

Appendix I

TEXT A:

The fifth booke of Boethius of chance and freewill, and how they stand with providence.

Prose I

Of chance

Having sayd thus she began to turne her speech to certaine other questions when I interrupted her, saying: ‘Thy exhortation is very good and well beseeming thy authority. But I find it true by experience, as thou affirmedst, that the question of providence is entangled with many other. For I desire to know, whether thou thinkest chance to be anything at all, & what it is.’ ‘I make haste,’ quoth shee, ‘to performe my promise and to shew thee the way by which thou mayest returne to thy cuntry. And these questions, though they be very profitable, yet they are somewhat from our purpose, and it is to be feared, lest being wearied with digressions, thou beest not able to finish thy direct journey.’ ‘There is no feare of that,’ quoth I, ‘for it will be a great ease to me to understand those things in which I take great delight, and withal when thy disputation is fenced in on every side, there can bee no doubt made of any thing thou shalt inferre.’ ‘I will,’ quoth shee, ‘doe as thou wouldest have me,’ and withal beganne in this manner: ‘If any shall define chance to be an event produced by a confused motion, and without connexion of causes, I affirm that there is no such thing, and that chance is only an empty voyce without any reall signification. For what place can confusion have since God disposeth all things in due order. For it is a true sentence that of nothing commeth nothing, which none of the ancients denied, though they held not that principle of the efficient cause but of the material subject that is of the nature of all formes. But if any thing proceedeth from no causes, that will seeme to have come from nothing, which if it cannot bee, neither is it possible there should be any such chance, as is defined a little before.’ ‘What then,’ quoth I, ‘is there nothing that can rightly bee called chance, or fortune? Or is there something, though unknowen to the common sort, to which these names agree?’ ‘My Aristotle,’ quoth shee, ‘in his bookes of nature declared this point briefly and truly.’ ‘How?’ quoth I. ‘When,’ quoth hee, ‘any thing is done for some certain cause and some other thing hapneth, for some reasons than that which was intended, this is called chance: as if one digging his ground with intention to till it, findeth an hidden treasure. This is thought to have fallen thus out by fortune, but it is

not of nothing, for it hath peculiar causes, whose unexpected and not foreseene concurrence seemeth to have brought forth a chance. For unlesse the Husbandman had digged up his grounds and unlesse the other had hidden his money in that place, the treasure had not been found. These are therefore the causes of this fortunate accident, which proceedeth from the meeting and concurrence of causes, and not from the intention of the doer. For neither he that hid the golde, nor hee that tilled his ground, had any intention that the money should be found, but as I said, it followed and concurred, that this man should dig up that which the other hidde. Wherefore wee may define chance thus: that it is an unexpected event of concurring causes in those things which are done to some end and purpose. Now the cause, why causes concurre and meete so together, is that of order proceeding with inevitable connexion, which descending from the fountaine of providence, disposeth all things in their places and times.'

Prose II

Of freewill

'I observe it,' quoth I, 'and acknowledge it to bee as thou sayest. But in this ranke of coherent causes, have wee any free will, or doth the fatall chaine fasten also the motion of men's minds?' 'We have,' quoth she, 'for there can be no reason, hath also judgement, by which he can discern of every thing by it selfe, wherefore he putteth a difference betwixt those things which are to bee avoided and those which are to bee desired. Now every one seeketh for that which he thinketh is to be desired, and eschueeth that which in his judgement is to be avoyded. Wherefore they which have reason, have freedom to will and nill. But yet I make this not equal in all. For the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgement, and an incorrupted will, and an effectual power to obtaine their desires. But the minds of men must needs be more free when they conserve themselves in the contemplation of God, and lesse when they come to their bodies and yet lesse when they are bound with earthly fetters. But their greatest bondage is, when giving themselves to vices, they loose the possession of their owne reason. For having cast their eyes from the light of the soveraigne truth to inferior obscurities, forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtfull affections, by yielding and consenting to which, they increase the bondage, which they layd upon themselves, and are after a certaine manner captives by their own freedome. Which notwithstanding that foresight of providence, which beholdeth all things from eternity, foreseeeth, and by predestination disposeth of every thing by their merits.'

Prose III

Boethius proposeth the difficulty of concording God's providence with men's free-will

Then I complained, that I was now in a greater confusion, & more doubtful difficultie than before. 'What is that?' quoth she, 'for I already conjecture what it is that troubleth thee.' 'It seemeth,' quoth I, 'to bee altogether imposible and repugnant that God foreseeeth all things and that there should be any free-will. For if God beholdeth all things and cannot be deceived, that must of necessity follow, which his providence foreseeeth to be to come. Wherefore if from eternity he doth not only foreknow the deds of men, but also their counsels and wills, there can be no freewill: for there is not any other deede or will but those which the divine providence that cannot bee deceived hath foreseene. For if things can be drawn to any other course than was foreknowne, there will not be ay firm knowledge of that which is to come, but rather an uncertaine opinion, which in my opinion were impious to believe of God. Neither do I allow of that reason, with which some suppose that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question. For they say, that nothing is therefore to come to passé, because providence did foresee it, but rather contrarywise, because it shall bee, it could not be unknown to providence, and in like manner it is necessary that the other should be true. For it is not necessarie that those things should happen which are foreseene but it is necessarie that those things should be foreseene that are to come. As though our question were which of them is the other's cause, the foreknowledge of the necessitie of things to come, or the necessitie of thing to come of foreknowledge? But let us endeavour to prove that howsoever these causes be ordered, the event of the things, which are foreknowne, is necessary, although the foreknowledge seemeth not to inferred necessitie of being upon the things themselves. For if any man sitteth the opinion which thinketh so must needes be true, and again on the other side, if the opinion that one sitteth be true hee must needest sitte. Wherefore there is necessitie in both in the one of the sitting, and in the other of truth. But one sitteth not because the opinion is true, but rather this is true because one sitteth. So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part, yet there is a common necessity in both. And the like is to be inferred of providence & future things. For although they be foreseene because they shall be and they doe not come to passé because they are foreseene¹⁰: notwithstanding it is necessary that things to come be foreseene, or that things foreseen doe fall out; which alone is sufficient to overthrow freewill. Besides how preposterous is it that the event of temporal things should be said to be the cause of the everlasting foreknowledge.

