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**China, India and the armed conflict
potential in South East Asia**

Diplomová práce

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Abstrakt

Diplomová práce Čína, Indie a potenciál ozbrojeného konfliktu v jihovýchodní Asii se zabývá současnými vztahy zmíněných zemí a snaží se zjistit, zda existuje možnost vypuknutí ozbrojeného konfliktu mezi nimi nebo zda se budou spíše ubírat cestou spolupráce. Práce vychází z toho, že tyto dva světové giganti, co do počtu obyvatel, rozlohy i objemu HDP, vedou od začátku existence samostatné Indie spor o území. Hranice mezi nimi nebyla nikdy oficiálně vytyčena. Množství drobných ozbrojených střetů pohraničních hlídek není možné spočítat a v roce 1962 dokonce mezi nimi propukla jeden měsíc trvající válka, která skončila drtivým vítězstvím Číny. Oba státy se dodnes přou, kdo tento konflikt zapříčinil. Stoupající ekonomická síla obou států v dnešní době, společně s domnělým vyzbrojováním, vývojem vojenské raketové a ponorkové technologie schopné nést nukleární hlavice a budování námořních základen Čínou v těsné blízkosti Indie mohou vytvořit velmi třaskavou atmosféru v této oblasti. Práce je rozdělena do šesti kapitol. První kapitola uvádí do tématu. Druhá kapitola vytváří teoretický rámec, do kterého byl výzkum zasazen. Zbylé kapitoly jsou empirické. Hlavními oblastmi zkoumání jsou vzájemný diskurs státních představitelů a úředníků, materiální faktory ve formě vojenských prostředků a infrastruktury využitelné proti druhé straně a porovnání zjištěných dat s událostmi a fakty předcházejícími jedinému ozbrojenému konfliktu mezi těmito dvěma státy v roce 1962. V poslední kapitole jsou pak data zjištěná v předchozích kapitolách vyhodnocena pomocí zvoleného operacionalizačního rámce.

Abstract

Master's thesis China, India and the armed conflict potential in South East Asia is concerned with the current relations of mentioned countries and is trying to figure out, if an outburst of a military conflict between them could occur or whether they will rather cooperate. The thesis is based on the notion that these two world giants in the terms of number of inhabitants, area and even a GDP volume have an unresolved border dispute, ever since the India reached independence. Their mutual border has never been officially demarcated. The small skirmishes between the border patrols of both states are uncountable. In addition, in 1962 they waged a war against each other, which China won in very decisive manner. Both states have been disputing which side caused this conflict till today. Rising economic power of both states currently, together with supposed arming, development of military rocket and submarine technology capable to carry nuclear warheads and establishment of naval bases by China in the proximity of India could create a really effervescent atmosphere in the area. The thesis is divided into six chapters. First chapter introduces the topic. Second chapter establishes the theoretic framework, which is underpinning the research. The other chapters are empirical. The main areas of the analysis are the mutual discourse between representatives and officials of both states, material factors in the form of military means, technique and infrastructure which could be used against the other side and comparison of identified data with the events and facts foregoing the only military conflict between the India and China in 1962. In the last chapter, all the identified data from the previous chapters were assessed according to the given operational framework.

Klíčová slova

Indie, Čína, vojenský konflikt, konfliktní vztahy, Rovnováha hrozeb, agresivní záměr

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India, China, military conflict, conflictive relations, Balance of threats, aggressive intentions

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Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval samostatně a použil jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
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3. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna pro studijní a výzkumné účely.

V Praze dne 17. 5. 2013

Zdeněk Blažek

Poděkování

Rád bych na tomto místě poděkoval JUDr. PhDr. Tomáši Karáskovi, Ph.D. za odborné vedení mé diplomové práce, vstřícný přístup a cenné připomínky.

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1 Vymezení tématu

Indie a Čína jsou dvě asijské mocnosti, nejlidnatější státy světa. Jejich ekonomická síla stále stoupá, podle údajů Mezinárodního měnového fondu za rok 2011 Číně patří v žebříku zemí podle HDP druhé místo, s polovičním HDP oproti prvním USA, Indii patří desáté místo.¹ Společně také tvoří přibližně třetinu světové populace. Obě země se nyní snaží tento svůj rostoucí ekonomický potenciál proměnit i v posílení svých vyjednávacích pozic, dosažení postavení nejmocnější země v regionu a k zajištění své vlastní bezpečnosti. Územní blízkost, částečně též společná hranice obou zemí ale nutně znamená protínání a kolizi jejich zájmů. Vztah obou zemí se tak víceméně již několik let podobá soupeření více než kooperaci, včetně počínajícího závodu ve zbrojení a ukázek síly. Cílem tohoto výzkumu proto bude zjistit, zda vztah těchto dvou zemí má potenciál vyvinout se v ozbrojený konflikt či nikoliv.

Jde o velmi aktuální téma na poli mezinárodních vztahů, mezi oběma státy vládne napětí, oba pomalu zařazují do své výzbroje hi-tech vojenské prostředky a proklamují vysoké vojenské ambice. Relevance tématu je dána geopolitickou důležitostí obou aktérů: jde o dvě nejlidnatější země světa, dohromady mají cca třetinu obyvatelstva Země, disponují jedněmi z nejvýznamnějších ekonomik světa, poskytujícími levnou pracovní sílu a částečně odbytiště pro západní státy. Případný konflikt větší intenzity by měl zásadní vliv na mezinárodní systém, včetně rozsáhlých dopadů na světovou ekonomiku.

2 Hypotézy

Východiskem práce jsou tři konkurenční hypotézy:

- 1) V bližší či vzdálenější budoucnosti hrozí ozbrojený konflikt vysoké intenzity² mezi Čínou a Indií.
- 2) Přímá ozbrojená konfrontace nehrozí, nicméně vztahy budou na úrovni krize a s možností sporadických ozbrojených incidentů. („low/medium intensity conflict“)³.
- 3) Krize čínsko-indických vztahů nehrozí, oba státy budou vzájemně spolupracovat na svém rozvoji a zařazení mezi nejvýznamnější geopolitické hráče.

2.1 Vysvětlovaný jev a jeho aspekty

Jevem, který bude v tomto výzkumu vysvětlován, je konfliktnost vztahů mezi Čínou a Indií. Zde budou stanoveny dva základní aspekty, pomocí nichž bude tento jev zkoumán. Budou to jednak vzájemné úmysly obou stran (zkoumané na základě výroků a prohlášení státních představitelů

¹ Report for selected countries and subjects. International Monetary Fund.

² Conflict Barometer

³ Conflict Barometer

obou států), a jednak vojenské schopnosti Číny a Indie (dokumentované početními stavy a typy výzbroje explicitně zaměřenými nebo využitelnými proti druhému z aktérů). Výsledek analýzy obou těchto základních má poskytnout obraz o tom, jak se vztahy mezi Čínou a Indií vyvíjejí a zda lze očekávat, že jejich případné soupeření bude vedeno pouze slovně, či je pravděpodobná i jejich vojenská konfrontace.

2.2 Metodologie, operacionalizace a použitá data

Práce bude obsahovat tři základní části: teoretické zakotvení, diskurzivní analýzu a výzkum materiálních faktorů. V teoreticko-analytické části zapracuji téma čínsko-indických vztahů do kontextu vybrané teorie mezinárodních vztahů. Jako užitečnou a nejlépe použitelnou se v tomto případě jeví teorie rovnováhy hrozeb Stephena M. Walta, kdy státy využívají reaktivní vyvažovací strategii proti bezprostřední hrozbě pro přežití.⁴

Diskurzivně-analytická část se bude zabývat politickými prohlášeními. Budou vyhledány výroky a prohlášení představitelů obou států, které jsou relevantní pro předmět zkoumání. Tyto výroky pak budou vyhodnoceny s ohledem na míru konfrontační - nebo naopak kooperační - rétoriky ve vztahu k druhé straně potenciálního konfliktu. Výroky a prohlášení budou hodnoceny podle toho, zda jsou charakteru přímo útočného, obranného (odpovídajícího na hrozbu), nebo vyzývajícího ke spolupráci. Vytvořením grafu posloupnosti takto ohodnocených výroků obou stran získám obrázek úrovně vzájemných postojů v průběhu času. Potřebná data budou vyhledána v čínských a indických anglicky psaných mediích, eventuálně v mezinárodních mediích, a dále na oficiálních stránkách státních úřadů.

V rámci analýzy materiálních faktorů budou zkoumány vojenské prostředky, zázemí a schopnosti obou států shromážděním dostupných dat a jejich následnou interpretací. Zabývat se budu nejen počty vojenských prostředků, jimiž Čína a Indie disponují, ale také jejich strategickou využitelnost v kontextu vojenské strategie vůči druhé straně. Při nalezení podobných prostředků na obou stranách budou tyto vzájemně porovnány jak množstevně, tak kvalitativně. Selekcí získaná data budou vzájemně porovnána. Graf posloupnosti zařazování jednotlivých vojenských prostředků do výzbroje pak ukáže, který aktér navyšuje arzenály a kdo dorovnáva vojenské kapacity protivníka a jakou dynamiku tedy mají případné závody ve zbrojení. Mapa rozmístění prostředků a základen s časovým vývojem následně pomůže vyhodnotit, zda se aktéři připravují na možnost konfrontace. V této části práce budu používat data mezinárodních organizací zaměřujících se na zbrojení, resp. odzbrojení, dále zprávy amerického kongresu o vývoji vojenské a bezpečnostní situace ve světě a také oficiální vládní

⁴ Beneš, V. (2009). Realismus. In Barša, P. (Ed.) *Dialog teorií: Filozofická dilemata výzkumu mezinárodních vztahů*. Praha: SLON, 30-59.

stránky k zjištění požadovaného počtu prostředků, zázemí a podobně. Dá se předpokládat, že stejné údaje zjištěné z různých zdrojů se budou lišit. Bude je proto nutné důkladněji ověřit z více zdrojů, případně je upravit některou ze statistických metod.

Výstupy kvantitativní analýzy budou následně porovnány s výsledky diskursivní analýzy s cílem potvrdit či vyvrátit, zda prohlášení a výroky státních představitelů korespondují s vojenskými přípravami a materiální vybaveností jejich států. Součástí práce bude prezentace scénáře budoucího vývoje v případě vojenského konfliktu.

V části Podmínky vzniku vojenského konfliktu - komparace budou využity výstupy z předcházející části a pomocí komparační metody budou srovnány se situací předcházející některému vhodnému konfliktu z blízké minulosti. Výstupem této komparace bude zjištění, zda se dnešní situace ve vztazích obou států podobá situaci, která předcházela vybranému konfliktu z minulosti. Východiskem této části budou tyto hypotézy:

1. Dnešní situace ve vztazích obou států se podobá situaci, která předcházela vybranému konfliktu z minulosti. Proto mezi státy hrozí otevřený konflikt.
2. Dnešní situace ve vztazích obou států se nepochodá situaci, která předcházela vybranému konfliktu z minulosti. Proto mezi státy nehrozí otevřený konflikt.
3. Obě situace jsou natolik specifické, že na základě komparace obou situací vývoj nelze předpokládat.

3 Osnova práce

1. Úvod do tématu a zhodnocení současné situace
2. Rovnováha hrozeb - teoretický rámec
3. Analýza prohlášení a výroků státních představitelů Číny a Indie
4. Čínské a indické vojenské prostředky, jejich vývoj, aktuální stav a výhled do budoucna
5. Podmínky vzniku vojenského konfliktu - komparace
6. Závěr: spolupráce či konflikt?

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1 Introduction

India and China are the two largest Asian powers and their economic power has been rising. According to the data of World Monetary Fund, China is on the second place in the world by GDP, only USA has larger one. India is on the tenth place.⁵ Population of those two states joined together equals one third of the entire population of the world. Both countries are nowadays trying to transform their potential into the creation of a better position among the world leading superpowers, to have a more effective position for negotiations, to secure its own safety and to build up the position of region leading superpower. The facts of their territorial proximity and the length of common border which is 3380 km long⁶ necessarily mean the clash of their interests. The mutual relationship of both countries has for last few years more or less looked like a competition and rivalry than cooperation. It has been possible to observe there few cases of aggressive power projection in the important area of South China Sea. The equipping of their armies looks like an arms race more than mere securing the safety. It will be referred to this matter further bellow.

The aim of this diploma thesis is to find out whether the relationship of both states has a potential to develop into an armed conflict or whether it looks as if they will rather cooperate. It is highly actual theme of international relations. There are significant tensions between those states, both of them have been putting high-tech weapon systems into the service of their armies and have been proclaiming high military ambitions. Relevance of the topic is given by the importance of both actors: both are the most populous countries in the world, volumes of GDP of their economic is in the world's top ten, they provide cheap labor and partly also outlets with products for the countries of the Western world. Possible mutual higher intensity conflict would have a substantial influence for the international system including an impact on the economy of the whole world.

⁵ International Monetary Fund (2012): Report for selected countries and subjects. Comparison according to Gross Domestic Product in USD.

⁶ CIA: The World Factbook (2013). East and South East Asia: China. Section: Geography.

1.1 Disputed areas

The main reason of the dispute between India and China is the conflict regarding the never demarcated frontier in two particular regions. Origin of the conflict is described in the following sub-chapter.

Given the fact that China has been establishing the sophisticated network of naval bases in the states around Bay of Bengal and Arabian Sea and both states are enhancing their naval capabilities⁷, it is necessary to include into the research even an assessment of naval forces. Naval capabilities and warfare are not directly related to the original dispute between India and China, but if the extreme scenario of a high intensity conflict occurred, involvement of naval forces would be highly probable.

