

This thesis examines the Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon Administrations' policies on the Vietnam War. The first two chapters describe and sum up their approaches to issues they had to face. Then the administrations' policies are compared from three different perspectives: their handling of the Vietnam War itself, their respective approaches to connection of Vietnam and the Cold War as a whole, and their presentation of the Vietnam War in the USA. It also shows that a number of factors that influenced the course of the war were out of reach of the power and influence of the American presidents. In the war itself the Johnson administration gradually enlarged the scope of its bombing raids on North Vietnam and sent the US Army to fight the Communist insurgents in the South, trying to damage the DRV enough so it would sign a peace treaty with the USA. The Nixon Administration, forced to gradually withdraw the American soldiers, tried to get Hanoi's concessions at the peace negotiations by threats and sudden escalations of the war. In the Cold War-Vietnam link Nixon was more successful, as he was able to establish relations with the People's Republic of China, which indirectly benefited the USA in the Vietnam War. The Nixon Administration's presentation of the war in the United States was more successful, as Nixon was able to react more adequately to the anti-war sentiment. He managed to keep the anti-war movement relatively calm by using US troop withdrawals from Vietnam, and he more capable than Johnson in getting the mainstream voters' support for his war efforts.