Preserving Peace: Chechnya, Iraq and the U.S.-Russian relationship 1994-2005

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Abstract

Since the end of the Cold War the quality of the relationship between Russia and the United States has been difficult to articulate. Despite claims of ‘friendship’ tensions frequently surface between the two states. This thesis examines the relationship between the United States as a nascent security community and examines two periods of crisis in the relationship from 1994-2005: Chechnya and Iraq. Borrowing from the English School of International Relations and factoring in a theorisation of force as a necessary tool in the maintenance of community, I examine the institutions that govern the U.S.-Russian relationship in order to better understand the dynamics of the security community. I find that the institution of diplomacy causes the most tension in the U.S.-Russian relationship because of its focus on the identity of state actors; while the institution of the market, which challenges the institution of sovereignty provides the most scope for reducing the frequency of diplomatic crises between Russia and the United States.

Keywords

Russia, United States, Chechnya, Iraq, security community, institutions, sovereignty, diplomacy, the market, balance of power.

Abstrakt

Povaha americko-ruských vztahů po ukončení studené války je těžko uchopitelná, když přes deklarované “přátelství” mezi oběma státy často vzniká napětí. Předložená diplomová práce se zabývá vztahy mezi Ruskem a Spojenými státy jako vznikající bezpečnostní komunitou s přihlédnutím ke dvěma križím v vzájemných vztazích letech 1995-2004, které se týkaly války v Čečensku a Iráku. Práce, která je koncepčně ukotvená v anglické škole mezinárodních vztahů, zpracovávající teoreticky sílu jako nezbytný nástroj udržení komunity, se soustřeďuje na instituce, jež regulují americko-ruské vztahy, což je předpokladem pochopení dynamiky bezpečnostní komunity. Práce dochází k závěru, že za napětí ve vzájemných vztazích jsou zodpovědně zejména diplomatické instituce, které se soustřeďují na identitu státních aktérů, zatímco soustředění na trh, který je výzvou pro institut suverenity, poskytuje větší prostor k redukování četnosti krizí mezi Ruskem a Spojenými státy.

Klíčová slova

Rusko, Spojené státy, Češko, Irák, bezpečnostní komunity, instituce, suverenita, diplomacie, trh, rovnováha síl.

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Declaration of Authorship

1. The author hereby declares that he compiled this thesis independently, using only the listed resources and literature.

2. The author hereby declares that all the sources and literature used have been properly cited.

3. The author hereby declares that the thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

Prague 17 May 2013

Adam Lewis
The thesis will look examine how a non-adversarial relationship is maintained between America and Russia despite the disagreements that arise between the two states. I take non-adversarial to mean the assurance that crises between the two states are solved by diplomatic means without the threat of physical force. Diplomacy is variously defined as ‘the peaceful resolution of conflicts’ (Pouliot 2010), or ‘the art of letting someone have your way’. I will present two cases of crises in U.S.-Russian relations that strained the diplomatic relationship in the period 1994-2005: the conflicts in Chechnya and the crisis over the disarmament of Iraq. I will study the policies of the American government regarding the Chechen crisis and the policy of the Russian government on Iraq with a view to understanding how peace was maintained despite each side ‘failing to get its own way’. This may help the analyst to understand whether future disagreements might threaten the peace between the two states or how the disagreements might be resolved or avoided altogether.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The charter of Paris for a New Europe signed in November 1990 to end the Cold War stated as its aim the establishment democracy, peace and unity from Vancouver to Vladivostok.¹ This wide geographical sweep sought to include the United States and Russia – the former Cold War adversaries who had maintained stability in the international system and kept territorial control over their spheres of influence through the threat of mutually assured destruction. The words in the Paris declaration are idealistic, but as history has unfolded since then it has brought with it an ‘assurance’ that Russia and the United States ‘will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch et al. 1957:5). Although this assurance may not be shared by all, or may waver for others at times of crisis when old rivalries re-emerge, there is no question that a new spirit animates the relationship between Russia and the United States. This new and difficult-to-articulate quality of the relationship is where my inquiry begins.

In order to assess the quality of the relationship it is necessary to engage with the body of International Relations literature that takes a sociological perspective and to examine the relationship in the context of what it is: a second-order society. Borrowing from the English School I begin with the assumption that it is necessary to examine the institutions that shape the relations between states in order to assess changes in the quality of international society. The U.S.-Russian relationship comes with sustained cooperation in several spheres, notably economic, nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, but Russia and the United States do not share a collective identity. Therefore, the expectation of peaceful change between them cannot be attributed to the existence of a mature security community.

This thesis will examine how a non-adversarial relationship was maintained between America and Russia despite the disagreements that arose between the two states in the period from 1994 to 2005. I take non-adversarial to mean the

continued assurance that crises between the two states would be solved by diplomatic means without the threat of physical force. Diplomacy is variously defined as ‘the peaceful resolution of conflicts’ (Pouliot 2010), or ‘the art of letting someone have your way’.\(^2\) I present two cases of crisis in U.S.-Russian relations that strained the diplomatic relationship in the period 1994-2005 when the United States and Russia failed to ‘let the other have their way’: the conflicts in Chechnya and the crisis over the disarmament of Iraq. I will study the approach of the American government regarding the Chechen crisis and the approach of the Russian government on Iraq in terms of how certain key institutions were negotiated during the crisis, with a view to understanding how peace was maintained despite each side failing to ‘get its way’. This may help the analyst to understand whether future disagreements might threaten the peace between the two states, or how the disagreements might be resolved or avoided altogether.

The next chapter will review the literature on international society, power in International Relations, and the theory of security communities, in order to furnish the conceptual tools necessary for my case studies. I will then outline my approach to the study before presenting the cases on Chechnya and Iraq.

\(^2\) Some sources attribute this oft-quoted phrase to Italian author and diplomat Daniele Varè, but Chas W. Freeman gives credit to Canadian statesman Lester B. Pearson: http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/speeches/aramoutcy-lost-challenges-american-diplomacy-competitive-world-order (accessed 25.03.13).
2. THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHOD

2.1 Overview
This chapter begins with an overview of English School theory and specifically Barry Buzan’s (2004) synthesis of this expansive body of work. I will make the argument that in order to understand the nature of international society it is necessary to examine the institutions that exist within it. The following section will explore the role of power in structuring the relations between states, which is insufficiently explored in Buzan’s work and is key to understanding the structure of the U.S.-Russian relationship. This leads to a discussion about security community development and demonstrates that the name of this concept is in some ways misleading. Although security communities promise peace, they rely on patterns of domination to maintain them.

2.2 Buzan and the English School
The English School of International Relations theory is a useful place to commence an examination of the quality of the relationship between the United States and Russia because of its interest in the social aspect of interstate relations. The English School provides the scope to develop the idea that states shape their identities and interests through interaction with one another. Hedley Bull writes that ‘a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions’ (Bull 1977, 13). A fundamental ontological contention in the theoretical debate on world politics centres on whether these ‘common interests and values’ are exogenously given, or whether they emerge, or are modified in the process of interaction. The traditional neorealist approach would argue that the anarchic world order allows the analyst to reliably predict the behaviour of self-interested states, and postulates the international system as a material structure consisting of territories to defend or conquer and stocks of weapons with which to do so. This thesis is based on the premise that the international system is a social structure, rather than a material structure, and that
states inhabit an international ‘society’ rather than an asocial self-help environment.

The English School is broad in its approach to world politics, but its fundamental focus is on the social nature of international relations (Buzan 2004:26). International society was one of three concepts central to the English School, which used a constructivist epistemology and historical methods to explore the development of shared interests and identities between states based on common norms and institutions (Buzan 2004:6-7). In ‘From International to World Society?’ Buzan (2004) constructs a framework to track the development of international society on a spectrum from ‘pluralist’ to ‘solidarist’. In substantive terms pluralism describes ‘thin’ international societies that have few shared norms and which focus on devising rules for coexistence within a framework of sovereignty and non-intervention. By contrast, solidarism describes ‘thick’ international societies where rules are not just about coexistence but also about the pursuit of joint gains and management of collective problems in a range of areas (Buzan 2004:59). Buzan commits to the theoretical principle that states (rather than individuals) are the only subjects of international law and this allows him to position pluralism and solidarism on the same spectrum of interstate society. He makes this distinction in order to distinguish the level of analysis that focuses on the state, from the level of analysis that focuses on individuals and other non-state actors. Buzan sees solidarism developing when states abandon their commitment to difference and pursue becoming more alike as a conscious goal (ibid:59).

Holsti (2002) argues that the student of international relations should look to the norms and institutions of world politics to define what an international society is and to set benchmarks against which to assess changes in it. This idea is developed by Buzan, who advocates for the empirical study of what institutions exist in any given manifestation of interstate society, and for an analysis of how existing institutions decay or evolve, and how new institutions emerge. For example, institutions such as sovereignty and war are open to change in terms of meaning and practice, and institutions such as the market and colonialism have
been seen to rise and decline over the course of time (Buzan 2004:190). Buzan notes that there is a great deal of confusion in the literature on the exact definition of norms and institutions, but the essence of each term carries a sense of being a durable feature that constitutes the behaviour of actors, and shapes expectations about international politics (Buzan 2004:169-171). They are ‘durable and recognised patterns of shared practices rooted in values held commonly by the members of interstate societies, and embodying a mix of norms, rules and principle’ (Buzan 2004:181). Although they are durable, institutions are neither permanent nor fixed, and undergo historical patterns of rise, evolution and decline (ibid.).

In order to decide which institutions warrant closer examination, when analysing the nature of the international society that exists between the United States and Russia, it is first necessary to decide where U.S.-Russian interstate society falls on Buzan’s spectrum of pluralist to solidarist international society. It is quite clear that this is not an example of ‘power political’ interstate society, which is governed by enmity and the constant threat of war between states. It is also apparent that this is not a form of ‘convergence’ interstate society where the adoption of similar political, legal and economic forms lead to a blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic policy, and international and domestic law, bringing sovereign statehood and territorial borders into question. Instead, this thesis rests on the premise that the form of international society that exists between the United States and Russia lies somewhere between ‘coexistence’ interstate society and ‘cooperative’ interstate society as outlined by Buzan (2004:192-194).

Coexistence interstate society is based on Hedley Bull’s model of international society that posits a Westphalian system of unitary states balancing power against each other. Buzan writes that within such a society, diplomacy is a well-developed means of communication, but war is not excluded as an institution governing the interactions between states. The use of force is limited, however, by the balance of power and management of the system by great powers. He argues that nationalism is an important institution of coexistence society but looks to the interaction
between the norms governing nationalism and those governing international trade. Buzan suggests that in coexistence society states are likely to develop mercantilist trade policies, but they may also begin to seek ways to improve them by embracing free-market principles (2004:192). He goes on to suggest that in cooperative interstate society many of the same institutions as those governing coexistence society remain in place, but the market becomes increasingly more prominent and begins to affect ‘both how states define and constitute themselves, what kind of other actors they give standing to, and how they interpret sovereignty and territoriality’ (Buzan 2004:194).

I hold that the relationship between Russia and the United States is a manifestation of international society in which there are increasing tensions between the norms and practices associated with the institution of sovereignty due to the ascendance of the market as the primary institution of interstate society. As Buzan explains, the market means more than just trade: ‘in order to realise joint gains, a liberal international economy has to be organised around a host of rules about trade, property rights, legal process, investment, banking, corporate law… states have both to open their borders and coordinate their behaviours in selected but systematic ways’ (2004:151). Buzan postulates that if Western interstate society continues on its current trajectory, the market is likely to replace sovereignty as the primary institution. In the case of Russia and the United States, the ascendance of the market and the decline of sovereignty can be seen as a movement from coexistence interstate society towards cooperation interstate society.

Following Buzan, I assume that the ascendance of the market has begun a process whereby the United States and Russia ‘redefine how their sovereignty and their boundaries operate’ (Buzan 2004:152). In the period of the study, Clinton makes several references to what Buzan and Wæver (2003) have subsequently labelled the liberal-realist dilemma. The dilemma centres on the realist instinct that warns against trading with those you might have to fight, versus the liberal instinct that claims the expansion of the market to include potential adversaries reduces the possibility that you would have to fight them. In a speech to the White
House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe in January 1995, Clinton expounds the virtues of the neoliberal promise of peace and prosperity, in contrast to those who claim that ‘we simply must not extend the West's institution of security and prosperity to all, that to do so would upset a delicate balance of power’ (Clinton, 13 January 1995). The desire to foster deeper economic ties is also seen on the Russian side. In a speech in April 2003, Vladimir Putin notes: ‘the U.S. is our major trade and economic partner... we face the challenge of integrating the Russian economy into the world economy. And on this we actively cooperate with our American colleagues’ (Putin, 4 April 2003). These statements not only reveal the primacy of the market in the relationship between Russia and America, but they also reveal a definite power structure: America is eager to actively expand the market and Russia is eager to learn how to integrate itself. However, the degree to which Russia is willing to accept the norms that the United States wants to teach it is important to understanding the relationship between the two states. It may be that this willingness to ‘learn’ changes in degree according to the context. There may be other occasions when Russia refuses to be a student. An attempt to answer this question requires an adequate theorisation of power.