1.1.1 Border dispute

Conflict between India and China is regarding especially the control of border regions. First disputed area is the state Arunachal Pradesh administered by India, bordering on the one side with Bhutan and with Burma on the other side. The territory of this state has the area of 83 743 square kilometers and 1, 4 million inhabitants and it is culturally to a great extent diversified. Moreover, it is mountainous, therefore hardly accessible.⁸ Second disputed region is Aksai Chin, which is situated next to Kashmir. Since 1962 it has been hold by China. Prior this set up, it was administered by India.⁹ The frontier line from Kashmir to Nepal is disputed as well.¹⁰

The origin of the conflict is dated to the year 1914, when the Simla Accord¹¹ was negotiated with British colonial administration of India, Tibet and China. The border between India and Outer Tibet¹² was set up arbitrarily by so called McMahon Line. This issue itself had not to concern China. But the border between the Outer and Inner Tibet¹³ was also set up by this treaty and China did not agree with the proposal. As a result, Simla Accord was signed without the participation of China. However, according to the British – Chinese treaty from 1903, China

⁷ Network of naval bases and naval capabilities are described in chapter Material factors analysis.

⁸ *At Glance*. Official website of Government of Arunachal Pradesh.

⁹ Rajan, D. S. (2011)

¹⁰ See the map of disputed areas in Appendix 1.

¹¹ Convention Between Great Britain, China, And Tibet. Simla 1914. Tibet Justice Centre, 2012.

Hereinafter only Simla Accord.

¹² Part of Tibet which didn't belong to China. China recognized the autonomy of Outer Tibet in article 2 of Simla Accord. There is also very interesting fact, that in the same article, China bound herself not to annex it.

¹³ Part of Tibet which belonged to China. *Ibid.*, article 2.

did not accept the right of Tibet to independence. Therefore all the treaties signed by Tibet are not valid in the eyes of China.

In the 1962 broke out a brief war between India and China. As a result, China occupied the majority of Arunachal Pradesh as well as whole Aksai Chin and declared victory. The cause of the conflict was according the Chinese side the Indian Forward Policy issued in 1961¹⁴, according to which Indian army established more than 40 military posts beyond the Line of Actual Control, to disrupt the supply lines of the Chinese army and to push Chinese soldiers farther to the north.¹⁵ According to the Indian point of view, the conflict emanated from strengthening of military presence around the McMahon Line, frequent incursions of Chinese troops and skirmishes caused by them.¹⁶ A month after the beginning of the conflict, China withdrew its soldiers from Arunachal Pradesh, 20 kilometers behind McMahon Line.¹⁷ Since 1962 there have been a few shootouts and some incursions, but a high intensity conflict has never occurred.

Development of infrastructure

The disputed areas in both regions, divided by never officially demarcated border are heavily militarized. China is developing the infrastructure in an intense manner, building a highway from Lhasa to the border, establishing airports and maintaining strong frontier units. India is trying to initiate the same measures, but their mountain roads look such as muddy paths more than quick connectors. The infrastructure is examined in a more detail way in chapter Material factors analysis.

1.1.2 String of Pearls

Second element with a potential to cause a conflicting situation is the so called String of Pearls. It is a system of naval bases and ports which is being established

¹⁴ According to article India's Forward Policy documenting the correspondence of N. Maxwell(1971)and A.G. Noorani defending the Forward Policy, Maxwell says: „*The Forward Policy was designed to evict China from territory India claimed, by "dominating" Chinese positions and thus forcing their withdrawal. Since the material from which the writer's information is drawn has not been published d, Mr. Noorani cannot be blamed for the inaccuracy of his conclusion. But in his own pamphlet on the subject, published in 1963, he quotes a report showing that in December 1961 the Chinese were already in full control of the area they claimed in the west, and had been so for at least one or two years; so it is difficult to understand how he can now maintain that the forward policy was designed to " check the continuing Chinese advance.*" Maxwell, N., Noorani, A. G. (1971). p. 158.

¹⁵ Li, Y. (2010) Translated from original Han Chinese text using Google Translator.

N. Maxwell in his analysis of this conflict called India's China War expresses the same opinion on the origin of the war. For further reference see the chapter Conditions of outburst of military conflict.

¹⁶ Sinha, P. B., Athale, A. A.(1992). p. 32-36.

¹⁷ Maxwell, N. (1970) p. 417.

and maintained by China. It is located near Sea Lane of Communication heading from Persian Gulf through Malacca Strait and South China Sea to China. This Sea Lane of Communication is vitally important for China, and the installation should serve as bases and sanctuary for tankers and other ships on the way to China and for the naval ships as well.¹⁸ However, looking on the locations of the “Pearls”, it is possible to think about their secondary purpose, they could be used to encircle and surround India.¹⁹ This infrastructure is described further in Material factor analysis as well.

2 Structure

2.1 Research question and Hypothesis

Main research question of this thesis is: Does the development of bilateral relationship between China and India head to an armed conflict?

There are three basic possibilities of result, scenarios of the future development in their mutual relationship. First extreme case is the unavoidability of a high intensity armed conflict.²⁰ It will be valid if the relationship of the states will be proved as maximally conflicting. The second possibility of the result is the opposite extreme case; there is not any conflictive element in mutual relationship of both states. They cooperate on their development with a will to enlist themselves among the world leading geopolitical actors.

Those are the extreme cases. But there is also the middle case, the third possible result. The high intensity conflict is not probable, but there is a crisis in mutual relationship and so that there is a possibility of a low or medium intensity conflicts²¹.

In the conclusion of the thesis, with a help of evidence, one of these result has been accepted as valid.

2.2 Basic division of the thesis and methodology

In the theoretic- analytical part the Sino – Indian relations were incorporated into the framework of a suitable theory of international relations. For this purpose,

¹⁸ Pehrson, C. J. (2006) p. 3 -4.

¹⁹ See the map of the installations (“Pearls”) in Appendix 2

²⁰ Conflict barometer, p. 121.

²¹ Ibid.

as the most suitable was chosen the Balance of threats of Stephen Walt. According to this theory, the states are using the reactive balancing strategy against the immediate threat for the purpose of their survival.²² For the purposes of the research only the part of this theory was used. This fact is explained below in the subchapter Operationalization - Link between theoretical framework and analytical part.

This thesis consists of six basic chapters – introduction, structure, discursive analysis, material factors analysis, comparative analysis and conclusion.

The empirical part consists of the discursive analysis and material factors analysis. Discursive analysis is concerned with political statements. Basically, it is a research of intentions of the highest representatives and officials related to the second state. The material factors analysis is based on evaluation of the military technique, capabilities and infrastructure of both states. In the conclusion of each analysis there will be assessed the nature of intentions of the representatives and the development and focus of military capabilities of each state respectively. The results of both analyses will be compared in conclusion of the thesis in order to determine, if the intentions of the representatives correspond with the development and focus of military capabilities. A method, using which the statements were evaluated is described in the sub-chapter Operationalization - Link between theoretical framework and analytical part.

For the purpose of the discursive analysis the statements of representatives of both states, which are relevant for the given research topic, was searched for. Those statements were assessed according to if they are rather of cooperative or confrontational rhetoric, with a relation to the second side of a potential conflict. It has been assessed whether the statements are of an offensive or a defensive nature or whether they call for cooperation. The methodology which was used for the assessment of the statements is described in the chapter Operationalization - Link between theoretical framework and analytical part. By the creation of a succession graph of those statements, the picture of mutual attitude level with a respect to time was made. Necessary data was looked up in the Indian, Chinese and international English written media and also on the official websites of state offices.

²² Beneš, V. (2009). p. 34, 35, 42, 53, 54.

In the material factors analysis, the military means and infrastructure were examined as well as the capabilities of both states. It was necessary to interpret those data correctly, to elicit whether those means are really relevant to given topic. They were assessed as relevant insofar they are intended or possible to be used against the second side. Concretely, the number of relevant military means possessed by both actors was examined as well as their strategic or tactical usability against the given potential adversary. Whereas similar means were found on both sides, they were compared quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Succession graph of acquisition of those means is showing which actor has been increasing his power and which one has been balancing it. From this graph it is possible to deduct the dynamics of a possible arms race. In that part, the data of international organizations focused on arming or disarmament were used as well the official web sites of state offices. When the data from different resources were varying, a double check from more resources was necessary.

In the chapter called Conditions of outburst of a military conflict the situation preceding the military conflict between China and India in 1962 was analyzed. The analysis was focused on the relationship between those states, especially on the origin and pretence of the conflict. It is necessary to include the views of both states and one impartial view as well. In the conclusion of this chapter, the outputs were compared with the outputs of the discursive analysis. Result of this comparison was used as the supportive evidence for the conclusion of the thesis.

The comparison of material factors from the period preceding the conflict in 1962 and the contemporary period is not included because such analysis would exceed the extent of this thesis. The other reason is that as was presupposed, it was impossible to find the precise database of military personnel, technique and equipment of both states from that period.

2.3 Theoretical framework

2.3.1 Introduction to Balance of Threats

As the most suitable theory for the purposes of this thesis, the Stephen Walt's theory Balance of threat was chosen. In this chapter, the main features of the theory are described. At the end of the thesis, the behavior of both states is assessed to prove whether one or both of the states have hostile intentions or not. Also the theory could

confirm or reject the conclusions made up from the other parts of the thesis. The advantage of this theory is that Stephen Walt in his work states precise reasons that force the states to behave in different ways. It is really helpful for this thesis because by using them it is possible to clearly assess the behavior of the states according to their notion of threat. Hence, he defines four so called sources of threat. These sources of threat concept were used in this thesis to establish the theoretical framework of research. It can help to find out, if there is an evidence of hostile intentions in the behavior of examined states.

The theory works with two kinds of behavior of states when they face the threat. It is balancing and bandwagoning behavior. It is necessary to say, that in those two cases, state is not able to face the threat alone.²³ The states decide which behavior to choose by considering four basic factors – sources of threat: aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive power and aggressive intentions²⁴. At first, it is necessary to explain these terms in advance to be able to examine the behavior of the states later.

Balancing behavior

In this case the states are forming an alliance to face together a single adversary or the coalition with hostile intentions. When such states feel threatened by the adversary who has evidently superior power, they are looking for the sanctuary of similarly threatened or friendly states to join their resources. Typically, in such alliance there is no state that can either defeat the others or oppose the enemy alone. That is according to S. Walt the reason why the states balance. The similar level of power of the allies provides them with a certain feeling of safety. There could be a possibility that some of the allies would later exert hostility, but such ally ordinarily does not have an overcoming power to dominate the others.

The other reason is exactly opposite than the previous one. A state considers two choices, to join a stronger side and be safe from adversaries, but to be more vulnerable towards new partners and to be almost without any influence. The level of a state's influence when it joins the weaker side is much higher than in the case of joining the stronger side. But there is a certain level of vulnerability towards the strong adversary

²³ Walt, S. (1985) p. 4 – 5.

²⁴ Walt, S. (1987)

side. Also, when resorting to weaker side, along with an influence goes the necessity to work harder for the sake of alliance security. Much more resources need to be spent there. The most tempting thing on joining the weaker side is the higher certainty about the alliance partners.²⁵ They have to cooperate tightly so that there is lesser danger of betrayal of some member and when it occurs, it means neither such threat for the rest of the members nor it weakens the alliance so much.

In this attitude to the superpower game, for the success of the weaker side it is necessary to capture the moment when the adversary power is rising and tame the adversary in time. Otherwise the weaker side would not have a chance to face the adversary.²⁶

Bandwagoning behavior

In this case the state resorts to ally with the stronger side with generally hostile intentions. S. Walt highlights hostile intentions as the most important feature of bandwagoning behavior and he places it above the feature of the relative strength.²⁷

S. Walt states two motives to ally with a strong power. Firstly, the defensive reason is that the state would like to avoid the attack of the stronger side. When the state allies with an apparently dominating power, it would be certainly safer. And even if its strong ally would be beaten in the conflict, its weaker ally would be at the periphery of the winner's interest. Such state could achieve all of those without depletion of its own resources. However, in this attitude there is a significant level of uncertainty about the future behavior of the much stronger partner when the state does not have an employable level of its own influence. Such state is thus strongly vulnerable and has to rely on favor of his stronger partner.

Secondly, the offensive reason of bandwagoning is according to Walt the will to share spoils of the victory in the conflict. Such state hopes that by joining the stronger side, it would achieve some territory or will get rich by looting in defeated countries.²⁸

In his research Walt provides the conclusion that states more frequently resorts to balancing rather than to bandwagoning.²⁹ The reason is that states generally

²⁵ Waltz, K. (2010) p. 127.

²⁶ Walt, S. (1985) p. 4 – 5.

²⁷ „States may balance by allying with other strong states, if a weaker power is more dangerous for other reasons.“ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 5 -6.

²⁹ For further reference see Walt, S. (1987)

do not prefer the condition of vulnerability towards an apparently stronger power. Therefore, substantial part of bandwagoners resorts to this attitude only in a situation when there is no other feasible solution to their situation or if there is simply no suitable ally to balance the adversary.

2.3.2 Sources of threat

Stephen Walt provides four important factors which the states take into account when choosing the strategy regarding their future partners. Concretely, he mentions aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions. Those aspects are according to him the sources of threat against which the states have to balance or with which they have to bandwagon.³⁰

In the following paragraphs, those Walt's sources of threat are described as well as the way to imply the balancing or bandwagoning behavior.

