioned findings presented in the thesis raise a new set of questions. The main reason why China has so far ignored international appeals for it to become more active responsible great power appears to be the most prominent question which can be tackled as part of future research on Chinese foreign policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. If China seems to generally adhere to rules and institutions of the present international society then why is it disinterested in assuming greater responsibilities?

Without being too speculative regarding this issue, one can find a mixture of reasons, rather than just the one, why China would be unwilling to assume greater leadership within the contemporary international society now or in the short-term future. With emphasis being largely put on domestic economic development, China is cautious about devoting too many resources to provide public goods on international level. In accordance with Chinese view on the concept of responsibility presented in the thesis, part of Chinese political elite apparently still underrates their country, labelling it as developing, and refutes claims that China should assume great power responsibilities.

Furthermore, Chinese vision of further development of international society differs from the U.S. vision and until China gains greater international support for its own vision or finds a compromise with the U.S., it is unlikely to act more assertively and move to the forefront of international society. Another reason may very well be awareness of Chinese officials that if China acted more assertively, seeking greater international role even with good intentions, it could provoke negative reactions from other states mainly in the South East Asia region which are increasingly sensitive to China's rise. Last but not least, increase in scope and extent of Chinese global interests

is likely to contribute to domestic tensions over the course of foreign policy. To what degree is China willing to sacrifice pursue of its own interests for the sake of maintaining the image of responsible member of the present international society?

Even though China's behaviour within international society will continue to draw negative responses from international or academic community, at the moment there is almost none justification for fearful rhetoric related to China's impressive rise. When criticizing China, one should firstly praise it for becoming a responsible status quo member of international society before denouncing its inadequate behaviour as a great power or stakeholder. China has become an integral part of international society and acts as a responsible ordinary member. The fact that it has so far failed to assume more central role in international society cannot obscure its undeniably spectacular integration in the last couple of decades to the form of society which certainly was not tailored to its interests. Only the future will show whether China continues down this path. If China becomes also a responsible great power, it will significantly reinforce institution of the present international society and international order.

## Summary

China's behaviour on the international level has been under scrutiny due to its unprecedented economic development in the last couple of decades. A question of China's responsibility has been tackled on numerous occasions but without establishing neither the nature of environment within which it should act responsibly nor precise indicators for determining responsible behaviour of a state.

It is the aim of the presented thesis to utilize the concept of international society as developed by the English school of international relations and to specify the type of present international society which states are currently members of. By looking more closely at primary and derivative institutions which form the core of the present international society, the thesis determines a set of indicators which any state has to follow in order to be regarded not only as a member but as a responsible member of international society. In addition to it, the thesis establishes also a set of tougher criteria in order to evaluate actions of a great power which has more central role to play in any international society. The first part of the thesis therefore concludes that at the moment states live in the global pluralist international society with solidarist elements and presents a set of indicators which can be used to test a behaviour of ordinary state and great power in international society.

Selected case studies then present an opportunity to test China's behaviour in specific areas of the present international society in order to determine whether China can be regarded as a responsible adherent or revisionist opponent in relation to important institutions of international society. Furthermore, China's actions will be assessed while treating it as an ordinary state and great power.

Testing China's behaviour in the WTO, which is expectedly the most likely area of international society where China would act in a responsible way, shows that while China meets indicators to be regarded as a responsible ordinary state, it is reluctant to assume further responsibilities of great power and play more central role in strengthening international order.

Testing China's behaviour within the NNP regime, which is predictably the least likely area of international society where China would behave responsibly, surprisingly indicates that China acts as a responsible ordinary state but has so far failed to contribute further to stability of international society and is still a long way from becoming a responsible great power.

The findings document a significant transformation in China's behaviour in international society. They show that China responsibly adheres to institutions of the present international society. Thus, at the moment, China shows no signs of being a revisionist state documenting lack of justification for scaremongering China threat theories. At the same time, the results indicate that China will need to do more if it is to be regarded as a responsible great power protecting the present international society.

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**A Study of China's Responsibility in the Present International Society  
with the Emphasis on Security and Economy**

**Subject of the thesis**

In my thesis I would like to focus on the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (China) and its behaviour within the international system, or rather international society, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. To be more precise, I would like to concentrate in my research on the question whether China can be regarded as a responsible power (or responsible stakeholder) in the international society. The two areas which the thesis will focus on are security and economy.

The aim will be to utilize the concept of responsibility of a state/great power as an actor in international relations and to interconnect it with the concept of international society in which individual states expect each other to preserve institutions, rules and norms which have been established and contribute to protection of the system as a whole while respecting the rules of conduct which were agreed upon. By applying these concepts to a case study of China, the thesis will attempt to determine and test indicators which a state (China) must meet in order to be recognized as a responsible power in the present international society. As far as China is concerned, the thesis will necessarily deal with the question of internal reflection on responsibility and its perception, external expectations, various identities of responsibility and role of interests which shape responsible/irresponsible behaviour.

**Motivation of the research**

The rise of China presents a challenge for policy makers and scholars in the field of international relations. With increasing capabilities and power of China there has been a constant questioning of its intentions within the international system. Scholars attempt to determine whether China will be a status quo power respecting established institutions, rules and norms of the international society or a revisionist power trying to overthrow them. By analyzing its present behaviour, one can at least determine the present state of its foreign policy and predict its short to mid-term development (barring any critical and game changing events). One can also analyze what drives China to behave either responsibly or irresponsibly within the present society.

