APPENDIX

Appendix A
Roosevelt’s first appeal to Hitler and Beneš
"So long as these negotiations continue so long will there remain the hope that reason and the spirit of equity may prevail and that the world may thereby escape the madness of a new resort to war.

"On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity everywhere I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations looking to a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement of the questions at issue.

"I earnestly repeat that so long as negotiations continue, differences may be reconciled. Once they are broken off reason is banished and force asserts itself.

"And force produces no solution for the future good of humanity.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT"
Appendix B
Roosevelt’s second appeal to Hitler

Document 125
Papers as President: President’s Personal File

HIS EXCELLENCY
ADOLF HITLER
CHANCELLOR OF THE GERMAN REICH
BERLIN (GERMANY)

I desire to acknowledge Your Excellency’s reply to my telegram of September 26. I was confident that you would concur in the opinion I expressed regarding the unforseeable consequences and the incalculable disaster which would result to the entire world from the outbreak of a European war.

The question before the world today, Mr. Chancellor, is not the question of scores of judgment or of injustices committed in the past. It is the question of the fate of the world today and tomorrow. The world asks of us who at this moment are heads of nations the supreme capacity to achieve the destinies of nations without resorting upon them as a price, the extermination and death of millions of civilians.

Resent to power in the Great War failed to bring tranquillity. Victory and defeat were alike sterile. That lesson the world should have learned. For that reason above all others I addressed on September 26 my appeal to Your Excellency and to the President of Czechoslovakia and to the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and of France.

The two points I sought to emphasize were, first, that
HRE

Adolf Hitler
Berlin
Sept 27, 10 p.m.

All matters of difference between the German Government and the Czechoslovak Government could and should be settled by pacific methods; and, second, that the threatened alternative of the use of force on a scale likely to result in a general war is as unnecessary as it is unjustifiable. It is, therefore, supremely important that negotiations should continue without interruption until a fair and constructive solution is reached.

My conviction on these two points is inspired because responsible statesmen have officially stated that an agreement in principle has already been reached between the Government of the German Reich and the Government of Czechoslovakia, although the precise time, method and detail of carrying out that agreement remain at issue.

Whatever existing differences may be, and whatever their merits may be—and upon them I do not and need not undertake to pass—my appeal was solely that negotiations be continued until a peaceful settlement is found, and that thereby a resort to force be avoided.

Present negotiations still stand open. They can be continued if you will give the word. Should the need for supplementing them become evident, nothing stands in the way of widening their scope into a conference of all the nations directly interested in the present controversy. Such a meeting to be held immediately—in some neutral spot in Europe—would offer the opportunity for this and correlated questions to be solved in a spirit of justice, of fair dealing, and
I would, in all human probability, with greater permanence.

In my considered judgment, and in the light of the experience of this century, continued negotiations remain the only way by which the immediate problem can be disposed of upon any lasting basis.

Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner, I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding historic service to all humanity.

Allow me to state my unqualified conviction that history, and the souls of every man, woman, and child whose lives will be lost in the threatened war will hold us and all of us accountable should we fail to appeal for its prevention.

The Government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations. Yet in our own right we recognize our responsibilities as a part of a world of neighbors.

The conscience and the impelling desire of the people of my country demand that the voice of their government be raised again and yet again to avert and to avoid war.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Appendix C
Messersmith's memorandum issued on September 29

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, October 1, 1938.

The attached confidential memorandum, handed to me by Mr. Messersmith on September 20th, while prepared previous to the Munich meeting, contains some comment and views in which you might be interested.

Hull

[Annex]

The Assistant Secretary of State (Messersmith) to the Secretary of State


Dear Mr. Secretary: Needless to say I shared yesterday the general relief which was felt by, I am sure, all of us when the news came over the ticker that an immediate outbreak of hostilities was to be avoided by the four-power meeting at Munich today. I believe, however, that thoughtful, well-informed persons must have this optimism and relief seriously tempered by fears that the greatest mistakes made in handling the European and German problem may be made now. If, in the desire to avoid the war with which Hitler is threatening Europe and the world, too far-reaching concessions are made, we will find that instead of arranging for peace a war has been made inevitable.

The fear of war has grown into a hysteria and there is grave danger that in the face of the tension and psychology prevailing in Europe today and elsewhere preliminary arrangements and promises may be made at Munich in the next few days which, if carried through, will either make Germany the master of Europe and of a good part of the world eventually—with all that that involves for others and ourselves, or a war will be made inevitable. If arrangements are made at Munich now or in a general conference elsewhere later which are a

*Photostatic copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y.
cynical sellout of principle—just to avoid a war, and if Hitler will get promises of economic help, which he is certain to ask for, it will mean that the present Government in Germany will be solidified in power, given permanence and means to exist and fatton, and then through the avoidance of war now we should only have put Germany in a position to carry through successfully the war which she intends to fight and which she is not in a position to wage successfully now.