Aggregate power

This feature is described by Walt as a classical notion of power from the realist point of view. The greater resources a state controls, the greater threat it constitutes for other actors. As the relevant resources, there are mentioned military means and technology, population, natural resources the state possesses or available funds.

Actor who possesses more resources than the others is definitely perceived by them as the source of potential threat, according to whom it is necessary to balance. On the contrary, he is able to provide a sanctuary to his allies and he can grant them profit in the case of their engagement in a successful conflict.

Geographic proximity

The fact of territorial proximity of two states is as important as the previous one. The ability to project the aggregate power of a particular actor, described in the previous paragraph, declines with rising distance of the actors. Thus, the most threatened state is the one which directly borders with the hostile power.

State bordering with the hostile power is more vulnerable to the actions of its adversary than a farther state. Therefore, the proximate weaker state is frequently forced to bandwagon. Such state could afford the balancing attitude only in the case when

³⁰ Walt, S. (1985) p. 9 – 12.

it has enough power to oppose at least the first attack or has security guarantees from its farther allies.

S. Walt states a good example using the phenomenon regarding proximity feature. He explains the formation of spheres of influence by the bandwagoning of proximate states, which neither can oppose the hostile power alone nor which are simply close to the state with which they could establish a balancing coalition.³¹

Offensive power

This feature specifies the preceding feature of Aggregate power. State whose power is focused on defensive capabilities is not perceived as such a threat as a state, whose capabilities are offensive.

Consequences of this feature are similar to those of Geographic proximity feature. Actor who has a high level of Offensive power constitutes a threat to the others. Therefore, there is a good reason why to form a balancing alliance against him. But as in the case of proximity, only states with sufficient capabilities or those with security guarantees could afford to balance against a hostile power with extensive offensive capabilities.

Such constellation is the cause of forming spheres of influence as well.³²

Aggressive intentions

Retreating from the power in the realist point of view, the intentions which are not underpinned by the respective capabilities are the reason itself to form a balancing alliance against the particular actor. Especially the extremely aggressive states are not a very beneficial partner to ally with. The crucial problem is that such state is not calculable for its potential partners. They cannot be sure about future behavior of the aggressor, for example against whom will he turn the aggression henceforth. Not mentioning the fact that such state is seldom as rational as the others.

There could be, according to the author, only one reason why to ally with such actor. The potential partner needs to possess something excessively special, precious or scarce for this actor. Such actor could be tamed using this resource, whatever it is, and his partner could make a significant profit of it. However, when such resource is depleted, it is too late to abandon the partnership.

³¹ Walt, S. (1985) p. 11.

³² Ibid., p. 11.

2.3.3 General implications of these factors for notion of threats by states

The factors mentioned above are according to S. Walt crucial for every state when there is a significant source of threat and the state is not capable to manage such situation alone. All of the factors were analyzed relatively to the capabilities of the given threatened state. According to the outputs of this analysis the state chooses if it is better to bandwagon with a hostile side, become more or less safe in a low-cost way and accept its superiority or whether it is capable to actively engage in balancing against the hostile power. When choosing the second option, it would become more influential but would have to spend a considerable amount of its resources.

There could be also a few other factors to consider when choosing the potential partners. For example, ideological proximity or preferences of a leader (leading group), which would be definitely important for certain states. However, they are not common for the majority of the states.

2.4 Establishment of the breakpoint

The theoretical framework, which was established in this chapter, was used to evaluate the behavior of both China and India below. Prior to this evaluation, it was necessary to create a model of their behavior in the last five years, since 2009 to the first quarter of 2013.

As the main topic is to examine the current conflictive development of relations between China and India, it is necessary to establish such a landmark point, breakpoint. In order to examine current situation, the most suitable breakpoint cannot be the one which occurred long time ago. Subsequently, it is possible to evaluate the behavior of the states after this point to the present time and shortly before that breakpoint.

It was necessary to undertake a pre-research to establish the breakpoint. Within this pre-research, all the preliminary resources were surveyed. During this procedure even more relevant resources were found. The pre-research began within the most obvious resources, websites of government offices, ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of defense of both states. Then the pre-research was concerned with the media. The worldwide news media directory Mondo Times³³ proved itself as a very useful

³³Mondo Times - The Worldwide News Media Guide

engine for searching the international media. See the list of all media, which have been lately used in the discursive analysis in the Appendix 3. Within the pre- research, all accessible materials were collected. Using the collected materials, as the breakpoint in the relationship of both countries was determined the end of year 2009 and the beginning of 2010.

In 2010, both countries organized and celebrated together the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. This feast itself was followed by a number of mutual visits of top representatives. During those visits, the representatives planed to increase further contact. For instance, the hot line connecting the Prime Ministers was established. In accord with those deals, the exchange of representatives and students was practically enhanced next years.³⁴ On the other hand, the year 2009 was denoted by the A. Sahgal from Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies in New Delhi as turbulent (Then he praises the politician for their extensive dialogue in 2010).³⁵ This was proved by the offensive statements from the 2009 and the fact that no one occurred later.³⁶ There is also another factor which was necessary to consider when choosing the time range for the discursive analysis. Simply the archives of relevant newspapers are accessible only to 2009.

2.5 Operationalization - Link between theoretical framework and analytical part

Firstly, it is necessary to mention that for evaluation of both actors' behavior, that only the relevant part of the Stephen Walt's theory will be used. As mentioned above, the thesis does not assume the bandwagoning behavior of the states. Both states are the most powerful actors in the area of Southeast Asia. According to the Balance of Threats, the bandwagoning behavior in this case would mean that one of the examined states would bandwagon with the second one. Given the fact that nature of the conflict is the territorial dispute, the possibility of the bandwagoning behavior is excluded.

The facts that both states are the most powerful actors in the area and the nature of the dispute also means that the states will not resort to balancing the other side

³⁴ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2012) p. 2

³⁵ Sahgal, A. (2010) p. 1

³⁶ Refer to footnotes 36 and 47.

by forming the alliances, but rather to the “bilateral” balancing using their own resources and capabilities.

Given the fact that it is not possible to expect the alliance formation behavior in this relationship, only three sources of threat from the Walt’s Balance of power theory were used in the research.

- **Geographical proximity** is the basic feature of this relationship. China and India are adjoining states; their common border is 3,380 km³⁷ long. The border disputes are the main factor in the relations of both states and from this factor all disputes have been emanating. The geographical proximity as the conflicting factor is not further evaluated in the thesis; it is perceived as a proved fact.
- **Aggressive intentions** is the feature which is evaluated in the third chapter of the thesis, where the statements of the officials and representatives are examined.

Relevant statements were divided into three parts according to their nature. Their nature was evaluated as offensive, if the given representative expresses the resolve to attack the adversary or even if he threatens the other by using force. Then the nature of the statement could be defensive. Using such statement, given representative responds on the rhetoric or threat posed by the other, expressing the will of state to defend itself and usually warning the other. In both types of statements it is possible to find aggressive intentions. In the case of an offensive statement, the aggressive intentions are on the side of the representative who expresses it. On the contrary in the case of a defensive statement, aggressive intentions could be found on the side against which the statement is directed or even on both sides.

The third possibility is that the representative expresses the will of his state to cooperate with the other. In this case the intentions of such state are directly opposite of aggressive.

- **Offensive power** is the feature which is evaluated in the material factors analysis chapter. It encompasses all the military capabilities, technique,

³⁷ CIA: The World Factbook (2013). East and South East Asia: China. Section: Geography.

infrastructure and military personnel of each of the actors, which could be used directly against the other side.

The fourth feature of Balance of power theory, ***aggregate power***, was not used in this research, because it would distort it. Aggregate power factor comprises the sum of the military technique which would show the level of absolute military strength of the given state.³⁸ Such factor is distortive for this research, because it is the relevant factor for balancing and bandwagoning behavior. According to absolute military strength of a state and its increasing and decreasing tendency, the other states are deciding if to balance or bandwagon.

The purpose of the research is to evaluate the level of relative strength of China and India, by comparing capabilities which could be used to attack one another. Hence, every capability was evaluated according to its usability against the other side and only such capabilities, representing offensive power, were included into the final conclusion.

2.6 Causal nexus between data established by research and hypothesis

Causality emanates from the outputs of the discursive analysis and the material factors analysis.

Output of the discursive analysis could show either increasing tensions in the diplomatic relations or a will to cooperate. Regarding the first option, there could be two other possibilities- massive expressing of the resolve to attack the adversary or squabbles among the representatives. In the output of this chapter, the statements are evaluated according to the option they belong to.

Output of material factors analysis is important as well. It can show the amount of military capabilities and technique they possess, which is deployable against the other side. As the edge option, one or both of the states could also have the troops assembled near the borders, missiles aimed on the other, ships and aircraft ready for action. But analysis could also show the low numbers of particular military units.

To reach the final hypothesis, it is necessary to compare the outputs of the discursive analysis and the material factors analysis. The sign of a high intensity conflict potential

³⁸ Walt, S. (1985) p. 9.

is the heavy offensive rhetoric underpinned by sufficient military technique and personnel, deployable against the other side. All of this would have to be possible to find together on at least one side. Of course, there has to be a defensive rhetoric on the other side, because without it the conflict would not escalate.³⁹

Viewed from the opposite perspective, cooperative nature of the relationship could be reached by the rhetoric, where both states are calling for mutual cooperation. The high level of military capabilities, even usable against each other, does not necessarily mean an obstacle in that case.

There is a really extensive range of mid-possibilities. From the one end, which is such a “positive uncertainty” characterized by mutual doubts about the intentions of the other, to the other end, small occasional skirmishes and extensive tensions. All of the mid- possibilities could be evaluated using the dynamics of rhetoric and dynamics of arming or disarmament in the given time range. The development of the situation shows clearly, if it leads rather to conflictive or cooperative relationship.

3 Confrontational and cooperative rhetoric

This part is concerned with the rhetoric of representatives of China and India. Statements relevant for the purpose of the thesis are those which were articulated by top representatives or officials in last five years. It does not matter, if those statements were expressions of an official opinion or a decision of a given office, or if such expression was stated by somebody of in-group unofficially. In the case of opinion clash between the statements, as the determinant one was used the one stated by the more important official or representative.

Before the examination of statements, it was necessary to establish a rule according to which the relevant sources of statements were identified. If the representative of one state would like to address by the statement the representatives of the other state, he needs to use the language understandable for both sides. As a result, all the important statements are expressed in the English language.

³⁹ The other possibility for the state against whom the offensive rhetoric is expressed, is to accept the conditions stated by the aggressor. Usually it means to subordinate under his administration, to pay the tribute or to concede a part of a territory to him.

Therefore the relevant statements are possible to be found in two sets of resources. Firstly, websites of authorities and institutions of the given state. The relevant resource for this topic could be issued by the government, Ministry of foreign affairs, Ministry of defense or any other office concerned with international relations and security. The basic logic is that if the two countries are trying to be an important actor on the global field, at least their essential offices need to provide the necessary information, declare the policies or express opinions for partners in a globally used language, which is currently English.

Second, websites of international or national, but necessarily English written newspapers and magazines. The list of relevant newspapers and offices which were used in this chapter is provided in Appendix 3. They were all examined and all the relevant statements were included into the research to ensure its completeness.

The research was divided into two parts, statements of Chinese representatives and statements of Indian representatives. The statements are divided according to their nature. For this purpose, three categories were defined in the subchapter Operationalization - Link between theoretical framework and analytical part:

- 1) ***Offensive statements*** – which are expressing aggressive intentions
- 2) ***Defensive Statements*** – which are responding to an aggressive behavior or rhetoric
- 3) ***Cooperative statements*** – which are calling for cooperation

The first output of this chapter is the timeline of the statements comparing the statements of both states, specially displaying in which time which category of statements was used most frequently. Timeline will show the dynamics of rhetoric of both states. Second output is the evaluation of the content of the statements.

3.1 Statements of Chinese representatives

1) *Offensive statements*

- 11. 6. 2009, Global Times⁴⁰

This article is very offensive to India, saying that “China won’t make any compromises in its border disputes with India. And while China wishes to coexist peacefully with India, this desire isn’t born out of fear.” In the next section of this article, there is also a reaction on Indian behavior.

2) *Defensive Statements*

- 11. 6. 2009, Global Times⁴¹

In this newspaper, which is according to K. Rafferty⁴² very close to Chinese representatives, appeared an article according to which India moves 60 000 troops the disputed border region near China. It accuses India of aggressive behavior and warns: “India needs to consider whether or not it can afford the consequences of a potential confrontation with China”.

The fact of movement of soldiers was confirmed in the article of Sanjoy Banerjee, teacher of International Relations at San Francisco State University.⁴³

- 11. 11. 2011, India Today⁴⁴

Unnamed Chinese representative, marked by the Indian newspapers as Beijing, reacted on the proposal of India to upgrade the infrastructure by stating that “New Delhi is starting to treat China as a competitor.” He refers to a proposal of Indian Ministry of Defense, which wants to deploy 90 000 soldiers and upgrade infrastructure into disputed regions for the period since 2012 to 2017.

⁴⁰ *India’s unwise military moves*. Global Times. 11 June 2009.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Rafferty, K. *War of words in Himalayas*. South China Morning post. 1 April 2012.

⁴³ Banerjee, S. (2009)

⁴⁴ Joseph, J. *Army likely to recruit one lakh soldiers for China border*. The Times of India. 2 November 2011.

