UNIVERZITA KARLOVA V PRAZE

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Institut politologických studií, Katedra mezinárodních vztahů

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Analysis of the Official Israeli Discourse during the Second Intifada: Legitimization and Categorization

Diplomová práce

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Anotace

Diplomová práce „Analysis of the Official Israeli Discourse during the Second Intifada: Legitimization and Categorization" se zabývá zobrazením palestinského terorismu a izraelských bezpečnostních opatření během druhé intifády v diskurzu čelních představitelů izraelského státu. Čerpá přitom z prací, které vnímají jazyk nikoliv jako neutrální prostředek k popsání sociální reality, ale jako nástroj pro nastolení a udržení společenské a politické nerovnosti a dominance určitých skupin nad jinými. Tento postoj je základem epistemologického rámce následného výzkumu, který se zabývá rétorickými strategiemi, jimiž izraelští politici ospravedlňovali izraelské protiteroristické politiky po vypuknutí intifády na podzim roku 2000. Práce identifikuje několik diskursivních schémat, která měla legitimizovat tvrdě kritizovaná bezpečnostní opatření izraelského státu. Základní strategií izraelských představitelů je kategorizace na jedné straně Izraelců jakožto národa neúnavně usilující o mír, jehož velkorysé kompromisní návrhy jsou opakovaně odmítány palestinskou stranou na straně druhé, která na veškeré mírové iniciativy reaguje terorem. Práce se dále zabývá tím, jak je po útocích z 11. září izraelsko-palestinský konflikt diskursivně napojen na globální válku proti teroru vedenou Spojenými státy s cílem zajistit Izraeli místo po boku západních států. V závěrečné kapitole pak práce zkoumá další legitimizační strategie využívané izraelskými politiky.

Annotation

This thesis named „Analysis of the Official Israeli Discourse during the Second Intifada: Legitimization and Categorization" is concerned with discursive construction of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli security policies by Israeli officials in the period following 2000. The paper draws on works which refuse to perceive language as neutral communication means to describe the social reality, and instead approach it as a tool to impose and maintain social and political inequality and dominance of some groups over

others. These theoretical foundations underpin the following research which examines legitimation strategies employed by Israeli officials in order to justify Israeli controversial measures aiming to quell Palestinian terrorism during the Second Intifada. The paper identifies several discursive schemes through which Israeli state representatives purported to legitimize Israeli security policies that were harshly criticized at the time. The basic strategy is to depict and categorize Israelis as peace yearning people who relentlessly offer far-reaching compromises aiming to achieve calm, which proposals are being adamantly rejected by Palestinians whose only reaction is resort to terror. The thesis further deals with Israeli officials' reframing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a part of the US-led global war on terror in the post-9/11 era which interpretation positions Israeli as a Western states' ally in this international struggle. Lastly, the paper examines legitimation strategies employed by Israeli politicians and high-ranking military officials.

Klíčová slova

Izrael, Palestina, terorismus, druhá intifáda, diskurz, legitimizace

Keywords

Israel, Palestine, terrorism, Second Intifada, discourse, legitimization

Prohlášení

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval samostatně a použil jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.

2. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna veřejnosti pro účely výzkumu a studia.

3. Prohlašuji, že práce nebyla využita k získání jiného titulu.

V Praze dne 17. května 2013   Jakub Záhora

Text má 250 882 znaků.

Poděkování

Na tomto místě bych rád poděkoval dr. Stříteckému za jeho cenné rady a připomínky při vedení této práce. Dále bych chtěl poděkovat své rodině za podporu po celou dobu mého studia.

List of Contents

Introduction

At the time when pictures of the falling skyscrapers of the World Trade Center in New York shocked the world, the State of Israel had been already caught in the middle of its own struggle against terrorism for several months.[1] Unlike its predecessor from the late 1980s, the Second Intifada which erupted in autumn 2000 was characterized not by a massive movement of civil, largely non-violent disobedience: on the contrary, Palestinians soon adopted strategy of terrorism and launched an intensive campaign of suicide bombings, peaking in 2002 which witnessed more than fifty attacks behind the Green Line.[2] Israeli ensuing reaction was no less unprecedented, as Israelis resorted to harsh measures, ranging from the so-called targeted killings of Palestinian militants to construction of the security fence dividing Israel proper and the Palestinian territories.

Even though the Israeli state faced truly massive series of suicide attacks during the period, the enacted responses earned it world-wide criticisms as they were deemed highly excessive, and in fact imposing a collective punishment on the entire Palestinian population. The point of departure of the present thesis is thus a notion the Israeli material superiority over Palestinians was not matched by moral recognition at the international level, as most of the foreign countries strongly condemned the Israeli incursions. It could be therefore assumed that Israeli leaders invested considerable effort to convince foreign audiences about righteousness of their conduct vis-à-vis Palestinians.[3]

The role of language in politics was coincidentally highlighted by the war on terror proclaimed by the Israel's American ally in the wake of the Al-Qaeda attacks. The peculiar rhetoric adopted by the Bush administration drew attention of critical

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[1] Throughout the paper, I will adopt the term terrorism as used by various governmental figures and security experts. This does not mean that I accept definition of particular acts of political violence as "terrorism" without any reservations; this is rather to state that various discursive strategies dealing with these events themselves share certain features, and on this basis it is reasonable to speak about terrorism. In another words, what bind these acts together is not necessarily that much observable qualities they share (although this might be the case), as rather properties attributed to them by officials and professionals. Another reason for using the term is more pragmatic – even though possible, complete refraining from adoption of the word would be quite inconvenient given the lack of any other term that could replace it in an understandable and less problematic manner. See the chapter 3 of the present paper for a more detailed discussion of reasons behind my skepticism to the terrorist label.

[2] The number is taken from statistics of the General Security Service, Israeli internal security agency. It is cited in Schweitzer, Yoram, "The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in the Second Intifada", *Strategic Assessment*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2010), pp. 42.

[3] This notion was unwittingly confirmed in one of speeches by the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in June 2001 when he stated "[t]here is a struggle between Arafat and ourselves to win over the international community." (TE18).

authors who pointed to the crucial role that officials' narrative of the struggle between the "free world" and global terrorism played in making controversial policies palatable for the public. Nevertheless, works concerned with socio-political significance of language of course predate the beginning of the third millennium, and security scholars have largely drawn on these earlier works.

So does the present paper which, following what has been just stated, aims to discern what rhetorical means did Israeli officials employ to legitimize Israeli counter-terror measures during the Second Intifada in order to improve Israel's international standing. The thesis is thus informed by principles of discourse analysis which will be discussed at length below. Nevertheless, since the term discourse is rather ambiguous, a precise definition for the purposes of the present paper is warranted. I adopt Richard Jackson's conceptualization that defines discourses as "related sets of ideas, expressed in various kinds of written and spoken texts, and employing a distinct arrangement of vocabularies, rules, symbols, labels, assumptions, narratives and forms of social action."[4] As can be seen, this approach renders the term quite narrow concept, seeing it as a demarcated body of texts, rather than as an overarching scheme structuring social reality, which understanding is usually adopted by (post)structuralist readings.

In this specific case, I will investigate Israeli official discourse on Palestinian terrorism and Israeli responses during the Second Intifada; it should be nevertheless noted that due to scope constraints, the present paper is concerned only with messages meant for foreign audiences as it might be assumed that Israeli politicians employed quite different discursive strategies when communicating with the domestic public.

Since Israel has been at the very centre of the world's attention in the period following the outbreak of violence in late 2000 (or rather continued to be), it would be misleading to state that these issues have altogether completely escaped scholarly interest. However, unlike is the case with the Bush administration's discursive construction of the war on terror, a detailed research focused primarily on the Israeli official discourse during the Second Intifada is quite rare, and primary purpose of the present paper is thus to try to partially fill in this gap.

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[4] Jackson, Richard, "An Analysis of EU Counterterrorism Discourse Post-September 11", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2007a), pp. 234.

Research questions

As has been just stated, the purpose of this paper is to discern what discursive schemes and practices were utilitzed by Israeli officials to legitimize their state's policies towards Palestinians during the Second Intifada. Nevertheless, preliminary research of texts constituting the Israeli official discourse as well as secondary literature strongly suggested that there are be more specific questions the paper will have to focus on in order to successfully accomplish this goal.

These questions pertain mostly to the characterization of the conflicting parties by Israeli leaders. Importance of this depiction is twofold. Firstly, works concerned with discursive construction of terrorism demonstrate that one of the most ubiquitous legitimating strategies is to portray the struggle between state authorities and terrorists in a purely dichotomist manner, in which "they" (terrorists) are depicted as antithesis of "us" (potential victims, state representatives and officers). Since preparatory reading of the texts has revealed that these notions are very salient for scrutiny of the Israeli official discourse, this paper needs to focus more deeply on allocation of properties to conflicting parties.

Secondly, given the close alliance between Israel and the United States, it was safe to assume that Israeli officials would strive to depict the local Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a part of the war on terror proclaimed by the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks. Since this reframing is made possible by a peculiar portrayal of both Israelis and Palestinians (which cast them direct participants in the global struggle against terrorism), these notions again highlights a need to investigate qualities allegedly defining the two opposing sides of the Middle Eastern conflict.

The research questions thus go as follows:

1. Which legitimation strategies did Israeli officials employ during the Second Intifada?
2. What qualities and behavior patterns did Israeli officials allocate to Palestinians and Israelis respectively?
3. How was this particular depiction used to reframe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a part of the US-led war on terror?

Wording of questions hints at rather cautious attitude towards the Israeli officials' interpretation of the Second Intifada, which skepticism is informed by works

theoretically underpinning the present thesis. Nevertheless, this paper does not aim to establish which claims are based on "truth" and which are mere distortions of reality. Although in some instances I will refuse arguments made by respective speakers, point of this enterprise is not to cast Israeli officials liars or manipulators, or to even vilify the Israeli state as such. Rather, being aware that all labels and narratives inevitably result in a simplification of the complex reality, the present paper aims to make intelligible how did Israeli officials' interpretation (whose nature is necessarily arbitrary) of the events of the Second Intifada served to legitimize Israeli policies at the time. To put it differently, the thesis aims to discern power interests vested in language adopted by Israeli speakers when referring to Palestinian terrorism and Israeli counter-measures after 2000.

Literature Review[5]

There is a relative paucity of works concerned directly with the Israeli discourse during the Second Intifada. One of few examples is article by Julien Peteet named "Words as interventions: naming in the Palestine – Israel conflict"[6] in which she scrutinizes politics of labeling by both Israelis and Palestinians. Nevertheless, the scope of Peteet's focus is rather wide which means that, although it is a valuable contribution to the body of knowledge on the issues examined in this paper, the article does not offer a detailed analysis of the Israeli official discourse during the period of the most intensive terrorist campaign.

This thesis nevertheless draws on number of books and articles dealing with other relevant issues. To start with, there are works concerned with power-laden nature of language. Pieces by Norman Fairclough[7] can serve as an introduction to this kind of literature, and provide the reader with many valuable insights into relationship between texts, power and inequality.

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[5] This section is concerned solely with secondary literature. The primary data will be discussed in detail later in the paper.

[6] Peteet, Julie, "Words as Interventions: Naming in the Palestine – Israel Conflict", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 153-172.

[7] Fairclough, Norman, "Discourse, Social Theory, and Social Research: The Discourse of Welfare Reform", *Journal of Sociolinguistic*, Vol. 4 (2000), pp. 163-195, Fairclough, Norman, *Language and Power* (Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2001), and Fairclough, Norman, *Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language* (London, New York: Longman Publishing, 1995).

More specific issue of legitimation is discussed by another renowned scholars, Ruth Wodak and Theo van Leuween who examine discourse on immigrants to Austria.[8] Besides scrutinizing official texts, authors make several more general and very informative points about process of legitimation as such. Van Leuween furthermore penned an article titled "Legitimation in Discourse and Communication"[9] in which he, like Antonio Reyes in "Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions",[10] lists several specific legitimating strategies. Another piece related to these issues worth mentioning is Louis Rojo and Teun van Dijk's article dealing with officials' justification for expulsion of illegal immigrants from Spain,[11] in which authors offer wider remarks about language and power.

Van Dijk also authored several pieces concerned with methodology employable for the purposes of examination of language's role in politics: one can mention his chapter in a volume edited by Schiffrin, Tannen and Hamilton,[12] as well as "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis"[13] published in the *Discourse & Society* journal. Another book providing methodological guidance is *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* edited by Wodak and Meyer.[14].

A different methodology employed in the paper is discussed in an article by Tanja Collet.[15] In the introductory part of the "Civilization and Civilized in post 9/11 US Presidential Speeches" Collet succinctly summarizes the main principles of Membership Categorization Analysis, a method used to classify Israeli officials' statements on Israelis and Palestinians. Collet's piece and relevant parts of the article named "On Membership Categorization: 'Us', 'Them' and 'Doing Violence' in Political

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[8] Van Leeuwen, Theo; Wodak, Ruth, "Legitimizing Immigration Control: A Discourse-Historical Analysis", *Discourse Studies*, Vol. 1, No.1 (1999), pp. 83-118.

[9] Van Leeuwen, Theo, "Legitimation in Discourse and Communication", *Discourse & Communication*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2007), pp. 91-112.

[10] Reyes, Antonio, "Strategies of Legitimization in Political Discourse: From Words to Actions", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 6 (2011), pp. 781-807.

[11] Rojo, Martín L; van Dijk, Teun A., "'There Was a Problem, and It Was Solved!': Legitimating the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1997), pp. 523-566.

[12] Van Dijk, Teun A., "Critical Discourse Analysis", in: Schiffrin, Deborah; Tannen, Deborah; Hamilton, Heidi E. (eds.), *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), pp. 352-371.

[13] Van Dijk, Teun A., "Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1993), pp. 249-283.

[14] Wodak, Ruth; Meyer, Miachael (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: SAGE Publications, 2009).

[15] Collet, Tanja, "Civilization and Civilized in post 9/11 US Presidential Speeches", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2009), pp. 455-475.

Discourse" by Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapil[16] largely informed my understanding of this approach.

I naturally draw also on works examining discursive construction of terrorism. Albeit most authors are concerned with US portrayal of the international struggle against terror, there are pieces examining representations of terrorism beyond those enacted by US officials. As for the former, especially prominent author in this regard is Richard Jackson who has produced several works that offer critical examination of various aspects of the war on terror narrative in an accessible yet very informed manner.[17]

Furthermore, Richard Jackson and his colleagues have edited and authored couple of volumes that are concerned with social construct of terrorism as such, and also persuasively dispel "orthodox", taken-for-granted assumptions about this phenomenon.[18] More narrowly focused articles dealing with specific instances of state officials' depictions of terrorist attacks and their perpetrators can be found in a special volume of *Third World Quarterly* journal from 2005.[19] The pieces featured in this issue provide the reader with empirical investigations of various discourses, and thus enable to posit the findings of the present paper within the field of the existing academic knowledge.

Lastly, I have used works directly concerned with the Second Intifada and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in general. There is of course a whole plethora authors who

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[16] Leudar, Ivan; Marsland, Victoria; Nekvapil, Jiří, "On Membership Categorization: 'Us', 'Them' and 'Doing Violence' in Political Discourse", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3 (2004), pp. 243-266.

[17] Jackson, Paul, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005b), Jackson, Richard, "Security, Democracy, and Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism", *Democracy and Security,* Vol. 1 (2005a), pp. 147–171, Jackson, Richard, "Language, Policy and the Construction of a Torture Culture in the War on Terrorism", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33 (2007c), pp. 353-371, and Jackson, Richard, "Constructing Enemies: 'Islamic Terrorism' in Political and Academic Discourse", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007b), pp. 394–426.

[18] Jackson, Richard; Smith, Marie Breen; Gunning, Jeroen (eds.), *Critical Terrorism Studies. A New Research Agenda* (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2009), Jackson, Richard; Murphy, Eamon; Poynting, Scott (eds.), *Contemporary State Terrorism. Theory and Practice* (Abingdon, New York: Routledge, 2010), and Jackson, Richard; Jarvis, Lee; Gunning, Jeroen; Smith, Marie Breen, *Terrorism: A Critical Introduction.* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

[19] The issue comprises, apart the already cited article by Peteet (2005), the following pieces: Bhatia, Michael V., "Fighting Words: Naming Terrorists, Bandits, Rebels and Other Violent Actors", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 5-22, Ivie, Robert L., "Savagery in Democracy's Empire", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 55-65, Schroeder, Michael J., "Bandits and Blanket Thieves, Communists and Terrorists: The Politics of Naming Sandinistas in Nicaragua, 1927-36 and 1979-90", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 67-86, Nadarajah, Suthaharan; Sriskandarajah, Dhananjayan, "Liberation Struggle or Terrorism? The Politics of Naming the LTTE", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 87-100, Russel, John, "Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens Before and Since 9/11", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 101-116, and Horsman, Start, "Themes in Official Discourses on Terrorism in Central Asia", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2005), pp. 199-213.

have examined this period, acts of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli measures. Worth mentioning is a chapter by Ami Pedazhur and Arie Perliger who offered a succinct but elaborated critical overview of the Israeli security policies and their effects on the Palestinian population,[20] which dispels number of claims made by Israeli officials at the time. Especially important is a work by Arie Kacowicz whose subtitle "Clashing Narratives, Images, and Frames in the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict"[21] hints at issues the author is concerned with. Kacowicz deals with critical examination of both Palestinian and Israeli interpretations of the conflict and thus enables to compare Israeli officials' narrative with that of their Palestinian counterparts.

Outline of the Paper

After this introduction, the thesis proceeds to a discussion of theoretical foundations underpinning the latter empirical analysis. The first chapter thus points to the political significance of language which should not be seen as a mere "innocent" tool to describe the reality "as it is". On the contrary, this part of the paper demonstrates that language and power are inextricably intertwined, which principles inform the empirical research this paper engages in. The second chapter is then concerned with various legitimation strategies whose overview serves to lay foundation for the later scrutiny of Israeli officials' rhetoric.

The third chapter engages in a critical examination of terrorism as usually understood nowadays. It aims to show that orthodox understanding of this phenomenon is rather problematic and should be contested; it further traces discursive schemes characterizing various state discourses on terrorism.

Afterwards, the paper outlines methodology adopted in the rest of the paper. Apart from discussing specific discourse analysis methods, the chapter also makes the reader familiar with nature and collection of the primary data, as well as with operationalization of categories into which Israeli officials posit their fellow citizens on the one hand and Palestinians on the other.

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[20] Pedazhur, Ami; Perliger, Arie, "The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Israel", in: Crenshaw, Martha (ed.), *The Consequences of Counterterrorism* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2010), pp. 335 – 367.
[21] Kacowicz, Arie, "Rashomon in the Middle East. Clashing Narratives, Images, and Frames in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2005), pp. 343-360.

The categorization itself is the main topic of the fifth chapter. This section of the paper examines what qualities Israeli officials endow respective parties with, and demonstrates that they portray Israelis and Palestinians in a largely dichotomist way. The sixth chapter reconstructs the narrative of the war on terror as conceived by Israeli officials, and shows how are alleged properties defining Israelis and Palestinians used to frame the Middle Eastern conflict as a part of the struggle against international terrorism.

The last chapter shows what legitimation strategies Israeli officials mainly utilitized during the Second Intifada. Being informed by earlier discussion of legitimation, this section lists several discursive schemes aiming to justify Israeli policies in the eyes of foreign public and statesmen.

The conclusion then summarizes the main findings and ascertains a relative importance of individual legitimating strategies employed by Israeli officials. It also determines features that the Israeli official discourse shares with other state representatives' depictions of terrorism and suggests areas for future research.

1. Language and Power

It would be misleading to say that language has become object of scholarly interest only recently, as history of linguistics reaches back to ancient times; nevertheless, focus on social and political impact of language is something that is quite novel. Various thinkers started to realize in the course of the 19th and 20th century that language can not be conceived as a mere sum of words which precisely describe (social) reality its users encounter. The notions that much more is at stake with language than just signifying the world gradually spread to other disciplines beyond philosophy and linguistics, and laid the foundations for burgeoning research programmes.

There is thus nowadays a wide array of approaches towards language and its social functions like constructivism, feminism, post-structuralism and others which, even though they share certain "core commitments",[22] differ on several important epistemological and ontological issues. The purpose of this section is therefore to clarify what theoretical standpoint underpins the following empirical analysis.

This thesis draws on works which strongly argue against seeing language as neutral means for communication - on the contrary, the strand of thinking which informs the present paper suggests that names, labels, and words in general actively form the way we perceive the world. These approaches are thus based on conviction that there is no given, self-evident, common sense reality which language just captures, since events "do not speak for themselves."[23] Process of naming inevitably simplifies the complex social reality we encounter and structures and influences our perception of social phenomena that surround us. Therefore, when it comes to how we see the world, how we allocate normative qualities to social facts and actions, "discourse in short matters",[24] as summarized by Vivien Schmidt.

This line of enquiry thus falls under broad category of interpretive strand of social scientific research, which stance is usually put in contrast with its causalistic counterpart.[25] Scholars embracing the latter approach generally adopt a model of

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[22] See Jackson, (2007b), pp. 395-396.
[23] Jackson (2005a), pp. 149.
[24] Schmidt, Vivien A., "Does Discourse Matter in the Politics of Welfare State Adjustment?", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2002), pp. 190.
[25] A comprehensive discussion of ontological and epistemological foundations underpinning different strands of social scientific research is to be found in Hollis, Martin; Smith, Steve, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). See also Drulák, Petr, "Epistemologie, ontologie a operacionalizace", in: Drulák, Petr (ed.), *Jak zkoumat politiku. Kvalitativní metodologie v politologii a mezinárodních vztazích* (Praha: Portál, 2008), pp.15-22 [in Czech].

scientific enquiries that is formed according to principles guiding research conducted in the natural sciences, as they seek to uncover how are observed events related, i.e. what is the causal link between them. This approach is grounded in a positivist notion that it is indeed possible to discern how certain social phenomena directly cause other; in Smith's and Hollis's words, this line of scientific enquiry strives to *explain* social phenomena, taking position from "outside", deliberately ignoring subjective meanings and values held by actors.

Interpretative approach, on the other hand, aims to *understand* social reality from "inside". Unlike scientists seeking to uncover and observable casual relations, interpretative scholars maintain that social scientific research must remain sensible to cultural and societal milieu. They argue (and the present thesis adopts this stance) that efforts to define objective casual links between events as it is done in the realm of natural sciences can not be replicated when scrutinizing the social reality. Interpretative scholars seek to understand actors' subjective motivations and culturally determined values which underpin their decisions and actions. This approach thus tries to undercover actors' "inner" mindset and determine how is their thinking structured, how is the world constructed in their minds. In turn, this understanding helps to ascertain how are some actions made possible and worthy of resorting to in the actors' eyes. Albert Yee defines the interpretive approach as based on enquiries seeking to understand "intersubjective meanings" that inform social practices "not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or inconceivable, respectable or disrespectable, etc."[26]

Nevertheless, these notions derived from interpretative approach guide and underpin most of the scholarly works concerned with complex interactions and mutual influences between language and societal setting. It is therefore necessary to further specify foundations on which this thesis is based.

This work aims to contribute to a substantial body of research which is epistemologically, ontologically and normatively rooted in critical theories scrutinizing, among others, societal and political impact of language. Indeed, the category of "critical theory" is still ambiguous, containing range of approaches that are defined mostly negatively by their discontent with "traditional", or "problem solving" theories,

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[26] Yee, Albert S., "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies", *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1996), pp. 97.

as famously delineated by Robert Cox,[27] rather than by actual convergence in their assumptions and epistemological and ontological positions. Therefore, this thesis adopts a narrower definition of "critical theory" which stands for works that, even though sometimes only implicitly and quite loosely, draw on and proceed from Frankfurt School teaching.

Scholars who adhere to critical theory's foundations agree with the claims made above that language can not be conceived as a mere objective description of the reality. Norman Fairclough maintains that all social practices, including use of language, are "practices of production",[28] creating something in the process, albeit a nature of products can be non-material, i.e. discursive. It should be stressed out that Fairclough adds that this view of social practices is not an example of economic reductionism – on the contrary, it is meant to demonstrate that production of economic assets is only one form of production amongst many.

At the same time, critical scholars go beyond these notions. They argue that there is always a plethora of possible interpretations and labels that can be attached to social "facts"; there is no "way things simply are", as events' meaning is always constructed by a particular interpretation; Richard Jackson sums up this attitude succinctly by stating that "different words can result in different 'readings' for the same set of acts".[29] Privileging one way how to portray and interpret reality is thus intimately linked to power, since adopted language always tends to make some actions and phenomena intelligible, natural and legitimate, while casting other as not deserving public recognition. Meaning of events is established in discourse that can be deliberately constructed in a way that privileges only certain interpretation(s); representation is thus a highly political enterprise. Related point of contention is who is entitled to authoritatively speak at all, as the speaker's status determines to a high degree how are her discursive performances perceived and if they are embraced by wider audience.[30]

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[27] Cox, Robert W., "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium. Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126-155.
[28] Fairclough (2000), pp. 168.
[29] Jackson (2005b), pp. 29.
[30] See e.g. Fairclough (2001), pp. 43-108, Chang, Gordon; Mehan, Hugh, "Discourse in a Religious Mode: The Bush Administration's Discourse in the War on Terrorism and its Challenges", *Pragmatics*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1-3, or Chilton, Paul; Schäffner, Christina, "Introduction. Themes and Principles in the Analysis of Political Discourse", in: Chilton, Paul; Schäffner, Christina (eds.), *Politics as Text and Talk. Analytic Approaches to Political Discourse* (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Copany, 2002), pp. 22-23.

In public arena, it is mainly elites who have prominent access to media and other sources of widely disseminated discourses.[31] This applies especially to leading political echelons who are given media attention and have at their disposal other means to cast their interpretation the most salient among general population. The point is not that other, more marginal groups can not speak out, rather that social effects of particular discourse(s) are cumulative – those interpretations and depictions that are the most circulating become gradually embedded and accepted as unambiguous and self-evident. And because of elites' vast opportunities for public appearances, their depiction is usually the one which earns the widest recognition.

Political representatives, in accordance with mainstream journalists and other prominent groups which seek to maintain the current status quo, can therefore easily through their (repeated) utterances construct accepted narratives, meta-stories which apart from simply describing events also endow actors and practices with normative qualities. They also promote particular interpretations over others, reducing multiple possible understandings to one that suits their purposes, allegedly based on a "common sense".[32]

In fact, interpretations evoked as obvious and "natural" do not necessarily correspond with "truth", but often rather serve to conceal the power-laden nature of language. These discursive steps seek to maintain superior position of certain groups because, as hinted above, these efforts have actually far-reaching effects, and they influence social reality in several ways. By defining what is considered legitimate knowledge, they cast dissenting voices as illegitimate and/or unreasonable, therefore shielding leaders from any serious criticism. Because of wielding considerable control over public debate, dominant groups can describe policies enacted or supported by them as a sensible, "right" thing to do, and beneficial for the society as whole (and not just for elites' narrow interests) which portrayal results in public endorsement of these actions. In a parallel process, some groups are marginalized and exposed to social exclusion, as they are cast "outsiders" who do not belong among "us", and who can therefore easily become victims of racism and discrimination.

Another notion shared by most of critical scholars is that discourses are not constructed independently from already existing historical and political narratives. On

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[31] Van Dijk, Teun A., "Discourse and the Denial of Racism", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1992), pp. 88-89, Bhatia (2005), pp. 10.
[32] Fairclough (2001), pp. 2.

the contrary, groups seeking to maintain their hegemonic position in most cases draw on prevailing semantic structures and shared values.[33] This should come as no surprise since resort to socially embedded and established discourses endows speakers with a nearly automatic salience stemming from the fact that public is acquainted with this line of reasoning. It is obvious that to introduce a completely novel depiction of some social facts, and to simultaneously claim that it is self-evident is a quite peculiar endeavor. Socio-political context in which discourses are enacted must be therefore taken into account when conducting critical enquiries, as widely-held values and embedded practices often guide speakers' performances. But it should be noted that contexts as well "are not objective, or 'out there', but subjective constructs of participants"[34] as Van Dijk reminds us.

At the same time, however, there is a dialectical relationship between discursive structures and specific texts.[35] Put differently, while actors draw on the already salient discourses, they also modify them in turn. These notions depart from the conviction that social reality is never fully fixed and inert – it is actually fluid and "vulnerable" to actors' interventions that can gradually mold it. The result is that what is being generally considered as legitimate and truthful depiction or narrative is in a constant process of change, and that speakers are actively involved in this process.

The relationship of between larger discursive structures and concrete texts based on mutual influences highlights a last crucial issue often emphasized by critical scholars, which is a possibility of resistance against those instances of language use which result in oppression and/or social and political inequality. Even though, as described above, elites wield considerable power derived from the control over legitimate discourses, other groups and individuals are not entirely deprived of a chance to offer different interpretations and disseminate their messages.[36] There is always space for contesting allegedly self-evident depictions, labels and "truths" which efforts can potentially result in a more just social setting.

