

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STUDIES

MASTERS THESIS

**Analysis of 2010 mass mobilization in
Kyrgyzstan: *causes and driving forces***

Author: **Asia Sherniazova**
Supervisor: **Prof. Slavomir Horák, Ph.D.**
Academic Year: **2012/2013**
Date Submitted: **31. July 2013**

THESIS PROJECT

REFERENCE

Institute of Political Studies
Faculty of Social Sciences
Charles University in Prague

Program: International Economic and Political Studies

Thesis Title: Analysis of 2010 mass mobilization in Kyrgyzstan: causes and driving forces

Supervisor: Prof. Slavomir Horák Ph.D. _____

Student: Asia Sherniazova

Date: 23. October 2012

Topic Characteristics:

My thesis will investigate the pre-Revolutionary political situation in Kyrgyzstan and determine possible causes of mass uprising in Talas, April 7, 2010. The significance of the study lies in the research strategy that offers unique contributions to political science as a whole. The study and analysis of the issue will be based on testimonies of direct participants of that outbreak and the consequent revolution.

My thesis will be divided in two parts. In the first theoretical part of my work I will give an overview of the existing theories of revolution. In the empirical part of my thesis I will try to critically analyze the pre-revolutionary political, economic, social situation in Kyrgyzstan and determine possible causes of outbreak in Talas.

The aim of the project is seeing things from participant's viewpoint – political crisis in the country, the growing public dissatisfaction and the eventual outbreak, but at the same time trying to be utterly unbiased in estimation of bygone events. The main agents of the conflict are the leaders of opposition which eventually established an interim government headed by Roza Otunbayeva and the former Kyrgyz president Bakiyev's administration.

Analyzing the collected data I will try to verify the validity of the foregoing theories of revolution. I am going to use data from interviews with direct participants, NGO (Non Governmental Organization) representatives and human right activists, political observers, from political magazines and official Kyrgyz government web sources.

Working Hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1: The nature of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan: the Kyrgyz turmoil was another color revolution;

Hypothesis #2: The geopolitics in Central Asia: role of world and regional powers in political instability in Kyrgyzstan;

Hypothesis #3: The criminal and corrupt activities of Bakiyev, some of his relevance and members of his administration caused mass uprising in Talas, April 7, 2010;

Hypothesis #4: Kyrgyz clanism as a reason for the mass uprising in Talas, April 7, 2010.

Methodology:

In my project I will use qualitative data collection tools, which are:

1. Document (archival) studies. The document study involves the analysis of any written material, which contains information on the subject being studied.
2. Interview. The interview method is useful to obtain the detailed information about personal feelings, perception and opinions, and is a very good technique for getting the information about the complex, emotionally laden subjects. Data collected by this method is likely to be more correct compared to the other methods that are used for the data collection.

Outline:

Introduction

1. Theoretical background and the review of world literature
 - 1.1 The color revolution phenomenon
2. Kyrgyzstan as a geopolitical pivot – configuration of international powers
 - 2.1 Russian versus American military presence in Kyrgyzstan
 - 2.2 Conflict of interests between China, Russia and the US
 - 2.3 Influence of neighboring countries: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan
3. Pre-revolutionary Kyrgyzstan's economic and social situation
 - 3.1 The rule of Bakiyev's administration on the eve of revolution

4. National identity – clanism

4.1 North-South Separation

Conclusions

References / Bibliography:

Dukenbaev, A., Hansen, W.W., 2003, Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan, Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus Department of International and Comparative Politics,

American University – Central Asia, DEMSTAR Research Report No. 16. Available at: <http://www.demstar.dk/papers/UPKyrgyzstan.pdf>

Freeman, M., 1972., Theories of Revolution., British Journal of Political Science, Vol.2, No.3 (Jul., 1972), pp. 339-359. Abstract only. Available at: www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/193601

Friedrich, J. Carl., 2007., An Introductory Note on Revolution. In: Friedrich, J.Carl. ed. 2007., Revolution. Aldine Transaction, 2007., pp. 3-10. Available at: http://books.google.cz/books?id=XpIn5TedUykC&printsec=frontcover&hl=cs&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false

Horak, S., 2010., Predposledni faze zhroucení Kyrgyzstanu?, Mezinárodní politika, ročník 34, č. 8 (srpen 2010), s. 41-43. ISSN 0543-7962., Available at: <http://www.slavomirhorak.net/news/kyrgyzstan-mp201008/>

Kraminick, I., 1972., Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship., History and Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1972), pp. 26-63, Abstract only. Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504623>

Poliannikov, T., Prokopov, G., 2005., Sindrom “tsvetnyh revolutsiy”., Svobodnaja mysl XXI., 2005. № 6. Available at: <http://polit.ru/article/2005/06/07/sindrom/print/>

Stone, L., 1966., Theories of Revolution., World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (jan., 1966), pp. 159-176, Abstract only. Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009694>

Zhunusov, S., 2010, “Gosudarstvennyi perevorot v Kyrgyzstane: prichiny, sledstvija, uroki”, Open Online newspaper: Forum.msk.ru. Available at: <http://forum-msk.org/material/fpolitic/2908467.html>

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that I have written this thesis on my own and that all the quotations and sources are duly marked in the text. I cite all background materials and literature in the bibliography. I also state that this thesis has not been used to obtain a different or the same degree.

In Prague, July 31, 2013

Signature

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Here I would like to express my thanks to this Masters Thesis Supervisor Prof. Slavomir Horák Ph.D. for expert assistance with the elaboration of the submitted work.

Table of Contents

Abstract	10
Anotace.....	11
Introduction	12
Thesis Disposition	16
1. Perspectives on April Events.....	18
2. Context of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan.....	22
2.1 Political Instability.....	22
2.2 Compound Disaster	23
2.3 Economic Factors	27
2.4 Political Repressions.....	29
3. Analysis of informal institutions in Kyrgyzstan	32
3.1 Tribalism in Kyrgyz Society.....	32
3.2 Fight with tribalism during the Soviet Union regime.....	38
3.3 Functioning of tribalism principles in contemporary Kyrgyzstan.....	40
3.4 Theoretical Considerations	43
3.5 Never Enough Power – Bakiyev’s Clan	46
3.6 Mass Mobilization	52
Conclusion.....	58
Bibliography.....	61
Appendices	70

Abstract

Kyrgyzstan is the only country in the region that has experienced two violent changes of regime since proclaiming its independence in 1991. The first regime overthrow was in 2005 and the second, which is the subject of this study, occurred in 2010.

The actual purpose of the paper was to study the background of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan: economical, socio-political situation, and activities of Bakiyev's clan that probably precipitated the grievance in Kyrgyz society and led to mass mobilization. There have been suggestions that a specific phenomenon in the structure of Kyrgyz society called tribalism served as a push for mass mobilization in Talas.

Since Kyrgyzstan with its geographical location plays an important role in Central Asia, the events in the country in 2005 as well as in 2010, are of great importance for neighboring countries, mainly for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. In addition, Kyrgyzstan is in the zone of influence of some foreign powers – China, Russia, the US and the members of the European Union (EU).

The dynamics and contradictions of domestic political and social environment that caused mass mobilization in April 2010 will be disclosed in this paper.

Anotace

Kyrgyzstán je jedinou zemí v regionu, která zažila dvě drsné změny režimu od okamžiku vyhlášení nezávislosti v roce 1991. První svrnutí režimu se odehrálo v roce 2005 a druhé, které je předmětem této studie, se konalo v roce 2010.

Skutečným cílem této práce bylo prozkoumat pozadí dubnových událostí 2010 v Kyrgyzstánu: ekonomickou, socio-politickou situaci a činnost klanu Bakijevových, která pravděpodobně vyvolala rozhořčení v Kyrgyzské společnosti a přivedla k masové mobilizaci. Existují názory, že kmenový systém jako specifický fenomén ve struktuře Kyrgyzské společnosti vynutil masovou mobilizaci v Talasu.

Jelikož Kyrgyzstán díky své zeměpisné poloze hraje důležitou roli ve Střední Asii, události v zemi jak z roku 2005, tak i 2010, měly obrovský vliv na sousední státy, především na Kazachstán a Uzbekistán. Navíc, Kyrgyzstán se nachází v zóně vlivu několika zahraničních mocí – Číny, Ruska, Spojených Států a členů Evropské Unie (EU).

Dynamika a rozpor místního politického a sociálního prostředí, která vyvolala masovou mobilizaci v dubnu roku 2010, bude odhalena v této práci.

Introduction

Kyrgyzstan is a young Central Asian country that became independent not so long ago.¹ The country shares a border with China, the Central Asian state's main trading partner. It is also bordered to its north by oil-rich Kazakhstan, on the West by Uzbekistan and on the South by Tajikistan. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan overlaps the politically explosive resource-rich area known as the Ferghana Valley, a multinational ethnic and political friction zone located also in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. It is chiefly known to the world as the stage of two forceful regime changes in the space of five years.²

In April 2010, the former President of Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev fled Bishkek to the south of the country after clashes in the center of Bishkek when security forces ruled by Bakiyev first used smoke bombs and tear-gas, and then the weapons (Abdirasulova, et.al., 2010). In the April events of 2010 88 people were killed, while more than 1000 injured (Lycyuk, 2011). Then a provisional government was formed headed by Roza Otunbayeva, which deprived him of presidential power.³ Bakiyev fled to Kazakhstan and after to Belarus, where tendered his resignation, which he subsequently denied (Lenta.ru, n.d.).

Since Kyrgyzstan with its geographical location plays an important role in Central Asia, the events in the country in 2005 as well as in 2010, are of great importance for neighboring countries, mainly for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.⁴

The political regime in those two countries is neither characterized by a high degree of democracy. The neighboring China also monitors the situation in Kyrgyzstan because of its geopolitical, territorial and economic interest in the country. In addition, Kyrgyzstan is in the zone of influence of some foreign powers – Russia, the US and the members of the European Union (EU). The presence of military facilities of more than one country (Russia and the USA) in Kyrgyzstan characterizes the pursuit of Kyrgyzstan to conduct a versatile foreign policy that

¹ In October 1991, Akayev was elected president of the new independent Republic, receiving 95 percent of the votes cast. On 21 December 1991, Kyrgyzstan joined with the other four Central Asian Republics to formally enter the new Commonwealth of Independent States. Kyrgyzstan gained full independence a few days later on 25 December 1991. The following day, 26 December 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

² “Tulip Revolution” of 2005, April Revolution of 2010.

³ The President of the Kyrgyz Republic in transition period from May 2010 to December 2011 was the head of the interim government from April to December 2010.

⁴ Unlike Kyrgyzstan, the presidents of these countries, Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov, respectively rule their countries from the moment of claiming independence in 1991.

takes into account the balance of forces in the world.⁵ Here, one wonders: does it pay off to have these countries around? Does their presence come up to conflict of interests within Kyrgyzstan? What is their impact on the internal situation in the country? A study of interaction of internal and external factors is an important element in analyzing the causes of mass mobilization in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. The dynamics and contradictions of domestic political and social environment that caused mass mobilization in April 2010 will be disclosed in this paper.

Relevance of the topic being researched is determined by the fact that nearly three years have passed since the tragic April events, though the public did not get any objective international assessment of what actually happened in April 2010. Meanwhile, what happened in Kyrgyzstan requires detailed analysis, since it has considerable political and historical significance.

The main purpose of this paper is to study internal factors which served as a prerequisite for the increasing discontent of the people and the general tension in the country. Another goal is to analyze possible circumstances that led to mass mobilization in April 2010 in the town of Talas, and in the rest of the country later on.

Mobilization is here understood as “...the process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective action. The major issues, therefore, are the resources controlled by the group prior to mobilization efforts, the process by which the group pools resources and directs these towards social change, and the extent to which outsiders increase the pool of resources” (Jenkins, 1983, p.532-533).

In order to achieve the papers’ goals we need to introduce certain hypotheses:

Hypothesis #1: The criminal and corrupt activities of Bakiyev’s clan caused mass mobilization in April 2010;

Hypothesis #2: Tribalism in Kyrgyz society was a reason for the mass mobilization in Talas, April 7, 2010.

The object of the research includes economical, social, and political situation in the country, precipitated the April events 2010. It will also study the influence of such phenomena as clanism,

⁵ Transit Center at Manas is a US military installation at Manas International Airport, near Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan., Kant Air Base is a Russian military base, located in the city of Kant, some 20 km east of Bishkek.

nepotism, tribalism and regionalism on interregional conflicts and society as a whole. They all have traditionally played an important role in the political life of Kyrgyzstan.

Theoretical basis of the thesis are works of scholars, specializing on the Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and the study of social movements, theory of groups and the logic of collective action, theory of organizations and incentive systems; specifically John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, Mancur Olson, J. Craig Jenkins, Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso, Bob Edwards and Patrick F. Gillham.

An important source of political instability in the Kyrgyz society is tribalism: the fight for power and property. The importance of these informal relationships should not be underestimated. Informal institutions (tribes and political clans) are an integral part of Kyrgyz social structure and have a major influence on the political and social situation in the country. The study of this phenomenon will be based on “The logic of collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups” by Mancur Olson and “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations” by Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson.

In this paper, tribes and political clans will be treated as a group of individuals with common interests, who are trying to bring to life these shared interests. It is quite useful to consider these groups in terms of traditional group theory, which is divided into formal and causal. It is assumed that such groups will act in their own interests with the same aspiration as some individuals act in their own interests. In fact, as long as there is no compulsion or motivation, rational individuals will not make any effort in order to achieve common group goals.

Nevertheless, economic motivation is not the only type of motivation. With the absence of any economic motivation to participate in the achievement of group goals, an individual may have a certain social motivation (social status, personal recognition, respect, identification). Social motivation (penalties or awards) can be used to mobilize the large group. The nature of social motives suggests that they have different effects on different individuals. Rebellious individual may be expelled and the individual involved in achievement of group goals may be escalated to the higher circles. Social motivation should be treated the same way as the financial motivation (Olson, 1971). The paper will apply the study “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations” written by Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, where clans will be analyzed in terms of different types of motivation: material incentives, solidary incentives and purposive incentives.

In order to understand the subject in the light of its earliest phases and subsequent evolution, the research is mainly based on the following works: “Tribalism and Development problems of Kyrgyzstan” by Djenish Djunushaliev and Vladimir Ploskih; “Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz republic” by Azamat Temirkulov; “Tribalism as a mirror of Kyrgyz politics, or phenomenon of tribalism in Kyrgyzstan” by M. N. Omarov; and “Kyrgyz Political clans. Part 1” by N. Rakymbay Uulu.

To study the mechanism of mass mobilization in the city of Talas on 7 April, the research is mostly based on: “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory” by John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald; “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements” by J. Craig Jenkins; “Resource mobilization theory” by Bob Edwards and Patrick F. Gillham; “Community Power and Grassroots Democracy. The Transformation of Social Life” by Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso; and “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations” by Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson.

According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), resource mobilization theory does not deal with social change or its suppression, but with the dynamics and tactics of social movement. Kauffman and Alfonso (1997, p.206) say that resource mobilization approach “takes the issues, the actors and the constraints as given, and focuses instead on how the actors develop strategies and interact with their environment in order to pursue their interests”. The basic principle of the approach is reduced to a rational understanding of the nature of social movements and collective action (Edward and Gillham, 2013).

Therefore the riots in the small town of Talas on April 7 should not be seen as a spontaneous protest, but as an option to deal with the government on such an organized collective action as a rebellion. Thus, social movements are not seen as a form of spontaneous collective behavior but rather as a kind of rational collective action. According to this approach, there is no significant difference between institutional and extra-institutional forms of public participation and collective action (Jenkins, 1983). Neither the level of structural tension nor revolutionary ideology can be the cause of social movements. They occur under certain conditions and opportunities that become resources of movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Resource mobilization theory focuses on how groups organize to pursue their ends by mobilizing and managing resources (Kauffman, Alfonso, 1997). By resources, Jenkins (1983) meant people, finance, land, time, information, social and personal relationships, communication, different

types of technical support, cultural capital, and many other features possessed by the society and that the movement can turn in their resources. All internal resources can be divided into three categories: organizational, leadership and resources of solidarity.

