Abstract

This thesis aims to analyze why and how did the Israeli-Palestinian conflict influence the Union for the Mediterranean in the first three years of its existence. The new organization was meant to provide a fresh impulse to the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, by focusing on pragmatic co-operation and newly introducing a concept of co-ownership and institutionalization. However, the initial thought of achieving the pragmatic cooperation through greater political engagement and visibility soon proved fatally wrong, with the Gaza war and its aftermaths. The first part briefly describes a history of EU policies towards Mediterranean, Barcelona Process and European Neighbourhood Policy. It also presents the attitude of all main actors – European states, Arab states and Israel – to the idea of regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. Second part introduces the Union for the Mediterranean and points out weak points of its structure, using the analysis of founding declarations from Paris and Marseille. The last, third chapter, uses the chronology of Israeli-Palestinian conflict to analyze its effects on the UfM structure. General conclusion of this thesis is that the structure, as agreed in 2008, was not able to deal with growing tensions between member states. On the contrary, it created a platform for the southern states to voice their dissatisfaction with the situation in Palestine.