3) *Cooperative statements*

- 15. 7. 2009, Global Times⁴⁵

Paper cited the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. According to him China was ready to work with India to promote bilateral relations. He thought that the India – China strategic and cooperative partnership would be beneficial for both countries and their citizens.

- 16. 9. 2011, Times of India⁴⁶

Spokesperson of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted, that *“China strictly abides by agreements and the spirit of consensus reached by two sides, and have never taken action that jeopardize peace and tranquility in the border area.”* He also noted, that the leaders of both countries reached a principled consensus on coordination mechanism concerning border affairs during BRICS meeting that year.

- 12. 10. 2012, web site of Chinese government⁴⁷

During the press briefing, spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked about the Sino-Indian boundary issue. He answered that nowadays situation is stable and peaceful. He admitted that the only Chinese interest is to maintain friendly and cooperative relationship with India. According to him, *„China wishes to settle the boundary issues through the negotiation wholeheartedly”*.

- 20. 6. 2012, web site of Chinese government⁴⁸

Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met his Indian counterpart during the UN Conference on Sustainable Development in Brazil. He emphasized that the cooperation and development of both countries *“brought huge changes to the world”*. And he admitted that the mutual partnership even on the strategic level helped to the stable and peaceful situation in the disputed border region. He sees the opportunity, but also a challenge, to further development of partnership in current global situation.

⁴⁵ *China vows to advance bilateral ties with India*. Global Times. 15 July 2009.

⁴⁶ *China says it never disturbed border peace with India*. India Today. 16 November 2011

⁴⁷ Lu, H. (2012)

⁴⁸ Xu, A. (2012)

- 19. 3. 2013, The Wall Street Journal⁴⁹

Shortly after a take-over of the office, new Chinese president Xi Jinping proposed a possible solution of the decades lasting border dispute between China and India in his Five- point formula. Transcription of the Five-point formula: „ *First, to maintain the strategic communication and keep the bilateral relations on the right track. Second, to harness each other’s comparative strengths and expand win-win cooperation in infrastructure, mutual investment and other areas. Third, to strengthen cultural ties and constantly increase the mutually expanding friendship between the two countries. Fourth, to expand coordination and collaboration in multi-lateral fora to jointly safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of developing countries and tackle global challenges. Fifth, to accommodate each other’s core concerns and properly handle problems and differences existing between the two countries.* ”

- 29. 3. 2013, China Daily⁵⁰

On the summit of BRICS countries in Durban, South Africa, new Chinese president Xi Jinping met for the first time with the Indian representative, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. According to Xi, bilateral relationship is the top priority and he called for strategic cooperative partnership. He admitted the existence of border dispute, but promised the safeguarding of peace by China. He also called for the mutual cooperation of the armies, cooperation on infrastructure and enhancing the security trust.

2.2 Statements of Indian representatives

1) *Offensive statements*

- 11. 6. 2009, Global Times⁵¹

In the days around this date, India moved to the region of Arunachal Pradesh about 60 000 troops. This Chinese newspapers cited the governor of given region, according to whom this move

⁴⁹ *China unveils 5-point formula to improve ties with India.* The Wall Street Journal. 19 March 2013.

⁵⁰ Zhao, S. *Bilateral relations a top priority.* China Daily. 29 March 2013.

⁵¹ *India’s unwise military moves.* Global Times. 11 June 2009.

was intended to “meet future security challenges” from China. Chinese newspapers Global Times evaluated this Indian move as unwise.

2) Defensive Statements

- 3. 9. 2009, NY Times⁵²

Mr. Chellayney, advisor of Indian National Security Council and professor of strategic studies at the Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, said the Indian army recorded 270 border violations and about 2300 instances of aggressive border patrolling of Chinese soldiers in 2008. According to him, Sino- Indian border is hotter than Indo- Pakistani border. He also expects the Chinese attempt to annex Tawang area, important Tibetan monastery deeply in Arunachal Pradesh area.

- 29. 9. 2011, Times of India⁵³

Newspaper provides a secret report of Ministry of Foreign Affairs which says that there were sharp rise of Chinese military units incursions into Indian territory. Article shows also a list of most significant incursions.

- 2. 11. 2011, The Times of India⁵⁴

As an answer on the continuing and growing military presence in border regions, Ministry of Defense of India issued a proposal to deploy about 90 000 troops and to upgrade the infrastructure, like roads, air- fields and heliports, around disputed areas.

3) Cooperative statements

- 14. 5. 2010, India Today⁵⁵

Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh confirmed that representatives of both China and India are “working very hard to find practical and pragmatic solution to the boundary question and its resolution. But he admitted, that it would take time.

⁵² Wong, E. *China and India Dispute Enclave on Edge of Tibet*. The New York Times. 3 September 2009.

⁵³ *Secret note to MEA says Chinese troops made 50 incursions into Indian territory in three months*. India Today. 29 September 2011.

⁵⁴ Joseph, J. *Army likely to recruit one lakh soldiers for China border*. The Times of India. 2 November 2011.

⁵⁵ *India, China working hard to resolve boundary issue*. India Today. 14 April 2010.

- 6. 6. 2010, India Today⁵⁶

National Security Advisor of India, who was the PM's envoy for the border issue, summed up the talks with the Chinese part, saying that both parties are working "to resolve differences over demarcation of borders and conduct joint military exercises so as to boost bilateral ties".

- 8. 4. 2011, Government of Maharashtra Region press release⁵⁷

During the inauguration of exhibition Treasures of Ancient China in Mumbai, governor of Maharashtra K Sankaranarayanan evaluated the Sino – Indian relations as trade and economic cooperation. He mentioned that the China is Indian biggest trade partner and that on the base of enhanced mutual political and economic engagement, the long-lasting friendship should be established.

- 23. 11. 2011, Times of India⁵⁸

According to the statement chief of Indo-Tibet Border Police⁵⁹, the Sino-Indian border is very peaceful place and there can't be any possible threat to the security of the area. He categorically rejected the information, that there is any activity from Chinese side such as incursions or bunker building by Chinese troops on Indian territory.

- 9. 1. 2012, web site of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of India⁶⁰

During the meeting on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi, National Security advisor had a speech, where he outlined the enhancing and unprecedented cooperation of both countries on either economic or security issues. He admitted that the border dispute between both countries still remains unresolved, but the mechanisms has been

⁵⁶ India – China plan to resume border talks. India Today. 6 July 2010.

⁵⁷ Kashikar, U. (2011) p. 1.

⁵⁸ Sinha, R. *All quiet on China front, no new threat: ITBP chief*. The Times of India. 23 October 2011.

⁵⁹ Police force which was established to guard the 3488 km long Sino-Indian border, from Karakoram in Ladakh region to Jachep La in Arunachal Pradesh. The unit consists mainly of skiers and mountaineers. For further information see official website of Indo-Tibetan Border Police:

<http://itbpolice.nic.in/itbpwebsite/index.html>

⁶⁰ Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2012) *Speech by NSA on "Developments in India-China Relations"*

set in order to keep the situation stable⁶¹. In conclusion of his speech, he emphasized that the level of cooperation of the countries is on the very high level and that it needs to improve further to deepen the strategic cooperative relationship.

- 10. 8. 2012, South China Morning Post⁶²

In previous days, the border talks had run between those two countries. During these talks, the statement of former Indian foreign secretary Salman Haider comes. He said: *“it seems both sides were confident of achieving concrete results and settling the issue in the near future”*.

- 15. 8. 2012, South China Morning Post⁶³

According to Prime Minister Singh, *“ties with Beijing are an important part of India’s overall strategic development, and it was willing to communicate with China on border issues”*.

- 5. 10. 2012, web site of Chinese government⁶⁴

During the meeting with Chinese representatives in New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister spoke about the great importance of further improvement of bilateral relations as well as the tightening the connections between the armed forces of both countries. Such improvement and enhancement of bilateral relations is important contribution to peace and prosperity in Asia and all around the world.

- 12. 12. 2012 South China Morning Post⁶⁵

Indian minister of foreign affairs expressed his opinion that *“even though China is strong and aggressive, India needs to develop its partnership with China into a meaningful partnership”*.

- 29. 3. 2013, China Daily⁶⁶

⁶¹ The mechanisms which were mentioned by National Security Advisor during his speech on Chinese embassy are set up by the bilateral treaty called Agreement between The Government of the Republic of India and The Government of the People's Republic of China on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs. For further information and for the full text of the Agreement see <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/17963/IndiaChina+Agreement+on+the+Establishment+of+a+Working+Mechanism+for+Consultation+and+Coordination+on+IndiaChina+Border+Affairs>

⁶² Abdi, S. N. M. *'Deadline' set for resolving border row with India*. South China Morning Post. 10 August 2012.

⁶³ Ng, T. *Trust crucial for bilateral ties, Wen says*. South China Morning Post. 10 August 2012

⁶⁴ Lu, A. (2012)


⁶⁵ *Salman Khurshid says India must accept China's growing influence*. South China Morning Post. 12 December 2012.

As an answer to promise of new Chinese president to safeguard peace situation in the border dispute, Indian Prime Minister also committed to safeguard peace but he also mentioned that India will be seeking the solution of the dispute. He agreed with Xi on the necessity of mutual cooperation and enhancing the security and stability. And he also remarked that the both countries have to convince the world that they are partners, not the rivals.

2.3 Conclusion of the discursive analysis

The graph illustrates the number of statements of each category per year.

Fig. 2.1: Succession of statements



To conclude this chapter, it is possible to elicit that since 2009 there has not been expressed any offensive statement from any side. It indicates a decrease of aggressive intentions of both states. It looks as if they acknowledged that the almost hundred years lasting hostility does not lead to any feasible solution of the problematic situation. The breakpoint which meant the end of aggressive statements was certainly the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations, which they celebrated in 2010. The both actors have been following the agreements on cooperation and termination of hostility, which they

⁶⁶ Zhao, S. *Bilateral relations a top priority*. China Daily. 29 March 2013.

signed on the occasion of the anniversary. After this date there have not been detected any sign of aggressive intentions in the statements.

In 2011, there was one defensive statement on the Chinese side and two defensive statements on the Indian side. Looking on those statements, the representatives were expressing the worries from the rising military presence of the second side in the border region.

Except for those three statements, pointing on some kind of military activity around disputed border and the clearly offensive ones from 2009, there have been found only statements by which the representatives were calling for cooperation and ensuring each other about their friendly intentions.

In the cooperative statements, it is possible to see the exhaustion of the representatives from the long-lasting hostilities and lack of confidence. In the proposals, they have been accenting the necessity of mutual cooperation in order to enhance the bilateral business relations, which are on the highest level in history.⁶⁷ The representatives of both states perceive that the hostile factor in mutual relations would freeze the business relations and the profit emanating from it would disappear.

The greatest challenge in the relationship of China and India is definitely to establish the state of mutual trust. Mistrust can be seen especially on the Indian side, for instance in the only India offensive statement and the last defensive statement. Future security challenge can be interpreted either as the aggressive intention or the defensive concern. However, the reason to deploy such numbers of troops is the lack of trust anyways.

Especially the new Chinese president Xi Jinping has been engaging in this issue actively in the first months in the office. If he will be able to maintain the relations with India according to his proposal called Five- point formula and perceive the Indian representatives about his right intentions, the states would be on the good way to establish the state of mutual trust and cooperation. Such state is necessary for the further improvement of their relationship and for the future solution of the whole dispute as well. Current situation is still too fragile to reach the final solution. If the state of mutual trust will not be established, the dispute will never be solved.

⁶⁷ Bilateral trade between those countries reached in 2011 the worth of 73.9 billion USD. Now it is moving slightly lower, but still approximately about 70 billion USD. For further reference see Krishnan, A. (2013). *India's trade with China falls 12 %*. The Hindu.

On the other hand, it is obvious from the statements responding on the higher military activity, that both states want to have an overview of the situation along the frontier and do not want to be surprised. This proves the lack of essential mutual trust.

4 Material factors analysis

This chapter comprises a detailed analysis of material factors of both actors. Material factors mean all the military equipment held by both countries, but also the infrastructure which is normally used by civilian inhabitants but which could be used for military purposes. The materials will be searched for in public resources, on web sites of national offices as well as on the websites of international organizations assessing the figures of armed forces and capabilities, and dealing with arming and disarmament.

The data from national websites will need to be double checked using the data from international institutions, because the states are likely to obscure about their real strength, for the reason to look like they are not arming in the time of peace. On the other hand, in the time of disputes they need to look stronger to deter the potential adversary.

Relevance of every single capability will be evaluated right under its description. The evaluation will regard the determination to usage against the second actor, usability against the second actor, if usable immediately or in longer time, then the ability to cause significant damage.

4.1 Chinese material factors

4.1.1 Nuclear forces

According to Bulletin of Atomic Scientists⁶⁸, Chinese armed forces had in 2011 available about 178 nuclear warheads.

⁶⁸ Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2011) p. 85.

Fig. 4.1 List of Chinese nuclear equipment

Type	NATO designation	Number	Year deployed	Range (kilometers)	Warhead × yield (kilotons)	Number of warheads
Land-based ballistic missiles						
DF-3A	CSS-2	~16	1971	3,100	1 × 3,300	~16
DF-4	CSS-3	~12	1980	5,400+	1 × 3,300	~12
DF-5A	CSS-4	~20	1981	13,000+	1 × 4,000–5,000	~20
DF-21 ^a	CSS-5 Mods 1, 2	~60	1991	2,150	1 × 200–300	~60
DF-31	CSS-10 Mod 1	10–20	2006 ^b	7,200+	1 × 200–300?	10–20
DF-31A	CSS-10 Mod 2	10–20	2007	11,200+	1 × 200–300?	10–20
<i>Subtotal:</i>		~138				~138
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles^c						
JL-1	CSS-NX-3	(12)	1986	1,000+	1 × 200–300	n.a.
JL-2	CSS-NX-4	(36)	?	~7,400	1 × 200–300?	n.a.
Aircraft^d						
H-6	B-6	~20	1965	3,100	1 × bomb	~20
DH-10 ^e		?			?	
Others?	?	?	1972–?	–	1 × bomb	~20
Total						~178^f

Source: Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2011) p. 85.

