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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL STUDIES**

**The EU Foreign Policy towards the
North Korea:
Its effects and limitations**

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Introduction

EU has been growing with enlarging its members and deepening the integrity. One of the conspicuous EU developments is that former ideological enemy states, the middle-eastern Europe countries, acquired the membership, and they agreed with the EU criterion such as democracy and market driven economy. In addition, the common foreign and security policy was introduced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty to strengthen the EU diplomatic capacity in the international community. It has been evolved through several institutional reforms to become a foundation of the EU foreign policy. For further step, the constitutional treaty, Lisbon Treaty, was agreed upon among member states in 2007 after institutional commitments to the establishment of European constitution. The constitutional treaty granted legal personality to EU, so EU has the basis to act as a principal agent having rights and duties in the international community. EU is still trying to further Europeanization and strengthen its identity as a unitary actor in the international relation.

The EU common positions on the external relation are required not to lose its credibility as a global actor. However, even though EU established the Common Foreign and Security Policy to have one voice in the international society, it has not showed the common positions in relations with third countries as much as unitary states. It is assumed that having a common position among member states in foreign policy is not simple and easy because the foreign policy is significantly connected with the state's sovereignty. Moreover, it is difficult to make the relevant decisions on sensitive issues because the decision making process in the constitutional treaty requires the unanimous agreement among member states for the common foreign and security policy. Thus, it is a reasonable argument that EU take the preventive diplomacy strategy based on soft powers because it needs to draw the easier consensus from member states and get the acceptable justification in the external policy. With this reason, the EU engagement in North Korea can be seen in the perspective of preventive diplomacy using soft powers.

North Korea requested emergency relief from the international community when facing food shortage due to the natural disaster in the mid-1990s. At that time, EU started emergency relief. Afterwards, EU has been involved in the political and economic issues of North Korea. There are many issues which are drawing international attentions. Nuclear weapon problem, human rights abuse, famine and economic crisis are issues which EU officially expresses its interests in. The issues are also connected with the EU values and

goals, so they can be tasks to test the common foreign and security policy beyond Europe. EU needs to take a so-called niche approach by using differentiated strategies from other powers surrounding the Korean peninsula in order to secure its position as an international actor. It is a value-based soft power.

Research questions

This research is aiming at examining if the EU foreign policy towards North Korea has been implemented on the basis of (Neo)liberalism. It has an intention to show that the EU's engagement in North Korea is more appropriately explained on the perspective of (Neo)liberalism, similar to the definition of soft power, which stresses human security, international cooperation and institutions, etc. Then, i try to predict the future EU-North Korea relation in my personal view after looking at the effects and limitations of EU engagement policy. Another purpose of the research is to argue the possibility that EU can play a role to induce the North Korean transition and inter Korean reconciliation. To be specific, the research has expectation of finding answers to main questions: First, what components of (Neo)liberal thinking are found in the EU foreign policy? Secondly, how well do EU approaches to North Korea work (its effects and limitations)? Thirdly, what prospect of the future EU policy towards North Korea can be expected? Finally, can EU be an alternative to resolve the North Korean issues? This research is expected to add another implication for seraching a way to resolve the North Korean issues.

Theoretical application

I employ one of the international relation theories, (Neo)liberalism, to identify EU foreign policy towards North Korea. Traditionally, the main concerns of liberal thinking are to promote greater human security through international cooperation. This cooperation includes the acceptance of ethical norm, international law and institution. (Neo)liberalism is defined as a theoretical perspective which explains the way international institutions facilitate peace and prosperity, global change, cooperation through collective programs for reforms.¹ It believes that independent transnational actors may result in cooperation because of the convergent and overlapping interests, and it also concentrates on the democratic governance, economic transaction, international law and organization,

¹ Charles W. & Kegley, JR. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 12th edition, 2009, p. 36.

multilateral diplomacy, arms control and disarmament for the better life.² The interdependence among states was increased during the last quarter of the twentieth century, accordingly the expectation of increased cooperation based on mutual interest has been grown.³ The global issues such as the international economy and environment matters support the (Neo)liberal views.

(Neo)liberalism believes that states are rational actors and seek opportunities to acquire absolute gains for all concerned parties. It considers states as an important actor, and acknowledges non-state actors and multiple channels of access between societies. Baldwin argues the (Neo)realism and (Neo)liberalism are distinguished by the different assumptions on the six topics.⁴ If looking at the these assumptions, it will be easier understand the features of (Neo)liberalism. According to his argument, whereas (Neo)realism argue that anarchy does not matter much, (Neo)liberalism believes that anarchy should be mitigated by international regimes and global institutions. The latter also emphasizes an international cooperation for a problem solving process. Besides, international institutions are crucial component because they are considered as a way to overcome the obstacles of interdependence. Moreover, (Neo)liberalism puts priority on the economic welfares rather than security issues, and considers states' intentions, interests, information and ideals more than the distribution of capability. The cooperative competition is a concern.

