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Martin Dražan

Univerzita Karlova v Praze
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Martin Dražan

Phenomenology of space: Husserl's and early Heidegger's notion of space

Fenomenologie prostoru: Pojem prostoru u Husserla a raného Heideggera

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Ritter, Ph.D.

Vedoucí práce: Mgr. Martin

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Abstrakt (česky):

Tato práce se zabývá prostorem, tak jak ho pojmají dva velikáni fenomenologie, konkrétně Martin Heidegger a Edmund Husserl. Zkoumání prostoru není limitováno jeho pojmáním jako vědeckého, třídímenzinálního prostoru. Taková interpretace prostoru je vykázána jakožto odvozená z jiných, původních významů prostoru, v kterých se extenzinalita prostoru teprve konstituuje. Fenomenologická analýza, provedená u každého filosofa jiným způsobem, je pak předvedena jako zdroj skutečného porozumění fenoménu světa. Toto porumění pak může obohatit limitované chápání světa nastavené většinou moderních věd.

Abstract (in English):

This thesis is concerned with the topic of space as treated by the two giants of phenomenology, namely Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. The investigation is not limited to the strict sense of space understood as scientific three-dimensional space. Such interpretation of space is shown to be derived from other primordial meanings of space in which the extensional quality of space is only constituted. The phenomenological analysis, carried out differently by each philosopher, is found to be the source of genuine understanding of the phenomenon of space. Such understanding can enrich the limited view of space laid out by most of the modern sciences.

Klíčová slova (česky) :

prostor, fenomenologie, vnímání, jev, vědomí, reprezentace, samodanost, konstituce, bytí, Husserl, Heidegger,

Klíčová slova (anglicky):

space, phenomenology, perception, phenomenon, consciousness, representation, self-givenness, constitution, being, Husserl, Heidegger

"He, who in even a single point ... relies upon factors pregiven in natural apperception, has to pay for it with countersense and absurdity."¹

Edmund Husserl

¹ Husserl, Edmund. *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/1907*. Ed. U. Melle, 1984. page

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1 Introduction

The topic of this thesis is space. In our experience, we encounter space in different forms such as space of physical objects or geometrical space. Similarly, when we talk about space, we often operate with the whole multiplicity of meanings that can be designated to 'space'. In spite of this, we shall not be tempted to start our investigation with clarifying which *kind* of space undergoes our thematization here. But can we do without some such clarification? As certain meanings of 'space' are yet hidden to us, it would be sufficient at this point to disclose our topic negatively; we will not limit ourselves to understanding space as three-dimensional grid of physics or mathematics.

Our interest in the topic of space was triggered by reading two books about architecture. It was *Genius Loci* by Christian Norberg-Schulz and *Architecture in the age of divided representation* by Dalibor Veselý. Both of these books discuss the topic of space in connection to several theories of architecture with help of phenomenology. It became clear that the phenomenological investigation of space was something worth of attention. Not only because it would allow for much better understanding of certain theory of architecture (which is what we could assume already), but also (and more importantly) because *phenomenological interpretation of space provides genuine understanding of the topic of space and its foundations* (which is what we hereby propose to be our general thesis) that transcends our usual or/and scientific interpretation which is prevailing in most of us.

When one immerses oneself in the topic of space, she may become overwhelmed by its richness. Certainly, any comprehensive study of space and spatial phenomena would comprise of many volumes. We shall therefore limit our investigation exclusively to early phenomenology as it would make less sense to try to reproduce later periods without any knowledge of what came before. Moreover, the analyses of both of the authors of our choice have, in many ways, not been surpassed or devalued and remains valid to some extent even today. These authors are Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology and his pupil Martin Heidegger. The latter had to be reduced to his early period (before his so

called 'Turn' [*Kehre*]) as we already limited our investigation to 'early' phenomenology. Continuing, we focused exclusively on his masterpiece *Being and Time*² as the topic of space is, even though seldom directly thematized in the book, the fundamental pillar of Heidegger's project (on which he develops in his later writings where the topic of space becomes very complex). The lack of addressing the topic of space directly creates some asymmetry in our thesis, because Husserl, unlike Heidegger, dedicated a lot of 'space' to illuminate the problem in many of his books. Therefore we shall not limit ourselves to any one book or source when discussing Husserl. Our treatment of secondary literature has to adapt to this asymmetry as well. While we use several secondary books in order to explain Heidegger's existential analysis, we try to reduce the use of such sources in our examination of Husserl.

This thesis was written during our year-long stay at the Katolike Universiteit Leuven, where the main archive housing Edmund Husserl's heritage is located. Therefore this thesis was written under the supervision of several wonderful philosophers teaching in Leuven. The biggest challenge we faced, besides conducting our investigation in English language³, can be articulated through this question: How shall we grasp the complex topic of space without having to include the whole 'system' or project through which it is articulated? Indeed, there is an array of dictionaries explaining Husserl's and Heidegger's thoughts. To avoid losing of the 'path' of our investigation, we have to develop certain method. The sort of 'narrative' we created in both chapters of this thesis begins with explaining the 'subject' and only then *moves* on to start explaining spatiality. The 'intersubjectivity' is revealed along this general path (even *together* with space).

In this thesis, it will be our goal to demonstrate the genuine nature of phenomenological understanding of space and its foundational character for every objective space. Let us first turn to Husserl.

2 We use the translation of Macquarrie and Robinson, as it is widely used by authors of secondary literature. Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Blackwell Publishers, 2001. We use the abbreviation 'BaT' to refer to the book later.

3 The reason for writing this thesis in English shall be clear in the light of our year-long stay in Belgium in English speaking environment.

Husserl

We often mean different things when we talk about space. For instance we say we need to have more space in a relationship, decorate our working space, there is the Euclidean and other mathematical spaces etc. Even within Husserl's project, we can trace several meanings of the word with each of them being more or less different. There are two such kinds of space we would like to investigate in this chapter. The first one is the space which is constituted along with the constitution of a thing. We can call it *spatial apprehension*. The second kind of space we are interested in is the space constituted as objective reality. We can call it the world.

Apart from being constituted on different levels⁴, there are further distinctions between the two. At the same time, we should try to understand both of them as two poles of one phenomenon called space. But before we proceed with our inquiry into space, we feel the need to make some preliminary remarks on phenomenology as such. That will be the topic of the first section of this chapter and will prove helpful for understanding of the second chapter on Heidegger as well.

2.1 Phenomenology as science

Before one begins with the study of a specific problem within the field of phenomenology, she should understand the motivations underlying this scientific field and the method it uses in order to pursue its goals. Answer to this simple „what is he [Husserl/phenomenology] interested in“ or „what it is all about“ undoubtedly shapes other scientific fields as well, but it is absolutely crucial for understanding phenomenology. Unlike most of the disciplines we think of when we talk about science, phenomenology can not be understood as *natural* science. The study of phenomena does not rely on our experience of the world of nature. Following paragraphs of this section will try to explain what are the goals and motivations of phenomenology, how phenomenology differs from other sciences and what are the phenomena it studies.

⁴ As is explained in length below.

As we have suggested, we should start by asking about Husserl's motivations to do phenomenology. These are of course closely connected with his motivations to do philosophy as such. „Husserl's idea of philosophy is determined by the thought of a revival of the Socratic-Platonic idea of philosophy as absolute knowledge in its connection with self-knowledge. As such an idea, philosophy is only to be realized in Husserl's view in an infinite process, and not as the work of one man and his 'system'.“⁵ The idea of philosophy as absolute knowledge in its connection with self-knowledge strongly reminds us of Cartesian *Meditations*. Indeed, Descartes often stands for an inspiration as well as a point of reference, dialog or even dissent for Husserl as does the whole tradition of skepticism. But how is the absolute knowledge connected to self-knowledge? Husserl finds this connection in the analyses of consciousness, which became the sole object⁶ or more precisely the background for phenomenology. Consciousness is the object of study of several other sciences like psychology, pharmacology or neuroscience. What makes phenomenology so fundamentally different is Husserl's determination to seek absolute knowledge which led him to development of a method far from those used in experiential sciences.

2.1.1 Distinction between fact and essence

Husserl called his new method *eidetics*⁷, or eidetical reduction, since it is concerned with the *essence* of consciousness. One could argue that psychology at least to some extent studies the essence of consciousness as well. Still, psychology is not *eidetical science* because it bases its discoveries and theories on the states of affairs (*Sachverhältnis*) or facts rather than on essences (*Wesen*). What is meant by using the word 'essence' would best be described in contrast with what Husserl considered to be a fact. A fact, or any „individual existence of every sort is, quite universally speaking, 'contingent'. It is thus; in respect of its essence it could be otherwise.“⁸ Facts, unlike the essences, can and do change. Some facts can remain the same for generations or even longer, but they never

5 Bernet, Kern, Marbach. *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Third paperback printing. Northwestern University Press, 1999. Page 4.

6 All phenomena studied in phenomenology occur within our consciousness.

7 Derived from Greek εἶδος, meaning 'essence' or 'form'.

8 Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten. The Hague: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1983. Page 7. Later referenced as ID I in this thesis.

escape the possibility of change. Likewise the laws on nature, described by the natural or experiential sciences may also become a subject of change because they only describe the world „*de facto*“, meaning that they only describe what happens under some factual circumstances (which are themselves subject to change) but they could as well be otherwise.