2.3 Power in International Relations

Adler (2005) criticises Buzan's framework for its lack of sufficient theorisation of power and agency. Buzan argues that shared norms and institutions are always pursued through a combination of coercion, calculation and belief (Buzan 2004:153). Buzan’s commitment to positivism means that he does not question how knowledge is produced and this lack is keenly felt by Adler, who holds that power plays a significant role in international politics by shaping the dominant normative understandings that build subjectivity (2005:178). An understanding of how power shapes the interests and identities of states is important in understanding how states come to share the norms and institutions that they have in common and how some states may impose the shared norms on others, while other states try to resist having the meaning of norms imposed upon them.
Haukkala (2008) argues that the norm of sovereignty is not simply based on an intersubjective understanding of what constitutes legitimate actorness and that its meaning can be imposed on states. He argues that the process of defining sovereignty is a struggle between ‘norm-makers’ and ‘norm-takers’ and that ‘the efficacy of the given notion of sovereignty is dependent on power in two respects: the power of those who are strong enough to affect the content of sovereignty, and the power of those who are strong enough to resist the normative pressure to adhere to a given norm’ (Haukkala 2008:40). The idea that dominant discourses and identities constrain the actions of actors is also explored by Neumann and Williams (2000) who argue that since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s identity has been shaped by the process through which NATO redefined itself as a democratic security community as opposed to a military alliance. They argue that identity is constructed by socially and historically constructed narratives and that a given identity can only be socially effective when it is stabilised. This stability emerges when an actor is understood by others to be legitimate and working within a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Neumann and Williams 2000:364). According to Neumann and Williams different actors have different capabilities to influence the structures of social knowledge. They argue that after the Cold War Russia’s identity was constructed as undemocratic when it opposed NATO expansion because of the way that NATO defined itself. The dominant discourse stated that a democratic nation had no reason to oppose NATO expansion.

Acknowledging the confluence of ideas and power in institutions such as sovereignty is important to an understanding of how conflicts between states emerge and how they might be resolved. In his response to Michael Cox’s (2005) ‘Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia’, Pouliot argues that the disputes between allies do not inevitably lead to the breakdown of the relationship predicting peace. He argues that rifts in the relationship can be considered the ‘power politics of peace’ where allies struggle ‘to impose identities, security cultures and norms on one another’ (Pouliot 2006:125). Janice Bially Mattern (2001;2005) has also explored the idea of non-physical force in the maintenance of interstate relations. Mattern argues that security communities rely on a form of power that she calls representational force, which fixes ‘we-feeling’ in times of
crisis. Mattern claims that representational force is a discursive strategy to construct a truth claim and coerce the interlocutor into trusting its validity. This is in contrast to Habermas’ theory that evidence-based reasoning is the best strategy to get something to be considered as ‘fact’ or ‘reality’. Mattern argues that this is only possible when actors share a common ‘life world’ and have the same conception of what constitutes evidence. She argues that a lack of ‘we-feeling’ is generally the status quo in the world of international politics, and means that reasoned persuasion does not work as a discursive strategy (Mattern 2005:585-586, 594-595). Mattern presents the example of the Anglo-American Suez crisis to demonstrate how each side deployed discursive force against the other to prevent them undermining their collective identity. Within the logic of the security community, collective identity is the same as subjective identity, so to threaten one, is to threaten the other (Mattern 2001). Mattern concludes that the deployment of representational force is in fact proof of the health of a security community as it maintains collective identity in times of crisis.

2.4 Theory of security communities

The literature exploring the social nature of interstate relations has inevitably led to research on the possibility of achieving lasting peace in the international system, and has furnished the concept of the security community. This concept, first introduced by Deutsch el al. in 1957, and later redeveloped after the end of the Cold War has a lot to offer in terms of understanding the expectation that the United States and Russia no longer pose a physical threat to one another. The degree to which Russia has been integrated into the Euro-Atlantic security community is a matter for considerable debate, and does not form the substantive inquiry of this thesis. Nevertheless, the idea of ‘community’ as a predictor of peace between states brings with it an understanding of the co-constitutive nature of identity and community ‘we-feeling’. The idea that community depends on intersubjectively held values has been explored in depth by Adler (1997; 2005), Adler and Barnett (1998), Wæver (1998), Mattern (2001; 2005) and Pouliot (2006; 2007; 2010), amongst others. This literature also highlights the presence of power and patterns of domination within the community itself, which restricts the agency of certain actors to act, and provides a useful theoretical foundation to
furnish an understanding of how peace is maintained between the United States and Russia despite their disagreements.

Adler and Barnett (Adler 1997; 2005; Adler and Barnett 1998) were the first to seriously revisit the concept of the security community after a period of neglect during the Cold War. Adler and Barnett understand security communities to be socially constructed ‘cognitive regions’ whose borders run to where shared understandings and common identities end. A security community is defined as ‘a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change’, where peaceful change is understood as neither the expectation of, nor the preparation for, organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes (Adler & Barnett 1998: 30, 34). According to Adler and Barnett’s framework there are three phases in security community development. The first relies on precipitating conditions that orientate states towards one another. The next stage transforms the relationship into a community through increasing interactions that lead to the development of common institutions. This then leads to the emergence of mutual trust and collective identity (Adler and Barnett 1998:37-48).

Adler and Barnett provide five indicators to empirically assess whether a security community exists: evidence of multilateralism, unfortified borders, changes in military planning, common definition of threats, and the discourse of community (1998: 55-57). An overview of the relationship between the United States and Russia in the period 1994-2005 reveals dynamics of security community formation that lie somewhere between the first and second stages of security community development. This can be attributed to a degree of multilateralism through mutual participation in international forums such as the NATO-Russia Council and the G8, as well as some joint military planning, notably on the issue of counter-terrorism. A key factor for a mature security community is trust and mutual identification between members of the community. Pouliot (2007) presents survey data collected in 2002 and 2006, which suggests that Russians and Americans do not share a sense of ‘we-feeling’, but this does not preclude that possibility that this collective identification could develop. Both
Russian and American actors speak in the language of community and friendship, and this was witnessed in the period under examination, although this language faded at times of tension between the two states, so the language of community was not fully normalised in the relationship between the United States and Russia (Pouliot 2007:611). Alder notes that the action of political elites plays an important role in security community formation, through establishing practices that deepen the process of social learning (1997:277), so my study will focus on elites, to see how they attempted to foster security community development in the period under examination.

The process of social learning is a key feature of Adler and Barnett’s framework that purports to distinguish it from neorealist or neoliberal approaches. However, there is a hint of a neoliberal bias in Adler and Barnett’s claim that ‘core states’ exert magnetic attraction which pulls weaker states towards them because of ‘the positive image of security or material progress that they are associated with’ (Adler and Barnett 1998:39-40), and their assertion that liberal-democratic societies are more likely to develop into mature security communities because they are more prone to advance transnational civic culture (ibid:41). This magnetic attraction begins the process of interaction which leads to the gradual blurring of the self-other divide as the state’s interests begin to merge with the interests of the community. Adler writes that states and security communities mutually constitute one another, and that states remain free agents as long as their preferences are cognitively framed by the shared understandings of the community:

> Since social reality is a result of imposing meanings and functions on physical objects that do not really have those meanings and functions, the ability to create the underlying rules of the game, to define what constitutes acceptable play, and to get others to commit themselves to those rules, because these rules are not part of the self-understandings of the players, is, perhaps, the most subtle and most effective form of power’ (Adler 1997:261).

However, as stated in the previous section, not all actors have the same capacity to define the rules of the game, even when this game concerns collective identity. This idea is particularly pertinent to the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Vincent Pouliot (2010) explores in considerable depth the Russian-Atlantic relationship and the degree of agency that Russian actors have relative to Euro-
Atlantic actors. In his work on NATO-Russia diplomacy Pouliot uses the interplay between Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus and field to theorise how NATO has remained the dominant player in its relationship with Russia. Habitus is defined as the embodiment of history, learned experience, and subjective and intersubjective meanings that generate certain propensities or tendencies in actors who inhabit a social field. The field is structured by capital and power relations control the historically constructed forms of capital: economic, social and symbolic. The dominant players have an interest in controlling the conversion rates of capital and so they turn them into social facts such as institutions and norms. This is a form of ‘symbolic capital,’ which allows the dominant players to maintain the rules of the game by endowing them with a sense of naturalness and legitimacy so that they are accepted as obvious (ibid:33-34).

In his study of diplomacy at the NATO-Russia Council, Pouliot shows how the dynamics of security community formation have risen and fallen at different points throughout the history of NATO-Russia relations. However, he argues that the early stages of their interaction and the disagreement over NATO’s geographical expansion and its functional transformation into a community-building organisation led to an overall worsening of the relationship between NATO and Russia since their initial positive interactions between 1992 and 1994. Pouliot refers to NATO’s decision to pursue community-building rather than remaining a military alliance as a logic of ‘security-from-the-inside-out’. This logic assumes that when states transform themselves from the inside and begin to share the same liberal-democratic institutions as the states around them, they naturally become pacifically disposed towards each other. This is in contrast to the ‘external’ or military mode of pursuing security based on the neorealist logic of power balancing that prevailed during the Cold War.

The new logic of NATO expansion at the end of the Cold War meant that those states with high stocks of social capital (such as those with a long tradition of the rule of law and adherence to human rights norms) dominated the field, and those states that were happy to be ‘dominated’ gladly accepted NATO expansion. Russia, on the other hand, was not able to accept domination when its reasonably high
The stock of military capital was downgraded in the new ‘game’ and its low stocks of social were brought to the fore. I take the functional and geographical expansion of NATO in 1992-1997 as the background against which the tensions between Russia and the United States play out in 1994-2005. This is due to the historical constitution of habitus, which not only makes it durable but also creates a certain path dependency in the Russian-Atlantic relationship, since ‘all the external stimuli and conditioning experiences are, at every moment, perceived through categories already constructed by prior experiences’ (Pouliot 2010:193). It will be important to bear in mind the relative position of Russia to the United States in the structured field of their relations throughout my study.

The literature on security communities is important to my study because it describes how the peaceful relations between states are maintained. This is achieved through intersubjectively held ideas that define the community, and in the process of community formation, as the values of the community are defined and negotiated among the actors, the identities of the actors who belong to that community are also redefined and renegotiated. This means that if the identity of the community is threatened, the identity of the actors who constitute it is also threatened and vice versa. Risse (2004) provides another useful model with which to understand security community formation, which states that security communities are founded on three I’s: identity, economic interdependence and institutions. This is useful because it introduces the material (economic) element, which cannot be excluded from a consideration of identity in the context of Western liberal international society, where the market is rising in dominance as an institution.3

3 Of course, the Western liberal concept of economic interdependence is also shaped by knowledge and power, but I assume that Russia has internalised the norms of the Liberal international economic order (LIEO) to the extent that it understands that engagement with the open market is the best way to ensure its economic security. However, as will be shown, this does not prevent tensions
2.5 Approach to the study

Since the end of the Cold War the United States has attempted to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic security community, and Russia has shown varying degrees of willingness to be integrated. However, this process of integration into the community must be understood in the context of the pattern of domination that structures it. The period 1994-2005 reveals that despite maintaining its commitment to partnership with America in the spheres of nuclear non-proliferation and counter-terrorism, as well as acknowledging the need to integrate Russia into the global economy with the support of the U.S., Russia also asserts its foreign policy independence and condemns the American propensity to act unilaterally in fulfilment of its foreign policy goals, rather than seeking to foster multipolarity in the international system. It also reveals how America's foreign policy concerning Russia and its attempts to develop Russia's institutions of liberal democracy leads to accusations ranging in severity from unwanted meddling to neo-imperialism. The purpose of this study is to assess how the crises that emerge between America and Russia, when either one side or the other is not able ‘to have its own way’, are resolved without restoring the adversarial balance of power logic of the Cold War era.

The literature on security communities has demonstrated that communities in international relations are formed thorough a confluence of power and ideas. This is best illustrated with reference to Risse's (2004) theory of the security, which argues that security communities are built on three I’s: identity, economic interdependence and institutions. This model is appropriate to apply to the case of Russia and the United States because as was shown above the two states do not share a collective identity (citizens of the United States and Russia do not mutually identify with each other) and the United States and Russia are not economically interdependent (while the United States is seen to benefit from the opening of the Russian market, it does not depend on Russia for its economic security. The same cannot be said for Russia, which depends much more on financial support from the United States and the stability of the U.S. economy for its economic security, as will emerging between this set of norms and the other norms and institutions that shape Russia's identity, such as sovereignty and nationalism.
be argued later). Therefore, it must be in its common institutions that the nascent dynamics of the U.S.-Russian security community can be found.

Based on my assessment that U.S.-Russian international society lies somewhere on the spectrum between coexistence and cooperation society I have chosen to study the institutions that exists in both coexistence international society and cooperation international society in order to better understand the dynamics of security community formation. Buzan argues that diplomacy and the balance of power exist in both coexistence and cooperation society, but that in cooperation society one would expect the balance of power to decline as an institution. Diplomacy and the balance of power are particularly interesting to examine in the case of the United States and Russia because of the new meaning of diplomacy that emerged at the end of the Cold War when Russia and the United States began to disarm their nuclear arsenals and disagreement between the two states no longer threatened mutual annihilation. Diplomacy can now be seen as a form of soft power, where states attempt to let other states 'have their way' by non-forceful means. This is where Mattern's theory of representational force is a useful concept because it shows how community identities are able to withstand crises, as actors deploy rhetorical force to try to fix the meanings of the norms that hold the community together. The second pair of institutions that I will study is sovereignty and the market. Buzan argues that these institutions should be studied in order to understand the movement of international society from more pluralist/coexistence’ international society to more pluralist/’cooperative’ international society. Buzan suggests that as Western liberal society develops, one would expect the market to rise and replace sovereignty as the primary institution. This creates tensions as the institution of sovereignty is renegotiated, and nationalist/protectionist norms might be seen to surface as territorial boundaries are increasingly questioned.