¹⁰ The original 1963 edition reads "because they are *not* foreseene". As both the preceding context and the 1999 version clearly indicate a positive polarity, the clause has been checked against and revised after another edition of I.T.'s translation published in 1918 (see bibliography)

TEXT B:

Book 5

Chapter 1

Following upon these verses, she was diverting the course of her words to discuss and explain certain other matters, when I remarked: ‘Your exhortation is doubtless all it should be, and is wholly worthy of the authority which you lend it. But that statement which you made a moment ago, that Providence is an issue which interlocks with a number of others, I find true from my own experience. So the question that I pose is whether you think that there is such a thing as chance, and what you think it is.’

To this she responded: ‘I am in a hurry to fulfil the promise which I owe you, and to reveal the route by which you are to be restored to your homeland. These matters which you raise are admittedly useful to grasp, but they do divert us for a little while from the path which we have set ourselves. My fear is that these digressions will weary you, and that you will not be equal to complete the road lying straight ahead.’

‘You must not have the slightest fear of that,’ I said. ‘It will be as good as a rest for me to identify the problems closest to my heart. At the same time, once every facet of your thesis incontestably holds good, there can be no uncertainty about what follows.’

Then she said: ‘I shall indulge your wish.’ At once she began like this: ‘If one were to define chance as the outcome of a random movement which interlocks with no causes, I should maintain that it does not exist at all, that it is a wholly empty term denoting nothing substantial; for since God confines all things within due order, what place can be left for random processes? It is a true saying, never challenged by any of the ancients, that nothing comes forth from nothing – though this foundation, so to speak, which they laid for all explanations of nature, they applied not to the creative originator, but to the matter subject to it. Now if something should emerge uncaused, it will be seen to have arisen from nothing; and if this cannot happen, chance in the sense in which we defined it cannot exist either.’

‘So is there nothing,’ I asked, ‘which can rightly be called chance or accident? Or is there something hidden from the public gaze for which these terms are appropriate?’ ‘My Aristotle,’ she replied, ‘in his *Physics* has offered a succinct account of it which approximates to the truth.’

‘How does he put it?’ I asked.

‘Whenever something is done with a particular purpose in mind,’ she said, ‘and as a result of certain causes something other than was intended occurs, it is called chance. For example, when a man is digging the ground to cultivate his field, and he finds a quantity of gold buried there, people believe that this has happened by accident, but it does not come to pass out of nothing, for it has its own causes, and the conjunction of these unforeseen and unexpected causes seems to have produced a chance happening. But in fact if the cultivator of the field had not dug the ground, and if someone had not lodged and buried his money there, the gold would not have been found. So this is the explanation of that casual acquisition of his. It resulted not from any intention of the man who was digging, but from causes which met and fused with each other. Neither the person who buried the gold, nor the one who dug the field, intended the money to be found, but as I have explained, the place where one buried it happened to coincide with where the other dug. Thus we can define chance as the unexpected outcome of a conjunction of causes in actions carried out for some purpose. What causes the conjunction and the coincidence of these causes is that order which unfolds in an irresistible chain, descending from its source in Providence, and allocating all things to their due place and time.

Chapter 2

‘I take heed of your words,’ I said, ‘and I agree that it is as you say. But in this sequence of interlocking causes, do we have any free will, or does the chain of fate constrain the movement of men’s minds as well?’

‘There is free will,’ she replied, ‘for no rational nature could exist if it did not possess freedom of will. What can by its nature deploy reason, possesses the judgement by which to discern each and every thing, and thus unaided it distinguishes what must be avoided from what is desirable. So the individual seeks what he judges to be desirable, and shuns what he reckons must be avoided. Hence creatures which themselves possess reason also possess the freedom to will or not to will, but my view is that this freedom does not exist equally in all. Heavenly and divine creatures command perceptive judgement, uncorrupted will, and the power to achieve what they desire; human souls, however, though necessarily free when they devote themselves to the vision of the divine mind, are less free when they slip down to the physical world, and less free still when they are bound fast in earthly limbs. The furthest degree of slavery is reached when they devote themselves to vices, and abrogate the possession of reason which is theirs; for once they lower their eyes from the light of the

highest truth down to the world of darkness below, they are then shrouded in a cloud of ignorance, and become confused by destructive emotions. By yielding and lending consent to them, they intensify the slavery which they have brought upon themselves, and in a sense they become prisoners through the exercise of their freedom. However, the eye of Providence, which gazes on all things from eternity, observes these developments, and arranges predestined things according to the merits of each.'

Chapter 3

At this I said: 'I fear that I am further disconcerted by a still more difficult doubt.'

'What is it?' she asked. 'Mind you, I can guess what is worrying you.'

'There seems to be a considerable contradiction and inconsistency', I said, 'between God's foreknowing all things and the existence of any free will. If God foresees all things and cannot be in any way mistaken, then what Providence has foreseen will happen must inevitably come to pass. So if God has prior knowledge from eternity not only of men's actions but also of their plans and wishes, there will be no freedom of will; for the only action and any sort of intention which can possibly exist in the future will be foreknown by divine Providence, which cannot be misled. If such actions and aspirations can be forcibly diverted in some direction other than was foreseen, certain foreknowledge of the future will no longer exist, but instead there will be vacillating opinion; and I regard it as sacrilege to believe this of God.'

I do not subscribe to the argument by which some believe that they can disentangle this knotty problem. What they suggest is that Providence's foreknowledge of a future event is not the cause of its happening, but that it is the other way round. Since something is about to happen, this cannot be hidden from divine Providence, and in this sense, they claim, the element of necessity is reversed. Their argument is that things foreseen do not therefore happen by necessity, but that things which will happen are necessarily foreseen. The assumption here is that we are toiling over the problem of which is the cause of which: is foreknowledge the cause of the necessity of future events, or is the necessity of future events the cause of Providence? In fact, however, we are struggling to show that whatever the sequence of causes, the outcome of things foreknown is necessary, even if such foreknowledge does not appear to impose an inevitable outcome upon future events.