The study will further focus on how the supporters were involved in mass mobilization in April 2010 in the town of Talas. The incentive system of Clark and Wilson will help us to understand this dynamic. Clark and Wilson (1961, p.130) state that “all organizations must provide tangible or intangible incentives to individuals in exchange for contributions of individual activity to the organizations”. Three kinds of incentives are distinguished: material incentives, solidary incentives and purposive incentives. Material incentives are tangible rewards that have a monetary value. Solidary incentives are intangible rewards, which include socializing, congeniality, the sense of group membership, and identification. Purposive incentives are also intangible, but unlike soldiery incentives, are inseparable from the ends being sought: the members are brought together to seek some change in the status quo (Clark and Wilson, 1961).

The main focus of this thesis is put on the analysis of the time period preceding the mass mobilization in the north of the country. In this respect, the reasons, premises, and internal conditions that contributed to the rise of discontent in the country and served as the origin for mass mobilization in the country, are of greatest interest.

This thesis applies an empirical and analytical approach, based on qualitative analysis of the data from primary and secondary sources, as a methodology. The study is based on available written sources.

Thesis Disposition

In order to promote a better understanding of the circumstances preceding the events of April 2010 and to identify the internal reasons that led to an origin of mass mobilization in the town of Talas, the thesis is structured into three substitutive chapters.

The first chapter seeks to define the perspectives on April events. Events in April 2010 can be interpreted in different ways. First, these events can be seen as a revolution that has radically changed the nature of power.⁶ A second interpretation is that this was merely a coup d’etat. Brinton (1952) as cited in Tanter and Midlarsky (1967, p.265) defines coup d’etat as “a simple

⁶ Kyrgyzstan became Central Asia’s first parliamentary republic after more than 90 percent of voters supported a new constitution in June 2010.

replacement of one elite by another”. Some names have changed, but the way of the rule remained the same. Third, the events of April could mean the process of removal of unwanted government from the power, which in many countries is carried out by means of voting. Forced exile of the leader becomes a normal way of leading politics in Kyrgyzstan. Fourth, the events may reflect an irreconcilable conflict between the North and the South: the lack of a complete identity at the national level and the struggle for power and resources between the North and the South. The purpose of this chapter is to figure out whether to call the events of April 2010 revolution in Kyrgyzstan or not. This, in turn, requires a careful definition of the term “revolution”.

The second chapter discusses the situation in the country prior to the April events. The economic, social and political situation in the country will be assessed, as well as the general mood of the population on the eve of the April events. This chapter will cover the aspects that have been the cause of instability in the country and probably provoked the overthrow of the government. The analysis will be based on the work “Institutionalized instability: Factors Leading to the April 2010 Uprising in Kyrgyzstan” by David Gullette.

The third chapter of this thesis reveals the topic of the traditional Kyrgyz social structure. The topic of tribalism in Kyrgyz society as well as its impact on the internal policy making process in the country will be carefully examined. The subject of the chapter will also be a detailed analysis of the tribe system in Kyrgyzstan. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the relationship between the structure of Kyrgyz society, the reasons of the events in April and mass mobilization in the town of Talas.

The conclusion will bear an overview of the work done throughout the study, summarizing the major theoretical contributions of the thesis as well as the main practical outcomes. The hypotheses set earlier in the paper will be either confirmed or rejected and the possible direction of more sophisticated research will be claimed in the end.

1. Perspectives on April Events

Before investigating and analyzing April events of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, it may be useful to describe and define the phenomenon of revolution, in order to ascertain whether abrupt outbreak of riot in the north of the country was the birth of so-called “April Revolution” or coup d’etat, or successful social rebellion.⁷ There is no (scientific or authoritative) consensus on the exact definition of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan. The Head of the Commission for the major causes of April events, A. Erkebaev (2010), makes no doubt about revolutionary character of April unrests. In contrast, some Russian and Kazakh media asserts that it was not a revolution, but another coup d’etat (Zhunusov, 2010). Ismail Isakov, the current member of Kyrgyz parliament, proposed to declare the 7th April as a day of the Great April Revolution, and to erect a monument in honor of the dead in the central square of Bishkek: “Why the Great April Revolution? Because it has achieved the goals and led to radical changes” said Isakov (Beshov, 2011).

Political analyst Marat Kazakpaev, on the other hand, is of opinion that April events can be called a youth armed rebellion that unseated the government but did not succeed in carrying out any meaningful and structural reform (Beshov, 2011). According to the first president of Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akayev, the events that took place in April 2010 were “solely a spontaneous social uprising of desperate people, a classic example of a popular uprising” (Shevchenko, 2010). The first overthrown president considers the overturn of the Bakiyev’s “criminal regime” as “a positive result” of the uprising (Shevchenko, 2010). According to interim president Roza Otunbayeva, the first revolution did not achieve its goals, while the second one marked the beginning of democratic changes: “Freedom loving people have chosen the path of democratic development. The main reason for the overthrow of both regimes was the same unresolved contradiction between society and government” said Otunbayeva (Beshov, 2011).

The April events can be interpreted in different ways. One can speak of a “revolution” in the full sense of the word. The argument in favor of this definition claims that the presidential form of government in Kyrgyzstan has been replaced by a parliamentary one, which paved the way for the creation of coalitions, the separation of powers and prevented the consolidation of power in the hands of the president.

⁷ Previous Tulip Revolution took place in 2005.

The fact that the April events were only a coup d'etat, is another interpretation. From a legal point of view, any revolution is a violent seizure of state power, which under the law means committing a coup d'etat. In accordance with the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, Kyrgyz people are a carrier of sovereignty and the only source of state power (Constitution, 2007). People exercise their power directly in elections and referendum, as well as through a system of state bodies and local authorities, based on the Constitution and laws. Consequently, the legitimate state power is the power transmitted to the individuals as a result of a referendum or elections held on the basis of the Constitution and the laws. Violent seizure of power means committing a coup d'etat, when officials displace the elected leaders of the state, and escalate themselves to the power, which is normally granted only on the basis of the election or appointment in accordance with the Constitution and laws. They also interrupt legal activities of public authorities, etc.

According to Matveeva (2010), the April events could mean a process of removal of unwanted government from power, which in many countries is carried out by means of elections. Bakiyev has ruled the country for five years, but the citizens have decided that it is time for a new leader. Since the handing over of power through elections was not possible because the elections were under control of the current executive and the results of elections could not truly reflect the will of the people, therefore exile of the leader was the normal way of doing politics in Kyrgyzstan.

Further, the events of April may reflect the irreconcilable contradictions between the North and the South of Kyrgyzstan. In 2005 already overthrown Akayev and his entourage were for the most part natives from the north, as opposed to Bakiyev and his subordinates. If we imagine the situation in a simple way, the southern clan of Bakiyev first dismissed the northern clan of Akayev. Later the united northern opposition took revenge and subsequently overthrew the southern Bakiyev's clan.

In tackling the issue of revolution, the first requirement is a careful definition of the term. For successful investigation, the field being studied must be delimited. To determine whether the April events in Kyrgyzstan could be called a "revolution", it is critical to specify what the term "revolution" actually means? There are numerous detailed and sophisticated definitions of the term, and it is easy to get misled. We will fall right into the temptation of choosing the most suitable characteristics of the April events, subconsciously trying to fit them into the definition of

revolution. The first necessity in any inquiry is a rational and simple approach to the study of the issue. In order not to go into the time-consuming theoretical wilds, it is better to adhere to a fairly easy structure and a strict sequence.

Naturally, the investigation cannot be exhaustive and absolutely objective, although may serve well as a springboard and a certain basis for other more serious and deep research activities. In this respect, revolution in general may be defined as a political change, effected by the use of violence (Kraminick, 1972; Friedrich, 2007). This defining characteristic of revolution is utterly broad, though is one of the most frequently cited in the literature. It turns out, that the events of 2005 as well as of 2010 comply with the definition of revolution, though they are quite different in the number of casualties, further reforms and changes in the structure of power.

Since the history is written by the victors, perhaps the Friedrich's (2007, p.4) definition of revolution as a "successful rebellion" has truth to some extent. Emphatically, it is ridiculous to compare April events with those Great Revolutions such as the French Revolution of 1789, English Revolution of 1642-1651, or Russian Revolution of 1917, every of which altered economic and social structures as well as political institutions.

Of course, members of the interim government, which included all the advanced opposition leaders that actively participated in the April events, were glad to see themselves as heroes who saved the nation, but the objectivity of such claims need to be recognized as justified first. It requires some time to understand and give a correct assessment of what happened. Since becoming sovereign state, Kyrgyzstan has faced various difficulties – many smoldering conflicts stay irresolvable. Recall at least the Kyrgyz north-south divide, the Batken war, the Aksy events, the Tup events.^{8,9,10} Kyrgyzstan like any other country needs a responsible president, strong parliament and effective government, working laws and an independent judicial branch. However, every Kyrgyz president, as well as parliament and government chronically fails to meet stated goals. This naturally leads to resistance in society and resistance always forgoes revolution (Friedrich, 2007). Considering that the essence of political revolution lies in the failure of government, the establishment of more effective government (or an attempt to establish) seems to

⁸ Armed clashes between militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 1999.

⁹ Police shot dead six civilians in the southern town of Aksy in 2002 during a peaceful protest.

¹⁰ Procession from the village Tup to Bishkek to protest against the transfer of the disputed territories to Kazakhstan.

be characteristic to all revolutions (Friedrich, 2007). However, it will take some time before we can assess whether the initiative was successful or not.

In this regard, it is of a great interest to present Amman's (1962) vision on revolution cited in Stone (1966, p.174). The modern state, according to Amman, holds a monopoly of administration, physical force, and justice, that is dependent more on habits of obedience than on powers of coercion. Revolution, consequently, starts with the emergence of several foci of power and failure of accustomed habits of obedience, and ends with the removal of all but one.

To find out whether the events in Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 were actually a revolution, it is needed to make more deep analysis, but this is beyond the scope of the paper, since the purpose of this work is to study the internal factors that served as a criteria for the increasing discontent of the people and the general tension in the country, as well as an analysis of possible circumstances that are responsible for mass mobilization in April 2010 in the town of Talas, and afterwards in other regions across the country. Therefore from the practical point of view it is more suitable to use here and after the term "April events of 2010".

2. Context of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan

2.1 Political Instability

The driving force of the mass protests in 2005 was the People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan which brought together all the leaders of opposition (Radio Azattyk, 2005). Kurmanbek Bakiyev was one of the leaders of that movement. Afterwards he won the election in May 2005 and has become the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.¹¹ He promised to put an end to corruption and “nepotism” in the politics.

At a news conference on the day after the vote Bakiyev said: “From the first day, I said that I would fight against corruption, and I intend to fight it until I stop being the head of government”, or “When I was prime minister I sometimes had to work with unprofessional ministers who were appointed because they were someone's relative or friend”. “That seriously damages the economy and it's a brake on development” (MacWilliam, 2005). Nevertheless he did not fulfill his promises. Bakiyev's six brothers and two sons were in key positions with access to state assets. Janysh (brother) headed state security, Marat (brother) supervised the judicial system, Ahmat (brother) ruled over Jalalabad province, Maxim Bakiyev (son) was head of the Kyrgyzstan's Central Agency of Development of Investments and Innovations (CADII) etc. (Matveeva, 2010).

The process of constitutional reform was the example of continuing authoritarian tendencies. During the international referendum, which was held on the 27th October 2007, the electorate voted for a new constitution proposed by K. Bakiyev. The main changes concerned the increase of presidential power and the structure of the parliamentary elections, which are now being elected by party lists (Constitution, 2007). According to the new Constitution, judicial and executive branches of Kyrgyzstan were fully dependent on president. With regard to the legislative branch of the country, the pro-presidential party “Ak Jol” gained 71 out of 90 parliamentary mandates. (Ermakova, 2008) Thus, practically a one-party parliament, with a clear predominance of “Ak Jol” party, is not legislative body, but executive (as well as any ministry). Bakiyev received an obedient parliament. By April 2010 Bakiyev and his surroundings had virtually unlimited power. According to David Guette, (2010) despite such political processes,

¹¹Bakiyev won the presidential election in a landslide, with 88.9% of the vote

causing the tension in the country, there were other problems, such as the safety of food and energy, which could provoke further instability.

2.2 Compound Disaster

Kyrgyzstan faces many risks of natural disasters, water, food and energy security, external and internal economic shocks and conflicts. In the years before the 2010 April events these risks have confronted the region in quick succession and often compounded each other.

According to Elizabeth Zalkind, an expert on public relations of UN WFP (United Nations World Food Programme), the rise in prices in 2007-2008 was a result of the global economic crisis. Severe winter, energy problems and drought have caused terribly cold weather, and, consequently, higher prices of electricity. As an external factor, the country was hit by the global economic crisis (Ivashenko, 2012).

According to David Gullette (2010), the price of most agricultural products in Kyrgyzstan has significantly increased, because of the global food crisis. Since January 2007, the price of bread, flour and vegetable oil increased by 50%, milk products by 25%. By June 2008, the prices have reached their peak. In September 2007 several protests against high prices were held throughout Kyrgyzstan. The requirements of the demonstration, held in the town of Naryn on September 18th, included: lower tariffs for electricity, increase of salaries and pensions, in order to compensate the increased prices of goods and services (Gullette, 2010). “Unfavorable weather conditions, rising fuel costs, and, more recently, trade restrictions have added to upward price pressures” (IMF, 2008).

The winter of 2007 and 2008 in Kyrgyzstan was the coldest for the last 40 years. This situation has contributed to further instability in the country. The difficulties with the climate have created additional problems in the agricultural sector, which is the largest industrial sector in Kyrgyzstan. About 40% of the population of Kyrgyzstan is employed in this industry. The situation became even more critical during the summer of 2008, when prices for fertilizers have increased (Gullette, 2010). The global economic crisis was an external factor of increased prices for agriculture production in 2008 (Ivashenko, 2012). Low-water period and the cold winter of 2007-2008 caused the high demand for energy. Significantly lowered water level in the Toktogul

reservoir has become one of the reasons of acute energy shortage in the country (Vinogradov, 2007).

The total capacity of the Toktogul reservoir, the largest in Central Asia, is 19.5 billion m³; the useable share of this total is 14 bcm. The reason of the deficit of electricity was the fact that the level of water in the Toktogul reservoir fell to 6.5 billion m³ whilst the critical level is 5.4 billion m³. Trying to address the problem, the Kyrgyz government introduced 8-10 hour power cuts, starting from spring 2008 (Juraev, 2009). Although the government has introduced some limitations on energy consumption and has raised the electricity tariff by November 2008, the water level in the Toktogul water reservoir was 70 percent of the level in previous year, foreboding an unavoidable worsening of the supply of electricity in the winter of 2008-2009 (Juraev, 2009).

Climate changes are not the only cause of water problems. According to Ernest Karybekov, the head of the International Public Foundation “Institute for research of hydro energetic and water resources in Central Asia”, one of the main causes of the catastrophic situation of water resources in the Toktogul water reservoir was the technological one. According to the expert, every thing has its own technical instruction on how to use it and technologically unified energy system of Central Asia should not have been separated. It was created as a complementary and interchangeable unit. The countries concerned must understand that, primarily Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Vinogradov, 2007).

Another reason, according to Gullette (2010), is that most of the energy equipment is very old and need a constant repair. For instance, the Bishkek Thermal Power Station is 50 years old and is in need of maintenance to keep it functioning.

Moreover, the low capacity of water in the reservoir gave the suspicion that during last summer the significant amount of electricity was sold to Kazakhstan. According to an expert on electricity Dzhollina Murphy, in 2007 Kyrgyzstan has exported 70% of energy more than was the demand of importing countries. This has almost devastated the Toktogul reservoir (Akipress, 2010).