In order to understand how these tensions have not led to the breakdown of the U.S.-Russian non-adversarial relationship, I will undertake a study of two crisis periods in U.S.-Russian relations. I have chosen for my study the events surrounding the two wars waged by Russia to quell separatist uprisings in
Chechnya and the bombings and subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003 led by the United States. These are useful cases to examine because they are coterminous, playing out across the period from 1994-2005. They also span the events of 9/11, which had a significant impact on American foreign policy. Of course, the events in Chechnya and Iraq have histories that precede 1994 and continue beyond 2005, but this 10-year period encompasses the most serious crisis points in the US-Russian relationship that are related to events in Iraq and Chechnya.

I am examining each crisis from one side only, because my interest is not to show how Russia defended its actions in Chechnya against American criticism or how the USA defended its actions in Iraq in the face of Russian criticism. This would lead to much broader questions of why Iraqi sovereignty was violated and the Chechen right to self-determination was somewhat overlooked, which are interesting questions nonetheless, but would take the discussion beyond the confines of how peace is maintained in the U.S.-Russian relationship. My focus is to investigate what elements of Russia’s conduct in Chechnya was considered threatening to the U.S.-Russian relationship from the American perspective and, vice versa, how American action in Iraq is construed by Russia as a threat to U.S.-Russian relations.

I analysed all the publicly available speeches, statements, articles, interviews and press conferences that made reference to the situation in Chechnya by American presidents and secretaries of state (including deputy secretaries of state) and spokespeople in the period 1994-2005. For the same period I studied similar texts of the Russian presidents, presidential aides and foreign ministers that made reference to American activities in Iraq. I examined how they defined and/or attempted to shape the institutions of diplomacy, the balance of power, sovereignty and the market. I focused on these actors because they are the ultimate reference points for the definition of national interest and identity, and as Adler claims, political elites are often the initiators of interstate community building (1997:277). Buzan offers a similar explanation to justify taking a state-centered approach when examining the institutions of international society because the state is still ‘the most powerful and focused unit’, which ‘can shove and
shape’ the transnational and interhuman domains of international society (2004:201). Buzan’s framework begins with a state-centred analysis of international society but lays the foundations for shifting the weight from states to individuals and other transnational actors involved in the evolution of societies and institutions in particular contexts (Adler 2005:177). It is theoretically possible to begin with the assumption that ‘states are still the primary medium through which the effects of other actors on the regulation of violence are channeled into the world system’ (Wendt 1999:9). At the same time it provides room to consider how the actions of state actors could give way to the increasing prominence of non-state actors in international society.

Taking into account the pattern of domination in the U.S.-Russian relationship described by Pouliot (2010), I found that it was the United States who set the rules of the game in terms of shaping the institutions that governed the relationship between the United States and Russia. I also found that Russian attempts to portray American behaviour as threatening the norms of the community were failed deployments of Mattern’s ‘representational force’. This is because the United States did not accept Russian threats to its subjectivity as real threats, due to the fact that America defined the norms governing the relationship. However, given that representational force is theorised by Mattern as holding the security community together, I found that Russia recast its threats in such a way that demonstrated its acceptance of the rules of the game as they were determined by the United States. In this way the non-adversarial relationship was maintained.
3. CASE ONE: U.S. CRISIS CONCERNING CHECHNYA

3.1 Overview

In September 1991 the Republic of Chechnya unilaterally declared independence from the Russian Federation and Dzhokhar Dudayev was elected president on 27 October 1991. The government in Moscow did not intervene hoping that the fragmented opposition in Chechnya would unite and overthrow Dudayev. However, with Dudayev still in power in 1994, the Russian government was increasingly concerned that inaction over Chechnya would lead to the secession of other republics from the Federation. On 9 December an ultimatum calling for Dudayev to surrender expired, and Yeltsin authorised the use of ‘all means available’ to disarm ‘illegal groups’ and impose constitutional rule in Chechnya (Youngs 2000:10). The significant loss of civilian life, the failures of the decaying Russian army and accusations of egregious human rights abuses on both sides of the conflict are well chronicled (Denbar 1997; Freire 2005). Relative peace was initially restored in Chechnya with the signing of the Khasavyurt peace accord on 30 August 1996. Separatist activities and guerrilla warfare continued, and led to the second Russian military incursion in 1999. Russian troops entered Chechnya on 1 October, citing the invasion of Dagestan by a militant Islamic group led by Chechen separatist Shamil Basayev and the illegitimacy of President Aslan Maskhadov’s government. Russian forces seized Grozny in February 2000 and established direct rule of Chechnya in May. Attacks by Chechen separatists continued for several years following the end of the offensive, and the impact of the Russian counter-terrorist operation on human and civil rights continued to draw the attention of the press and international human rights organisations. The Russian counter-terrorist operation officially ended in April 2009 and Russian troops were withdrawn from Chechnya.

In the opening chapter, diplomacy was defined as ‘the art of letting someone have your way’. This case study will examine how the American government sought ‘to let Russia have America’s way’ over Chechnya in the period from 1994 to 2005. The study begins at the time of the first Chechen war when the United
States was primarily concerned with the fact that the conflict would undermine democratic reform in the fledgling Russian state or disintegrate into a much wider regional conflict. In this sense, America ‘having its way’ meant restoring peace in Chechnya and preventing the conflict from destabilising the Russian state and creating a threat to U.S. national security, or from bringing about the return of the nuclear deterrence regime. The second part looks specifically at the issue of terror, which was one of the primary justifications given by the Russian government for its military incursion. Concerning the issue of terror there was a division between the pre- and post-9/11 American ‘way’. While the Clinton administration refused to accept that terrorism was an issue that warranted a military response, the Bush administration embarked upon a military strategy to fight terror following the events of 9/11. This meant that while the Clinton administration consistently failed to ‘get its way’ in dissuading the Russian government from using force in Chechnya, after 9/11 the Bush administration accepted the use of Russian force in Chechnya, but only in the narrow contexts defined by its policy on combatting international terrorism in the War on Terror. This led to a lessening of the crisis in terms of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Finally, I focus on the Clinton administration’s neoliberal community-building logic and examine how tensions emerged between this logic and the institution of sovereignty.

In examining how America sought but failed to get its way on Chechnya, I will explore how it shaped the institutions of diplomacy, the balance of power, sovereignty and the market.

3.2 Diplomacy and the balance of power

Chechnya is more than a place name hitherto exotic, now suddenly a household word everywhere in reach of CNN... Chechnya has become, in a matter of two months, a universally recognized synonym for a threat to the survival of reform in Russia in which we Americans [...] and, indeed, the rest of the world have such a huge stake [...] It has, literally and figuratively, broadcast to the world an image that conjures up the worst memories of Russia's past and clouds the best visions of its future.

(Talbott, 9 February 1995)

This fragment from a speech given by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott in February 1995 captures the essence of the Clinton administration’s thinking about Chechnya during the period of the first Chechen war. Analysis of American policy
on Chechnya reveals a lot more than concern about the excessive military strategy pursued by the Russians and the humanitarian impact of the conflict. In the period from 1994 to 1996 Chechnya becomes an issue on which the future of Russia is seen to hang, and by extension the formulation of American national security policy. Chechnya is seen as a threat to the internal stability of the Russian state and there is fear that Yeltsin’s pro-Western, pro-democratic government (as it is perceived by Washington), will be ousted from power and Russia will revert to communism or fall prey to ultra-nationalism and cease its positive engagement with the United States. Another preoccupation is the threat that the conflict in Chechnya will disintegrate into a much wider regional conflict bringing with it the possibility that American troops might have to be deployed.

A tension emerges between concern about Russia deviating from its path of liberal-democratic development and the American government’s lenient stance towards the humanitarian aspect of the conflict. The lenient stance is implied by journalists who frequently question why economic sanctions are not being imposed on Russia for its conduct in Chechnya. The administration criticises Russia’s excessive and indiscriminate use of force, but beyond urging it to moderate its behaviour and encouraging Yeltsin’s government to seek a political solution more actively, no sanctions or other punitive measures are threatened. The argument is made that the carrot of American support is needed in order to keep Russia on the path of political and economic reform, rather than the stick of sanctions for its excessive use of force in Chechnya. To its audience at home, the Clinton administration argues that sanctions would be counter-productive because they would damage support for the ‘embattled forces of democracy’ and ‘friends of reform’ who oppose the war in Chechnya (Talbott, 23 February 1995). Nuclear disarmament projects are also highlighted as primary recipients of U.S. aid and in this way sanctions are framed as a direct threat to American national security: the smaller the Russian nuclear arsenal, the less of a threat Russia poses to America. Bolstering Russian reform with economic support is also defended on the grounds that it is helping Russia to make the ‘right choice’ about its future. Both Clinton and Albright talk about ‘shaping’ US policy in order to influence Russian behaviour: ‘we should do everything in our power to increase the chance that they will choose
wisely, to be constructive members of our global community’, Clinton urges with reference to Russia in his State of Union address in January 2000.

As expressed by Talbott in the opening quotation, the conflict in Chechnya is perceived by the U.S. government as an issue that threatens the quality of the U.S.-Russian relationship that emerged at the end of the Cold War. In the context of this new relationship, which is no longer based on the regime of nuclear deterrence, the United States is able to deploy soft power in its attempts to encourage the transformation of Russia into a liberal democracy so that it will never again pose a threat to the United States. Clinton's administration frequently refers to the fact that Russian missiles are no longer pointed at the United States and it is the maintenance of this new status quo that is fundamental to U.S.-Russian relations. However, it is also clear that the balance of power has not completely declined as an institution governing the relationship because of the focus that the administration places on funding the Russian programme of nuclear disarmament. As mentioned above, frequent attention is drawn to the need to continue financial support for Russian nuclear disarmament projects in parallel to support for the development of democratic institutions. So, in this respect, the Clinton administration demonstrates that it still considers the possibility of Russia posing a physical threat to U.S. security. It is interesting to note that the first moment of contention that emerged in the U.S.-Russian relationship during Bush's administration was the American unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. While this can be considered reflective of a realist foreign policy, centred on the balance of power between states, it is presented by Colin Powell as a sign of the durability of the U.S.-Russian non-adversarial relationship. He argues that although Russia was highly critical of this action ‘no new arms race began’ (Powell, 3 October 2002). Powell’s confidence that there will be no return to the regime of nuclear power balancing between the United States and Russia is his justification for conducting a foreign policy that Russia may criticise. Criticism in itself is not dangerous. As Bush notes:

Look, friends don’t always agree, but friends are more likely to be able to work things out than enemies. As a matter of fact, in the old days, if there was a disagreement between enemies, that could lead to war. And there won’t be a war between Russia and the United States.

(Bush, 12 July 2002)
As highlighted above, the first Chechen war caused concern for the American government because it threatened a return to the nuclear deterrence regime that governed the U.S.-Russian relationship of the past. Clinton's administration responds to criticism that it is not doing more to end Russia's military intervention in Chechnya on the grounds that it needs to maintain friendly relations with Russia. Albright talks of the need for ‘time and patience’ with regard to the crisis in Chechnya, arguing that ‘we can be hostile and dismissive toward Russia and risk recreating our enemy, or we can explore with vision and persistence the full possibilities of this new era’ (Albright, 16 September 1999). At the time of the first Chechen war it is understandable why the Clinton administration feared the return of nuclear deterrence because it had good reason to believe that the political situation in Russia was significantly less stable then it was during the second Chechen conflict and its immediate aftermath. By the time the Bush administration inherited responsibility for the U.S.-Russian relationship the threat of civil war sparked by the conflict in Chechnya had subsided and the economic situation had improved. However, as will be argued below, the brand of soft power that the Clinton administration applied through its diplomatic relationship with Russia differed in character to that of the Bush administration and this can be seen in comparing their understandings of terror and how it should be fought.

3.3 Chechnya and terror

The Bush administration's policy relating to Chechnya reveals broad continuities with that of the Clinton administration. Bush and his Secretaries of State reiterate that their policy on Chechnya involves first and foremost a political solution to the separatist grievances and a full investigation into reported human rights abuses. However, the one striking difference is that the Bush administration qualifies all of its statements on Chechnya with the assertion that it is an internal Russian issue. In this respect the Bush administration distances itself from Russian domestic politics in a way that the Clinton administration did not. Clinton refers to Chechnya as an ‘internal Russian affair’ only once, at the very beginning of the first military incursion in a statement to the press on 11 December 1994. As the conflict progressed and evidence of Russian military misconduct became more apparent,
no references were made to the ‘internal’ nature of the conflict. On the contrary, the Chechen conflict was described as ‘casting a long international shadow’ and Clinton pointed to the OSCE charter as an instruction to signatory states that ‘we do have to have to be concerned about internal affairs in other countries’ (Clinton, 18 November 1999). What emerges under Clinton is a policy that posits Russian territorial integrity and state sovereignty as inviolable, but insists that events in Chechnya are the rightful subject of international concern, and that the domestic policy of the Russian state is the subject of rightful scrutiny. The Bush administration also draws attention to certain deficiencies in the institutions of liberal democracy with a particular focus on standards of press freedom, as well as concern about the increasing centralization of legislative and judicial power in the hands of the executive. However, regarding the issue of Chechnya specifically, the administration betrays a lack of clarity in distinguishing its policy on Chechnya from its policy relating to the War on Terror, and the extent to which the problem of terrorism in Chechnya can be fought in the same way as the War on Terror in the Middle East.