Take the case of a person who is seated. The belief which hazards that he is seated must necessarily be true; and conversely, if the belief that a certain person is seated is true, then he must be seated. In each of the two formulations some necessity is present: in the one

that it is true, and in the other that he is seated. But the individual is not seated because the belief that he is seated is true; rather, the belief is true because the person was already seated. Thus, though the reason for its being true emerges from the fact that he was seated, there is a necessity which both statements share. Clearly the argument about Providence and the future is similar; for even if things are foreseen because they are about to happen, and they do not in fact happen because they are foreseen, nevertheless necessity lies either in that future events are foreseen by God, or that things foreseen happen because they are foreseen. This alone is sufficient to eliminate the freedom of the will.

Appendix II

<u>Text A - EModE</u>			<u>Text B - PDE</u>		
S-no.	C-no.		S-no.	C-no.	
1	1	Having sayd thus	1	1	Following upon these verses ,
1	2	she began	1	2	she was diverting the course of her words
1	3	to turne her speech to certaine other questions → Od The difference between A-3 and B-3 is partly given by the choice of predicate verbs, both lexical and morphological. While in A-3 “to certaine other questions” describes direction, B-3 expresses purpose.	1	3	to discuss and explain certain other matters, → Adv - purpose adjunct
1	4	when I interrupted her ,	1	4	when I remarked:
1	5	saying: Clause A-5 (non-finite) lacks a parallel in Text B. The practice of doubling expression of verbs of saying is no longer extant in PDE.	1	5	∅
1	6.1	‘ Thy exhortation is very good and well beseeming thy authority.	1	6.1.a	‘ Your exhortation is doubtless all
1	6.2	∅	1	6.2	it should be, The content of the adjectival relative clause B-6.2 is in Text A represented by the Cs “very good” in A-6.1. The proposition in present-day version seems to be more informative and complex than that in the Early Modern English, not only because of its clausal realization, but also in its employment of modal predicate.

			1	6.1.b	and is wholly worthy of the authority
1	6.3	∅	1	6.3	which you lend it. → adjectival relative, postmodifier The content of B-6.3 seems to roughly parallel the determiner pronoun “thy” in 6.1, albeit in comparison with Text A it is more descriptive and informative.
2	7	But I find it true by experience,	2	7.a	But that statement
2	8	as thou affirmedst, → adverbial, Adv (content disjunct)	2	8	which you made a moment ago, → adjectival relative, postmodifier
2	9.1	that the question of providence is entangled with many other. → Od (extraposition)	2	9.1	that Providence is an issue → postmodifier
2	9.2	∅	2	9.2	which interlocks with a number of others, → adjectival relative, postmodifier In Text A, the semantic content explicated in B-9.2 is encoded in the predicate and prepositional object of A-9.1 (unlike B-9.1, which is patterned as S-V-Cs, Text A uses S-Vpass-Opred).
			2	7.b	I find true from my own experience.
3	10.1	For I desire	3	10.1.a	So the question
3	10.2	∅	3	10.2	that I pose → adjectival relative, postmodifier

3	11	to know,	3	11	∅
		The lack of corresponding clause structures between B-10.2 and A-11 (non-finite, Od) is given by different lexical choices in the predicate, leading to different collocational and colligational pattern. The same applies to the difference between A/B-13.			3
3	12	whether thou thinkest	3	12	whether you think
		→ Od			→ Cs
3	13	chance to be anything at all,	3	13	that there is such a thing as chance,
		→ non-finite			→ finite The formulation in Text B seems to be more explicit.
3	14	& what it is.'	3	14	and what you think it is.'
		→ Od			→ Cs
4	15	' I make haste,'	4	16	To this she responded:
4	16	quo th shee ,	4	15	' I am in a hurry
4	17.1	'to performe my promise and to shew thee the way	4	17.1.a	to fulfil the promise
4	17.2	∅	4	17.2	which I owe you ,
				17.1.b	and to reveal the route
4	18	by which thou mayest returne to thy country.	4	18	by which you are to be restored to your homeland.
5	19.1	And these questions , though they be very profitable,	5A	19.1.a	These matters
		→ dependent adverbial, Adv (conditional-concessive disjunct)			main clause

5	19.2	∅	5A	19.2	which you raise
					B-19.2 (adjectival relative, postmodifier) is unparalleled in Text A. The information it adds explicates what is deducible from the context.
			5A	19.1.b	are admittedly useful
5	19.3	∅	5A	19.3	to grasp,
					→ non-finite The content of B-19.1.b and B-19.3 roughly correspond to A-21.
5	20.1	yet they are somewhat from our purpose ,	5A	20.1	but they do divert us for a little while from the path
5	20.2	∅	5A	20.2	which we have set ourselves .
					B-20.2 (adjectival relative, postmodifier) is paralleled in Text A by the pronoun determiner “our”. It adds, however, an explicit reference to the broader textual context (cf. note to B-19.2).
5	21	and it is to be feared,	5B	21	My fear is
5	22	lest being wearied with digressions,	5B	22	that these digressions will weary you ,
		→ non-finite In comparison with B-22, the information is more condensed. Although both 22 clauses can be said to perform the role of Cs, The A-22 clause is subordinated to A-23.1, while B-22, like B-23.1 is subordinated to B-21.			→ finite

5	23.1	<p>thou beest not able to finish thy direct journey.’</p>	5B	23.1	and that you will not be equal to complete the road
		<p>→ S (extraposition)</p> <p>Connected to the issue of extraposition is also the choice of subject in clauses A/B-21, where the latter text appears to rely on a more personal expression.</p>			→ Cs
5	23.2	∅	5B	23.2	lying straight ahead.’
					<p>The non-finite postmodifier clause B-23.2 lacks a clausal parallel in Text A. Corresponding to it in content is the pre-modifier “direct”, although the present-day version is more specific in the description.</p>
6	24	‘There is no feare of that,’	6A	24	‘ You must not have the slightest fear of that,’
6	25	quoth I ,	6A	25	I said.
6	26	‘for it will be a great ease to me	6B	26	‘ It will be as good as a rest for me
		<p>→ dependent adverbial, Adv (reason disjunct)</p> <p>Text A more directly explicates and thus tightens the relationship between the content of the clause 26 and the clauses immediately preceding.</p>			→ main
6	27	to understand those things	6B	27	to identify the problems closest to my heart.
6	28	in which I take great delight,	6B	28	∅
		<p>Clause A-28 (adjectival relative, postmodifier) has a non-clausal parallel in the postmodifier phrase “closest to my heart” in B-27.</p>			
6	29.a	and withal	6C	29.a	At the same time,