Thereof 138 warheads are land-based ballistic missiles, with range from 3100 to 13000+ kilometers. Then they possess 20 aircraft – launched warheads which range of 3100 km. There is an assumption that China has also slightly less than 50 submarine – launched ballistic missiles. But according to the footnote of the article, it is just under development and the last tests failed.

According to information of Arms Control Association, in 2012 China had about 240 deployable warheads.⁶⁹ The data differs from the data from 2011, because the number of Chinese warheads is only estimated. There is no evidence about the exact number, all available data are according to the authors only estimation.

4.1.2 Aircraft

According to data of Global Security websites⁷⁰, People's Liberation Army Air Force is operating large variety of aircraft available now. Most of them are manufactured in China, but they have been coproducing them with Russian companies. In contract with India, China has 80 pieces of strategic bombers Hong -6 (copy of Soviet Tupolev 16) with an operational range 8 060 km. Some of them were designed to carry the nuclear weapon, but they are no longer operational since mid 1990's.⁷¹ Chinese

⁶⁹Collina, T. (2013)

⁷⁰Global Security.org. (2011) *People's Liberation Army Air Force PLAAF Equipment*. Global Security.org

⁷¹ Sinodefence.(2008) *Hong-6 Bomber*.

engineers are developing the new Hong- 8 and Hong-9 bombers for the future replacement of Hong – 6. Then China has 300 pieces of bombers for close air support, like Sukhoi-30, JianHong-7 and Jian 11. The plan is to enhance their numbers to reach at least 325 until 2020 including the replacement the old Qiang – 5. Speaking about the jet fighters, China possesses 1 100 of different types of those aircraft. The plan is to maintain this amount including replacement of old types. To mention the most important jet fighters mostly represented within People's Liberation Army Air Force, the Jian – 11 (copy of Sukhoi-27) has an operational range about 3 500 km⁷² or Jian 7(copy of MiG-21) with 1000 km of operational range.⁷³ Chinese air force also has the capability of aerial refueling. For this purposes, 10 pieces of the Hong-6 bombers are adjusted. Using this capability, the operational range of JianHong-7 and Jian 11 could be extended for 500 km. But the system is compatible only with the planes of Chinese origin, not with the Soviet ones like SU- 30.⁷⁴ There is an interesting fact that the aircraft type only gets a Chinese designation after it is produced in China. So that all of the aircraft which are operated by People's Liberation Army Air Force, are being manufactured in China under the license of Russian military enterprises.⁷⁵ Speaking about the air bases, China has about 150 of them. When focusing on disputed areas, there is well- developed network of the air bases around them. Air bases are highlighted on the map, which is attached as Appendix 4.

4.1.3 Helicopters

Helicopter is not a typical decisive weapon with a strategic potential. But it is very useful for transport of troops and fighting in mountainous terrain, which is typical for the Sino – Indian frontier regions, so that it is worth to examine even this capability. According to Asian Military Review magazine, China possesses about 900 operational helicopters, from which about 100 are attack helicopters, mainly Z-9, Z-11, WZ - 10.⁷⁶

4.1.4 UAV's

Chinese air forces also possess the UAV's. According to the report of Project 2049 institute, which has been undertaking researches about security in Asia, China operates about 280 UAV's, but none of them has a precision strike capability. The number

⁷² Sinodefence. (2008) *Jian-11 Multirole Fighter Aircraft*.

⁷³ Sinodefence. (2008) *Jian-7 Interceptor Fighter*.

⁷⁴ Sinodefence. (2008) *Hong-6U Tanker*.

⁷⁵ Global Security.org. (2011) *Chinese Helicopters – Zhishengji*.

⁷⁶ Asian Military Review. (2012) *The AMR Regional Air Force Directory 2012*.

is expected to rise every year. They are being used to monitor area of both sea and land disputed boundaries.⁷⁷ But there are no details about the Chinese drones.

4.1.5 Naval forces

China possesses very huge surface fleet. The fleet consists of 26 destroyers, 47 frigates and 84 guided missile boats.⁷⁸ China now also has fully operational aircraft carrier, which was bought from Ukraine in 1998 for 20 million USD. It has been operational since July 2012; it can carry about 50 planes. For this purposes, the Jian-10 and Jian-15 will be used.⁷⁹

China also possesses a significant fleet of submarines. They have about 50 of conventional diesel submarines and 7 submarines with nuclear propulsion. China also declares that it has 4 submarines which can launch ballistic missiles,⁸⁰ but according to data of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and strategypage.com, neither of those four has been fully operational. Warheads are expected to be available, but the submarines failed the tests because of their unreliability. The warhead carriers are not fully developed as well.⁸¹ This statement was confirmed by the up to date article from Pacific Focus, Inha Journal of International studies, which was published on 11th April 2013. There is written that “*there have been no reported SSBN deterrence patrols, or SLBM test firings*”.⁸² There are plans to acquire more of the ships and submarines.

4.1.6 Ground forces

People’s liberation army’s ground force are equipped by approximately 7 000 tanks and 800 light tanks, 6 000 pieces of armored fighting vehicles and about 20 000 pieces of different kinds of artillery. Interesting is, that according to plans, they are about to acquire more equipment of all categories.

4.1.7 Troops

People’s liberation army has totally about 2 300 000 troops in active duty. Thereof 1 600 000 serves in ground forces, 255 000 in navy, 400 000 in air forces and 10 000 is operating strategic missiles. Then there is slightly less than 1 000 000 people

⁷⁷Easton, I. M., Hsiao, L. C. R. (2013)*The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities*. p. 13.

⁷⁸Global Security.org. (2012) *Chinese Warships*.

⁷⁹Strategic Defence Intelligence. (2012) *Liaoning (Varyag) Aircraft Carrier, China*.

⁸⁰Global Security.org. (2012) *Chinese Warships*.

⁸¹Strategy Page. (2013) *SLBM Success Elusive*.

For this reference see also Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2011). p. 85

⁸²Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S., McKinzie, M. (2006)

in reserves and 8-10 million in militias.⁸³ In 2000, number of soldiers in People's liberation army was 2 810 000.⁸⁴ According to the article from Military Overview Journal, China had in 1990 more than 4 000 000 troops, then in 1995 about 3 000 000, in until 2005, it was reduced by 800 000 people to the contemporary number. The reduction was undertaken because of the modernization and structural changes in order to establish cheaper and more flexible force.⁸⁵

4.1.8 Infrastructure

Looking to the Appendix 5 it is possible to see the typical examples of infrastructure in border regions, found using satellite map of google.com.

4.1.9 String of Pearls

String of Pearls is the system of mostly naval facilities, which has China been establishing around areas of its interest. According to the original theory of Christopher J. Pehrson, by establishment those facilities, China is going to underpin its rising influence in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea.⁸⁶ Map of the facilities from 2012 is attached as Appendix 2; example of such facility is attached as Appendix 8. The project itself is highly inventive. China has been establishing those facilities around the most important and the busiest Sea Lane of Communication in the world. It leads from the Persian Gulf, still so far irreplaceable source of the crude oil and natural gas⁸⁷, to east coast of China, the industrial centre of the country, and nearby two most important and busiest choke points of maritime transport, Malacca Strait and Hormuz Strait⁸⁸. The picture of Sea Lanes of Communications is attached as Appendix 7. The naval facilities are intended to be docks for the ships on the way from or to China, where they can be fixed, refueled and hidden in the case when pirates are present in the area. It is also the base for warships guarding the pirate occupied areas. As apparent from the map, they are established in the network which can cover the whole area of the Sea Lane of Communication. There is also one planned facility

⁸³ Sinodefence. (2012)*Chinese Military Overview*.

⁸⁴ Nationmaster. (2012)Armed forces personnel.

⁸⁵ Blasko, J. (2005) p. 68, 70.

⁸⁶ Pehrson, C. J. (2006) p. 3 -4.

⁸⁷ The irreplaceableness of Persian Gulf as a biggest source of oil and gas for China does not have to last for eternity, because China is trying to achieve the huge resources of those raw materials in South China Sea (for further reference, see U. S. Energy Information Administration. (2013) *South China Sea*) and East China Sea (for further reference, see U. S. Energy Information Administration. (2012) *East China Sea*, p. 2-3). But this is a matter of dispute around exclusive economic zones in both areas.

⁸⁸ About 80% of world maritime oil transit is being transported through them. Pehrson, C. J. (2006) p. 2.

in Thailand, Kra canal, which would allow Chinese ships to bypass the busy Malacca Strait.

But there is also the other side of this issue. All of the naval facilities are high water docks, where also the most powerful warships can anchor. Strategic location of those facilities would allow China project its power and maintain its interests aggressively. In the edge situation, the facilities could be used as military naval bases to encircle and surround India very well and block all naval access routes.

4.2 Indian material factors

4.2.1 Nuclear forces

Nuclear arsenal of India is almost a half smaller. According to Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, India has in 2012 around 100 warheads, but not all of them deployable.⁸⁹ Unfortunately, Fig 4.2 provided by this magazine does not show the numbers of different kinds of warheads, but it shows another interesting fact. India has been trying to develop several new kinds of warhead carriers. The data was double-checked by the SIPRI database, which says that India does not have any warheads deployed.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2012) p. 96 – 97.

⁹⁰ Kile, S. N. (2012) p. 320.

Fig 4.2 List of Indian nuclear equipment

Type/Designation	Range (kilometers)	Payload (kilograms)	Comment
Aircraft			
Mirage 2000H/Vajra	1,800	6,300	Squadron 1 or 7 at Gwalior Air Force Station.
Jaguar IS/IB/Shamsher	1,600	4,775	At Ambala Air Force Station.
Land-based missiles			
Prithvi I	150	1,000	Nuclear version entered service after 1998 with the 333rd and 355th Missile Groups—will be converted from liquid to solid fuel.
Agni I	700+	1,000	Deployed with the 334th Missile Group in 2004.
Agni II	2,000	1,000	Under development: Successful test-launch on September 30, 2011; deployed with the 335th Missile Group in 2004.
Agni II+	2,000+	1,000	Under development: Failed test-launch on December 10, 2010.
Agni III	3,000+	1,500	Under development: Fourth test-launch on February 7, 2010.
Agni IV	3,500	1,500	Under development: First test-launch November 15, 2011.
Agni V	5,000+	1,500	Under development: First test-launch April 19, 2012.
Sea-based missiles			
Dhanush	350	500	Under development: Extended-range naval version of Prithvi II, seventh test-launch on March 11, 2011.
Sagarika/K-15	300–700	300–700	Under development: Test-launch on February 26, 2008, from a submerged platform; possible future deployment on the <i>Arihant</i> .

Source: Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2012) p. 100.

4.2.2 Aircraft

According to server of Global Security.org⁹¹, India is now using a variety of jet fighters of mostly Russian provenience. As the heavy combat fighters, they use about 100 of SU-30. The plan for 2020 is to have 280 of them. The range is about 1 500 km. Currently they use 4 types of medium combat aircraft, French Mirage 2000, British Jaguar S and Russian MIGs 27 and 29, in total they possess 250 aircraft with a view to the 2020 to replace the old MIGs with new Eurofighter Typhoon and to rise the total amount to almost 300 aircraft. The operational range of this type of aircraft is about 1 100 km. They also use the light combat aircraft, MIG 29 and LCA Tejas of home provenience in total number more than 200, the final state in 2020 is to have 150 pieces of those aircraft. Firepower of Indian Air Force is going to be increased by acquisition of 126 pieces of new French multirole jets Rafale, which are possible to be used even

⁹¹ Global Security.org. (2012) *Air Force Equipment*.

on aircraft carrier due to its small weight.⁹² The operational range of the Mig-29 could be extended using an external tank from 4 000 km to 6 200 km⁹³. Speaking about bombers, they are not using classical strategic bombers like B-52 or B-2, but for this purposes they are equipping the heavy and medium combat aircraft if they need this capability. Therefore as the nuclear delivery vehicles they could use Mirage 2000, Jaguar and MiG-27 jet fighters. The longest possible combat radius has Mirage 2000 with just 1 850 km.⁹⁴ So it is not a classic strategic capability. In the Indian Air Force equipment, there are also 6 pieces of flying tanker IL-78. This capability can extend the operational range of every plane for approximately 500 km. India has also developed the wide net of military airports along the problematic regions. The map of area with marked airports with a list of deployed aircraft is attached as Appendix 4.