The Russian government used the combat of terrorism as the justification for its military strategy in Chechnya long before 9/11, but Clinton administration officials consistently refuted the legitimacy of a military strategy to combat terror. They also made the parallel claim that terrorism was not a problem unique to Chechnya, and that there was no distinction between the terrorist attacks in Chechnya, the Middle East, or Oklahoma City (Clinton, 17 June 1995). The Clinton administration, like the Bush administration, never denied the fact that terror was ‘unjustifiable’, but it did not separate the issue of terrorism from the political grievances of Chechen separatists. The root causes of both issues were to be found in the deficit of liberal democratic institutions. In a speech in September 1999 Albright argued that the problem of terrorism exists in all societies where there are disenfranchised people ‘who have no stake in the system’:

[...] terrorism affects all of us. All decent people that operate by the rules are in some way affected by those who have no stake in the system and are deliberately trying to disrupt it [...] We have condemned the acts of insurgent groups in the north Caucuses against lawful authority and which are causing needless deaths and destruction [...] all of us who care about laws and who care about open societies – are under threat from
the indiscriminate use of violent acts against innocent people by terrorists. So we stand side by side with Russia in terms of trying to deal with this terrible problem.

(Albright, 20 September 1999)

Although Albright condemns indiscriminate violence perpetrated by people whom she labels terrorists, she also notes that these people feel they have ‘no stake in the system’. She also gives a name to the type of terror that exists in Chechnya. It is north Caucasian ‘insurgency’. The terrorists in Chechnya are situated in a specific political context. These are not indiscriminate murderers hiding in ‘shadowy caves’, as Bush later describes them. In the context of the War on Terror, following the events of 9/11, terrorists in Chechnya are not understood to inhabit a specific political or social environment; they are people who ‘have no place in the civilized world’ (Powell, 14 May 2003).

While not directly equating the conflict in Chechnya with the War on Terror, the Bush administration admits that there are Al Qaida agents at work in Chechnya, and it relies on the Russian government as a strategic ally to help remove them. Bush argues that combatting terrorism and solving the political causes of the conflict in Chechnya are separate issues:

[...] we’re dealing with people who hide in caves and kind of shadowy corners of the world and send people to their suicidal deaths. It’s a war that I believe can lend itself both to chasing those people down and, at the same time, solving issues in a peaceful way, with respect for the human rights of minorities within countries.

(Bush, 18 November 2002)

Bush notes that the War on Terror is a ‘different kind of war’. The key word here is war, and this is what distinguishes the American approach to terror before 9/11 and after 9/11. Before the 9/11 attacks the ‘security-from-the-inside’ logic was pursued, which was described in the opening chapter as the basis for the OSCE’s community-building model. This held that states needed to adopt liberal democratic institutions to transform themselves from within and join the expanding European security community. Following the events of 9/11, a military approach was employed, founded on the principle that freedom and democracy ought to be defended (or imposed) by force.

Mendelson (2004) argues that from the moment war was waged in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American government lost focus of the interconnectedness of Russian
domestic politics and U.S. national security. She contends that by focusing on the War on Terror, the Bush administration neglected the root causes of the conflict in Chechnya that were turning it into a breeding ground for terrorism. It is true that the Bush administration betrays its ambivalence concerning the relevance of key Chechen actors and their potential role in the resolution of the conflict, and this is indicative of its artificial delineation of the domestic political aspect of the conflict from what it believed was the apolitical, ‘uncivilized’ senselessness of international terror. Rather than positing Chechnya as a unique zone of conflict with distinct root causes, the Bush administration demonstrates its preoccupation with Chechnya only in so far as the situation can be related to the War on Terror. In an interview with Russia’s NTV in November 2002, Bush is unable to state his position on whether he agrees with the Russian government’s classification of former president-turned-rebel-leader Aslan Maskhadov as an international terrorist. This ambivalence is later brought to the fore when Maskhadov is killed by the Russian army in March 2005. In an exchange with journalists, the President’s press secretary is questioned over the apparent contradiction between the willingness the Bush administration had shown in deposing Saddam Hussein, and its policy that the Russian government should have engaged in political dialogue with Maskhadov:

**Question:** The Russians have just announced they have killed the secessionist leader, Aslan Maskhadov. First, do you have any independent confirmation of that?

**McClellan:** No, the last I heard before I came out here, I’d seen the reports, but I did not have any confirmation on those reports at this point. Our views, in terms of the situation, is that we believe it should be resolved through a political process, and that remains our view.

**Question:** How can it be resolved in a political process if the leader of the secessionists has now been killed?

**McClellan:** Again, I've seen the reports. I don't have confirmation on that. But we've consistently said that when it comes to Chechnya... that it needs to be resolved through a political process.

**Question:** I don't see the logic there. Why is it different from capturing and killing terrorists in other countries? Why is it different from capturing Saddam Hussein?

**McClellan:** Again, I mean, you're talking about a specific report. I've not confirmed that report. I would want to find out more about the information on this particular report.

**Question:** I’m asking –

**McClellan:** Obviously, our views on terrorists are very well known.

**Question:** I’m asking about your –

**McClellan:** We work very closely with Russia in the global war on terrorism.  

(McClellan, 8 March 2005)
This exchange reveals what Mendelson claims is the American government’s focus on the War on Terror at the expense of acknowledging the root causes of the conflict in Chechnya. Rather than articulating a clear policy on Chechnya in the above extract, McClellan hones in on the strategic partnership between Russia and the United States in the War on Terror. And this is seen throughout the period from 2001 to 2005. Chechnya is only considered an issue of American national security in so far as it is linked to the War on Terror. The result is that the conflict in Chechnya is less of a crisis in the U.S.-Russian relationship following the events of 9/11. The U.S. government ‘has its way,’ to a certain degree, by gaining a strategic ally in its battle with Al Qaida. As the exigencies of the War on Terror begin to take precedence in U.S. foreign policy, the focus on Russian internal politics recedes to the background, and in the case of Chechnya, the Bush administration engages with the Russian government over Chechnya’s strategic importance in the War on Terror, rather than focusing on political complexities of the separatist conflict.

Further evidence of this is seen in the Bush administration’s application of the technologies it uses in its fight against terror and applying them to the conflict in Chechnya. In the following extract from an interview with Colin Powell, the importance of intelligence gathering is noted:

**Question:** Mr Secretary. There are two extreme opinions. The Chechen fighters in the mountains say they're fighting for national liberation and say in Moscow, most of the political leaders, I would say absolute majority, are convinced that it’s international terrorism. Where is the truth?

**Secretary Powell:** The truth is for someone else to decide, not me. I know that there are terrorist organizations in Chechnya... We have to be very careful to make sure that when we identify, at least in our system, organizations that are conducting these kinds of attacks that we can justify with information and intelligence that they are terrorists, that they are using terrorist financing, and that they have no interest in the political process.

(Powell, 14 May 2003)

Powell exemplifies the Bush administration’s post-9/11 attitude towards Chechnya in admitting that there is a link between the War on Terror and the situation in Chechnya in so far as the claim that there are international terrorist organisations operating there can be validated with intelligence. While Powell admits that there is a political process that must be adhered to in order to resolve the conflict in Chechnya, ‘the truth’ is somewhat hidden, and Powell is most
comfortable framing the conflict in terms of the War on Terror, rather than focusing on the aspect related to ‘national liberation’:

We realize that Chechnya is place where there are terrorist organizations, but we have a system of laws, a system of regulations where we are required under our law to make an examination of information provided to us, intelligence we can gather. And we go through this because we are a nation of law and we apply the laws in a very, very careful way. It is not a matter of just snapping your finger one day and the next day saying I designate you as a terrorist organization.

(Powell, 14 May 2003)

The reader would be justified in questioning the degree to which the law is applied in a ‘very, very careful way’ in America’s approach to the War on Terror, but this is beside the point. What the extract above demonstrates is a reluctance to engage with the political aspect of the Chechen conflict as it relates to the question of distinguishing between legitimate national liberation actors versus ‘uncivilized’ terrorists. Powell distances himself from attempting to resolve the political complexities of the Chechen issue and leaves it for the instruments of intelligence to decide.

Therefore, the distinction between the pre- and post- 9/11 U.S. responses to Russia’s use of force to combat terrorism in Chechnya centres on the U.S. attitude towards terror and how it should be combatted. Neither the Clinton nor the Bush administration denies Russia’s right to defend the integrity of the Russian state against the forces of Chechen separatism. Madeleine Albright affirms this sentiment at the time of the second Chechen war: ‘No one questions Russia’s responsibility and even obligation to combat insurgency and terror within its borders’ (Albright, 2 February 2000). The Bush administration also acknowledges that a solution to the conflict in Chechnya must respect ‘Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (President’s press secretary, 13 May 2003). However, the Bush administration pursued a military mode of combatting terror through force by eliminating or ‘weeding’ it out, while the Clinton administration focused on Chechnya as conflict with social and political causes that needed to be addressed. As Clinton argued:

Ultimately, in any democracy, there has to be a political solution to people’s differences... I know that the problem in Chechnya is occupying everyone’s attention. The gripping scene at the hospital must have a hold on the imagination of the Russian people, very much like the explosion in Oklahoma City had on our people. And we join the Russian people in condemning terrorism in the strongest possible terms. But we
hope that in the end all the people of Russia, including the people in Chechnya, can be reconciled so that your democracy can flourish everywhere and the cycle of violence can be broken.

(Clinton, 17 June 1995)

Ultimately, the idea of terror as understood by the Bush and Clinton administrations differs very little in substance. For both it is a problem that can arise anywhere and which prevents freedom and democracy from ‘flourishing’. However, the approach to reducing the incidences of terror is different. For Bush’s administration this involves war; for Clinton’s administration the method is peaceful. In terms of U.S. policy on Chechnya, it meant that the Bush administration focused on the military-strategic aspect of its relationship with Russia, while the Clinton administration pursued an approach that foregrounded the domestic politics of Russia and the democratic deficit in Chechnya as the root causes of the conflict, which needed to be addressed in order to reach a peaceful resolution.

Beck has looked to the US-led response to 9/11 for proof of his theory of ‘world risk society’. He argues that ‘neoliberalism has always been a fair-weather philosophy, one that works only when there are no serious conflicts and crises. It asserts that only globalized markets, freed from regulation and bureaucracy, can remedy the world’s ills – unemployment, poverty, economic breakdown and the rest’ (Beck 2002:47-48). According to Beck, the American response to 9/11 was typical of its imperialistic foreign policy, which denied any form of true multilateralism: ‘For America to stay America, a free and open society, intimately connected to the world, the world has to become – Americanized’ (ibid:49). However, it will be argued below that the Clinton administration also had a vision of an Americanized world even before the events of 9/11, which were rooted in a certain liberal idealism, which saw terror as a universal concern caused by society’s ‘oldest problem’. In the fragment above (Clinton, 17 June 1995), by drawing a parallel between events in Chechnya and events in Oklahoma City, Clinton does not separate the problems of Russian society from those of American society. He admits that societal problems exist everywhere and the root causes are often the same, even if the manifestations are different. This also reflects the neoliberal logic guiding the pre-9/11 American policy on Chechnya. If societies are to be open and free, the internal politics of different states will be the legitimate
concern of everyone. It is also interesting to note his description of acts of terror as ‘gripping scenes’ that have ‘a hold on the imagination’, because it reveals a distancing of terror as a real social fact that can be dealt with. Terror is more of a spectacle that has an emotional impact which distracts from the political causes that are at its root. It is almost as though Clinton is trying to resist what James Der Derian has theorised as ‘the simulacrum of terrorism – that is, the production of a hyperreal threat of violence’ (1992: 81). What Clinton tries to resist, Powell embraces wholeheartedly, with his unwavering commitment to intelligence: a primary trope in Der Derian’s (2008) ‘simulacrum of war’.

The remedy for the problem of terrorism was an expansion of American liberal democracy to the entire world. Inherent in this logic is the expectation that as the market expands and liberal norms are adopted, the domestic politics of individual states becomes increasingly homogenized, and this homogenization leads to mutual trust and collective identification. According to Adler and Barnett (1998) mutual trust and collective identity are necessary conditions for the development of a mature security community. As will be shown below, the Clinton administration was interested in accelerating the adoption of American liberal democracy in Russia and drawing it into the Euro-Atlantic security community.

3.4 Diplomacy and sovereignty
The U.S. government’s interest in the internal political affairs of the Russian state is seen most clearly at the time of Russia’s second presidential election in June 1996, towards the end of the first Chechen war. The war in Chechnya is perceived as a threat to Yeltsin’s re-election because of its increasing domestic unpopularity. Strobe Talbott argues that the ‘gruelling, gruesome war in Chechnya’ will be a factor in the upcoming election: ‘It is against this backdrop of change and upheaval that Zhirinovsky’s ultranationalists and Zyuganov’s communists did so well in the parliamentary elections of 1993 and 1995’ (Talbott, 7 June 1996). While maintaining an officially neutral stance, the Clinton administration struggled to disguise the fact that it wanted to see the re-election of Yeltsin, whom they hoped would continue his programme of democratic reform with financial assistance.
from the United States. Talbot says of the Russian electorate in the run-up to the election:

Many of them will be asking themselves a version of the question Ronald Reagan made famous in our own presidential election campaign of 1980: "Are we better off today than we were five or even 20 years ago?"... How the Russian people answer those questions is up to them and to no one else.