Juraev (2009) argues that over 40% of electricity are both technical (the persistent problems in transmission and distribution) and commercial (no payment) losses. In August 2010, the Minister of Energy Osmonbek Artykbaev said that the loss summed up to about 27% of total output for the first half of the year (Zpress, 2010). According to Akylbek Tumenbaeva, director

of long-term development of the Ministry of Energy, every lost percentage equals to a loss of 52 million Kyrgyzstani som (KGS), which is about one million USD (Akipress, 2010b). Thus, the imposition of the problems with its chronic nature of the energy sector has led the country to the brink of collapse.

Since the beginning of 2010, the price of electricity has increased by 100% and the price of central heating by 500% (Toktonaliev, 2010). The Kyrgyz government says that it was forced to take the steps and increase the real prices of services for consumers to cope with the consequences of the economic crisis, as well as generating funds for investment in the energy sector. Officials said that earlier the electricity and hot water were distributed to commercial and domestic sectors below the production costs. Now, the new higher tariffs correspond to the cost of production of electricity and hot water supply to consumers (Toktonaliev, 2010).

Perhaps, the government of Usenov took the responsibility for such a dangerous step that had not been risked by any of their predecessors. “Apparently, the political aspects were above the economic ones. If we had not taken such a step, in about two or three years we would have lost the entire power supply”, - said Usenov (Sultambaev, 2010).

However, in the context of fraud in the electricity industry, the fair intention of the government actions seem to be shady. Severelectro, the company for distribution of electricity that serves some parts of northern Kyrgyzstan (Chui, Talas Provinces, and Bishkek city), has been handed over to the concession to the private sector since 2006. At the government meeting Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev said: “as long as the electric power industry is not run by private businesses, there will be no stability” (Radio Azattyk, 2005b). In 2008, together with the owner of the Chakan HPP, Alexey Shirshov, Bakiyev conspired to buy the Severelectro (Chyntemirov, 2013). On February 18th 2008 an independent commission to determine the value of state-owned shares of the Severelectro was established, in order to simulate the legal action. The Minister of State Property O. Turdumambetov has signed the order about this process. The average cost of state-owned shares of the Severelectro amounted to 135.7 million USD. On November 12th 2008 an independent committee was established in order to organize a tender in terms of implementing the public program of privatization of the Kyrgyzenergo (Moiseeva, 2013). On February 1st of the following year the Minister Turdumambetov instructed the State Secretary to sell the shares of the Severelectro to the Chakan HPP for three million USD. Mr. Turdumambetov has made damage to Kyrgyzstan in the estimated sum of 132.7 million USD

with the help of illegal instruments that led to the sale of Severelectro for such a small amount of money (Chyntemirov, 2013).

According to unofficial sources, Roger Robinson, the manager of the World Bank in Kyrgyzstan, informed the US Embassy that he was surprised by the decision of the government. According to him, the head of the government considered himself politically stable enough to overcome the criticism in a short term and in the hope that the discontent would fade away when the appropriate government policy would increase economic growth and improve the standard of living of the population (KyrTag, 2010).

In the dispatch of the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan it is reported that the political opposition heavily criticized the increase in prices, arguing that many of the people cannot afford the new rates. Roza Otunbayeva told the embassy that the increase in energy prices would be their “main topic” in 2010 and said that this would greatly benefit the opposition (KyrTag, 2010).

The Kyrgyz government is going to take reasonable risks, dramatically increasing the price of energy. If the funds received are used for the modernization of the energy infrastructure, the price increase will be economically rational. However, this step will have a significant impact on poverty, as far as many middle class families will experience difficulties in paying higher prices, especially if the increase in energy prices causes inflation, since businesses will put the increased cost on the final consumers. (KyrTag, 2010).

According to David Gulette (2010b), high electricity tariffs introduced at the beginning of 2010, caused a flash of anger in the population, which consolidated the processes that led to the sooner exile of President Bakiyev.

In early February, the residents of the town of Naryn held a demonstration against the high tariffs. In Naryn, the average winter lasts for six months, so the demand for electricity is much higher. On March 10, people in Naryn held a demonstration against higher tariffs for electricity and heat that brought together representatives of the opposition, led by Roza Otunbayeva and the head of the Social Democratic Party (Fergana News Agency, 2010).

Discontent in Naryn was the first wake-up call for the authorities, because the opposition did not fail to take advantage of the situation to enhance their political strength. Raising tariffs was a real basis for enhancing protest of the population by the opposition. The authorities began to show signs of discontent and impatience at that time. On March 9, the governor of Naryn

region was fired. The reason was a verbal permission to hold a demonstration without prior notice to local authorities, given by him (Fergana News Agency, 2010b).

2.3 Economic Factors

According to the World Bank, economic conditions in the country have markedly deteriorated prior the events of April 2010. The graph below shows that the economic downturn preceding mass mobilization in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 was much stronger and originated at the point of higher economic growth than during the 2005 Tulip Revolution. See Graph 1

The main indicator of economic depression in the country is unemployment. The unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan remains high for many years, especially among young people. As shown in the Graph 2, the unemployment rate rose from 7.5% in 2000 to 9.3% in 2010. However, according to Sapar Orozbekov, the head of the Bishkek Centre for Economic Analysis, the real unemployment rate in Kyrgyzstan is 20% (KyrTag, 2011). High unemployment for such a long time could not end up without consequences. If a person cannot find work for a longer period of time, it often leads to psychological stress, desperation, cardiovascular disease, collapse of the family and to suicide. The loss of a stable source of income may tempt to commit a crime (theft and even murder) as well as to antisocial behavior. At the level of society it is, first and foremost, means growth of social tension that may turn out to the political revolution. For instance, the American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, explaining the reason for the development and implementation of a policy of so called "Roosevelt's New Deal" to get out of the Great Depression including a huge unemployment (in the U.S. during that period one person out of four was unemployed), wrote that by doing so he would "prevent a revolution desperation." Indeed, revolutions involving military participation are connected with a high level of social and economic instability (Matveeva, 2003).

Unemployed being the main instruments of the opposition, represent the biggest threat to the social instability in the country. As Lipsey and Chrystal (2007) put it "the longer-term effects of high unemployment rates for those who have become so disillusioned that they have given up trying to make it within the system, and who may be contributing to social unrest, should be a matter of serious concern to the haves as well as the have-nots." (Lipsey, Chrystal, 2007, pp. 572)

The unemployment level in Kyrgyzstan is very high which makes people search for the job opportunities outside the country. The labor emigrants from Kyrgyzstan are working in Russia (92%) and Kazakhstan (8%). The main factors of emigration are the low income and unemployment in Kyrgyzstan as well as demand for labor in Russia and Kazakhstan (KyrTag, 2013).

The fact that Russia and Kazakhstan employ the Kyrgyz people helps to reduce tension and decrease the number of protests that may occur due to ineffective government policies. Between 2004 and 2008, when there was a boom in labor emigration, 800 000 people from Kyrgyzstan left their houses and went for work to Russia and Kazakhstan (Janovskaja, 2010).

Emigrants play a pivot role in the Kyrgyz economy. Kyrgyzstan dependence has been growing from year to year from the money transfers of its emigrants. Incomes from the money transfers raised the overall life quality in Kyrgyzstan and did not let the people slide into poverty. Remittances are a major, permanent and reliable mechanism that helps to support the lower class of population. From 2006 to 2008, revenues in Kyrgyzstan increased from 481 million USD to 1.2 billion USD, which is approximately 40% of the overall budget of the country (janovskaya 2010).

When the global economic crisis struck in 2008, Russia has tightened its immigration policy. In 2009, the quota reduced from 3.9 to 1.95 million immigrants and many Kyrgyz workers lost their jobs and at the end of 2009 returned back to their homes (Gullette, 2010). In June 2009 Cherkiz market in Moscow has closed. It was one of the biggest place were Kyrgyz emigrants have been employed (Ria Novosti, 2009). It was a disaster. According to the National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic the amount of remittances in 2009 has decreased by 21.5% compared to the previous year (Gullette, 2010). In late 2009, Kyrgyzstan was worried what to do with the returning emigrants. The authorities were thinking about the creation of employment centers, but the initiatives aimed for creating new jobs have never been developed (Janovskaja, 2010). The return of emigrant workers has meant serious problems for the government and for those families whose main source of income were remittances (Gullette, 2010).

The International Crisis Group has published the report called "Central Asia: Migrants and the Economic Crisis" that identifies the consequences of the crisis. First is the emergence of interest in politics among the people of traditionally apolitical views. Second is the strengthening of extremist religious organizations such as Hizbut Tahrir. According to the experts who prepared

the report, the return of emigrants to their homeland and an overall failure in remittances is capable of social and political disturbance in the region (Janovskaja, 2010).

The return of emigrants and lower amount of remittances to Kyrgyzstan by the end of 2009 has completed the list of problems, which included the economic recession, high unemployment, consumer products increase, severe weather conditions as well as the increase in tariffs for electricity and heating in the winter.

2.4 Political Repressions

Another reason of the increasing social discontent was strict repression of the political opposition and an independent mass media. According to Djumataeva (2010) "since Bakiev became president, about 10 well-known public figures -- including five members of parliament -- have been murdered; three journalists have been killed and numerous others beaten and threatened. About 20 politicians or journalists have fled the country and received political asylum in the West (Djumataeva, 2010).

Rumors about the president's family members and their direct or indirect involvement in organizing attacks on opposition leaders and journalists were spreading in the society (Gullette, 2010). Bakiyev and his subordinates managed to eliminate most of the opposition leaders - some were imprisoned, some has fled the country, while others disappeared in mysterious circumstances. The same methods were used against the independent mass media: the judges have closed independent publishers while several journalists have been killed in circumstances of consideration to be the agents of the foreign countries (Temirkulov, 2010).

The persecutions have begun back in September of 2006, when the so-called scandal "The Heroin Matryoshka" has broke out. In Warsaw airport in baggage of O. Tekebayev was found a souvenir doll, stuffed with a mixture of various powders with low content of heroin. Mr. Tekebayev was imprisoned, but the Polish court acquitted the policy, determining that someone else had planted the "matryoshka". The investigation in Kyrgyzstan found that the person who ordered "matryoshka" was president's brother Zhanysh Bakiyev. At the request of the Parliament Mr. Bakiyev was released from his position where he was appointed by the president earlier, but was not punished by the law. After the revolution of 2010, several people were arrested for the same "matryoshk case" (Ivashenko, 2010).

In 2008 was a next scandal that involved CEC Chairman Clara Kabilova and the president's son Maxim Bakiyev. At a press conference in the agency AKI a video message was presented in which Clara Kabilova said that she had been under the pressure of the president's son Maxim Bakiyev, who used blatant force and humiliated her following the meeting of the CEC on ensuring voting rights of the candidate for deputy of the city council Ishenbay Kadyrbekova. Clara Kabilova resigned and left the country, saying, "now she is afraid not only for herself, her family and also for all citizens of Kyrgyzstan, whose president can not protect his people" (Lykov, 2008).

In March 2009, there was another death of the influential Kyrgyz politician, former head of the presidential administration of Kyrgyzstan Medet Sadyrkulov. According to official data, it was a fatal car accident. There were rumors that Mr. Sadyrkulov planned to unite the opposition and to speak out against the Bakiyev regime, so no one doubted the involvement of the president's family to his death (Gullette, 2010).

Absurd death of a prominent Kyrgyz politician caused a flurry of accusations from opposition, which stated that "this is not a fatal car accident, as claimed before but arrogant, ostentatious political assassination" and even more than that, "terrorist act directed against opposition" (Rasov, 2009). Minister of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan Zarylbek Rysaliev said that the main reason for the murder of an influential politician Medet Sadyrkulov was his negative attitude to politics Bakiyev, "Sadyrkulov was against the policy of the president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, so president's brother wanted to take revenge on him. Before the accident president's brother talked for almost an hour with Sadyrkulov that he supposedly did a mistake when protesting against his brother. Thereafter, two employees of the State Security Service with the personal involvement of the president's brother Janysh have strangled Medet Sadyrkulov with the loop" (Ivashenko, Dzhani, 2011).

According to the "Moscow News" journalist Arkady Dubnov, this version sounds quite plausible, "the most important thing is that it completely refuses a nasty version that was offered during the Bakiyev's presidency - I mean the "accident", which wasn't taken seriously by society. And I trust that, according to the present version, the person who ordered it, was president's brother. Of course, I understand that it is in the current political course of Kyrgyzstan, but, nevertheless, it is not a reason to doubt this conclusion" (Ivashenko, Dzhani, 2011).

On December 22, the Kyrgyz journalist Gennady Pavlyuk passed away. Mr. Pavlyuk, who has been publishing under the name Ibrahim Rustambek, worked in the Kyrgyz Russian representative publications "Arguments and Facts" and "Komsomolskaya Pravda", as well as in the independent Kyrgyz edition of "The White Ship", later renamed "White Sail". He also was a member of the opposition party "Ata Meken" and intended to run some media project (Lillis, 2010). Renowned journalist was hospitalized with multiple injuries and then fell in a coma on December 16, after unknown threw him from the sixth floor apartment building with his hands and feet tied (Fergana News Agency, 2009).

Responsibility for the murder of G. Pavlyuk was laid on special services of Kyrgyzstan, "I can say, against all of rejections, we know that a journalist is a colleague of yours, Pavlyuk in Almaty, in Kazakhstan, was killed by our special agencies (organized by Bakiyev), " said Atambayev, the current President of the Kyrgyz Republic (Nur.Kz, 2010). Within two weeks after the death of Pavlyuk a number of journalists and politicians were attacked in Kyrgyzstan. In Bishkek in one day a political scientist, a citizen of Russia - Alexander Knyazev and ex-secretary of the Security Council, a friend of former President Askar Akayev Bolot Januzakov and a journalist Alexander Egorov were beaten. A few days later, Osh city newspaper "Osh Shamy" has received threatening package with machine-gun bullet inside.¹²

All these cases of opposition leaders and journalists frightened the population, but at the same time caused a rejection and negativity to the rulers of the country: "Fear was spreading in the country that quickly turned into a deep anger directed against Bakiev" (Djumataeva, 2010).

¹² Fergana News Agency, 2009, "Kazakhstan: Kirgizskiy zhurnalyst Gennadiy Pavluk skonchalsja v bolnice Almaty", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=13676> [Accessed 21 June 2013]

3. Analysis of informal institutions in Kyrgyzstan

3.1 Tribalism in Kyrgyz Society

One of hypotheses of this thesis is a statement that Kyrgyz tribalism was a reason for the mass mobilization in Talas on April 7, 2010. In order to confirm or deny this statement, it is necessary to carefully examine the phenomenon of tribalism in Kyrgyz society; to be more precise it is relevant to study the essence and principles of traditional social structure of the Kyrgyz people on the basis of tribalism. This chapter is intended to scrutinize the roots of Kyrgyz tribalism, its principle and its place within the society. A general understanding of the concept of tribalism and definition of the term is needed at first place.

According to Umbetalieva (2003), Ph.D Candidate in Political Sciences, tribalism can be defined as an ideology of tribal isolation (separatism), seeking preserve obsolete attributes of primitive tribal system (customs, primitive beliefs, tribal languages, the structure of tribal self-government, etc.). Tribalism is a complex phenomenon which cannot be unambiguously characterized.

Therefore, it is necessary to highlight an exhaustive definition of Tapper (1983) as cited in Oraz (2006, p.2) who offered the following definition of a tribe: “Tribe may be used loosely of a localized group in which kinship is the dominant idiom of organization, and whose members consider themselves culturally distinct (in terms of customs, dialect or language, and origins); tribes are usually politically unified, though not necessarily under a central leader, both features being commonly attributable to interaction with states. Such tribes also form parts of larger, usually regional, political structures of tribes of similar kinds; they do not usually relate directly with the state, but only through these intermediate structures. The more explicit term confederacy or confederation should be used for a local group of tribes that is heterogeneous in terms of culture, presumed origins and perhaps class composition, yet is politically unified usually under a central authority”.