4.2.3 Helicopters

As explained above in the part describing Chinese military capabilities, helicopter capability is crucial for fighting and quick transport in border regions with mountainous terrain. India currently possesses 20 pieces of Russian Mi – 35 attack helicopters, but plans to wean this old type and replace it by 87 pieces of new ones. India then has about 300 transport helicopters of different types and capacity. And also plans to at least double the number of them.⁹⁵

4.2.4 UAVs

For purpose of patrolling the border regions, India has been successfully using the UAV capability since 2005. They have two available types, The Searcher Mark I Nishant with operational range of 400 km and The Searcher Mark II with operational range of about 1 000 km. Both types were developed and manufactured by the Indian state institution, Defense Research and Development Organization.⁹⁶ The information about the number of totally deployed UAVs is classified. In the future, India would like to deployUCAV (Unmanned Combat Unmanned Vehicle) as well.⁹⁷

⁹² Kumar, M., Pineau, E. Reuters (2013)

⁹³ Global Security.org. (2011) *MiG-29 FULCRUM (MIKOYAN-GUREVICH)*

⁹⁴ Global Security.org. (2011) *MIRAGE 2000 (DASSAULT-BREGUET)*

⁹⁵ Milavia Press. (2012) *Order of Battle - India*

⁹⁶ Defence Research and Development Organization, Ministry of Defence, Government of India.

⁹⁷ Chakravorty, P. K. (2012)

4.2.5 Naval forces

Indian surface fleet comprises 8 destroyers, 14 frigates and 24 corvettes. They also operate one aircraft carrier, bought in 1985 from Royal Navy of Great Britain.⁹⁸ This ship can carry maximally 30 aircraft. It had to be replaced around the year 2010 due to its extreme age, but it was repaired and the service life was extended. The plan is to replace the old one and finish the two new carriers until 2015, which is in development now.⁹⁹

Speaking of the submarine fleet, Indian navy operates 16 conventional diesel submarines and single nuclear propulsion submarine.¹⁰⁰ Because India is trying to go for the nuclear triad, there is also a nuclear propulsion submarine with capability to launch ballistic missile under development since 1984.¹⁰¹ According to the article from Indian newspaper, on 27th January India succeeded to launch the ballistic missile K-15¹⁰² from 50 meters deep underwater platform. If they succeed to launch it from the nuclear propulsion submarine, which is being developed for this kind of missile, the nuclear triad of India will be completed. They are also developing the ballistic missile for submarines, with a range of just 1 500 km.¹⁰³

4.2.6 Ground forces

According to Global security website, Indian ground forces equipment consist of about 3 700 tanks, 1 700 armored fighting vehicles and 4000 pieces of different types of artillery. The plans until 2020 show that India is not going to raise the numbers of the equipment, but just to maintain those amounts and replace the old types.¹⁰⁴

4.2.7 Troops

Whole Indian army consisted of about 1 325 000 soldiers in 2011. There were also about 1 747 000 people in reserves.¹⁰⁵ In 2000, the number of soldiers in the Indian army was 1 303 000.¹⁰⁶

⁹⁸ Global Security.org. (2011) *Indian Navy*

⁹⁹ Global Security.org. (2011) *R 22 Viraat Class*

¹⁰⁰ Global Security.org. (2011) *Indian Navy*

¹⁰¹ Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2012) p. 99.

¹⁰² For details about the ballistic missiles, refer to Table 2 above.

¹⁰³ Banerjee, A. *India moves closer to nuclear triad*. The Tribune. 27 January 2013.

¹⁰⁴ Global Security.org. (2011) *Indian Army Equipment*.

¹⁰⁵ Global Firepower. (2012) *India Military Strength*

¹⁰⁶ Nationmaster. (2012) *Armed forces personnel*.

4.2.8 Infrastructure

Looking to the Appendix 6 it is possible to elicit the typical examples of infrastructure in border regions, found using a satellite map of google.com.

4.3 Qualitative comparison of military capabilities of both countries

4.3.1 Nuclear forces

Given the fact that India has significant amount of nuclear warheads, it is strong deterrent factor. They are also going to achieve the classical nuclear triad.¹⁰⁷ But when the arsenal is examined in a detailed way, it is possible to see that the range of their missile carriers is limited. Looking to the footnote 106, it is possible to see, that India is not able to hit the Chinese capital city Beijing or even the most important industrial cities on the east coast. That gives China a significant strategic advantage, because it will anyway locate its nuclear silos, strategic bombers airports and naval bases out of the range of Indian carriers. Locations of the nuclear silos are secret, but the main base of Chinese strategic bombers Hong - 6, Datong air base, is about 1 600 kilometers far from the nearest airport on Indian territory, Jorhat.¹⁰⁸ Such location is currently unreachable for Indian nuclear warheads carriers. If it is possible to guess, Chinese ballistic missile silos will be located even further from the Sino- Indian border.

If the data is correct, China still has not reached the classic nuclear triad either¹⁰⁹. This fact provides a significant deterrence which will give China major superiority in the bilateral relations. Even though the area of both states is really enormous and distances between different places are long, the diversified range of the ballistic missiles gives China the possibility to hit any place of Indian territory.¹¹⁰ The facts that

¹⁰⁷ According to Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, India has been developing the Submarine Launched Missile capability since 1984. Given this fact, it is possible to presuppose that they can reach this capability in a few years.

¹⁰⁸ MapCrow, Travel Distance Calculator

¹⁰⁹ Nuclear triad is a capability and doctrine, which can according to classic notion of deterrence strategy provide the maximal possible deterrence to its possessor. There are three inseparable legs of this capability, strategic bombers – most flexible weapon allowing to hit the precise and even moving targets, intercontinental ballistic missiles - possible to be fired on long distance without a necessity to endanger pilots and with a low possibility to be shot down, and submarine-launched ballistic missile- submarine with nuclear propulsion has the highest chance from all of the military capabilities to survive even overwhelming first strike of adversary. For further reference to nuclear triad, see Lowther, A. B. (2010)

¹¹⁰ To have a clue about distances between Chinese and Indian territory, there are the distances provided between the most important Chinese and Indian cities. To achieve a usable date, the cities from different parts of both countries were compared: Beijing- New Delhi: 4416 km, Beijing – Bangalore: 5407 km,

the ballistic missile type DF 31 A (which has the range of 11 200 km) was deployed in 2007 and that China has been developing the nuclear weapons for more than 40 years gives us a probability that the new types of weapons will be highly precise and reliable. But there is no evidence or even estimation if China has been deploying the warheads for immediate use in the last years.

4.3.2 Aircraft

Indian Air Force has diversified fighter aircraft capability, supported by aerial refueling system. But when lacking the long range strategic bombers capability, the air force could be used rather for a territory protection or maximally border skirmishes and support of the ground units. As obvious from the map of airports attached as Appendix 4, these bases are densely established along the border regions. The system was designed definitely in order to provide a wide impermeable air protection of Indian territory.

China has a highly extensive air arsenal with very diversified ways of usage, from close ground support to jet fighting and strategic bombardment. Similarly to India, the Chinese network of air bases covers the most important disputed areas. It is necessary to say that the main base of strategic bombers, Datong¹¹¹, is in a very good location. It is in a reachable distance from New Delhi and other important areas in the north of India¹¹², but it is also out of range of the majority of the Indian aircraft¹¹³ and out of range of all available Indian nuclear warheads carriers¹¹⁴. Given the fact that it is more than 1 600 km far from the nearest Indian airport Jorhat¹¹⁵, the attack would be a suicidal mission for them, because they would not have enough fuel to return. The only Indian plane capable to undertake such attack and return back is MiG – 29.

4.3.3 Helicopters

From this brief analysis it is obvious that India wants to massively improve the helicopter capability. It is probably related to the proposal of Ministry of Defense to reinforce the border regions around disputed Lines of Actual Control

Harbin – Bangalore: 5852 km, Urumqi – Bangalore: 3554 km, Beijing – Calcutta: 3849 km, Beijing – Bihar: 3911.74 km. Source of data: MapCrow – Travel Distance Calculator.

¹¹¹ Global Security.org. (2011) *Chinese Airbases*.

¹¹² MapCrow – Travel Distance Calculator.

¹¹³ For further information about operational range of Indian aircraft, refer to chapter about Indian material factors - aircraft below. For the distances between different places in China and India, refer to note 96.

¹¹⁴ For the operational range of Indian nuclear warheads carriers, refer to Table 2.

¹¹⁵ MapCrow – Travel Distance Calculator.

by the deployment of 90 000 soldiers until 2017.¹¹⁶ Such amount of soldiers is useless with the poor infrastructure conditions (refer to the chapter Infrastructure in border regions above). But using the helicopters, India would establish a quickly deployable unit capable to patrol and if necessary to defend the border areas.

A much higher number of the helicopters give Chinese forces a great advantage in fighting in the mountainous terrain. The excessive numbers of soldiers can be moved in short time around the inaccessible terrain.

4.3.4 UAVs

Deploying the UAVs is a modern trend in armament. It is definitely very good way how to effectively monitor the border regions and report the incursions of adversary soldiers.

Lacking the precision strike capability, both states have the UAV's just for monitoring missions. But if China obtained similar number of the drones with a strike capability such as they have the monitoring ones, it is possible to presuppose, that India would not be able to get even with China. So that China will have a great advantage for the potential border fighting, because in the mountainous terrain of disputed regions this capability will be more than effective.

4.3.4 Naval forces

The extensive maritime fleet allows China to operate and patrol around the whole coastline and simultaneously to have some of the capacities deployed elsewhere, for example to secure the Sea Lines of Communication and seek pirates and also to have some of them available within their farther naval bases called String of Pearls¹¹⁷. Comparing with Indian surface fleet, China has definitely a great advantage in this capability, having numerical superiority over India. Both states already have the aircraft carrier, but the Chinese one is newer and able to carry twice more aircraft.

The same numerical superiority is valid even for submarine fleets of both states. Especially the fact that China possesses 7 submarines with nuclear propulsion against only a single Indian submarine of that type gives China significant advantage of long underwater endurance.

¹¹⁶ Joseph, J. *Army likely to recruit one lakh soldiers for China border*. The Times of India. 2 November 2011.

¹¹⁷ For further reference, see chapter Infrastructure below.

4.3.5 Ground forces

China has also superiority in the ground forces equipment. Comparing the amount of tanks, China has only twice more, but in artillery, numerical superiority is significant, because there are 5 times more pieces of artillery equipment of all types.

4.3.6 Troops

Given the fact that China is a larger state than India, it is naturally employing more soldiers. Comparing the proportion of soldiers in population, China has been almost twice more militarized country than India.¹¹⁸ And looking to the past, China was three times more militarized in 1990.

4.3.7 Infrastructure

For the comparison of the infrastructure, the web site googlemaps.com was used. On the detailed view of the satellite map, the area of approximately 10 km to the both sides of the Sino- Indian border was examined and the typical examples of infrastructure were picked for mutual comparison.

It is possible to see that China invested into buildup of the infrastructure to allow a quick movement of the soldiers. Looking to the same map from the wider perspective, it is possible to see that the network of the asphalted roads along the borders is really well-developed and much denser than on the Indian side. Also there are plenty of solid military bases. Very interesting thing is, that 16 km far from the border, Nyingchi airport was established in 2005.¹¹⁹ Even though it is primarily intended for civilian purposes, it would be no problem to use it militarily to allow the soldiers to reach the border very quickly.

On the contrary, on the Indian side of the border, there is possible to see very sparse network of mud paths. Military bases are small and do not look as solid and well-build as on the Chinese side. Only “airport” which is somehow nearby the border region

¹¹⁸ According to CIA World Factbook, estimated population in India for July 2013 is 1,22 billion people, in China it is 1,35 billion people. Using the number of the soldiers from Material factors analysis, which are from 2011, but it would not differ from the contemporary state so much, China has 1, 7 soldiers per 1 000 capita and India has 1, 08 per 1 000 capita. In the case of interest, China and India are first and third countries in the world ranking in the absolute number of soldiers. But in relative number of soldiers per 1000 capita, there are much more militarized countries all over the world.

¹¹⁹ Tibet Tour. (2012) *Nyingchi Airport - Flights Schedule*.


in Arunachal Pradesh, is Machuka advanced landing ground. So it is not even a proper airport and it is located about 50 km far from the border.¹²⁰

4.4 Quantitative comparison of military capabilities of both countries, including also the timeline of equipping of armies by different capabilities

Using the data mostly from the online military database Globalsecurity.org (if not cited differently), the succession graph showing acquiring the military equipment was compiled, according to description above. The decisive factor was the year when the particular kind of equipment was incorporated into the inventory and the total number of particular weaponry. In some of the graphs, there are also plans for the years 2015 and 2020 included.

4.4.1 Ballistic missiles with a capability to carry nuclear warhead

Fig 4.3 Development of ballistic missiles



Sources of the data:

Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2012) p. 100.

Kristensen, H. M., Norris, R. S. (2011) p. 85.


¹²⁰Our Airports. (2012) *Airports in Arunachal Pradesh, India*.

Notes:

Number of ballistic missiles of India is not public. Data comes from the information about the number of Indian nuclear warheads. This adjustment was used because the Chinese number of ballistic missiles corresponds with the number of nuclear warheads and also because for this table ballistic missiles without nuclear warheads are not relevant (see the description of nuclear forces of both states above).

4.4.2 Aircraft

Fig. 4.4 Development of aircraft




Notes:

The information about Chinese jet fighters is not included in order to keep the graph legible and detailed. Missing data: Number of Chinese jet fighters in 1990: 2950, in 1995: 4022, in 2000: 2498.

4.4.3 Helicopters

Fig. 4.5 Development of helicopters




Source for Chinese helicopters: Asian Military Review. (2012) *The AMR Regional Air Force Directory 2012*.

Notes: Unfortunately there is no available data showing the number of Chinese helicopters in the past or even the plans for the future, the only available information is the status of helicopter park in 2012.

4.4.4 Naval forces – surface fleets


Fig 4.6 Development of surface fleets



Notes: For the purposes of this graph, the group “rest” consists of larger warships: frigates, destroyers and corvettes.