„But the sense of this contingency, which is called factualness, is limited in that it is correlative to a *necessity* which does not signify the mere *de facto* existence of an obtaining rule of coordination among spatiotemporal matters of fact but rather has the character of *eidetic necessity* and with this a relation to *eidetic universality*.“⁹ We can see the facts and the essences differ fundamentally, as facts are merely contingent and only actual and essences are both necessary and universal. „... *it belongs to the sense of anything contingent to have an essence and therefore an Eidos which can be apprehended purely; and this Eidos comes under eidetic truths belonging to different levels of universality*.“¹⁰

Continuing, to grasp an essence, we can rely on „merely imaginative“ intuitions (phantasies) equally well as on facts observed in the natural world. „*If we produce in free phantasy spatial formations... then on that basis by 'ideation' we can see various pure essences originarily and perhaps even adequately: either the essence of any spatial shape whatever... or the essence of a shape, a melody, etc., of the particular type exemplified*.“¹¹ This does not mean that phenomenology regards the *actual data* as if they were the same as data obtained only through *imagination*. What it implies is that seizing upon an essence has nothing to do with any factual existence, it can be done solely through imagination. Moreover, no matters of fact are asserted in eidetic truths. Phenomenology is thus exploring the limits and possibilities of any knowledge whatsoever, that is why Husserl calls it *fundamental science*.

2.1.2 Reflection and reduction

What are we left with after we ruled out the usefulness of data acquired through experience of the natural world? It is the *reflection* that Husserl believes we must focus on. The kind of reflection he has in mind is not the one in which

9 ID I, page 7.

10 ID I, page 7.

11 ID I, page 11.

we reflect on the natural world in our 'natural attitude'¹². One of the key problems with *natural attitude* is that „*the radical sense of natural attitude* could not appear outside of the process of reduction which reveals it while suspending it.“¹³ it presupposes the existence of objects that make up the world without questioning such positing and therefore can only reflect on these 'real' objects. We will later see that such objects are already *constituted* with help of our consciousness. In contrast to natural attitude, the reflection Husserl has in mind focuses on the very acts performed by our consciousness. „Instead of becoming lost in the performance of acts built intricately on one another, and instead of (as it were) naively positing the existence of the object intended in their sense and then going on to characterize them, or of assuming such objects hypothetically, of drawing conclusions from all this etc., we must rather practice 'reflection', i.e. make these acts themselves, and their immanent meaning-content, our objects.“¹⁴ The reflection Husserl talks about in this quote is actually only the first step of a long journey to achieve eidetical necessity. But the most important is that the consciousness itself is brought to the light of interest. We have mentioned above that the method Husserl proposed is sometimes called eidetic or phenomenological *reduction*. We already at least partially clarified the meaning as well as approach of *eidetics* and wish to proceed on to explaining what Husserl means with the term reduction.

Logical investigations show us the necessity to study the very acts of our consciousness in *reflection* but partly fail to provide us with adequate method that would guarantee *pure apperception* of the consciousness. The problem there is that the performance of phenomenological reduction is literally *unnatural* because one must get rid of all presuppositions she initially had about the natural world, or in terms used by Husserl, she must repeatedly and utterly disconnect the natural empirical apperception of consciousness, otherwise she would never escape psychologism that is a part of the natural attitude. The undressing of oneself and getting rid of the objective-empirical robe seems to be the metaphor used by Husserl in order to describe the reduction.¹⁵ To be precise, the doubting (or

12 Natural attitude is the primary mode of apprehension of the world that surrounds us. It is not limited to our everyday interactions but is also present in most of the sciences.

13 Ricoeur, Paul. *Key to Husserl's Ideas I*. Marquette University Press, 1996. Page 86.

14 Husserl, Edmund. *Logical Investigations, Vol. II, Part I*. trans. J. N. Findlay. Routledge, 2001. Page 170. Later referenced as LI II.

15 See Husserl, *First philosophy. Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction* . Published as *Erste Philosophie. Zweiter Teil: Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*. Editor Rudolf

epoché) of existence of the world we know from *Meditations* of Descartes is not enough, even though it was exactly this doubting that helped Husserl in developing his method. Cartesian epoché is thus the first step of phenomenological reduction which must go even further in order to achieve the *absolute epoché* and not content itself with only seemingly evident claims such as Cartesian *sum*.

In the light of what has been written above, it is legitimate to ask if the consciousness studied in phenomenology differs from the one studied in psychology for instance. The kind of consciousness that Husserl wants to access can not be understood as empirical consciousness nor as human consciousness. It must rather be grasped as the *absolute consciousness* that does not fall under the categories of being either psychical or physical. It is neither because it is absolute and not accessible through natural-scientific attitude i.e. without the suspension of the natural attitude. „Throughout the domain of phenomenological contemplation this absolute is the field of givenness“¹⁶. In the absolute¹⁷ consciousness the *constitution* of objects we encounter takes place and it is precisely this constitutional ability of consciousness that became the centerpoint of Husserl's analyses. The consciousness is „highly complex temporal system of mental processes by which the givenness of the known object is 'constituted'. This means that in every case of knowledge there is a strict correlation between the real (later 'noetic') and the intentional (later 'noematic') components of the act of knowing, which itself can be wholly given in an act of reflective apprehension.“¹⁸ The constitutive analyses are performed step-by-step in stages, correlating to the observed structure of the transcendental consciousness. Husserl discovered that there are unities constituted in the *continuous manifold*¹⁹ that in turn function as constituting manifolds of other higher unities. The importance of this claim of hierarchy embedded in the structure of consciousness is enormous for the topic of

Boehm, 1959. Page 78.

16 Husserl, Edmund. *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/1907*. Ed. U. Melle, 1984. Page 242.

17 Husserl also uses the term 'transcendental consciousness' which we will prefer from this moment onward.

18 Husserl, Edmund. *The idea of phenomenology*. Trans. Lee Hardy. Kluwer academic publishers, 1999. Page 9 of the translators introduction.

19 This term is often used by Husserl and means the continuous stream that our consciousness consists in. For instance, if we observe the same object for a certain period of time, we perceive it in a manifold of other data or experiences. The object may remain the same, but the sensuous data that come with it could change rapidly (watching a tree in a sunset). The object may also seem to encounter some changes because our perception changes over time (the huge tree I remember from my childhood may seem rather small when I see it again in twenty years time).

space as we will see how different kinds of space unfold from these layers. We will start our investigation with Husserl's analyses of thing-constitution because „space is co-apprehended along with the apprehension of spatial things.“²⁰

2.2. The Thing Constitution

Since the very beginning of the phenomenological project, the thing-constitution became one of the key areas of study. As Husserl continued with his research, he discovered enormous complexity within the thing-constitution analysis. There are several diverse paths one could take in order to pursue thing-constitution and it was not easy to choose one. The one we have chosen in this chapter is somewhat alternative. It starts with the concept of phantom which has been unfortunately quite often neglected by authors of secondary literature. The reasoning behind our choice is mainly interest based, but not simply accidental, as the concept of phantom proved to be fairly revealing concerning the thing-constitution. Later in this chapter, we will try to analyze some of the crucial concepts like intention or meaning which are relevant to thing-constitution. We will then try to show the connection between thing-constitution and the problem of body, which is the topic of the follow-up chapter.

2.2.1 Formation and abstraction

The concept of phantom plays central role for understanding the constitution of an object in our experience and was a reoccurring theme in Edmund Husserl's thinking. Although the understanding of the concept seems to change over the years even within Husserl's own phenomenological project, the core of the concept with regard to this thesis can be revealed quite easily. It is not in our intentions to track the development of the concept throughout the years as Husserl felt the need to return to the issue with subtle modifications, rather, we will try to elaborate the problem as it appears in *Ideas II*, where Husserl begins to deal with the problem systematically for the first time. The fact that we do not need to closely elaborate clear definition of the concept of phantom relates to the

²⁰ Moran, Dermot and Cohen Joseph. *The Husserl dictionary*. Continuum, 2012. Page 303.

whole of Husserl's project in a sense, that the introduction of fluidity into language is what according to him a philosopher must do.²¹ The employment of the concept of phantom will among other things allow us to clearly grasp the differences between extensionality and materiality, two clearly significant concepts for investigation of space.

The most basic definition of the concept of phantom would be that the phantom is the object we experience in our outer perception, without its material existence. This interpretation is sufficient for the time being because it fulfills Husserl's intention to use it in order to illuminate the gap between the mere *extensionality* and the sphere of *materiality*. We can already see that the phantom concept presupposes that objects of perception are made up of two completely separate levels which can not be reduced to one another. Furthermore, each of these layers consists of different kind of properties with the level of extensionality consisting in properties that fill extension and the level of materiality, which is bedded over the extensionality, in material (or causal) properties.

What Husserl does here is that he divides all properties that any object can have in the external perceptual experience into two groups. The space-filling properties belonging to the extensionality of the object could be also called the space-covering properties since the color, roughness/smoothness or glance of the surface of an object all belong to this category. But there are other properties of an object that can not be said to cover its surface but nevertheless are linked to it. These properties would be recognized in perceptual experience as weight or sound of an object and are called material or causal properties.

How is the phantom formed? We have to abstract from the material properties and what remains is precisely the phantom. All of the properties that can be linked to causal interactions of the object must be therefore excluded as well. The remaining object has no material existence and becomes a phantom "*spatial form fulfilled purely by color*"²². It should be noted that only the extensional layer of the object (the phantom) is conceivable in concrete experience, whereas the material properties can not stand alone. The phantom,

21 See *Ideas I*, especially § 24 (all knowledge is based on evidence "in flash and blood").

22 Husserl, Edmund. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch*, ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana IV (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1952); English translation: *Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989. Cited here as ID II. Page 23.

consisting only of spatial and space-filling properties is also called „purely qualified schema“ by Husserl. This qualified schema is a needed component of any thinkable object. This means that no material object could appear in perception without the qualified schema.

If we were to search for an example of a phantom in our everyday experience, we would not have to go far. Quasi-objects like the sun or a rainbow²³ function in our experience in similar way as a phantom of any factual object. Rainbow can not affect objects flying through it because it is only shape in space which is pure appearance. There is no materiality in rainbow and therefore it fits the above mentioned descriptions of a phantom²⁴.