6	30	when thy disputation is fenced in on every side,	6C	30	once every facet of your thesis incontestably holds good,
6	29.b	there can bee no doubt made of any thing	6C	29.b	there can be no uncertainty
6	31	thou shalt inferre.’	6C	31	about what follows.’
		→ adjectival relative In using the referential “thou” the formulation of clause A-31 in Text A suggests a greater amount of interactivity in the dialogue than B-31.			→ nominal relative In its reference, the subject “what” corresponds to “any thing” in A-29.b.
7	32.a	‘I will,’	7A	33	Then she said:
7	33	quoth shee ,	7A	32	‘I shall indulge your wish.’
7	32.b	‘doe			
7	34	as thou wouldest	7A	34	∅
7	35	have me,’	7A	35	∅
		Clauses A-34 (finite, adverbial, manner adjunct) and A-35 (non-finite, Od) have no corresponding clausal realization in Text B. Instead, Text B uses the expression “your wish” (B-32), which is a Od realized by a simple noun phrase. In this case, text B appears to be more economical.			
7	36	and withal beganne in this manner:	7B	36	At once she began like this:
7	37	‘If any shall define chance	7B	37	‘If one were to define chance as the outcome of a random movement
7	38	to be an event	7B	38	∅
		A-39 appears to be a parallel clausal realization of the phrasal head “the outcome”. Despite its clausal status, there appears however to be little difference in meaning between the two.			

7	39	produced by a confused motion, and without connexion of causes,	7B	39	which interlocks with no causes,
		→ non-finite The first part of the clause, corresponds semantically to the phrasal postmodifier “of a random event” in B-37; the second part, comprising a prepositional phrase, corresponds to B-39.			→ finite, adjectival relative
7	40	I affirm	7B	40	I should maintain
7	41	that there is no such thing,	7B	41	that it does not exist at all,
7	42.1	and that chance is only an empty voyce without any recall signification.	7B	42.1	that it is a wholly empty term
7	42.2	∅	7B	42.2	denoting nothing substantial;
					→ non-finite The content of the B-42.2 clause corresponds to the postmodifying prepositional phrase “without any recall signification” in A-42.2.
8	43	For what place can confusion have	7B/8	43.a	for
8	44	since God disposeth all things in due order.	7B/8	44	since God confines all things within due order,
			7B/8	43.b	what place can be left for random processes?
9	45	For it is a true sentence	9	45	It is a true saying,
9	46	that of nothing commeth nothing,	9	47	never challenged by any of the ancients,
9	48	which none of the ancients denied,	9	46	that nothing comes forth from nothing –
9	48.1	though they held not that principle of the efficient cause but of the material subject	9	48.1.a	though this foundation ,
9	48.2	∅	9	48.2	so to speak,

9	48.3	∅	9	49	which they laid for all explanations of nature,
			9	48.1.b	they applied not to the creative originator, but to the matter
9	49	that is of the nature of all formes.	9	48.3	subject to it .
10	50	But if any thing proceedeth from no causes,	10	50	Now if something should emerge uncaused,
10	51	that will seeme	10	51	it will be seen
10	52	to have come from nothing,	10	52	to have arisen from nothing;
		→ Cs The difference between A-52 and B-52 is given by a choice of predicate verb in A/B-51.			→ S (extraposition)
10	53	which if it cannot bee,	10	53	and if this cannot happen,
		→ adjectival relative			→ coordinated structure
10	54	neither is it possible	10	54.a	chance in the sense

10	55	there should be any such chance, → S (extraposition) The absence of a clausal parallel to A-56 is given by the fact that B-55 does not use extraposition of the subject. Notice, however, the use of existential construction with <i>there</i> in A-56 as opposed to the plain S-V pattern of B-55.	10	55	∅
10	56	as is defined a little before.’ → adverbial, (Adv) content disjunct	10	56	in which we defined it → adjectival relative, postmodifier
			10	54.b	cannot exist either.’
11	57.a	‘What then,’	11	57	‘So is there nothing,’
11	58	quoth I ,	11	58	I asked,
11	57.b	‘is there nothing			
11	59	that can rightly be called chance, or fortune?	11	59	‘ which can rightly be called chance or accident?’
12	60	Or is there something,	12	60	Or is there something
12	61	though unknown to the common sort,	12	61	hidden from the public gaze
	62	to which these names agree?’	12	62	for which these terms are appropriate?’
13	63.1.a	‘My Aristotle,’	13	63.1.a	‘My Aristotle,’
13	64	quoth shee ,	13	64	she replied,
13	63.1.b	‘in his bookes of nature declared this point briefly and truely.’	13	63.1.b	‘in his <i>Physics</i> has offered a succinct account of it
13	63.2	∅	13	63.2	which approximates to the truth The clause B-63.2 (adjectival relative, postmodifier) corresponds to the manner adjunct “truely” in A-63.1.b. The present-day version appears to be less categorical in the sense that the quality (i.e. truth) is scalarized instead of absolutized (cf. also B-6.2 as opposed to A-6.2).

14	65	'How?'	14	65	'How does he put it ?'
		→ verbless			→ verbal Contrary to A-65, B-65 is more explicit.
14	66	quoth I .	14	66	I asked.
15	67.a	'When,'	15A	67	'Whenever something is done with a particular purpose in mind,'
15	68	quoth shee ,	15A	68	she said,
15	67.b	' any thing is done for some certain cause			
15	69	and some other thing hapneth, for some reasons than that	15A	69.a	and as a result of certain causes something other
15	70	which was intended,	15A	70	than was intended
			15A	69.b	occurs,
15	71	this is called chance:	15A	71	it is called chance.
15	72.a	as if one	15B-16/15B	73	For example, when a man is digging the ground
					→ finite, main
15	73	digging his ground with intention	15B-16/15B	74	to cultivate his field,
		→ non-finite, dependent, postmodifier In comparison with B-73, the structure in A-73 is more condensed.			→ Adv (purpose adjunct)
15	74	to till it ,	15B-16/15B	72	and he finds a quantity of gold buried there ,
		→ postmodifier			→ coordinated structure
15	72.b	findeth an hidden treasure.			
16	75	This is thought	15B-16/16	75	people believe
16	76	to have fallen thus out by fortune,	15B-16/16	76	that this has happened by accident,
		→ non-finite, S raising			→ finite, Od Notice also the explicit expression of general human agent in B-75 as opposed to implicit passive "this is thought" in A-75.