These notions correspond with a larger emancipatory project of the Frankfurt School, to which bulk of the authors reviewed here adhere, although it is not always openly admitted. As is the case with some other concepts used in this paper, definition

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[33] See e.g. van Leeuwen; Wodak (1999), pp. 83-118.
[34] Van Dijk, Teun A., "War Rhetoric of a Little Ally. Political Implicatures and Aznar's Legitimatization of the War in Iraq", *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2005), pp. 68.
[35] See van Leeuwen; Wodak, (1999), pp. 91-92.
[36] For example, Rojo and van Dijk state that "[p]olitical power and legitimacy are always at risk." See Rojo; van Dijk (1994), pp. 524.

of emancipation is rather contested. Nevertheless, I use the term to stand for efforts that seek to erase oppression of any kind and to enable all people to employ their full potential without any obstacles.[37] This leads us to normative dimensions of critical theory underpinning examinations of social effects of language. Scholars engaging in this kind of research are often far from being neutral observers, since by revealing the relationship between utterances and domination they strive, at least implicitly, to promote certain normative agenda. Even though this stance might be unacceptable for those who adhere to the positivist strand of scientific enquiries which strictly delineates the border between the scientist and object of scrutiny, the well known counter-argument states that this demarcation is impossible, as the researcher herself influences the reality she seeks to study, and is influenced by her social milieu in turn at the same time. Moreover, Norman Fairclough maintains that "scientific investigation of social matters is perfectly compatible with committed and 'opinionated' investigators (there are no others!), and being committed does not excuse you from arguing rationally."[38]

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[37] For an elaboration on the concept of emancipation within confines of the security studies, see Booth, Ken, "Security and Emancipation", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1991), pp. 313-326. For discussion of emancipation in the context of research on terrorism, thus closer to the topic of the present paper, see Gunning, Jeroen, "A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007), pp. 384-390.
[38] Fairclough (2001), pp. 5

2. Legitimization

As can be deducted from the previous chapter, legitimation is one of the crucial concepts in critical enquiries concerned with language and its social context and impact.[39] Van Dijk defines legitimation as "related to the speech act of defending oneself which requires as one of its appropriateness conditions that the speaker is providing good reason, grounds or acceptable motivations for past or present action."[40] Successful legitimation through appropriate discourse is thus crucial for gathering support and public acceptance of one's actions, policies and/or efforts. Problem of (lack of) legitimacy is therefore highly relevant for the topic of this paper as it was exactly the endorsement of the Israeli measures by other countries what Israeli leaders sought during the Second Intifada, having achieved considerable physical superiority over Palestinians, yet facing world-wide condemnations of and uproar against Israeli actions in the occupied territories.

Nevertheless, legitimization is to be found not only in the realm of politics. Theo van Leuween states that legitimation can be basically defined as an (sophisticated) answer to a question "'Why' - 'Why should we do this?' and 'Why should we do this in this way?'"[41] By arguing that particular actions are necessary and right thing to do (which evaluation is indeed contextually bound),[42] the speaker seeks to justify her conduct and earn support from other actors. This kind of reasoning is thus traceable in nearly all social interactions, as people often try to convince others to follow and help them in their activities, and in order to achieve this, they have to depict them in a way that persuades other to participate.

These notions about general relevance of the concept of course do not diminish significance of legitimacy in political arena. It can be said that powerful and effective legitimizing discourses are required especially in exceptional times[43] like wars, major crises, painful economic adjustment, and so on.[44] Even though, as hinted above, there is always a certain contest over narratives and interpretations, during periods characterized by mundane politics need for legitimation is not that much pressing for elites, as the

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[39] For an introduction to debates on legitimation see Rojo; van Dijk (1997), pp. 527-533
[40] Quoted in Peled-Elhanan, Nurit, "Legitimation of Massacres in Israeli School History Books",
Discourse & Society, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2010), pp. 380.
[41] Van Leeuwen (2007), pp. 93.
[42] See e.g. Peled-Elhanan (2010), pp. 380, or Reyes (2011), pp. 782.
[43] Rojo; van Dijk (1997), pp. 528.
[44] On the latter point see Schmidt, Vivien A., "The politics of economic adjustment in France and Britain: when does discourse matter?", *Journal of European Public Policy*, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 (2001), pp. 247-264, and Schmidt (2002).

current status quo, and by implication their position and image, is not endangered. Since social practices are informed by shared values based on dominant discourses, there is a certain inertia which ensures that social stratification is quite stable. Moreover, van Dijk and Rojo correctly point out that legitimization can be provided also by other, non-discursive means, as certain political and social acts and institutions like for example elections "automatically" endow those who participate in them with justification in regards to decisions and conduct.[45]

Social upheavals and conflicts, on the other hand, can quite easily result in serious questioning of dominant narratives and shattering of current leaders' positions. Major ground-breaking events with wider societal repercussions are often accompanied by challenges to conventional wisdom and taken-for-granted interpretations. Another related issue to be considered is the fact that crises of this kind often trigger extreme response on part of those currently in power, and controversial actions enacted need to be legitimized in order to be publicly acceptable.

There is a general consensus among scholars that legitimation belongs among key concepts related to critical enquiries concerned with political functions of language. Nevertheless, when it comes to specific legitimizing strategies, there are considerable variations among authors dealing with this issue. This is not to suggest that they necessarily differ profoundly on question what discursive processes and efforts are most likely to ensure public support for certain actions or policies; I rather point out that there are more possible ways how to conceive the problem of legitimation. The following parts will briefly introduce main approaches towards this particular discursive practice.

2.1. Binary Opposition as Legitimization

Although more authors elaborate on these notions, investigation of discourses based on establishing "them" and "us" as deeply opposed is often associated with works of Teun van Dijk. The argument here is very much straightforward and quite intuitive: when finding themselves in dispute of some kind, leaders (and people in general) tend to depict their opponents in a negative light, while endowing themselves and members of their own group with positive characteristics.[46]

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[45] Rojo; van Dijk (1997), pp. 531.
[46] There is a plethora of works investigating discourses based on "us"-"them" division. See e.g. Lazar, Anita; Lazar, Michelle M., "The Discourse of the New World Order: 'Out-Casting' the Double Face of Threat", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3 (2004), pp. 236-238, van Dijk (2005), pp. 76-82, Oddo,

This dichotomy is generally enacted when authorities resort to controversial measures and actions, which steps usually follow depiction of opponents as harmful and vicious. By rhetorical allocation of negative properties to the other group, leaders aim to construct their actions as a righteous and just response, necessary in the given situation. Legitimation is to be provided by construction of inherently good, moderate and reasonable "us" who are pressed by evil "them" to react forcefully and sometimes even violently.

This scheme is thus highly effective because when it becomes the prevalent way how to perceive the relationship between rivals, it erases in-group members' feelings of compassion and empathy towards "them", who are portrayed as deeply repulsive, and therefore can be exposed to otherwise highly disputable measures.[47] Simultaneously, these measures are also justified by "our" inherent kindness and restraint which must be unfortunately put aside when dealing with threatening "them". The actions taken are thus constructed as a regrettable necessity triggered by the other party.

Discourses based on binary opposition can be found in a wide array of situations characterized by some kind of tension or conflict, from deportation of immigrants[48] to fighting insurgency.[49] Nevertheless, even though respective discourses share several important characteristics, there also some differences. Most crucially, these discourses vary in the level of vilification which is said to be the basic property defining the out-group and its members. Negative depictions can range from pointing to some dubious impact "they" have on "our" society, lets say by engaging in criminal activities or by taking jobs,[50] to total dehumanization which aims to cast the given group completely out of the human community.[51] The specific nature of portrayal has indeed important repercussions, as in the latter cases "they", due to their complete exclusion, can be exposed to otherwise unthinkable measures, since the usual constraints limiting one's actions against a fellow human being are removed: it is widely known that labeling people as rats and cockroaches turned out to be the first step towards a mass murder.

John, "War Legitimation Discourse: Representing 'Us' and 'Them' in Four US Presidential Addresses", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2011), pp. 287-314, and van Dijk (1992), pp. 87-89.

[47] See e.g. Jackson (2007c).

[48] Rojo; van Dijk (1997).

[49] Schroeder (2005), pp. 67-86.

[50] Van Leeuwen; Wodak (1999), pp. 111-114.

[51] For elaboration on the concept of moral exclusion see Opotow, Susan, "Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (1990), pp. 1-20. See also Martín-Pena, Javier; Opotow, Susan, "The Legitimization of Political Violence: A Case Study of ETA in the Basque Country", *Peace and Conflict*, Vol. 17 (2011), pp. 134-135.

Regarding other differences among discourses resorting to "us"-"them" dichotomy, there are variations when it comes to possibility of staying outside the dispute. Whereas sometimes impartiality is at least implicitly possible, in some cases there is no such option, which applies mostly to those instances of discursively constructed opposition that feature complete vilification of the out-group – when put in the middle of fight between ultimate evil and pure good, space for neutral stance is indeed limited.[52]

2.2 Legitimization through Proximization

Another way how to theoretically conceive legitimization is based on Paul Chilton's work[53] which is further elaborated on by Piotr Cap.[54] Chilton's conceptualization is built on the notion that "texts enable hearers to generate cognitive structures in short and long-term memory" and that "[a]mong these structures are complexes of 'spaces', 'worlds' or 'sub-worlds'".[55] Chilton then continues by saying "that in processing any discourse people 'position' other entities in their 'world' by 'positioning' these entities in relation to themselves along (at least) three axes, space, time and modality."[56] Chilton thus suggests that the speaker, who is located at what he calls "deictic centre", can situate all social actors and phenomena within a matrix composed of three axes, based on their temporal, spatial and modal position. I will now briefly introduce these terms, and then I will describe how can be this scheme used to conceive legitimating strategies.

Chilton adopts the term "deictic centre" to mark the position of the uttering subject. In a nutshell, "deictic centre" stands for here, now, I/we. It serves as a point of reference to locate all phenomena the speaker encounters. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind the centre does not contain only speaker himself, but possibly much larger groups like nation, "citizens of free world" etc.

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[52] See e.g. Jackson (2005a), pp. 153-156.

[53] Chilton, Paul, *Analysing Political Discourse. Theory and Practice* (London, New York: Routledge, 2004) features the most coherent and comprehensive conceptualization of legitimation as conceived by Chilton, and as such informs this part of the paper. For a deeper elaboration on issues discussed here see especially Chilton (2004), pp. 48-65. Alternatively, a brief overview of Chilton's argument is to be found in Amer, Mosheer M., "'Telling-it-like-it-is': the Delegitimation of the Second Palestinian Intifada in Thomas Friedman's Discourse", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2009), pp. 8-9.

[54] Cap, Piotr, "Towards the Proximization Model of the Analysis of Legitimization in Political Discourse", *Journal of Pragmatics*, Vol. 40 (2008), pp. 17–41.

[55] Chilton (2004), pp. 57.

[56] Ibid, pp. 57-58.

Regarding the first two axes, whose characteristics might seem quite obvious, it needs to be stressed out that they do not simply refer to mere geographical distance separating deictic centre from some social actors/phenomena, or to time elapsed between two events. As Chilton persuasively shows, since discourses are often composed of diverse metaphors, spatiality and temporality are utilized to allocate normative and politically laden properties. For examples, allies are generally referred to as "closer" to "us" (i.e. deictic centre) than adversaries, although a mere geography suggests different conclusions. This depiction has clear political implications, as "closeness" is generally regarded as a positive social bond.

The same argument with minor modifications applies to the temporal dimension of the Chilton's model. Defining given era as for example "post-revolutionary", instead of simply stating what is the year, serves to put emphasis on some of this period's characteristics, while neglecting or suppressing others. It has been also noted by Chilton that time is often conceptualized "either as an object moving towards the speaker ('the end of the war is coming') or as the speaker moving towards a time ('we are approaching the end of the war')."[57] In short, speakers do not resort to expressions containing temporal specifications to simply remind their audience about time, but rather to achieve certain effect and to frame their message in a specific way.

Modal axis defines to what degree are social occurrences epistemically true and how much are they "right" on a deontic level, thus combining more modal strands. Firstly, modality states if a phenomenon actually exists, or with what certainty. As number of social phenomena can not be directly observed, speakers comment on probability of their existence. Chilton points out that even in regards to the epistemic dimension the notion of remoteness is often evoked, which is illustrated by expressions like „not *remotely* possible", or „*far from* the truth".[58]

Deontic status then concerns level of justness and righteousness, and is therefore closely connected to the prevalent values system, since it labels events and actors as "good" or "bad". There is a range of deontic claims which can be again in many cases conceptualized in terms of remoteness or proximity; consider for example phrases „he has gone *too far*", or „*outside* the norms of convention".[59]

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[57] Ibid., pp. 57.
[58] Ibid.,pp. 59.
[59] Ibid., pp. 60.

It can be deducted from the discussion so far how can be Chilton's notions used to find a common denominator for various legitimation strategies aiming to gather support for some action or policy. If these steps relate to negative phenomenon, legitimizing discourse, according to Chilton's reasoning, seeks to construct this phenomenon as "close" in few ways: as physically near and with only short time remaining before it impacts "us" (this is why Piotr Cap speaks about Chilton's model as "legitimation by proximization").[60] Simultaneously, epistemic status of this event is being established as "existent without any doubts" and, perhaps most crucially, it is framed as "bad", i.e. negative on the deontic level.

Such a phenomenon is thus portrayed as near and imminent with definite negative implications for deictic centre ("me"/"us"). Therefore, it must be tackled in order to lower its probability of occurrence, or to be disposed of its deontic unjustness.[61] This is said to be in the best interests of the deictic centre, thus making an appeal to all who are considered to be its part. Alternatively, in the cases of phenomena deemed positive for the deictic centre, it is argued centre's members need to invest efforts to make the phenomenon "closer" and more "probable".

2.3 Legitimization in Communication

Whereas van Dijk focuses solely on discourses seeking to depict adversary parties as binary opposed, and Chilton offers an overarching scheme through which various legitimation efforts might understood, this and the following part of the paper scrutinize more specific legitimizing strategies used in social interactions.

This section draws on work of Theo van Leeuwen[62] who introduces the following four categories of legitimation: authorization, moral evaluation, rationalization, and mythopoesis. These types of discourses, van Leeuwen maintains, can be observed in societal situations in which the speaker seeks to persuade others to support her.

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[60] Cap (2008).

[61] This can be done for example by overthrowing regime labeled as dangerous.

[62] This section is basically a summary of main ideas from van Leeuwen (2007). Therefore, in this part van Leeuwen's article is explicitly referred to only when quoting specific excerpts from it.

2.3.1 Legitimization through Authorization

Van Leeuwen starts with authorization, in which case legitimation is linked either to the speaker herself, or to an impersonal, abstract concept. As for the former, van Leeuwen states that "legitimate authority is vested in a person because of their status or role in a particular institution".[63] Legitimacy is thus derived from the fact that the speaker argues as teacher, president, parent, i.e. as a person who is entitled to speak authoritatively and to be obeyed in the given situation. There is therefore no need for the speaker to offer additional reasoning, although in practice people tend to support their statements with arguments of some sort.

Another possible source of speaker's legitimacy is her being an expert in the field concerned. Authority thus does not stem from societal status, rather from being recognized as a specialist with credentials in respective area, which endows the speaker with authority to decide what should be done. Alternatively, the speaker can establish her reputation by referring to other authoritative sources relevant under circumstances.

The last strand of personal authority is called a "role model" by van Leeuwen. Model in this case refers to either members of one's group who are held in high esteem, or to widely known celebrities or leaders. What is important here is that only by virtue of association, deeds and stances of these people are worth of imitating and following: as van Leeuwen sums up, "the mere fact that these role models adopt a certain kind of behaviour, or believe certain things, is enough to legitimize the actions of their followers."[64]

Regarding impersonal authority, there are several strands of this type as well. In this case, one of possible answer to the "why" questions evoked above ('Why should we do this?' and 'Why should we do this in this way?') is "because the laws (the rules, the policies, the guidelines, etc.) say so."[65] The body of these restrictive orders thus defines what should be done.

Another obvious source of impersonal authority is tradition which might not be as institutionalized as the social norms just referred to, but which provides those who evoke it with a substantial legitimacy as it appeals to "our way of life". Discourses

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[63] Van Leeuwen (2007), pp. 94.
[64] Ibid., pp. 95.
[65] Ibid., pp. 96.

appealing to habits or customs embedded in the given society are thus powerful in terms of generating legitimacy.[66]

Lastly, van Leuween mentions authority of conformity: in this case, the speaker suggests following the way things are usually done simply because this is what "everybody else is doing it, and so should you".[67]

2.3.2. Legitimization through Moral Evaluation

Legitimacy obviously does not have to be derived only from some kind of authority, be it personal or impersonal. Van Leuween therefore then elaborates on legitimation derived from moral judgments. It should be noted that in this regard his work is closely related to van Dijk's notion of binary opposition, as van Leuween also speaks about allocation of normative values ("good" vs. "bad") as a tool to achieve justification for certain practices. Nevertheless, there are some differences from and additions to van Dijk's work.

Van Leuween reminds us that discourses conveying moral evaluation are often "not made explicit and debatable", as "[t]hey are only hinted at, by means of adjectives such as 'healthy', 'normal', 'natural', 'useful' and so on." These expressions „are then the tip of a submerged iceberg of moral values."[68] We therefore have to conduct a historical-social investigation of system of given society's values in order to be able to discover underlying discourses establishing "common sense" about what is "good" and what is "bad". What follows is an overview of types of legitimization achieved by appeal to moral values.

Simple evaluation is the most common. Nevertheless, van Leuween points out that many adjectives that contain moral judgment at the same time allocate non-normative attributes to given objects (lets consider "golden" age,[69] for instance), which serves to conceal the normative aspects and thus prevent adoption of the term from being critically discussed. Another important point is that this kind of discourse often not necessarily seeks to overtly label one's own actions as "good", but as "natural" which again curtails space for critical evaluation of this interpretation.

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[66] Similar point is made in Graham, Phil; Keenan, Thomas; Dowd, Anne-Maree, "A Call to Arms at the End of History: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of George W. Bush's Declaration of War on Terror", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 15, No. 2-3 (2004), pp. 204-208.
[67] Van Leeuwen (2007), pp. 97.
[68] Ibid., pp. 97.
[69] Ibid., 98.

Apart from straightforward evaluation, another way how to utilitize moral judgments for legitimation purposes is through abstraction. Rather then simply stating what happened, speaker can resort to expressions that partially obscure actual situation and have more positive meaning from the normative point of view. Example that is given by van Leuween concerns school attendance: "Instead of 'the child goes to school for the first time', we might say 'the child takes up independence', so that the practice of schooling is legitimized in terms of a discourse of 'independence'."[70]

Van Leuween examines analogies as a third strand of discourses that draw on morality. Actions and practices are in this instance justified not on the basis of being normatively superior themselves, but because they are depicted as linked to different phenomena deemed moral.

2.3.3. Legitimization through Rationality

Van Leuween distinguishes two main types of legitimation achieved by appeals to rationality. He firstly discusses instrumental rationality, which is derived from what Habermas calls 'strategic-utilitarian morality': the main (and very often the sole) measure of desirability of particular action is if it works and can bring about required results. Discourse of this type is thus not based on shared normative values but on "a rationality of means and ends",[71] as these calculations define which activity is worth of taking and which not.

Whereas discourses drawing on instrumental rationality aim to show that "things work", those rooted in theoretical rationalization aim to demonstrate that they represent things "the way [they] are".[72] Legitimization is in this case achieved by pointing to correspondence between factual content of utterances and "truth", which is, as we have already seen, established on the basis of either shared, "common sense" experience or, alternatively, body of scientific knowledge.

2.3.4. Legitimization through Mythopoesis

Lastly, van Leuween maintains that storytelling can be a powerful tool for gathering support for and ensuring consent with one's actions. In stories with moral

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[70] Ibid., 99.
[71] Ibid., pp. 101.
[72] Ibid., 103.

overtones, those who engage in legitimate social activities are rewarded, while in cautionary stories, on the other hand, those who act against widely embraced values are punished. This scheme thus obviously seeks to justify and promote adherence to certain ways and practices which is to be achieved by positing them in the given narrative.

2.4. Legitimation in Political Discourse

While explicitly departing from the van Leuween's just reviewed work concerned with legitimation observable in a whole range of social interactions, Antonio Reyes in his work[73] focuses solely on discourses enacted in the realm of politics. All strategies he lists are as well based on fact that "we share, as a society, certain values and visions of the world",[74] on which speakers draw.

2.4.1. Legitimization through Emotions

Reyes starts with discourses whose appeal is based on evoking emotions which effectively shapes people's perception of the world by influencing their cognitive system. To put it differently, certain words, names and labels, when used, will result in emotional reaction on the part of the audience, which is then translated into specific social practices informed by these reactions. Reyes's notions thus fully conform to the ideas referred to above which refuse to see language as neutral means to describe social reality, since framing of actors and practices is of crucial importance in terms of guidance of social behaviour. Evoking emotions is particularly salient in this regard, which makes them prone to be exploited in order to trigger certain actions.

This is especially true for fear which is, according to Reyes, one of the most powerful emotions. Employed in various contexts and situations, fear can make people do otherwise rather unthinkable things. It should be also added that Reyes refers to the already discussed dichotomy which, among others, seeks to portray "them" as entity which is to be both loathed and feared.

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[73] Reyes (2011). As was the case with the van Leuween's piece, this section presents overview of Reyes's main arguments.
[74] Reyes (2011), pp. 787.

2.4.2. Legitimization through a Hypothetical Future

This strategy is based on a discursive construction of particular relationship between past, present and future. The presence is depicted as a period during which crucial decisions must be made and steps taken, if "we" are to shield "ourselves" from future negative impacts of some event which originated in the past. Or, as Reyes sums up, "the cause of our present problem is in the past, and it now triggers imminent action in order to avoid the same problem repeating itself in the future".[75] Listeners are therefore facing two options: in the case of inaction, they will experience profoundly negative impact of the phenomenon; however, if they act according to what the speaker suggests, they will prevent these effects from materializing.

Although these scenarios are hypothetical (and therefore yet not real), they can be naturalized and established as "certain" by repeated evoking.[76] By permanent circulation of discourses suggesting the two possible results just described, the inactivity-disaster causal nexus might become socially embedded and accepted as unproblematic and obvious. This depiction has potentially far reaching political implications, as a mere possibility of a certain threat automatically invites particular reaction, generally perceived as legitimate and appropriate.

2.4.3. Legitimization through Rationality and Consensus

Although there is a convergence between Reyes and van Leuween's works on this point, Reyes offers slightly different conceptualization of rationality on which political actors often draw in order to legitimize their policies. Rationality is defined by Reyes as "a social construct within a cultural group, [...] something that 'makes sense' for the community and constitutes the 'right' thing to do."[77] Reyes maintains that in the current cultural-political context, leaders generally seek to portray policies they propose as cautious, reasonable and based on thorough deliberation, trying to avoid impression that they take hasty, short-sighted steps, since the former is more valued than the latter. In order to achieve this impression, discourses of this type often imply that the adopted policies were agreed upon by more parties which arrived to generally embraced, consensual conclusions. On the basis of these claims, the speaker is in position to

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[75] Ibid., pp. 793.
[76] See also chapter 1.
[77] Reyes (2011), pp. 797.

legitimately ask audience to support actions that can put them under considerable hardships.

This conceptualization of rationality thus does not fit neatly into categories of instrumental and theoretical rationality as introduced by van Leuween, as they do not trace legitimacy to emphasis on utilitarian value of a chosen course of action, or to correspondence between utterances and "truth", even though there is a certain connection to the former – careful deliberations preceding making decisions aim to make sure that the steps taken will lead to the required outcome. Reyes nevertheless stresses out mostly the fact that rationality is a concept which is contingent on social norms; approached this way, rationality and morality are often non-distinguishable. Reyes thus agrees with van Leuween (and others like-minded scholars) that rationality is inherently context-bounded, yet focuses more on attached normative dimensions of "rationality" itself (careful and cool-headed decision-making is generally nowadays held in a higher esteem than hasty, impulsive steps), rather than on ontological status of "truth" and its correspondence with utterances under scrutiny.

2.4.4. Legitimization through Voices of Expertise

In this regard, Reyes derives his ideas directly from the van Leuween's concept of legitimation based on authority. Reyes notes that political elites often quote and refer to those experts' opinions which are in accordance with their own statements in order to bolster their credibility, as experts are generally considered impartial professionals with extensive knowledge on discussed issues. At the same time, experts can be attributed share of blame in the case of a failure.[78]

2.4.5. Legitimization through Altruism

Finally, Reyes notes that politicians often legitimize their actions by depicting them as generally beneficial, promoting not only their own narrow group's (like political party members') interests. The speaker adopting this rhetoric seeks to shield herself from accusations of self-interest and to establish herself as an altruistic leader which image can then be used for justification of various policies. Effectiveness of such a strategy is further enhanced if the speaker succeeds in persuading the audience that the

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[78] See also Rojo; van Dijk (1997), pp. 536.

concerned policies are especially beneficial for vulnerable sectors of society, since taking care of less fortunate is widely recognized as righteous and admirable conduct.

3. Terrorism: Representations

The principles outlined in the previous sections based on critical approach towards language and its social repercussions have been applied to a wide array of disciplines, including international relations and security studies. Recently, the Al-Qaeda attacks in September 2001 and the global war on terror launched in their wake, accompanied by the US official discourse, have resulted in increasing scholarly attention to discursive construction of terrorism. Even though it is safe to state that majority of authors deal with Bush administration's depiction of terrorism, US security policies, "civilized world" etc., there is a growing body of literature concerned with similar issues in different places and contexts. Since the intended purpose of the present paper is to contribute to this research, what follows is a brief review of rhetorical schemes dealing with terrorism that can be traced world-wide, reaching beyond US officials' discourse on the war on terror.

Nevertheless, before discussing more specific properties characterizing various state discourses on terrorism, it is appropriate to offer some general remarks about the phenomenon and its discursive construction. The point of departure in this regard is a growing consensus (at least among critical scholars) that terrorism is a deeply contested concept. This is not meant to be an addition to often heard lamentations that states' representatives are unable to agree upon one single definition of terrorism, which lack of consent is said to seriously hinder counterterrorist efforts and international cooperation in this area;[79] on the contrary, this is to point out that the phenomenon of "terrorism" is often essentialized and that the label is applied indiscriminately, without, on the one hand, awareness of a specific context in which it exists and contingent forms it can take, and considering observer's own cultural, social and political bias when using the label on the other - in short, mainstream approach towards terrorism completely omits its socially constructed nature, and conceive it as "free-standing, ontologically stable phenomenon".[80] Moreover, in many cases adoption of the term by officials and elites does not often serve to simply describe group or activity, but to promote certain power interests.

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[79] For a critical discussion of this inability to arrive to generally accepted definition of terrorism see Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 100-105, and Jarvis, Lee, "The Spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2009), pp. 7-8.

[80] Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 15.

Why this is the case can be deducted from the previous chapters of this paper: "terrorism" is clearly one of primary examples of terms whose utterance has serious repercussions, it "produces" some social facts; it is no coincidence that Antonio Reyes lists terrorism as one of the labels (over)laden with deeply normative connotations.[81] It is clear that nowadays naming somebody a "terrorist" entails imposition of a profound moral stigma and leads to casting concerned groups or persons completely illegitimate actors. Employment of this label is thus often deliberate strategy, as there is a plethora of other words that could be used to describe acts of "terror", like bombing or murder.[82] Likewise, perpetrators can be conceivably defined as bandits, rebels, or, to touch upon one of the major debate in the study of terrorism, freedom fighters. But resort to language of terrorism and framing violent actions in this way almost inevitably leads to complete social exclusion of the perpetrators.

At the same time, it is remarkable that even though, as just mentioned, there is no internationally embraced definition, various official documents converge on demarcation of terrorism as conducted solely by individuals or non-state entities that adopt violence in order to influence or overthrow national governments. This effectively serves to shield states and their leaders from accusations that they engage in terrorist activities (and by extension from contempt resulting from these accusations) despite the fact that many officially sanctioned policies fulfill the other often evoked criteria of terrorism.[83] Moreover, individual states' definitions of terrorism are often vague which enables to enact repressive policies, disguised as counterterrorism measurers, against a whole range of activities deemed subversive by state institutions.[84] These findings again demonstrate that labeling in general, and naming somebody a "terrorist" in particular, can not be conceived as politically neutral, strictly objective procedure.

To illustrate the contested nature of the label, one can refer to the current intrastate conflict in Syria.[85] Bashar Assad and governmental loyalists frequently adopt

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[81] Reyes (2011), pp. 788.