2.2.2 Tone and the three-level stratification

The difference between materiality and extensionality as it has been thus far elaborated is closely connected to the idea of *constitution* which concerns itself with the fact that our experience of the world can be reduced to series of accomplishments. The possibility of such series (or levels) is revealed through the concept of phantom, which allows us to make distinction of properties of any object of possible experience into above mentioned categories. The concept of phantom is therefore crucial for constitutive analysis. Furthermore, the constitutive analysis can not stop at this level and Husserl discovers even deeper level that can be found in objects of outer experience. In order to demonstrate clearly what is meant, he uses another example. This time he moves to the realm of auditory.

“Let us consider, as the most convenient example, a tone played on a violin. It can be apprehended as a real violin-tone and hence as a real occurrence in space.”²⁵ The move from visual to auditory realm is a significant one but would not be needed for the sake of this example. It seems that Husserl chooses this

²³ Husserl himself uses these examples in *Ideas II* on page 40.

²⁴ To avoid confusion, rainbow can not be mistaken for a phantom. Phantom is formed or imagined in our experience as abstraction from certain, namely material, properties of an object. A rainbow or blue skies can not be understood as an object in this sense. Moreover, the rainbow example is not the most illustrative one in regard to what is intended to be shown. The phantom was supposed to be the residuum of abstraction which served to cut off any material and/or causal properties of an object. But when we imagine a rainbow without its causal properties we don't lose nor gain (and therefore demonstrate) anything. It is exactly the main function of the concept of phantom to demonstrate the difference between *spatiality* and *extensionality* and thus the rainbow example does not fully serve its purpose.

²⁵ ID II, page 24.

example in particular not out of methodical necessity but rather for the sake of clarity. The object (tone played on a violin) appears in consciousness unaffected by the constant changes in the material world²⁶ because the intentional consciousness directs itself to it despite the constant streaming of sensuous data. If we take the tone and abstract from material reality, what remains is a tonal phantom with its spatial characteristics. This tonal phantom still has a point or direction from which it approaches me but it remains the same if one moves closer or further from it. Here Husserl proposes even further suspension, after which only the sense datum²⁷ remains. In order to 'encounter' the sense datum, we would have to suspend spatial apprehension [*Auffassung*]. After modifying the real and the spatial setup consequently, the sense datum that remains would appear as something that undergoes continuous changes. Three different layers can be distinguished here: 1) tone as a sonic (real) object, 2) phantom as a tonal phantom and 3) a sense-datum which remains after the spatial apprehension is suspended. We can now track the development of spatial apprehension since we have localized the stratum where it is created.

It is worth pointing out the above mentioned idea that there can be continuous change on the lower level (ie. the sense-datum) while there appears to be unity of the object on the higher level. The multiplicity and unsteadiness is unified through the acts of consciousness²⁸. Moreover, the unity on the higher level is not anyhow affected by the constant changes on the lower level. Furthermore, these constant changes are a necessary condition for a thing-constitution in our experience. The object we perceive as steady has to appear to us in perceptual continuum (manifold) which is characterized as a constant stream (flux).

It can be argued that such three-level stratification of the object under consideration makes sense only within the realm of auditory. If we imagine (visually appearing) object in experience and abstract from its material qualities, only the phantom remains. Further suspension (that of spatial apprehension) leads too far from the object and can not be completed without losing the object in consideration from its perceptual (experiential) individuation. This does not imply the color sensation of the object (the sense-datum) disappears. The sense datum of

26 Which affect the sounds we hear.

27 *Pures Empfindungsdatum*

28 These acts as well as the processes behind the unity of an object will be clarified below in section Intention and meaning.

color remains but it no longer has the quality of a spatial form filled with color because it is exactly the spatial form that can no longer be recognized or present after the suspension of spatial apprehension. We can therefore speak of a color reference at all three levels without falling into fallacies (color phantom and color sensation can both be conceived intelligibly apart from the experience of objective color). In contradiction to color-reference, we can not intelligibly grasp a 'thing' in our experience as a pure sense-datum without losing its 'thingness'. "The difference between *that what appears* and its appearances is not a matter of materiality. Questions concerning this difference structurally precede all questions concerning the relation between visibility and materiality. That is precisely what constitutive phenomenology reveals... No matter how many times we look at a given thing, we never see its materiality as such; what is actually seen only belongs to the level of extensionality."²⁹ The visible therefore is a phantom. This claim can be supported by direct quote from Husserl: "...what we are seeing is precisely not a material thing... *essential groups of features are not represented in the apprehension at all, namely, those of materiality...*"³⁰

The proper constitution of a thing must require visual experience of the surface which is to be done in perceptual continuum. If this is the case, then the changes on the lowest level (of sensations) are required for the formation of a sense-thing on the higher levels. Such sense-thing or sight-thing (*Sebding*) can not be mistaken for the one-sided view of the object. Such one-sided view is not a sight-thing, not an object and it would be the case of improper thing-constitution (*uneigentliche Dingkonstitution*) to consider such visual perception as an object. But do we not experience objects as full spatial objects even if we have only limited, one-sided view of them? Husserl knows that "...the perspectival adumbration through which every spatial object invariably appears, only manifests the spatial object from one side."³¹ We do experience in this way in our everyday life but it is precisely the grounding idea of constitutive analysis that our experience of unity of an object can be divided into different levels and analyzed separately. In other words, Husserl tries to perform the synthesis that is normally performed by consciousness but remains hidden in the perception of the already

29 Mattens, Filip. *Space, Experience, and the Senses: Reflections on Spatial Perception in Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Mind*. Leuven, 2009. Page 33.

30 ID II, pages 39-40.

31 Husserl, Edmund. *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic*. Translated by Anthony J. Stenbock. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001.

constituted object. This hidden synthesis is actual performance of consciousness.

2.2.3 Implications drawn from the concept of phantom for the thing-constitution analysis

Keeping in regard what the concept of phantom has revealed about the thing-constitution, we may draw at least two conclusions. 1) Our perception relates to material things and 2) what we see (the content of our visual perception) is not all of what the material thing is. This second conclusion is allowed by the fact that one would not see that a phantom is *not* a material thing. To clarify this, let us turn to Husserl again: „The thing which appears at rest and unchanged qualitatively 'shows' us no more than its schema or, rather, than the apparent, whereas it is nevertheless *apprehended* at the same time as something material. But in this respect it does not 'show' itself, it does not properly come to view. If the whole stratum of materiality were stricken from the apperception, it would change nothing as regards what is 'properly' given.”³². The real thing is only visible through its many appearances but its corresponding phantom can not look different from the material thing it is a phantom of. This observation is presented by Husserl as a starting point in *Ideas II*.

There are further observations that are implied in what has been said. They concern general structure of our (visual) perception. Husserl adds few pages later. “But, in what we have said, it is also implied that under the presupposition referred to (namely, that we take the thing outside of the nexus in which it is a thing) we do not find, as we carry out experiences, any possibility for deciding, in a way that exhibits, whether the experienced material thing is actual or whether we are subject to a mere illusion and are experiencing a mere phantom.”³³ This sentence explains not only the uncertainty implied in visual perception but can serve as sort of guarantee for the second conclusion of previous paragraph, namely that a material thing is more than what we see. The key moment which is the aim of the analysis is the moment when the *intentional surplus* and the *given* visual experience become related. The phenomenological analysis of perception is highly concerned with this difference between what is intended in our

32 ID II, page 40.

33 ID II, page 43.

consciousness and what is given. This problem can under no circumstances be reduced to more trivial problem of one-sidedness of appearance of any object of apperception. The given and the intentional are related in a sense that the causal properties or the causal interaction of an object with other objects must be contained in perceptually full (not just visual) apperception of its materiality.

2.2.4 Intention and meaning

We have reached one of the most complex moments of the analysis of thing-constitution. „Such complexity appears inevitable once we clearly see that all objects and relations among objects only are what they are for us, through acts of thought essentially different from them, in which they become present to us, in which they stand before us as unitary items that we *mean*.“³⁴ Every object we encounter in our experience is therefore 'meant' by us. The act of meaning any kind of object actually happens at all times in the consciousness, it is always directed towards something, it is *intentional*. Let there be no mistake in understanding what causes the intentionality of consciousness because it is „not caused by an external influence, but is due to internal moments in the experience itself. Briefly put, it is the intentional content that makes consciousness intentional, furnishing the act with its directedness.“³⁵ It is worth noting that when one analyzes *intentional content*, the *meaning* of the intentional experience is analyzed. The intentional content is thus different from intentional *object*, which is the intended object.

Furthermore, the intentional content can be broken into two abstract parts, both of which are essential for every object to have. Let's use a simple example, when one fears a dog. There is the fear-quality of such experience and that is the intentional *quality*. But this fear is not just some abstract fear, it is fear of a dog, which would in this case stand for the intentional *matter*. But is not there a possibility for intentional quality to stand in its own right in the consciousness without an object? Isn't it so that we can experience for instance a feeling of hatred (general/abstract feeling) without the intentional matter? Although Husserl distinguishes such so called *nonobjectifying* acts that contain no direct reference to an object in themselves, even these nonobjectifying acts need to have an

³⁴ LI II, page 194.

³⁵ Zahavi Dan: *Husserl's phenomenology*. Stanford University Press, 2003. Page 22.

objectifying act underlying them in order for their abstract possibility to be realized. In other words, without an object of the imaginary fear, there would be no fear whatsoever.