It is I believe clear that it cannot be hoped that this four-power meeting at Munich will do more than to arrive at some preliminary arrangements which will ward off immediate hostilities. No four powers can sit down and settle in a few days the general problems which are disturbing the world. Further discussions and a more general conference would have to be called to settle these problems and it will be a long drawn out process at the best. If promises are made of economic adjustments now of a far-reaching character, which promises cannot be met later, the maintenance of peace may not have been advanced but further prejudiced. In spite of some of the reports which we get, I am convinced that the weight of evidence is that the economic position of Germany and Italy and Japan is much weaker. I am convinced, out of my direct experience and observation, that there can be no peace in the world and no real progress towards the reestablishment of law and order as long as there is not a return to law and order and an observance of international practice in the present totalitarian states. These states are weak and can not much longer continue in their present practices unless they are given real aid of an economic nature. This is what they are after. While the economic readjustments must be made just as much as the political, they cannot be made at this time if it is done in a way which will merely strengthen these totalitarian states and put them in a position to dominate the rest of the world. This is their unquestioned aim. If there had been any doubts as to the issues at stake, the last few weeks should have dispelled them to any person who can think realistically.

If the powers meeting at Munich, or which will meet later at some other place, will be only dominated by this fear of war and the desire to avert it at any price, then arrangements will be made, whether we sit in or not, which will have the most far-reaching consequences for us not only in our political relations with other states but in our economic relationships and the repercussions on our internal situation, political and economic, will be far-reaching. Our trade agreements program will go by the board—we shall have to take the crumbs which are left to us. Our relationships with practically every state outside of this hemisphere will become more difficult. Our problems in a good part of this hemisphere, which are already difficult, will become
acute. We shall ourselves eventually be faced by war which will become just as imminent a threat as that which has faced Europe in the last days.

I do not wish to assume and am not assuming a defeatist attitude. I have continuously from the beginning of the totalitarian regimes endeavored to maintain a constructive but at the same time a realistic attitude. To face the real situation is not taking a defeatist attitude but a realistic one. The Germany with which certain arrangements could have been made under Stresemann \(^1\) and Brüning \(^2\) is a different Germany from the one we have to deal with under Hitler today in many ways. And arrangements which were then possible, and which would have been constructive, are today impossible until there is a regime of law and order in Germany. Certain economic arrangements will eventually have to be made and should be made as soon as possible but they can only be made with safety with a Government in Germany which has definite respect for the rights of others—large and small—and which is not aimed at world domination.

I put forward that it is not realistic to assume that with the gaining of its now proclaimed objectives in Czechoslovakia, Germany will be satisfied so far as her territorial objectives are concerned. Only a year ago the German Government said just as definitely that it had no objective in Austria affecting the sovereignty of Austria. Until less than six months ago the present Government in Germany said that it had no objectives in Czechoslovakia affecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity but only wished to assure decent treatment of minorities. I will not go over the long record, but I think we must view the last Hitler pronouncement realistically and in the light of the known facts and with the realization that with Germany made stronger now, it is inevitable that the progress towards territorial expansion will continue.

Nerves are giving way under the strain in more than one part of the world. We cannot and will not let that happen here. The Monroe Doctrine is just as much of an irritant to the present Government in Germany as the maintenance of the Czechoslovakian State. We have in the end the most to lose if arrangements are made now which endanger our interests and, as I see it, there is a grave danger of that, which must be realized by anyone who takes a long-range view and a realistic attitude. A wise man asked me yesterday what the difference was between Hitler taking something which didn’t belong to him and had never belonged to his country and between Chamberlain and Daladier giving away something which wasn’t theirs and had

\(^1\) Gustav Stresemann, German Chancellor, August-November 22, 1923; German Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 1923 until his death, October 3, 1929.

\(^2\) Heinrich Brüning, German Chancellor, March 29, 1930-May 20, 1932.
never been theirs. I am fearful that in the arrangements about to be
made, and which may be made in the near future growing out of the
Munich meeting, someone other than ourselves is going to give away
something precious that belongs to us.

It is necessary for us, as I feel all of us in this country will, to keep
our heads and to maintain the long-range view. There are grave
dangers in the situation even in this country. A few months after
the present Government came into power, Goebbels' was telling me
what the Party was going to do in order to regiment the German popu-
lation in every way and to make it an instrument of the state. I re-
marked that the methods which had been employed in Russia and
which he was planning to employ in Germany would probably not be
successful as the German population was much more intelligent and
informed. Goebbels, who is the most profound cynic in the world to-
day, said in German the equivalent of the following, "There is nothing
so untrue which if repeated often enough all the people will not end in
believing". As a fundamental practice of National Socialist Govern-
ment this requires no elucidation. How dangerously true it is is re-
flected in the growing opinion in this country that the Czechoslovakian
Government has really oppressed and ravaged the Sudeten area. The
world has apparently ended in believing that what was in reality a cer-
tain unequal treatment of the Sudeten was in effect a regime of bar-
barity and oppression. There is food for thought in this.

G. S. Messersmith