In dialogues with China, foreign officials (mostly from the U.S. and Europe) continuously call upon China to behave responsibly and to assume responsibility for maintaining the current system/society. Their argument is that China has been a system exploiter for a long time and now it is the time for it to become a responsible maintainer of the international order. A responsible behaviour has become something of a precondition of a peaceful rise of China in the current world order. Therefore, in order to judge China in the terms of responsibility, I think it is necessary to determine specific indicators of behaviour on which we can test the responsibility of a state. Testing these indicators and analyzing China's foreign policy can at least in the present confirm or refute foundations of "China threat theories" and clarify China's behaviour with respect to established norms, rules and institutions of the present international society. If China could be deemed to behave responsibly in the present society, mainly in the institutions which represent the present society, it increases chances that it could develop peacefully without efforts to overthrow the existing system (albeit one should be aware of no direct causal connection).

### **The aim of the research, hypotheses, research questions and indicators**

The actual aim of the thesis is to empirically test whether ever growing voices of decision makers which call upon China to become a responsible state (meaning they believe China is not a responsible state) within the present international society are justified and are supported by evidence in China's behaviour in the international scene. The focus will be put on institutions within the field of security and economy which represent the present international society and embody its principles, such as the UN, WTO, and IMF.

Therefore, the main question would stand as follows: Does China's behaviour within the international relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century meet the criteria in order for China to be regarded as a responsible power or stakeholder in the present international society? (Is China a responsible status quo power which wants to maintain and perfect established institutions, rules and norms or a revisionist power wishing to overthrow them?). In the beginning of the thesis, it will be vital to precisely set the criteria of a responsible behaviour within the established institutions and organizations which a state/great power has to meet in order to be regarded as a responsible power. After that, the indicators will be analyzed on a set of case studies with the aim to determine areas

where China can be regarded as a responsible state and areas in which it behaves rather irresponsibly.

Preliminary set of case studies which the thesis will focus on includes:

- a. field of security
  - i. China's responsibility as a system maintainer
    1. Contribution to dealing with shared security threats - non-proliferation (Iran, North Korea), counterterrorism (Afghanistan), regional security (South-East Asia), etc.
  - ii. China's responsibility as a member of the UN
    1. China's responsibility in the Security Council with regard to maintaining international peace and security
    2. China's participation in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations
    3. Leadership within the UN (e.g. reform of the SC), respecting established norms (state sovereignty, non-intervention)
- b. field of economy
  - i. China's responsibility as a member of the Bretton Woods economic organizations
    1. China's role in the WTO and international trading system in general (role in the WTO negotiations, participation in the Dispute Settlement Body)
    2. China's role in the IMF (e.g. does China behave responsibly as far as currency and macroeconomic stability are concerned in the light of current crisis?)

### **Concepts to be utilized by the thesis**

The research aims to utilize several concepts. First of all, it is the concept of international society elaborated especially by the English school of international relations in the works of C. Manning, M. Wight, H. Bull, B. Buzan and A. Watson. Their basic argument is that the international society exists when a number of states realize that they share certain interests which then lead to creation of limited rules in order to co-exist peacefully. On a higher level of co-existence, members of the

international system act to create and maintain institutions, norms and rules which prescribe the code of conduct, limit the space for conflict and encourage cooperation.

The thesis will aim to distinguish between various forms of international order (international system, international or interstate society, world society). Furthermore, it will aim to distinguish also the international community from the international society. This is based on the difference between *gemeinschaft* (community - civilizational identity) and *gesellschaft* (society - functional identity) in sociology. When talking about international society, the focus is put on shared interests of actors in the system whereas in the case of the international community the emphasis is put on common identity, culture and values.

After defining characteristics of the present international society, the thesis will attempt to interconnect this concept with the concept of responsibility. Every state in the international society has its rights and responsibilities. It has been defined that a state which supports the established rules, norms and institutions of the international society and acts in order to preserve or perfect them can be consequently labelled as a responsible power. A responsible statehood within the international society also means responsibility as obligations a state should fulfil and responsibility as accountability for the consequences of state's actions/inactions.

The thesis will further elaborate on efforts of scholars who attempted to interconnect the concept of international society with the concept of responsibility in international relations. However, there are several problems with a clear definition of responsibility within the present international society which the thesis will attempt to tackle. Responsibility of a state can be judged based on external expectations and resources available to a state. Therefore, different expectations are placed upon great powers, the fact that is important to take into account. Also, norms and rules of the international society are always in development so there can be disagreements over which norm is a part of the society and which is not.

### **Methodology**

As far as methodology is concerned, the thesis will present a case study (or rather several case studies) of China's behaviour within the present international society. After briefly outlining the historical development of China's participation within the international society in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the thesis will focus on the first

decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century until now and analyze how China meets the determined criteria in order to be regarded as a responsible power.

The thesis will predominantly work with qualitative methods, evaluate and analyze the qualitative data in order to confirm or refute indicators of China as a responsible state within the present international society. The data will include strategic documents relating to China's foreign policy, data from international organizations (UN, WTO, and IMF) and other evidences of China's behaviour within the international society. Also, the research will include the analysis of Chinese discourse on the question of responsibility in the international society.

A selection of suitable cases will be one of the key parts of the thesis. In selecting specific cases within the fields of security and economy, I will attempt to choose the most probable (areas in which China could be expected to behave responsibly) and the most improbable cases (areas in which China could be expected to behave irresponsibly) in order to give the thesis higher relevancy. It can help me determine areas where China behaves responsibly and others where it doesn't. In the end, the thesis may attempt to analyze why this is the case and what is the explanation and motives behind China's behaviour (identity vs. interests).

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