The intentional matter is also sometimes called *ideal meaning*. It is the essence of every concrete intention and has two functions, (1) to direct consciousness to the object and at the same time (2) to conceive such object *as* something. „It is meaning or sense that provides consciousness with its object-directedness... More specifically, the matter does not only determine which object is intended, but also what the object is apprehended or conceived *as*. Thus it is customary to speak of intentional 'relations' as being conception-dependent.“³⁶ This conception-dependency means simply that the object is always intended with different act-matters (from a different perspective, with different description etc.). Moreover, a single act-matter is unique to each object and can not refer to more (distinguished) objects. On the other hand, there are many cases of different act-matters referring to the same object like when we look at the mountain from below and then from the peak. This example also clarifies the difference between object and meaning because it shows the ideal meaning allows consciousness to conceive the object (through the act of meaning). .

It has been shown³⁷ that we perceive objects of experience in consciousness as stable even though on the level of sensations there is no such stability. It is feasible to reveal now what makes this stability possible. The object 'arises' from manifold of sensations thanks to the objectifying apprehension (meaning) given to sensations. The sensations can be interpreted in many different ways because they have no intrinsic reference to objects. They can only acquire intentional reference, once they are interpreted. This means that the appearance of (and directedness of consciousness toward) the object is constituted somewhere between the manifold of sensations and their objectifying interpretation (act-matter).

2.2.5 The senses and the body

We are always surrounded by all kinds of objects and quasi-objects (like above mentioned example of a 'rainbow' or the 'ground'). We are aware that they

³⁶ Ibid. Pages 23-24.

³⁷ See section 2.2.2 above.

surround us and that we are somewhere else than they are. At the same time the sense of space disappears when we lose the ability to see, hear and touch (feel). Vision simply dominates our perceptual relation to the world and our perception of space, however the retinas (parts of an eye on which the objects of sight are projected) are flat (unlike the space). Vision is therefore denied direct access to space. But since we possess a spatial body that *moves* in space, the sense of touch has generally been granted the origin of our idea of space and the sensory access to spatial properties. „According to Husserl, in the end, it is due to the 'localization' exclusive to tactile sensations that my body becomes my body.”³⁸ The main difference between vision and tactile experience consists in the possibility of double-apprehension we experience while touching ourselves. „So here [in the tactual realm] we have that double apprehension: the same touch-sensation is apprehended as a feature of the 'external' Object and is apprehended as a sensation of the Body as Object. And in the case in which a part of the Body becomes equally an external Object of an other part, we have double sensation (each part has its own sensations) and the double apprehension as feature of the one or the other Bodily part as a physical object. But in the case of an *Object constituted purely visually* we have *nothing* comparable.”³⁹

Husserl needs to make this methodological move towards the body because it is the body that is the “...*medium of all perception*; it is the *organ of perception* and is *necessarily* involved in all perception.”⁴⁰ Why should we presuppose the dominance of tactile experience within the space-constitution over any other perceptual experience? Is not this claim in contradiction with our '*visual*' experience of space? We can 'see' the distance between the objects. We see how far they rest in space from each other. But the problem of visual perception lies in the way it is given to us, namely the fact that the visual perception is not continuous. Unlike tactile experience, which is 'present' at all times and can not be really abandoned during our waking life, the visual experience can be shot down any moment whenever we decide to close our eyes.

Moreover, the following quote reveals why touch has such an importance for Husserl: „The idea that Husserl advances remains comprehensive, and that seems to be sufficient: the objects we see around us can (usually) be touched, and this possibility

38 Mattens, Filip. *Body or Eye: A Matter of Sense and Organ* in *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy VIII* (2008): 93-125. Page 97.

39 ID II, page 155.

40 ID II, page 61.

refers to the potential realization of the most “immediate,” most “fundamental” relation a thing can have to me, that is, the direct experience of the presence of an object established in the physical contact between this object and my body—an experience we call *touch*.”⁴¹ This immediate relation to the thing is the relation of our body as lived-body (*Leib*) to the thing. The following chapter will therefore have to begin with examining the relation of the body to the thing-constitution problem and with elucidating of the two concepts of body Husserl distinguishes.

2.3 Body in space

We have discussed some (by far not all) difficulties concerning the thing-constitution. Perhaps the biggest problem that implicitly arises in connection with the main interest of this thesis, the space-constitution, is following: The transcendental consciousness studied through phenomenological reduction is in itself non-spatial. How is it possible then, that spatial objects, that means spatially transcendent objects, are constituted in such consciousness? Husserl deals with this problem⁴² by placing the sensational data „into a motivational nexus of association along with a corresponding multiplicity of kinaesthetic data and, ultimately, along with the bodily [*leiblich*] mode of being of the perceptual subject.”⁴³ We are now presented with a new, much greater multiplicity, where sensational data form a nexus together with corresponding kinaesthetic data. But why are kinaesthetic data so important for the constitution of objects and space?

2.3.1 The importance of kinaestheses for the constitution of

41 Matterns: *Body or Eye* (page 98).

42 This problem is already partially solved by assigning pre-empirical *extensional* quality to the sensuous data as was discussed above. Husserl talks of pre-empirical system of positions [*Lagesystem*] and its qualitative covering [*Bedeckung*]. We do not want to approach this problem from this angle as 1) it is extremely complex and also 2) controversial because Husserl understands these sensuous data as immanent contents of consciousness while holding they are extended. But the notion of consciousness we use in this thesis, (in accord with Husserl) is not really compatible with such assertion. Consciousness is a flux of experience and change (in time), not a flux in any extensional (or material in vulgar meaning of the word) sense.

43 Bernet, Kern, Marbach. *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Third paperback printing. Northwestern University Press, 1999. Pages 132-131.

Körper and Leib

Let us first examine what kinaesthetic data are. „All kinaestheses, each being an 'I move', 'I do' [etc.] are bound together in a comprehensive unity-in which kinaesthetic holding-still is [also] a mode of the 'I do'“⁴⁴ So the kinaestheses are very much connected with both ego and its motility. In fact, they are 'sensations of motion' of both the things [*Körper*] that surround us and our (lived) bodies [*Leib*] as well. To make everything clear, Husserl distinguishes between physical (geometric) body (*Körper*) and lived body of a person or an animal (*Leib*). The lived body differs in that it is soulful, 'animated' by the psychic subject. It is a medium or an organ of consciousness.

Kinaestheses are also different from the 'aspect-exhibitions' of any thing perceived. Their importance for the constitution of objects and space lies in the fact that they do not 'simply run' alongside the aspect-exhibitions (representational sensations), but „work together in such a way that the aspects have the ontic meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the body only through the fact that they are those aspects continually required by the kinaestheses – by the kinaesthetic-sensual total situation in each of its working variations of the total kinaesthesia by setting in motion this or that particular kinaesthesia – and that they correspondingly fulfill the requirement.“⁴⁵ Should we interpret this quote as if the kinaestheses were responsible for the motivation of *appearance* of things (*Körper*)? Indeed, Husserl discovered that kinaestheses played such central role for the thing-constitution. Without kinaestheses, it would not be possible to intelligibly grasp the motivation for the thing-constitution. But kinaestheses were designated even more importance than what we have seen thus far. They seem to be responsible for the appearance of the body (*Leib*) as well.

A body only becomes the lived, sensing body (*Leib*) or an organism through kinaestheses experienced as *body capabilities*. But where do these capabilities come from in the first place? How are they connected to and in the end localized in the body? In order for the kinaestheses to fulfill this function, the psychic subject has to live through particular experiences. These experiences subsequently enable the occurrence of one's body as an organism (organ of

44 Husserl Edmund. *The Crisis of European sciences and Transcendental phenomenology*. Northwestern University Press, 1992. Page 106.

45 Ibid.

consciousness). There are at least two different kinds of such specific experiences. Both of them involve understanding that kinaestheses never occur separately from one another, rather, there are whole *systems* of kinaestheses each corresponding to the organ (eyes, ears) through which they are 'sensed'. When different experiences intersect/intertwine with each other, whether within one system or across multiple systems, we experience body capabilities.

The first case we mentioned was when experiences within one system of kinaestheses intersect. It is precisely the double-apprehension, as in the case of one hand touching the other hand, that was already discussed above⁴⁶ when such experience is encountered. The second kind of experience is acquired when different kinaesthetic organ systems interact. Such interactions are quite common and the best example would be when we touch the eye that is seeing. We can conclude from what has been shown that the psychic subject does not 'primarily' relate to his body as a material thing. „The psychic subject has a material thing as his Body *because* it is animated, i.e., because he has psychic lived experiences which, in the sense of the apperception of the human, are one with the Body in a singularly intimate way.“⁴⁷ It is now obvious, that the kinaestheses constitute the appearance of things (*Körper*) as well as the body (*Leib*). Husserl also believes they are the necessary foundation for the constitution of unity of things and the psychic unity. Moreover, there seems to be *analogical* relation between these unities. He adds: „the analogy between the psychic unity and the unity of the material thing extends so far that we can say there exists a full analogy, according to form, between material properties, manifested in the changing physical behavior of the thing and psychic properties, manifested in corresponding lived experiences as psychic modes of behavior.“⁴⁸ We should bear in mind that the relation under consideration is that of *analogy*.

Continuing, kinaestheses constitute the body, but the constitutive relation also exists reversely. „Not only are the kinaestheses constitutive for the experience of the bodily organism, but the functioning bodily organism is also constitutive for the experience of the various kinaesthetic systems.“⁴⁹ This point can also be interpreted as a frontier of the constitutive analysis. Kinaestheses are the (given)

46 In section 2.2.5

47 ID II, page 129.

48 Ibid.

49 Bernet, Kern, Marbach. *An introduction to Husserlian phenomenology*. Third paperback printing. Northwestern University Press, 1999. Page 132.

data that constitute the lived body (organism) and vice versa. This constitutive relation can not be reduced any further, meaning kinaestheses are the original, last data discovered in and needed for the constitutive analysis.