16	77	but it is not of nothing,	15B-16/16	77	but it does not come to pass out of nothing,
16	78	for it hath peculiar causes,	15B-16/16	78	for it has its own causes,
16	79	whose unexpected and not foreseene concourse seemeth	15B-16/16	79	and the conjunction of these unforeseen and unexpected causes seems
		→ dependent, adjectival relative			→ main
16	80	to have brought forth a chance.	15B-16/16	80	to have produced a chance happening.
			17	83.a	But in fact
17	81	For unlesse the Husbandman had digged up his grounds	17	81	if the cultivator of the field had not dug the ground ,
17	82	and unlesse the other had hidden his money in that place ,	17	82	and if someone had not lodged and buried his money there ,
17	83	the treasure had not been found.	17	83.b	the gold would not have been found.
18	84	These are therefore the causes of this fortunate accident,	18A	84	So this is the explanation of that casual acquisition of his.
18	85.1	which proceedeth from the meeting and concourse of causes, and not from the intention of the doer.	18B	85.1.a	It resulted not from any intention of the man
		→ dependent, adjectival relative			→ main clause
18	85.2	∅	18B	85.2	who was digging,
			18B	85.1.b	but from causes
18	85.3	∅	18B	85.3	which met and fused with each other .
					Both clauses B-85.2 and B-85.3 present clausal realizations of phrasal elements “the doer” and “meeting and concourse of causes” in A-85.1
19	86.a	For neither he	19	86.a	Neither the person
19	87	that hid the golde ,	19	87	who buried the gold ,
19	86.b	not hee	19	86.b	nor the one

19	88	that tilled his ground ,	19	88	who dug the field ,
19	86.c	had any intention	19	86.c	intended the money
19	89	that the money should be found,	19	89	to be found,
		→ finite, adjectival relative, postmodifier The difference between A-89 and B-89 is given by the difference of structures present in 86.c, where the V-Od combination of “had an intention” in A, corresponds to the construction involving object raising present in B.			→ non-finite, Od
19	90	but as I said,	19	90	but as I have explained,
19	91.1	it followed and concurred,	19	91.1.a	the place
19	91.2	∅	19	93	where one buried it → adjectival relative, postmodifier
			19	91.1.b	happened
19	92	that this man should dig up that → nominal content, S (extraposition)	19	91.2	to coincide with → non-finite The corresponding stretch of text to B-93.1.b and 93.2 in Text A is the coordinated predicate in A-93.1. The formulation in B can be said to involve more complexity.
19	93	which the other hidde.	19	92	where the other dug. → nominal relative, Oprep
20	94	Wherefore wee may define chance thus:	20	94	Thus we can define chance as the unexpected outcome of a conjunction of causes in actions
20	95	that it is an unexpected event of concurring causes in those things Clause A-95 is paralleled in Text B as the manner adjunct “as the unexpected outcome [...]”.	20	95	∅

20	96	which are done to some end and purpose. → finite	20	98	carried out for some purpose. → non-finite
21	97.a	Now the cause ,			
21	98	why causes concur and meet so together, → postmodifier	21	98	What causes the conjunction and the coincidence of these causes → S
21	97.b	is that of order	21	97	is that order
21	99	proceeding with inevitable connexion, → non-finite	21	99	which unfolds in an irresistible chain, → finite
21	100	which descending from the fountaine of providence,	21	100	descending from its source in Providence, and allocating all things to their due place and time.
21	101	disposeth all things in their places and times.’ → finite, adjectival relative The lack of clausal parallel to A-101 in Text B can be attributed to the fact that the modern version uses a coordination of two non-finite verbs, thus forming one coordinated postmodification structure.	21	101	∅
22	102	‘ I observe it ,’	22	102	‘ I take heed of your words,’
22	103	quoeth I ,	22	103	I said,
22	104	‘and acknowledge it	22	104	‘and I agree
22	105	to bee → non-finite, Od (extraposed)	22	105	that it is → finite, nominal content, Od
22	106	as thou sayest.	22	106	as you say.
23	107	But in this ranke of coherent causes, have wee any free will,	23	107	But in this sequence of interlocking causes, do we have any free will,
23	108	or doth the fatall chaine fasten also the motion of men’s minds?’	23	108	or does the chain of fate constrain the movement of men’s minds as well?’
24	109	‘ We have,’	24	109	There is free will,’
24	110	quoeth she ,	24	110	she replied,

24	111	'for there can be no reasonable nature,	24	111	'for no rational nature could exist
24	112	unlesse it be endued with freewill.	24	112	if it did not possess freedom of will.
25	113.a	For that	25	114	What can by its nature deploy reason, → nominal relative, S
25	114	which naturally hath the use of reason → adjectival relative, postmodifier	25	113	possesses the judgement
25	113.b	hath also judgement,			
25	115	by which he can discerne of every thing by it selfe, → finite	25	115	by which to discern each and every thing, → non-finite
25	116.1	∅	25	116.1	and thus unaided → non-finite Clause B-116.1 has no correspondence in Text A.
25	116.2.a	wherefore he putteth a difference betwixt those things	25	116.2	distinguishes
25	117	which are to bee avoided → adjectival relative, postmodifier	25	117	what must be avoided → nominal relative, Od
25	116.2.b	and those			
25	118	which are to bee desired. → adjectival relative, postmodifier	25	118	from what is desirable. → nominal relative, Oprep
26	119.a	Now every one seeketh for that	26	119.a	So the individual seeks
26	120	which he thinketh → adjectival relative, postmodifier	26	120	what he judges → nominal relative, Od
26	121	is to be desired, → finite	26	121	to be desirable, → non-finite
26	119.b	and eschueth that	26	119.b	and shuns