[82] This point is made in Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 112-114 and in Bartolucci, Valentina, "Terrorism Rhetoric Under the Bush Administration. Discourses and Effects", *Journal of Language and Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2012), pp. 565-568.

[83] Jackson, Richard; Murphy, Eamon; Poynting, Scott, „Introduction. Terrorism, the State and the Study of Political Terror", in: Jackson et al. (eds.) (2010), pp. 1-6. Considering the topic of this paper, it is noteworthy that the State of Israel belongs among countries that have been accused of conducting terrorist campaigns against its opponents. See e.g. Nasr, Sandra, "Israel's *Other* Terrorism Challenge", in: ibid., pp. 68-85.

[84] Bartolucci, Valentina, "Analysing Elite Discourse on Terrorism and Its Implications: the Case of Morocco", *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2010), pp. 129, or Horsman (2005), pp. 200-202.

[85] The paper was written in spring 2013.

the term "terrorists" to describe anti-regime rebels. Indeed, Syrian heterogeneous opposition, composed of number of different groups, has employed means that would fall into category of terrorism as it is usually understood. Nevertheless, using the term indiscriminately in fact seeks to completely delegitimize the whole opposition as such, regardless of actual actions taken by its individual members. The fact that Assad's arguments are not endorsed by the Western countries should not divert our attention from the fact that governmental officials obviously try to adopt the label in order to further certain interests; politics of naming becomes obvious in this instance. And it also should not go unnoticed that such a contestation over labeling is rather commonplace in other countries as well.

These notions underpin the following parts of the paper which investigate various official discourses dealing with terrorism. These rhetorical strategies also constitute more concrete examples of some general discursive schemes introduced above in chapters 1 and 2.

3.1. "Us" vs. "Them"

Drawing an unbridgeable line between "us" and "them" is probably the most prominent discursive strategy employed by elites when depicting acts of terrorism, and this scheme is observable on world-wide scale, irrespectively of national boundaries – as stated by Valentina Bartolucci, "[i]n analysing recent published material on terrorism, Van Dijk's notions of 'positive self-presentation' and 'negative other-presentation' are particularly useful."[86] This should come as no surprise since tackling terrorism entails in most cases adoption of controversial measures by security agencies, which steps demand effective legitimating strategies on the part of officials.

There is thus a strong trend in various official discourses on terrorism to depict perpetrators as inherently and irreversibly "bad", as the "other" standing in direct opposition to "us",[87] although specific qualities allocated to both terrorists and governments and their representatives are culturally and contextually contingent. Several authors have thus noted that while Bush administration and its allies have

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[86] Bartolucci (2010), pp. 123.
[87] There is abundance of studies dealing with this topic. Apart from works referred to below, see also Oddo (2011).

labeled the 9/11 attackers as "uncivilized" and "barbarians", [88] elites in countries with predominantly Muslim population tend to portray terrorists with religious agenda as "unbelievers" whose acts constitute distortion and grave violation of Islam.[89]

The latter point is connected to another theme that is repeated in official discourses: even in instances when evidence strongly suggests that they are members of the domestic population, terrorists are cast "foreigners" that came from afar to conduct murderous attacks.[90] At the same time, leaders are cautious to involve in the struggle as large part of the audience as possible, very often evoking nationalistic feelings.[91] Nevertheless, in some cases, most notably in the context of the war on terror, the division between the in-group ("free world") and the out-group (terrorists and their accomplices) runs through the whole international community.[92] This attitude was famously summed up by George W. Bush's categorical statement "you are either with us, or against us."[93]

However, there are also certain variations among depictions of terrorism drawing on a binary opposition. Those with the greatest relevance for the issues examined in this thesis are firstly gravity of the (alleged) terrorist threat, and secondly the level of vilification of terrorists. As for the former, it can be stated that terrorism is in all instances depicted as a phenomenon that has a potential to severely disrupt social and political fabric of the given country.[94] But in some instances it has been further argued that acts of terror threaten not only citizens' lives and stability of specific state institutions: terrorism is portrayed as capable of bringing about a collapse of the whole civilization and abolition of widely shared norms like human dignity, freedom and democracy.[95] Indeed, these notions suggesting that global community and its values are in danger lay the foundations for imposition of the "us"-"them" division on the global scale.

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[88] See e.g. Esch, Joanne, "Legitimizing the 'War on Terror': Political Myth in Official-Level Rhetoric", *Political Psychology,* Vol. 31, No. 3 (2010), pp. 370-371, or Jackson (2007a), pp. 238.
[89] Horsman (2005), pp. 204-208, Bartolucci (2010), pp. 126-128.
[90] See e.g. Horsman (2005), pp. 205-208.
[91] Graham et al. (2004).
[92] Collet (2009).
[93] Cited in "'You Are Either with Us or against Us' ", *CNN*, November 6 (2001) (author not stated), available online at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/ (last access on May 14, 2013).
[94] Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 128-139.
[95] Jackson (2005a), pp. 156-160.

Another divergence among concrete official depictions of terrorism concerns intensity of vilification of groups and persons labeled as terrorists by state officials.[96] This can reach from, as mentioned earlier, framing perpetrators as foreign agents, to adoption of quite dehumanizing language. Russian leaders' rhetoric accompanying the fight against Chechen terrorism can very well serve as an example, as Russians described perpetrators of various attacks as "wolfs"[97] who, it logically follows, must be hunted down. Another often evoked instance of representation that deprives terrorists of traits of humanity is Bush administration's discourse on the 9/11 attackers, who were labeled "animals"; US officials further adopted language likening terrorists to diseases, such as "cancer".[98]

3.2. Obscuration of Causes of Terrorism

Another reoccurring feature, common to many official representatives' portrayal of terrorism, is a discursive step that can be called "decontextualization". Acts of terror are not conceived as a product of political struggles, but as insane acts of pure hatred. Framed in this way, terrorism is allegedly not rooted in, nor stemming from, discontent with the current establishment and political order, socio-economic grievances, and/or history of past conflict(s) between competing groups - even though it can be easily argued that all these experiences often have a profound bearing on people's decision to adopt terrorism as a strategy. However, official discourses in general silence various possible interpretations of terrorism, and the same applies to perpetrators' demands which are brushed away.[99] It is alleged that terrorists resort to violence not in order to achieve specific political goals, but just for the sake of violence itself, or out of a pure hatred.[100]

At best, terrorist actions are said to be product of radicalization or brainwashing, as happened in Morocco, where terrorist activities were depicted in a way that deprived them of any political dimension, and were said to be a result of extremist

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[96] These findings thus perfectly correspond with van Dijk's and other discourse scholars' more general notions about discourses drawing on binary opposition discussed above.
[97] Russel (2005), pp. 106.
[98] Cited in Jackson (2007c), pp. 362-363, and Jackson (2005a), pp. 154
[99] See Bartolucci (2012), pp. 565-568, and Jackson (2007a), pp. 236-238.
[100] Jackson (2005a), pp. 153-156.

indoctrination.[101] These steps as well render terrorists irrational individuals whose objectives are if not completely nonsensical, then at least politically unattainable.

In short, naming somebody a terrorist in the end effectively works to obscure any negotiable agenda she might promote, or, as Michael Batia puts it, in such cases "[c]omplex local variations, motives, histories and interrelationships are consistently played down",[102] and are further discursively overwhelmed by far-reaching simplifications that results in serious constraints on a possibility of a political dialogue.

These notions are especially relevant for discourse on "new terrorism" which is said to be inspired by religious zealotry, unlike "old terrorism" which was triggered by secular demands, be them national liberation or regime change.[103] Since nowadays terrorists seek to fulfill utopian visions which are virtually unconfined both geographically and in their aspirations (like establishment of world caliphate following sharia law in all aspects of life), there is no way these objectives could be possibly accommodated.

Moreover, religiously inspired terrorists, due to their objectives completely detached from the reality, are not inhibited from adopting extremely lethal strategies – whereas terrorists of the past had to be concerned about support from sympathetic constituencies whose interests they sought to promote, and therefore were constrained in their murderous activities, "new terrorism" does not shy away from conducting suicide attacks and even pursuing WMD. Islamist extremist groups (the most usual members of the "new terrorism" category) thus pose an extremely grave threat to most of the world as they would show no reluctance to cause mass casualties in the course of their divine mission should they have a chance to carry out such an attack.

Arbitrary nature of these claims can be demonstrated by their refusal on several grounds. To start with, in reality there is no clear cut between religious and secular groups in terms of their goals, as there is a strong historical evidence that the latter also engaged in pursuing utopian objectives when trying to introduce a global overhaul of political order.[104] Moreover, many of groups usually put in the category of "new terrorism" actually seek specific political objectives like ending of foreign occupation or

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[101] Bartolucci (2010), pp. 126-128.
[102] Bhatia (2005), pp. 16.
[103] Critical overview of the "new terrorism" argument can be found, among others, in Jackson (2007b), or in Gunning, Jeroen; Jackson, Richard "What's So 'Religious' about 'Religious Terrorism'?", *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (2011), pp. 369-388.
[104] Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 169.

removal of national governments.[105] As for the WMD, it can be easily argued that to obtain such weapons is extremely costly and requires high level of expertise, both kinds of assets usually unavailable to non-state groups, which means that the threat of "new terrorism" is not as grave as many experts and officials claim.[106] These arguments are raised here not to establish a definitive truth claiming that religious-inspired terrorism is completely abundant and analytically useless category (even though this might be easily the case), rather to illustrate once again that narratives and politics are inextricably intertwined.

3.3. Drawing on Embedded Narratives

It has been discussed above that elites in their speeches and utterances often draw on already accepted discourses in order to reinforce appeal of their messages by invoking salient narratives. Depictions of terrorism by officials are very illustrative in this regard, as there are many instances in which terrorism and governmental responses are framed in a way which connects them to widely shared interpretation of the past that "assign particular meanings to the events and provide a very specific kind of contextual framework for their interpretation."[107]

It should be noted that what follows is not necessarily in contradiction with the argument of the previous section which showed that acts of terrorism are often discursively deprived of political context in which they take place. It is quite conceivable that elites simultaneously strive to portray their terrorist opponents as irrational individuals without negotiable political agenda, and assign the same actors a prototypical role present in a culturally embedded narrative, as under some circumstances these steps can reinforce each other. One can also argue that officials have several strategies at their disposal, and can switch between them freely to a certain degree, evoking different conceptualizations at different times.

Several authors have pointed out that even though discourse concerned with the recent US counterterrorism policies is quite novel in some respects, in other areas there is a considerable level of continuity in terms of narrative consistency. Depicting Islamic

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[105] Crenshaw, Martha, "'New' Vs. 'Old' Terrorism: A Critical Appraisal", in: Coolsaet, Rik (ed.), *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008), pp. 27-30.
[106] Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 136-139.
[107] Jackson (2005b), pp. 31.

terrorists as "savages" threatening civilization draws on a whole body of ideas and deeply engrained imagination of the American people: figure of a "savage" has been present in the American public consciousness from the very beginning of European colonization of North America, firstly being embodied by the often hostile Indian indigenous population.[108] Lately, this label was attached to other enemies, like Germans during the First World War, or Asian people in general, and Japanese in particular, in the first half of 20th century;[109] subsequently, during the Cold War, it was the USSR which was depicted as a source of threat for the "civilization". Seen in this light, it can be argued that Muslim extremists were simply assigned the already established role of a ruthless enemy whose qualities are in direct contrast with those of Americans, rather than occupying a newly constructed category of "savages".

Similarly, depicting the United States as a beacon of reason and civilization, as a "chosen nation" with "divine mission", is a very salient feature of American self-definition, and Bush administration's discourse invoking current threats to these values could thus strongly resonate within the American audience.[110] Closely related discursive source providing legitimation for controversial measures is adherence to principles of American "civil religion" which, in words of Chang and Mehan, "is associated with the myths represented in the Declaration of Independence, especially with the notions of liberty, equality, justice, and human happiness which has profound influence on molding US discourse."[111] By appealing to this set of values and adopting buzzwords from the shared political lexicon, the Bush administration ensured it did not face any serious obstacles when striving for public endorsement of its post-9/11 policies. Furthermore, the war on terror was depicted as sharing important features with America's previous "just wars" like the Second World War,[112] and such framing endows it with a considerable level of legitimation.

Even though US official rhetoric related to the post-9/11 era has received most of the scholarly attention, there are authors who deal with discourses enacted in non-American milieu as well. Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah have for example demonstrated that when describing its conflict with the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government had

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[108] For discussion of image of a "savage" in American history see Ivie (2005).

[109] Apart from Ivie's piece, see the following article dealing with this issue: MacDougall, Robert, "Red, Brown and Yellow Perils: Images of the American Enemy in the 1940s and 1950s", *The Journal of Popular Culture*, Vol. 32, pp. 59-75.

[110] Esch (2010).

[111] Chang; Mehan (2006), pp. 3.

[112] For example, John Oddo (2011) discerns number of parallels between Roosevelt's war-time speeches and statements of George W. Bush following the 9/11 attacks. See also Jackson (2005b), pp. 41-44.

adopted conceptualization of Tamil ethnicity which originated in the 1970s, and which back then, as well as 30 years later, featured highly negative properties defining Tamils.[113]

The Russian narrative of Chechen terrorism drawing extensively on legacy of the Tsarist and Soviet eras is also a case in point: the 19th century picture of Chechens as ruthless warriors whose stiff resistance must be met by even tougher stance and employment of considerable force largely informed the Russian leaders' depiction of the contemporary conflict in Chechnya. The same can be said about Soviet portrayal of Chechens who harbored deep repulsion towards the regime, refused to subordinate to Moscow, and engaged extensively in black market thriving in the communist empire.[114]

To stay in a geographically close region, official depictions of terrorism in Central Asian states seem to be stemming from narratives and practices enacted during the Soviet era as well. As described by Horsman, "[t]he evolutionary nature of the transition means that Soviet discourses, experiences and policies have not been entirely jettisoned by the successor regimes."[115] He especially points to paranoia reigning among ruling elites, who keep constructing anti-regime conspiracy networks which are allegedly sponsored from abroad and whose members plan to carry out terrorist attacks. Infamous Stalinist show trials mentality and rhetoric thus still weighs on the contemporary political reality in some Central Asian countries. [116]

3.4. Reframing: Discursive Linkages to the War on Terror

The previous section has shown that drawing on earlier, embedded discourses is something that one comes across when examining depictions of terrorism in various countries reaching from Sri Lanka to Russia. Launch of the US-led war on terror has given impetus to yet another trend observable among discourses molded by state officials.

Despite decline of its power, the US still retains prominent position in the world system, and as such its assistance and support is still very much sought. Moreover, the narrative portraying the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath as a struggle for civilization has obtained a world-wide currency and can be quite easily exploited as a legitimation tool

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[113] Nadarajah; Sriskandarajah (2005), pp. 90-91.
[114] Russel (2005), pp. 102-105.
[115] Horsman, (2005), pp. 208
[116] Ibid., pp. 208-209.

by elites from other countries. Seen in this light, it can be easily explained why some governments have made significant effort to frame their struggle against terrorism as a part of the US-led war against terrorism.

Maybe surprisingly, one of the countries whose leaders consistently tried to link their counterterrorism campaigns to the global war against Al-Qaeda was Russia. As John Russell points out, since the Russian government was at the time facing growing fatigue with the war in Chechnya, "attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 came at a juncture that was extremely fortunate for the Russian leader [Vladimir Putin]", since "[a]lmost overnight, Russia became a key partner of the USA and its allies in the common struggle […] against a common foe - Islamic fundamentalism",[117] which fact also effectively shielded the Russian establishment from most of foreign criticisms pointing to excessive brutality of Russian troops operating in Chechnya. Indeed, Russian officials were quick to adopt rhetorical totalizing figures of the Bush administration when they depicted Islamist groups in Caucasus as threat to the "civilized world".[118] Chechen groups were portrayed as a part of the global terrorist network, closely linked to Osama Bin Laden, and were said to be joined by fighters from the Middle East.[119]

Michael Blathia then lists Uzbekistan, Egypt and Algeria as other examples of countries whose governments have tried to frame their counterterrorism operations as a part of the war on terror led by the United States by emphasizing jihadist elements of groups they fought.[120] As Blathia states, the common rationale behind these rhetorical efforts "is to make local conflicts and armed movements appear as either one big Al-Qaeda or as a series of small Al-Qaedas united in purpose, and as all part of or directly linked to those who attacked the USA on 9/11",[121] which interpretation aims to endow respective governments with world-wide support for their counterterrorism policies.

Given the topic of this thesis, it should be added that number of authors have mentioned Israel among those countries whose leaders took advantage of the American declaration of the war on terror to promote their own interests, policies and

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[117] Russel (2005), pp. 110.
[118] Cited in Campana, Aurélie; Légaré, Kathia, "Russia's Counterterrorism Operation in Chechnya: Institutional Competition and Issue Frames", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 34 (2011), pp. 51.
[119] Russel (2005), pp. 110, and Campana; Légaré (2011), pp. 51-54.
[120] Bhatia (2005), pp. 13.
[121] Ibid.

interpretations.[122] As outlined in the introduction, this discursive link constructed by Israeli officials will be examined in detail in chapter 6.

3.5. Effects of Discursive Construction of Terrorism

Many authors have persuasively showed that the assemblage of discourses on terrorism that has been just discussed results in forging an overarching construction with serious repercussions. As already suggested, by removing acts of terrorism from context of specific political struggles and grievances, their perpetrators' goals are rendered not negotiable. Since terrorists are depicted as irrational fanatics driven by hatred, there is virtually no way their demands can be accommodated (as summed up in the often adopted "we do not negotiate with terrorists" stance) and as such, only force can contain and defeat them. This framing thus directly leads to privileging of violent, war-like means when struggling with terrorism.[123]

At the same time, since terrorist groups' members are cast as irreversibly evil "outsiders", in many instances even located at the very edge of the human community, methods that can be used against them encompass otherwise unthinkable or at least very disputable measures.[124] Profoundly negative representation thus enables enactment of highly controversial policies against terrorists, as well as against states and populations that are said to harbor them, reaching from "enhanced interrogation techniques",[125] effectively constituting torture, to spread of surveillance throughout the public space, to toppling hostile regimes.[126] These policies are often legitimized, apart from favorable portrayal of "us" who are pushed into these actions by inherently evil "them", by drawing on ingrained discourses and narratives.

In the conclusion of this section concerned with official discourses on terrorism, it can be stated that all these notions further highlight arguments made earlier in the thesis, pointing to language as constitutive rather than simply descriptive phenomenon.

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[122] See e.g. Anderson, James, "American Hegemony after 11 September: Allies, Rivals and Contradictions", *Geopolitics*, Vol. 8, No. 3 (2003), pp. 48-50, or Peteet (2005), pp. 156.
[123] Bartolucci (2012), pp. 568–573, Leudar et al. (2004), pp. 246-256.
[124] Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 112-114.
[125] Jackson (2007c).
[126] For more elaboration on this specific issue see Chang, Gordon; Mehan, Hugh, "Why we must attack Iraq: Bush's reasoning practices and argumentation system", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2008), pp. 453-482. See also Dunmire, Patricia L, "'9/11 Changed Everything': An Intertextual Analysis of the Bush Doctrine", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2009), pp. 195-222.

State representatives' depictions of political violence perpetrated by non-state actors do not reflect reality in some straightforward manner; on the contrary, there are vested interests of various officials inextricably linked to images of terrorism. The empirical chapters of this thesis draw on these findings when examining the Israeli official discourse during the Second Intifada.

4. Methodology, Data and Operationalization

4.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is quite specific among methodologies used in social sciences, as there is no clear line between methodology itself on the one hand and theoretical foundations on the other. CDA thus should not be conceived as a tool to confirm/falsify concepts and theoretical frameworks concerned with relationship between language, society and power that were introduced in the first chapter of this paper - CDA rather directly departs from these notions. In other words, ideas about constitutive role of language are not something that is the primary object of a scientific scrutiny utilizing CDA - these ideas are themselves indispensable and crucial part of the CDA method itself. I will therefore repeat some of the points raised earlier in the paper throughout this section introducing the methodology used for the later analysis, but will limit these reiterations to cases when doing so is necessary for understanding the method.

Apart from the impossibility to clearly distinguish between theory and method, another peculiar characteristic of CDA is a lack of its precise definition and clearly demarcated body of concrete methods. As observed by Meyers, "[i]t is generally agreed that CDA must not be understood as a single method but rather as an approach";[127] van Dijk further adds that CDA rather than being "a direction, school, or specialization […] aims to offer a different 'mode' or 'perspective'."[128] There is thus a whole spectrum of more specific methodological procedures which can be possibly employed by CDA scholars, who also differ on some of theoretical foundations guiding their investigations.[129]

Nevertheless, it is possible to discern several features and assumptions which are shared by vast majority of authors employing CDA in their studies. The basic, unifying characteristic is CDA's concern with power and ways how power is produced and maintained in language.[130] Seen from this perspective, texts are not to be conceived as a mere sum of information, but as tools enabling social exclusion and establishing

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[127] Meyer, Michael, "Between Theory, Method, and Politics: Positioning of the Approaches to CDA", in: Wodak; Meyer (eds.) (2009), pp. 14.
[128] Van Dijk (2003), pp. 352.
[129] Meyer (2009), pp. 18-20.
[130] See Wodak, Ruth, "What CDA Is about – A Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its Developments", in: Wodak; Meyer (eds.) (2009), pp. 2, or van Dijk (2003), pp. 353-354.

dominance of some groups over others.[131] CDA thus aims to discover how various discourses contribute to social and political inequality - indeed, this is the *critical* component of discourse analysis.

These notions are based on a shared conviction that language has a constitutive social role. This is not to claim that there is a direct casual relationship between use of language and social action, but to see semantic structures as enabling or prohibiting these actions to a certain degree. Language is inextricably linked to social reality, yet can be distinguish from other social practices it informs.[132] But because language can not be seen as neutral means of communication, it is worth to examine how certain discourses maintain dominance and exclusion.

Another aspect of CDA important for this thesis is that it considers individual texts inseparable from their context.[133] Again, context is conceived differently by individual scholars scrutinizing impact of language on power relations, some of them focusing for example on speakers' intonation, surroundings in which utterances take place, accompanying gestures etc. Nevertheless, in the present thesis I will focus predominantly on socio-political context of discourse under scrutiny, i.e. context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or more specifically on context of the unprecedented wave of Palestinian terrorist attacks followed by harsh Israeli countermeasures. The purpose of this enterprise is to investigate the discourse in question in its historically and politically situated milieu, rather than as free standing body of texts.

Apart from these widely shared foundations, there are more specific notions pertaining to CDA that are important for purposes of the present paper, one of which is Van Dijk's concept of political implicatures. Political implicatures aim to, as put (somewhat bluntly) by van Dijk, "*explain* […] why political participants say the things they do."[134] This approach thus (rightly in my opinion) assumes that particular discourse belongs to a repertoire of political tools, and is deliberately used to further certain (not necessarily discursive) goals. Therefore, "[discourse] analysis should not be limited to structural features of text and talk, but should also account for their conditions and

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[131] Van Dijk (1993), pp. 254-257.

[132] For a more detailed discussion see Beneš, Vít, "Diskurzivní analýza", in: Drulák (ed.) (2008), pp. 101-102 [in Czech], or Chilton, Paul, "Missing Links in Mainstream CDA: Modules, Blends and the Critical Instinct", in: Wodak, Ruth; Chilton, Paul, *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity* (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2005), pp. 23.

[133] Meyer (2009), pp. 15-16.

[134] Van Dijk (2005), pp. 70, emphasis in original.

functions in the political process."[135] In short, the concept of political implicatures points to the political significance of discourses produced by elites and other actors.

Lastly, this paper draws on Norman Fairclough's notion of intertextuality which maintains that various texts tend to refer to each other (although this linkage is often only implicit), as well as to draw on certain overarching discursive structures.[136] Indeed, these references enable establishment of a coherent discourse with reoccurring schemes and topics in the first place.

4.2. Membership Categorization Analysis

As outlined in the introduction, apart from other goals this thesis seeks to investigate which qualities were both Palestinians and Israelis associated with in the Israeli official discourse. Therefore, this paper employs Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA) along with CDA in order to accomplish this task, as utilizing MCA seems very promising in this regard.

History of MCA dates back to 1960s when it was introduced by Harvey Sacks. Even though MCA as developed by Sacks was originally largely an ethnographic method[137] with only limited utility for international relations or security studies, it had been later partially modified to some degree by scholars interested in international politics to fit their research interests.[138] It can be argued that one of the major shifts brought about by this research reorientation is an increased focus on deliberate attempts to frame others as incumbents of a certain group, rather than dealing with more unconscious categorization enacted by individuals. Given the paper's topic, it is not surprising that I draw mostly on these more recent developments within MCA.

Ivan Leudar and his colleagues define MCA as "a formal analysis of the procedures people employ to make sense of other people and their activities'".[139] This method is based on the observation that people, when encountering complex social reality, tend to set up "taken-for-granted"[140] categories into which they subsequently position other people. Nevertheless, some authors maintain that even though MCA

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[135] Ibid., pp. 66.
[136] See Fairclough (1995), pp. 187-191.
[137] See Stokoe, Elizabeth, "Moving Forward with Membership Categorization Analysis: Methods for Systematic Analysis", *Discourse Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2012), pp. 277-303.
[138] See e.g. Leudar et al. (2004), pp. 243-266, Oddo (2011), or Collet (2009).
[139] Leudar et al. (2004), pp. 244.
[140] Fitzgerald, Richard, "Membership Categorization Analysis: Wild and Promiscuous or Simply the Joy of Sacks?", *Discourse Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2012), pp. 305.

originally dealt primarily with categorization of people, it can be employed also to analyze how we approach inanimate entities like for example middle class, bank, or state.[141]

What should be stressed here is that there are obviously always more possible categories into which a person can be situated (like male, worker, European, Christian, Briton, Westerner), and MCA aims to investigate this process of positioning and preferring one particular category over other.[142] This is intimately linked to the fact that each category is associated with certain characteristics: as stated by John Oddo, "categories are constituted by category-bound activities, i.e. activities that are thought to be characteristic of the category, as well as by category-bound predicates, such as aims, beliefs or values".[143] Membership categories thus serve as "prior resources for talking about people",[144] working effectively as a "shorthand" suggesting what is to be expected from incumbents of a given category – Sacks famously used an example of mother picking up crying baby exactly *because* she was baby's mother (i.e. incumbent of a "mother category"), and was therefore expected to take this particular action under the given circumstances.[145]

Therefore, categorization is a highly normative enterprise because it endows incumbents of given categories with certain qualities, invokes a priori judgments, and defines activities in which categories' members are expected to engage. Also, as pointed by Leudar and Nekvapil, apart from putting people into certain pre-existing groups, the process of categorization simultaneously enables to exclude them from other groups.[146] Link between MCA and CDA is here becoming clearly visible – categorization is far from being only descriptive and neutral: on the contrary, it can be very easily exploited for power interests, as has been documented by several scholars.

This brief overview of MCA hints at two basic tasks this method aims to accomplish when dealing with utterances or texts which are concerned with categorization of some sort.[147] First, MCA aims to discern to which larger collectivities are people discursively put in, and from which they are excluded. Second, this kind of

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[141] Collet (2009), pp. 459.
[142] Beneš (2008), pp. 108.
[143] Oddo (2011), pp. 459.
[144] Leudar, Ivan; Nekvapil, Jiří, "Presentations of Romanies in the Czech Media: On Category Work in Television Debates", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2000), pp. 492.
[145] Sack's argument is quoted in Housley, William; Fitzgerald, Richard, "Membership Categorization, Culture and Norms in Action", *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2009), pp. 348.
[146] Leudar; Nekvapil (2000), pp. 491-492.
[147] Ibid., pp. 491.

investigation analyzes predicates attached to these categories which enable to construct them in the first place; MCA thus seeks to discern what qualities define given categories, on what basis is categorization established.