2.3.2 Kinaestheses as source of motivation for the construction of the spatial world

We have thus far discussed the role kinaestheses play for the constitution of a thing and the body as lived-body. It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate the essential role of the body for the *construction*⁵⁰ of space and spatial apprehension. Indeed „the Body, in virtue of the constitutive role of the sensations, is of *significance for the construction of the spatial world*. In all constitution of spatial thinghood, two kinds of sensations, with totally different constituting functions, are involved, and necessarily so, if representations of the spatial are to be possible“⁵¹ The two necessary components for every constitution are the two kinds of sensations we have discussed, namely the 'representational' sensations and the kinaestheses. The function of the representational sensations is to constitute features of the thing in apprehension.⁵² The function of kinaesthetic sensations, on the other hand, is to *motivate* the apprehensions of the representational sensations. By motivating the representational sensations, the kinaestheses themselves undergo an apprehension but of „completely different type, an apprehension which thus belongs correlatively to every constituting apprehension“⁵³

Even though both kinds of sensations perform different functions, they are nevertheless deeply connected, as one kind motivates the apprehensions of the other kind. We have partially discussed this when we quoted Husserl's *The Crisis of European sciences and Transcendental phenomenology* in the previous section

50 This term does not have any unique phenomenological meaning here.

51 ID II, page 62.

52 This happens by way of adumbration [*Abschattung*], meaning the thing is always apprehended only *partially* as was addressed in section 2.2.2.. Adumbration happens necessarily in every act of apprehension of any thing. It hold the status of a priori eidetic law. „Every material thing unveils itself in endless spatial profiles. Husserl speaks of a 'manifold of adumbrations'... No act of perceiving a physical object can present all sides at once, or all perspectives.“ quoted from Moran, Dermot and Cohen, Joseph. *The Husserl Dictionary*. Continuum, 2012. Page 29. It is actually the essence of any spatial object that it appears in adumbrations. Acts of consciousness, in contrast, appear as they are, that is fully. They are only and only what they are for us.

53 Ibid.

of this thesis. Part of that quote read: 'the aspects have the ontic meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the body only through the fact that they are those aspects continually required by the kinaestheses'. But this does not sufficiently explicate the form in which the motivating aspect of kinaestheses is encountered in the consciousness.

This form of motivation, by necessity, is the form of the 'if-then'. Husserl describes how the 'if-then', also called 'because-therefore', form of motivation works in the following passage:

„Those sensations which undergo extensional apprehension (leading to the extended features of the thing) are motivated as regards the courses they take either actually or possibly and are apperceptively *related to motivating series, to systems, of kinesthetic sensations*, which freely unfold in the nexus of their familiar order in such a way that if a free unfolding of one series of this system occurs (e.g., any movement of the eyes or fingers), then from the interwoven manifold as motive, the corresponding series must unfold as motivated.“⁵⁴

Although we have never mentioned it thus far, it was perhaps quite clear from our description of kinaestheses that they are free, i.e. we can decide whether we look to the left or to the right, whether we go straight or up etc. The unfolding of a series of 'images' of the thing as well as visual sensations belonging to the thing therefore happen in a motivated order based on the order of the eye movement that was triggered by the perceptually apprehended thing. An apprehension of a thing would not be possible if the kinaestheses were missing because some essential components of the thing would disappear. It is not intelligible how the thing could be apprehended without being situated, oriented etc., in other words, without the *relations of motivation*. This means also the following: it is in the *essence* of the apprehension that it allows for „the possibility of letting the perception disperse into '*possible*' series of perceptions...“⁵⁵ It should be noted that such perceptions are certainly not limited to vision and can be found mediated through every organ of perception of the body. The 'if-then' aspect of kinaestheses also applies for these perceptions in the sense that if the organ moves, then the object moves correspondingly. Husserl

54 Ibid., page 63

55 Ibid.

sums up this investigation as follows:

„Perception is without exception a *unitary accomplishment* which arises essentially out of the playing together of two *correlatively related functions*. At the same time, it follows that *functions of spontaneity* belong to every perception. The processes of the kinesthetic sensations are *free processes* here, and this freedom in the consciousness of their unfolding is an essential part of the constitution of spatiality.“⁵⁶

It may be only now that we fully understand the notion of unity that was used many times above. The two '*correlatively related functions*' are of course the '*representational*' function of primary sensations and the '*motivating*' function of kinaesthetic sensations.

We have discussed the importance of kinaesthetic sensations for the constitution of space. Still, the analysis of body has more to reveal about how the space and spatial apprehension are constituted in consciousness. Until now, we have used a simple distinction between bodies (things) and the body as lived-body. As much as the lived body can also be viewed as a material thing of a particular type, the two cannot be mistaken. We can not assign the body quality to any random thing. But can we assign it to anything at all besides our own body in phenomenologically reduced consciousness? At first, we would like to look at the body as center of orientation as it will help us to solve this riddle.

2.3.3 Body as center of orientation

All of Husserl's analyses we have followed until this moment implicitly anticipated the existence of a something we can call a thing in itself. „Things that are there exist *in themselves*, and were in themselves, and will be in themselves.“⁵⁷ The a priori eidetical law of adumbration, for instance, tells us that the thing only appears partially and never in full. The thing also inevitably appears in a certain orientation, that is, in orientation toward me. Every spatial thing must appear as being to the right or left, far or close etc. The role of the body in the orientation of

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Husserl, Edmund. *Basic problems of phenomenology*. Translated by Ingo Farin and James G. Hart. Springer, 2006. Page 3.

things lies in the fact that the body can be apprehended as a sort of 'zero point' for orientation of every thing. „I have all things over and against me; they are all 'there' – with the exception of one and only one, namely the Body, which is always 'here'.“⁵⁸ This 'here', this zero point, does not have to be actually seen (as it never is). The central 'here' is further characterized as a „here which has no other here outside of itself, in relation to which it would be a 'there'.“⁵⁹

The orientation of the body is connected to its mobility too. When we move, we bring about the series of appearances and with them, the orientation or orientations of all things (and the changes in them). A change in orientation does not imply a change in the thing itself. It only implies change in the spatial position of the Body.

It is worth noting that the orientation of my own body to 'myself' (psychic subject) is very limited. My body is always here and can not be apprehended from distance. Some parts of the body even can not be seen at all (my back for example). The zero point structure of the orientation understood as 'here' as opposed to all 'there(s)' has further implications. It does not just describe necessary conditions of every apprehension. It also allows for positing of intersubjectivity.

„Because we grasp them [other subjects] in empathy as analogons of ourselves, their place is given to us as a 'here,' in opposition to which everything else is 'there'. But with this analogizing, which does not result in anything new over against the Ego, we have at the same time the other Body as 'there' and as identified with the Body-as-here- phenomenon. I then have Objective movement in space, the other Body is moved just like any body whatsoever, and, in union with it, the man 'himself' with his psychic life moves.“⁶⁰

2.3.4 Constitutional function of empathy for the thing and intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity seems to be strongly connected to the phenomenon of empathy. But how exactly can we 'empathize' with other subjects? How can we

58 ID II, page 166.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., page 177.

apprehend them as being subjects themselves? We can only perceive another subject in objective reality. We then have to make an *analogy* to ourselves and posit the other subject in the sense of the last quotation of Husserl from previous section. The newly posited second subject then has to be apprehended along with all the phenomena I encounter in myself but for himself. There needs to be the possibility of the same things being apprehended by the second subject in the same manner as they are apprehended by me. After all, we have the same kind of body and therefore should have the same kind of sensibility. „The things posited by others are also mine : in empathy I participate in the others positing“⁶¹ So it seems that empathy is essential part of any constitution, especially the constitution of (objective) space. „Through empathetic apperception, there is constituted one common space and one and the same thing.“⁶²

How can we be sure that the same thing, and with it, the same space is constituted in me as in the other subject? The first condition was already discussed in the previous paragraph and it is the possibility of having the same sensations and consequently same apprehension of a thing from the same place. The second condition is somewhat implied in the first one and it is the possibility of changing places with the other subject and thereby experiencing the same aspects of the thing from the same place under the same circumstances.

The 'sameness' of the experience is allowed by the possibility of *primal presence* [Urpräsenz] of perceived object, when it is 'actually' present 'in the original'. It comes naturally that no spatial object can be primally present in consciousness with all of its aspects (as it always undergoes adumbration). It is sufficient (and possible) that only some aspects of the object are primally present.

There are perceptual objects, such as the acts and states of consciousness, its corporeality etc. that are primarily given only to one subject. (It would be interesting to ask whether these objects are primarily present absolutely, meaning in full). At the same time, there are also objects that are primally present not just to one, but (because they are for one) also to any subject whatsoever. „The totality of objects that can be given as primally present and that make up a domain of common primal presence for all communicating subjects is *nature in the first and original sense*. It is spatial-temporal-material nature: The one space, the one time,

61 Ibid.

62 Mohanty, J. N. *The philosophy of Edmund Husserl*. Yale University Press, 2008. Page 281

the one world of things for all...⁶³ This quote is of utter most importance as it answers all of the questions asked in this section. I can never access the consciousness of the other, but I can share the same *nature* with the other in the sense that there can be an object I can primarily present to myself in the same, namely spatial, temporal and material way as the other subject.