Dairov (2010) states that the practice of tribalism is to provide people of one ethnic group with benefits in the process. Umbetalieva (2003) believes that tribalism effectively nullifies the principle of the equality of citizens and provoke civil war. Author suggests that to understand the mechanism of tribalism, it is necessary to highlight its aspects: political, social, historical and cultural, which will reveal not only the degree of influence of each of them on the processes

taking place in social life, but also to determine the dominant one. When clans within the government have the potential to influence the policymaking process, pursuing their own political interests, it's called "political tribalism". These groups are not bound by any legal obligations to the government. Acting informally, competing clans will divide the central state's offices and resources among themselves. Thus, tribalism is nothing but representing tribal interests in the public arena, including the elites fight (Umbetalieva, 2003). Historical and cultural tribalism means the preservation of the obsolete principles and traditions, based upon tribal division (Umbetalieva, 2003). Social tribalism is a type of behaviour and attitudes that stem from strong loyalty to one's own tribe, based on kinship relationships, which manifested in the provision of social support to members of the tribe. Tribe becomes the most important social actor, based on the feelings of kinship. That small tribal community represents a certain corporation, inside which there is a close and regular communication on the basis of established rituals (Umbetalieva, 2003).

The principles of tribalism in Kyrgyzstan have its own specifics. Every Kyrgyz man is always integrated into a small tribal community, which is the key to capturing the essence of Kyrgyz identity – the balance of tribe and nation.

Despite the two thousand year history of the Kyrgyz statehood, according to an independent expert Rakymbay uluu Nurdin (2005), tribes have always been the authentic bearer of the Kyrgyz identity, language and culture. Moreover, the Kyrgyz tribe had the attributes of the political community. According to cultural studies of Baktykan Torogeldieva (2008), tribes had generic external attributes: uraan (battle cry), tuu (flag), tamga (cattle sealing), namys (clan's honor), jardam (mutual help between members of one clan), aksakal (tribal elder), baatyr (tribal hero, who served as an example for younger generation education). It is necessary to note, that the patriotism is linked with the understanding of one's tribe and its territory in the traditional Kyrgyz way of thinking. It is also an interesting fact that even the word "el" has two meanings in the Kyrgyz language. The phrase "Kyrgyz eli" refers to the Kyrgyz people as a nation. But when the person is asked "elin kaisy?" – it means "what is your tribe?". Accordingly, the answer to this question is the following: "solto elinen bolom (I am from the solto tribe)" or "elim - adigine (my tribe is adigine)", etc. (Rakymbay uluu, 2005)

In the current society, tribalism masks democratic structure, while retaining its tribal entity and actively influencing the political processes in the country. Tribalism with its "democratic"

face has become a reality in the politics of Kyrgyzstan, due to the fact that only a thin layer of the country's intellectuals understands and shares the views of Western liberal ideology (Omarov, 2007). Technically there is a constitution with a set of rights and freedoms of citizens, parliament, political parties, elections are held, however, society in fact lives by the customs and ideas established centuries ago (Dairov, 2010).

For what reasons Kyrgyz political life cannot be imagined without tribalism in the present days? What is the cause of survivability of tribalism? Why this phenomenon preserves till the present days? In order to find answers to these questions it is essential to not only carefully examine the social and moral codes of tribal relationships, but also to learn how these codes have evolved throughout the history.

Let me now consider the traditional Kyrgyz social structure from a historical perspective. In the words of deputy Ravshan Jeenbekov "Kyrgyz policy is a reflection of the clans fight for the redistribution of financial flows" (Omarov, 2007). The persistence of tribal remnants in the life of Kyrgyz society stems from peculiarities of its historical development. The principles of tribalism started to develop at the dawn of human history, before the emergence of the institutions of the state. It was impossible to survive alone in those conditions. In the fight for life people survived only in a team usually kin-based. Kyrgyz people, who led a nomadic life and was dependent on animal husbandry, was not an exception to this rule. They were not aware of settled life and agriculture, they did not develop class division, much of their history they lived in a tribal system without statehood (Omarov, 2007)

According to Djunushaliev and Ploskih (2006), the history of the nations, which went through the period of tribal relations in their development process, shows that violation of tribalist regulations of social relations is caused by several reasons. First of all, it is explained by the shift to the sedentary agriculture, resulting in both the dramatically increasing efficiency of household activities and great reduction of dependence of individual families from generic mutual help. Second, it is caused by the formation of statehood, which takes over the function of population protection from the external attack, and the duty of the legal regulation of the domestic economic, social, and political relations. Those are the conditions that the Kyrgyz society was missing nearly up to the first quarter of the XX century. Therefore, the demonstration of individual elements of tribalism, which is the foundation of pre-class society, is quite natural in contemporary social life of the country.

What is the cause of persistence of tribal relations? It is entirely possible that it is the presence of social need for their preservation and strengthening throughout the long history of the nation. A matter of life and protection of people was managed by tribal alliances. Nomadic cattle breeding was both preventing the formation of agriculture and sedentary, and preserving pre-class relations; while the lack of a common state has made the protection of the independence and integrity of the tribe a matter of tribal unities themselves (Omarov, 2007)

In addition, Kyrgyz mentality was developed in limited space of mountain gorges and valleys, which significantly restrained opportunities for communication and consolidating joint economic relations. Due attention should be given to the incredible durability of traditions, rules and regulations of tribe, preserved to the present days. The social conscience of Kyrgyz people did not keep pace with the revolutionary change in the method of production as well as social relations and type of ownership (Omarov, 2007).

Every Kyrgyz realizes the superiority of the interests of his tribe. The protection of the tribal property and territory, including those from the neighboring tribes, was a matter of honor for any community member. It is the historical truth, that the power of the tribal system has allowed the Kyrgyz to protect themselves as a nation and to preserve their unique art, language and culture. Even becoming a part of various states (Mongol ulus, the Kokand Khanate), each of Kyrgyz tribes remained its own traditions, customs and rules (Rakymbay uluu, 2005). Being a self-contained and self-sufficient community, the Kyrgyz tribe did not let foreign elements in and kept its own self-conscience. Therefore, even while being separated, our tribes have not lost the fundamental principle of the Kyrgyz nation – its national culture and language. Thus, there should be no underestimation of the role of tribal relations in this historical phenomenon (Rakymbay uluu, 2005).

The history of all nomadic people shows that only those who, in the absence of statehood most consistently adhered to the principles of tribalism, managed to preserve their ethnic autonomy and integrity. Others – Huns, Sakas, Usuns, Kuman – formed into tribes almost simultaneously with the Kyrgyz, dissolved among other ethnic formations or became known by other ethnic names (Djunushaliev, Ploskih, 2006).

The economic basis of Kyrgyz tribes throughout the history was a community of basic livelihoods. Back in the early decades of the last century, the public use of property was common.

This applied to both land and cattle which formed the basis of nomad economy and well-being (Omarov, 2007)

And today, for example, the right to manage and control the public property, which the member of the tribe received while being in power, turns into a generic one. It is important to note that the system of power relations in Kyrgyzstan is based on the principles of nepotism, when the whole pyramid of power operates due to the involvement of relatives and friends (Omarov, 2007).

As Temirkulov (2004) puts it, Kyrgyz traditional social structure is based on a set of rules and norms of customary law—adat, which acts as a system of social control. This system of social control takes the form of strict discipline which is based on respect toward parents, ancestors and elders in general. The author believes that one of the basic postulates of adat is a concept that was elaborated during centuries of constant threats and warfare – tooganchilik (uuruchuluk, djurtchuluk) – that is the obligation of each Kyrgyz to be a soldier, to help and avenge his community members. This rule is a source of strong allegiance to a solidarity group and presents an essential principle of Kyrgyz tribal structure. The social significance of this traditional solidarity has always been very important.

Omarov (2007) writes that all members of the tribe were interested in strengthening its forces and ensuring its well-being, as long as an ordinary tribesman could be supported only by members of his tribe. The tribe did not only protect its members, but was also responsible for their misconducts. Customs did not only allow and encourage, but also obliged all the relatives to avenge the injustice or crime committed against any member of the tribe. For example, in order to take revenge, it was enough to kill any member of the murderer's family not only the murderer himself. The tradition of liability for your relatives continues to exist even today.

According to Temirkulov (2004) the concept of tooganchilik is a basis of adat and all other social institutions of the Kyrgyz are built around this principle. Thus, according to adat, the decision making role is given to aksakals (white beards) - elders of the community, which take decisions within a council. Nevertheless every member of the community can participate in an annual meeting of the community – kurultai.

Social control is maintained via sanctions, such as punishment by shame (uiat) exclusion from society, or rewards, such as prestige or respect. The capacity to sanction is given to

aksakals, who, imbued with prestige and deference of judgment, can mobilize communities for different collective actions. (Temirkulov, 2004)

Rakymbay uulu (2005) supposes that anyone who dared to betray or waver in fight became an outcast. In addition, tribe was the only union capable and always ready to defend its member and his family. In steppe full of dangers and threats it was a very strong argument. Loner, expelled from the tribe, was doomed to dishonor and death. Not by chance the expulsion from the tribe (kochuruu) was at Kyrgyz one of the worst punishments and used for the most serious offenses.

Adat still plays a significant role in the social, political and economic life of Kyrgyz people. Traditional institutions and elements of social control have been formalized and integrated into the state structure since independence of Kyrgyzstan (Temirkulov, 2004). Thus, Art. 39 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan resolves that “citizens shall have the right to establish courts of aksakals [elderly]” (Constitution, 2007); Art. 23 states that “citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic shall have the right to hold kurultayi [assemblies], which is the sacred historic tradition of the Kyrgyz people, on issues regarding the performance of state authorities, local self-government bodies and other important issues. The decision of a people’s kurultay shall be sent to the respective bodies as recommendations” (Constitution, 2007).

Obviously, courts of aksakals and kurultai may be used by the ruling elite for the creation of public opinion on the regional and national levels. Aksakals can persuade people to support certain policies or course of action (Temirkulov, 2004).

There is a centuries-old tradition of rivalry between leaders of tribes for land, cattle and pastures. This tradition of rivalry between the leaders of clans and tribes for dominance, stiffened with the subsequent "rules" of “volost” rulers elections in tsarist times and the "party approach to recruitment" in the Soviet, gave birth to the action on the principle: "The leader must be from our tribe" (Djunushaliev and Ploskih, 2006).

Nochevkin (2010) points out that even in the alternation of the leaders of Kyrgyzstan traced the logic of such a confrontation: after the war, the republic was headed by “Ichkilik” Ishaq Razzakov. He as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Kirghiz SSR (with nearly a quarter of a century) was replaced by “Sarybagysh” Turdakun Usubaliev, who was replaced by “Ichkilik” Absamat Masaliev. The first President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev

was “Sarybagysh”. Thus coming to power of “Ichkilik” Kurmanbek Bakiyev is as one might say a historical revenge.

Many principles and rules of tribalism, justifiable and even necessary in primitive conditions of production, lack of settlement and statehood, not correspond to the realities and concerns of contemporary social practice. Moreover, they represent a serious threat to social stability and integrity of a sovereign state. Kyrgyz tribalism featured intra-tribal unifying ability, but on the scale of the nation as a whole, this ability was already with the opposite sign. And this is natural, because narrow tribal interests and needs, which serves tribalism, in many points contradict with nation-wide interests.

3.2 Fight with tribalism during the Soviet Union regime

The fight against tribalism in the Soviet Union did not achieve any significant results. Bolshevik’s fight with "remnants" wore a jump like character, moving from ideological "cleansing" to practical repression. Depending on the endless political and economic reforms and campaigns this fight was called variously class stratification of society, elimination of “baimanapstvo” and kulaks, industrialization, collectivization, Cultural Revolution, etc. But mostly it was a radical change in the content of the traditional social structure and social relations (Djunushaliev and Ploskih, 2006).

The first step against tribalism began with stratification of Kyrgyz society to exploiters and exploited, establishing consciousness in non consanguineous but class community of people. The state supported and pushed to leadership positions representatives of the poor and middle segments of the population and pursued the propertied classes, neglecting their knowledge and experience (Djunushaliev and Ploskih, 2006)

There were housecleaning within the Party of the Soviet apparatus from the “baimanap” elements suppressed and persecuted folk legends about the genealogy of the Kyrgyz people “sanjyra”, etc.

Not by chance in the first years of Soviet rule all officials of the former imperial administration suddenly turned into people from “poor peasant segment” (more conscientious - from the middle peasants) and permanently retained their position. Today, the situation is repeated, but in a reverse way. So, after the August 1991 most of the leadership of the Soviet Party of Kyrgyzstan suddenly became the descendants of the famous and rich landowners manaps

(Omarov, 2007). More than 70-year-old struggle for approval of class consciousness of the Kyrgyz did not achieve its purpose.

Carriers of tribalism, getting into the party ranks and the administrative apparatus, added there the former tribal tradition of confrontation: for pasture, land and domination over each other. But the goal and methods of struggle changed. They was a fight for leadership positions in the party and state apparatus. The group struggle within the party organization in the years of transition was constant, especially during the elections and the formation of the governing bodies. It remained a constant factor weakening the party organization and retarding the solution of many urgent political, economic and social problems (Djunushaliev and Ploskih, 2006).

Many of the principles of Soviet power created the conditions for the preservation of illegal but widespread use of tribal principles in the public practice. Suffice to say that the political system of socialism is built on the principles of hierarchy and obedience to the leader, in fact repeated the tribal structure of society (Omarov, 2007).

At the same time, many of principles of Soviet-era central planning and distribution, the system of recruitment turned into a “monopoly of the party”, have fueled the illegal but widespread use of laws of tribalism in the social practice. Due to “Perestroika” phenomena of the late 1980s, freedom of expression and democratization of society, principles of tribalism began to operate openly. (Djunushaliev, Ploskih, 2006)

The large scale fight against tribalism and clan networks came under the rule of Gorbachev, when it was viewed that this problem aggravated corruption and the shadow economy (Temirkulov, 2004). However, during the last years of the Soviet Union, the importance of political clans and tribal allegiance increased due to the spread of nationalism to the Kyrgyz SSR (Beissinger, 2002) and the desire to return to roots. Thus, this legacy entered together with Kyrgyzstan into independence, and today comprises an important component of social and political life of the country.

Thus, tribalism in Kyrgyzstan safely, with some losses, have survived all campaigns organized in order to eliminate it, and in the years of independence, there was in fact its rehabilitation and legalization, which created favorable conditions for strengthening regional clan elites (Omarov, 2007). The time has come when these phenomena, retaining not only its identity and traditions, but also the mass base, have become the dominant in the country’s political processes, got an opportunity to influence openly the processes of nation building.

3.3 Functioning of tribalism principles in contemporary Kyrgyzstan

It is doubtful that there is only one group-identity which is able to account for political struggles in Kyrgyzstan. The odds are that the political landscape is much more complex and needs a more differentiated explanation.

According to Borodine (2012), all domestic policy of Kyrgyzstan consists of the struggle between the North and the South. Geographically, there are concepts of so-called "The South" (Batken, Jalal-Abad and Osh regions) and "The North" (Chui, Talas, Issyk-Kul and Naryn regions) of Kyrgyzstan. Clear separation by geography is presented below in Figure 1. Thus during the change of the power whoever becomes the president always strives to minimize the influence of the opposite clan.

This separation between the North and the South also covers about 40 tribal unions (uruk) based on kinship relations (imaginary, rather than real). These tribal unions were united into three big confederations: On kanat (Right wing), Sol kanat (Left wing), and Ichkilik (Neither or Central) (Temirkulov, 2004). This division on confederations is based on the ethnic origin of the ancient military defensive structure where Kyrgyz people were divided into following groups: right wing, left wing and centre wing. All the wings were united only when facing an external enemy (Mokeyev, et.al., 2013). However, the North-South division appeared in the twentieth century is more typical for modern Kyrgyzstan.