26	122.1	which in his judgement is to be avoyded. → finite, adjectival relative, postmodifier	26	122.1	what he reckons → nominal relative, Od The content of both B-122.2 and B-122.1 is in Text A is subsumed under A-122.1 in that instead of the clausal “he reckons”, A-122.1 expresses via an adjunct “in his judgement.” In this sense, Text B is more explicit.
26	122.2	∅	26	122.2	must be avoided. → non-finite, Od
27	123.a	Wherefore they	27-28/27	123.a	Hence creatures
27	124	which have reason,	27-28/27	124	which themselves possess reason
27	123.b	have freedom	27-28/27	123.b	also posses the freedom
27	125	to will and nill.	27-28/27	125	to will or not to will,
28	126.1	But yet I make this not equal in all.	27-28/28	126.1	but my view is
28	126.2	∅	27-28/28	126.2	that this freedom does not exist equally in all. → nominal content, Cs B-126.1 and B-126.2 correspond to A-126.1, Text B being considerably more explicit and lexically specific.
29	127	For the supreme and divine substances have both a perspicuous judgement, and an incorrupted will, and an effectual power	29-30/29	127	Heavenly and divine creatures command perceptive judgement, uncorrupted will, and the power
29	128.1	to obtaine their desires.	29-30/29	128.1	to achieve

29	128.2	∅	29- 30/29	128.2	what they desire;
					Clause B-128.2 (nominal relative, Od) corresponds to the noun phrase “their desires” in A-128.2. Once again, Text A is more condensed.
30	129.1.a	But the minds of men must needs be more free	29- 30/30	129.1.a	human souls , however,
30	129.2	∅	29- 30/30	129.2	though necessarily free
					→ adverbial, Adv (concessive disjunct) Although the reference to freedom is present in A-129.1.a, the concessive relationship is absent from Text A.
30	130	when they conserve themselves in the contemplation of God,	29- 30/30	130	when they devote themselves to the vision of the divine mind,
30	129.1.b	and lesse	29- 30/30	129.1.b	are less free
30	131	when they come to their bodies	29- 30/30	131	when they slip down to the physical world,
30	129.1.c	and yet lesse	29- 30/30	129.1.c	and less free still
30	132	when they are bound with earthly fetters.	29- 30/30	132	when they are bound fast in earthly limbs.
31	133	But their greatest bondage is,	31- 32/31	133	The furthest degree of slavery is reached
31	134.1	when giving themselves to vices,	31	134.1	when they devote themselves to vices, and abrogate the possession of reason
		→ non-finite, Cs			→ finite, adverbial, Adv (time adjunct)
31	134.2	∅	31	134.2	which is theirs ;
					adjectival relative, postmodifier corresponds to determiner-premodifier sequence “their own” in A-135

31	135	they loose the possession of their owne reason.	31	135	∅
		adverbial, time adjunct The content expressed in A-135 corresponds to the second part of B-134.1, where it is however not put into the place of a superordinate clause, but instead forms a coordinate predicate with the preceding verb phrase.			
32	136	For having cast their eyes from the light of the soveraigne truth to inferior obscurities,	31-32/32A	136	for once they lower their eyes from the light of the highest truth down to the world of darkness below,
		→ non-finite			→ finite
32	137	forthwith they are blinded with the cloud of ignorance, molested with hurtfull affections,	31-32/32A	137	they are then shrouded in a cloud of ignorance, and become confused by destructive emotions.
32	138	by yielding and consenting to which ,	31-32/32B	138	By yielding and lending consent to them ,
32	139.1.a	they increase the bondage ,	31-32/32B	139.1	they intensify the slavery
32	140	which they layd upon themselves ,	31-32/32B	140	which they have brought upon themselves ,
32	139.1.b	and are after a certaine manner captives by their own freedome.			
32	139.2	∅	31-32/32B	139.2	and in a sense they become prisoners through the exercise of their freedom.
					B-139.2 corresponds to the part of the coordinate predicate expressed in A-139.1.b.
33	141.a	Which notwithstanding that foresight of providence ,	33	141.a	However, the eye of Providence ,
33	142	which beholdeth all things from eternity,	33	142	which gazes on all things from eternity,

33	141.b	foreseeth, and by predestination dispoſeth of every thing by their merits.	33	141.b	observes these developments , and arranges predestined things according to the merits of each.’
34	143.1	Then I complained,	34	143.1	At this I said:
34	143.2	∅	34	143.2	’ I fear B-143.2 is basically unparalleled in Text A. Though it may be said that the predicate “complained” in A-143.1 is more specific than “B-143.1”, the notions of complaining and fearing are not fully interchangeable.
34	144	that I was now in a greater confusion, & more doubtful difficultie than before.	34	144	that I am further disconcerted by a still more difficult doubt.’
35	145	’What is that ?’	35A	145	’What is it ?’
35	146	quoſh ſhe ,	35A	146	ſhe asked.
35	147.1	∅	35B	147.1	’Mind you , B-147.1 functions as a discourse marker, strengthening the appeal to the listener.
35	147.2	’for I already conjecture	35B	147.2	I can guess
35	148	what it is	35B	148	what is worrying you.’
35	149	that troubleth thee.’ The extra clause A-149, absent in Text B, is a result of <i>it</i> -cleft in A-148, which appears to offers also a different rhetorical and rhythmical segmentation of the text.	35B	149	∅
36	150	’ It seemeth,’	36	150	’There seems
36	151	quoſh I ,	36	152.a	to be a considerable contradiction and inconsistency’,
36	152	’to bee altogether impossible and repugnant	36	151	I said,
			36	152.b	’between God’s foreknowing all things and the existence of any free will.

36	153	that God foreseeeth all things and	36	153	∅
36	154	that there should be any free-will.	36	154	∅
		Clauses 153-154, both presenting a case of extraposed subject, have no clausal parallel in text B. The semantically correspondent content is instead encoded as a postmodifier (B-152.b) to the noun phrase in Cs function in B-152.a (“inconsistency”). No significant change in the meaning of the content and in FSP is involved.			
37	155	For if God beholdeth all things and cannot be deceived,	37	155	If God foresees all things and cannot be in any way mistaken,
37	156	that must of necessity follow,	37	157	then what Providence has foreseen
					→ nominal content, S
37	157	which his providence foreseeeth	37	158	will happen
		→ adjectival relative, postmodifier			→ finite
37	158	to be to come.	37	156	must inevitably come to pass.
		→ non-finite			
38	159	Wherefore if from eternity he doth not only foreknow the deeds of men, but also their counsels and wills,	38	159	So if God has prior knowledge from eternity not only of men’s actions but also of their plans and wishes,
38	160	there can be no freewill:	38	160	there will be no freedom of will;
38	161.1	for there is not any other deede or will but those	38	161.1.a	for the only action and any sort of intention