4.3. Data Collection

Lack of clearly defined CDA methods becomes clearly visible when it comes to collection of data, as there is no generally agreed upon way ho conduct this initial phase of research. Some authors tend to collect as large corpus of various texts as possible, ranging from media reports to official documents.[148] The present thesis, however, adopts more modest approach, focusing on a rather small number of texts. The rationale behind this decision is that unlike works which examine highly extensive, complex discourses, this thesis focuses on a much more demarcated body of texts dealing with quite specific and narrow topic. It can be therefore assumed that even a limited corpus contains structures, arguments and schemes typical for the whole given discourse.[149]

The sample to be examined in this paper has been collected from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) official website. More specifically, one of its sections features English transcripts of numerous speeches and interviews given by Israeli officials dealing with Palestinian terrorism and Israeli policies since the outbreak of the Second Intifada. These data were used for the purposes of the present paper which deals with approximately sixty texts which originated in the period from March 2001 to April 2002. This roughly one-year span was chosen on the assumption that the Al-Qaeda attacks against Israel's closest ally in September 2001 brought about novel schemes in the Israeli official discourse during this period, and the said sample should thus enable to determine if there were truly any considerable shifts and discontinuities in Israeli state representatives' discursive strategies prior to and after the 9/11 attacks. The texts which originated during March and April 2002 were included in the analysis in order to examine Israeli officials' description of events related to the operation Defensive Shield, a major operation launched in late March 2002 during which Israeli army reoccupied Palestinian cities and refugee camps in the West Bank and Gaza

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[148] Work of Ruth Wodak and her colleagues on construction of the Austrian national identity serves as primary example of such an approach. For a brief review of this project see Beneš (2008), pp. 109-116.
[149] See Meyer (2009), pp. 25.

strip,[150] as it can be expected that such a massive deployment of force was accompanied by intensive legitimation discourse. The complete list of speeches with a description and date of origin adopted from the website is to be found in Appendix I. The list also features codes assigned to every speech, interview and statement which will be used throughout the paper to identify individual texts along with a name of specific speaker.

Although it has been already mentioned in the introduction, it should be stressed here again that the examined texts were largely meant for foreign audience's consumption. Even speeches given on the Israeli soil were, it can be assumed, in most cases recorded by foreign press and globally disseminated, as they were generally given during visits of foreign statesmen with substantial foreign press coverage, and majority of the interviews recorded at the Israeli MFA's website were conducted by non-Israeli media outlets as well. It can be thus anticipated that these speeches differ quite widely in their content and tone from those addressed solely to the Israeli population. Nevertheless, some of messages recorded at the MFA website are seemingly also meant for Israeli domestic audience, like interviews for Israeli media or speeches at the Knesset, the Israeli parliament. However, I still maintain that even these texts were meant largely for foreign consumption. My argument to uphold this is twofold. Firstly, some of the concerned statements are clearly so significant that they were most likely expected to be translated to number of other languages (this applies for example to Prime Minister's addresses to the nation). Secondly, the very fact that the transcripts of statements and interviews are available at the website (which serves to familiarize the reader with the Israeli official stance towards various issues related to foreign and security policies) says something on its own, as it means that they were considered conforming to a more general way of argumentation (i.e. discourse) depicting Israeli actions in a positive light.

Speakers and interviewees under scrutiny encompass then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, leading Israeli politicians at the time; apart from these two statesmen, the list of speakers includes also Labor Party member Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, who served as the Defence Minister during the concerned period, and high ranking military officers. Now, it can be conceivably argued that such a limited number of speakers constitute an obstacle for studying the Israeli official discourse in its entirety, but I hold that the rather low number of speakers included

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[150] For a critical account of the Operation Defensive Shield see Hammami, Rema, "Interregnum. Palestine After Operation Defensive Shield", *Middle East Report*, No. 223 (2002), pp. 18-27.

should not be really seen as a shortcoming raising serious doubts about validity of the later analysis. To start with, one can reiterate the point just raised: the very fact that the speeches were chosen to be recorded at the Israeli state-sponsored official website suggests that they accurately represent the whole discourse this paper seeks to investigate. Also, given that the messages were meant to influence foreign audiences, it is reasonable to expect that speeches given by the top political representatives are in this regard much more salient compared to those given by low cadres and rank-and-file officials, whose media appearances in general do not really attract attention abroad. Last but not least, the speakers just named in fact represent the whole mainstream political scene, reaching from the Labor Party's prominent member Shimon Peres to hardliner Sharon from Likud, and this should ensure that examined texts capture positions of dominant streams within Israeli politics.

4.4. Operationalization

A preliminary scrutiny of the texts constituting examined discourse has discerned that a process of categorization of Israelis and Palestinians, i.e. positioning them into discursively constructed groups is conducted on the basis of two set of properties. The most important characteristic defining both conflicting parties is their attitude towards peace and violence. The other categorization is in the examined discourse established through "civilizational" traits Israelis and Palestinians allegedly display. What follows is a more elaborate operationalization of these two categorization shcemes which will be used in the next chapter to discern what properties Israeli officials associate with both peoples.

4.4.1. Categorization based on Attitude towards Peace and Violence

In this case, the primary categorization determinant is behaviour observable during disputes or struggles, specifically adherence to peace and/or violence. There is indeed a whole plethora of constellations in this regard, but I propose two basic categories: the category of "peace-loving" people on the one hand, and that of "peace rejectionists" on the other. Even though I admit these are quite clear-cut categories and that there are possible inner stratifications within them, I maintain that for analytical purposes this categorization is still conceivable and reasonable.

The category of "peace loving" people encompasses those individuals and groups who adopt peaceful means to resolve conflicts, propose diplomatic solutions, and are open to external efforts to quell hostilities without additional physical violence. Nevertheless, incumbents of this category can resort to force in the case their security is profoundly compromised, as it can not be expected they would let their adversaries annihilate them. But they generally refrain from violence and in rare instance when they are pushed into fighting back they seek to minimize damage they impose, which means their counter-steps are restrained and moderate, aiming solely to divert the threat.

The "peace rejectionists" category then features largely opposite qualities. Members of this category employ violence even in instances in which they could accomplish their goals by solely diplomatic means. Use of force is thus not the last resort as was the case with the previous category, but rather a result of aggressive nature of the category's incumbents who are starkly opposed to any agreements that can lead to calm.

Of course, this construction must be necessarily seen as a reduction of the social reality in which human actions can not be classified in such a neat manner. However, we have seen that MCA assumes that the process of categorization inevitably brings about simplification of complex relations, attitudes and inclinations. Moreover, this dichotomist conceptualization is defendable on the basis of what has been discussed in the previous chapters: binary juxtaposition is the most common portrayal of situation in which "we" (the group to which the speaker belongs) face "them" (the other group), which notions are highly relevant for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict whose depiction by Israeli officials is examined in this paper.

4.4.2. Categorization Pertaining to Civilization Properties

This category is defined by more heterogeneous set of qualities than the previous one, as people and nations are in this case defined by what I have called "civilizational" properties. Indeed, the term civilization is rather ambiguous label with multitude of possible meanings. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, I adopt a definition which identifies "civilization" with qualities which are generally, albeit somewhat naively, associated with the West and its institutions.

In terms of underpinning values, "civilization" in this sense stands basically for ideas derived loosely from the era of Enlightenment, represented by liberalism, freedom

and respect for multiplicity of opinions. Regarding the political regime, these ideological foundations are translated into democratic system which enables to accommodate varying, conflicting positions. Related principle is connected to harmless conduct and intentions – even though there is a certain proximity with the other categorization in this respect, it can be distinguished from the notions above, since benignity is in this case derived from the values just discussed: liberal regimes do not suppress their domestic dissent, as well as mostly refrain from use of force in relations with other countries, since stifling public debates or dominating others would go against the values they promote.

Yet another characteristic attached to "civilization" in the sense adopted here refers to economic and technological development. Indeed, progressivism in these areas is one of the main properties associated with "civilization", which serves as a beacon for backward countries by displaying achievements its inhabitants enjoy. These conditions are result of cultural and intellectual milieu characterized by open-mindness and sensitivity to all potentially beneficial propositions and ideas.

Categorization pertaining to the notion of "civilization" is determined by the level of adherence to/disrespect towards the discussed values and institutions. Even though in reality there is always continuum rather than ruptures in regards to the level of endorsement of certain ideas and principles, I propose that there are two basic categories related to predicates and activities just discussed (again, this simplification can be further justified by arguments raised in the previous section). These two categories are for the purposes of the present paper named simply as "civilized" and "non-civilized", depending on embracement of and displaying the qualities just named.

It might be objected that given the plethora of properties constituting the category, particular entities (nations, countries) can be simultaneously both "civilized" on the basis of some qualities and "un-civilized" in other respects. However, I maintain that those who "earn" the label of "civilization" fulfill all the criteria, since the properties are actually quite intimately linked to each other, as the underpinning values determine not only personal conduct, but also political system and economic and scientific performance of incumbents of the "civilized" category. Therefore, I assume that when saying "civilization", one is referring to an entity characterized by all relevant properties. This interpretation also implies that failure to display any single of these qualities is indicative of an "uncivilized" character of the given group.

5. Categorization of Israelis and Palestinians in the Official Israeli Discourse

After outlining the theoretical foundations informing the research and introducing methodology used in the paper, the thesis now proceeds to analysis of the Israeli official discourse during the Second Intifada. As stated in the introduction, it is divided in three parts. This chapter deals with categorization of both Israelis and Palestinians in the discourse, focusing mostly on allocation of properties to the respective groups. The next chapter then shows how were in the post-9/11 era these depictions used to discursively transform the local Israeli-Palestinian struggle into a part of the global war on terror, and how were they exploited to link Israelis and Palestinians to respective camps in this US-led international campaign. The last chapter is concerned with specific legitimating strategies employed by Israeli officials.

In what follows I thus deal with a question what beliefs, aims and activities Israeli representatives associate with Israelis and Palestinians, and how these properties serve to categorize both peoples. Nevertheless, the paper goes beyond simple reconstruction of the discourse, as it discloses arbitrary nature of some of the claims Israeli officials make, as well as points to depictions' strategic function in the struggle for international support and recognition.

A detailed examination of texts under scrutiny has revealed that there are two main axes along which Israelis and Palestinians are defined, the first being attitude towards violence, while the second concerns "civilizational" traits. With regards to the first set of characteristics, Israelis are positioned as a moderate nation yearning for peace, while Palestinians, on the other hand, are constructed as a people engaged in terrorism and rejecting any meaningful compromise. As for the second category, Israelis are depicted as a people fulfilling criteria of a "civilized" nation, in which task Palestinians largely fail.

5.1. Categorization of Israelis

Based on what has been just stated, the enquiry into categorization in the Israeli official discourse is concerned with two set of properties. Firstly, I show that Israelis are cast incumbents of the "peace loving" category; in the following section it will be demonstrated that they are also positioned as "civilized" nation.

5.1.1. Israelis as Peace Loving Nation

This section of the paper investigates by which means Israeli officials established themselves and their fellow citizens as members of the "peace loving" category. The section is divided into two parts which follow the main lines of argumentation traceable in the examined discourse, focusing firstly on the depiction of Israelis' position towards peace, and then on the nature of their reactions to Palestinian terrorism.

5.1.1.1. Israelis' Attitude towards Peace

Unifying element of a vast majority of the examined speeches and interviews is a depiction of Israelis as yearning for peace, which can be demonstrated by the following excerpts:

All of Israel seeks peace. (TE3, Ariel Sharon)

We in Israel are all committed to peace. As one who saw in the past all the horrors, the wars, I believe I understand the importance of peace, and in Israel, all of us are committed. (TE4, Ariel Sharon)

Israel is determined to bring an end to the violence and to bring a beginning to peace. Actually, we would like to stop violence as soon as possible because we are interested to start the negotiation at the earliest possible date. (TE8, Shimon Peres)

Israel is committed to peace. We are all committed to peace. (TE26, Ariel Sharon)

Israel is a peace-loving country and our hand has always been extended in peace towards our neighbors. Today we want to continue following the path to peace. We want peace with our Palestinian neighbors, a real peace, a peace for generations, the Israeli generations as well as the Palestinian generations. As

one who took part in all of Israel's campaigns, and as one who has experienced the horrors of war and its pains, I understand how important peace is. (TE35, Ariel Sharon)

We are an optimistic, peace-seeking people […] (TE64, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

In these (and number of other) speeches, the audience is being repeatedly assured that Israel sincerely strives for end of hostilities and that, as stated in TE8, Israelis are eager to launch negotiations immediately. Adherence to and admiration of peace is thus in the case of Israelis the most important category-bound predicate, i.e. "belief or value"[151] that defines the group. These claims should come as no surprise, since, as already noticed, the State of Israel was at that time facing fierce international criticism accusing the Israeli political and security establishment of escalating the conflict by employing indiscriminate and excessively harsh measures. The insistence on Israel's peaceful nature thus aims to dispel these charges by convincing international audience about Israelis' benign intentions. The just cited excerpts testify that this portrayal is maintained by Israeli officials regardless of speakers' political affinity: construction of Israel as a peace seeking nation is consensus shared by the whole political specter.

Those who will benefit from the attainment of peace nevertheless do not include only Israeli citizens – as stated in TE35, Palestinians will profit from stop of hostilities as well. This quote thus hints at another legitimation strategy employed in the Israeli official discourse, appeals to altruism, which will be investigated later on.

Moreover, we can observe that in TE4 the speaker, the then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, supports claims about Israelis' yearning for peace by evoking his own experience with war and suffering it inevitably causes, suggesting that these are honest confessions based on his personal history of former soldier, rather than a mere rhetorical exercise by calculating politician. These assertions thus aim to further enhance reliability of the overall message.

After establishing Israel as a country whose primary interests lie in achieving peace, Israeli officials proceed to support their claims with concrete evidence:

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[151] Leudar et al. (2004), pp. 264.

I want to say that Israel has accepted the Mitchell Report on all its points, including the four-step sequence of the implementation: ceasefire, cooling off period, confidence building measures, and a comeback to the political negotiations in order to attain full-fledged peace. (TE15, Shimon Peres)

We decided to begin some of these activities [envisioned in the Tenet agreement] not in the second day of this period but actually to begin it today and to do some other things beyond what we were expected - like, for example, to open the international passages in Allenby Bridge from the Jordan River and in Rafah between Israel and Egypt [...] And as I said, since Tuesday morning when our Prime Minister decided to accept it as it is, we are fully committed to carry out and to implement whatever is written in this document. (TE22, Giora Eiland)[152]

We are committed to the Mitchell report in its sequence, according to sequence. We adopted the Mitchell report and we received the Tenet document, Tenet plan. (TE24, Ariel Sharon)

We placed our confidence in the arrival of General Zinni, a professional military man, who took his mission very seriously and made an enormous effort to promote a cease-fire and to get the Tenet process underway. (TE56, Ariel Sharon)

These speeches refer to various American peace proposals, from the Mitchell Report drafted in April 2001, to the Tenet Plan from the same year, to the mission of American general Zinni conducted in early 2002. What unites these texts is Israeli leaders' apparent acceptance of and support for these initiatives, with a clear goal to vividly show that Israelis are genuinely interested in peace which is to be brought about by the said proposals.

In the case of Mitchell Report, it is argued that Israel is already following the envisioned course of peace negotiations as it has repeatedly declared unilateral ceasefire. One does not necessarily have to dispute Israelis' consent to stop their operations against Palestinians at particular moments. What can be rather pointed out is

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[152] Eiland served as the Head of the IDF Operation Branch during the Second Intifada.

that by putting such a stress on embracement of immediate ceasefire, Israeli officials divert attention from less direct and more structural violence to which is the Palestinian population exposed in the occupied territories, which arguably fuels Palestinians' hatred towards Israel and thus reinforces popular appeal of terrorist organizations that can then more easily recruit new members. It can be also added that temporal halt of retaliatory measures does not say anything about their excessive nature that had been mostly criticized in the first place. These issues are unsurprisingly never discussed by Israeli leaders who are mostly referring to their peaceful intentions, and who generally gloss over or downplay the impact of Israeli policies on Palestinians' lives.

To further bolster claims about Israelis' engrained peacefulness, Israeli leaders show willingness to talk not only to their allies, but to representatives of Arab states as well:

In regard to the proposal, I hope that no one expects that when Saudi Arabia suggests a plan, then it is our job to say 'Yes'. This would be inconceivable. Let there be no doubt - we are ready to sit with the Saudis, as we are willing to do with every Arab country and every official Arab representative. (TE50, Shimon Peres)

In this speech it is admitted that Israelis look at Arab states' peace proposals with some level of suspicion. Yet, despite this hesitation, Israeli leaders are willing to listen to the Saudi plan and weigh its merits. The initial caution in dealing with long-term enemies thus effectively serves to enhance Israeli alleged peacefulness, as Israel's desire to halt violence can overcome even engrained hostility and mistrust. The overall tone of the speech suggests that talks with Saudis might very possibly end without any tangible results, but the act of considering the proposal itself renders Israel even more open-minded when it comes to the question of peace.

This depiction is also bolstered by pointing to historical precedents:

The fact is that we made peace with Egypt, we made peace with Jordan, and 20 years ago we could hardly have dreamed of. (TE29, Shimon Peres)

Actually, we made peace with two countries. We left the territory of a third country and we offered agreement to a fourth country. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

By the way, we gave back to the Egyptians all their land and all their water - without terror. We did likewise to the Jordanians. We offer the Palestinians an independent state, their full land actually, a position in Jerusalem. (TE62, Shimon Peres)

The texts above mention peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan that were concluded in the late 1970s and in the wake of the Oslo accords, respectively; TE42 further refers to a pull-out from Lebanon and an attempt to strike a deal with Syria, whereas TE62 points to the failed Israeli-Palestinian negotiations at Camp David. Remanding the audience about these efforts to ensure peace serves to show that Israeli yearning for calm is of long-term nature, being not a novel phenomenon, as it reaches back to the 1970s when Israel stroke a peace accord with Egypt and withdrew from Sinai. The present relentless search for peace is thus discursively linked to previous initiatives, depicting Israel as a nation that has been trying to promote peace agenda for decades.

Israelis are moreover the only ones who are actually willing to recognize Palestinians as a sovereign nation, and are also willing to make serious concessions in order to reach peace:

We offered the Palestinians a future of their own, an independence, of their destinies. By the way you want to be fair, and I am sure you want to, the West Bank and Gaza they were under Arab rule. They never offered it to the Palestinians, we did. There wasn't a Palestinian personality recognized before Oslo, we did. (TE12, Shimon Peres)

We have offered the Palestinians full liberty: all of the land, a position in Jerusalem. (TE32, Shimon Peres)

We did something that the Arabs didn't do. The West Bank was under their authority; they never gave it to the Palestinians. Gaza was under their authority; they never gave it to the Palestinians. We were the ones who went to Oslo, offered to Arafat and the Palestinian people that they will have the land and the

future, and they will enjoy at the beginning, autonomy, and later on,
independence. (TE62, Shimon Peres)

Now, it is indeed the case that other Arab states had not provided Palestinians with tangible support, be it diplomatic or material, and that they had not been generally very helpful in the matter of advancing the Palestinian national project. Nevertheless, the Israeli narrative of Oslo Accords and the further development omits several crucial issues. The Oslo peace process led to establishment of the independent Palestinian Authority (PA) which was recognized by Israel, but also resulted in setting up numerous checkpoints throughout the West Bank, division of the Palestinian territories, and brought about a massive expansion of Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line. By emphasizing only the initial political dialogue and the subsequent agreement, Israeli officials effectively suppress other, much more negative aspects of the process which undoubtedly contributed to the outbreak of harsh violence in 2000.

It is further argued that Israelis strive for peace despite risks stemming from their concessions:

We declared - myself, I declared, when we accepted the Mitchell Report, a unilateral cease-fire. The Palestinian reaction was a massive terror acts and murder, and assassinations all over the country. Since the Tenet report, we had already over 1,050 acts of terror. We lost many people. We have many injured. Mortar shells, shooting, suicide bombers, car bombs. All that happens since the Tenet plan was accepted. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

All this has happened at a time when Israel's hand was - and still is - extended towards peace. We have done everything in our power to achieve a cease-fire and an immediate entry into the Tenet process in order to advance any possibility of a cease-fire. All we have received in return was terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism. (TE56, Ariel Sharon)

Since then we have made an endless number of efforts to reach a cease-fire: we tried to ease security measures - and each time we lifted a closure, opened a road and withdrew the IDF, we were immediately answered with horrific terrorist attacks; we accepted the Mitchell Plan which includes painful

compromises for Israel; we accepted the Tenet Plan; we even waived the most elementary demand for seven days of quiet - we did not even get seven hours free of an attempt to perpetrate a murderous suicide attack […] (TE60, Ariel Sharon)

Judging according to these excerpts, all concessions in the name of peace result in more attacks and suffering inflicted upon Israelis. Nevertheless, this can not dissuade them from truly striving for calm and end of hostilities:

I said in the past that in exchange for real peace, the State of Israel would be willing to make painful compromises. (TE36, Ariel Sharon)

We are an optimistic, peace-seeking people, but reality slaps us in the face time after time and reminds us who our neighbors are. Despite that, we are committed to carrying on and exhausting every process in the effort to achieve a cease-fire and opening a dialogue to peace. (TE41, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

But our choice is to make peace, pay the price, painful compromises every moment. (TE62, Shimon Peres)

Israeli leaders in these speeches convince the audience that their concessions have highly negative repercussions for the Israeli state and society – but, even under these unfavorable circumstances, they still cling to the idea of peace and make concrete steps to achieve it. This interpretation thus highlights determination on the part of Israelis to end the conflict with Palestinians no matter what are the costs; as we will see later, only Palestinian rejections prevent this desired scenario from materializing.

Nevertheless, it must be recorded that Israeli admiration of and striving for peace has clear limits:

There is one thing where there is not going to be any compromises, not now and not in the future, and that is where it comes to the lives or the security of Israeli citizens and the very existence of the State of Israel. Here there will be no compromises. (TE35, Ariel Sharon)

This quote clearly demonstrates that Israeli effort to abolish further violence is not limitless; on the contrary, there are clear lines whose crossing leads to (temporal) suspension of striving for peace. This bring us to the other predicates and activities associated with the category of peace loving, moderate people into which are Israelis discursively situated, to those related to self-defence.

5.1.1.2. Israeli Responses to Terrorism

Even though it might seem that activities related to counterterrorism belong to a different category than that defined by adherence to peace, depiction of Israeli security policies is in fact intimately linked to the discursive schemes discussed in the previous section, because all Israeli responses are interpreted as a mere reaction to external acts of terrorism, and are moreover described as discriminate and very measured when compared with the scope of threat the country faces. These assertions thus further construct Israelis as a moderate nation with deep aversion to violence to which they resort only when there is no other alternative. Even though this depiction is a reoccurring feature in the Israeli discourse, one can also observe that there are certain variations among speakers with different political inclinations.

Appeals to self-defence are abundant throughout the examined speeches, but in the case of Shimon Peres, a representative of the left-wing camp in the Israeli mainstream politics, this stance is in general complemented by (yet another) reiteration of peaceful intentions on the part of Israel as illustrated by the following excerpt:

> *Our aim is peace; we do not want to dominate other people. We do not want to endanger other people. Our policy is clearly self-defense on the one hand and achieving peace on the other.* (TE18, Shimon Peres)

As we have seen, references to peace are very much present in speeches by Ariel Sharon as well. Nevertheless, when it comes to the need to keep Israeli citizens out of harm's way, the imperative of self-defence for Sharon largely overshadows other concerns:

> *Israel's supreme obligation, as in any state, is to protect its citizens, and Israel will continue to exercise its right to self-defense.* (TE34, Ariel Sharon)

I have made it very clear that for a genuine, durable, true peace we are willing to make painful compromises. But we will not make any compromises whatsoever which might endanger Israeli citizens and the very existence of the State of Israel. (TE46, Ariel Sharon)

I have said before and I say today: for the sake of real peace, there will be painful compromises. But there will not be any compromise on the security of the State of Israel and its citizens. (TE48, Ariel Sharon)

What follows from this attitude is that Sharon rejects any negotiations before Palestinians cease their murderous activity aiming to annihilate the Jewish people and the State of Israel:

And though we are committed to peace, one thing I can assure you, we are not going to negotiate under threat of terror and fire. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

Israel will not negotiate under fire and under terror. (TE24, Ariel Sharon)

However, Sharon is cautious to emphasize that this stance does not mean he rejects peace as such:

Israel's position is that we can negotiate only, and we would like to negotiate only when it will be full cessation of hostilities, terror, violence and incitement. Otherwise, I don't think we'd be able to reach a peace which will really make all of us committed to […] We said it because if we do that we'll never reach peace. That is the point. What I'm saying is not an obstacle, not a barrier against peace. On the contrary. If we will be very strict, then the Palestinians will understand they cannot gain anything by terror. Therefore, we have to be very strict in order to reach peace, which all of us would like to have. (TE24, Ariel Sharon)

Once it will be quiet -- completely quiet, full cessation of terror, hostilities, violence and excitement -- I can assure you, I'm not going to waste one day. I'll start negotiating immediately. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

So, for Sharon yearning for peace has even clearer limits than is the case for the left-wing subjects represented by Shimon Peres. As long as there is Palestinian violence, diplomatic efforts to end hostilities must be suspended and Israel has to focus solely on self-defence. In Sharon's interpretation, however, a rejection of negotiations for their incompatibility with fighting terrorism does not contravene efforts to reach peace, since only a tough stance can bring Palestinians to their senses and persuasively demonstrate to them that their resort to violence will not achieve anything, thus making them to abandon terror and become open to diplomatic solutions instead. By these discursive schemes, categorization of Israelis as a peace loving nation is possible despite any actual concessions on the ground.

Putting aside differences in emphasis on self-defence or yearning for peace (which effort is temporarily suspended for Sharon because of the grave threat of Palestinian terrorism), what is common to all the speeches concerned with Israeli security policies is that they read situation in a way that renders use of force by Israeli military and security agencies as a mere reaction to acts of Palestinian violence. Israelis, it is repeated, seek peace, but they are pushed into engagement in hostilities by Palestinian actions since they have to protect their bare lives; this narrative is maintained by Israeli officials regardless of their political inclinations:

From the outset, I want to say that we do not believe that the conflict between us and the Palestinians can be solved by force. Force was imposed on us; it was not our choice, and we would like to get rid of it as soon as possible. (TE6, Shimon Peres)

I would not exaggerate if I say that about 95% of all the hostile activities, of military incidents in the past eight months, are initiated by the Palestinians. Basically the Israeli policy is to respond and not to escalate the situation. (TE13, Giora Eiland)

For the past 8 months, Israel finds itself in the front line of terror and violence imposed upon us by the Palestinians. (TE14, Ariel Sharon)

We are currently in the midst of a difficult campaign forced upon us - a brutal campaign of terrorism. (TE48, Ariel Sharon)

On the one hand, we have murderers, killers, suicide bombers. On the other hand, we are taking defensive counterterrorist measures. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

Describing Israeli security policies as a regrettable, yet necessary response to external threats is one of the central components in construction of Israelis as moderate people yearning for peace who however, at the same time, engage in hostilities. Use of violence, it is asserted, has been "imposed" on Israelis which image obliterates any Israeli agency in creating conditions which led Palestinians to adoption of violent means to challenge the Israeli occupation.[153] Decades of struggle between Jews/Israelis and Arabs/Palestinians are simply written off which enables to construct Israelis as a group with largely pacifist goals whose resort to violence is not of their choice, since they simply have to protect themselves from dangers for whose creation they bear no responsibility.

Another step in categorization of Israelis as peaceful and reasonable people lies in an insistence on moderation pertaining to all Israeli countermeasures enacted in the wake of terrorist attacks:

This week was an extremely difficult week for us. As you know, a baby of 10 months was shot to death by a sniper, who apparently could see her on his telescope on the rifle. Two young boys aged 13 and 14 were killed by a bomb. There were four bombs in the cities. Luckily, we were able to neutralize them beforehand, otherwise it would have been a terrible catastrophe. A woman on the morning of her marriage was stoned and critically wounded; another man was critically wounded, and that's in addition to the shooting, to the shelling of mortars. Our action was extremely measured and restrained. (TE6, Shimon Peres)

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[153] There is one rare exception in this regard, the Shimon Peres's speech from February 2002 (TE46) which will be dealt with later on.

And every day we have 30 acts of terror. And no other country would show so much restraint and patience in our reaction as we do. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

My reaction is, considering the provocation, Israel is showing a great deal of restraint. You know, over the last four days, there were more than five bombs in attempt to kill people. Two of them were, so to speak, successful. They killed 20 young people and women and families in Jerusalem, in another part of the country. And we are looking for ways and means to stop it. It doesn't give us any pleasure to have any political incursions. (TE29, Shimon Peres)

I'm not looking for revenge. I am only interested in doing whatever I can to protect our homes and our children. (TE57, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

We remained patient and moderate as one atrocity followed another. Despite the fact that we knew of our power to act, we hoped that we would not be forced to use our forces, and rejected extreme suggestions of all sorts. (TE60, Ariel Sharon)

Establishing Israeli measures as discriminate and moderate is in these texts achieved by showing horrors brought about by terrorism which precede any Israeli incursions. Speakers are rather brief when describing actual content of state security policies, but do not hesitate to go in details when dealing with attacks perpetrated by Palestinians. Consumers of the messages are thus acquainted with challenges the Israeli state and its inhabitants face, but has to completely rely on speakers' assessment of Israeli responses as "restrained" and "non-extreme" - which evaluation seems plausible, as one is struck by a description of terrorist attacks resulting in dozens of deaths.[154]

It is not that much surprising that Israeli officials do not endeavor to offer an elaborate analysis of Israeli measures aimed at dissuading Palestinians from further terrorist attacks, as it was precisely these policies, reaching from destruction of houses of families whose members became suicide attackers, to imposition of strict limits on

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[154] For a very different account describing the Israeli policies as excessive see Pedazhur; Perliger (2010), pp. 335-367, or Kurtulus, Ersun N., "The New Counterterrorism: Contemporary Counterterrorism Trends in the United States and Israel", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* Vol. 35 (2012), pp. 37-58.