Masanov (1995), as cited in Bolponova (2012), states that the ability to unite in a confederation of nomadic tribes - is a way of thinking and interpretation of the processes and phenomena through genealogical origin, as well as explanation, reasoning, regulation and control of social mobilization and consolidation of society.

Borodine (2012) claims that in addition to the dominant role of the tribal institute, the main role in Kyrgyzstan plays a person or a group that belongs to the Northern or the Southern part of the country, which mostly determines the human relationships in the country. The main point of the Kyrgyz conflict is a fight between various tribes for control of the entire country. Moreover, as there is no tribe's monopoly yet in Kyrgyzstan, the fight mainly occurs between the North and the South. The division between the North and the South is based on two factors: historical and

geographical. According to Oraz (2006), due to the natural division within the country¹³, the two regions have been scattered and lost a close relations with each other¹⁴.

Temirkulov (2004) argues that during the 19th and early 20th century, two factors had a great impact on the cultural and economic separation of the North and the South: sedentarization and geographical differentiation along cultural and economic-political lines: northern tribes around the Chui valley, and southern tribes around the Ferghana valley.

After several years of war with the Kokhand Khanate in the early 19th century, the northern tribes joined the Czarist Russia that conducted a policy of sedentarization and created administrative-territorial local authority based on volost, rather than on tribal principles. At the same time, the Southern tribes remained loyal to the Kokand Khanate and fought against the Imperial Army, supported by the Northern tribes (Temirkulov, 2004).

In the beginning of the twentieth century, during the Soviet conquest, the Kyrgyz part of the Central Asian movement "basmachi"¹⁵ have focused on the southern part of the country, despite the fact that the "bolsheviks" were mostly from the North. The fact that the Northern and the Southern fought against each other influenced the modern cultural differences in these regions (Temirkulov, 2004)

Aforementioned Umbetalieva's distinction between political and social tribalism is crucial for Kyrgyz society. As discussed before, the social tribalism is a way of thinking and behaving based on kinship, which can be expressed as support and protection of the family members. From this point of view, tribes can be seen as isolated groups of individuals with the loyalty and devotion as their main principles. On the other hand, Kyrgyz society has a political tribalism. The core of the political tribalism lays in connection of the tribal society with the functioning of the state machinery. The Political tribalism is the penetration of organized groups, formed on the basis of the tribal and economic interests into the governmental system. Furthermore, it has a huge impact on both state and regional policy.

To more complete understanding of tribalism in Kyrgyz society contributes division offered by Shahrani (1986) as cited in Gullette (2002), who claims that there are "categorical loyalties" (i.e. affiliation, ancestry) and "acquired loyalties" (i.e. patron-client, bribes, alliances).Such a division, even though it seems extremely simplistic, very clearly explains the basic principles of

¹³ The Tian-Shan mountains separate the southern and northern parts of Kyrgyzstan

¹⁴ There are differences in customs, mentality and dialect

¹⁵ Movement against Russian Imperial and Soviet rule by the Muslim peoples of Central Asia.

the informal groups in Kyrgyzstan. Consequently, the tribal structure of the Kyrgyz society can be characterized by these "categorical loyalties". Every ethnic Kyrgyz is a member of a certain tribe, and this individual has no right to choose this tribe, as he or she becomes the tribe member from the birth. And this is a very strong binding factor: every tribe member is unconditionally loyal to his tribe, represents his family tribe's interests, must be proud of the real or imaginary ancestors (sanjyra). Informal structures based on the "acquired loyalties" bear completely different meaning. These groups are created according to the political, economic and other interests. Let's call them "political clans".

Baiialinov (1995), the press spokesman of A. Akaev, as cited in Khanin (2000), once acknowledged: "It is no secret that top-ranking officials usually come from a clan. This is the truth of the matter. In our small republic, wherever you turn, you will always find somebody who is somebody's person." The most striking example is Akaev's clan. According to Djararova (2011) Askar Akayev belongs to Sarybagysh tribe, and his wife, Mairam Akayev - to the tribe Kushchu. Thus, Akaev was supported not only by Sarybagysh tribe but also Kushchu. Representatives of political clans are like-minded people united into one group. Political clans are formed on the principles of nepotism and engagement of the relatives or countrymen. However, a member of a clan can be any member of other clans or even a representative of a nation different from Kyrgyz.

The nature of political processes in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, in Khanin's (2000) view as cited in Gullette (2002, p.36), is determined largely by a complex system of "a neo-traditional, meaning a revival of what is thought to be how life was "traditionally" led; and a new, forced political and social structure". These considerations led him to believe that contemporary Kyrgyzstan has political clans that are combined by means of personal or business relationship.

The relationships between the members of a political clan and its leader, as Khanin (2000) further puts it, based on personal loyalties and traditional exchange of services: the leader of the political clan protects and helps his supporters in various illegal activities, provides access to material and social benefits (tenders, licenses, government loans, privatization of state enterprises, a tax shelter), helps and supports with career development by providing positions in the political and administrative sectors. In exchange, the clan leader has the right to use all the resources and contacts of his protégé, to strengthen his position in the government.

3.4 Theoretical Considerations

Political clans in Kyrgyz society can be considered as a group of individuals with common interests who usually try to implement these common interests. The study of this issue will be based on “The logic of collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups” by Mancur Olson and “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations” by Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson.

Olson (1971) claims that groups of individuals with common interests are expected to act in their interests with the same strive as individuals act in their own interest. According to author, this statement is based on the assumption that people in groups tend to act in their own interests. This statement comes from the generally accepted concept of the rational and selfish behavior of the individual.

In fact, when there is no any coercion or group is not small enough, then the rational, self-interested individuals will not make any effort to achieve common group goals. This principle is based on a free rider concept: even if the individual does not make any effort to achieve common group goals, he or she will still enjoy the benefits of achieving this goal in the end (Olson, 1971)

According to Olson (1971), all actions performed in a group or individuals' interests are taken by the organization, whose primary purpose is to support the interests of its members. Socio-psychologist Leon Festinger (1953) as cited in Olson (1971, p.6) argued that “the attractiveness of membership in the group is not the belonging to group but getting something thanks to this membership”.

For instance, the task of tribes is to support and protect its members, while the task of political clans is to provide all kinds of material and social benefits (tenders, licenses, government loans, privatization of state enterprises or a tax shelter) as well as career growth by offering prestigious positions in the political and administrative spheres.

Further Olson (1971) discusses the traditional theory of the behavior of groups, the differences between the two main types of this theory: the causal and formal. According to the causal type private organizations and groups exist all over the place, which is the result of the fundamental human tendency to participate in all kinds of social activities. According to the Italian political philosopher Gaetano Mosca (1939) mentioned in Olson (1971, p.17), people have an instinct to "gather in flocks and fight against rival flocks".

Olson (1971) says, that the formal version explains today's group and organization existence as a result of the evolution from primitive to modern industrial society. The initial small groups of primitive societies were small family groups. In modern society, according to Parsons (1950) as cited in Olson (1971), the government, the church, universities, corporations and professional associations gained the main weight in the social structure of the society. Mac Iver (1932) as cited in Olson (1971) says: “the main market difference between the primitive and modern societies would be the small number of specific communities in the first case and a high number in another. To sum up, big communities in modern society are comparable to small groups in primitive society”.

According to Olson (1971), traditional theories make a mistake when assuming that large groups are similar to the small ones except for the size, and therefore, are expected to behave in a similar way. The author believes that the basic needs of small groups can be easily satisfied, while larger groups cannot achieve their goals without motivation or coercion.

Olson (1971) argues that there is social motivation and people being in a group can be guided by the desire to gain prestige, respect, friendship and other social and psychological benefits (social status, personal prestige, respect, identification).

The author believes that there are social sanctions and social rewards that are part of motivation that can be used to mobilize large groups. Social incentives may be used in different ways: individual who breaks the rules may be expelled and on the other hand, the individual involved in the co-operation, can be escalated to the highest circles. Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson (1961), in their work “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization” state that organizations must provide tangible and intangible incentives for individuals in exchange for contributions of individual activity in the organizations. The authors also emphasize that social motivation should be considered as well as the financial motivation and all kinds of motives must be treated in the same way.

Olson (1971) further gives the example of a situation in which social motives likely to lead to the coordinated action of the members of a large group. This is a case of a federal group divided into several small groups. Each group has a reason to be reunited with the rest of a federation, representing a large group as a whole. This case describes the division of the Kyrgyz society to the North and the South, where many tribes team up according to their geographical origin in order to fight for dominance in the country. Thus the federal organization provides any

services to a small group that is a member of the federation. It is likely that small groups use social motivation to make the individuals of each of the small groups contribute to the collective goals of the group as a whole.

Clark and Wilson (1961) argue that organizations must provide tangible and intangible incentives to individuals in exchange for contributions of individual activity to the organizations. The Authors gives an example of three categories of incentive:

1) material incentives are “tangible rewards; that is, rewards that have a monetary value or can easily be translate into ones that have. These include money in the form of wages and salaries, the tangible benefits of a taxpayers' association to its members, the improvement in property values for a neighborhood redevelopment association or the increase in wages etc.” (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p.134);

2) solidary incentives mean “basically intangible rewards; that is the reward has no monetary value and cannot easily be translated into one that has...they derive in the main from the act of associating and include such rewards as socializing, congeniality, the sense of group membership and identification, the status resulting from membership, fun and conviviality, the maintenance of social distinctions, and so on” (Clark and Wilson, 1961, pp.134-135)

3) purposive incentives “like solidary incentives are intangible, but they derive in the main from the stated ends of the association rather than from the act of associating” (Clark and Wilson, 1961, p.135)

Clark and Wilson (1961) thoroughly distinguish purposive incentives from solidary ones. Solidary incentives mean devotion to the organization as such, whereas, purposive incentives mean loyalty to an organization's purposes. This difference is evident in the case where the individuals who are in a particular organization choose to leave an organization, which they believe is no longer fulfilling their purposes. So in the case of tribe and political clans, members of the tribes must stay loyal for the whole life, whereas the representatives of the political clans can leave the clan and flop in another, if the former was not able to fulfill their purpose.

A particular organization, according to Clark and Wilson (1961), may appeal to many motives. If tribes, for example, basically operate on the principle of solidary incentives, then the incentives for political clans are material and purposive ones.

3.5 Never Enough Power – Bakiyev’s Clan

The purpose of this chapter is to study the reign of Bakiyev’s clan in 2005-2010 in order to proof the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis #1: The criminal and corrupt activities of Bakiyev’s clan caused mass mobilization in April 2010.

Kurmanbek Bakiyev came to power in a result of a coup against Askar Akayev regime, later called "Tulip Revolution" (Aidarova, 2013). But after that, trying to protect himself from such a development, he built an even more authoritarian regime than has been under Akayev. After a two-year period of instability and mass protests that shocked the whole country in 2005 and 2007 (InfoCenter AntiTerror, 2008), Bakiyev has set a new goal to reform a Constitution in order to strengthen his power.

By the Decree of the President of Kyrgyz Republic on 21 October 2007 was held a referendum, which adopted new Constitution, proposed by Bakiev, which he signed two days later (Kadyrkulova, 2013). According to the new Constitution judicial and executive branches of Kyrgyzstan were fully dependent on president. According to the Constitution of the Kyrgyz republic as approved by referendum on 21 October 2007, Section II, Art.46, the President:

- 1) shall appoint the Prime Minister and members of the Government;
- 2) shall receive tenders of resignation from the Prime Minister, the Government or an individual member of the Government; shall take decisions on the resignation of the Prime Minister or the Government;
- 3) on his own initiative or at the proposal of the Prime Minister, shall dismiss from office a member of the Government;
- 4) appoint, at the proposal of the Prime Minister, the heads of administrative departments and other executive authorities; shall be entitled, on his own initiative or at the proposal of the Prime Minister, to dismiss from office a head of an administrative department or other executive authority;
- 5) in consultation with the Prime Minister, appoint heads of local state administrations; dismiss them from office. (Constitution, 2007)

Obviously, the government is dependent on the president and posts are therefore distributed on the basis of the principles of tribalism, mentioned earlier. It is the members of a political clan in power who make appointment in the government. In addition, paragraph 5 of the Art.46 of the

Constitution, clearly indicates that only people loyal to the president take the key posts at all governmental levels.

Temrikulov (2004) says that the balance between the North and the South is an important aspect in the distribution of seats in the government. “The absence of representatives of the South or North in key positions can provoke discontent among the population of this region which can lead to the loss of a huge part of electorate or even lead to destabilization. Therefore, the policy of appointment to government posts is stipulated by two main principles: loyalty to the president and regional balance” (Temirkulov, 2004, p.95).

It is worth mentioning that after the overthrow of Akayev in 2005, Bakiyev said that Kulov (Lenta.ru, n.d.b) refused to participate in the presidential election and if he wins the election he will appoint Kulova a prime minister, in turn, Kulov will actively support his ally during the electoral race (Central Asia, 2005). According to media reports, the parties signed an agreement (Dubnov, 2005). One of the points of agreement between Bakiyev and Kulov (critics found it unconstitutional) read as follows: if the Prime Minister Kulov will have to resign, President Bakiyev will also have to leave his post (Dubnov, 2005).

Analysts pointed out that the alliance of two political candidates allowed avoiding the confrontation of the North and the South. They also pointed out that since the agreement prescribed separation of powers, the next president will not have absolute power, which Akayev had (Makarov, 2005). July 10, 2005 Bakiyev was elected President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, gaining 88.65 percent of the vote. In August 2005, Kulov was appointed Acting Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, and in September took over the government of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. At that time Bakiyev and Kulov publicly stated that created a “tandem” in order to avoid “confrontation between southerners and northerners” (Osmonalieva, 2010). South was represented by Bakiyev, North by Kulov. However, after January 2007, after the parliament did not repeatedly support the candidacy of Kulov (Zhenmin Newspaper, 2007), Bakiyev has issued orders for the release of Kulova from the duties of the Prime Minister and, with the support of Parliament, appointed A. Isabekov as a new head of government (RBK, 2007). Since Bakiyev and most of his clan were Southerners, Kulov’s elimination (a representative of the North, widely perceived as a kind of guarantor of stability (Dzhani, 2006) disrupted the balance of power in the country. Superiority of the "South" on the "North" was clearly manifested, which of course was very dangerous.

The president's power in the judicial branch of the government is represented in Art. 46, part 2:

- 1) shall submit to the Jogorku Kenesh candidates for election as judges of the Constitutional Court;
- 2) at the proposal of the National Council for the Judiciary, shall submit to the Jogorku Kenesh candidates for election as judges of the Supreme Court;
- 3) shall appoint and dismiss local court judges at the proposal of the National Council for the Judiciary; shall give consent for criminal prosecutions or administrative proceedings against local court judges, administered under judicial procedure;
- 4) shall appoint with the consent of the Jogorku Kenesh the Prosecutor General; shall appoint at the proposal of the Prosecutor General the deputies of the Prosecutor General and dismiss them from office;
- 5) shall submit to the Jogorku Kenesh candidates for election as the Chairman of the National Bank and appoint at the proposal of the Chairman of the National Bank the deputy chairmen and members of the board of the National Bank; shall dismiss them from office;
- 6) shall appoint with the consent of the Jogorku Kenesh the Chairman of the Central Commission on Elections and Referendums; shall appoint one-half of the members of the Central Commission on Elections and Referendums; shall dismiss them from office;
- 7) shall submit proposals to the Jogorku Kenesh for the election and dismissal of the Chairman of the Chamber of Audit and its auditors.