4.4.5 Naval forces – submarine fleets

Fig. 4.7 Development of submarine fleets




Notes: Diesel – means submarine with diesel-electric propulsion

Nuclear – means submarine with nuclear – reactor propulsion

Ballistic – means submarine with a capability to launch ballistic missile. All Indian ones, which are planned for 2015 and further, will have nuclear propulsion. One of the Chinese ones has diesel-electric propulsion.

4.4.6 Ground forces

Fig. 4.8 Development of ground forces



Notes: “SP” – means self-propelled

“armored vehicle” – wheeled armored infantry vehicles

“tanks” – both light and heavy tanks

4.5 Conclusion of Material factors analysis

Looking to this chapter evaluating the material equipment of India and China, it is obvious that there has been no massive armament around all capabilities on both sides since 1990. But there are some capabilities which are being enhanced. This enhancement could be seen in the specific capabilities.

Firstly, naval forces, both surface and underwater. Both states have been continually raising the number of the warships since 1990 and trying to have at least two aircraft carriers as the very important strategic tool. Enhancement could be seen in Fig 4.6. They both bought the carriers from their foreign partners, China from Ukraine and India from the United Kingdom. India is more ambitious in this regard, it is now finishing its own aircraft carrier and intends to develop one more in near future.¹²¹ The plan to have three aircraft carriers and to double the surface fleet of regular ships is definitely a response on the Chinese naval superiority, because China currently possesses about twice more regular warships and is also developing the high water bases in Indian Ocean. Therefore India needs to react on this staff in order not to have a great disadvantage in this highly strategic issue.

When comparing the current number of Chinese submarines in Fig 4.7, which is three times higher than Indian, it corresponds with the India plan to raise the number of their submarines. This capability, as well as the previous one is definitely intended to be used for the mutual rivalry. In both capabilities, India has been reacting upon the Chinese high numbers of that equipment.

A slightly different is the issue of submarines with a capability to launch ballistic missiles. Both states are trying to reach a nuclear triad. For that purpose, they are developing a particular capability. This is a highly strategic issue as well. It is a major deterrence factor focused on geopolitical relations and not only on the other side, unlike the two previous capabilities. Therefore they are both proposing the plan to have this capability shortly.

¹²¹ Anandan, S. *Work on aircraft carrier to restart by month-end*. The Hindu. 24 January 2013.

Secondly, it is possible to see the enhancement of some ground forces capabilities, even since 1990. It is necessary to add, that it is not so rapid like in the case of naval forces and also, that the enhancement does not cover the tank capability. It is obvious in Fig 4.8 that China has been enhancing the number of armored infantry vehicles since 1990 and has been trying to at least maintain the numbers of artillery. From the table with statistic data on Global security.org website, it is apparent that the artillery equipment is aging and it is being continually replaced. That is why the numbers of towed artillery slightly decreased in 2010.¹²² In contrast to the development of the Chinese equipment, India started to enhance its armored infantry vehicles park since 1995, from when the number of those vehicles doubled. It is also apparent in the table on Global Security.org, which contains Indian military statistics, that the Indian artillery equipment is aging and being displaced from the arsenal. They are acquiring plenty of new pieces to at least maintain the number of the artillery.¹²³ Explanation of this development is that both countries adapting their equipment for potential deployment within the hard mountainous border regions, where the light vehicles and precise artillery are necessary. Taken into account that tanks are not so quite usable there, it is not necessary to maintain the tank arsenal on such high numbers. But the light armored infantry vehicles are really useful in such terrain.

This thesis is underpinned by the development of the Indian helicopter park and quantitative status of the Chinese one. As well as the light ground vehicles, helicopters are very worthy in such terrain, especially the transport ones. They allow their possessor to move large units of soldiers around the rough terrain. The development of helicopter parks is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. The proposed plan for the years following after 2015 shows a significant raise in the number of helicopters in Indian services. This plan also corresponds with the intention to deploy a reinforcement of current garrison in Arunachal Pradesh with more then 90 000 soldiers since 2012 till 2017. It is a little pity that the data about the Chinese helicopter park are not available, but the really high actual number of the Chinese helicopters is good reason itself for enhancing the numbers on the Indian side. The other reason why to obtain new helicopters is the heavily underdeveloped ground infrastructure

¹²²Global Security.org. (2012) *Army Equipment*.

¹²³ Global Security.org. (2011) *Indian Army Equipment*

on the Indian side of the border, which would allow a quick movement of the units around the problematic region.

Examining the aircraft capability, it is obvious that both states are trying to maintain the number of jet fighters and multirole jets. But it is highly complicated, because these planes are aging on a quick pace and they have to be discarded. This is the reason for the decreasing curves in the Fig. 4.4. Both states need to preserve this vitally important capability, because they plan to acquire new planes, both jet fighters and multirole aircraft. For example, India is currently negotiating about the contract on 126 pieces of new Rafale jet fighters, which would be a significant reinforcement of the Indian Air Force. China plans to acquire hundreds of aircraft of its 4th generation jet fighters and some of the 3rd generation.¹²⁴ But both acquisitions help the states only to maintain their former number of aircraft, replacing the old ones. No significant increase or decrease is being planned there.

Similar issue occurs in the case of strategic bombers. To maintain this capability, China plans to develop new types of bombers, Hong -8 and Hong -9 to replace old Hong – 6 type.¹²⁵ Whereas India does not possess such capability, park of bombers means significant strategic advantage and an important deterrence factor for China.

Well-developed infrastructure on the Chinese side of the border in Arunachal Pradesh shows that China wants to have a possibility of a brisk movement along the border area (examples of infrastructure in Appendix 5). Even though it is rough mountainous terrain, China has developed there a network of asphalt roads and military bases. The airport in that area gives the Chinese army the possibility to move large units in the area very quickly. Then they can spread to whole region in a short time using the quality roads. In the contrast, the Indian infrastructure network is by far not as dense as the Chinese one and even not qualitative as the Chinese. It looks such as mud paths than solid roads. Even the airport, which is located 50 km from the border line, is only an advanced landing field and does not allow convenient and safe landing of significant number of planes. The movement of soldiers around the region cannot be as quick, because the roads do not allow fast relocation (see the examples of infrastructure in Appendix 6).

¹²⁴ Global Security.org. (2012) *Chinese Army Equipment*.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

5 Conditions of outburst of military conflict

This chapter is examining the development of the situation and bilateral relations before the only high intensity military conflict between India and China. That situation was compared with the outputs of the previous research in order to analyze, if the situations are similar or not.

5.1 Analysis of Neville Maxwell

To examine the background of the conflict, the study of Neville Maxwell was used.¹²⁶ He notes that there is an official analysis of the conflict prepared by the Indian army officials, but it has never been made public and even after the decades it has top secret status. But even though, he has undertaken the research of the situation prior the conflict itself, which the author of this paper finds very interesting.

The conflict itself began in October 1962, when China started the offensive against Indian forces in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai China. In a single month, Chinese forces conquered the whole territories. But then, immediately after they reached the end of Arunachal Pradesh, China unilaterally announced ceasefire and withdrew the forces. China has been keeping only the Aksai Chin till now. War itself was a total debacle of the Indian Army, which was defeated by People's Liberation Army practically in a few days.

Maxwell claims that Chinese offensive is the direct consequence of the expansionist policy of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister of 1950's and early 1960's and he adds that implementing this policy, conflict became inevitable.

Undefined Sino- Indian border is a heritage from British colonial administration, as described above in the chapter Disputed Areas. According to Maxwell, Nehru prepared the solution of the border issue unilaterally using the research of his bureaus, claimed it and refused to negotiate about it with the China. "*Barring the inconceivable - - that Beijing would allow India to impose China's borders unilaterally and annex territory at will -- Nehru's policy thus willed conflict without foreseeing it.*"¹²⁷ After this, officials and soldiers started the demarcation of the territory. During this activity, plenty of border clashes took place. In the end of 1950's China many times appealed

¹²⁶ Maxwell, N. (1970)

¹²⁷ Maxwell, N. (1970) p. 195.

on Nehru to stop this activity. But he still was refusing to negotiate about the border issue, saying that there is nothing to negotiate. This policy also contained some extensions of Indian territory and Indian Army started to establish the army presence and outposts on the Chinese territory from 1961. Especially this activity was making the Chinese officials mad and was taken by them as a war declaration later. So that China warned Nehru not to proceed in his plan. But in 12th October 1962, he declared that India needs to drive Chinese forces out of the claimed areas. A week after this proclamation, China started the pre-emptive offensive and till the end of October conquered whole Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. After the total victory, China unilaterally declared a ceasefire, which was accepted by Nehru under the pressure of events. Then, China withdrew her forces.

5.2 Materials of Chinese origin

Looking into the Chinese internet resources, it is possible to find few websites which are describing the conflict from the Chinese point of view.

First document called 1962 Sino – Indian War, the whole story¹²⁸ describing the policy of Indian Prime Minister, Nehru, similarly to the Maxwell's document. There is written, that implementing the Nehru's Forward Policy, Indian army annexed in 1962 about 125 000 square kilometers of Chinese territory, building the outposts and establishing the military presence there. As the event which caused an outbreak of the conflict was marked: *"Nehru complete denial of the recommendations of the Chinese government to prevent the border conflict, insisting on the implementation of the "Forward Policy," continued occupation of Chinese territory. In October 1962, Nehru to the Indian army issued a "drive out the Chinese army command, the outbreak of the Sino-Indian border war."*¹²⁹

In the rest of the document, author is describing the details of war conflict. There is an accent on Indian intention to drive the Chinese soldiers out of claimed territory and on the fact, that Indian army started the heavy flanking on Chinese positions, which was followed by first Chinese counterattack. As a proof of Chinese good intentions,

¹²⁸Li, Y. (2010) Translated from original Han Chinese text using Google Translator.

¹²⁹ Li, Y. (2010) Translated from the original:

尼赫鲁完全阻绝了中国政府防止边界冲突的各项建议，一意孤行地执行“前进政策”，继续侵占中国领土。1962年10月，尼赫鲁向印度军队下达了“将中国军队赶出去”的命令，中印边界战争全面爆发。

there is highlighted the fact that after the decisive victory, Chinese army stopped more than 300 km from New Delhi and then, after unilaterally declared ceasefire, withdrew the forces 20 km behind the Line of Actual Control, which is valid till now.

In the second document called 1962 Sino-Indian war, Looking back: southern Tibet away from us¹³⁰, author says that before the war, China was respecting the border even though they claimed that it is illegal. The origin of the conflict is seen there *“in the beginning of the Forward Policy in the middle of Aksai Chin and Sino Indian border, in eastern military presence. The Chinese government has repeatedly called on both sides to sit down and talk, but Indian authorities refused.”*¹³¹

5.3 Materials of Indian origin

The official document of Indian Ministry of Defence¹³², which was declassified in 1993, accuses China from expansionism. It is widely describing the Chinese incursions into the Indian territory and sees the origin of the conflict only in the fact, that Chinese were violating the border regularly and were shooting the Indian troops.¹³³ But it is not mentioning the Indian Prime Ministers’s Forward Policy and the Indian offensive actions and establishment of outposts deep in the Chinese territory.

5.4 Conclusion of the comparative analysis

The goal of this chapter was to briefly analyze the situation foregoing the only high intensity military conflict between India and China in the history and to compare it with the current situation in order to find out if there is any similarity.

Firstly, it is necessary to point out that there is a significant difference in the views of both countries on the origins of the 1962 conflict. Each side has been blaming the other of the aggressive behavior and has been saying that it had to intervene preemptively to avoid the consequences of adversary’s offensive. Frankly, it would be naive to assume that one of those states would pledge guilty in such long lasting conflict. According to the analysis in this chapter above, the Chinese explanation, which

¹³⁰Qiang, S. (2012) 1962 Sino-Indian war Looking back: southern Tibet away from us. http://war.163.com/12/1219/09/8J329KDI00014OVF_all.html Translated from Han Chinese using Google Translator.

¹³¹ Qiang, S. (2012) Translated from the original text: 当印度政府在《人民画报》上看到这条路通车的报道时，立刻向中国发出抗议，并开始了所谓的“前进政策”：向阿克赛钦地区及中印边界的中段、东段派驻军队。 Qiang, S. (2012)

¹³²Sinha, P. B., Athale, A. A.(1992)

¹³³ Ibid. p. 32 -26.

is also supported by analysis of N. Maxwell, who allegedly uses the outputs of secret analysis of two Indian Army officials¹³⁴, is based on more objective facts. In the favor of Chinese explanation it is possible to add also the essay of John Garver. As the major reason of the conflict he determines the Forward Policy¹³⁵ and he concluded that *“Indian leaders believed that China would not strike back, but would back down before Indian provocations, or so China’s leaders concluded. Indian leaders did not respect New China, but arrogantly believed they could impose their will on it, just like Britain, India’s imperial mentor, had done repeatedly in the Nineteenth Century. Indian leaders were oblivious to the power and determination of New China.”*¹³⁶ On the other hand, the Indian explanation is definitely not made up and it is underpinned by some truthful facts. Absolute truth would be probably somewhere in the middle.

To sum it up, not matter if we use the explanation of Chinese side or Indian side, in both explanations it is possible to find one important feature – aggressive intentions of the adversary. The Forward Policy of Indian Government is a good example, because it comprises apparent intention not to respect the Line of Actual Control, establish the outposts there and drive the Chinese soldier out of that area. On the other side it is possible to see the aggressive intentions (and also the highly aggressive behavior) in well-documented incursions of Chinese soldiers into Indian territory in the report of Indian Ministry of Defense, which is cited above.

