

## Abstract

The submitted thesis deals with the topic of organic memory, its definition and function, as well as its conceptions from various historical points of view. I use the term “organic memory” in respect to some authors who have previously dealt with this subject (Elsasser 1987, Otis 1994, Barbieri 2003) and also as a term by which to represent a kind of memory distinct from neuronal/cerebral memory.

The general memory metaphors (in the case of neuronal memory) are essentially connected with terms such as storage, matrix, or place. For rather materialistic conception of memory, it is also symptomatic that different states such as emotions or mental faculties can be concretely localized in the brain tissue. On the contrary, some philosophers described memory as a primarily temporal entity without connection to place or matter. The question of organic memory was already vivid in 19<sup>th</sup> century biology, linked to Lamarckian philosophy (Hering 1870, Haeckel 1876, Butler 1910). The organic memory ideas floundered between vitalistic and rather materialistic conceptions: the first attributed some psychological features to cells or memory particles; the second was based on physics or in Cartesian doctrine, and described memory as essentially localized as a kind of storage of traces or patterns of physical waves.

The most deterministic memory conceptions are rooted in the computer metaphor, influencing the natural sciences to a broad extent. By contrast, the hologram or neuronal networking metaphor offers us the experience dependent memory concept, where experience embraces the facilitation processes that simplify the emergence of certain configurations and information is radically distributed.

My own on language metaphor of life based conception is inspired by the work of Markoř (2002, 2009), Elsasser (1987) and Barbieri (2003), and tries to deconstruct the idea of organic memory as mere DNA storage. Beginning on the level of DNA itself, then on the level of its outputs, my conception further emphasizes that epigenetic memory creates memory engrams in form of diacritics, which are rewritable and radically change the meaning of the primary text. The last conception I mention is that of developmental memory, which is activated after the period of the phylotypic stage and which has a modular character. Although it is fundamentally linked to the *Hox* gene transcription pattern, it embodies memory without storage.

My conclusion forms a language-like conception based on the idea of differences between natural and transcendental worlds, and on differences between reading and program execution. The meaning of a genetic representation is thus a role, way of usage in the language game; it is not formed by the relationships of representation itself, but by praxis, by the implicit rules of language games.