Thus, the distribution of positions in the judiciary also depends on the president. According to Temirkulov (2004), the legislative branch of the government is the only place for competition between different regional groups and family clans. The majority of the parliamentary parties do not have a clear strategy, but have a narrow electorate, which is limited to inhabitants of certain regions. That is why there are so-called "the Northern" and "the Southern" parties in the parliament.¹⁶

But a regional party can not claim the republican scale until it has received support of all the regions. This is indicated by the norm of the Election Code of the Kyrgyz Republic (Electoral Code (1999, as amended 2007):

¹⁶ Whether the party is Northern or Southern in most cases determined by the origin of its leader. For instance, the party Atazhurt is considered to be the Southern since its chairman, Kamchibek Tashiev, is a native of the Jalal-Abad region that belongs to the south of the country.

Article 77. Determination and Official Publication of Elections' Results

1. On the basis of the protocols from precinct election commissions, by way of summing up data contained in them, the Central Election Commission shall perform the counting of votes taken for each list in a single-member electoral district.

2. Political parties, whose lists of candidates received

- less than five percent of votes of voters, included into voter lists, in the whole republic

- less than 0,5% of votes of voters, included into voter lists, in each oblast, cities of Bishkek and Osh shall be excluded from the distribution of deputy's mandates in a single-member electoral district.

For this reason, parties are trying to make their electoral lists, taking into account the fact that the party would have been equally reflected candidates from the south and from the north.

It should be noted that the results of 2007 parliamentary elections played a key role in analysis of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan. President Bakiyev created "Ak Jol" party before the elections which received eventually seventy one parliamentary seat of ninety; eleven seats went to the Social Democratic Party, eight to the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan (Ermakova, 2008). Part of the parties, who wished to go to elections, was deselected before the registration of candidates, eight were unable to overcome the five percent barrier. Walked the second largest of votes the party "Ata-Meken", which embodied a united opposition, could not overcome regional barriers to half a percent (Mamaraimov, 2007).

According to the new Constitution judicial and executive branches of Kyrgyzstan were fully dependent on president. With regard to the legislative branch of the country, the pro-presidential party "Ak Jol" gained 71 out of 90 parliamentary mandates (Ermakova, 2008). Thus practically a one-party parliament, with a clear predominance of "Ak Jol" party, is not legislative body, but executive (as well as any ministry). Bakiyev received an obedient parliament. By April 2010 Bakiyev had virtually unlimited power.

What he initially used. Roza Otunbayeva, as cited in Bukasheva (2010), noted that nowadays five persons with the last name Bakiyev hold top posts in the "White House". We are not discussing their relatives who filled all the posts of the "White House". Moreover, Bakiyev's nephew is the person in charge of the human resources department of the "White House".

What he initially used. Roza Otunbayeva, as cited in Bukasheva (2010), noted that nowadays five persons with the last name Bakiyev hold top posts in the "White House". We are

not discussing their relatives who filled all the posts of the “White House”. Moreover, Bakiyev’s nephew is the person in charge of the human resources department of the “White House”.

Bukasheva (2010) claims that the president’s brother, Marat Bakiyev, was Kyrgyzstan's ambassador in Germany and Norway. The president's son, Marat, served as Deputy Chairman of the National Security Service, his name is also linked with the murder of Kyrgyz journalist Gennady Pavlyuk in Kazakhstan. Another brother, Ahmat, was the uncrowned King of the Jalal-Abad region. The president's brother, Zhanysh Bakiyev, served as the head of the presidential guard and was involved in the mentioned above murders of Medet Sadyrkulov and “The Heroin Matryoshka” Tekebayev.

However, the president’s son, Maxim Bakiyev, who was involved in the aforementioned scandal with Klara Kabilova, evokes the greatest interest. Maxim Bakiyev has focused mainly on the economy and the business sector of the country. In October 29, 2009, the presidential decree was issued with the appointment of Maxim Bakiyev as the head of the Kyrgyzstan’s Central Agency of Development of Investments and Innovations (CADII) (Kompromat, 2010).

This means that from now on, the youngest presidential son will represent the interests of the government in negotiations with local and foreign businesses (Mihailov, 2009). Speaking of CADII, Otunbayeva, as cited in Bukasheva (2010), noted: “In fact, today were created two cabinets of ministers”. CADII’s position was alternative, but in fact, it represented the current government of Kyrgyzstan.

During the political exile of the Kyrgyz opposition leader, the former secretary of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan Edil Baisalov noted: “Bakiyev is finally concentrating power in his own hands. The only missing element from the full monarchy is the lack of hereditary succession, but I believe, and this “deficiency” will be fixed in the next stages of political reform” (Mihailov, 2009).

During the same year Kurmanbek Bakiyev initiated the reform of public administration. The essence of this reform was the possible transfer of presidential authority (if the president, for a certain reason, is unable to perform his duties) to a temporary president – a person who is determined on the presidential meeting by a majority of votes by a number of its members.

In February 9, 2010 the Constitutional Court of Kyrgyzstan approved the draft law on amendments to the Constitution of the Kyrgyzstan - from this date the election of temporary president after the resignation of the current president will be decided on the number of votes of a

small group of top officials. The opposition believed that those conditions form a hereditary transfer of power (Fergana News Agency, 2009b)

According to Bukasheva (2010), CADII transferred the control of the country's private assets to a foreign company called "MGN Group", founded and headed by Yevgeny Gurevich, a citizen of the USA with a Russian origin.^{17 18}

The "MGN Group" was given a control of the national strategic objects such as gold mining, energy and information: "KyrgyzAltyn", airport "Manas", "Power Plants", "KyrgyzGas" and even the Social Fund of Kyrgyzstan. The "Kyrgyztelekom" and "SeverElectro" by the time of revolution have been resold to themselves for pennies (Bukasheva, 2010).

The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the party "Ak Jol" made a grave mistake by appointing Adahan Madumarov, a representative of not only the South, but also of one tribe "Ichkilik" with President Bakiev (Akipress News Agency, n.d), the Speaker of the Parliament (CentraAsia News Agency, 2007).

As was mentioned before, the policy of the Kyrgyz Republic has always maintained the balance. Namely, if the President is from the North, then the Prime Minister should be from the South, and vice versa. Since under the new constitution it is not the Prime but the Speaker replacing the President, then the Speaker, it was expected, to be a representative of the North. Therefore pops up a question of interregional usurpation.

Meanwhile, the party "Ata Meken" refused to accept the official results of the elections, and more than a hundred of its supporters went on hunger strike (Mamaraimov, 2007). Participants of the rally, "I do not believe it", acted against election fraud, including well-known human rights activists were arrested and fined (NGO Kyrgyzstan, 2007)

December 25 2007 Kyrgyz opposition announced creation of a new movement "For Justice". It includes nine political parties and ten public organizations which disagreed with the election results. Among them the leading opposition party "Ata-Meken", "Ar-Namys", "Asaba" and NGO "Interbilim", headed by a member of the party "Ata-Meken" Asia Sasykbayeva

¹⁷ Maxim Bakiyev himself by rumours is currently an legal co-owner of the company, see Bukasheva (2010)

¹⁸ In March, the newspaper "San Francisco Chronicle" wrote that the Rome judge Aldo Morgini issued a warrant for the arrest of a U.S. citizen Eugene Gourevitch, a leading international consultant for the governmental authorities of Kyrgyzstan. Between 2003 and 2006 he participated in a fraud of Telecom Italia SpA and Fastweb SpA, when a staggering 2.7 billion USD have been transferred from the companies. The warrant of arrest counted 1600 pages and was signed by the judge Morgini. That document claimed that Gourevitch used his international contacts and financial expertise to help the Italian criminals to launder their illegal profits. (See Bukasheva, 2010)

(Fergana News Agency, 2007). The fact that the organization was headed by a prudent politician diplomat and former foreign minister Alikbek Dzhekshenkulov indicated that the opposition movement in Kyrgyzstan went to a higher level (Mamaraimov, 2007).

December 24, 2008 Kyrgyz opposition has established a new movement – United People's Movement (CentraAsia News Agency, 2008). The formal leader of the OND was the single ex-presidential candidate from united opposition, Almazbek Atambayev¹⁹, who lost the election gaining more than 8% of the vote (Fergana News Agency, 2008)

In case of victory, the opposition promised Kyrgyzstan would turn into parliamentary republic (Radio Azattyk, 2008), what indeed happened subsequently after the overthrow of the Bakiyev clan., when more than 90% of voters in a referendum approve a new constitution reducing the powers of the presidency and turning Kyrgyzstan into a parliamentary republic (BBC News Asia, 2012).

At the same time, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev managed to deprive the opposition of many influential leaders. Thus, one of the most fervent opponents of president Melis Eshimkanov headed national TV - the main information resource of the country. Former Chief of Staff of the United Front opposition Gen. Omurbek Suvanaliev took the post of secretary of the Security Council. Many other opponents of the government were appointed to various positions (Mamaraimov, 2007)

With the exception of a couple of newspapers and foreign media, almost all media in the country shifted to the side of authorities, thus, the opposition had virtually no impact on the electorate through the media resources (Mamaraimov, 2007).

If we consider the opposition according to regional distribution, it is clear that almost all leaders of the parties who joined the UNM originate from northern part of Kyrgyzstan (Akipress News Agency, n.d). There is evidence of a clear split between the South and North Bakiyev clan opposition. There was clear split between Bakiyev's South clan and Northern opposition.

3.6 Mass Mobilization

An obvious robberies, corruption and brutality by the Bakiyev clan, murders and persecutions of opposition, lack of jobs and low standard of living, the constant increase in

¹⁹ Almazbek Atambaev is the current president of Kyrgyz Republic.

electricity prices and food prices resulted in a broad growth of social discontent throughout Kyrgyzstan.

On March 17, 2010 opposition conducted “kurultay” that culminated in the row of demands for the country's authorities that were expected to be fulfilled by March 24, 2010 (Fergana News Agency, 2010c)

The National Kurultaj has put forward the following demands:

1. To cancel the increase of electricity prices, heat, hot and cold water, unreasonably high fees for the use of irrigation water and pastures;
2. To declare illegal and to cancel the sale of the Severelectro and the Kyrgyztelekom, as well as to stop further sale of energy facilities such as the Osh electro, the Jalalabad electro, the East electro and others for an underestimated price.;
3. To release from prison and justify the General Ismail Isakov and others; No to political repression and terror!
4. To withdraw the amendments to the Constitution, to eliminate the Central Agency for Development, Investment and Innovation (CADII) and other illegal government agencies.
5. To release the president Bakiyev's sons, Maxim and Marat, brothers Janysh, Adil and Marat from their governmental posts as well as to stop the intervention of sons, brothers and other president's family members in the activities of state and local governments.
6. To organize a special commission including members of the opposition and civil society to fully investigate the activities of the international fraudster Yevgeny Gurevich and his associates hired by Bakiyev's family as well as to investigate the legality of their companies that completely and uncontrollably managed all the assets of the country in the past few years.
7. To restore the freedom of speech and media, to stop the beatings and intimidation of journalists, to ensure the broadcasting of radio “Liberty” on the whole territory of the country, to allow access to independent Internet websites as well as to provide broadcasting time on public TV and radio channels for the opposition and civil society.

In case of not fulfilling these demands, the opposition has threatened with the People's kurultay across the whole country with a single agenda - to restore the power of the people (Fergana News Agency, 2010c)

Having received no reply, the opposition has set the People's Kurultay in all regions of the country on April 7, 2010. It was expected that the People's Kurultays would not achieved their

goals, as well as opposition demonstrations back in 2006-2007. The main reasons of the opposition's failure have been named the limited resources, the political apathy of society and the weakness of the opposition itself (Temirkulov, 2010).

The Bakiyev's clan, however, miscalculated. The April events in 2010 started from the people's discontent in the north of the country, in the town of Talas. According to Report of the Independent Civic Commission on the Events of 6-8 April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan (Abdirasulova, et.al., 2010), the sequence of the events has turned out as following:

Morning of April 6, a deputy chairman of the party "Ata-Meken", Bolot Sherniazov, was detained in the city of Talas. He arrived from Bishkek to participate in the opposition kurultay on the next day. By the lunchtime, hundreds of his supporters gathered outside the police department and then Sherniazov was released. After that, demonstrators headed to the Talas local administration. At 14:00 about 600-800 people stormed the administration building and took the Governor Beishenbek Bolotbekov hostage. By the evening, the number of people involved increased. According to witnesses, the audience was provided with stones and petrol cans, after which demonstrators began to prepare Molotov cocktails.

By the evening, two planes and five helicopters delivered combined detachment of 200 policemen and students of the Police Academy from Bishkek. They were given a special task to free the governor. Tear gas, rubber bullets and stun grenades were used against the demonstrators at around 20:30. The governor was released from the building and at the same time Bolot Sherniazov with several other activists was demonstratively arrested in front of his supporters.

After this happened, the crowd became more aggressive. They surrounded a group of police officers, began to beat them and then set the local administrative building on fire.

Despite all the difficulties, some time after the police officers managed to clear the area and released the governor that had been taken hostage. During this time, a press conference was on national TV with the Minister of the Interior M. Kongantiev, who, referring to the information provided by his deputy, said that the demonstration in Talas stopped and the whole situation is under control. Early in the morning of April 7, the security forces backups, headed by the Minister of the Interior M. Kongantiev, arrived in Talas. He was given a task to protect the police department and its armory, where a large quantity of firearms and ammunition was stored.

The demonstrators again gathered on the square of Talas and soon the number of them rapidly increased to about 15 thousand people. The protesters went straight to the police

department with the only demand - to release Bolot Sherniazov. In the afternoon, demonstrators tried several times to break into the building. Police used rubber bullets, tear gas and stun grenades against them. In response, protesters began to throw prepared Molotov cocktails and stones at the building. Protesters eventually managed to break the fence behind the police department (the fence was about 40 meters around the perimeter), and enter the yard. Police officers (over 200 people), who stood on the perimeter of the police department, could not use their weapons against the angry crowd, as they have not received the relevant order from the appropriate authorities.

After the incident happened in the town of Talas, the wave of demonstrations has spread to other regions of Kyrgyzstan. Opposition representatives together with the inhabitants of the certain regions have organized demonstrations in front of the buildings of public administrations in the towns of Tokmak, Naryn, Batken, Osh, Jalalabad, Karakol, Kara-Balta, villages Kirby and Ton. The governors of almost all areas voluntarily laid down their powers, and new people's governors were selected in all these regions.

Some questions have arisen immediately: what was the cause of such a powerful burst of people's resentment? Who is Bolot Sherniazov? Why Talas' people reacted to his arrest so aggressively?

Bolotbek Sherniazov was born in May 1, 1959 in the village of Pushkin, Manas District, Talas region (Akipress News Agency, n.d) . Kyrgyz by nationality and comes from a small tribe Kulek that flows into a stronger tribe of Saruu. Saruu is one of the main clan in the Talas valley and belongs to the left wing (Sol Kanat) (Sanjyra, Genealogy of Kyrgyz people). Since 1994 he was a member of the Uch-Kurgan village council of people's deputies of Manas, Talas region. In February 2000 Mr. Sherniazov was elected to the assembly of the people's representatives of Zhogorky Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic. Since March 2005, a deputy from the opposition party Ata-Meken and a deputy of torag (speaker) of Zhogorky Kenesh of the Kyrgyz Republic of the third convocation. He is also considered to be a deputy chairman of the party Ata-Meken (Akipress News Agency, n.d). During the elections of the year 2007, the opposition party Ata-Meken failed the regional half-point barrier to go further. It should also be noted that Sherniazov was twice elected to represent the electoral district of Talas, which makes him to be the undisputed leader in the region. The family clan plays a crucial role during the elections as it brings the support and promotion of the tribe's representatives.