38	161.2	∅	38	161.2	which can possibly exist in the future
					Clause 161.2, a postmodifying adjectival relative clause, has no direct parallel in Text A, both syntactic and semantic. The content specifies and elaborates on the passage in A-161.1 “there is not any other”, in that it explicitly refers to the future. Also significant is the usage of modal predicate in combination with the explication of possibility, as opposed to simple <i>be</i> in the Text A.
38	162.a	which the divine providence	38	161.1.b	will be foreknown by divine Providence,
		→ adjectival relative, postmodifier The absence of a clausal parallel in Text B is given by a different structure of the superordinate clause (161.1), which is of a simple passive S-V-Adv structure. Where Text A relies on a use of there-construction with negation + <i>but</i> , Text B achieves the same semantic result by using the subject premodifier <i>only</i> , while maintaining a positive polarity.			
38	163	that cannot be deceived	38	162	∅
38	162.b	hath foreseene.	38	163	which cannot be misled.
39	164	For if things can be drawn to any other course	39	164	If such actions and aspirations can be forcibly diverted in some direction
39	165	than was foreknowne,	39	165	other than was foreseen,
39	166.1.a	there will not be any firm	39	166.1	certain foreknowledge of the future

		knowledge of that			will no longer exist,
39	167	which is to come,	39	167	∅
		Clause 167, a postmodifying, adjectival relative clause, has no clausal parallel in Text B. Instead, its content is expressed via prefix <i>fore-</i> in the subject of B-166.1.			
39	166.1.b	but rather an uncertain opinion,			
39	166.2	∅	39	166.2	but instead there will be vacillating opinion;
					Clause 166.2 lacks a clausal parallel in Text A. The reason for this is given by the different structures of 166.1 in A and B. Unlike in A-166.1, where <i>there-</i> construction is used to introduce both the concept of “knowledge” and “opinion”, Text B splits those into two coordinating clauses: B-166.1, an existential clause of a simple SV pattern and B-166.1 with the grammatical subject <i>there</i> .
39	168	which in my opinion were impious	39	168	and I regard it as sacrilege
		→ adjectival relative, postmodifier The formulation in A-168 potentially allows for two different interpretations, according to whether we regard <i>which</i> as pertaining to the <i>opinion</i> in A-166.1.b, or whether we interpret it as covering the whole previous content of the clause. Note that the reading of B-168 and its extraposed object expressed in			→ main

		B-169 favours the latter interpretation.			
39	169	to believe of God.	39	169	to believe this of God.
40	170	Neither do I allow of that reason,	40	170	I do not subscribe to the argument
40	171	with which some suppose	40	171	by which some believe
40	172	that they can dissolve the difficulty of this question.	40	172	that they can disentangle this knotty problem.
41	173	For they say,	41A	173	What they suggest is
41	174.1.a	that nothing is therefore to come to passe, → Od	41A	174.1	that Providence's foreknowledge of a future event is not the cause of its happening, → Cs The different syntactic function of A-174.1 and B-174.1 in relation to A/B-173 is given by the wh- cleft in the latter case.
41	175	because providence did foresee it , Clause B-175 (adverbial, reason adjunct) does not have a clausal parallel in Text B. The semantic content of both A-174.1.a and A-175 is enclosed in B-174.1. Contrary to Text A, Text B relies on nominal expressions, rather than verbal ones, thus making the clause B-174.1 more condensed.	41A	175	∅
41	174.1.b	but rather contrarywise,			
41	174.2	∅	41A	174.2	but that it is the other way round. B-174.2 has a non-clausal parallel in A-174.1.b. The difference may be partly attributed to the differences between A-174.1-175 and B-174.1 mentioned above, in

					which the more condensed structure chooses a more explicit counterpart and vice versa.
41	176	because it shall bee,	41B	176	Since something is about to happen,
41	177	it could not be unknown to providence,	41B	177	this cannot be hidden from divine Providence,
41	178	and in like manner it is necessary	41B	178	and in this sense, they claim,
41	179	that the other should be true.	41B	179	the element of necessity is reversed.
		→ S (extraposition) The differences in syntactic function between A-1879 and B-179 are given by the differences in A/B-178. Whereas Text B uses a general subject <i>they</i> , Text A is less personal in that it employs an extraposed structure with anticipatory <i>it</i> .			→ main
42	180.1	For it is not necessarie	42	180.1	∅
42		∅	42	181.2	Their argument is The clause 181.2 has no direct semantic parallel. In comparison with the older text, the present-day version seems to tend to choose more personal or concrete subjects where Text A uses anticipatory <i>it</i> .
42	181	that those things should happen	42	182.a	that things
		→ S (extraposed) The extraposition is also related to the presence of A-183.1, which is paralleled in Text B in B-184.b by the reason adjunct.			→ Cs
42	182	which are foreseene	42	183	foreseen
		→ finite, adjectival relative			→ non-finite

			42	182.b	do not therefore happen by necessity,
42	183	but it is necessarie	42	186	∅
				184.a	but that things
42	184	that those things should be foreseene → S (extraposed) (see note to A-183.1 and A-184)	42	185	which will happen
42	185	that are to come.	42	184.b	are necessarily foreseen.
43	186.1	As though our question were → main	43	186.2	The assumption here is The clause seems to be roughly corresponding to the use of subjunctive predicate in A-189.1.
43	186.2	∅	43	186.1	that we are toiling over the problem → dependent, nominal content, Cs
43	187	which of them is the other's cause, → nominal content, Cs	43	187	of which is the cause of which: → adjectival relative, postmodifier
43	188.1.a	the foreknowledge of the necessitie of things → non-verbal	43	188.1	is foreknowledge the cause of the necessity of future events, → finite Text B delivers a more specific description of the content in A-188.1.a (see also note to B-188.2).
43	189	to come, Clause A-189 (non-finite, postmodifier) does not have a clausal parallel in Text B. Instead, its content is delivered via predication in B-188.1(see note to B-188.1 and B-188.2).	43	189	∅
43	188.2	∅	43	188.2	or is the necessity of future events the cause of Providence? The lack of clausal correspondence to 188.2 in Text A is given by the non-verbal realization of 188.1. Text B is more specific in the sense that instead of presenting a
43	188.1.b	or the necessitie of things			