Husserl goes so far to even say: „it is only with empathy and the constant orientation of empirical reflection onto the psychic life which is appresented along with the others Body and which is continually taken Objectively, together with the Body, that the closed unity, man, is constituted.“⁶⁴ Empathy is thus crucial not only to the constitution of the thing, but also to the constitution of a man (in natural-scientific sense). It is important not to confuse the subjectivity constituted through different experiences of the body as lived-body (which is not yet the real unity called 'man') with the constitution of a man as a natural-scientific object. The latter is a part of the nexus of relations (intersubjectivity) and therefore a member of objective nature. With man understood in this sense, constituted in intersubjectivity which he himself co-creates, space (apprehended as 'world') is also constituted. „Ultimately, the constitutive process occurs in a threefold structure, *subjectivity-intersubjectivity-world*.“⁶⁵

2.4 Conclusion of Husserl's accounts on spatiality

Our investigation of Husserl's ideas about spatiality is not completely exhaustive for the topic of space is rather vast in Husserl. We selected the ideas we found interesting and tried to connect them in such a way that they would create meaningful articulation of Husserl's accounts on spatiality. At first, we had to start with explanation of several phenomenological concepts. We have then examined the problem of thing-constitution through the lens of the phenomenon of phantom. The three-level stratification of constitution was revealed in this investigation. We saw that the constitution of phantom from sensuous data is due to spatial apprehension. The materiality of a thing proved to be only constituted (at the highest level of the three-level stratification), perhaps contrary to our intuition. This is due to full analogy found between the change of material

63 ID II, page 171.

64 Ibid., page 175.

65 Zahavi Dan: *Husserl's phenomenology*. Stanford University Press, 2003. Page 76.

properties of the thing and corresponding change in states of consciousness.

After the inspection of spatial apprehension we went on with exploration of constitution of space as objective space or the world. We needed to do this move since the experiences of spatiality in vision and touch were not sufficient to constitute objective reality. We had to examine the body and its sensations as they played an important role here. The body and especially its motility proved to be the necessary conditions for the constitution of objective space as well as intersubjectivity enabled through empathy. For the sake of clarity, we avoided the concept of horizon Husserl elaborates when he speaks of the world as *horizontal structure of belief*. Let us at least mention that to have a horizon means that the object „is presented in an essential wider context that is not actually being exhibited in my experience.“⁶⁶

We have seen that for Husserl, experienced reality is always spatial (and temporal). Space is apprehended along with the apprehension of spatial things but the objective space is only constituted as a result of intersubjectivity. The peak of our investigation is the discovery Husserl made about our motility as well as our capability of empathy, they are both necessary features of the constitution of space.

⁶⁶ Smith, A., D. *Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations*. Routledge, 2003. Page 168.

3 Heidegger

As we have already indicated in the introduction to this thesis, we shall limit our investigation of Heidegger to his most famous book *Being and Time*. Although spatiality as a theme only occurs in three sections of *Being and Time* (§22-24). „...It is precisely the exclusion or suspension of spatiality from the articulation of the question of being that indicates its powerful role in Heidegger's thought.“⁶⁷ We will attempt to bring this role into the light of our understanding in this chapter.

3.1 Dasein

Before we start explaining Heidegger's understanding of space, we shall make few remarks on the words (specific dictionary) he uses in *Being and time*. We have seen that Husserl's analyses understood the subject as transcendental consciousness. In contrast, Heidegger introduces new notion, so called *Dasein*. We can't investigate every aspect of Dasein here as Heidegger dedicated much of his energy into elaborating this concept „... the task of the whole book is to lay out the basic makeup (Grundverfassung) of Dasein...“⁶⁸ We will therefore only focus on the features that are internally connected to the topic of space.

3.1.1 What or who is Dasein

What is the difference between Heidegger's Dasein and Husserl's transcendental consciousness? To answer such question, it would be helpful to clarify what is the main concern of Heidegger in *Being and time*. The ultimate question he asks is: what is the *meaning* of Being? The question of the meaning of Being is important for several reasons. The most significant one is that the question of meaning of Being should be the aim of all ontology and its fundamental task as it is „...ascertaining the *a priori* conditions... for the possibility of the sciences... [and further] for the possibility of those ontologies

67 Vallega, A., Alejandro. *Heidegger and the Issue of Space, Thinking on Exilic Grounds*. The Pennsylvania State University, 2003. Page 60.

68 Brandom, B., Robert. *Tales of the mighty Dead*. Harvard University Press, 2002. Page 325.

themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations.⁶⁹ Heidegger therefore describes the field of his exploration as *fundamental ontology*. Dasein is very much connected to the question of meaning of Being, since „Dasein is the kind of Being we ourselves have.“⁷⁰ Moreover, the distinctive property of Dasein as a special kind of entity is that it has pre-ontological understanding of Being and that it can reflect on this meaning of Being. In other words, Being is an issue for Dasein. This is meant by Heidegger when he proclaims the essence of the Dasein lies in *existence*.

Understanding Dasein as existence is crucial for Heidegger calls *Being and Time* an existential analytic. Yet, „Heidegger is not interested in giving the necessary and sufficient conditions for existing in his sense. He is only interested in the de facto structure of this way of being.“⁷¹ So without the necessity to further elaborate the meaning of existence, we can interpret it as fundamental 'way of being'. In case of Dasein, standing back from the world to observe itself and to become open to Being. We can already see how these descriptions differ from Husserl's thinking ego, the transcendental consciousness that allows objective study of phenomena.

Continuing, more shall be revealed about the nature of Dasein. If we look at the very word 'Dasein', we can translate it as there-being. Heidegger chose this purposely to signify that Dasein is always situated in or thrown into the world i.e. among other entities that make sense to her. This, of course, can not be interpreted in a way that Dasein is always *located* at a certain point in Cartesian, three-dimensional extended space. Such localization could only be granted to things in a particular mode of Being that will be discussed in the next section. Another way of looking at the there-being of Dasein would be to say it means being *open* to the world in a sense that Dasein is always taking the things surrounding her *as something* and thus giving them meaning. Here, we can trace the similarities to Husserl.⁷²

69 BaT, page 31.

70 Brandom, B., Robert. *Tales of the mighty Dead*. Harvard University Press, 2002. Page 325.

71 Dreyfus, L., Hubert. *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*. MIT, 1995. Page 15. Later referred to as BitW.

72 The 'taking of something as something' was one of the functions of intentional matter (ideal meaning). See section 2.2.4 Intention and meaning.

3.1.2 Care as primordial structure of Dasein's way of Being

Heidegger proclaims Dasein is an entity that is always in-the-world. Such Being-in-the-world can not be understood in any physical or natural-scientific sense as if Dasein was located in space. Rather, Being-in-the-world comes before spatiality. „Not until we understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein can we have any insight into Dasein's existential spatiality.“⁷³ In a sense, Dasein is this Being-in-the-world, it always already *dwells* among things that have meaning and therefore matter to it like we dwell or live in a house.⁷⁴ It is always occupied with those things and „as Being-in-the-world, Dasein must *deal* with that world. The world and everything in it is something that cannot fail to matter to it.“⁷⁵

Heidegger pays special attention to distinguishing the Being-in of Dasein's Being-in-the-world from mere finding/situating something or oneself somewhere. Being-in can not be otherwise. Dasein can not choose to escape this Being-in like we can choose to leave the house. It is always necessarily and inevitably in-the-world. „*Being-in' is... formal existential expression for the Being of Dasein, which has Being-in-the-world as its essential state.*“⁷⁶

We have said that Dasein is a kind of being for which Being is an issue. We can add now, that for Dasein as Being-in-the-world, the world is an issue for it, or in other words, Dasein *cares* about the world. This is because Dasein cares about its *existence* (the meaning of existence as well as its continuation etc), its 'way of being' as we called it. Naturally, there are more than just one way Dasein can care about (or be involved with) the world. Heidegger recognizes three distinct *moments* of care or *disclosedness*. They are thrownness, fallen-ness and projection. As indicated by our choice of the word 'moment' and Heidegger's choice of 'projection', care will be understood in terms of the dimensions of time. Since our topic is space, we do not need to go into details of each of these involvements of disclosedness. Rather, we can concentrate only on thrownness.⁷⁷ We shall nonetheless note here that space will ultimately be understood through/in

73 BaT, page 83.

74 When we dwell in a house, we are not aware of our being there in the sense of a thing being inside a box. Instead, we have it as a familiar place where we carry out intimate actions.

75 Mulhall, Stephen. *Heidegger and Being and Time*. Second edition. Routledge 2005. Page 112.

76 BaT, page 80.

77 We will briefly discuss fallenness in section 3.2.1 as well.

terms of time. This does not mean we suddenly have to turn to study the main topic on *Being and Time*, the phenomenon of time in order to explain spatiality. We only need to acknowledge that the meaning of Being is constituted primordially in time rather than space.

3.1.3 Dasein's moods

We have seen how Dasein always finds itself to be in-the-world that it cares about or is involved with. Heidegger calls one way of such Being-in-the-world *thrownness* [*Geworfenheit*]. Thrownness designates the fact that Dasein is always already thrown into the world. We can also view the thrownness as crucial part of the three-fold structure of Being-in-the-world. The thrownness of Dasein into the world coincides with our previous descriptions of Dasein as always *already* dwelling among things. In other words, Dasein already finds itself to-be-there in-the-world. It may help the understanding of thrownness to stress that thrownness belongs to the dimension of past. In this light, we can proclaim that Dasein is always *already* thrown into the world instead of *being* thrown there.