(Talbott, 7 June 1996)

On one hand the United States encourages and provides material support for the development of the democratic norms that guarantee Russian citizens the freedom to choose their leader, while on the other there is a distinct sense that there is only one correct choice. The role of the American government is then to ensure that the right choice is made. This is because the ‘answer’ that informs how Russian citizens vote in the election, is always framed in terms of the impact that it will have on American national security. At another point Clinton argues that the choices the Russian people make ‘will define what kind of defence budget we have to have, how many folks we have to enrol in the armed services...’ (Clinton, 8 December 2000). Secretary of State Warren Christopher describes the $788 million budget request ‘in support of democratic reform in Russia’ as ‘the least expensive investment that we can make for our long-term security’ (Christopher, 6 February 1995). It is believed that with support for civil society flowing from the U.S. the choice that the Russian people make will invariably be for a democratic Russia that will ‘define its greatness... in a more modern sense’, rather than in the way of the past, which was ‘to dominate their neighbours’ and ‘to control their own people’ (Clinton, 8 December 2000). During the first Chechen war, one of the U.S. government’s primary concerns is that it is undermining support for Yeltsin, whom the United States considers to be the pro-democracy, pro-reform candidate. The U.S. is both critical of Yeltsin and his campaign in Chechnya, but also hopes for his re-election. As Strobe Talbott notes: ‘our nation’s relationship with Russia will, ultimately, depend on the choices that the Russian people make’ (Talbott, 23 February 1995).

In its concern that the conflict in Chechnya is undermining the legitimacy of Yeltsin’s government, the United States reveals a tension between the institutions of diplomacy and sovereignty. As was mentioned above, the Clinton administration
deployed soft power in order to encourage political and economic reform in Russia and secure the ‘friendly’ nature of U.S.-Russian relations. The logic was that if Russia transformed itself into a liberal democracy, like the United States, it would no longer pose a security threat. The Clinton administration’s continued support for Yeltsin despite criticism of his conduct over the war in Chechnya was frequently justified with references to Russia’s past. It was understood that Russia’s history of authoritarian government made it difficult for reform to take hold. Both Clinton and his Secretaries of State frequently implore their audiences to assuage their criticisms of Russia and observe the progress that has been made since the Soviet collapse. Even at the height of the Chechen conflict in 1995, audiences are urged to take note of ‘how far Russia has come’.

Paradoxically, interest in the continuation of democratic reform always assumes that popular sovereignty already exists in Russia and that the ‘choices that the Russian people make’ will in fact define the future of Russia:

What lessons will the Russian leadership learn from Chechnya? Will Russia’s leaders uphold the rule of law and human rights or will they give priority to "order" and "security" in a fashion that ends up undermining both, as it did so spectacularly and fatally during the Soviet period of Russian history? Will they embrace the obligations that come with membership in the international community, or will they choose the path of self-enforced isolation and economic and political backwardness? This is not a new question. President Clinton posed it starkly when he visited Moscow and participated in a televised, nationwide town meeting just over a year ago, in January 1994. He asked the Russian people: "How will you define your role in the world as a great power? Will you define it in yesterday's terms, or tomorrow's?"

(Talbott, 9 February 1995)

What is interesting to note in the fragment above is the way in which Talbott conflates the choices of Russia’s leaders with the choices of Russia’s people. He assumes that the institutions of liberal democracy are already sufficiently well developed to ensure that the choices of the Russian people are converted into Russian foreign policy. This is where the tension between the diplomatic soft power and the institution of sovereignty emerges. The Clinton administration is first and foremost concerned about the stability of the Russian state and the need for strong leadership in Russia; but it has to balance this national security need with the parallel goal of democratisation. As Talbott self-consciously notes, there is a fine line between maintaining order and security and undermining it. Clinton is also aware of this when he refers to the fact that ‘when you take the heavy hand of
authority away [...] you see the ethnic fighting in a place like Chechnya consuming the energies of the nation and threatening the values of the nation’ (Clinton, 30 June 1995). Clinton is also forced on several occasions to defend the authority of Yeltsin from concerns that he has lost legitimacy to fulfil his roll as President:

**Question:** Do you think that Boris Yeltsin is in charge of Russia every day?

**Clinton:** I think he is in charge of Russia.

**Question:** Every day?

**Clinton:** Well, if he's in charge, he's in charge every day. I think he's running the government. He's the elected President. He's been much more vigorous in the last few days in his assertion of policy with regard to Chechnya.

(Clinton, 26 January 1995)

Clinton’s retort reveals a definite frustration, which underlies his administration’s concern with the situation in Chechnya. The United States is not only concerned by Yeltsin’s hold on power, which could undermine the prospects for economic and political reform in Russia, but also with Russia’s ‘self-enforced isolation’ and the fact that it is losing credibility among members of the international community due to its conduct in Chechnya (Talbott, 20 February 1995). It is at times when Russia ceases to behave like a liberal democracy (or ceases to show willing that it wants to develop its institutions of liberal democracy), that the U.S. government begins to dwell on the possible return to the ‘past’ of nuclear deterrence. Clinton speaks of the fear of the Chechen conflict eroding international support for Russia’s reform (Clinton, 7 May 1995). The legitimacy of Russia’s sovereign statehood may be questioned by other states, but Clinton argues that Russia’s sovereignty cannot be questioned, and the soft-power tactics of the U.S. government must continue because of the danger of ‘recreating the enemy’.

The underlying concern of the Clinton administration’s policy on Chechnya is one of uncertainty about Russia’s future. But it is an uncertainty injected with hope. One of the criticisms of mainstream constructivist theory in International Relations is that it has little more to offer than neoliberal idealism (Guzzini 2000; Barkin 2003; Jackson and Hexon 2004). By encouraging cooperation with Russia in as many spheres of activity as possible (civil, military and economic), Clinton holds firm to the neoliberal logic that undergirds Adler and Barnett’s (1998)
constructivist account of security community formation, and their assertion that liberal societies are more likely to develop the mutual identification and trust that create mature security communities. On a number of occasions Clinton refers to the fact that society is afflicted by its ‘oldest’ problem, and this problem affects all societies from the United States to Chechnya. Speaking about a spate of hate-motivated crimes in America, Clinton notes:

  [...] don’t you think it’s interesting, with all this stuff going on, that the biggest problem we face as a society is still the oldest one? We’re still scared of people who are different from us. And it’s easy, once you are frightened or uncertain, to turn that into distrust, to turn that into dehumanization, to turn that into violence [...] You see continuing religious and ethnic tensions in the Middle East [...] the problems they’re having in Russia in Chechnya [...] And in America you say, "Well, look at us. We’re the most successful, diverse democracy in history"[...] but we should be humble about this [...] because we have, number one, not repealed all the laws of human nature, which means there is still the darkness of the heart to deal with [...]

  (Clinton, 29 February 2000)

What is interesting about this passage is that it draws a direct parallel between the problems in Russian society and the problems in American society. This is a full endorsement of the ‘security-from-the-inside’ concept that formed the foundation of the reinvented NATO the end of the Cold War, as argued by Pouliot (2010) and Neumann and Williams (2000), and which was pursued with renewed vigour by the OSCE following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Alder 1998; Pourchot 2011).

Clinton does not draw a line separating Russian domestic politics from American domestic politics, and in so doing he legitimises his ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. By expressing the fact that America suffers from the same domestic problems as Russia, because of the universality of human nature, Clinton argues a strong case for deepening cooperation with Russia. In this comment Clinton reveals the fundamentally neoliberal foundation of his thinking, which is based on an individualist understanding of human nature. In striving to promote his vision of democratic societies constructed on the American liberal model, it seems that Clinton hopes to repeal the ‘final laws of human nature’. This fundamental commitment to the possibility of universal human progress is certainly idealistic, and it informs the administration’s concern in the internal political affairs of the Russian state. Within the neoliberal vision of the Clinton administration, the root causes of social and political problems in Chechnya and the United States are the same, and therefore they can be tackled in the same way.
And in its diplomacy relating to the Chechen crisis, the Clinton administration places a strong emphasis on teaching the Russian government how to tackle its problems and providing it with the material support with which to do so.

3.5 Conclusion

In a press conference before the American presidential election in 2000, Clinton is asked to comment on Republican candidate George Bush’s attitude that Russia should be considered a ‘competitor’ of the United States rather than a ‘strategic partner’. Clinton notes that competition and disagreements, such as the disagreement over Russia’s military strategy and record on human rights in Chechnya, should be expected, and that they pose no problem to U.S.-Russian relations as long as ‘characterizing a country as a competitor’ does not mean that ‘there will be an adversary relationship’:

[...] there will be instances of competition, instances of partnership. But what we should be looking for is a world in which nations [...] define their greatness by the achievements of their people and by their ability to profit in their relations with other nations by bringing out the best in them, instead of by the traditional 19th and 20th century great power politics.

(Clinton, 20 November 1999)

The idea of ‘bringing out the best’ in Russia reflects the neoliberal logic of the Clinton administration’s policy on Chechnya and is witnessed in the admonishment over Russia’s handling of the Chechen conflict, as well as encouragement to improve its conduct. This also informs the justification for financial aid, rather than sanctions, with the stated aim of winning the hearts and minds of the Russian people and solidifying their commitment to liberal democracy. The Bush administration retains broadly the same approach to Chechnya in the sense that it supports a political solution to the conflict and adherence to standards of human and civil rights. However, the Bush administration’s commitment to a political solution in Chechnya comes into conflict with its parallel (and predominant) commitment to fighting the war on terror after the attacks of 9/11.

This first case has outlined the broad similarities between the Clinton and the Bush administrations’ approaches to Chechnya in the period 1994-2005. In the earlier years encompassing the first Chechen war, the concern was with Chechnya as a threat to the stability of the Russian state and the continuation of democratic
reform. This had an impact on American national security for two primary reasons: the first was the threat that the conflict in Chechnya might disintegrate into a broader regional conflict; and the second was a concern that Russia might revert to its ‘past’, leading to the re-emergence of an adversarial relationship between the United States and Russia, bringing with it a return of the regime of nuclear deterrence. In the later period of the second Chechen war and initial phase of the counter-terrorist operation, the internal stability of the Russian state was questioned less, but there was a concern with the deficient standards of democracy and human rights that the Russian government applied in its handling of the conflict. However, this concern faded into the background somewhat due to the Bush administration’s focus on fighting the War on Terror.

Both the Bush and Clinton administrations foreground the existence of a U.S.-Russian ‘friendship’, which is contrasted to the adversarial relationship that existed in the past. Even at times when friendship was questioned, there is an absolute negation of the idea that Russian and the United Sates could ever again be adversaries. In a speech to the Russian Duma in June 2000 Clinton notes: ‘We are not destined to be adversaries, but it is not guaranteed that we will be allies’. This attitude reflects the ‘self-negating, self-transforming’ logic of European security discourses in the 1990s: ‘Europe’s ‘other’, the enemy image... is Europe’s own past which should not be allowed to become its future’ (Wæver 1996:122). In the same way that Wæver describes Europe’s greatest threat as its past of expansionist war, the U.S.-Russian partnership is driven by a refusal to contemplate the possibility that the two states would ever again be adversaries and aim their nuclear missiles at one another. The degree of strategic cooperation as ‘allies’ is secondary to the importance of remaining friends. This is the reason why tensions are sometimes seen to emerge between the institutions of sovereignty and diplomacy. The U.S. soft-power approach depends on favourable relations with its counterparts in the Russian government, and threat to the breakdown of inter-governmental relations is framed as a threat of return to the regime of nuclear deterrence. The United States is forced to accept that Russia may not act like a liberal democracy where sovereign power rests with the electorate, but it behaves as though this is the case in order to increase the chances of success from its soft power approach.
The market is not specifically referred to in the context of Chechnya, and for this reason it was not discussed in the main body of the case study. However, the benefits of opening the Russian market inheres in the neoliberal logic that guides the Clinton and Bush administrations’ policy on reaching a peaceful solution to the separatist grievance in Chechnya. The Chechen conflict is frequently referred to as a threat to economic and political reform in Russia, and in finding a democratic resolution to the conflict the logic is that the openness created by the institutions of liberal democracy will foster a virtuous circle of peace and prosperity. In a speech to the White House Conference on Trade and Investment in Central and Eastern Europe, Clinton argues that peace depends on successful market economies: ‘From Tallinn to Tirana, people must have good jobs so that they can provide for their families and feel the self-confidence necessary to support democracy’ (Clinton, 13 January 1995). The United States does not depend on Russia for its economic security, but expanding the institution of the market to Russia is seen as a way to ensure peace and stability, which does have an impact on U.S. national security.

While both the Clinton and Bush administrations adhered to a broadly neoliberal policy regarding Chechnya, where the resolution of the conflict was to be found through adherence to liberal democratic institutions, there was a shift in the degree to which an interest was taken in Russian domestic politics. Clinton’s ‘Americanization’ of the conflict turned Chechen, and more broadly Russian, society into another case for capitalising on the new opportunity for expanding peace and prosperity brought about by the end of the Cold War. Bush’s ‘Americanization’ of the Chechen conflict emerged in parallel to the perceived need to wage war on terrorism. This led to a realist turn in foreign policy where force was privileged as the right way to combat terror. It was believed that once terror was rooted out, freedom would flourish. Before 9/11, America attempted to ‘have its own way’ on Chechnya by encouraging the development and adherence to norms of liberal democracy in Russia. It was believed that this would inevitably lead to the peaceful resolution of the conflict. After 9/11, a new mode of pursuing security emerged, and it was less dependent on the presence of democratic
institutions to resolve the Chechen conflict. Liberal democracy, human and civil rights became more of a desired outcome that would emerge once the terrorist scourge was forcefully removed.