As Temirkulov (2004) puts it, Kyrgyz traditional social structure is based on a set of rules and norms of customary law—adat, which acts as a system of social control. This system of social control takes the form of strict discipline. The author believes that one of the basic postulates of adat is a concept that was elaborated during centuries of constant threats and warfare – tooganchilik (uuruchuluk, djurtchuluk) – that is the obligation of each Kyrgyz to be a soldier, to help and avenge his community members. This rule is a source of strong allegiance to a solidarity group and presents an essential principle of Kyrgyz tribal structure. The social significance of this traditional solidarity has always been very important.

Omarov (2007) writes that all members of the tribe were interested in strengthening its forces and ensuring its well-being. The tribe did not only protect its members, but was also responsible for their misconducts. Customs did not only allow and encourage, but also obliged all the relatives to avenge the injustice or crime committed against any member of the tribe. According to Akimov (2002) at the time of a crisis and danger, tooganchilik facilitates mass mobilization, which can be expressed through such institutions of adat as aksakals council.

The most striking example of such practice is mass mobilization in Talas city in April 2010.

The fact that the Chairman of the Ata-Meken Party Bolot Sherniazov, who arrived in Talas on April 6 to participate in the opposition kurultai next day, was arrested in front of his supporters, became a powerful unifying and mobilizing factor. His supporters began to gather in Talas Square, soon the number of the crowd reached 15 thousand people, they went to the police department demanding release of Bolot Sherniyazov (Abdirasulova, et.al, 2010).. After that incident in Talas the mass mobilization spread throughout Kyrgyzstan. Representatives of the opposition together with the population of the regions organized rallies outside the buildings of local administrations in Tokmak, Naryn, Batken, Osh, Jalalabad, Karakol, Kara-Balta, Kirby and Ton (Abdirasulova, et.al, 2010)

The fact that the Minister of the Interior Kongantiev arrived to resolve the condition in Talas, aggravated the whole situation. Moldomusa Kongantiev was born in the southern part of the country in the city of Maili-Sai of Dzhalalabd region (Akipress News Agency, n.d). As well as Kurmanbek Bakiyev, Kongantiev is a representative of the clan Ichkilik (Sanjyra). Kongantiyev was a member of Bakiyev's clan and a Southerner in the eyes of Talas' people. Also, aforementioned North and South divisions play an important role here. Northerners gathered and rebelled against South Bakiyev clan.

The fact of the mass mobilization in the city of Talas represents phenomena of so-called “federal” group, where several small clans reunite with the rest to create a federation that represents a large group as a whole. This was a case, when the social motives and common goals (fighting against the South) led to an agreed action of members of the “federal” group.

According to the Resource Mobilization Theory, mass mobilization in Talas on April 7 should not be seen as a spontaneous protest, but as an option deal with the government supported with an organized collective rebellion. Thus, social movements are not seen as a form of spontaneous collective behavior, but as a kind of rational collective action, which is consistently in line with the objectives of social movement or organization and rational assessment of the changing social situation. Collective action is carried out on the basis of certain resources that are involved by social movement or organization. According to this approach there is no difference in principle, from the standpoint of this theory, between institutional and extra-institutional forms of public participation and collective action (Jenkins, 1983). Resource mobilization in this case, according to McCarthy and Zald (1977), were mainly social and personal communication, organizational, leadership and resources of solidarity.

In order to understand how the supporters and participants of the event were involved in a massive mobilization, we need to address to the incentive system of Clark and Wilson (1961). Recall that the authors present three categories of incentives: material incentives, solidary incentives and purposive incentives. Since representatives of the clans are committed to their groups a priori, the participants of mobilization acted naturally through a solidary incentive. However, the Northern opposition, as a federal group pursuing a common goal – the overthrow of the Bakiyev’s Southern clan, was mobilized through a purposive incentive.

Conclusion

Kyrgyzstan is a unique country. It is probably the only country in Central Asia from the former Soviet Union that tried to get out and find its own path of development. This is the only country in the region that has experienced two violent changes of regime since proclaiming its independence in 1991. The first regime overthrow was in 2005 and the second, which is the subject of this study, occurred in 2010.

The main object of this paper is the study of internal factors that served as a prerequisite for the increasing discontent of the people and the general tension in the country. Another goal is to analyze possible circumstances that led to mass mobilization in April 2010 in the town of Talas, and in the rest of the country later on.

In order to achieve the main goals of the thesis, the following hypotheses have been set:

Hypothesis #1: The criminal and corrupt activities of Bakiyev's clan caused mass mobilization in April 2010.

Hypothesis #2: Tribalism in Kyrgyz society was a reason for the mass mobilization in Talas, April 7, 2010.

It is important to note that the main objective of this work was not a comprehensive analysis of the April events, but all their possible causes and consequences.

The actual purpose of the paper was to study the background of 2010 April events in Kyrgyzstan: economical, socio-political situation, and activities of Bakiyev's clan that probably precipitated the grievance in Kyrgyz society and led to mass mobilization. There have been suggestions that a specific phenomenon in the structure of Kyrgyz society called tribalism served as a push for mass mobilization in Talas.

The study found out that the growth of discontent and social tension in the country was due to many factors. Increase in electricity tariffs, blackouts and heating problems in the winter were the main irritants in society, and it became a real base to enhance the potential for protest of the public opposition. It should be noted that the reasons for shortages of electricity and tariff increases were not only a wrong domestic policy of the country as well as corruption. It was also the climatic changes, the separation of the technologically unified energy system of the Central Asia, as well as obsolete energy equipment, requiring constant repair.

Another annoying factor was the economic recession and high rate of unemployment in the country. The consequence of the global economic crisis in 2008 was the return of the majority of labor migrants, which further worsened the situation for the government and those families, whose main source of income were remittances. The unemployed, making up one fifth of the working population and returning migrants, as a key audience for the opposition, represented a threat of social instability in the country.

Of course, Bakiyev and his government could not be responsible for the global economic crisis that led to economic recession in the country, the return of migrant workers and increase of the unemployment rate. However, the government headed by Kurmanbek Bakiyev was guilty that has not been able to respond adequately to the emerging social and economic problems and to take appropriate action. This all together has caused discontent among the population.

The following irritating factors are directly related to the activities of the president Bakiyev's clan. Despite the fact that after coming to power, Bakiyev has promised to fight corruption and nepotism, he did not keep either. His brothers, sons and nephews, not to mention fellow countrymen and associates, have occupied high-level governmental posts and virtually controlled the entire economy and politics in the country. Bakiyev has expanded its powers and amended the Constitution, creating anti-constitutional authority CADII, which was essentially the current government in the country. He then has appointed him his son, Maxim Bakiyev, as the head of this organization and handed him a control over the national strategic objects such as gold mining, energy, information, the national companies "KyrgyzAltyn", the airport "Manas", "Power Plants", "KyrgyzGas" and even the Social Fund of Kyrgyzstan. The president's family has bought the "Kyrgyztelekom" and "Severelectro" at the time of the revolution for pennies. All this was for the country's natural irritants.

Since coming to power, Bakiyev has made about 20 opposition representatives leave the country while killing 10 more well-known personalities, including politicians and journalists.

From the above reasoning it can be concluded that all these factors, including criminal and corrupt activities of Bakiyev's clan, for a long time caused dissatisfaction and tension in the country, but were not the cause of mass mobilization.

According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), neither the level of discontent, structural tension nor revolutionary ideology cannot be the cause of social movements. They occur under certain conditions and opportunities that become resources of movement. Therefore, the claimed

hypothesis that the criminal and corrupt activities of Bakiyev's clan caused mass mobilization in April 2010, has been denied.

Later on during the analysis of unrest in town of Talas on April 6-7 of the year 2010, we found out that the origin point for mass mobilization was the demonstrative detention of Bolotbek Sherniyazov, the deputy chairman of the opposition party Ata-Meken, who is the undisputed leader in the region. This fact is explained by the specific social structure of Kyrgyz society. Kyrgyz social structure is based on a system of social control - adat. One of the basic principles of adat is tooganchilik - it is a duty to protect members of clan. This rule is a source of strong solidarity and loyalty to the group and is the most important principle of the structure of the Kyrgyz society. In times of crisis and danger, tooganchilik contributed to the mass mobilization. Detention of Bolotbek Sherniyazov became a powerful unifying and mobilizing factor. After that incident in Talas, the mass mobilization has spread throughout Kyrgyzstan.

According to the Resource Mobilization Theory, mass mobilization in Talas on April 7 is a kind of a rational collective action that was carried out in accordance with the objectives of the social movement and rational assessment of the changing social situation. Resource mobilization in this case was the social and personal communication, organizational and leadership resources of solidarity. Since representatives of the clan are committed to their group a priori, the mass of people have been supporting their leader, Bolot Sherniazov, and have been mobilized through a solidary incentive. However, the Northern opposition as a federal group pursuing a common goal, which is the overthrow of the Bakiyev Southern clan, was mobilized through a purposive incentive.

So we can conclude from the study that hypothesis: "Tribalism in Kyrgyz society was a reason for the mass mobilization in Talas, April 7, 2010", was proved to be correct.

In this paper we have disclosed the dynamics and contradictions of domestic political and social environment that caused mass mobilization in April 2010. Since Kyrgyzstan with its geographical location plays an important role in Central Asia and is located in the zone of influence of some foreign powers – neighboring China, Russia, the presence of the USA and the European Union, it is necessary to study the interaction of internal and external factors as an important element in analyzing the causes of mass mobilization in 2010 in Kyrgyzstan.

Bibliography

Abdirasulova, A. et al., 2010, “Report of the Independent Civic Commission on the Events of 6-8 April 2010 in Kyrgyzstan”, Bishkek, Akipres, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1272720300>, [Accessed 12 June 2013]

Aidarova, A., 2013, “T.Chorotegin: “Zakladyvaetsya osnovanie dlja parlamentsko-prezidentskoy sistemy vlasti””, Gezziter News Agency, Available at: http://www.gezziter.org/interviews/18555_tchorotegin_zakladyivaetsya_osnovanie_dlya_parlamentsko-prezidentskoy_sistemyi_vlasti/, [Accessed 2 June 2013]

Akipress News Agency,n.d, “Kto est kto”, Available at: <http://who.ca-news.org/people/71>, [Accessed 20 May 2013]

Akipress News Agency, 2010, “Veernye otklucheniya energii v 2008 godu proizvodilis iz-za plohogo upravlenija energosektorom - nezavisimyi expert” Available at: <http://business.akipress.org/news:119111/>[Accessed 15 June 2013]

Akipress News Agency, 2010b, “Ministerstvo energetiki: 1% poter elektroenergii raven 52 milliona somov, v energosfere KR poteri sostavlyayut 30%”, Available at: <http://www.tazabek.kg/news:123251/> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

BBC News Asia, 2012, “Kyrgyzstan profile - Timeline”, October 2012, Available at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16185772>, [Accessed 3 June 2013]

Beissinger, M.R., 2002, “Nationalist mobilization and the collapse of the Soviet State”, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Beshov, A., 2011., "Aprelskaya revoliucija" v Kirgizii: god spustya", BBC Russian version [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/international/2011/04/110406_kyrgyzstan_april_revolution_anno.shtml

Bolponova, A., 2012, “K issledovaniyu problemy traibalizma v kyrgyzskom obshestve v XX veke”, Bizdin.kg, Availavle at: http://bizdin.kg/elib/jurnaldar/vik/2011_2/bolponova.doc [Accessed 10 June 2013]

Borodnie, E.A., 2012, “Klanovyi harakter ustroystva Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki”, MP Mir i Politika Journal, Available at: <http://mir-politika.ru/81-klanovyy-harakter-ustroystva-kyrgyzskoy-respubliki.html> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

CentraAsia News Agency, 2007, “Spikerom Parlamenta Kirgizii izbran Adahan Madumarov”, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1198484820>, [Accessed 21 May 2013]

CentraAsia News Agency, 2008, “Oppoziciya Kyrgyzstana obrazovala “Obedinennoe Narodnoe dvizhenie”, December 2008, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1230101160>, [Accessed 2 June 2013]

Central Asia Regional News Digest, 2005, “F.Kulov poidet v tandeme s i.o. prezidenta K.Bakievym na prezidentskih vyborah i otkazyvaetsya ot uchastiya v kachestve kandidata na vyborah glavy gosudarstva”, May 2005, CA News.Info Central Asia regional news digest, Available at: <http://ca-news.info/2005/05/13/44>, [Accessed 15 May 2013]

Chyntemirov, A., 2013, “kem byl v Kyrgyzstane Maxim Bakiyev, kotorogo zashishaet Angliya, opravdyvaet Amerika?”, Gezitter.org News Agency, Available at: http://www.gezitter.org/politic/20431_kem_byil_v_kyrgyzstane_maksim_bakiev_kotorogo_zas_chischaet_angliya_opravdyvaet_amerika/ [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Clark, B. Peter., Wilson Q. James, 1961, “Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol.6, No.2, (Sep.,1961), pp.129-166, Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2390752> [Accessed 22 June 2013]

Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic, New wording as approved by referendum on 21 October 2007, European Commission for democracy through law (Venice commission), Available at: [http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL\(2007\)127-e](http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2007)127-e) [Accessed 25 June 2013]

Dairov, I., 2010, “O traibalisme kak ob obratnoi storone globalizma”, Akipress News Agency, Available at: <http://akipress.org/comments/news:731> [Accessed 25 May 2013]

Djumataeva, V., 2010, “The Roots Of Kyrgyzstan's Uprising”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Commentary_Roots_Of_Kyrgyzstan_Uprising/2022430.html [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Djunushaliev, J., Ploskih V., 2006, “Traibalizm i problemy razvitija Kyrgyzstana”, CA&CC Press AB, Available at: <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-09-2000/17.Dzhunu.shtml> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Dubnov, A., 2005, “Kulov vykladyvaet kozyri”, Vremya Novostey Izdatelstvo, Available at: <http://www.vremya.ru/2005/161/5/133491.html>, [Accessed 20 May 2013]

Dzhani, F., 2006, “Politicheskaya nekompetentnost Bakieva sdelala ego chelovekom , kotorogo mozžno obvinit v presledovanii edinsvennoi celi - uzurpacii vlasti”, Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/4690>, [Accessed 21 May 2013]

Edwards, Bob., Gillham F. Patrick, 2013, “Resource Mobilization Theory”, The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, Available at: http://academia.edu/2901695/Resource_Mobilization_Theory_and_Social_Movements, [Accessed 14 June 2013]

Engdahl, F. William, 2010, "Kyrgyzstan as a Geopolitical Pivot in great Power Rivalries. Washington, Moscow, Beijing and the Geopolitics of Central Asia", Global Research., Available at: <http://www.globalresearch.ca/kyrgyzstan-as-a-geopolitical-pivot-in-great-power-rivalries/19327>, [Accessed 12 June 2013]

Erkebaev A., 2010, Report of the Head of the Commission for the study of the major causes of April events 2010, Available at: <http://www.ca-news.org/news:443281/> [Accessed 8 June 2012]

Ermakova, I., 2008, "Kirgizija: Opozicija namerena sozdat alternativnyi parlament", Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=8119>, [Accessed 14 May 2013]

Fergana News Agency, 2007, "Kyrgyzstan: neskolko opozicionnyh organizacij obedinilis v edinoe dvizhenie", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=8045>, [Accessed 21 May 2013]

Fergana News Agency, 2008, "Kyrgyzstan: Obedinennoe narodnoe dvizhenie vozglavil Almazbek Atambaev", September 2009, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=12926>, [Accessed 2 June 2013]

Fergana News Agency, 2009, "Kazakhstan: Kirgizskiy zhurnalist Gennadiy Pavluk skonchalsja v bolnice Almaty", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=13676> [Accessed 16 June 2013]

Fergana News Agency, 2009b, "Kyrgyzstan: Konstitucionnyi sud razreshil izbirat Gossovetu vremennogo prezidenta", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=13992> [Accessed 4 June 2013]