Palestinian population's mobility, that were so harshly criticized by the international community. By glossing over specific details, or rather over any details at all, Israeli officials can sustain the image of Israel as moderate and striving for end of hostilities and resumption of diplomatic negotiations.

Furthermore, contrary to most of criticisms that point out at indiscriminate nature of Israeli incursions, state representatives repeatedly maintain that the most important characteristic of the Israeli security measures is the fact that they are not aimed against the Palestinian population as such, but are designated to target only terrorist infrastructure and perpetrators. As the following excerpts testify, assertions of this kind are uttered by all officials irrespective of their political persuasion or position they hold:

I said that I would like very much to ease the conditions of the Palestinians that live in the area, because I believe that we have to draw a very clear distinction between a terrorist and their supporters, and the people that would like just to go and work and bring some bread home and raise their children. (TE1, Ariel Sharon)

As far as Israel is concerned, we look upon the Palestinian people as a neighbor. We don't want them to suffer, to be discriminated, or be humiliated. They are our neighbors today, they will be our neighbors in the future, and we would like to enjoy a real and friendly relationship. (TE5, Shimon Peres)

Then again I want to say we do not consider the Palestinians as our enemies. We consider the Palestinians as our neighbors today, our partners tomorrow. What we are fighting it is not against the Palestinians, we are fighting against terror. (TE13, Giora Eiland)

First of all, the steps, adopted by the Israeli government up until today, [are] based on implementing a policy designed to answer the question: how to ease the life of the population in a very uncertain situation, in a terrorism environment, and a very risky situation [...] The decision was made by the Israeli government, even with this increase in the terrorism, and in the environment of terrorism, not only in the actual events, to minimize restrictions and constraints by trying to differentiate between terrorism and

population. Of course it's very difficult to differentiate, but as a principle to differentiate. (TE17, Yaakov Or)[155]

We are making every effort to focus only on targeted infrastructures and terrorist targets, and we [continue to] explain this fact, as we have always explained it. We are not fighting against the Palestinian people, and the Palestinian people are not our enemy. We are fighting terrorism [...] (TE56, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

It is further asserted that Israeli policies should not be in any case seen as revenge or collective punishment:

We see eye to eye about the existing problem, and it is the policy of the government of Israel to do - right away and unilaterally - whatever we can to ease the situation in the territories, to facilitate normal life, to avoid collective punishment, and to let civilian life be conducted as it should be, without unnecessary interference or threat. (TE7, Shimon Peres)

We have said, and I insist that we shall do it, that when it comes to the territories we shall go ahead and facilitate the life in the territories, reducing and bringing an end to the closures, enabling the flow of goods and people, so civilian life can go on without any collective punishment. (TE23, Shimon Peres)

Reasonable rhetoric rejecting any vengeance is reiterated even during the operation Defensive Shield in late March 2002:

I'm not looking for revenge. I am only interested in doing whatever I can to protect our homes and our children. (TE57, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

Not only that Israeli reactions to Palestinian incitements are depicted as extremely measured and Israelis are described as careful not to cause any excessive damage which could be possibly interpreted as acts of revenge against civilian population, which interpretation is maintained to be valid even in the case of the

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[155] Yaakov Or was Major-General who was serving as the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories during the Second Intifada.

operation Defensive Shield which led to a number of deaths of Palestinian civilians and severe curtailment of Palestinian freedom.[156] As speeches by military officer Yaakov Or (TE17) and Shimon Peres (TE23) show, humanitarian considerations are moreover so prevalent among Israelis that they, despite horrors experienced, sincerely care about their Palestinian neighbors' lives.[157] Once again, one can object that such an interpretation can be quite easily rejected if one looks at the Israeli actual policies enacted during the period, but in the scrutinized discourse it is firmly established that Israeli use of force aims solely to prevent terrorists from striking Israel.

As has been already noted, Israeli officials' speeches and interviews are characterized by a considerable paucity when it comes to specific Israeli measures. The only particular Israeli policy that is actually discussed at length in the examined corpus are "targeted killings" operations, consisting in physical elimination of Palestinians who in some way engage in terrorist activities, one of policies that were widely condemned at the time (and continue to be).[158] However, Israeli officials are adamant that one can not speak about "extra judicial killings" (TE11, Shimon Peres) or "liquidations" (ibid.) of Palestinian leaders, and describe these measures as "prevention" or "interception" of suicide attackers who set out for their mission:

> *I don't know where the word "liquidate" came from. We don't liquidate anyone and I don't know why you stuck that in. There is no justification for doing it. There is no inclination to liquidate anyone. Anyway, liquidation is a term used by the gangsters.* (TE27, Shimon Peres)

> *On the one hand, we have murderers, killers, suicide bombers. On the other hand, we are taking defensive counterterrorist measures. That's what we are doing […] We are intercepting suicide bombers on the way to commit their crimes.* (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

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[156] See Hammami (2002) for more detailed account.

[157] As already stated, legitimation strategies drawing on appeals to altruism on the part of Israel will be dealt with in a more detailed manner later in the paper.

[158] Avi Kober explores Israeli tactics of "targeted killings" in the following article: Kober, Avi, "Targeted Killing during the Second Intifada. The Quest for Effectiveness", *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2007), pp. 76-93. See also Kurtulus (2012), esp. pp. 47-50.

When in doubt, cut it out, as they say. We would usually try to get rid of what you call today ticking bombs. Once you have suicide bombers you don't have a choice but to intercept them before they become a human bomb and kill many people. (TE44, Shimon Peres)

Israeli officials then justify the policy of "interceptions" by pointing to a peculiar nature of this threat, as suicide attacks are extremely hard to divert:

[W]e have exactly the same problem: how to confront or intercept a suicide bomber. The minute he's on his way, you can't stop him, because he's not afraid of policemen, he's not afraid of soldiers. He's ready to be killed, so he will explode himself in face of the policemen and soldiers, or in a plane or elsewhere. The only chance or the best chance to intercept him is before he starts moving. Once he's on his way, it's too late. So you and us are trying really to prevent the suicide bombers to come to our places. (TE32, Shimon Peres)

Now, the question is: What do you do with a suicide bomber? If you send the police to confront him, what does he care? He is willing to die at any moment, so he'll blow himself up next to the policemen. Send the army and he'll blow himself up next to the soldiers. He leaves us no choice, but to stop him at the starting point, before he goes out on his mission. (TE27, Shimon Peres)

This type of terrorism is moreover described as something that is rather unique:

[O]urs is the only country in the world that is experiencing a type of terror that does not exist anywhere else in the world. This is "suicide terror". The Irish don't blow themselves up, the Basques don't do it, even the Chechens don't kill themselves. (TE27, Shimon Peres)

Indeed, the argument that "type of terror that does not exist anywhere else in the world" can be very easily dispelled on factual grounds since Palestinian organizations were definitely not the first ones to employ this tactics in late 2000 (especially curious in this regard is Peres's statement on Chechens allegedly not conducting suicide attacks). However, this claim should be understood as a part of the whole discourse

which aims to depict Israelis as moderate, pacifist people. Since it is hard to deny that Israel engages in extra-judicial killings (or "interceptions", as Israeli officials label them) which fact is repeatedly evoked by media outlets and activists groups, Israeli leaders need to find justification for this policy and at the same time interpret it in a way that does not undermine the main message they are trying to convene. Labeling suicide terrorism as unprecedented phenomenon enables them to construct Israeli counterterrorism measures as appropriate and even moderate when compared to this novel threat.

What follows from all these assertions is that usual rules of engagement can be broken and suicide attacks, it is argued, can not be stopped by any means but by preventive killing of a perpetrator on her route. Indeed, this is unfortunate but the only possible response to acts of suicide terrorism, since other considerations are overridden by imperatives of self-defence and protection of innocent civilians' lives:

> *We have a problem, and that is the suicide bombers. When you talk about human rights, the first human right is to remain alive, because if you don't exercise this right, the rest of the rights are not terribly relevant.* (TE32, Shimon Peres)

> *Terrorism and violence, the killing of women, the killing of children -- that is against international law. Israel does not take any initiative to that effect. We are forced to react, and we are not pleased at all with it. But we have to defend our lives.* (TE11, Shimon Peres)

Apart from the unprecedented nature of suicide attacks, one more argument for effective counterterrorism measures is succinctly summed by Ariel Sharon in this excerpt:

> *The Jewish people are having one tiny, small country, that is Israel.* (TE24, Ariel Sharon)

Sharon here draws on an embedded narrative depicting Israel as a country lacking any strategic depth that has been part of the Israeli security discourse for decades - Sharon, albeit indirectly, refers to the well-known naming of the pre-1967

boundaries as "Auschwitz borders" by the then Foreign Minister Abba Eban,[159] which reasoning implies that any retreat from the West Bank would put Israel in a grave danger since it would not be able to deflect any Arab states' attacks before they reach the main Israeli cities, i.e. Jerusalem and urban areas at the Mediterranean coast.

It is not my intention here to deny geographical determinants of and constraints on the Israeli ability to protect itself. Nevertheless, the emphasis on physical proximity to areas breeding hostile activities omits numerous advantages on the part of Israel, like a close alliance with the world superpower and staggering superiority in terms of military strength over its neighbors. In short, focus on geographical conditions (which have serious repercussions for self-defence) further depicts Israel as a country which, albeit truly strives for peace, needs to prioritize security considerations.

All the discursive structures discussed in this section contribute to categorization of Israelis as "peace loving", as people who can be defined mostly by their peacefulness and moderation, which depiction is supported by pointing to historical and more recent evidence. Even when the efforts to achieve peace are disrupted by acts of terror, which push Israelis to use force, they display restraint and adopt measures aimed solely to stop terrorist threat, refraining from collective punishment.

5.1.2. Israelis as Civilized People

Emphasis on construction of Israelis as what I have labeled "civilized" people is not as much present in the Israeli official discourse as is the case with qualities defining "peace loving" nation, but the categorization based on "civilizational" characteristics is still traceable throughout the examined corpus. Whereas the previous category's predicates were linked to recent political decisions, inclinations and security considerations, this one is constructed by references to more deeply held beliefs and more intrinsic dispositions.

Even though this type of messages is not as ubiquitous in the examined discourse as assurances about the Israelis' peace loving nature, Israeli officials repeatedly tie the current conflict to the history of the Jewish people:

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[159] Quoted in Caspit, Ben, "To Understand Israel, Understand the Holocaust", *Al-Monitor*, April 9 (2013), available online at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/israels-post-traumatic-society.html (last access on May 14, 2013).

In our history, in our 4,000 years of existence, we have never dominated another people. We didn't leave the house of slaves in Egypt to build a house of masters in Israel. It goes against everything we stand for […] We don't want to occupy anybody. It is so hard to occupy the Jewish life, why should we try our hands with other people? But we weren't born to be masters, we weren't born to be dominators; we were born already with the message against slavery, against mastery, against domination, and that's what kept us historically. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

What we are really trying to do is to follow a great Jewish tradition that its main message is the preference of the moral code upon all other attractions. Let me say in a very serious manner that the late Prime Minister Rabin and I went to Oslo because we did not want to dominate the Palestinian life. It is against our moral position as Jewish people. Never in our history did the Jewish people dominate another people. We think that it is wrong; it is a mistake. Our driving force was basically spiritual and moral more than strategic. That is an unchanging situation. We are not willing to dominate other people. We think that it may corrupt our very basic standing as a Jewish people. That is unchanged. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

These speeches reiterate numerous claims about of Israelis as inherently moral and relentlessly pursuing peace which were scrutinized in the previous section. What is novel, however, is the stress on historical roots of this attitude, reaching back to the ancient times. Rather than result of political deliberations, current seeking of peace is a result of culturally determined values and experiences of oppressed victims. The Jewish history characterized by victimhood renders any accusations of malign intentions on the part of Israelis ridiculous – striving for peace is inscribed deeply in the their collective soul.

Let's brush aside the fact that the available historical evidence suggests that yearning for peace and refrain from violence and domination are actually not really characteristic of the Jewish ancient history. It is not by any means my intention to deny repeated massacres to which Jewish communities fell victim since the destruction of the Second Temple. Nevertheless, it can be asked what citizens of Israel, the state with the most efficient army in the region, armed with nuclear weapons, and enjoying support of

the world superpower, have in common with Jewish communities exposed to numerous pogroms. Collapsing the distinction between the Israeli presence and the Jewish history enables Israeli officials to obscure profound changes in status and position of the Jewish people during the 19th and 20th century.

The Israeli discourse thus introduces an essentialized image of merciful Jew who, simply due to this label, can not conceivably belong among oppressors and is incapable of "dominating another people". The Israeli nation (the Israeli officials apparently do not reflect on the ethnic diversity of their country, and the term "Israelis" can be read as identical with "Jews") is depicted as morally superior, being repelled by any acts aiming to dominate or harm others, which properties are said to be deeply historically embedded, rather than being a choice of the current political leadership. It is noteworthy that these characteristics, i.e. benign intentions and conduct, are often associated with modern liberal countries guided by ideas of the Enlightenment like freedom, which is to be granted to all people irrespective of their nationality.

Another reoccurring theme in Israeli officials' speeches is stressing the democratic nature of the Israeli state:

> *We have friends here, and you have friends there in Israel, which is a democratic country, a stable democracy which appreciates the values of democratic life.* (TE4, Ariel Sharon)

> *In order to make peace you need two things: you need a partner and you need the support of your people. You cannot act without a majority because we are a democratic country.* (TE12, Shimon Peres)

Israeli leaders here clearly draw on embedded narrative that is very salient feature of Israeli self-representation from the beginning of state's existence. Israeli leaders are very well aware that democratic political system is nowadays generally perceived positively and try to capitalize on this attitude by drawing attention to the democratic nature of the Israeli state. They seem especially eager to emphasize Israeli institutions' capacity to accommodate various opinions:

> *They interpreted Israeli democracy and the multiplicity of opinions in Israel as weaknesses.* (TE34, Ariel Sharon)

Israel is a pluralistic society with broad representation from the entire political spectrum, and the Knesset, to our pride, is perhaps the only place in which those who oppose it and those who love it, secular and religious, left and right, Jews, Druze, Bedouin and Arabs - all groups in the rich mosaic of rivalries and tensions - sit together to debate and discuss, occasionally, even if in strident tones, but always in the fervor of parliamentary dynamism and action. The Knesset is the pulsating heart of Israeli democracy. (TE43, Ariel Sharon)

Again, it is not hard to raise objections against this depiction: pointing to a rather problematic position of the Arab minority in the Israeli society is common among many authors and activists. Other scholars further draw attention to differentiation even among the Jewish majority, since "Mizrachim", Jews of "oriental" origin, i.e. immigrants from Arab countries, had been historically treated by the state institutions much worse than was the case with Jews who moved to Palestine and later Israel from Europe.[160] These claims cast doubts over Israeli officials' insistence on the profoundly democratic character of the state they represent.

It can be further argued that democratic system itself does not prevent a state from pursuing policies which are generally condemned, like occupying a different country, ignoring international law and so on. The fact that a given state is democratic thus should not divert attention from controversial steps taken by its leaders, which can easily tarnish image of enlightened, "civilized" country.

The strategic purpose of emphasizing the democratic nature of Israel, ignoring the points just raised, can be quite easily discerned. Stressing the democratic nature of Israel, providing its citizens with peaceful means to express their discontent, aims to depict it as a country aligned if not geographically, then in terms of ideology and civilization, to the Western community. By omitting problematic domestic issues and disputed security policies, Israel is constructed as a country following modern, liberal principles.

Israeli officials are furthermore cautious to dispel any doubts that the democratic system is something that sets Israel apart from other states in the Middle East:

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[160] See e.g. Kimmerling, Baruch, *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness. State, Society, and the Military* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 94-96.

I want to stress that Israel is a democracy, the only one in the region and we face a wave of terror perpetrated by countries who are not democracies. (TE14, Ariel Sharon)

These notions will prove quite crucial when examining reframing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a part of the global struggle against terrorism. What suffices to say now is that emphasis on the regional uniqueness of the Israeli state aims to further highlight Israelis' adherence to values championed by West, embodied in this instance in democracy, as these qualities are put in sharp contrast to those characterizing neighboring states.

Yet another assertion pertaining to categorization of Israel as a "civilized" nation relates to obeying body of legal norms:

We have to defend ourselves, but we don't have any policy of killing people. But when there is concrete information that someone is carrying a bomb, and is on his way to Israel, then we try to prevent it. That is not against international law. Let's not get mixed up. Terrorism and violence, the killing of women, the killing of children -- that is against international law. Israel does not take any initiative to that effect. We are forced to react, and we are not pleased at all with it. But we have to defend our lives. (TE11, Shimon Peres)

The issue was checked by our judiciary and what you call 'liquidation' was prevention. If you have an enemy, whether in a uniform or not, who comes to kill your people, you have the right of self-defence. I have explained carefully that if we get information about someone who carries what we call a ticking bomb and who could enter the country at any time and bomb us - the usual targets are youth clubs and night clubs to kill young people - it is our full right to defend our lives. We are very careful, because we are a law-abiding people. We do not want to overdo it. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

Appeals to legality of the concerned policies further underscores the categorization of Israelis scrutinized in this section. Even when facing unprecedented and grave threat like suicide terrorism, "law abiding" Israelis react in a way which is in

accordance with widely accepted norms. Not only that Israeli policies are examined by domestic judiciary, thus ensuring their legality; Israelis, as "civilized", enlightened people pay attention to international law as well.

Lastly, Israeli officials strive to draw attention to Israeli achievements:

We are having a fine agriculture, which is all the time improving, becoming more modern [...] We have quite a successful high tech, and high tech is changing life. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

We have held the sword - and made the wilderness and desert bloom. We have built cities, developed industry and cultivated agriculture - we have transformed the State of Israel into an example and symbol for many other countries in the world. (TE37, Ariel Sharon)

You are observing us, Israelis, yearningly, and see Israel's many achievements. In the last 53 years Israel has developed flourishing industries and agriculture, among the most advanced in the world; our hi-tech industry will prosper again with the recovery of the world economy; one of the most advanced food industries in the world; modern cities with hundreds of thousands of citizens and education and health systems which are envied across the world. All this has been achieved in 53 years. (TE48, Ariel Sharon)

In the past 100 years, and primarily since it gained independence 54 years ago, Israel has had remarkable achievements in every field of life. (TE54, Ariel Sharon)

Israeli leaders tend to focus on Israeli successes in economic and scientific spheres, but the point they are making goes beyond these confined areas. The Israeli state is depicted as highly progressive and modern, as a state which made "desert bloom". These are not merely descriptive, but rather normative statements which aim to endow Israel with superiority in the non-material sphere as well. Israelis are depicted as resourceful and hardworking, capable of nearly miracles, and the state they built is labeled to be unique not only on regional scale, but even globally, serving as "symbol

for many other countries in the world". The narrative of progressivism stemming from underlying values is clearly discernible.

Although the categorization just examined is not present in the Israeli official discourse as much as the one that defines Israelis as peace loving and moderate, reoccurring statements sharing certain traits are still traceable. The Israeli state is characterized by properties which are usually associated with progressive, Western countries with highly developed economies and functioning democratic systems; furthermore, Israeli people are depicted as inherently decent. All these properties pertain deeper than just to the current politics, as they are rooted in history and collective mentality, and together render Israelis "civilized" people.

5.2. Categorization of Palestinians

Whereas Israelis are in the examined discourse categorized as "peace loving" and "civilized" people, Palestinians are, unsurprisingly, depicted in a quite different manner; in fact, they are to a large extent positioned as Israelis' antithesis. These notions are especially salient for a portrayal of Palestinians' attitude towards terrorism and peaceful coexistence: the primary category-bound activities related to the Palestinian side of the conflict, as constructed in the Israeli official discourse, are engagement in terrorist activities (i.e. resort to violence) and rejections of peace. Israeli officials do not really deal with characterization of Palestinians pertaining to "civilizational" traits, but even when they touch upon this topic, the examined speeches maintain that Palestinians can not match Israelis in terms of progressivism and embracement of modern liberal ideas either.

5.2.1. Palestinians as Peace Rejectionists

Even though properties defining Palestinians related to their position on peace and violence are quite overlapping, they might be separated into two different subcategories for the purposes of the present paper. The subsequent part thus deals with Palestinian rejections of propositions aiming to achieve peace as depicted by Israeli officials, and then the paper proceeds to analysis of discursive construction of Palestinians' involvement in terrorism.

5.2.1.1. Palestinians' Attitude towards Peace

When compared to number of texts concerned with Israelis in this respect, there is a relative paucity of speeches and interviews dealing specifically with Palestinians' attitude towards peace or diplomatic efforts, be them solely Israeli or US-brokered. But still, there are statements, vast majority of them given by Shimon Peres, which constitute Palestinians as a group that, when it comes to matters of peaceful co-existence, is characterized by repeated, stubborn rejections of proposals aiming to bring about calm:

> *[Palestinians] are creating the feeling in Israel that all our efforts to offer compromises, to meet the Palestinians not half-way, but three-quarters and maybe even more, four-fifths of the way, are in vain. Unfortunately the Palestinians have rejected the very generous offers that were put before them by President Clinton in Taba and Camp David, and our people don't understand. What are we talking about? The loss of confidence among our people is a real damage to peace. I regret it very much.* (TE6, Shimon Peres)

> *The Israelis are very angry with the Palestinians because we don't understand their rejection of our proposals.* (TE9, Shimon Peres)

> *You see, we have suggested to the Palestinians full independence. We have suggested to them to end occupation without firing a single bullet, they could have had it around the negotiating table [...] I think they were mistaken when they have rejected it.* (TE29, Shimon Peres)

As can be seen in all these excerpts, Palestinians are constructed as people who reject any offers that might conceivably lead to peace; these steps are even more inexplicable as acceptance of the proposals would ensure them fulfillment of their basic demands. In the following excerpts Peres speaks about the Camp David talks during which, it is maintained, Israelis offered Palestinians "everything":

> *At Camp David, our former Prime Minister Barak and President Clinton offered the Palestinians the return not of all their land but of between 96% and 97% of it. They could have negotiated over the remaining 2% or 3%. It is hard for Israel*

and the Israelis to understand why the Palestinians rejected that offer. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

But the question before every Israeli is why didn't Arafat accept the proposals of President Clinton backed by former prime minister Barak? Why are they using terror? They were offered a Palestinian state. They were offered practically all of the land. They were offered a position in Jerusalem. Why fight? Why kill? Why incite? What is the reason? (TE59, Shimon Peres)

We offer the Palestinians an independent state, their full land actually, a position in Jerusalem. Believe me, nobody in Israel understands why the deal was rejected. (TE62, Shimon Peres)

The narrative of the unsuccessful Camp David summit outlined in these speeches can be encapsulated as following: in 2000 Israelis (who, as we have seen, are always willing to bring considerable sacrifices in order to reach peace) offered far-reaching compromises to their Palestinian counterparts led by Yasser Arafat when they consented to establishment of the Palestinian independent state in most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and designated the eastern part of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. However, to Israelis' amazement Palestinians adamantly refused all these offers.

This interpretation of the failed Camp David summit is still very much salient in the Israeli public discourse nowadays, and it provides the Israeli party with seemingly convincing arguments stating that any negotiations with Palestinians are pointless, since they reject virtually any settlement that does not include destruction of the Israeli state.

It is redundant to state that the Palestinian perception of the Camp David talks differs profoundly from the Israeli perspective.[161] But even Robert Malley, former American diplomat who took part in the summit and preceding diplomatic meetings, publicly doubts if the Israeli conditions were as generous as alleged. Malley maintains that Barak, the Israeli Prime Miniester at the time of the Camp David talks, in fact

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[161] For an overview of the Palestinian narrative of the Camp David negotiations see Kacowicz (2005), pp. 351-352.

initially proposed much more modest concessions and showed basically no flexibility on the issues crucial for the Palestinian side.[162]

These claims thus call into question the alleged unprecedented generosity of the Israeli delegation at Camp David in 2000. Of course, these doubts are not reflected in the Israeli official discourse at all, which utilitizes the peculiar interpretation of the events as the main component in construction of Palestinians as a group which is defined by unwillingness to any concessions and rejections of peace. This depiction is further supported by pointing out to previous instances of Palestinian refusals:

> *In 1947 they [Palestinians] were offered to build a state. They rejected it. It was a resolution of the United Nations that gave them 80 percent of the land. And to this very day, nobody can seriously explain why did they do it, because seriously you cannot explain a mistake. Mistakes are inexplainable. And it brought tragedy upon the Palestinian people, including the creation of a refugee problem, which haunts to this very day, as a shadow, our capacity to make peace.* (TE9, Shimon Peres)

> *It is for the second time that the Palestinians are committing a terrible mistake that made them the victims of their own mistakes. The first was in 1948 when the United Nations has offered the Palestinians the formation of a Palestinian state on most of the land of Israel. The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, who was their leader, rejected it. To this very day, they pay the price of their rejection, of their mistake. I hope the Palestinians will not repeat another mistake. It is totally counterproductive, unnecessary and it serves nothing in the future.* (TE29, Shimon Peres)

Peres in these statements speaks about the 1947 United Nation Partition Plan for Palestine which envisaged division of the then British Mandate into Jewish and Arab independent states, and which was at that time rejected by the Palestinian party. These references aim to support other statements on Palestinians which categorized them as

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[162] These issues pertain to Israeli settlements in the West Bank, land swaps, question of the Palestinian refugees, status of Jerusalem and proposed demilitarized zone along the Jordan river. See Malley, Robert; Agha, Hussein, "Camp David. The Tragedy of Errors", *The New York Review of Books*, July 12 (2001), available online at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2001/aug/09/camp-david-the-tragedy-of-errors/?pagination=false (last access on May 14, 2013).

people unwilling to accept any compromise – mentioning more than sixty years old event is supposed to demonstrate that the current rejections of reasonable propositions are just the newest manifestations of Palestinian disinterest in peace.

However, to draw parallels between the Second Intifada and the 1940s is rather confusing and mistaken endeavour. It can be argued that had Palestinians known what would be the course of future events, they would have been probably much more prone to endorse the UN plan to divide the country into two parts. But under the given circumstances, without benefit of any foresight, the Palestinian decision can be quite easily understood. Jews still constituted minority in the area, and they were only recent immigrants, lacking any rights to the land from the Arab point of view. One can also add that nature and attitude of the Palestinian political leadership, as well as people's preferences, have changed dramatically since the end of the Second World War, and any comparison between 2000 and 1947 is therefore misleading. But, once again, these complex histories are not discussed by Israeli officials who try to construct their Palestinian adversaries as inherently opposed to any initiatives aiming to achieve peace.

However, as we have already seen, not only that Palestinians do not accept the Israeli hand extended in peace - they try to cut it off:

I declared, when we accepted the Mitchell Report, a unilateral cease-fire. The Palestinian reaction was a massive terror acts and murder, and assassinations all over the country […] On the [Palestinian side], we have murderers, killers, suicide bombers. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

We have done everything in our power to achieve a cease-fire and an immediate entry into the Tenet process in order to advance any possibility of a cease-fire. All we have received in return was terrorism, terrorism and more terrorism. (TE56, Ariel Sharon)

These statements point to other crucial activity defining Palestinians, involvement in terrorism.

5.2.1.2. Palestinians' Involvement in Terrorism

Even though Palestinians are in the examined speeches defined mostly by their link to terrorism of some sort, a precise nature of this relationship is not depicted in a uniform manner throughout the official Israeli discourse. As we have seen, there is an unanimous agreement among Israeli leaders that terrorism is a scourge for whose origin bear full responsibility solely Palestinians; the question remains, however, if only some particular groups are (according to Israeli officials) behind the attacks, rather than the whole Palestinian population, and if so, what specific groups are labeled as perpetrators.

As for the issue of engagement in terrorism, it has been already demonstrated that Israeli leaders actually maintain that Palestinian terrorists can be distinguished from the rest of the population who abstain from terrorist activities and, in Sharon's words "would like just to go and work and bring some bread home and raise their children" (TE1). Violence that was imposed on the Israeli state thus can be linked to specific groups with limited membership, and Israeli officials in the speeches and interviews examined in this paper refrain from portraying the whole Palestinian people as implicated in terrorism. Nonetheless, there is still a certain kind of relationship between "ordinary" Palestinians, their leadership, and terrorism, which is quite complex and ambiguous, and will be dealt with later in this section.