But Dasein is never thrown into the world 'unconcerned' so to speak. It is rather the opposite. Dasein, having thrownness as a condition, always already finds itself in some mood [*Stimmung*]. The mood determines how or which world is accessible to us. Heidegger's usage of mood is somewhat broader than our everyday use of the word, as it also encompasses affects such as fear. Moreover, the common usage of the word conceals Heidegger's understanding of *Stimmung*. In our everyday life, we implicitly operate with the idea of the world as objective natural world which, if we only observe it, doesn't undergo any changes beside those caused by the laws of nature. Therefore, if we leave our room and come back in two hours, the room will be flooded given the condition we left the water running in the sink that is clogged. Similarly, if we didn't leave the water running and there is no other natural cause (like an explosion of the piping), the room should not be flooded when we come back and should remain the same. Now, returning from a successful date, the unflooded room will most probably seem comfortable and nice, possibly even bigger than usually. If, on the other hand, we just arrived from the funeral of our best friend, the room will feel terribly small and uninviting. In both of these cases, the room remains the same. What changed

was our mood. We thus understand the mood in our everyday dealing with the world as something subjective that was only added by us onto or over the objective world.

Heidegger wants us to understand the mood as something different, namely as the necessary feature of every Being-already-thrown-into-the-world. To ease the understanding of mood, we could ask the following: Given that neither the objective world nor Dasein decide what mood it will be attuned to, where does the mood come from? Heidegger would answer swiftly. „A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being.“⁷⁸

We can never escape the mood as it is the way of Being of Dasein. It is not possible to be dis-attached from the mood. Even the reflection can not achieve such dis-attachement. „Moods reveal Dasein in a primordial way only when Dasein is not reflecting on them. Moreover, they cannot be placed fully before the mind even in reflection.“⁷⁹ It is because the mood *discloses* Dasein to itself before any reflection or cognition as such arises. The character of this disclosedness is connected to the phenomenon of being 'there', which is the condition of every entity. The 'there' is a complex that can be divided into two situations; we have 1) 'here' understood as 'I-here' that is related to (it is toward) some 2) 'yonder'. „Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a 'there' – that is to say, only if there is an entity which has made a disclosure of spatiality as the Being of the 'there'. This entity carries in its ownmost Being the character of not being closed off. In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness... *Dasein is its disclosedness*.“⁸⁰

Last, but not least, mood is not a subjective state. This unintuitive aspect of mood is due to determination of moods by norms and culture. We can only have such and such moods because our culture allows for it. The culture is also the condition of having personal moods, as one can only have the same kind of moods as people have in her culture. More people in the same culture could also share the same mood. Even in reflection when we try to avoid all distractions, we remain in one or the other mood as we can be in a 'scientific' mood of observation/reflection. Therefore mood is not some private feeling we project on the world.

78 BaT, page 176.

79 BitW, page 173.

80 BaT, page 171.

We can now fully appreciate the importance of mood for our spatiality. It has been shown how our mood determines the world we find ourselves *in*. „Perhaps more than any other character of our existence, mood can disclose the way that we exist as being-in; for it allows to notice how 'objectively' identical thing or region holds an entirely different significance for us when we are in one mood versus another. We might say, then, that by means of our moods, our world has a spatial narrative.“⁸¹

3.2 Spatiality of Being-in-the-world

We have discussed some of the aspects of Dasein. We said Dasein is always concerned with its Being and that the most fundamental way of Being is existence. Dasein also gives meaning to things and remains open to the world in which it dwells (in the above elaborated special sense of Being-in). The world is always disclosed to it in a way that is determined by the mood. These observations allow us to turn now specifically to spatiality of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. We will start with looking at how we encounter entities in the world, *as what* do we possess/manipulate them.

3.2.1. Equipment ready-to-hand

When we said above that Dasein always takes the things *as something* it was not clear what we meant by 'things'. Since Heidegger repeatedly wants to avoid the dichotomy of subject and object, he introduces a new term to designate what we might have otherwise called object or a thing. This word is *equipment [Zeug]*. It should be noted from the beginning that not all of what we could name as a thing is or can be equipment. Heidegger chooses this notion to stress that in our everyday life, we give meaning to objects based on how or as what they can be used in our projects. „Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to...' ['etwas um-zu']“⁸² Heidegger points out that to take something as equipment means to take it in some context, namely the context of other equipment. It would make no sense of talking about a cooking pot, for example, if there was not already the

81 Jacobson, E., Kirsten. *Being at home: a phenomenological analysis of the experience of space*. The Pennsylvania State University, Thesis in Philosophy, 2006. Page 94.

82 BaT, page 97.

'equipmental whole' of the kitchen with the stove where we can heat the pot, the sink where we can fill it with water and the silverware we use to eat the dish. Any individual item of equipment show itself only through this nexus of usability and what is more important, only after such 'totality of equipment' was already discovered. „Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is.“⁸³

The relationship to things as equipment is the most primordial relationship. In it, we do not construct or possess things as independent objects but only and only as equipment. We do not need to be aware of the independence nor 'objectness' of the equipment we use as we can be lost in our usage or manipulating of equipment. In our phenomenal world, we do not grasp the equipment we use as the kind of object we see when we stop and 'theoretically' observe the thing. Strictly speaking, even the Dasein is not present when we use equipment as in phenomenological experience, we are only aware of the activity (of using equipment). This means that the subject-object structure makes no sense within the context of equipment and therefore also explains the unintelligibility of understanding equipment as 'the object' when being used for something.

Heidegger employs a new term to describe the kind of Being of equipment. „The kind of Being which equipment possesses - in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call '*readiness-to-hand*' [*Zuhandenheit*]. Only because equipment has *this* 'Being-in-itself' and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal“⁸⁴ In contrast to the traditional use of 'being-in-itself' by philosophers, Heidegger claims that readiness-to-hand is Being-in-itself of the equipment. Many philosophers including Husserl have disputed this unintuitive claim. Whether we accept the claim of readiness-to-hand of equipment as being the Being-in-itself or not is left to the reader. In order to do justice to Heidegger, let us only mention the interpretation of Hubert Dreyfus: „Since equipment is in no way derivative, and since involvement is as genuine a mode of access as theory, we can say that equipment in use is equipment as it is in itself.“⁸⁵

It has been shown that we always discover equipment (not things) to be

83 Ibid.

84 Ibid., page 98.

85 BitW, page 66.

ready-to-hand. More precisely, equipment is revealed as ready-to-hand *in-order-to* do something. It makes sense that one and the same 'object' of the natural world can be used as different kind of equipment, that is for different purposes, depending on the totality of equipment it is found in. I can use the golden nugget I found to kill someone if I feel threatened by them and use it as the medium of exchange on the market couple hours later.

Although we are involved with the World first and foremost through entities revealed to us as ready-to-hand, we do not engage entities in their way of Being as ready-to-hand exclusively. „If its kind of Being as ready-to-hand is disregarded, the 'Nature' itself can be discovered and defined simply in its pure presence-at-hand.“⁸⁶ Therefore, if I decide not to trade my nugget of gold at the marketplace, to add to our example, and instead sit somewhere and start observing it, it becomes an object of the Nature *present-at-hand* [*Vorhanden*]. Likewise, the presence-at-hand can be revealed when the object fails to perform its function (being ready-at-hand/ handed in-order-to do something). If I discover the nugget of gold to be too heavy for me in-order-to throw it and thus break the skull of my enemy, it is no longer ready-at-hand (at a disposal of my act of throwing it) and becomes simply present-at-hand. Suddenly we are aware of it as object of the Nature with its physical features. Therefore the spatiality of the thing (present-at-hand) is only consequential to its Being-in-itself ready-to-hand as equipment.

The switch from Being ready-to-hand to Being present-at-hand is a switch from one *mode* of Being of a 'thing' to another. It should be noted that with this change in the entity's mode of Being, there comes the change of mode of Being of Dasein. When we deal with the entities in their present-at-hand mode of Being, the structure of the experience suddenly reveals itself to be that of subject and object. The mode of Being of Dasein is then quite different from the mode of Being when it handles entities ready-to-hand, when Dasein *is fallen* into the world in or through things.⁸⁷ In the mode of dealing with entities as ready-to-hand, the primordial spatiality can be found. Such spatiality is the 'being far' or 'being accessible' of equipment. Yet, this kind of spatiality can not be measured by any

⁸⁶ BaT, page 100.

⁸⁷ Fallenness is the present dimension of disclosedness and means that Dasein is always *in* some thing in the sense of being always wrapped up *in* a thing it deals with in the present moment. Although Heidegger dedicated considerable amount of energy to the discussion of the problem of *falling*, we will not thematize it in our investigation since it is only remotely connected to spatiality. For the discussion of falling see BitW, chapter 13.

standard of measurement. If we attempted this kind of measuring (i.e. the golden nugget lies 5 meters from me), we would have to strip space of its being as ready-to-hand and thus of our experience of space. „Although there is certainly a place for this sort of measurement in our lives, we cannot use this form of spatiality as defining form for space and spatial experience.“⁸⁸

3.2.2 Spatiality of Dasein

Let us now fully examine the spatiality of Dasein. We already know Dasein always finds itself dwelling in-the-world amid other things. It should be clear from our explanation of these phenomena that such dwelling amid things can by no means be understood in terms of being placed in three-dimensional spatiality. We can instead use the term existence. But existence as such is itself spatial⁸⁹ and this spatiality can be defined by two features of Dasein's existence, namely its *directionality* and *de-severance*.

Directionality signifies Dasein's orientation to things, the fact that it is always directed toward some thing. As Miguel de Beistegui explains concisely:

„Existence is always directed towards things in a particular way, always engaged in this transitive activity of 'nearing' or 'bringing close' [*Näherung*], even if and when those things appear as out of reach, too far, unattainable... existence is always directed at something, intrinsically directional: right, left, up, down, above, beneath, behind, in front are all according to some thing encountered there, and it is that very thing, in its relation to an embodied existence as proto-place, that provides Dasein with its sense of direction.“⁹⁰

This quote does not only explain where directionality comes from but also makes easier our grasping of de-severance or 'bringing close'. We can only engage ourselves with entities that are at our disposal. The entities can be at our disposal when we can do something with them. This ability of dealing with the entity does not presuppose any factual nearness of the entity in sense of the entity standing in

⁸⁸ Jacobson, E., Kirsten. *Being at home: a phenomenological analysis of the experience of space*. The Pennsylvania State University, Thesis in Philosophy, 2006. Page 90.