Fergana News Agency, 2010, "Kyrgyzstan: V Naryne prohodit massovyi miting protiv povysheniya tarifov na elektrichestvo i teplo", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=14178> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Fergana News Agency, 2010b, "Kyrgyzstan: Prezident smenil gubernatora Narynskoj oblasti za razreshenie provesti vtoroi miting protiv povysheniya tarifov", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=14170> [Accessed 17 June 2013]

Ferghana News Agency, 2010c, "Chto potreboval narodnyi kurultai opozicii?", Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=14292> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Friedrich, J.Carl., 2007., An Introductory Note on Revolution. In: Friedrich, J.Carl. ed. 2007., Revolution. Aldine Transaction, 2007., pp. 3-10. Available through: http://books.google.cz/books?id=XpIn5TedUykC&printsec=frontcover&hl=cs&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false [Accessed 15 May 2013]

Gullette, D., 2002, "Tribalism in Kyrgyzstan Examined", The CA&CC Press® AB /Central Asia & Central Caucasus Press, Available through: <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/eng-02-2002/04.gulprimen.shtml> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Gullette, D., 2010, "Institutionalized Instability: Factors Leading to the April 2010 Uprising in Kyrgyzstan", Eurasian Review, Vol. 3, Available at: http://www.academia.edu/379904/Institutionalized_instability_Factors_Leading_to_the_April_2010_Uprising_in_Kyrgyzstan [Accessed 16 June 2013]

Gullette, D., 2010b, "Analiticheskie zametki o politike bezopasnosti v Centralnoi Azii #1. Vozrozhdenie politiki energeticheskikh tarifov v Kyrgyzstane", GCSP, Available at: http://osce-academy.net/uploads/docs/gullette_version_to_upload__ru_.pdf [Accessed 15 June 2013]

IMF, 2008, "Food and Fuel Prices – Recent Developments, Macroeconomic Impact, and Policy Responses", Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/063008.pdf> [Accessed 16 June 2013]

IMF, 2011, Unemployment rate, Kyrgyzstan, Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>

Ivashenko, Ye., 2010, "Omurbek Tekebaev: "Otmenit konstituciu i dekrety, vse vernut bakievskoi rodne?", Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6735> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

InfoCenter AntiTerror, 2008, "Osobennosti vntripoliticheskikh i okolopoliticheskikh konfliktov v Kyrgyzskoj Respublike: aktualnye podhody k snizheniu potenciala nasiliya", Available at: <http://www.kgcentr.info/?pid=4&cid=4&nid=50> [Accessed 14 May 2013]

Ivashenko, Ye., Dzhanii, F., 2011, "Ubijstvo Medeta Sadyrkulova: Kogda my uznaem pravdu?", Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/7095> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Ivashenko, Ye., 2012, "Kyrgyzstan: Muka dorozhaet, jizn uhudshaetsya, prodovolstvennaya bezopasnost strany pod ugrozoi", Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/7516> [Accessed 12 June 2013]

Janovskaja, M., 2010, "Mejdunarodnaja krizisnaya grupa: V trudovoi migracii zainteresovany i prostye ludi, i radikaly, i pravitelstva", Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/6441> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Jenkins, J.C., 1983, "Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements", Annual Review of Sociology Vol.9, pp.527-553, Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2946077?uid=3737856&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21102462618881>, [Accessed 12 July 2013]

Juraev, Sh., 2009, "Energy Emergency in Kyrgyzstan: Causes and Consequences", EUCAM Policy Brief, No. 5, EU-Central Asia Monitoring, CEPS and FRIDE, Brussels and

Madrid, Available at: <http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/PDF/PolicyBriefs/PB-5-eversion.pdf> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Kadyrkulova, N., 2013, "20 let Konstitucii Kyrgyzskoi Respubliki", Neweuroasia.net News Agency, Available at: <http://www.neweurasia.net/ru/culture-and-history/20-let-konstitutsii-kyrgyzskoy-respubliki>, [Accessed 2 June 2013]

Kauffman, M., Alfonso, D.H., ed., 1997, "Community Power and Grassroots Democracy. The transformation of social life", Zedbooks, London&NewJersey.

Khanin, V., 2000, "Kyrgyzstan: ethnic pluralism and political conflicts", The CA&CC Press® AB /Central Asia & Central Caucasus Press, Available through: http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2000/journal_eng/eng03_2000/16.khanin.shtml [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Kompromat.ru, 2010, "Kurmanbek Bakiyev zloupotrebil vlastyu", Available at: http://www.kompromat.ru/page_29110.htm [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Kraminick, I., 1972., Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship., History and Theory, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1972), pp. 26-63, Abstract only. Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504623> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

KyrTAG the Kyrgyz Telegraph Agency, 2010, "WikiLeaks: Povyshenie tarifov na elektroenergiu v 2010 godu oppozicija ispolzovala v politicheskikh celjah", Available at: <http://www.kyrtag.kg/?q=ru/news/13233> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

KyrTAG the Kyrgyz Telegraph Agency, 2011, "Realnyi uroven bezroboticy v Kyrgyzstane sostavlyayet 20% - expert", Available at: <http://www.kyrtag.kg/?q=news/6370> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

KyrTAG the Kyrgyz Telegraph Agency, 2013, "92% trudovyh migrantov iz Kyrgyzstana edut na zarabotki v Rossiu, 8% vybiraut Kazakhstan", Available at: <http://www.kyrtag.kg/?q=ru/news/42304> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Lenta.ru, Online Newspaper, n.d., "Kurmanbek Bakiev. Bysvshiy prezident respubliki Kirgizia", Available at: <http://lenta.ru/lib/14170838/> [Accessed 12 June 2013]

Lenta.ru, Online newspaper, n.d.b, Kulov, Feliks, Lider kirgizskoj partii "Ar-Namys", Available at: <http://lenta.ru/lib/14170839/full.htm> [Accessed 12 June 2013]

Lillis, D., 2010, "Zhestokoe ubijstvo v Kazakhstane kyrgyzskogo zhurnalista ukazyvaet na problemy so svobodoi slova", EurasiaNet, Available at: <http://russian.eurasianet.org/node/30949> [Accessed 21 June 2013]

Lipsey, R.G., Chrystal, K.A., 2007, "Economics", Oxford University Press, Available at: <http://books.google.cz/books?id=HgXWV8JMC10C&dq=%22the+longer->

term+effects+of+high+unemployment+rates+for+those+who+have+become+so+disillusioned+th
at+%22&source=gbs_navlinks_s [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Lucyuk, K., 2011, “Kolichestvo pogibshih v aprelnih i iunskih sobytiyah”, Analytical source Vesti.Kg, Available at: http://www.vesti.kg/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=8152&Itemid=83, [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Lykov, V., 2008, “Predsedate' CIK Klara Kabilova: Maxim Bakiyev menya oskorbil i zapugal”, Komsomolskaja pravda, Available at: <http://www.kp.ru/daily/24171.5/383159/> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Makarov, D., 2005, “Felix Kulov: My obyazany byt s Rossiei”, Argmunety i Fakty Press Centre, Available at: <http://news.aif.ru/news.php?id=19754>, [Accessed 20 May 2013]

Mamaraimov, A., 2007, “Kirgiziya: Parlamentskie vybory i konec epohi ulichnogo liberalizma”, Fergana News Agency, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/articles/5538>, [Accessed 14 May 2013]

Matveeva, A., 2010, “Kyrgyzstan in Crisis: Permanent revolution and the course of nationalism”, Crisis States Research Centre, Working Paper No.79., Available at: <http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP792.pdf> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Matveeva, T., 2003, “Kurs lekciy po makroekonomike”, Moscow, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

McCarthy John D., Zald N. Mayer, 1977, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory”, The American Journal of Sociology, Vol.82, No 6., (May 1977), pp.1212-1241, Available at: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2777934> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Mihailov, G., 2009, “Otec i syn”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, Available at: http://www.ng.ru/cis/2009-11-02/5_kirgizia.html [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Moiseeva, S., 2013, “Pervomaiskiy raisud opublikoval polnyi text prigovora Maximu Bakievu”, Publishing House “Vecherniy Bishkek”, Available at: http://www.vb.kg/doc/221962_pervomayskiy_raysyd_opyblikoval_polnyy_tekst_prigovora_maksimy_bakievu.html [Accessed 19 June 2013]

Mokeyev, A.M., et.al., 2013, “Proishozhdenie Kyrgyzskogo naroda”, Akipress, Project Istorija Kyrgyzstana i Kyrgyzov, Available at: <http://www.akipress.org/kg/history/news:13489> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

NGO Kyrgyzstan, 2007, “Arestovannye uchastniki akcii “Ya ne veryu” namereny prodoljit svou akciu”, December 2007, Available at: http://ngo.acssc.kg/news_rash.php?ify_id=17, [Accessed 22 May 2013]

Nochevkin, V., 2010, "Realnaya politika v Kyrgyzstane: vse reshayut sorodichi", Delo № Republic Newspaper, Bishkek, p.5-6, Available at: <http://delo.kg/index.php/health-7/4982-realnaya-politika-v-kyrgyzstane-vsjo-reshayut-sorodichi> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Nur.Kz Kazakhstan portal, 2010, "Otvetstvennost za ubijstvi Gennadija Pavluka vozlozhili na specluzhby Kirgizii", Available at: <http://news.nur.kz/149391.html> [Accessed 21 June 2013]

Olson, M., 1971, "The logic of collective action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups", Vol. CXXIV, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Available at: <http://outsidethetext.com/archive/Olson.pdf> [Accessed 14 June 2013]

Omarov. M, 2007, "Traibalizm kak zerkalo kyrgyzskoi politiki, ili Fenomen traibalizma u kyrgyzov", CentraAsia, Analytical Journal, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/news2.php?st=1183410000> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Oraz, S., 2006, "Tribal Connections within the political processes: the case of Kyrgyzstan processes: the case of Kyrgyzstan", International Strategic Research Organization, pp.78-91, Available at: <http://www.usak.org.tr/dosyalar/dergi/9ZqD7kNxAFRksv9htZoVFmHNX8OrdY.pdf> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Osmonalieva, A., 2010, "Kyrgyzstan: raskol v obshestve ne oznachaet raspad strany", Euroasia.org Information Agency, Available at: <http://europe-asia.org/ru/index.php/2009-10-10-13-39-27>, [Accessed 20 May 2013]

Radio Azattyk, 2005, "Narodnoe dvojenie Kyrgyzstana obratilos k narodu i vzyalo na sebya otvetstvennost za koordinaciju deistviy akciy protesta", Available at: http://www.azattyk.org/archive/ky_News_in_Russian/20050310/15816/832.html?id=1235767 [Accessed 21 June 2013]

Radio Azattyk, 2005b, "Kurmanbek Bakiyev: s Novogo Goda AO "Severelektro" dolzhno byt peredano v koncessiju", Available at: http://www.azattyk.org/archive/ky_News_in_Russian/20051123/15816/832.html?id=1246037 [Accessed 24 June 2013]

Radio Azattyk, 2009, "Obedinennaya oppozitsiya provedet svoi kurultai 25 aprelya", April 2009, Available at: <http://rus.azattyk.org/content/news/2797066.html>, [Accessed 2 June 2013]

Rakymbay uluu, N., 2005, "Kyrgyzskie politicheskie klany, chast I", CentraAsia, Analytical Journal, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1125311460> [Accessed 12 June 2013]

Rasov, S., 2009, "Gibel "serogo kardinala" Kyrgyzstana. DTP ili ubijstvo?", Center for Political Technologies, Available at: <http://politcom.ru/7785.html> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Ria Novosti, 2009, "Situaciya vokrug zakrytija Cherkizovskogo rynka v Moskve", Available at: http://ria.ru/trend/closing_closing_cherkizovsky_17062009/ [Accessed 16 June 2013]

RBK Ukraina, 2007, "President Kirgizii podpisal ukaz o naznachenii A.Isabekova premer ministrom respubliki", January 2007, Available at: http://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/politics/prezident_kirgizii_podpisal_ukaz_o_naznachenii_a_isabekova_premer_ministrom_respubliki__1170074997, [Accessed 21 May 2013]

Shevchenko, M., 2010, Sudite Sami, Russian First TV-Channel., April 2010. Available at: http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects_edition/si5691/fi3918/pid18956/pr1 [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Stone, L., 1966., Theories of Revolution., World Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2 (jan., 1966), pp. 159-176, Abstract only. Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009694> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Sultambaev, N., 2010, "Tarifi na elektroenergiu v Kyrgyzstane: fakty protiv sluhov", CentraAsia news Agency, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1268860500> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Tanter, R., Midlarsky M., 1967, "A theory of revolution", The Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 11, No. 3., Sage Publications, Inc., pp. 264-280, Available through: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/172594> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

Temirkulov, A., 2004, "Tribalism, Social Conflict, and State-Building in the Kyrgyz Republic", Berliner Osteuropa Info, Vol. 21., Pp. 94-100, Available at: http://www.policy.hu/temirkulov/at_pub_boi.pdf [Accessed 10 June 2013]

Temirkulov, A., 2010, "Kyrgyz "revolutions" in 2005 and 2010: comparative analysis of mass mobilization", Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 38:5, 589-600, Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2010.503617> [Accessed 20 June 2013]

The Code of the Kyrgyz Republic on Elections in the Kyrgyz Republic", 1999, as ammended 2007, Available at: <http://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/15276>, [Accessed 14 May 2013]

The World Bank, GDP per Capita growth (annual %) Kyrgyzstan, Available at: Source: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx> [Accessed 16 June 2013]

Toktonaliev, T., 2010, "Kyrgyztsan: rezkoe povyshenie tarifov vyzvalo nedovolstvo grazhdan", Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Available at: <http://iwpr.net/ru/report-news/> [Accessed 18 June 2013]

Torogeldieva, B.M., 2008, "Osobennosti politicheskoi kultury sovremennogo Kyrgyzskogo naroda", Vestnik KRSU, Tom 8., № 7, P.157-160., Available at: <http://arch.kyrlibnet.kg/uploads/Torogeldieva%20B.M..pdf> [Accessed 10 May 2013]

Umbetalieva, T., 2003, "Traibalism v Kazakhstane. Rodoplemennaya differenciacija - osnova politicheskoj sistemy", Centrasia, Analytical Journal, Available at: <http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1041591120> [Accessed 15 June 2013]

Vinogradov, V., 2007, Karybekov Ernest interview with slovo Kyrgyzstan newspaper, Available at: <http://www.fergananews.com/article.php?id=5235> [Accessed 16 June 2013]


Zhenmin Zhabao Newspaper, 2007, "Parlament Kyrgyzstana vnov otverg predlozhennuyu prezidentom Kandidaturu F. Kulova na post premer-ministra", January 2007, Zhenmin Zhabao Newspaper, Available at: <http://russian.people.com.cn/31519/5330541.html>, [Accessed 21 May 2013]

Zhunusov, S., 2010, "Gosudarstvennyi perevorot v Kyrgyzstane: prichiny, sledstviya, uroki", Open Online newspaper: Forum.msk.ru., Available at: <http://forum-msk.org/material/fpolitic/2908467.html> [Accessed 21 June 2013]

Zpress.kg, 2010, "S nachala goda obshie poteri elektroenergii sostavili 1.3. milliarda kilovatt/chasov ili 26.7% - Ministerstvo energetiki KR", Available at: http://www.zpress.kg/news/news_only/1/21722/418.ru [Accessed 16 June 2013]


Appendices

Graph 1. Economic growth in Kyrgyzstan 2000-2010




Source: “GDP per capita growth (annual %), World Development Indicators, World Databank, Available at: <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>, [Accessed 10 June 2013]

Graph 2. Unemployment Rates in Kyrgyzstan 1994 - 2010



Source: “Kyrgyzstan Unemployment rate”, 2013, Index Mundi, Available at: http://www.indexmundi.com/kyrgyzstan/unemployment_rate.html [Accessed 11 June 2013]

Figure 1. The North and the South regions of the Kyrgyz Republic



Source: <http://epmaps.wfp.org/>