It can be therefore stated that category of Palestinians as constructed in the Israeli official discourse contains several sub-groups defined by a different level of involvement in violence. Rest of the present section will thus scrutinize how are these properties allocated in the examined discourse.

When it comes to question of responsibility for terrorism, all Israeli speakers tend to focus mainly on the Palestinian semi-governmental, official bodies, rather than on organizations like Hamas or Islamic Jihad. This is not that much surprising since in terms of international recognition and legitimacy, Israel was waging a struggle mostly against the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its representatives, rather than against the Palestinian splinter groups, and the examined discourse was an integral part of this contestation.

But still, there are quite wide differences among individual Israeli leaders' utterances dealing with the Palestinian official bodies and their attitude towards terrorism. Whereas left-winger Shimon Peres tends to accuse the PA and Arafat of failing to stop terrorism, rather then of being directly responsible for it, Ariel Sharon, the most prominent representative of Israeli hardliners, does not shy away from publicly

pointing to official Palestinian agencies and leaders as the main perpetrators and organizers of the attacks.

In his speeches, Shimon Peres, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leading figure of the Labor Party at the time, adopts a rather cautious tone when speaking about PA's involvement in terrorism. As we have seen, he leaves no doubts that it is the Palestinian side that is responsible for the outbreak of violence, yet does not put all the blame on the PA and its leader:

Our position, my position, towards Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian authority is clear: We see them as the party responsible to end terror, to prevent terror, not to use terror, and to arrest terrorists. This is in accordance with the Oslo agreements, which was the basis of our relations. In Oslo we agreed to resolve our differences not by force, but by dialogue, and that is his responsibility, and we call him to fulfill it, as we are obliged to do likewise. (TE20, Shimon Peres)

[Yasser Arafat] can do more than he does [against suicide bombings]. I don't think he can stop it completely. But, you know, the United States, and actually all nations, are demanding from Arafat to show a 100 percent effort, not talking about the result, in order to bring an end to terror and to this ugly sort of terror. (TE29, Shimon Peres)

These excerpts are typical of a large bulk of Peres's speeches that are concerned with Palestinian authorities, as they make Arafat and the PA responsible not, as is the case with Ariel Sharon, for launching terrorist attacks, but for their cease. Peres repeatedly refers to mutual agreements that established the PA and obliged it to maintain calm in the Palestinian territories, which duty is being broken by Arafat and his fellow Palestinian officials at the time of the Second Intifada. This is the case because the PA is, according to Peres, unwilling to exercise its authority over other Palestinian armed groups:

Today there are at least three or four groups besides Arafat who are using weapons, who decide if there will be a cease-fire or not. You cannot handle them just by speeches. It is not for the sake of Israel, but for the sake of the Palestinians themselves that Arafat has to assert his authority and demonstrate

that the Palestinians have one address: militarily, politically and otherwise […] Our feeling is that not all of the commanders understood that there is one clear policy given by Chairman Arafat, and we can see variations on the ground where some give different interpretation to what is permitted and what is not, and we think there is an immediate need for clear instructions and orders to stop the shooting and violence. (TE26, Shimon Peres)

The real problem, as we see it, is that Arafat has to decide about his own leadership. We cannot decide instead of him. Today, as things are, he is heading a Palestinian people that has four different armed groups, each of them shooting on their own - for their own reasons in different directions, and actually killing any chance for tranquility and hope. (TE32, Shimon Peres)

Arafat and PA are therefore to be blamed for failing to halt the terrorist attacks which step they are definitely capable of to a considerable degree:

We don't ask him [Arafat] to produce miracles, we don't ask him to do things that he is incapable of doing. But we ask him to do things that he can do and that he has committed to do; for example to stand up against terrorism. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

In 1996, before the elections, when there were terrible acts of terror in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv that affected the results of the elections, I called Arafat and told him: "Look, if you won't stop the terror that is it." In a month's time they arrested a thousand people, and killed 20 of the leaders of Hamas and Jihad, and collected their arms. So with all your skepticism, don't forget also the experience. Then we had, relatively speaking, a period of four years of quiet, which Netanyahu enjoyed, and even took credit for. (TE47, Shimon Peres)

So, for Shimon Peres the main problem with Arafat in particular, and officials representing the Palestinian people in general, is not that they are the main "masterminds" behind terrorist attacks that started in late 2000. Rather, as the quoted speeches indicate, they are being accused for doing not enough to stop attacks carried out by other Palestinian organizations. At the same time, Peres maintains that this is

truly unwillingness rather than inability, since the PA and Arafat posses enough resources to if not completely stop the attacks launched from the Palestinian territories, than at least severely curtail them, which has been already proved before. In this particular (sub)discourse, the official Palestinian bodies led by Yasser Arafat are thus characterized by reluctance to halt terrorism, yet not by being directly implicated in attacks which are conducted by other Palestinian groups.

It comes as no surprise that Ariel Sharon, being known for his hard line stances, adopts much more condemnatory tone when he deals with the PA and its head:

Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority are returning to the belief that they can defeat Israel by means of armed struggle. (TE3, Ariel Sharon)

No doubt that the strategy of the Palestinian Authority is a strategy of terror [...] The Palestinian reaction [to Israeli unilateral cease-fire] was a massive terror acts and murder, and assassinations all over the country. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

As you know, we are in a war, a war that has been launched against us by a coalition of terror that has been established by Chairman Arafat after choosing a strategy of terror immediately after the Camp David conference. In the past we were dealing with one, two or three terrorist organizations. It is a different situation now. There is a coalition of the Hamas movement, the Islamic Jihad, the Palestinian Popular Front, the Tanzim which is the military arm of the Fatah, Arafat's Party and the Presidential Guard called Force 17. Living in a real democracy, when you hear that the Presidential Guard of the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority is involved in terror, and in the liaison with the Hizbullah, it is hard to understand, and even hard to believe, but that is the situation. We have been suffering heavy casualties. About half of those casualties were caused by those terrorist organizations which are under the full control of Chairman Arafat. The Tanzim and the Presidential Guard both receive their wages from him. (TE46, Ariel Sharon)

These excerpts show that unlike Peres, Sharon states openly that his Palestinians counterparts are inextricably implicated in terrorist attacks, which position is being

gradually strengthened over time. Sharon admits that there are more Palestinian groups engaged in terrorist activities, but whereas Peres maintained that these groups were chiefly responsible for attacks, and that Arafat and the PA were guilty mainly of not stopping them, Sharon posits the PA Chairman as the central figure of Palestinian terrorism:

> *This terror is operated, directed and initiated by one man - Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. Arafat heads a coalition of terror. He operates a strategy of terror. The PA Chairman is an enemy of Israel in particular and the entire free world in general. All those who treasure freedom, all those who were raised on the values of freedom and democracy, must know that Arafat is an obstacle to peace in the Middle East. Arafat endangers the stability of the entire region.* (TE58, Ariel Sharon)

> *And there is one dispatcher: Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat. He is the man who, in a series of agreements, promised to abandon the path of terrorism, refrain from committing murder, use his forces to prevent it - and betrayed all his promises […] In the territories under his rule, Arafat has established a regime of terror, which nationally and officially trains terrorists and incites, finances, arms and sends them to perpetuate murderous operations across Israel.* (TE60, Ariel Sharon)

In these texts, Sharon further intensifies his condemnation of Arafat to such an extent that he makes him chiefly responsible for the whole terrorist campaign against Israel. Reasons behind this rhetoric are not hard to discern, as both speeches were given in the aftermath of the Netanya suicide bombing in March 2002 which left roughly thirty Israelis dead and triggered the already mentioned operation Defensive Shield which was sharply criticized worldwide. Sharon's vilification of the PA Chairman should be thus seen as a part of the ongoing struggle for international legitimacy between the State of Israel and Palestinian representatives during the especially intense period.

Nonetheless, these notions should not draw attention from the fact that these later statements do not constitute a qualitative shift from the previous argumentation – as we have seen, Sharon has been maintaining from the beginning that Palestinian

officials are guilty not just of being lenient towards terrorism, but he straightforwardly labels them as the main perpetrators. This is true especially for Arafat who, even though Sharon does not resort to truly dehumanizing language, is repeatedly depicted as the person directly orchestrating the campaign of Palestinian suicide attacks.

Sharon moreover maintains that the Palestinian terrorism is a phenomenon reaching back into history:

We have a conflict with the Palestinians that started over 120 years ago. (TE1, Ariel Sharon)

The terror did not start last year. The terror started here 125 years ago. Arab terror which later came to be known as Palestinian terror. My grandfather was already facing this terror. I know families that have been facing Arab/Palestinian terror for five or six generations. (TE46, Ariel Sharon)

These excerpts suggest that the Arab (and lately Palestinian) terrorism is perpetual since it has been around for dozens of decades. By making such claims, Sharon unwittingly treats terrorism as what Jackson and his colleagues called "free-standing, ontologically stable phenomenon"[163] – he assumes that qualities which define it have not changed over time, although one might easily object that the resistance of Palestinian farmers against Jewish immigration in the late 19th century has actually nothing in common with the attacks during the Second Intifada (not to speak about the fact that labeling the former as terrorism is truly unique even among proponents of the "orthodox" approach towards terrorism). Nevertheless, these claims enable Sharon to portray the current Israeli struggle with Palestinians as continuation of the age long conflict which further implies that Palestinians' adherence to violence is nothing novel. Therefore, it can be deducted that Israel should be free to use any measures to stop terrorist attacks since, given Palestinians' disrespect towards peace, one can not expect them to cease in the foreseeable future.

Sharon and Peres's takes on the PA and Arafat's attitude towards terrorism during the Second Intifada constitute two poles, with other officials' statements falling in between. High-ranking military officers in their statements do not really dwell much

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[163] Jackson et al. (2011), pp. 15. See also chapter 3.

upon depiction of the Palestinian adversary, as they devote most of their attention to operational details, but there are still some speeches dealing with characterization of the PA and its implication in terrorism given by Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) representatives:

> *The Palestinian Authority decided not only to release from prison all those terrorists who belong to the organizations like Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, but also to encourage them to do what they do […] So actually, when we speak about the Palestinian Authority, which we all regard as a political entity, in many senses not far away from being very close to be a state - actually it doesn't only permit that these kind of activities to be carried out, but actually encourages them and inspires them and sponsor this kind of activity.* (TE13, Giora Eiland)

> *[T]errorist activities that, as I said, are fully sponsored and encouraged by the Palestinian Authority.* (TE16, Yaakov Or)

Both military officers' statements mimic Sharon's depiction of the PA's involvement in terrorism to a large degree, yet are not as condemning as those of the then Prime Minister. It might be nevertheless a bit surprising that also Ben-Eliezer, the Defence Minister at the time, adopts a stance that is very similar to the Sharon's position, rather than following argumentation of his fellow Labor Party member Shimon Peres:

> *The weapons that have been captured are not meant to be used in the struggle against terrorism or to solidify the PA's standing in light of the threats on its rule. These are offensive weapons meant to be used in "quality" terrorist attacks that indicate the intentions to escalate and continue the confrontation […] The weapons were meant for the Palestinian Authority. The ship was purchased by them; the people who organized and participated in this are from the Palestinian security apparatus.* (TE41, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

Arafat has made himself into the enemy. He cannot absolve himself from responsibility. He bears a heavy responsibility for the terrorist elements, through both his actions and omissions. (TE56, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer)

These quotes illustrate that a political affiliation is not the primary determinant of speaker's depiction of the PA and its link to the terrorist attacks – even though Ben Eliezer is as well as Shimon Peres representative of the left-wing political party, his rhetoric is much more similar to that of hardliner Sharon. Particular depiction thus might be function of not only political stances, but of personal characteristics and experiences of given official as well.

Up to now, this section has examined Israeli officials' statements concerned with PA and Arafat's stance towards violence, and purposefully bracketed those dealing with Palestinian population's involvement in terrorism. In this regard, we can observe a certain ambiguity among Israeli officials' messages: on the one hand, as has been already noted, they clearly distinguish between terrorists and Palestinians who refrain from violence, and this notion applies even to Ariel Sharon who is otherwise rather uncompromising:

I turn to those Palestinians who do not want war and are not involved in terrorism. Those Palestinians whose sole purpose is to support their families and afford clothes for their children. (TE48, Ariel Sharon)

The statements cited above in the section on the Israeli measures moreover demonstrate that Israeli officials are aware of hardships imposed upon Palestinians during the Intifada, as they seek to "ease" their lives (TE16, Yaakov Or), and the unpleasant conditions experienced by Palestinians are acknowledged by Ariel Sharon as well:

I turn from here also to the Palestinian people to say what I have said in the past - I know that it is not easy being a Palestinian. (TE48, Ariel Sharon)

However, simultaneously to recognizing the suffering of people not connected in any way to terrorist attacks, it is maintained that Palestinians themselves are responsible for their misery:

By resorting to violence, they have only brought tragedy on themselves. (TE34, Ariel Sharon)

Secondly, because of the Intifada, they [Palestinians] suffered a great deal of loss of life. Although it's their fault, but they would accuse us. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

It is clear that in these statements both Sharon and Peres deal with the Palestinian population as such, not only with Palestinian political representatives. A hint at how Palestinians "brought tragedy on themselves" can be found in the following statements:

[T]hey [Palestinians] are electing their leaders, and we are not trying to undercut it, we are not the ones that will elect the leaders of the Palestinians, as they will not be the ones that will elect our leaders. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

We didn't elect partners. The Palestinians have elected their leader, and Arafat is the elected leader of the Palestinians. (TE39, Shimon Peres)

The cited statements imply that since Palestinian people are free to choose their own leaders, they are then responsible for the enacted policies, including for resort to terrorism. Palestinians are thus at the same time cast victims of PA's decisions[164] and accomplices to its crimes – probably unconsciously, Israeli officials in fact adopt Karl Jasper's concept of political responsibility,[165] making the Palestinian population accountable for the PA policies and incitements as well.

What is striking about all the interviews and statements concerned with Palestinian terrorism is a nearly complete paucity of deliberations on the causes of Palestinians' resort to violence. The following text is the only one which touches upon reasons which might have conceivably led Palestinians to adopt terrorism:

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[164] See TE37, in which Sharon states that "the Palestinian people must know: They are the primary victims of the current situation brought about by Arafat."

[165] See Jaspers, Karl, *The Question of German Guilt* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

We cannot keep millions of Palestinians under siege without income, oppressed, poor, densely populated, near starvation. And though we have good reasons, security reasons, I don't know what produces what. Poverty produces terror, and I am not sure that by taking anti-terror measures and making people poorer you are really serving anti-terror. Maybe you kill terrorists, but you give birth to support of terrorism. Young boys at the age of 14, 15, are ready to commit suicide. (TE46, Shimon Peres)

This statement is remarkable not only because it is dealing with otherwise neglected problem, but even more because it draws listeners'/speakers' attention to the Israeli agency in provoking Palestinian terrorism. Even though suggestions that Israeli policies vis-à-vis Palestinians are the primary cause of violence are commonplace in some circles, such an opinion is naturally not a part of the Israeli official canon. Peres of course does not blame the Israeli side entirely for creating Palestinian terrorism, but his assertions are still very rare among Israeli mainstream politicians and officials.

Nevertheless, it must be stressed that this statement is indeed not representing the examined discourse as a whole; on the contrary, it should be conceived as sort of "heretic" argument since the discourse is defined by a deep silence when it comes to the roots of Palestinian anger which is subsequently translated into acts of terrorism. These causes are never discussed, or only to an extent that denies any rationality on the part of Palestinians: as we have seen, Israeli officials maintain that they have offered the other side "everything", and that reaction was ruthless rejectionist violence. Palestinians are thus depicted as a group which can not be negotiated with since there is no reasonable deal they are willing to accept.

Of course, there is no generally agreed upon answer to a question why people in general, and Palestinians in particular, adopt terrorism as a strategy, and one can not expect Israeli leaders willing to take a full share of blame for inciting Palestinian terrorism. But their reluctance to admit that conditions imposed by the Israeli-Arab conflict and Israeli incursions and policies might have some bearing on Palestinians' decisions works to construct image of Palestinians as irrational, pursuing violence only for its sake.[166]

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[166] For analyses more sensitive to Palestinian grievances leading to adoption of terrorism see Moghadam, Assaf, "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada. Motivations and Organizational Aspects", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 26 (2003), pp. 65-92, and Pedazhur; Perliger (2010). For an

This part of the paper has showed that the Israeli discourse defines the Palestinian population not as directly involved in terrorism, yet still allocates to "ordinary" Palestinians a share of blame for the ongoing violence. These allegations are concealed to some degree and put in a mild way, and one can assume that caution exercised in this regard by Israeli officials stems from the realization that accusing the whole population living in harsh conditions of indiscriminate violence would not be swallowed by other countries. Nevertheless, if we are to speak about characterization enacted in the Israeli official discourse, Palestinians as a whole are defined by a certain, albeit not direct, linkage to terrorism, i.e. violence. Moreover, the previous section has demonstrated that Palestinians are depicted as adamant in their refusals of peace proposals and reasonable compromises. It is therefore quite clear that all these properties categorize Palestinians as "peace rejectionists".

5.2.2. Lack of Civilizational Qualities on the Part of Palestinians

As we have seen, when it comes to categories defined by incumbents' attitude towards peace and violence, Palestinians to a large extent constitute the antithesis of Israelis. This juxtaposition is not that much prevalent in the "civilizational" categorization, and Israeli officials do not really dwell upon characterization of Palestinians in this regard. Nevertheless, some basic schemes can be still discerned.

The Israeli officials' proclamations that Palestinians are responsible for the leaders they elect should not be seen as designation of Palestinian political system as democratic. The Israeli discourse firmly established the State of Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East, and it logically follows that Palestine (which furthermore does not fulfill criteria for being recognized as a state) is therefore excluded from this category. This is confirmed by Shimon Peres:

The Palestinians worked very hard to be recognized by the world as a responsible, almost a democratic state in being. (TE29, Shimon Peres)

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account of Palestinian cultural milieu that has bearing on individuals' decision to resort to violence see Whitehead, Neil L.; Abufarha, Nasser, "Suicide, Vioience, and Cultural Conceptions of Martyrdom in Paiestine", *Social Research*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (2008), pp. 395-416.

Even though Palestinians strive to reach that stage, Palestine is "almost a democratic state", meaning that it still can not be perceived as such.

As for economic and scientific development, it is maintained that Palestinians can not compete with Israel with its successful economy and high-tech industry, albeit we have seen that Israeli officials admit that the current conflict takes its toll on the conditions in the Palestinian territories, which is further stated by Peres:

*[T]he conditions in the territories, [...] are very difficult, to be honest. Because of the Intifada, they lost 50 percent of their income; there is 40 percent of unemployment; there are a million and a half people below the poverty line, the poverty line being $2 per person a day, which is a sham*e. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

Nevertheless, Israeli state representatives keep reiterating that Palestinians are chiefly responsible for the situation they find themselves in:

And I think that the world is no longer divided between have and have-nots, but between connected and disconnected. People who are disconnected will remain poor and backward. We would like to see the Arab world being connected as well. And you cannot be connected unless you understand that the connection is not done by bombs, it's being done by education, it's being done by investing in the human being and enabling him to take out from himself the most he has; that within each of us is by far a richer enabling intelligence -- the secret of our talents. (TE9, Shimon Peres)

Therefore, we must all understand that terrorism is the main enemy not only against Israel, but is also hindering the efforts to build social-economic relations, in such a very unstable, uncertain, and sensitive situation. (TE16, Yaakov Or)

In TE9, Peres speaks about "the Arab world" but his claims are especially salient in respect to Palestinians who are chiefly associated with committing acts of terror (allusion to bombs is quite clear in this regard). These quotes thus demonstrate that Israeli officials claim that by resort to terrorism, Palestinians have indicate what is their attitude towards economic development, since by prioritizing violence over education

and "investing in the human being" they prevent themselves from being able to improve their living conditions. In short, Palestinians are to stay in category of underdeveloped, rather backward countries.

Given the depiction of Israelis as civilizationally superior, one could expect more lofty rhetoric of Israeli leaders when discussing Palestinians' culturally rooted characteristics. However, unlike was the case with Jews/Israelis, Israeli officials do not engage in discerning long-term, historically embedded nature of the Palestinian people. Indeed, it is suggested that the recent steps on the part of Palestinians (rejections of peace and resort to violence despite all generous offers) render them irrational, but Israeli leaders largely refrain from portraying these decisions as indicative of a socially engrained property defining Palestinians, having developed over thousands of years. The following excerpt is the only text which actually deals directly with culture-related qualities:

In the latest book by Bernard Lewis he says that the difference between the Eastern or the Muslim culture and the Western culture, is that the Islamic culture believed in justice and the Western culture believed in freedom. Justice is a very dangerous thing, because in the name of justice you can kill, you can cheat, you can murder - you justify it in the name of justice. There is no need to respect human life, their freedom, their honor. When it comes to freedom, you don't have this justified killing decided by the people who call themselves the just people. We have to bring this into consideration. (TE47, Shimon Peres)

Even though this remark is concerned with Islam in general, the argument is quite closely related to Palestinians in particular, as Peres raises these points when discussing the ongoing campaign of terrorist attacks against Israel. Drawing on Bernard Lewis, Peres suggests that Palestinian violence is informed by a certain cultural background. Because of being Muslims, Palestinians are said to have no respect to freedom or human life, which needs to be "brought into consideration" when dealing with Palestinian terrorism. Nevertheless, even though orientalist mentality displayed in this speech is quite striking, it needs to be added that this kind of reasoning is not representative of the discourse as such, and Israeli leaders do not really immerse into cultural characterization of Palestinians.

Briefness of the present section is quite illustrative in regards to paucity of Israeli officials' statements concerned with characterization of Palestinians in terms of socially embedded, civilizational qualities. The Israeli official discourse does not feature an elaborate description of Palestinians when it comes to civilizational belonging, yet a basic scheme can be found: Palestinians are cast members of a "non-civilized" world, not having yet reached stage of democracy and full development.

6. Israelis, Palestinians and the War on Terror

The previous chapter has analyzed how Israeli officials characterize Israelis and Palestinians, i.e. it scrutinized which properties do they allocate to the respective parties, and what actions are seen as typical of the two sides. On the basis of these findings it has also established to what categories have been Palestinians and Israelis discursively positioned. This chapter aims to discern which discursive means Israeli officials utilitized to frame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a part of the US led war on terror. In order to accomplish this goal, the subsequent analysis is conducted in two steps. In what follows I firstly show how Israeli leaders define the global struggle against terrorism. Afterwards, I will demonstrate how are properties defining Israelis on the one hand and Palestinians on the other used to link them to the opposing camps in the war on terror.

It should be stated at the beginning of this part of the paper that a detailed scrutiny of the corpus of speeches by Israeli officials revealed that despite expectations, there is not really a shift in terms of "internationalization" of the local Israeli-Palestinian struggle after 9/11; even before 2001 Al-Qaeda attacks, Israeli leaders were eager to link their policies to "global fight" against terrorism.[167] Even though the 9/11 events brought about a considerable intensification of the emphasis on the international dimension of the fight against terrorism, it did not mark a profound qualitative change of main themes traceable throughout the Israeli official discourse.

6.1. Israeli Officials' Narrative of the War on Terror

Israeli officials define the war on terror as a struggle between two completely antagonistic parties, perpetrators of global terrorism and those who oppose them. Incumbents of the latter category are generally associated with positive properties which they defend, as the following excerpts indicate:

> *Personally, I believe that the free world has to join in that warfare against terror.* (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

> *This battle against terror must be effective to protect life and safeguard freedom.* (T30, Shimon Peres)

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[167] See e.g. TE3 and TE4.

Since September 11th, this struggle has found its way to the doorstep of the free and democratic world. (TE43, Ariel Sharon)

It is a fight for basic values, freedom, liberty, security and democracy. It is a fight that every peace loving nation supports for the sake of the security of future generations. (TE35, Ariel Sharon)

This is a war forced upon the entire free, enlightened and democratic world. This is a war between a civilization which sanctifies the value of life and the pursuit of a better future, and those who glorify death and destruction and seek to drag humanity into an abyss of despair and desperation. (TE54, Ariel Sharon)

As can be seen, Israeli officials adopt language similar to many of other statesmen who pledged to take part in the war on terror after the 9/11 attacks. The states opposed to terrorism are not just fighting their adversaries: they are constructed as members of the "free" and "democratic" world, adhering to the ideas derived from the Enlightenment. As was the case with Israeli officials' description of their own nation, these are highly normatively-laden descriptions, going far beyond simply describing the current struggle, as they rather refer to alleged moral qualities.

Especially Shimon Peres is furthermore keen to stress the accomplishments of the "enlightened world" linked to technological progress and globalization:

We were surprised, all of us, to see the economy becoming global instead of national. What makes the economy global is that science has replaced land. Our living is no longer dependent upon agriculture, but upon high technology. I think many people mistakenly think that technology is a tactical matter - nothing whatsoever. (TE39, Shimon Peres)

Peres's adoption of the term "we" when speaking about the "free world" already hints at the position Israelis occupy in the global struggle. What is now however more important is the emphasis on the negative side of globalization which threatens to nullify all the achievements resulting from interconnectedness of the "free world":

Now we discover the second part of globalization, which is terror.(TE39, Shimon Peres)

We became global for good or for bad. For good means having the advantages of new technologies and new sciences. For bad means having to face the dangers that are emerging from change. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

These statements bring us to the other side of the global struggle, i.e. terrorists and their supporters, who are discussed at length by Israelis officials who offer several characteristics pertaining to this group. To start with, it is established that terrorists do not shy away from inflicting mass casualties:

[Terrorism] can strike anywhere and at any time. Unfettered by human values, the atrocities it perpetrates is indiscriminate, limitless, slaughtering civilians, innocent people. It disseminates horror, it is the personification of present day Satan. (T31, Shimon Peres)

[Terrorist is] someone who is prepared - like the suicide-bombers on the streets of Israel's cities and at the World Trade Center in the US - to die in order to kill innocent civilians, children, women and infants, to die in order to cause fear and terror. (TE51, Ariel Sharon)

Dangerous of terrorism is further amplified by its lack of clear boundaries and amorphous nature:

Enemies are national, dangers are in there plotting, flying over borders and definitions and uniforms and identification. (TE12, Shimon Peres)

Since there are seemingly no constraints, empathy or compassion on the part of terrorists, they are to engage in mass-scale attacks resulting in numerous deaths which are moreover directed mostly against "innocent" civilian population. As a result, terrorism threatens to disrupt foundations of the "free world" and bring about complete societal collapse:

That is the reason why in my judgment and in the eyes of the United States today terrorism is a danger like communism used to be twenty years ago. It is an un-American phenomena and in the eyes of the United States I think it is not just a crime, it is a sin. (TE12, Shimon Peres)

Should Satan-inspired terrorism be allowed to prevail, every water-well could be poisoned and every infant killed. It could jeopardize the freedom and security of the whole world, of every country, of every individual. It has the potential of creating pandemonium in domestic and international flights, dealing a fatal blow to tourism and ruining global trade - wreaking fear and undermining security. (TE30, Shimon Peres)

The war that America is now waging concerns all people all around the world and every person individually. It's war that if it will not be won, we shall be unable to walk, to work, to fly, to commerce, to remain free, to build buildings, to drink water, to breathe fresh air. It's uncompromising, unforgiving, no way to postpone it, and I know it's extremely challenging, because it's also unprecedented. (TE32, Shimon Peres)

We regard terror as the greatest danger to our free society, to our values, and to all our lives. (TE55, Ariel Sharon)

These texts are very illustrative in showing how Israeli officials depict global terrorism. Terrorists are constructed as indefinable group without any clear boundaries, whose main concern is to cause as much suffering as possible, and due to complete disregard of human live, their murderous attacks are completely unrestrained - even "infants" are not exempted from the list of potential targets. The alleged scope of the terrorist danger is so great that it is posed as a threat to the way of life of the "free world's" inhabitants: if terrorism is not fought back, it has potential and aspirations to erase achievements of globalization, to compromise security on a global level, and to destroy the foundations the "free world" is based on. It then logically follows that terrorists are opposed to these underpinning values and harbor deep repulsion towards democratic system, honesty, liberty etc.:

As high-tech can only exist in an honest society, so terror can only exist in a dishonest society […] It cannot go together. The two parts of globalization - the new economy with the great promise and the call for a new system, and the new terror with all the dark sides of it. (TE39, Shimon Peres)

Terror can exist only in countries where there is dictatorship, where murder and lies are permitted, where people can kill and cheat, cover and deny. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

This characterization of global terrorism that is allegedly driven by hatred towards ideational foundations of the "free world", is further made explicit in the excerpt from TE12 cited above, in which Peres compares terrorism to communism, ideology generally conceived as antithesis to Western liberalism. Peres furthermore labels terrorism "un-American", implying it is in profound opposition to values promoted by the "free world's" leading country. This applies to values like freedom, liberty and democracy, and by extension, also to technological and economic advancement:

You cannot have the potential for high technology unless you adopt real freedom and real decency. You cannot have a science-based economy where science exists alongside lies. Science cannot go alongside dictatorship. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

Israeli officials in their statements dealing with the international struggle clearly draw upon embedded narratives of terrorism originated in the West which construct terrorism as a grave threat to "our" way of life and depict terrorists as completely merciless.[168] Nevertheless, it should be noted that Israeli representatives do not depict global terrorism as a movement guided by Islam (or rather its extremist interpretation) as might be expected - actually, they refrain from referring to issues connected to religious faith altogether, with a sole exception of the Peres's speech TE47 quoted above.