Taken those facts into account and comparing them with the outputs of the discursive analysis, it is possible to see the significant differences. In the analyzed period, since 2009 to 2013, there is majority of cooperative statements expressed by the representatives of both states; there is a proposal of solution given by new Chinese president, Five-point formula. There is no sign of aggression in the intentions of both states, according to the output of discursive analysis of this thesis. In the contrary, there are plans for military cooperation, business relations are on the highest level in the history.

¹³⁴ According to the N. Maxwell, two Indian Army officials, Lieutenant General Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P. S. Bhagat, were ordered to study the debacle right after the ceasefire was declared by China. Their official output was classified as top secret and have never made public. Allegedly, because the output blames India of and concretely Indian PM Jawaharlal Nehru of causing the conflict. For further reference see Maxwell, N. (1970) p. 81.

¹³⁵ Garver, J. (2005) p. 29.

¹³⁶ Ibid. p. 61.

To conclude this chapter, the current relationship of both countries is on the much higher level than it was in late 1950's and early 1960's.

The comparison of material factors analysis is not included, because the output of the discursive analyses comparison is sufficient for this thesis. For the purposes of this thesis, the comparison of material factor analyses would not be reflective. Such comparison would be also far more extensive than the extent of this thesis allows.

6 Conclusion

Output of discursive analysis shows that in the bilateral communication among the representatives of both states, cooperative statements have been prevailing since 2010. There were a small number of defensive statements among them. The only offensive statements which were observed in bilateral communication were expressed in 2009, the year before the breakpoint.

In those cooperative statements, the representatives are ensuring public about their resolve to figure out the border dispute issue. It is making an impression that they are trying to maintain status quo, respecting the Line of Actual Control and not giving the other side the pretence to behave in hostile way. The other impression coming from the statements is that the unresolved border issue does not worry anybody among the high level representatives.

Since 2010 the statements of representatives have been directed to maintain the status quo. As a consequence, the solution is being postponed to the latter time. When there are not any aggressive intentions on any side of the conflict, the issue such as decades – lasting dispute about the frontier in mountainous and inaccessible terrain could easily lose the importance. So that status quo could be easily maintained there, until the feasible solution will be negotiated. The representatives of both sides have been showing the resolve to find such solution in their statements. However, their efforts have been arduous due to the lack of mutual trust. The Five- point formula policy, proposed by the new Chinese president Xi Jinping, is a step in the right direction. Successful implementation of this proposal could facilitate the establishment of the high-level mutual trust, which is essential for the future solution of the dispute. Without the implementation of this or similar cooperative initiative, which will

be binding for both sides, the enhancement of the mutual trust would be almost unbeatable challenge.

The important feature emerged here; a potentially successful policy needs to be binding for both sides and beneficial as well. As the Five- point formula presupposes in the second point, it is necessary to begin the cooperation, in which both sides will have to invest. They would spent their funds together and gain the benefits from the investments together. It does not matter if they would invest funds, infrastructure, manpower or anything else. It is related to the fourth point of the formula, which presupposes the cooperation in the issues, in which the both sides are interested.

On the contrary, the resolve and active engagement of representatives to settle the dispute down by peaceful means is not being reflected in the development tendency of armed forces and even in the plans of its future development as well. As the most significant example it is possible to mention the Indian plan to increase the military presence in Arunachal Pradesh and related massive purchase of transport helicopters.

Both states are also trying to enhance their nuclear deterrence by development of wide variety of intercontinental ballistic missiles - nuclear warheads carriers and by their resolve to reach classic nuclear triad. Only part of the triad they are still missing is the reliable submarine – launched ballistic missile capability. The both states have been running the tests, but have not succeeded yet.

Looking to the Fig. 4.4 regarding the status of air forces, it is obvious that China believes more in jet fighters and India favors multirole aircraft. Both are increasing the numbers, obtaining the new ones. An Indian issue is that multirole aircraft are only possibility how to carry a nuclear weapon by plane and they probably cannot afford to diversify aircraft park like China. Speaking about the strategic bombers, China is going to enhance this capability further, developing the new types of those planes.

The armament is most visible in the naval forces sector. China has been massively increasing the number of her diesel submarines since 1995 and India is reacting on this development in her plans for 2020. China was first to obtain the nuclear propulsion submarines, India has been reacting as well. India was first only to have the aircraft carrier.

Looking on the Fig. 4.8 regarding the ground forces, it is obvious that both states are not going to maintain the tank capability further and numbers are decreasing, but they have been increasing the numbers of armored vehicles. Favoring the light, quick and mobile vehicles in both armies is giving evidence about their desire to be able to move enhance the mobility of units in a heavy terrain.

Comparing the military arsenals of both countries, China possesses the advantage of numerical superiority in all evaluated capabilities. The superiority is qualitative as well in the strategic weapons. Chinese ballistic missiles as well as strategic bombers are able to hit any part of Indian territory, but Indian ones cannot hit neither Beijing nor the important industrial centres on the east coast. Only important target which is possible to be hit by Indian ballistic missile with the longest operational range, Agni II, is the base of strategic bombers in Datong¹³⁷. Moreover, India cannot compensate the limited operational range of ballistic missile capability using the available aircraft, because even this capability is limited by its operational range. India cannot compete with China even on the sea, under the sea surface, on the ground or in the air.

There can be stated the counterargument that China is very large country and their military units are deployed all around the country. But for this case, China has well – developed network of highways and even an airport near the frontier in order to move quickly anywhere along the disputed border. In the contrary, infrastructure of India is not in the condition to allow the quick movement of the armed forces and the nearest “airport” in the area, which is actually only aligned field, definitely does not provide a possibility of quick and convenient deployment of armed forces.

Chinese military superiority, which is evident, makes the possibility of Indian attack the act of pure insanity. For India, there is not any chance for success. Furthermore, India made this mistake once before in 1962, assuming that China will let India to annex the part of her territory without any resistance. Taken this into account, India has to be convinced about China’s resolve to defend its territory enough.

Looking to the dispute from the other side, considering the high level of bilateral trade, which is strongly in favor of China¹³⁸, there is no reason for China to begin the conflict.

¹³⁷ To imagine the operational range clearly, see the map in Appendix 2 which includes the kilometeric scale.

¹³⁸ Bilateral trade reached in 2012 worth of 66, 5 billion USD. Chinese export was almost 48 billion USD from the whole amount. Krishnan, A. India’s trade with China falls 12 %. The Hindu. 10 January 2013.

Her position is much stronger in military means and in business means as well. Furthermore, she would fall into the disgrace of the rest of the world, her customers¹³⁹ in almost every trade sector, when starting the conflict with India.

It is also necessary to take into account, that still there is a specter of nuclear warfare above all mentioned factors. It is possible to assume that neither China would sacrifice the part of her territory to be hit by nuclear weapon.

Considering all of the mentioned factors together, high intensity conflict cannot be assumed between China and India. Resolve of the states to maintain a peaceful bilateral relation which has been expressed by the representatives in last three years, is undisputable. But the obvious arming of both states could easily undermine that resolve and cause the skirmishes, especially if the militarization of disputed regions will continue further.

According to the contemporary conditions, any kind of military conflict would not be in favor of either China or India. The mutual trade cooperation will definitely continue on the high level, but it is not possible to assume the final resolution of the border dispute in short time. Ongoing arming and unresolved border dispute will not be an obstacle even for deepening of the diplomatic relations.

¹³⁹ See amount of Chinese exports in Table 5 of US-China Trade Statistics and China's World Trade Statistics.

Summary

The aim of this master's thesis was to analyze the bilateral relationship of China and India in order to examine if there is a potential for outburst of new armed conflict. The idea came from the fact that their common border is one of the most heavily militarized all over the world, the dispute regarding its final demarcation last almost the century since 1914, when the agreement about the border was signed among the British colonial administration, China and Tibet. During this long period, many skirmishes were undertaken as well as one high intensity conflict. Author thinks that the conflict between these two most populated states around the world could significantly overturn the world order and economy.

The first chapter introduced whole dispute and established the theoretical framework, which is based on Stephen Walt's theory Balance of Threats. For the purposes of the thesis it was necessary to isolate the relevant part of this theory. So that only three of Walt's four sources of threat were used: geographical proximity, aggressive intentions and offensive power. Using these factors, the behavior of both states was being evaluated. In second chapter, the statements of the most important representatives of both states, which were expressed in the English written newspapers and on the website of offices was being assessed, in order to detect the aggressive intentions. The third chapter was devoted to the military capabilities of both states. These capabilities were analyzed with a purpose to find out the arming dynamics and if there is significant superiority on one of the sides. The capabilities were assessed quantitatively as well as qualitatively. Fourth chapter was concerned with the conflict between China and India in 1962, analyzing the origin of that conflict. The output was compared with contemporary situation in order to determine if there are any similarities. The conclusion of this thesis is that the high intensity conflict is not in the interest of neither of the states. The discursive analysis in third chapter did not discover any aggressive intentions in the expressions of representatives, but in the contrary they are trying to establish a peaceful and cooperative relationship. However, the material factors analysis proved that both states are improving their military equipment and enhancing the numbers of some weaponry. It can be assumed that this arming can undermine mutual trust, increase the tensions between the states and even cause more skirmishes, but it will not be an obstacle for the further improvement of the bilateral relationship a maintaining the high level of trade.

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2913855%2CJ&city4=9228464%2CD](http://www.mapcrow.info/cgi-bin/cities_distance_airpt2.cgi?city3=-2913855%2CJ&city4=9228464%2CD)> [Accessed 25 April 2013]

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
Appendices

Appendix 1- Map of disputed areas



Source: http://24.media.tumblr.com/tumblr_l7nkb1CeDv1qd65vgo1_500.gif

Appendix 2 – Map of String of Pearls



Source:

[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-](http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6tBDYUSKXyI/T0EE3bplhzI/AAAAAAAAAF4/KQpkXsNhGbo/s1600/Chinese_string_of_pearls.jpg)

[6tBDYUSKXyI/T0EE3bplhzI/AAAAAAAAAF4/KQpkXsNhGbo/s1600/Chinese_string_of_pearls.jpg](http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6tBDYUSKXyI/T0EE3bplhzI/AAAAAAAAAF4/KQpkXsNhGbo/s1600/Chinese_string_of_pearls.jpg)

Appendix 3 - The list of relevant newspapers and offices which were used in the discursive analysis


Newspapers

- China Daily
- Global Times
- India Today
- New York Times
- South China Morning Post
- The Wall Street Journal
- Times of India

Offices

- Government of Maharashtra Region
- Government of People's Republic of China
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of India

Appendix 4- Map of Chinese and Indian military airbases



Notes to the map:

- Red crosses – India Air Force air bases
- Blue crosses - People's Liberation Army Air Force air bases
- For this research air bases were picked up according to their proximity to the disputed regions Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin. As the determining distance was defined 1 000 km from the border to the air base. Distance was measured from point given by coordinates taken from the sources mentioned above to the nearest border using the measure from the original map. Distance 1 000 km was chosen because it is a distance which could be reached by the jet fighters of both countries with the shortest operational range (Chinese Jian- 7 and Indian MiG-21) without refueling. As an exception, author decided to include also Chinese air base Datong, which is the main base of strategic bombers Hong – 6 with extraordinarily extensive operational range¹⁴⁰.

¹⁴⁰ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/airbase.htm>

List of Chinese airbases:

- Baoshan
 - Chengdu
 - Chongqing
 - Datong – Hong -6
 - Diqing
 - Feidong
 - Hetian
 - Kashi
 - Kunming
 - Lhasa
 - Mengzi
 - Nyigchi
 - Shigatse
 - Xining
- Data about particular aircraft deployed on the mentioned bases are not public.

List of Indian airbases:

- Adampur – MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG – 29. 84 aircraft.
- Agra – An 32, Il – 76
- Ambala – Jaguar IS, MiG -21, SU -30. 48 aircraft.
- Baghdogra – MiG- 21. 16 aircraft.
- Bakshi-Ka-Talab – MiG - 21
- Gwalior – Mirage 2000
- Hashimara – MiG- 21, MiG- 27. 34 aircraft.
- Jorhat – An -32.
- Kalaikunda – MiG -27. 18 aircraft.
- Leh – no information available
- Tezpur- MiG -21. 32 aircraft.

List of Chinese airbases was taken from the sources:

<http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/airbase.asp>

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/airbase.htm>


List of Indian airbases was taken from the source:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/airbase.htm>

Source of map:

<https://maps.google.cz/maps?hl=cs&tab=wl>


Appendix 5 – Chinese infrastructure in border regions



Here on the photo from the Arunachal Pradesh, it is possible to see the asphalt road, common on the Chinese side of the border.



The typical Chinese military base from the same area.



Near the yellow sign in the middle of the picture it is possible to see the Nyingchi airport, about 10 km from Sino- Indian border. Its approximate location is highlighted by the black line and the arrow.

Source of the maps: <https://maps.google.cz/maps?hl=cs&tab=ll>


Appendix 6 – Indian infrastructure in border regions



Typical road on the Indian side of the border




Typical base of Indian army



Machuka advanced landing field – only “airport” on the Indian side of the border in Arunachal Pradesh, about 30 km from the border.

Source of the maps: <https://maps.google.cz/maps?hl=cs&tab=ll>

Appendix 7 – Sea Lines of Communication



Source:

http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/wiredscience/2010/01/figure1a-660x379.gif

Appendix 8 - Example of the “Pearl”

- Woody Island



Source: <https://maps.google.cz/>