Pouliot (2010) argued that the events of 9/11 led to an improvement in U.S.-Russian relations because the realist mode of pursuing security through force matched Russia’s disposition in habitus to its position in the field more than the internal mode of pursuing security through the deepening of democratic institutions. During Clinton’s administration the United States was positioned as the teacher instructing Russia on the norms of liberal democracy and scrutinising its domestic democratic institutions, while after 9/11 the Bush administration engaged with Russia as a strategic ally in the War on Terror. However, the next case examining the Russian response to U.S. conduct in Iraq will bring the validity of this claim of an improvement in relations into question. Rather than encouraging closer cooperation between the two states, the crisis in Iraq led to accusations of American neo-imperialism and warnings from Russia that the stability of the international system was being threatened by American bellicosity and unilateralism.
4. CASE TWO: RUSSIAN CRISIS CONCERNING IRAQ

4.1 Overview
A spokesman for the Russian foreign ministry speaking in November 1994 stated: ‘It's hard to imagine a situation when different states, especially such large states as the United States and Russia which have their own interests, would have identical approaches to [...] such acute problems as the problems around Iraq’ (Gudev, 15 November 1994). This sets the tone for the disagreement between Russia and the USA over how to handle Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq that continued until the US-led invasion in March 2003. This case study will examine the Russian policy on Iraq as it was framed by American-led pressure on Iraq to adhere to the terms of the UN Security Council resolutions following its invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

In a similar format to the previous study this case will examine how the Russian state attempted to shape the institutions of diplomacy, the balance of power, sovereignty and the market in its crisis response to the situation in Iraq created by the actions of the United States. I will look at the tensions that emerge between the institutions of diplomacy, the balance of power and sovereignty before examining how these tensions emerge from an overarching conflict between the Russian desire for a Westphalian-type multipolar international system towards the pluralist end of Buzan’s spectrum and the inevitable need to cooperate with the United States and other major powers in a more solidarist, cooperative mode. Finally, I will examine the tensions between the institutions of sovereignty and the market.

In the period under examination, the main concern of the Russian government was the bellicose attitude of the United States concerning the disarmament of Iraq, culminating in the 2003 invasion over purported Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). What emerges is a Russian policy that seeks a diplomatic solution to the crisis. This must be seen in the context of the diplomatic ties that the Soviet Union had shared with Iraq. Because of its history of relations
with Iraq, Russia felt that it was in a better position to engage in constructive dialogue with Saddam Hussein than the Western powers, and was frustrated with the persistent American threat of force. However, the overarching issue, which dominates the Russian response to the situation in Iraq is its objection to U.S. unilaterality and perceived disregard for international law. In the context of the crisis over Iraq, for Russia to ‘get its way’ required neutralising American unipolarity in the international system and restoring a multipolar world order. As will be shown, Russia did not have the same power (or stocks of capital – economic, social or symbolic – to use Pouliot’s Bourdieusian conceptualization), to apply soft power in its diplomatic relations with the United States. What emerges from Russia’s attempt to get its way in its disagreement with the United States over Iraq, is a series of failed deployments of Mattern’s ‘representational force’.

4.2 Diplomacy, sovereignty and the balance of power

The USSR had voted for UN Security Council resolution 678 adopted on 29 November 1990, which gave legal justification for the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq following its invasion and annexation of Kuwait. However, after the initial operation to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait, disagreements began to emerge over how to maintain peace in the region. The crisis over how to deal with Saddam Hussein and the possibility that Iraq was producing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) continued throughout the 1990s and reached its peak in the run-up and immediate aftermath of ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ in March 2003. As Gudev, speaking on behalf of the Russian Foreign Ministry goes on to comment: ‘the problems around Iraq […] bring forth profound political resonance in each of our countries, and this resonance has an impact on the shaping of foreign policies in our states’. This demonstrates the desire that Russia had to pursue an independent foreign policy unimpeded by interference from the United States in what Russia felt was its sphere of influence.

Russia maintained that a diplomatic and political solution should be sought in Iraq and that the threat of force was counter-productive and unjustifiable. The Russian government condemned Operation Desert Strike; the American cruise missile attacks against Iraq in September 1996 following the Iraqi offensive against
the city of Ibril. While maintaining that Iraq should abide by the Security Council resolutions relating to WMDs and the rights of Iraq’s Kurdish population, it insisted that compliance was better achieved through diplomacy and negotiation, rather than the threat of force. In February 1998, Russian foreign minister Evegeny Primakov stated:

We never backed anyone who tried to breach Security Council resolutions and avoided liquidating mass destruction weapons... At the same time we believe that there are no indications for striking a blow on Iraq. We believe it would lead to dire consequences which will endure for months and years [...] And we think that the situation can be resolved by political means, as happened in November.

(Primakov, 2 February 1998)

The events of November refer to the Iraqi expulsion of weapons inspectors following a Security Council resolution demanding that Baghdad cooperate with UN weapons inspection teams. The American threat of a military response to Iraqi non-compliance was averted when Boris Yeltsin met with Iraqi officials, resulting in Saddam Hussein granting permission for the return of inspectors. Tensions escalated between the United States and Russia once again surrounding the events of Operation Desert Fox; the U.S.-led December 1998 bombing campaign to strike military and security targets deemed capable of producing and storing WMDs. The American justification for the attack was once more the perceived Iraqi non-compliance with UN weapons inspections.

What emerges in the Russian response to U.S.-led interventions in Iraq is consistency above all else. The Russian government justified its policy on Iraq according to the principle of international law prohibiting forcible regime change in a sovereign state, and Moscow criticized American threats of force as counter-productive to the diplomatic process. But more than simply impeding the resolution of the Iraqi disarmament crisis, U.S. policy on Iraq was perceived by the Russian government as having an impact on the stability of the international system that reached far beyond the dispute over how to deal with the purported production of WMDs in Iraq. Speaking at the time of the December 1998 bombings, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that: ‘this is an issue that is not limited to Iraq, this is an issue of a more global nature. The world in which we are going to live in the 21st century depends on this’. And following the invasion in March 2003, Putin argued:
The war in Iraq in terms of its consequences goes beyond the framework of a local conflict. Perhaps for the first time since the end of the Cold War the world community has been confronted with such a difficult crisis [...] with the danger of the foundations of global stability and international law being shaken.

(Putin, 28 March 2003)

However, neither the December 1998 bombing campaign nor the March 2003 invasion resulted in a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Russia and the United States, and in fact only led to a stronger reaffirmation of the closeness of the relationship between the two states. This is striking given the warnings of the Russian government that American actions were a threat to ‘the foundations of global stability’. In response to a question at the time of the December 1998 bombing campaign probing the possibility that the disagreement between Russia and the United States might lead a new Cuban missile crisis, Ivanov commented:

I do not think that there will be any Caribbean crisis of a second or a third edition. We have a different situation in the world now. I believe that the people in the American administration treasure the relations that they have with Russia [...] I do not think that this clash of approaches will develop into a global crisis.

(Ivanov, 21 December 1998)

On the day of the March 2003 invasion itself, President Putin’s spokesman noted:

Bilateral relations between Russia and the US have an intrinsic value and of course we are interested in keeping these relations at a high level and in preventing what is happening from damaging many of the cooperation programs that involve both Russia and the U.S.

(Yastrzhembsky, 20 March 2003)

And in noting the need to find a lasting solution for peace in Iraq following the invasion in March 2003, Putin notes that he is ‘open to constructive interaction with the international community, with all the parties involved in this conflict, including of course, with the United States of America’ (Putin, 28 March 2003). This does not suggest a breakdown in diplomatic relations between Russia and America. In fact, it demonstrates a commitment to the peaceful resolution of the crisis, one of the definitions of diplomacy given in the opening chapter. It is the willingness of Russia to work with the United States despite disagreement that both Pouliot (2006; 2007) and Mattern (2001; 2005) claim is the defining feature of a security community. The U.S.-Russian cooperative relationship remains intact, despite the ostensibly fundamental nature of the disagreement, where U.S. actions have threatened to ‘shake the foundations’ of global stability and international law according to the Russian government.
It is interesting to note Ivanov’s comment in the quotation above that there is ‘a different situation in the world’ when the journalist questioning him draws a comparison between the Cuban missile crisis and US-Russian disagreement over Iraq. This ‘different situation’ can only refer to the social aspect of the U.S.-Russian relationship because in material terms both the United States and Russia remain nuclear powers. Indeed, this is a point explicitly made by Putin following the 2003 invasion: ‘the United States and Russia are the biggest nuclear powers in the world and we bear a special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace’ (Putin, 4 April 2003). Ivanov’s comment that the situation in the world is different refers to the fact that neither state poses a physical threat to the other despite both states continuing to possess nuclear weapons. To paraphrase Wendt’s dictum: America’s nuclear weapons mean something different to Russia (and vice versa), in 1998 than they meant in 1962. However, the assurances that America and Russia are friends who no longer pose a physical threat to one another, while claiming that as the two largest nuclear superpowers they are collectively responsible for maintaining stability in the international system, reveals something of a paradox. Ivanov maintains that the situation in the world is different to the situation that existed at the time of the Cuban missile crisis when the two superpowers maintained stability in the system through the threat of mutually assured destruction. It is unclear, then, why Putin refers to Russia and America’s joint responsibility as the world’s largest superpowers for maintaining stability in the system. There are two possible meanings that can be gleaned from Putin’s assertion. The first is that by acting in concert, America and Russia can effectively deal with any threats to global security because of their military capabilities; the second is that global security would be undermined if the United States and Russia were to feel threatened by one another’s nuclear weapons. The line separating security through cooperation and security through the threat of force is blurred.

The first meaning that Putin suggests (security through cooperation), is consistent with the Russian government’s commitment to multilateralism to resolve the crisis in Iraq, and in the international system in general. In the run-up to the 2003 invasion, Putin hails the French and German opposition to the prospect
of U.S. military intervention as an important step in the emergence of global multipolarity. Speaking about the joint declaration issued by France, Germany and Russia, calling for strengthened United Nations weapons inspections in Iraq aimed at peacefully disarming that country, Putin notes:

Yes, it deals with Iraq, a concrete problem. But I’d like to draw your attention to the fact that this is the first attempt since the Second World War to settle a serious and acute international issue, an acute crisis outside the regime of blocs. [...] I think such a document is the first brick in the construction of the multipolar world [...] And I think that for this President Chirac deserves enormous, perhaps historic credit [...] It would, I think, be a big mistake if unilateral actions were taken outside the framework of international law.

(Putin, 12 February 2003)

In the end it transpired that the moment of historic import foreseen by Putin did not materialize, the invasion of Iraq was not averted, and in the succeeding years there was no sense that the unipolarity of the United States had been neutralised. The warning of committing a ‘big mistake’ did nothing to change the behaviour of the Bush administration in the same way that the warning of isolation did not lead to the Russian government ending its military strategy in Chechnya. In terms of Mattern’s theory of representational force, Putin’s strategy to threaten the subjectivity of the American state by positing the imminent invasion of Iraq as a threat to global stability is a complete failure. The United States is secure in its identity as the only superpower with the power to act unilaterally with impunity.

The second meaning in Putin’s reference to Russia and America’s responsibility for maintaining global stability as the world’s largest nuclear powers suggests that stability depends on Russia and America remaining ‘friends’, and not adversaries who might aim their nuclear missiles at one another. In this sense there is a hint of the realist power balancing of the Cold War era. However, it is a not a direct threat of possible nuclear war, it is a reminder of the threat that could be posed if the non-adversarial relationship between the United States and Russia were brought into question. The threat is not of mutually assured destruction (MAD); the threat is that the mutual hostility of the MAD regime might make a return to world politics. This is similar to the American policy of continued financial support for Russia despite its deficits in terms of democratic institutions and human rights in the resolution of the Chechen conflict. In the Chechen case, nurturing the cooperative nature of the relationship was deemed the best way to resolve the
problems that Russia faced, rather than risking ‘recreating the enemy’. Similarly, over the crisis concerning American unilateralism on Iraq, Russia decides that it is better to disagree and remain friends, rather than renounce the friendship, despite the seemingly fundamental nature of the disagreement.

4.3 Westphalian coexistence versus cooperative international society

Putin’s hope that a joint French and German stand against the war in Iraq would strengthen Russia’s position in fostering multipolarity in the international system appears naïve in retrospect. But it is a move that shows how Russia attempts to challenge the rules of the game structured by the United States. During the crisis over the disarmament of Iraq, Putin’s primary concern was the threat and eventual use of force by the United States to bring about regime change in a sovereign state. This concern must be seen from the perspective of the international attention that Russia had received and continued to receive over its conduct in Chechnya, and the fact that the transatlantic community continued to take a particularly keen interest in Russian domestic politics after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Putin reveals his frustration with repeated questions concerning the unrest in Chechnya, when he is asked about the prospect of a political solution to the conflict in an interview for French television:

We said it many times [...] We understand the concern of the public in our country and in Europe [...] I must say that in general we are opposed to any war, including the war in Chechnya. It is for this reason that we actually granted independence to Chechnya in 1996 [...] There is no war in the North Caucasus.