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[168] For a critical discussion of these narratives see e.g. Jackson et al. (2011), especially pp. 9-73.

As has been already suggested in this paper when discussing discursive construction of terrorism, arguments and interpretations Israeli leaders make in regards to the global struggle against terrorism can be contested on several grounds. Most importantly, in the light of data on terrorist attacks, it is hard to sustain the claims that terrorism is such a lethal phenomenon as suggested, and this is especially true in the case of the countries that are the main intended recipients of the Israeli messages, i.e. the European and North American states. The question how precisely can terrorism compromise the core values of (any) society thus remains unanswered.

It must be also stressed out that Israeli officials completely refrain from dealing with terrorists' motivations. As was the case with the particular Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reasons for perpetrators' decision to adopt terrorism are never discussed, and the result is that they seemingly engage in violence for its own sake. Of course, given the complexity of these issues and heated disputes on the roots of terrorism one can not expect Israeli officials to arrive to some authoritative conclusions. Yet, by completely omitting these aspects, they construct image of a terrorist without any achievable agenda who just "wants to watch the world burn".

Whereas in the case of Palestinian terrorism Israeli officials largely abstained from dehumanizing language, they do not exercise such caution when dealing with terrorism on a global scale. Indeed, cruelty and ruthlessness of terrorists is allegedly so profound that Israeli officials feel it appropriate to label them as "Satan-inspired" which depiction suggests that terrorists should be conceived as agents of metaphysical evil, rather than as human beings engaged in a struggle of political nature, albeit violent. This narrative further obscures reasons behind terrorists' decision to adopt violence in the first place: they do not act to promote or achieve certain discernible goals, but because the desire to inflict pain is deeply entrenched in their personalities.

The profound vilification of terrorists and their portrayal as the most serious menace the world faces then inevitably results in rejection of any compromise and in stressing the need to fight terrorism at all costs:

> *For that reason, I believe that the United States cannot stop the strike against terror. The United States, or China, or Russia, or India cannot permit a situation in which a small group of people will prevent us from flying in safety, from walking to work, from building a skyscraper, or even drinking fresh water or breathing fresh air.* (TE39, Shimon Peres)

We talked about the need to fight terror and not to get into compromise with terror - one cannot get into compromise with terror. (TE45, Ariel Sharon)

There is no neutrality in this struggle. Those who sit idly by and do nothing to prevent it become partners in the forces of terrorism and cannot wash their hands of it. (TE54, Ariel Sharon)

We must wage an uncompromising fight against this terror, uproot these weeds, and smash their infrastructure because there is no compromise with terror. (TE58, Ariel Sharon)

Moreover, as has been already suggested above, opposing terrorism is crucial for preservation of globalization's beneficial effects:

Strangely enough, the events of 11 September showed that most of the world has already entered the new age. Today there is an unwritten coalition of a united Europe, the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Japan and many of the Latin American countries and many African countries. It is not that all of them have fallen in love with America, but all of them understand that there must be a basic situation in which a new generation will be permitted to enjoy what is offered by the new age. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

Not only that those who are opposed to terrorism can not back off: since terrorism is such a grave threat, conceivably "poisoning fresh water and air", there is no middle ground in this fight affecting the whole globe. This struggle is also, as we have already seen, often conceptualized in terms of war - drawing on the US (or more precisely the Bush Administration's) narrative and interpretation of the fight against terrorism after the 9/11 attacks becomes quite clear in this regard:

The war that America is now waging concerns all people all around the world and every person individually […] And as I have said, I believe that this time, the camp against terror will be by far wider than ever before, maybe including Russia, China, India. You know, even the former non-aligned camp is

*disappearing because you cannot be non-aligned in face of death and terror.
And that's why I said that the differences between East and West and North and
South are disappearing.* (TE32, Shimon Peres)

Given what has been already stated, it comes as no surprise that the struggle
against terrorism is conceived in religious terms:

Today there is just one division - devil and anti-devil. (TE44, Shimon Peres)

These assertions stem from the construction of terrorists as fanatics whose
striving for violence does not know any boundaries, and who are not guided by any
achievable agenda. Since terrorists' goals can not be negotiated, there can be no
compromise short of complete submission. What also follows from this depiction of the
threat is that terrorists' inherently vicious and dangerous nature renders it impossible to
remain neutral in the fight which is depicted as a peculiar kind of divinely sanctioned
duty. Everybody ("all people all around the world and every person individually", as
stated by Peres in TE32) thus has to choose on which side of the barrier dividing the
"free world" and terrorism she stands. Polarization on the global scale, as conceived by
the Israeli officials, is simply absolute – as suggested by Sharon in TE54, anybody who
does not actively step in the fight and instead takes the position of an observer is to be
blamed for the bloodshed as much as the perpetrators themselves.

The war on terror is thus established as a struggle between two profoundly
antagonistic parties. One the one hand, there is a camp of countries promoting
democracy and freedom and taking advantage of modern economy and achievements of
globalization. But all these values and attainments are said to be in a danger stemming
from global terrorism which threatens to completely destroy them.

6.2. Reframing the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a Part of the War on Terror

Issues that have been covered up to now hint quite strongly at the Israeli position
in the global struggle against terrorism. To start with, one of the previous sections
dealing with characterization of the Israelis showed that Israeli officials define their
country and its inhabitants largely through adherence to certain values - which happen

to overlap with those characterizing the "free world". Just to briefly recapitulate, Israelis are portrayed as proponents of democracy and liberalism, hard-working people who laid foundations to progressive and efficient economic system, and refrain from dominance over others. Although not completely neatly, these predicates position Israel as a member of the "civilized" and "free" world constructed in the Israeli official discourse. Israeli membership in the camp fighting terrorism is thus firstly established through these shared values and achievements. Seen from this perspective, Israeli leaders' assertions about their country's democratic system as a regionally unique feature obtain even greater salience, since this characterization posits Israel as the only representative of the "free world" in the area.

These claims about cultural affinity are repeatedly made explicit by Ariel Sharon:

The bilateral relations between Europe and Israel are based on a long-standing tradition of shared values: democratic freedom and market economy. (TE36, Ariel Sharon)

The friendship between our two countries [Israel and US] is based upon shared interests and values, a common commitment to democratic institutions, regional stability, economic prosperity and the pursuit of peace. (TE54, Ariel Sharon)

The friendship between Israel and the United States is a true one, and there is a deep mutual commitment between the two states is founded on basic shared values: the aspiration for liberty, freedom, the security of our citizens, and democracy. (TE55, Ariel Sharon)

These excerpts capture the process of categorization of Israelis in relation to the war on terror in the Israeli official discourse. Speakers are especially keen to depict their home country as aligned (in terms of values underpinning given societies) with the Western countries, the main representatives of the "free world", since they are very much aware that majority of the countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic community would reject any suggestions of affiliation with the Israeli state out of hand.

The most important point pertaining to the categorization of Israelis at the international level, however, relates to the very activity that defines the current global

struggle: as we have seen, Israelis are characterized by an intensive engagement in counterterrorism. In speeches that deal with terrorism generally, not only with Palestinian attacks, Israeli officials insist on homogeneity of this phenomenon:

> *Mr. Vice President, terrorism is terrorism is terrorism, anywhere in the world. There is no "good terrorism" or "bad terrorism". Real or imagined injustice or deprivation cannot serve as an excuse for the murder of innocent civilians.* (TE54, Ariel Sharon)

In this speech, Ariel Sharon indirectly refers to the famous distinction between a "terrorist" and a "freedom fighter" which division he rejects since no "murder of innocent civilians" can be rationalized by pointing to grievances of any kind, be them fictional or rooted in reality. Of course, after going through the whole speech, it becomes clear that Sharon speaks concretely about violent acts perpetrated by Palestinians that are often being justified by referring to Israeli agency in inciting Palestinians' hatred. Sharon strongly rejects this argumentation and depicts terrorism as universally loathsome, regardless of any context explaining perpetrators' goals or motivation: terror remains terror, no matter what.

Sharon further suggests that terrorism is homogenous phenomenon not only in terms of its aims and causes, but also in terms of geography:

> *We have been supporting the courageous decisions and the great leadership that have been shown by President Bush and Vice President Cheney - by the American leadership - in their struggle against terror, local terror, regional terror, international terror.* (TE55, Ariel Sharon)

The fact that local manifestations of what he calls "terrorism" are profoundly different from each other is neglected by Sharon; for him, there is only one terrorism the "free world" has to fight - terrorism is constructed as a strictly unitary phenomenon. It then logically follows that by opposing Palestinian-local terrorism, Israel becomes a firm part of the camp fighting international terrorism, led by the US.

Position of Palestinians in the war on terror is then discernible from what has been just stated. As we have seen, according to Israeli officials terrorism is something

one must either fight or become part of, and there is no middle ground between these two poles; furthermore, terrorism is essentialized despite its local variations.

It has been also previously shown that Palestinians do indeed engage in terrorist activities, and this notion applies, albeit not directly, to the whole Palestinian population. There are differences among Israeli officials' speeches dealing with Palestinians' attitude towards terrorism, but they all implicate Palestinians in some way in this kind of violence – even though Peres does not put the supreme guilt on the PA and Arafat, he still maintains that Palestinian semi-state bodies are responsible for not stopping terrorism, for "not doing enough"; other politicians and military officers then point directly to Arafat and the PA and label them as the main actors behind the attacks. And since Palestinians bear political responsibility for their leaders, they are to be blamed for violence as well.

It is thus obvious that in the Israeli official discourse's logic, Palestinians are inevitably cast members of the "non-free world", striving to cause a collapse of civilization. Since there is no middle ground, by engaging in/allowing/supporting terrorism, Palestinians are inextricably linked to terrorism at a global level. This identification of Palestinians, embodied by Yasser Arafat, with global terrorist threat is expressed openly by Sharon:

> *The PA Chairman is an enemy of Israel in particular and the entire free world in general. All those who treasure freedom, all those who were raised on the values of freedom and democracy, must know that Arafat is an obstacle to peace in the Middle East.* (TE58, Ariel Sharon)

Positioning of Palestinians to the "terrorist camp" is sealed by their alleged cultural and civilizational characteristics. As we have seen, although Israeli officials do not really deal with this topic in a detailed manner, it is strongly suggested that Palestinians are not associated with any properties that could align them with the "civilized world". Palestinians are thus posited at the opposite side of the global struggle, pitted against Israel, the US and the rest of those who enjoy achievements of a modern, globalized economy and herald freedom and democracy.

7. Legitimization Strategies Employed by Israeli Officials

The previous sections of the paper have firstly analyzed how Israeli officials depict Israelis and Palestinians, and subsequently examined how was this portrayal used to discursively cast the local Middle Eastern conflict as a part of the global struggle against terrorism. The present chapter draws on and partially summarizes some of these findings when dealing with strategies Israeli representatives used to legitimate Israeli policies enacted in the course of the Second Intifada.

Following the works concerned with legitimation strategies that have been discussed in the second chapter, several types of discursive schemes that sought to justify Israeli measures can be discerned. This chapter thus deals firstly with legitimization by proximization and binary opposition, and then it proceeds to scrutiny of strategies discussed by Theo van Leuween and Antonio Reyes which were introduced in the second chapter.

Specifically, examination of the corpus has identified four main strategies conceived by van Leuween and Reyes: legitimation through emotions, altruism, impersonal authority and Reyes's conceptualization of rationality. It should be nevertheless noted that all these schemes are to some degree intertwined with those drawing a sharp division between Israelis on the one hand and Palestinians on the other. The focus on the four strategies just named should also not be taken as a claim that other strategies discussed by Reyes and van Leuween are not employed in the examined discourse at all: these four schemes simply feature most prominently and are most often used by the Israeli officials.

7.1. Proximization: Israel and the War on Terror

As we have seen, Israeli representatives in their speeches strive to make parallels between the local conflict in which their state is pitted against Palestinians and the fight against international terrorism led by the US. The aim of this enterprise is nevertheless not, as has been shown, to merely make the two struggles comparable, with an underlying rationale that "since no one dares to criticize the United States for doing whatever it deems necessary in its 'war on terrorism', no one should criticize whatever

they now do to suppress their own 'terrorists.'[169] Rather, Israeli officials aim to cast the Israeli-Palestinian conflict an inseparable part of the global war on terror, which depiction is supposed to endow Israeli policies with legitimation in the eyes of the "free world" (which stands basically for the US and Europe), since they are said to be a contribution to shared goals.

On a more general level, these discursive schemes can be conceived by employing Paul Chilton's concepts introduced earlier in the paper, albeit with certain reservations. Seen through these lenses, what Israeli officials strive to achieve is to locate their country as a part of the "deictic centre" in regards to the struggle of the against international terrorism. In other words, they seek to establish Israel as belonging to "us", to the "civilized world".

The present paper is concerned only with the Israeli official discourse as such, not with its perception by the intended audience, i.e. Western statesmen and public, and it therefore does not deal with the issue to what degree were attempts to include Israel into the deictic center in this context successful. Nevertheless, it is clear what is the purpose of this rhetorical enterprise. Inclusion into the deictic centre would enable Israeli leaders to persuasively depict Israeli measures as a contribution to the efforts to tackle the threat of global terrorism, and thus make them more palatable for the rest of the "free world". Identification of Palestinians with international terrorism can be then seen as providing further support for these claims. By fighting Palestinian terrorism, allegedly an integral part of the phenomenon constituting a looming threat for the "civilized world", Israeli leaders can position their country as belonging to this camp, i.e. deictic centre.

Indeed, the just sketched application of the Paul Chilton's ideas on legitimization to the case of the Israeli discourse during the Second Intifada is just a very brief, introductory attempt, and more nuanced and deep research is needed, especially in regards to temporal, spatial and modal determinants of both deictic centre and the threat of global terrorism; nevertheless, given the primary aim of the present paper, the analysis offered here is sufficient to shed a light on Israeli rhetorical strategies aiming to justify Israeli policies.

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[169] Quoted in Sluka, Jeffrey A., "The Contribution of Anthropology to Critical Terrorism Studies", in: Jackson et al. (eds.) (2009), pp. 150.

7.2. Drawing on "Us" vs. "Them" Dichotomy

We have already seen that apart from establishing a linkage between the Israeli struggle against Palestinian terrorism and the global war on terrorism, Israeli leaders employ legitimation strategy based on depiction of the conflict in a dichotomist manner which pits "us" against them", endowing the former with a moral superiority over the latter. Nevertheless, Israeli officials generally refrain from resorting to dehumanizing language to describe acts of Palestinian terrorism and their perpetrators, which is rather unusual among countries facing such an intensive campaign of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this prudence can be easily explained since Israeli leaders, being target of harsh international criticisms, were aware of the fact that depiction of Palestinians in a too condemnatory way would not be accepted by foreign audiences, and therefore opted for a more cautious language.

Still, it has been demonstrated in the fifth chapter dealing with characterization of the conflicting parties that Israeli officials construct the reality of the Second Intifada largely in a dichotomist manner, and the following discussion thus obviously draws on these findings. Establishing a stark division between "them" and "us" is arguably the most prominent legitimation strategy Israeli officials rely on, since this discursive structure is the most elaborate and is devoted most space in various speeches.

On the one hand there are Israelis striving for peace who tirelessly propose solutions to the conflict that would stop the chain of violence, and are open to any external interventions aimed to bring about this outcome. Israeli eagerness to start negotiations immediately and in a good will is supported by referring to previous peace deals Israel made with other neighboring countries. It is further asserted that Israelis adhere to their quest for peace despite harm imposed on them as a result of these efforts.

Palestinians, on the other hand, are constructed as the party whose actions make attainment of peace impossible. Palestinians, Israeli officials maintain, consistently reject generous Israeli offers, and these rejections go as far as to not seizing the opportunity to get a state of their own. By turning their back on this proposition which would secure them their foremost goal, they have vividly demonstrated that there can be no compromise which would satisfy them. Moreover, it is maintained that Palestinian response to all peace initiatives has been an unprecedented wave of violence which can not be explained in any reasonable manner.

This opposition serves to effectively legitimate Israeli security policies enacted during the Second Intifada, since these are merely, according to Israeli officials' argumentation, reaction to Palestinian terrorism, not a deliberate choice on the part of the Israeli political and military establishment. Israeli measures are depicted as regrettable yet necessary and, equally important, appropriate actions aimed to protect the country and its inhabitants from being harmed by violence incited/supported/conducted by Palestinians. By constructing a stark opposition between Israelis' inherent peacefulness and Palestinian violent and rejectionist nature, it is implied that the blame for the suffering of the Palestinian population resulting from Israeli policies should be attributed to Palestinians themselves, because Israelis only pursue self-defence, and have been pushed to use of violence by Palestinians' previous resort to terror. Legitimacy is thus sought largely by suppressing Israeli agency in generation of violence, which, Israeli officials unwaveringly maintain, has been imposed upon Israel.

It must be nevertheless noted that these notions apply only to speeches concerned directly with Palestinians and Israelis: in the case of international struggle against terrorism, Israeli leaders do not hesitate to associate terrorists with Satan and depict them as threatening to cause a complete societal collapse of the "free world". Israeli officials thus adopt much stronger language when describing the global war on terror, and opposition between the two camps in this struggle is established as much starker and non-bridgeable than that between Israelis and Palestinians.

Even though Israeli officials in their speeches do not really propose any specific measures to prevent the grim scenarios they envisage from materializing, given the severity of this threat it might be implied that the range of acceptable policies aiming to fight global terrorism is very wide and includes otherwise unthinkable steps. By casting Palestinians members of the category defined by profound evilness (albeit this linkage is only indirect), it logically follows that they as well might be exposed to these controversial measures. Seen in this light, Israeli incursions might be interpreted as still mild and relatively harmless, if one takes into account enormity of the danger Palestinian-turned-global terrorism entails.

Of course, this way of reasoning is only implicit throughout the body of texts examined in this paper, and its appeal is dependent on embracement of Israeli representatives' positioning of Palestinians as members of global terrorist network, which is far from guaranteed; it nevertheless points out to the role that portrayal of the

conflicting parties as deeply opposed plays in the Israeli official discourse, and how these schemes aim to endow Israeli actions with international legitimacy.

7.3. Appeals to Emotions

Even though this sort of appeals is present throughout the Israeli official discourse, there is not that many speeches relying on emotions, especially when compared to rhetoric of leaders of other countries which found themselves facing a wave of terrorist attacks. We have already seen in the previous parts of the paper that Israeli officials do not hesitate to refer to specific instances of Palestinian attacks and bring number of casualties to audience's attention - however, they largely refrain from adopting emotional language to describe the attacks and their outcomes. Again, reasons for this caution can be found in international reservations about nature of the Israeli measures: given the level of sympathies for Palestinians in the occupied territories, Israeli leaders were probably aware that they can not really reverse the perception of the conflict and resort to vilification of their opponents. The following excerpts are thus rather exceptional:

> *In the past few days we have witnessed horrific terrorist attacks [...]* (TE56, Ariel Sharon)

> *The tragedy in Tel Aviv was terrible. It was a massacre of young people and a cynical murder.* (TE18, Shimon Peres)

> *Due to the level of violence and the intensity of barbaric terrorist attacks inflicted on us - and the brave [counter-terrorist] war being conducted by commanders and soldiers, there is no possibility at this stage of achieving a few days of quiet.* (TE52, Ariel Sharon)

In these statements Israeli leaders do not just offer sheer numbers to inform their audience about the toll the conflict takes on Israeli civilians - words like "horrific", "massacre" and "barbaric" clearly are used in order to incite emotional reaction on the part of listeners. Use of these expressions aims to gather support for the Israeli victims of the attacks, while simultaneously vilifies their perpetrators. Framing Palestinian

terrorism in this way aims to demonstrate that Israeli policies enacted to tackle it might seem severe but under the given circumstances, when facing such a ruthless violence, they are fully justifiable.

Still, speeches of this kind are not really prevalent in the examined corpus. However, this notion does not apply to statements dealing with international terrorism - we have seen that even Shimon Peres, who displays the biggest restraints among Israeli officials when discussing Palestinian terrorism, does not hesitate to label opponents of the "free world" as inspired by Satan and completely pitiless. Nevertheless, these assertions do not aim to justify Israeli security policies as such, but rather to demonstrate that Israel is completely on the side of those fighting global terrorism which is proved by harsh condemnation of the latter.

7.4. Rationality and Consensus Pertaining to Decision Making Processes

As discussed in the second chapter, Antonio Reyes maintains that one of strategies adopted by political representatives seeking to legitimize their policies in the eyes of public is to appeal to rationality which he conceives slightly different from van Leuween – Reyes asserts that today's society generally values calm and caution exercised when making political decisions, and that politicians thus seek to legitimize their policies by depicting them as enacted only after long deliberations and consultations with other actors with whom they arrive to a consensus. These notions are highly relevant for the present paper, as Israeli officials often resort to this way of argumentation and put special emphasis on the fact that there are more parties which formulate given policies:

> *First, it doesn't go in the way that the army recommends and then comes the approval of the political level. There is the discussion of the military people with the high officials in the political level and this kind of decision is taken as a result of this discussion.* (TE13, Giora Eiland)

> *We don't act with a pleasure or light-mindedness, but with a responsibility for the future of our people. We are acting together, right wing and left wing. We need to work together and keep our differences for another day. By and large*

people understand what we are doing and we enjoy wide support because we are united and because people feel their views are represented in the Cabinet. Although we are upset, we remain cool and rational. (TE18, Shimon Peres)

We have established a serious of groups to handle the new situation. On the top level there will be a guiding team, headed by the Prime Minister, with the participation of the Defense Minister and myself. We shall try to meet as often as possible, occasionally even every day, to coordinate all the talks. Then there will be a group that will handle the security issues, with the participation of our top commanders. There will also be, for the first time, a political group that will deal with all political and economic aspects. This will include a representative of the Prime Minister - Minister without Portfolio Tzipi Livni, and the Defense Minister, or whoever he will appoint, and myself, chairing the group. (TE53, Shimon Peres)

In these speeches Israeli officials assert that policies aimed to protect the civilian population are enacted only after long discussions. Moreover, those who participate in these debates do not include only couple of leading politicians - Israeli representatives are "acting together", regardless of political affinity, to formulate widely embraced policies. Since such a wide spectrum of political actors participate in the decision making, opinions of a majority of the Israeli population are represented during the discussions; the result is that the actions taken reflect a general consensus, rather than opinions of handful of governmental figures.

Both Peres and Eiland further convince the audience that Israeli actions are frequently discussed with military staff. As these are professionals primarily concerned with security issues, it might be assumed that policies formulated on the basis of their opinion are the most reasonable and effective ones. In this regard, Israeli officials seek to legitimize their actions by pointing to the role experts play in their drafting which is also a rhetorical strategy discussed by Reyes. Nevertheless, this is not a dominant strategy traceable in the Israeli discourse - rather than relying on voice of expertise, Israeli leaders seek to construct policies aiming to tackle Palestinian terrorism as agreed upon by number of actors.

The fact that given policies are supported by such a wide consensus and adopted only after lengthy deliberations logically support the claims that they can not be seen as

impulsive, short-sighted steps, but rather as cautiously weighed option, most appropriate under given circumstances. Israeli officials can then make authoritative statements of this sort:

> *I think that we have, though, been very careful. I'll make every effort that we'll not cause any escalation of the situation, because I don't think we need this. We have to be very careful, yet we have the right to defend our citizens.* (TE1, Ariel Sharon)

It is further maintained that Israeli leaders are sensitive to international opinion and open to consultation with foreign partners:

> *So Israel cannot turn her back, and Israel is unwilling to turn her back, to the international voice and opinion.* (TE12, Shimon Peres)

> *We created a committee made of senior representatives of the United States, our representatives. This is a professional committee, which conducts meetings between military officers - both at the higher and at the lower levels. The American representative, the CIA representative, is present at those meetings. We attach great importance to those security meetings, to the contacts among officers in the field, as a calming element.* (TE26, Ariel Sharon)

By stressing cooperation and consultations with American officers and professionals, Israeli leaders aim to demonstrate that steps to protect their fellow citizens do not reflect solely their own particular assumptions about what needs to be done, but also those of their American counterparts. Since foreign representatives and experts directly participate in the formulation of Israeli security policies, it might be maintained that they are "rational" in the sense that they are carefully weighed and calculated. By being allegedly sensitive to "the international voice and opinion", Israeli officials can assert that the consensus which informs counterterrorism measures reaches beyond the borders of the Israeli state.

It is of course quite natural that Israeli leaders seek to label their policies as "calm", "careful", and not "light-minded", rather than as hasty, irresponsible steps taken without any considerations. Seen through this prism, Israeli controversial measures

aimed to halt Palestinian terrorism can be posited as the most benign alternative, because they are a result of a consensus among both Israeli and non-Israeli representatives, as well as among military officers and politicians alike - given the number of those took part in the decision making process, it might be assumed that there was no better and more cautions, i.e. more "rational", course of action, as it would have come up during the lengthy discussions.

7.5. Endowment with Impersonal Authority

Apart from relying on messages laden with emotions and pointing to rationality of the decision-making process, another relevant framework for scrutinizing Israeli officials' legitimation strategy, in this case derived from the van Leuween's work, is self-endowment with an impersonal authority. This particular strategy is in the examined discourse centered on a notion of Israel as a sovereign state.

Sharon who is the main proponent of this line of argumentation among Israeli politicians and officers in his speeches repeatedly points out to sovereignty and related rights and obligations:

A sovereign country cannot allow its citizens to be attacked in the streets. (TE14, Ariel Sharon)

That's Israel. And we have the right to defend ourself, like every other nation in the world. And that's what we are going to do. (TE28, Ariel Sharon)

Israel's supreme obligation, as in any state, is to protect its citizens, and Israel will continue to exercise its right to self-defense. (TE34, Ariel Sharon)

No sovereign nation would tolerate such a sequence of events [Pesach Seder bombing in Netanya in March 2002]. (TE56, Ariel Sharon)

Sharon maintains that the status of Israel as a sovereign state entails certain duties, of which the most important is to ensure that its inhabitants are kept safe from external threats. Seen through a prism of the van Leuween's work, legitimation is in these instances achieved by appeals to impersonal authority - since sovereignty has been

historically associated with, or to a large extent even consisted of, protection of people under its particular jurisdiction from incursions of other sovereign entities, engaging in counterterrorist operations can be conceived as following imperatives that have been inextricably associated with this status for centuries. Sharon as an elected leader thus just fulfils his historically entrenched duties by adopting policies aimed to quell Palestinian terrorism, to which action he is fully authorized.

Sharon also repeatedly emphasizes that Israel is "like every other nation in the world", which is supposed to incite foreign audiences and leaders to deliberate if they would not have adopted measures of a similar kind had they found themselves facing the same circumstances. By this move Sharon seeks to gather support and sympathy for Israel, as he appeals to obligations which are common to all functioning countries. It should be also pointed out that Sharon completely refrains from discussing or describing specific Israeli security policies aimed to protect Israeli citizens, which step purposefully draws all audience's attention only to the protection of civilians, rather than to controversial nature of these measures. Of course, pointing to casualties among Palestinian population would seriously diminish appeal of these messages which are based on emphasis on the rightful defence deriving from sacrosanct principles of sovereignty. Israeli leaders are thus in the discourse constructed as merely obeying to obligations associated with principles of sovereignty, which portrayal aims to endow them with authority to take necessary steps.