⁸⁹ As we have shown in the previous section.

⁹⁰ Beistegui, de Miguel. *Thinking with Heidegger: displacements*. Indiana University Press, 2003. Page 147.

front of us in physical space. We can talk to a friend over the phone across the globe and thus be engaged with her even though she is far away in the physical space. By means of this engagement, we bring the entity close to us, letting the distance (again not in the physical sense) disappear. We de-severe the distance. The closeness of the entity is then determined by its availability for our engagement with it.

The fundamental spatiality of Dasein's existence is revealed in deseverance. It is this sort of spatiality that founds the spatiality of entities ready-to-hand and ultimately the spatiality of the 'physical' world. Therefore the physical space (that is present-at-hand) presupposes and can only be made intelligible through equipmental space. Is, then, space in the subject? Or is the world in space? „*Space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space. Space is rather 'in' the world in so far as space has been disclosed by that Being-in-the-world which is constitutive for Dasein*“⁹¹ We do not observe the world as if it were in a space. Neither we project the space onto the world. What Heidegger means in the end is that Dasein's existence in-the-world *is* spatial. In this light we can see how the 'homogenous space of Nature' understood as 'multiplicity of positions for random Things' shows itself only when „the worldly character of the ready-to-hand gets specifically *deprived of its worldhood*.“⁹²

We have thus described the spatiality of Dasein. Interestingly, we did not need to turn to the body as Husserl did in his own investigations of spatiality. But we did not omit the topic purposely, leaving an important topic aside. It was Heidegger himself who famously omitted it, even though he admitted its relevance and significance. „... Dasein constantly takes these directions along with it, just as it does its de-severances. Dasein's spatialization in its 'bodily nature' is likewise marked out in accordance with these directions. (This 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here.)“⁹³

3.2.3 Region, and worldliness of the world

When we encounter entities in the mode of ready-to-hand, we are dealing with equipment. Every equipment has its place [*Platz*], in the sense that this place

91 BaT, page 146.

92 Ibid., page 147.

93 Ibid., page 143.

itself is defined as place of this equipment, „as one place out of a whole totality of places directionally lined up with each other and belonging to the context of equipment that is environmentally ready-to-hand.“⁹⁴ Equipment, thus, always *belongs somewhere*.

When we discussed equipment in section 3.2.1, we pointed out that it never reveals itself as if it were detached from the whole nexus of other equipment, the so called 'equipmental whole' defined by way of disclosedness. Belonging-somewhere of equipment corresponds to the belonging-to [*Zugehörigkeit*] of ready-to-hand to totality of equipment.

„But in general the 'wither' to which the totality of places for a context of equipment gets allotted, is the underlying condition which makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can be placed. This 'wither', which makes it possible for equipment to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view ahead of us in our concerned dealings, we call the 'region'.“⁹⁵

The belonging-somewhere of the equipment is therefore made possible 'as place' in some region. For the sake of clarity, we could also call it *realm*, which seems to be closer to the meaning of German *Gegend*. It makes sense, that regions are not first formed by things. The ready-to-hand things (equipment) are found within the region of the equipmental whole.

After examining Heidegger's meaning of region, the worldliness, the way of being of the world, can be shown. Although we have been repeatedly using Heidegger's term 'world' throughout this chapter, we have never fixed its meaning. We did this deliberately in order to enable full understanding of four different senses of 'World' Heidegger distinguishes, which is only possible after we carried out our investigation. Our intention was based on presupposition that everyone already has some vague understanding of this notion and that this understanding was sufficient to make our investigation intelligible. Another reason for saving the discussion of worldliness for the last section was its crucial importance (and therefore need to be interpreted correctly), Hubert Dreyfuss even regards it as „...the most important and original contribution of *Being and Time*. Indeed, since

94 Ibid., page 136.

95 Ibid.

worldliness is another name for disclosedness or Dasein's understanding of being, worldliness is the guiding phenomenon behind Heidegger's thought in *Being and Time* and even in his later work.⁹⁶

The world in the first sense is a 'universe conceived of as a totality of objects of a certain kind' (like physical universe or universe of discourse). In the second meaning, the world is defined as „what Husserl called the *eidos* defining each region of being, and what Heidegger calls each region's way of being.⁹⁷ The third sense of the world is the world as we were mostly concerned with it, the world *in* which Dasein lives, such as „'the business world' (this, as opposed to one's place of business, is what one is 'in' when one is in business)... such worlds as the business world... are 'modes' of the total system of equipment and practices that Heidegger calls *the* world. Their way of being given, Heidegger calls the 'phenomenon of world'.⁹⁸ This means that every world Dasein finds itself *in* is only a mode (or a sub-world) of the world conceived as total system of equipment and practices. Therefore, *my* world is founded in the world of which it is only a local mode. In other words, my world with its experiences and its meaning is always public. „Both Husserl and Sartre follow Descartes in beginning with *my* world and then trying to account for how an isolated subject can give meaning to other minds and to *the* shared intersubjective world. Heidegger, on the contrary, thinks that it belongs to the very idea of a world that it be shared, so *the* world is always prior to *my* world.⁹⁹

The last meaning Heidegger designates to the world is the worldliness of the world. This is the existential sense of the world, the way of being both of the world and its subworlds that is passed over in the tradition. To understand the structure of the world is to understand what the world with all of its modes has structurally in common.

3.3 Conclusion of Heidegger's existential analysis of Dasein's Being-in-the-world

To sum up Heidegger's accounts on spatiality in *Being and Time*, let us

96 BitW, page 89.

97 Ibid.

98 Ibid, page 90.

99 Ibid.

revise what we have found. We have pointed out the difference of the background against which Heidegger carries out his analysis to Husserl's project. Heidegger's primary concern is the question of meaning of Being, for Dasein is existential. We progressed our investigation by examining what kind of notion for 'subject' Heidegger uses in his analysis. Dasein was then characterized as the entity that always *cares* about its existence and its world *in* which it already finds itself as having-been-already-thrown into. This thrownness was interpreted as one of the moments of care, in this case understood as *disclosedness*. Moreover, thrownness was also viewed as a way of Being-in-the-world. The way of Being-in-the-world and with it the particular kind of world that we live in factually was then shown to be determined by our mood.

After we have traced the spatial narrative of the mood, we turned to explaining the character of things as they are primordially discovered by Dasein. The primordial relation to things was our treating of them as being *ready-to-hand*, as *equipment*. Equipment is always encountered in the 'equipmental whole' and as *something-in-order-to*. Every equipment has its *place* and therefore it is intelligible to talk about primordial spatiality of ready-to-hand, revealed through the phenomenon of *de-severance*. On the top of encountering entities as ready-to-hand, we can (under specific circumstances) encounter them as present-at-hand, that is, in the 'traditional' form of spatiality understood in terms of extensionality or physicality. Heidegger aptly explains this in two sentences: „When we let entities within-the-world be encountered in the way which is constitutive for Being-in-the-world, we 'give them space'. This 'giving space', which we also call 'making room' for them, consists in freeing the ready-to-hand for its spatiality.“¹⁰⁰

We discussed the implications of Heidegger's treatment of spatiality and could have finished our investigation there. Instead, we concluded our investigation with the explanation of the meaning of region. Only then were we able to access the four different senses Heidegger designates to world (one of which was explained as worldliness). This finally allowed us to understand how Heidegger interprets the *phenomenon of world*.

100BaT, page 146.

4 Conclusion

We have examined how Husserl and early Heidegger treat space. We were able to discuss most of Heidegger's accounts on spatiality in *Being and Time* and some aspects of Husserl's thought. Our task was not to comprehensively grasp the topic of space in early phenomenology, rather, we wanted to show the pathways leading to genuine understanding of space as opposed to common misinterpretation of the term. In doing so, we did not want to discredit the common understanding. On the contrary, our aim was to enrich it and to reveal its foundations. Throughout this thesis, we encountered many ways of understanding space through the lens of phenomenology. We do not need to list all of them here as such enlisting is already carried out in conclusion section of each chapter, moreover, it would not be much revealing without the context in which it was discussed.

Our own investigation gives by no means the complete picture of space as treated in phenomenology. Phenomenology was concerned with the topic of space in its later periods as well, most notably in the analyses (which draws heavily from Husserl) of body by Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

Often times when we introduced some new notion into our investigation, we could not provide the full meaning of it. Since we wanted to avoid reducing our thesis to explication of concepts and their relations (as we only tried to use as few words with phenomenologically fixated 'special' meaning as possible), some important features of a great number of concepts had to be left out. Sometimes only one of a pair of correlative words was introduced as was the case of Heidegger's existentiality. Our focus was always aimed at minimizing the unnecessary context of the particular word under investigation.

Our intention was not to compare Husserl's view of spatiality with that of Heidegger. Nor did we attempt to explain all the similarities of their projects. We occasionally pointed out such relations but always only for the sake of explication. Nevertheless, (as a consequence of our investigation) we can trace the difference between projects of Heidegger and Husserl in the different approach they take towards treating space as world.

Seznam zkratek (List of abbreviations):

BaT refers to Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Blackwell Publishers, 2001

ID I refers to Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, trans. F. Kersten. Martin Nijhoff Publishers, 1983.

ID II refers to Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas pertaining to a pure Phenomenology and to a phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.

LI II refers to Husserl, Edmund. *Logical Investigations, Vol. II, Part I*. trans. J. N. Findlay. Routledge, 2001.

BitW refers to W.Dreyfus, L., Hubert. *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*. MIT, 1995. Page 15. Later referred to as

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