(Putin, 10 February 2003)

When Putin speaks of multipolarity, what he seems to refer to is a Westphalian coexistence between states, towards the pluralist end of Buzan’s spectrum, where interference in the domestic politics of sovereign states is off limits to the other states in the system. Concerning the agreement with France and Germany on the opposition to the war in Iraq, Putin notes: ‘I think that the members of the Western community are not only upholding their position on Iraq, but they are upholding their right to have a position of their own’ (Putin, 12 February 2003). It was the claim to an independent position in foreign policy, free from American interference, that Russia was attempting to carve out for itself by aligning itself with the players that wielded more power to change the rules of the game: ‘when
we express our opinion, even if it is different from that of others, it does not provoke such a stormy reaction as the opinion of the members of the Western community if they begin expressing their own opinion’, Putin argued (ibid.). As it turned out, the right of Germany and France to have a position of their own on Iraq amounted to relatively little in practice, and Russia was forced to retract its words of warning on the consequences of American unilateralism.

Speaking at the G-8 summit two weeks after the invasion of Iraq, Putin clarified his stance on the U.S. military intervention:

You know our position. It was not only consistent over the events in Iraq, but fairly tough. And the President of the United States could have behaved differently [...] He might have cancelled his visit to Petersburg. He might have done many other things in order to worsen Russian-American relations. But President Bush chose a different tactic, a different way. He behaved as a serious politician, as a person who is willing to promote relations with Russia and the whole world.

(Putin, 3 June 2003)

By taking the opportunity to commend President Bush for his statesmanlike behaviour, Putin reveals the fact that Russia must work with the United States, despite its disapproval of American unilateralism. Following Pouliot, the structure of the Russian-Atlantic security game does not allow Russia to define what threatens global stability. Putin had hoped that alongside Germany and France, Russia might be able to neutralise the unipolarity of the United States. In this sense Putin reveals that the only way that Russia can attempt to ‘have its own way’ in the international system is through cooperation with other states, which initially requires their acknowledgement of Russia as a legitimate player. Therefore, Russia is not in a position where it can pursue the idea of Westphalian multipolarity at the pluralist end of Buzan’s spectrum, which would mean coexistence on the basis of territorial sovereignty and minimal interest in the domestic affairs of other states. This is because to employ diplomatic means in an attempt to ‘get its way’ requires recognition by other states in the system. Indeed there is evidence of Russia playing by the rules of the game in the interview Putin gave to TV-3. Although he betrays a certain reluctance in facing repeated questions on the Chechen issue, Putin admits that he ‘understands’ the concern in Europe. Maintaining a relationship with the United States is also necessary if Russia wants to continue diplomatic efforts to foster its goal of multipolarity in the international system and
less interference from the U.S. in pursuing its foreign policy interests. Following the invasion of Iraq, Russia continued in its attempt to position itself as an actor whom the United States would view as a legitimate player in world politics. This was the only feasible strategy if Russia was to achieve its diplomatic goals. But in pursuing its goals, Russia had to act cooperatively, and cooperation meant accepting the rules of the game as defined by the United States.

The War on Terror presented as an opportunity for Russia to position itself in such a way so that the United States could not refute Russia’s legitimacy if it did not want to bring its own legitimacy into question. In focusing on the increased threat of terror that the war in Iraq portended, Russia deployed what Mattern has called ‘representational force’ to threaten the subjectivity of the United States as a state fighting terror in an appropriate manner. Following the invasion of Iraq, Ivanov notes:

[...] we believe that if somebody has made a mistake, it doesn't mean that the mistake should separate us forever. We are ready – and we have said it after the war – we are ready to cooperate, to interact within the UN, within international law in search of a solution to the problem because it threatens everyone. It threatens not only the US, it also threatens us. Because Iraq, if the situation develops as it is developing, may well become a centre of international terrorism, a spawning ground, if you like, for international terrorism.

(Ivanov, 10 November 2003)

In this fragment Ivanov attempts to highlight the interdependence of U.S. and Russian security. Ivanov states that Russia will cooperate with the United Nations in order to aid recovery in Iraq following the invasion and help establish a government with the authority to prevent Iraq turning into a ‘centre of international terrorism’. In a similar way to Putin who commended Bush for not snubbing Russia over its criticism of American action in Iraq, Ivanov attempts to represent Russia as a responsible and reliable partner in world politics, who is able to forgive the errors of the United States in the name of global stability. By casting terror in Iraq as a question that must be dealt with within the framework of the United Nations, Ivanov tries to force the United States into a position where it would be denying its commitment to the War on Terror if it were to act independently of the UN or outside the jurisdiction of international law. This deployment of representational force threatens the legitimacy of United States’ response to the War on Terror. However, as argued in the previous chapter, the
United State’s abundant stocks of symbolic (as well as military and economic) capital, allowed it to define the war on terror as ‘a different kind of war’, giving it scope to act unilaterally meaning that it was not threatened by Russia’s attempts to discursively challenge its legitimacy as an actor.

Russian criticism of U.S. conduct did not abate for the duration of the crisis concerning the disarmament of Iraq, and it was frequently delivered in the sharpest tones. Iraq is cited as an example of America’s neo-imperialistic behaviour, which came to a peak at the time of the war in Kosovo:

Yesterday this was Iraq, today this is Yugoslavia, who is next? Regardless of what arguments are now used by the American strategists to justify these actions, their true aims are obvious – to impose on the world the political, military, economic diktat of the United States, to establish in the 21st century such a unipolar world order in conditions of which the destinies of nations will be decided in Washington.

(Ivanov, 26 March 1999)

Ivanov words are little short of a declaration of war against the imperialist expansionism of the United States, but it transpires that they amount to little more than an outpouring of frustration. Ivanov does not have a plan to strike back against the United States, and neither is he able to give an answer on how Russia will respond to the actions of the United States. Instead, he highlights what he perceives to be the flawed logic of the United States’ move that has brought with it regional instability, and moved the situation further away from a resolution. He continues:

I would start by rewording your question before answering it. I am asking my colleagues precisely what you have asked me just now, namely, Mrs. Albright and other foreign ministers: have you planned what to do next? Now you have delivered the first strike. They say: Milosevic will draw back. And I say: he is not drawing back […] They say: we deliver another strike. And I ask: what next? […] This is a precise rendition of the minutes of my conversation with my colleagues before the strikes against Iraq. The situation was precisely like that. So, where are we today on the Iraqi problem? Are we closer to our goal or are we farther from it? We are farther from it, as every sane and normal politician realizes. And today we do not know what to do next, how to implement the Security Council resolutions on Iraq.

(Ivanov, 26 March 1999)

Ivanov’s reversal of the question to rhetorically expound the flawed logic of the U.S. bombing of Iraq in 1998 reveals frustration more than anything else: frustration at the disruptive actions of the United States and frustration that Russia can only respond through continued cooperation with the United States. It is an
anger that betrays a sense that Russia can do nothing but help to clean up the mess made by the U.S. Ivanov’s choice of ‘sane and normal’ to describe the character of politicians who opposed the bombing of Iraq seems to disclose a certain disbelief in what the American government has done. Ivanov refers to ‘normality’ on more than one occasion. When answering questions on whether he thinks America will renounce its unilateralist bent in foreign policy in the months following the invasion of Iraq, Ivanov comments:

I think complicated internal confrontation continues in Washington between those who favor a unilateral foreign policy and those who understand that in the present world even such a state as the U.S. which can afford to spend more than 400 billion dollars a year on military purposes, is unable to solve single-handed the problems that arise. We have seen this in Iraq.

(Ivanov, 5 December 2003)

Ivanov acknowledges that the American political community is divided over the interventionist behaviour of its government. A day after the invasion, he draws attention to Madeleine Albright’s comment that the invasion of Iraq was the first war in the history of the U.S. started in the absence of a direct threat (Ivanov, 21 March 2003). Ivanov represents American actions as contingent upon a narrow circle of interests and support. By showing that the reality brought into being by the Bush administration in Iraq is contested within American political circles, Ivanov questions the domestic sovereignty of Bush’s government in the same way that Yeltsin’s prospects of re-election were questioned by the Clinton administration before the 1996 presidential election. This illustrates that Russia is forced to play the game by American rules not only because of its failed deployment of representational force. The pattern of domination is somewhat reversed in Russia’s internalization of the institution of sovereignty in relation to the domestic authority of a liberal-democratic government. In its understanding that U.S. unilateralism may be questioned and criticized in American society, Russia gains credibility through its opposition to U.S. unilateralism and bellicosity. However, in upholding the norm that legitimate behaviour in international society relies on domestic sovereign legitimacy, Russia also moves away from the pluralist/Westphalian end of Buzan’s spectrum and moves towards the solidarist/cooperative end, where interest in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is a norm.
4.4 Sovereignty and the market

The interest that Ivanov takes in the domestic politics of the United States and the acknowledgement that political opinion over the policies of the government is divided is not necessarily surprising. However, the context in which he expresses this fact is interesting, and it demonstrates that the durability of the U.S.-Russian relationship relies on more than just the interaction between the executive branches of both governments. Ivanov seeks reassurance in the fact that the continuation of Bush’s policy on Iraq is contingent upon Bush being able to convince Congress and his electorate that it is a sensible policy. Ivanov demonstrates this manner of seeking reassurance about the durability of the US-Russian relationship by looking for plurality of opinion on another occasion when he is questioned on a report that a grouping of American senators were calling for Russia to be excluded from the G8:

This is not the first time such an initiative has been voiced. I find it hard to characterize the people who launch such initiatives. One has a feeling that they are totally out of touch with reality. One shouldn’t rule out such initiatives in the future. Society has many faces and many different people. But I think that things will never move beyond the propaganda phase.

(Ivanov, 5 December 2003)

In this example, Ivanov refers to those who would isolate Russia from the international community as ‘out of touch with reality’, and he remains confident that, although anything is possible, the majority of those in ‘society’ are in touch with the reality that Russia is a legitimate member of the G8 and a reliable partner of the United States. This demonstrates an awareness that Russia’s legitimacy as an actor in the international system is not decided within the confines of the American government, or the American congress. The fact that Russia is one of the eight largest economies in the world is evidence alone that Russia is a site of interest for a host of actors – state, non-state and transnational, – and that its legitimacy as a global actor cannot be decided by the United States alone.

The Iraq crisis demonstrates that the Russian government sought justification for its criticism of U.S. policy in the plurality of political opinion that existed in the United States. By questioning the legitimacy of the United States’ action in Iraq, Russia was not bringing the foundation of the U.S.-Russian relationship into question. The foundation of the U.S.-Russian relationship is precisely the fact that
the two states can disagree with each other without the threat of nuclear war. This is what the actors themselves maintain, and this is what can be seen by applying Pouliot and Mattern’s theory of force as a constituent element holding security communities together. In an interview following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Putin is asked to elaborate on a remark that he made in which he stated that he was not interested in ‘the political and moral defeat of the U.S.’ He explains that the nature of the global economy is such that a poor economic situation in America would have adverse effects on the Russian economy, which is particularly reliant on the stability of the dollar:

As for the economic sphere, everything is fairly simple and, in my view, is understandable even for ordinary Russian citizens. First, the US is our major trade and economic partner [...] If we imagine that the rate of the US dollar starts falling relative to other key national currencies in the world, this would directly affect Russia [...] The Central Bank keeps three-quarters of its currency reserves in US dollars. If we imagine that the rate will change in a way that is unfavourable for the dollar then the Central Bank of the Russian Federation will suffer direct losses. The same would apply to the savings of Russian citizens who, as we know, keep part of their savings in US dollars.

(Putin, 4 April 2003)

It is interesting to note that Putin refers to Russia’s dependence on America as ‘simple’ and ‘understandable even for ordinary Russian citizens’, whose livelihood depends on the strength of the American economy. It is telling that when it comes to a consideration of the economic sphere, it is the ‘ordinary Russian citizens’ that Putin has at the forefront of his mind, knowing that the legitimacy of the government depends on providing economic security for its people. However, Putin is not quite able to articulate the interdependence of the political and economic spheres as successive U.S. governments did in the period from 1994 to 2005, in justifying their foreign policy to open up societies and markets in order to spread prosperity and peace. His response to the journalist’s question is structured around two distinct reasons for cooperation with the United States: political and economic, as though it were possible to separate the two. In the extract that follows, Putin is forced to express the incoherence of such an argument, revealing the centrality of the tension between Russia’s desire to pursue its foreign policy free from interference from the United States and the dependence of the Russian state on the strength of the American economy:

A highly relevant task for us is to change the proportions between different sectors of the Russian economy [...] that would be difficult to accomplish without bringing in modern American technologies and investments [...] At the same time – and I would like to make a note of it – in our bilateral relations we will proceed from the general...
principles of building the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, proceeding from the need to strengthen the foundations of international law, and the system of international security with the UN at its centre. If, in respect of the Iraq crisis, the first and the second considerations appear to contradict each other, I am sure that in the final analysis principled work in this direction – on a bilateral and multilateral basis – has a good prospect. Because not only Russia but an overwhelming majority of countries are interested in such a structure of foreign policy. In the final analysis it would benefit the United States.