7.6. Altruistic Nature of Israeli Policies

Last legitimation strategy employed by Israeli officials is stressing altruism on the part of Israelis, which discursive structure has been conceived and discussed by Reyes. The issue of Israelis' unselfish nature has been touched upon earlier in the section dealing with characterization of the conflicting parties which has shown that even when pushed into use of force, Israelis allegedly still exercise remarkable caution and try to avert casualties among and suffering of the Palestinian civilian population. Nevertheless, Israeli leaders go in some of their speeches beyond these claims - not only that Israeli security measures are rendered highly discriminate and moderate, Israelis are moreover portrayed as striving to economically support Palestinians and improve their living conditions:

In the first stage, which we have begun, we are already taking immediate steps to ease up restrictions and improve the economic situation of the Palestinian population. (TE3, Ariel Sharon)

This government is beginning its road by trying to improve the economic situation in the territories as far as it depends upon us - not as a condition, and not as a prize, but really as a way to save suffering from the Palestinian people. (TE5, Shimon Peres)

First of all, the steps, adopted by the Israeli government up until today, based on implementing a policy designed to answer the question: how to ease the life of the population in a very uncertain situation, in a terrorism environment, and a very risky situation. There were two main outcomes of the events from September or October, eight months ago, that made in fact a real change in the basic situation and the social-economic relations between us and the Palestinians. (TE30, Yaakov Or)

We would like to do immediately whatever we can to facilitate life and to make them [Palestinians] a happier and freer people. (TE42, Shimon Peres)

Unlike was the case with some other discursive schemes scrutinized in this paper, we can see that this particular argumentation is adopted by politicians regardless of their stances, reaching from Shimon Peres, representative of left wing camp to high ranking military official and hardliner Ariel Sharon.

In these statements Israeli leaders demonstrate that Israel is not engaged only in fighting terrorism (in as non-harmful manner as possible); Israelis further invest considerable effort and resources to "help [Palestinian] population" and "improve the economy and the social conditions" in the Palestinian territories. These assertions thus clearly depict Israelis as deeply altruistic people, because Israeli leaders maintain that they are concerned not only with their own electorate's wellbeing, but with that of Palestinians as well. The policies enacted by Israel during the Second Intifada should thus not be conceived as merely protective of Israeli population, but rather as contributing to the wellbeing of the Palestinian population.

The following texts hint at some other features characteristic of the legitimation strategy based on assertions about Israelis' altruism:

By the way, I told the President, and he appreciated it very much, that Israel has decided unilaterally and unconditionally to improve the economy and the social conditions in the West Bank and Gaza. We started already three days ago. We increased the number of permits for Palestinian workers to come and work. We have lifted restrictions on trade, on exports, on imports. We suggested to the Palestinians to build a power plant on their land and of their jurisdiction; we shall buy from them electricity. The same with desalination plant; we shall buy from them water. (TE10, Shimon Peres)

*Then to reduce wherever we can the closure - unconditionally, unilaterally. To open up traffic for goods and people within the territories. To lift the restrictions of exports and imports. To enable people who are engaged in trade to stay in Israel, the number went up from 1,000 to 5,000. To enable goods that were held in the ports to arrive at their targets. (*TE12, Shimon Peres)

In these speeches Shimon Peres brings to the fore specific Israeli projects and steps aimed to make lives of Palestinians more palatable which supports the claims about Israelis' altruism. But more important is that Peres maintains that Israelis acted "unilaterally and unconditionally" which assertions further amplify the core message conveyed in speeches focusing on altruism on the part of Israelis. By highlighting these characteristics of Israeli steps, Peres purports to demonstrate that Israelis are not in any way pushed into their acts of mercy, and that they do not expect any payback; in short, that Israeli policies are really expression of their altruistic nature, and not a plot to get something in return.

Strategic rationale behind these claims is not hard to discern: they should be seen as counter-arguments to allegations that accuse the Israeli state from inflicting unnecessary suffering on Palestinians by adopting too harsh measures that affect not only perpetrators of attacks and terrorist infrastructure, but the civilian population as well. By detailed description of altruistic efforts and providing specific examples of Israeli projects beneficial for Palestinians, Israeli leaders aim to dispel these accusations and demonstrate that they are guided mostly by humanitarian considerations.

It is not my intention to deny that Israeli provided Palestinian economy with some positive incentives which were in many aspects helpful in amelioration of the situation on the ground. Nevertheless these initiatives do not erase the highly negative impact Israeli less altruistic policies had on Palestinians, and the emphasis on Israeli efforts to revive economy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip should not obscure the fact that Israeli actions to a large extent made situation in the Palestinian territories so dismal in the first place.

Conclusion

Drawing on various works concerned with the role of language in the process of structuring social reality, discourse analysis methods and critical examination of terrorism, this paper aimed to discern what legitimation means Israeli officials employed during the Second Intifada to make their policies more palatable to foreign audiences. The thesis scrutinized allocation of qualities to and categorization of the conflicting parties, examined linkages between this characterization and the war on terror, and discussed specific legitimizing strategies. What remains to be done is to weigh what is a relative importance of individual components in the discourse, i.e. to demonstrate on which strategies Israeli officials rely mostly while trying to justify state policies.

The previous chapters have strongly suggested that basically all efforts to legitimize Israeli actions during the Second Intifada traceable in the examined discourse are derived from the construction of stark opposition between Israelis and Palestinians. Whereas Israelis are depicted as peace loving and civilized people, Palestinians, especially in regards to the first set of qualities, largely pose as Israelis' antithesis. Portrayal of all Israeli steps as a mere response to acts of Palestinian terrorism, without any acknowledgement of Israeli responsibility for inciting violence, serves to justify controversial measures as the only acceptable option on the part of Israel. Depicting Israeli incursions as measured and discriminate then further contributes to obfuscation of Israeli agency in perpetuation and intensification of the conflict.

This portrayal also lays the foundations to reframing of the regional struggle between the Israeli state and Palestinians as an integral part of the US-led war on terror. The allegedly inverse qualities attached to the conflicting parties determine their position in the international struggle between the "free world" and global terrorism: Israelis are cast members of the former camp, whereas Palestinians are assigned the role of Al-Qaeda accomplices. This peculiar interpretation seeks to further legitimize Israeli actions by depicting them as helpful in the fight against terrorism which concerns all members of "civilized world".

Various legitimating strategies conceived by Theo van Leuween and Antonio Reyes present in the examined discourse are in a certain way also all related to the binary dichotomy that defines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Albeit quite rare, statements laden with emotions underscore the ruthless nature of Palestinians who do

not hesitate to impose horrors upon "innocent" civilians. Assertions about altruism and rationality on the part of Israelis then further contribute to construction of Israeli policies as measured, reasonable, and in some instances even beneficial for the Palestinian population. Lastly, impersonal authority derived from Israeli sovereignty which obliges Israeli policy-makers to enact measures to protect citizens under the state's jurisdiction demonstrates that Israeli policies are truly necessary and that this particular course of action would have been taken by any leader under the given circumstances.

All these findings show that the specific case of Israeli leaders' depiction of Palestinian terrorism corresponds to trends observable among various official discourses concerned with terrorism that have been discussed in the third chapter. Indeed, construction of binary opposition between "them" and "us" that is one of the omnipresent features in state discourses on terrorism lies at the very heart of the Israeli officials' rhetoric. The Israeli discourse is also representative of the process of linking the local struggle to international fight against terrorist threat which reframing is quite ubiquitous among countries that have sought to quell domestic terrorism after 2001. Israeli officials' discursive repression of Palestinian terrorists' motivation, that renders its perpetrators irrational fanatics rather than actors guided by discernible agenda, also strongly resembles similar omissions on the part of representatives of states which found themselves facing acts of political violence conducted by non-state groups.

Israeli officials in their statements furthermore draw on embedded narratives which endow them with a higher level of credibility as they refer to taken-for-granted assumptions. The paper has shown that this applies both to narratives concerned with Israelis' alleged qualities on the one hand and to interpretation of the war on terror on the other. As for the former, we have seen that Israeli leaders repeatedly describe Israel as "the only democracy in the Middle East" which rhetorical figure has been indispensable part of the Israeli self-description from the very beginning of the independent statehood. Israeli officials further resort to early Zionist ethos when describing their state as a country that "made desert bloom". The narrative of the global war on terror constructed in the Israeli official discourse then largely adopts schemes, assumptions and interpretations that originated in the West during last decades. Israeli case is thus far from being unique in respect to discursive construction of terrorism.

I do not claim that the present thesis has covered all relevant issues, on the contrary. Its purpose was to deal with a rather narrow topic of the Israeli official

discourse during a relatively short period, encompassing mere fourteen months. There are therefore several related problems which deserve further scholarly attention, starting with questions pertaining to actual perception of the Israeli officials' statements: most importantly, did the intended audience, i.e. foreign public and leaders, accept the Israeli narrative of the Second Intifada? Given ensuing harsh criticisms, one is strongly tempted to answer this question negatively, but more elaborate research is warranted.

Furthermore, how is the discourse meant mainly for foreign consumption different from the one addressed to the domestic audience? There was couple of speeches examined in this paper that had definitely reached average Israelis, like Prime Minister's Addresses to the Nation or interviews for Israeli media outlets, but these constitute only a fraction of all political statements concerned with Palestinian terrorism after 2000. A comparison of messages purported to legitimize Israeli policies at home and abroad could conceivably highlight interesting contrasts, as well as similarities between these discourses.

Lastly, examination of speeches by Palestinian officials during the same period would undoubtedly yield valuable insights into dynamics of discursive struggles between adversaries. It is quite safe to suppose that detailed scrutiny of Palestinian representatives' statements would reveal assertions similar to those of their Israeli counterparts, just with a reversed roles order,[170] but this assumption should be confirmed by an in-depth empirical research.

One last concluding remark is appropriate. This hint at probable Palestinian interpretation of the Second Intifada further confirms that this paper should not be seen as an attempt to vilify the State of Israel or its representatives: on the contrary, it has been repeatedly acknowledged that language inevitably invites simplification and even distortion of complex reality we encounter. These features then result in political functions of language that can be easily exploited for power interests, as has been shown in this paper - various legitimizing strategies employed by Israeli officials all aimed to extend Israeli material superiority to the sphere of moral recognition as well. But this specific instance of arbitrary interpretation of events serving to further certain interests is just one among many.

Indeed, it logically follows from what has been just said that *any* interpretation is arbitrary and abusive of "truth", which is simply inaccessible in its entirety.

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[170] Claims about almost identical, yet diametrically opposed logic is the main argument of Arie Kacowicz's (2005) article on the Israeli and Palestinian narratives of the Middle Eastern conflict.

Nevertheless, this realization should not lead to nihilistic indifference to concrete cases in which this ambiguity is misused. Even though this enterprise can never be complete, it should not dissuade us from revealing interests hidden beyond seemingly self-evident assertions and claims, if we are to understand the (socially constructed) world we live in better.

Resumé

Tato diplomová práce si vytyčila za cíl odhalit diskursivní mechanismy, kterými čelní představitelé izraelského státu obhajovali izraelské bezpečnostní politiky během tzv. druhé intifády, která vypukla na podzim roku 2000. Práce vychází z toho, že izraelští předáci si byli jasně vědomi mezinárodní kritiky izraelských opatření proti bezprecedentní vlně palestinských sebevražedných útoků, které byly ostře odsuzovány jako excesivní a zasahující především palestinské civilisty, a vyvinuli proto značné úsilí interpretovat události druhé intifády způsobem, který by izraelskému státu zajistil mezinárodní legitimitu.

Teoretickým základem práce je přístup k jazyku inspirovaný východisky Frankfurtské školy. Ten odmítá vnímat jazyk jako neutrální prostředek k zachycení sociální reality, naopak poukazuje na jeho společenskou a politickou funkci: jazyk v mnoha případech slouží jako nástroj k nastolení a/nebo udržení mocenské nerovnováhy a privilegovaného postavení některých skupin nad jinými. Práce pak dále nabízí přehled různých legitimizačních strategií rozpracovaných autory jako je Teun van Dijk, Paul Chilton, Theo van Leuween a Antonio Reyes, stejně jako kritickou diskuzi v současnosti dominantní diskursivní konstrukce terorismu.

Zkoumaným materiálem je korpus zhruba šedesáti proslovů a rozhovorů dostupných na oficiálních webových stránkách izraelského ministerstva zahraničí. Časově práce pokrývá období od března 2001 do dubna následujícího roku. Analýza těchto textů odhalila několik legitimizačních strategií použitých izraelskými představiteli bezpečnostních složek a politiky v čele s tehdejším premiérem Arielem Šaronem a ministrem zahraničí Šimonem Peresem. Nejvýraznějším schématem prostupujícím celý zkoumaný diskurz je zobrazení izraelsko-palestinského konfliktu způsobem, kdy je každá strana sporu do značné míry antitezí druhé. Zatímco Izraelci jsou popsání jako neúnavně usilující o mír, vyvíjející diplomatickou aktivitu s cílem ukončit konflikt, Palestinci veškeré kompromisní návrhy ostře odmítají; reakcí palestinské strany na izraelské nabídky je navíc bezmyšlenkovitý teror. Za těchto okolností jsou Izraelci pochopitelně nuceni se uchýlit se k sebeobraně, avšak veškerá jejich opatření jsou směřována výhradně na odvrácení teroristické hrozby. Izraelci jsou navíc ve zkoumaném diskurzu kategorizováni jako členové "civilizovaného světa", jejichž hodnotový systém je založen na úctě k právu, demokracii a svobodě; Palestinci naopak tyto kvality postrádají. Tento kontrast mezi "mírumilovnými" Izraelci na straně

jedné a Palestinci uchylujícími k terorismu na straně druhé tak slouží k ospravedlnění kontroverzních kroků izraelských bezpečnostních složek: veškerá izraelské opatření jsou v tomto světle pouze nezbytnou a přiměřenou reakcí na palestinské, Izraelem nijak nevyprovokované násilí.

Kromě této strategie práce odhalila také systematické snahy izraelských předáků zobrazit konflikt s Palestinci jako součást globální války proti teroru vedené Spojenými státy, v níž Izrael neochvějně stojí na straně "svobodného světa", zatímco Palestinci jsou nepřímo označeni za spojence Al-Káidy. Tato interpretace má rovněž legitimizovat izraelská bezpečnostní opatření, která jsou vylíčena jako příspěvek ke společnému boji proti mezinárodnímu terorismu.

V závěrečné kapitole se pak práce zabývá dalšími legitimizačními strategiemi pozorovatelnými v izraelském oficiálním diskurzu. Ukazuje, že izraelští představitelé se uchylují k emocionálnímu jazyku při popisu teroristických útoků za účelem získání sympatií světové veřejnosti. Dále pak izraelští předáci zobrazují izraelská opatření jako výsledek racionálních diskuzí a konsenzu více aktérů, čímž odmítají nařčení, že se jedná o ukvapené a krátkozraké kroky. Kromě důrazu na jejich racionalitu jsou Izraelci vylíčeni také jako altruisté, kteří upřímně usilují o zlepšení životních podmínek palestinského obyvatelstva. Poslední strategií je opakované poukazování na izraelskou suverenitu, která zvolené představitele zavazuje udělat vše nezbytné proto, aby ochránili izraelské občany.

Diplomová práce tak dokládá, že zkoumané texty nelze číst jako prosté popsání událostí druhé intifády, a naopak poukazuje na diskurzivně-strategický význam mnoha argumentů v nich obsažených.

Summary

This diploma thesis aims to discern what legitimization strategies Israeli officials employed to justify their state's security policies during the Second Intifada that broke out in the late 2000. The paper departs from the notion that Israeli representatives found themselves facing harsh international criticisms which strongly condemned Israeli counterterrorism measures as excessive and in fact imposing collective punishment on the whole Palestinian population. It was thus reasonable to expect that under these circumstance Israeli leaders invested considerable efforts to depict the events of the Second Intifada in a way that would ensure Israel international legitimacy.

The paper draws on works loosely based on the Frankfurt School teachings that adopt rather cautious approach towards language which they perceive not as neutral means to describe social reality, but point out to its social and political significance. Language is thus conceived as a tool to enact and maintain inequality and dominance of some groups over others. The thesis then offers an overview of specific legitimization strategies conceived by Teun van Dijk, Paul Chilton, Theo van Leuween and Antonio Reyes, as well as critical discussion of the currently dominant discursive construction of terrorism.

The primary texts examined in the paper consist of approximately sixty speeches and interviews that originated between March 2001 and April 2002 and that are available at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website. Analysis of these texts has discovered several legitimization strategies employed by Israeli officials during this period. The most elaborate discursive scheme traceable throughout the discourse is depiction of the conflicting parties as starkly opposed: while Israelis relentlessly pursue peace and are willing to make far-reaching compromises, Palestinians adamantly reject all proposals, and they moreover respond with terror and violence. Under these circumstances, Israelis naturally have to protect themselves; nevertheless, all Israeli measures are said to be highly moderate and strictly proportionate, aiming solely to divert the terrorist threat. Israelis are moreover categorized as "civilized" people who adhere to values like democracy, freedom and rule of law, whereas Palestinians are cast members of "non-civilized" world defined by rather opposite properties. This juxtaposition of peace seeking Israelis on the one hand and Palestinians implicated in terrorism on the other effectively serves to legitimize

Israeli policies which are portrayed as a mere reaction to external violence for whose origins Israel bears no responsibility.

The paper further discerns that Israeli officials strive to reframe the local Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a part of the global US-led war against terrorism. Israel is depicted as member of the "free world", whereas Palestinians are (albeit indirectly) linked to Al-Qaeda and international terrorist network. This peculiar interpretation further aims to legitimize Israeli security measures that are posited as a contribution to commonly pursued goal to uproot terrorism worldwide.

Lastly, the thesis scrutinizes several other legitimization strategies present in the examined discourse. It demonstrates that Israeli officials often resort to emotional language when describing acts of Palestinian terror which aims to elicit sympathies for Israel on the part of international audience. They further maintain that Israeli policies are enacted only after lengthy discussions and on the basis of wide consensus which render Israeli incursions as the most rational and benign of all available alternatives. Moreover, it is maintained that in many cases these policies are actually beneficial for the Palestinian civilian population, as they seek to improve living condition in the occupied territories which render Israelis deeply altruistic people. The last legitimization strategy on the part of Israeli officials is self-endowment with impersonal authority stemming from emphasis on the sovereign foundations of the Israeli statehood – as elected leaders, Israeli politicians are authorized to take all necessary measures to protect citizens under state's jurisdiction.

The paper thus demonstrates that scrutinized texts should not be read as neutral description of the events of the Second Intifada, as it points out to power interests inherently embedded in the discourse.

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List of Appendices

Appendix I: List of Statements, Briefings, and Interviews Examined in the Paper

Appendices

Appendix I: List of Statements, Briefings, and Interviews Examined in the Paper

Code	Date	Description
TE1	March 11, 2001	Interview with Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, CNN Late Edition
TE2	March 13, 2001	President-in-Office of the EU, Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten
TE3	March 19, 2001	Address by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to AIPAC Policy Conference
TE4	March 20, 2001	Remarks by President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon following their meeting
TE5	March 21, 2001	Stakeout with Senator George Mitchell and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres following meeting with the Mitchell Committee Jerusalem
TE6	April 1, 2001	Briefing by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres to the Diplomatic Corps
TE7	April 16, 2001	Statements by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdel Ilah al-Khatib following their meeting
TE8	May 2, 2001	Remarks by US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres following their meeting
TE9	May 3, 2001	Remarks by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres at the Annual Meeting of the American Jewish Committee
TE10	May 3, 2001	Stakeout with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
TE11	May 13, 2001	Remarks by Foreign Minister Peres at a Press Conference following his Meeting with Foreign Minister Manley of Canada
TE12	May 16, 2001	Briefing by Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the Foreign Press Association
TE13	May 20, 2001	Briefing by Major General Giora Eiland, Head of the IDF Operation Branch, to the Foreign Press Association
TE14	May 22, 2001	Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
TE15	May 23, 2001	Statements by Deputy PM and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and EU High Representative Javier Solana following their meeting
TE16	May 30, 2001	Briefing to the Foreign Press by Major-General Yaakov Or, Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, on socio-economic issues in the territories
TE17	May 30, 2001	Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the Knesset Plenum
TE18	June 3, 2001	Excerpts from Conference Call by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
TE19	June 4, 2001	Briefing by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shimon Peres to the Diplomatic Corps

TE20	June 5, 2001	Statements to the press following meeting of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres with Russian Special Envoy Andrei Vdovin
TE21	June 10, 2001	Excerpts from statements to the press by Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Swedish Prime Minister and EU President Goran Persson and EU High Representative Javier Solana following their meeting
TE22	June 14, 2001	Briefing to the Foreign Press Association by Major General Giora Eiland, Head of the IDF Operation Branch, and IDF representative on the Israel-Palestinian committee on implementing the Tenet agreement
TE23	June 17, 2001	Statements to the Press by Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan following their meeting
TE24	June 26, 2001	Remarks by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister of Israel Ariel Sharon in photo opportunity
TE25	June 28, 2001	Statements by Israel Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and US Secretary of State Colin Powell following their meeting
TE26	June 28, 2001	Joint Press Availability by Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and US Secretary of State Colin Powell following their meeting
TE27	August 2, 2001	Radio Interview with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Galei Tzahal (Army Radio)
TE28	August 5, 2001	Fox News Sunday interview with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon hosted by Tony Snow
TE29	August 15, 2001	Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on Hardball with Chris Matthews - CNBC
TE30	October 7, 2001	Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on CNN Larry King Weekend
TE31	October 10, 2001	Terror - A Global Threat by Shimon Peres, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
TE32	October 22, 2001	"New Middle East Realities in the Wake of September 11th" Remarks by Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres at a National Press Club Morning Newsmaker
TE33	October 23, 2001	Stakeout with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres following his meeting with National Security Adviser Rice and conversation with President Bush
TE34	October 24, 2001	Prime Minister Sharon to Knesset: "Israel wants peace"
TE35	November 1, 2001	Joint Press Conference by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair following their meeting
TE36	November 18, 2001	Statement by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon following his meeting with Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt
TE37	December 3, 2001	Prime Minister Ariel Sharon Addresses the Nation
TE38	December 6, 2001	Statements to the press following meeting between Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres an Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher
TE39	December 16, 2001	Meeting of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres with the Foreign Press
TE40	January 2, 2002	Statements to the press following meeting between Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan

		Petersen
TE41	January 6, 2002	DM Ben-Eliezer: "Path of terrorism will lead Palestinian people to disaster"
TE42	January 23, 2002	Address of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
TE43	Janaury 28, 2002	Knesset speech by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
TE44	February 4, 2002	Interview by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on the Charlie Rose Show, PBS Television
TE45	February 7, 2002	Remarks by President George Bush and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in photo opportunity
TE46	February 20, 2002	Prime Minister Sharon addresses Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations delegation
TE47	February 20, 2002	Remarks by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres to Delegation of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
TE48	February 21, 2002	Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's Address to the Nation
TE49	February 25, 2002	Statements to the press following meeting of Foreign Minister Shimon Peres with EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana
TE50	March 6, 2002	Remarks of FM Peres to the Knesset on the Saudi Initiative
TE51	March 8, 2002	Excerpts of Interview with Prime Minister Sharon
TE52	March 10, 2002	Excerpts of Remarks by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon at a gathering of the IDF Engineering Corps
TE53	March 16, 2002	Press Conference by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres
TE54	March 18, 2002	Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's greeting welcoming the US Vice President, and remarks by Vice President Richard Cheney
TE55	March 19, 2002	Press Conference with US Vice President Richard Cheney and Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
TE56	March 29, 2002	Statements by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer at press conference following Cabinet meeting
TE57	March 30, 2002	Excerpts from interview with Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer broadcast on Israel Television Channel 2
TE58	March 31, 2002	Prime Minister Sharon's Address to the Nation
TE59	April 1, 2002	Interview by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on CNN Live Today
TE60	April 8, 2002	PM Sharon's Address to the Knesset
TE61	April 14, 2002	Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on CNN
TE62	April 21, 2002	Interview with Foreign Minister Shimon Peres on NBC Meet the Press

Projekt magisterské diplomové práce

Téma:

Analysis of Israeli Official Discourse on Palestinian Terrorism and Israeli Responses during the Second Intifada

Jméno: Jakub Záhora

Obor: Bezpečnostní studia

Semestr předložení projektu: LS 2012

Jazyk: angličtina

Vedoucí práce: PhDr. Vít Střítecký M.Phil.

Souhlasím s vedením magisterské diplomové práce:

V Praze dne 7. 6. 2012

Introduction to the Topic

The proposed MA thesis is going to deal with the topic of Israeli governmental officials' depiction of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli security policies. The time period concerned will be from 2001-2004, when the mutual violence between Israelis and Palestinians was at its height. Unlike its predecessor from late 1980's which could be largely described in terms of peaceful protests, the second intifada (literally means "shaking off" in Arabic) was marked by Palestinian suicide attacks campaigns that were followed by Israeli harsh counter-measures, including demolitions of attackers' houses, targeted killings, and building the security fence separating Israel from the Palestinian territories.

The point of departure of the thesis is a notion of Israeli nearly desperate need for legitimization of its security policies. Even though the Israeli state faced truly massive series of suicide attacks, the enacted responses earned her a world-wide condemnation as they were deemed highly excessive.

The thesis will argue that Israeli government sought to justify its actions by portraying Palestinians and their terrorist activities in a certain way which was to bring a change in international opinion towards the conflicting parties. The thesis will show that Israeli senior officials labeled Palestinians and their acts as a part of global jihadist terror network mastered by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, while Israeli responses were portrayed as a component of the US-led war on terror. This depiction was meant to reframe the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a way that would grant Israel recognition as a member of free, democratic world facing the threat of global jihad which it fiercely fights.

The processes which this thesis seeks to investigate constitute a fascinating example of "inverting" terrorist message. It is nowadays generally accepted in academic circles that terrorism is much more about an impression evoked by a carnage than about pure physical damage it actually inflicts. But, as will the thesis prove, in the case of second intifada the acts of terror were exploited for legitimizing Israeli governmental policies – and not necessarily only those aimed at suppressing attacks themselves. Moreover, unlike post-9/11 US official discourse surrounding the war on terror, the issue of Israeli portrayal of Palestinian terrorism largely escaped scholarly interest.

Methodology

The thesis will employ principles of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), established by Teun Van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, and other scholars. CDA does not conceive texts as

an innocent description of social reality, but rather as a tool for maintaining dominance, exclusion, and inequality. This critical approach seems to be very relevant for scrutinizing the issue of the second intifada which pitted Israel with its by-far-superior military and strategic means not only against Palestinian terrorist organizations, but against the Palestinian people as a whole. Nevertheless, as has already been mentioned, what Israel lacked was legitimacy denied her by the international community. The discourse enacted by officials aimed to spread Israeli superiority, confined to the material capabilities, into the sphere of moral capital as well. CDA can prove to be highly helpful tool for analyzing the ways which were used by Israeli elites to achieve this objective.

More concretely, the thesis will utilize certain strand of discursive analysis, Membership Categorization Analysis (MCA). MCA investigates how people set up categories to make sense of complex social phenomena they encounter and how they endow these entities with certain qualities. They subsequently have different expectations about actions, beliefs, and values connected with different categories. Critical elements of discurse analysis come into play as the principles of CDA suggest that this process of grouping and allocation of properties is often not politically neutral, but on the contrary, it seeks to bring certain gains to some parties. In this case, MCA can reveal how Israeli political elites tried to label Palestinians in their speeches as members of the global jihadist movement on one hand, and their own fellow citizens as fighters engaged in the struggle against this world-wide threat on the other, by assigning certain qualities to respective groups.

In order to discover these patterns, the thesis will scrutinize number of Israeli officials' speeches and statements dealing with Palestinian terrorism and characteristics of the warring parties. It will try to disclose discursive strategies striving to legitimize Israeli actions by locating them within different context, context of the war on terror.

Research Strategy and Research Questions

As have previous parts suggested, the thesis will try to reveal patterns enacted by Israeli officials in order to impose the war on terror script on the realities of the second intifada. To achieve this aim, the thesis will firstly analyze what properties Israeli official discourse assigned to the opposing parties. Subsequently, it will build up on these findings when examining how these discursive categories were utilized for reframing basically local conflict into the global struggle against terrorism, in which are Palestinians posed as Al-

Qaeda adherents, whereas Israelis fulfill the role of Westerners struggling against jihadist threat. Research questions then go as follows:

1. What qualities and behavior patterns did Israeli officials allocate to Palestinians and Israelis respectively?
2. How were the alleged properties used for imposing the war on terror framework on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?
3. Through which discursive means were Israeli policies identified with United States' and its allies' efforts to fight global terrorism?

Expected Outline
1. Introduction
2. Link to the literature dealing with governments' legitimization strategies
3. Overview of CDA and MCA methodologies
4. Analysis of texts produced by Israeli officials
   a. Characterization of Palestinians and their actions
   b. Characterization of Israelis and their actions
   c. Imposing the war on terror script on the events of second intifada
   d. Identification of Israeli security policies with the struggle against global terrorism
5. Conclusion

Tentative Bibliography

Primary Sources

The analysis will be based on a corpus of approximately 70 speeches, statements, and interviews by Israeli senior governmental officials that originated during 2001-2004. The relevant speeches will be gathered from two main sources: the first one is Israeli Prime Minister's Office website and its speeches archive. The second source is a section of Israeli Foreign Ministry website devoted to the topic of Palestinian terrorism after 2000, which contains relevant texts produced by then Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense, Israeli ambassador to the UN, and President.

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