					simple coordinated noun phrase modified by infinitival clauses, it presents two finite clauses, making the content less condensed.
43	190	to come of foreknowledge? Clause A-190 (non-finite, postmodifier) does not have a clausal parallel in Text B. Instead, its content is delivered via predication in B-188.2 (see note to B-188.2)	43	190	∅
44	191	But let us endeavour	44	191	In fact, however, we are struggling
44	192	to prove → non-finite, Od The differences in syntactic function of A-192 and B-192 can be explained by different valency patterns pertaining to the predicate verbs in A/B-191.	44	192	to show → non-finite, Adv (purpose adjunct)
44	193	that howsoever these causes be ordered, Clause A-193 has a parallel in B-193, where the predicate verb is ellipped.	44	193	that whatever the sequence of causes,
44	194.a	the event of the things,	44	194.a	the outcome of things
44	195	which are foreknowne, → finite, adjectival relative The finite realization in Text A is less condensed, although no significant level of specification is present.	44	195	foreknown → non-finite
44	194.b	is necessary,	44	194.b	is necessary,
44	196	although the foreknowledge seemeth	44	196	even if such foreknowledge does not appear
44	197	not to inferre necessitie of being upon the things themselves.	44	197	to impose an inevitable outcome upon future events.

45	198.1	For if any man sitteth	45A	198.1	Take the case of a person
		→ dependent clause, adverbial, Adv (conditional disjunct) Instead of forming an independent sentence, as observed in B-198.1 and B- 198.2, A-198.1 forms a dependent clause to A-199 (see below).			→ main clause The formulations in Text B suggests not only a greater level of specificity, but also a greater level of interaction with the character of the author himself (and thus, in fact, with the reader).
45	198.2	∅	45A	198.2	who is seated. Clause B-198.2 (adjectival relative, postmodifier) lacks a clausal parallel in Text A. The semantic content is instead encoded as a verbal predicate in A-198.1.
45	199.a	the opinion	45B	199.a	The belief
45	200.1	which thinketh so	45B	200.1	which hazards
45	200.2	∅	45B	200.2	that he is seated
					Clause B-200.2 (nominal content, Od) lacks a clausal parallel in text A. Instead, the semantic content of clause B-200.2 is encoded in the adjunct <i>so</i> in A-200.1.
45	199.b	must needes be true,	45B	199.b	must necessarily be true;
45	201.a	and again on the other side, if the opinion	45B	201.a	and conversely, if the belief
45	202	that one sitteth	45B	202	that a certain person is seated
45	201.b	be true	45B	201.b	is true,
45	203	hee must needest sitte.	45B	203	then he must be seated.
46	204.1	Wherefore there is necessitie in both in the one of the	46	204.1	In each of the two formulations some necessity is present:

		sitting, and in the other of truth.			
46	204.2	∅	46	204.2	in the one that it is true,
46	204.3	∅	46	204.3	and in the other that he is seated. Clauses B-204.2 and B-204.3 lack a clausal parallel in Text A. The content expressed by these two nominal content clauses is contained in prepositional phrase postmodifiers “of the sitting” and “of truth” in A-204.1. In this sense, Text B shows a greater level of explicitness.
47	205	But one sitteth	47	205	But the individual is not seated
47	206.1	not because the opinion is true,	47	206.1.a	because the belief
47	206.2	∅	47	206.2	that he is seated Clause B-206.2 (postmodifier, nominal content clause) lacks a direct parallel in Text A. As the semantic content it conveys is basically already present in A/B-205, it might be seen as somewhat redundant; yet nevertheless this direct explication seems to be included in order to avoid potential confusion, thus contributing to the greater intelligibility of the message. The same principle appears to motivate B-209.2.
			47	206.1.b	is true;
47	207	but rather this is true	47	207	rather, the belief is true
47	208	because one sitteth.	47	208	because the person was already seated.
48	209.1	So that though the cause of truth proceedeth from one part,	48	209.1	Thus, though the reason for its being true emerges from the fact
48	209.2	∅	48	209.2	that he was seated,

48	210.1	yet there is a common necessity in both.	48	210.1	there is a necessity
48	210.2	∅	48	210.2	which both statements share. Serving as a postmodifier to the noun phrase head in 210.1, the adjectival relative clause B-210.2 has a non-clausal parallel in Text A in the form of the premodifier “common” in A-210.1.
49	211	And the like is to be inferred of providence & future things.	49-50/49	211	Clearly the argument about Providence and the future is similar;
50	212	For although they be foreseene	49-50/50A	212	for even if things are foreseen
50	213	because they shall be	49-50/50A	213	because they are about to happen,
50	214	and they doe not come to passe	49-50/50A	214	and they do not in fact happen
50	215	because they are foreseene:	49-50/50A	215	because they are foreseen,
50	216	notwithstanding it is necessary	49-50/50A	216	nevertheless necessity lies either in
50	217.a	that things → S (extraposition)	49-50/50A	217	that future events are foreseen by God, Instead of an extraposed construction with the Cs “necessary” (A-217.a), Text B uses the noun “necessity” in the role of the subject. Clauses B-217 and B-219.1 therefore perform the role of adjuncts, instead of nominal content subject clauses.

50	218	to come	49- 50/50A	218	∅
		Clause A-218 (non-finite, postmodifier) does not have a clausal parallel in Text B; instead, the same semantic content is encoded via noun phrase pre-modifier “future” in B-217.			
50	220.b	be foreseen,			
50	219.1.a	or that things	49- 50/50A	219.1.a	or that things
50	220	foreseen	49- 50/50A	220	foreseen
50	219.1.b	doe fall out;	49- 50/50A	219.1.b	happen
50	219.2	∅	49- 50/50A	219.2	because they are foreseen.
					B-219.2 (adverbial, reason clause) has no direct parallel. Once again, it brings a higher level of explicitness to the sentence.
50	221	which alone is sufficient	50B	221	This alone is sufficient
		→ dependent, nominal relative The clause exhibits a tighter connection with the previous clauses in sentence 50. On the use of <i>which</i> as opposed to <i>this</i> cf. also the commentary on clauses 168-169.			→ main
50	222	to overthrow freewill.	50B	222	to eliminate the freedom of the will.