(Putin, 4 April 2003)

The reliance of Russia on America in the economic sphere is a point that highlights the tension between the norms relating to the institutions of sovereignty and the market as discussed in Chapter 2. While Russia may want to pursue an independent foreign policy, it also has to factor in its economic dependence on the United States. Without America’s support (or indeed America’s continuing global economic dominance, as Putin seems to suggest), the Russian government’s legitimacy will be threatened because Russian citizens may lose their livelihoods. In order to reap the benefits of American economic support, Russia must open up its borders to the American-dominated market. And as Buzan writes, the market is more than just trade: it also defines how states define and constitute themselves and what kind of other actors they give standing to. In short, it leads to a reinterpretation of sovereignty and territoriality (Buzan 2004:194). The tension that appears between Russia’s desire to see a Westphalian system prevail in international politics and its reliance on the market and American economic support can be explained by the ascendance of the market as the primary institution of international politics, as predicted by Buzan. Putin is unable to resolve the tension between Russia’s desire for an independent foreign policy and the need to rely on the U.S. for support in the economic sphere to protect the livelihoods of ‘ordinary Russian citizens’ and, ultimately, his legitimacy as President.

4.5 Conclusion

This case has demonstrated that the crisis over the disarmament of Iraq provoked two consistent responses from Russia regarding the conduct the United States. The first was a frustration with the counter-productive nature of the U.S. threat of force to depose Saddam Hussein. The Russian government believed that the resulting invasion in March 2003 did not contribute to stability in the region. On the
contrary, it only served to undermine the prospect of lasting peace. The second concern was with American unilateralism more broadly. Throughout the period under discussion, Russia consistently argued a case for a multipolar world order, which would curb the propensity of the United States to act independently of international consensus and outside the framework of international law.

Mattern argues that representational force is evidence of a thriving security community. When states are able to disagree and still maintain diplomatic relations it means that they share the same norms and values at a deeper level. What was seen in the period between 1994 and 2005 were a series of deployments of representational force aimed at the United States by Putin and Ivanov, which ultimately failed. This was due to the fact that America controlled the stocks of symbolic capital, which structured the norms and institutions governing the relationship between Russia and the United States. This lead to a situation where Russia took its own threats and recast them in order to demonstrate its commitment to continued cooperation with the United States. This was necessary in order to preserve the non-adversarial relationship between the United States and Russia, and prevent a return to the regime of nuclear deterrence. This was the case following the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, when Putin commended Bush’s statesmanlike behaviour in accepting Russia’s criticism with grace. This demonstrated that Russia valued the non-adversarial relationship with the United States more than it disapproved of U.S. unilateralism in Iraq.

However, although Russia has internalised the institution of diplomacy which foregrounds the soft approach of representational force and relegates the physical threat of the balance of power to the background, a tension emerged between this more cooperative form of interstate interaction and Russia’s desire to pursue an independent foreign policy free from external scrutiny. Ivanov employed a similar tactic in highlighting the fact that American political opinion was divided over the question of Iraq and Bush’s unilateralism as a justification for his criticism of Bush’s policies. But in pointing to the plurality of political opinion in America, and suggesting that it was a check on the wayward unilateralism of the executive, Ivanov was effectively countering the claim made previously that America was a
neo-imperialist bully. On the contrary, America was positioned as a healthy democracy where political opinion was divided, and where there were many people who disagreed with the United States’ unilateralist approach to foreign policy.

Therefore, the apparently fundamental disagreement concerning how the relations between states should be organised did not lead to a breakdown in the relationship between the United States and Russia. What emerged is a mode of cooperation between Russia and the United States in which Russia forced itself to renounce its commitment to the multipolarity that it has been attempting to advance. This demonstrates that it had to a certain degree internalised a less Westphalian and more cooperative understanding of the institution of sovereignty. Rather than adhering to a worldview based on the sanctity of territorial sovereignty and non-interference in the domestic affairs of the other great powers in the multipolar system (a Westphalian type of sovereignty at the pluralist end of Buzan’s spectrum), Russia had no choice but to accept the rules of the game as they were shaped by the United States if it did not want to see a return to the regime of nuclear deterrence. This was also necessary if Russia wanted to receive the support in the economic sphere that it required in order to integrate itself into the global market. Therefore, Russia was seen to ‘get its way’ regarding the promised benefits of the market in material terms, but it was forced to accept the opening of its borders to external interference if it was to receive these benefits. However, the opening of domestic sovereign borders was also a potential check on the dominance of the United States in terms of its status as the player wielding the most social and symbolic capital. Although Russia could not compete with the U.S. in the economic sphere, it achieved its diplomatic goals to a certain extent in terms of successfully aligning itself with other voices critical of the Bush administration and its conduct in Iraq. This demonstrated a tension between adherence to the more cooperative norm of interstate society, which understood that a challenge could be posed to the domestic sovereignty of the Bush government together with other state and non-state actors, while simultaneously wanting to close its own borders to international scrutiny.
5. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

In this study I have examined a period in the recent history of Russia and the United States (1994-2005), and looked at two periods of crisis, one from each perspective, in order to understand how peace was maintained. Diplomacy was defined as ‘the art of letting someone have your way’, so in my case studies of Chechnya and Iraq, I sought to uncover what Russia and the United States ‘wanted,’ and how peace was maintained despite each failing to get their way.

From the American perspective, the crisis over the conflicts in Chechnya meant, first and foremost, ensuring the stability of the Russian state, and reducing the likelihood that the conflict might disintegrate into a wider regional war with the potential to entangle the United States in military combat. An end to the conflict in Chechnya also promised better prospects for the deepening of democratic and economic reform in Russia, bringing with it an open market with which to trade, and the potential to mitigate future security risks through the liberal promise of peace and prosperity.

Although Yeltsin was re-elected and ostensibly continued with his programme of democratic and economic reforms, this liberal brand of ‘Americanization’ that emerged during Clinton’s administration did not achieve its goals. A second conflict broke out in Chechnya, standards of human rights and democracy did not improve and the Russian state increasingly began to concentrate more power in the hands of the executive. This coincided with the emergence of the realist brand of ‘Americanization’, which, after the events of 9/11 began to pursue its realist modus operandi with vigour. The War on Terror waged by the Bush administration meant that some scope was given to Russia in its desire to use force to combat terror in Chechnya. Although terrorists had to be carefully separated from those with legitimate political grievances, force was deemed appropriate when it was targeted at those correctly identified as international terrorists.
In the crisis over the disarmament of Iraq, Russia’s ‘way’ was to curb America’s propensity to act unilaterally outside the strictures of international law. Not only did Russia feel that the threat (and eventual use) of force was counterproductive to achieving peace in Iraq and the wider region, it also felt that America’s bellicosity and disregard for international consensus set a dangerous precedent. There is no ambiguity in the degree to which Russia failed to have its own way over the Iraq crisis, but what is interesting to note from the failure, is the immediate re-establishment of a positive relationship with the United States based on a more solidarist form of interstate cooperation than the pluralist coexistence that Russia had sought.

Risse (2004) writes that security communities consist of three I’s: identity, economic interdependence and institutions. A security community is well developed when the members share common values through their collective identity, are economically interdependent and share the same institutions. This thesis began with the premise that Russia and the United States do not share a collective identity. However, there are dynamics of a nascent security community present in the relationship and therefore the relationship between the two states invites further study. Since identity, interdependence and institutions are not mutually exclusive and all three are co-constituted in a confluence of power and knowledge, it is not easy to pull them apart in order to understand what exactly maintains the peaceful relationship between Russia and the United States, or what might be preventing the relationship from developing into a more ‘mature’ security community. The purpose of the study was to ascertain these factors.

Based on my analysis of the case studies concerning the crises in Iraq and Chechnya, I am able to conclude that there is certainly a degree of economic interdependence in the relationship, just as there are common institutions. True to my initial assumption that the quality of international society between the United States and Russia lies somewhere between coexistence and cooperation on Buzan’s pluralist-solidarist spectrum, I found that tensions exist between the four key institutions shaping the dynamics of the U.S-Russian relationship: diplomacy, power balancing, sovereignty and the market. This suggests that the balance of
power is declining as an institution in favour of ‘soft power’ diplomacy, and the market is ascending and posing a challenge to sovereignty. I will now present my findings on the manner in which each institution shapes the relationship, in order to point to a possible way forward to prevent future crises, or to resolve existing ones.

The United States engaged in diplomacy with Russia with the aim of finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Chechnya. But in terms of the U.S.-Russian relationship, diplomacy meant a lot more than reaching an agreement between Moscow and the Chechen separatists. U.S. diplomacy on the Chechen issue involved soft power in terms of financial assistance and other forms of aid to develop democratic institutions in Russia, but it also entailed Janice Bially Mattern’s concept of not-so-soft-power (Mattern 2005). The principle is the same as representational force: the attempt by one actor to discursively threaten the subjectivity of another. In their diplomatic discourse directed at Russia, Clinton and Albright made frequent references to Russia’s past, stating their fear that the conflict might lead to a regression towards the aggressive and hostile Russia of the Cold War era. Even when the tone was not directly critical and intended to justify continued support for Russia, despite its failings in standards of human and civil rights, the discourse was always framed in terms of transforming Russia’s identity: noting what Russia had been (an authoritarian state), and what it could become (a liberal democracy).

Taking into account Russia’s weaker position in terms of its ability to determine the content of norms and institutions (as argued by Neumann and Williams 2000; Haukkala 2008; Pouliot 2010), it is not surprising that Russia practiced diplomacy in a different way. In the crisis concerning the disarmament of Iraq, Russia wanted to pursue would could be termed a more Westphalian form of diplomacy, as opposed to a newer tendency, which Primakov observes, to impose sanctions rather than engage in dialogue: ‘in recent years a kind of sanction syndrome has manifested itself in international relations,’ he notes (Primakov, 10 September 1998). Russian actors understood that they did not wield the cultural/symbolic capital necessary to challenge the behaviour of the United States, and Putin openly
admitted this when he pointed to the historic import of France’s and Germany’s stand against the United States over Iraq, noting that when Russia expresses its opinion ‘it does not provoke such a stormy reaction as the opinion of the members of the Western community’ (Putin, 12 February 2003). Knowing that it cannot influence the rules of the game, Russia would rather inhabit a world where everyone plays by a predetermined and mutually agreed-upon set of rules, rather than enduring the uncertainty that it might one day be challenged by the dominant player in the field according to a new set of rules.

If Russia were trying to shape the institution of diplomacy in a Westphalian, coexistence-society mode, then one might expect a similar approach to power balancing. However, throughout the Iraq crisis there is a recurring assertion that the ‘situation in the world’ is different to what it was when the nuclear deterrence regime governed the relationship between Russia and the United States. Clinton voices a similar commitment at the time of the first Chechen conflict, when he hails the opportunities for fruitful partnership between Russia and the United States, on the grounds that they no longer have their nuclear missiles aimed at one another. During the period of the Bush administration there is a hint of the physical threat that both Russia and the United States could potentially pose to one another, but it is cast in a spirit of cooperation. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003 Putin notes that the United States and Russia have the responsibility to maintain order as the largest nuclear powers, and earlier, in October 2002, Powell noted that despite Moscow’s disapproval of Washington pulling out of the ABM Treaty: ‘no new arms race began’ (Powell, 3 October 2002). While Russia and America may clash over the institution of diplomacy, power balancing seems to recede in the cases under examination.

In my case studies of the Chechen and Iraqi crises, the institutions of sovereignty and the market are intimately connected, in a similar way to the institutions of diplomacy and the balance of power. The aim of the Russian state is to integrate its economy into the global economy and for this it relies on the United States. This does not present itself as a direct cause of tension between the two states but it does inform how Russia defines its statehood. Following the invasion
of Iraq, Putin admits that despite his criticism of America’s unilateralist approach, Russia would never hope for a ‘political or moral’ defeat of the United States because of the reliance of the Russian economy on the American economy. In referring to ‘ordinary Russians’ who hold their savings in U.S. dollars, Putin highlights the direct link between the stability of the American market and his domestic legitimacy.

Because of its economic dominance, the United States has little to fear from Russia in terms of how it shapes the institution of the market, and Russia is generally willing to accept the dominant role of the United States in governing the rules of the market as it shapes the U.S.-Russian relationship. In citing the closeness of the U.S.-Russian partnership in permitting the two states to resolve the ‘thorny issues’ such as those related to the Chechen conflict, Bush is able to brush off the occasional protectionism that emerges, which can be attributed to the resurgence of norms of nationalism and sovereignty as they come into conflict with the ascendance of the market. Bush quips: ‘Fortunately, we’re arguing over chickens and not over war, over chickens and not over missiles, like we used to,’ in reference to a Russian ban on imports of American chicken (Bush, 12 July 2002). Again, the relationship between Russia and the U.S. is framed in terms of allowing for disagreements because of the confidence that these disagreements will not lead to war.

Ultimately, the tensions that emerge between the institutions of sovereignty and the market are not formed in the context of the U.S.-Russian relationship alone. While diplomacy and the balance of power are shaped to a greater degree by the interactions between Russia and the United States, the institution of the market is shaped by a multiplicity of actors: state, non-state and transnational. Diplomacy and the balance of power tend to be shaped in the closer confines of the interactions of state actors (Pouliot’s (2010) study of the NATO-Russia council is one such example). It is also in the context of diplomacy that attempts to discursively fix shared values occur, where the dominant actor has the opportunity to rhetorically construct or challenge the identity of the other. This was seen during the first Chechen war, when American actors repeatedly articulated their
understanding of what they thought Russia should be, and what they thought it must not become. It is this attempt to shape shared values that causes most tension in the U.S.-Russian relationship in the cases examined. Risse (2004) argues that a security community forms when actors share identity, economic interdependence and institutions. By honing in on Russia’s identity, it seems that American state actors in the period 1994-2005 create the most tensions. It would seem much better to focus on those interactions, which relate to material interdependence such as developing U.S.-Russian commerce, or knowledge-based projects such as joint scientific research programmes, and let the development of ‘we-feeling’ take care of itself.
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