These (Neo)liberal concerns and positions are also found in many EU reports. For example, “A strategy for EU foreign policy, 2010” manifests the EU's values-based foreign and security policy stressing human rights, multilateralism and soft power. “The EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004” describe EU's cooperation objectives with Asian countries and North Korea. It underlines the EU commitment to support the inter-Korean reconciliation and to increase assistance to North Korea in response to progress by North Korea. Most of all, the EU constitutional treaty contains the EU values, objectives and principles of EU external actions, and they are all similar to liberal thinking. Therefore, the (Neo)liberalism is chosen for applicable theory in this paper.

² Ibid. p. 36

³ Zacher, Mark W. and Matthew, Richard A. (1995): *Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands*. In: Charles W. Kegley (ed.): *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, p. 117.

⁴ David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and neoliberalism: the Contemporary debate*, Columbia University, 1993, p.5-289.

Methodology

Basically, the data collection and analysis method is used for the research. For primary references, data from the international organizations such as UN, WFP, KEDO, and Amnesty International are researched. The official reports and statistics of EU organizations and South Korea are also examined. For example, the “towards a New Asia Strategy” (1994), the “Europe and Asia: A Strategy Framework for Enhanced Partnership” (2001), and “the EC-DPRK, Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004”, which were published by EU, are valuable references. The various declarations and resolutions of EU and UN in regard to North Korea also offer credible evidences. The official authorities’ speeches and interviews such like EU commission are served as good references. Statistics of “the Bank of Korea”, “Statistics Korea”, and “KOTRA”, and legal documents of KEDO improve objectivity of the thesis. For secondary references, the publications of many research institutes and scholars are used. The research reports, recent articles and dissertations regarding EU and North Korea become useful sources. As a first step, relevant data from library books and on-line e-books are collected. Then the collected data are analyzed to find out what is said in common about the EU foreign policy.

The thesis is composed of 4 body parts. The first chapter is aiming at finding out in what context EU has been involved in the North Korea: What are the environment and motivation of EU-North Korea relation? What is the institutional framework and strategy of EU engagement in North Korea? This chapter confirms that EU foreign policy is distinguished from other concerned countries due to its value-based soft power approach. The chapter 2 has researches on how EU has engaged itself in the North Korean political issues: How has EU been involved in the nuclear weapon and human rights issues and what are main features? On the other hand, how EU has approached the North Korean economic issues is discussed in the chapter 3. These chapters prove that EU has more active posture on the human rights and humanitarian aid rather than the security issue. They also show that the EU’s policy is affected by political variables surrounding the Korean peninsula. Finally, the chapter 4 is devoted to answering the effects and limitations of EU policy. It is concluded with the prospect of future EU policy and the possibility of EU’s being an alternative to resolve the North Korean issues.

CHAPTER I

THE CONTEXT OF EU ENGAGEMENT IN NORTH KOREA

I. EU - North Korea Relation

1. North Korean Foreign Policy in the new international environment

The international world order changed after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The cold war is over, and every country is moving to seek practical interests for their own nations. Of course, North Korea has been influenced by a new era of reconciliation and cooperation around the world. It lost the significant supporters when socialist nations were dismantled. The North Korea's need of being adapted to the new international environment increased. It has tried to break isolation and pursue economic interests for the regime survival. North Korea has expanded the diplomatic relations with western countries beginning with Italia. Though it is less than that of South Korea, the number of countries that have diplomatic relation with North Korea reached 160 in 2009.

*“We will improve relations with any country which respects our sovereignty”
(North Korean New Year's Joint Editorial, 2001) ”⁵*

Table 1: The amity of South Korea and North Korea by regions, 2009

(Number of country)

Regions	Done		Not yet	
	S·Korea	N·Korea	S·Korea	N·Korea
<i>Total</i>	<i>188</i>	<i>160</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>32</i>
Asia	36	25	0	11
America	34	24	1	11
Europe	53	49	2	6
Middle East	19	17	1	3
Africa	46	45	0	1

Source: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 2009 white paper, own computation

⁵ The Institute of National Unification, *Analysis of 2001 New Year's Joint Editorial*, 2001

One of the characteristic policies is that North Korea has expedited the development of mass destruction arms, and used them as a diplomatic strategy to protect the regime and get economic assistances from the international society, especially U.S. North Korea is putting the energy on diplomacy so as to survive in the ever-changing international environment. Speaking up the main principles of North Korea's diplomacy such as "equality, autonomy, mutual respect, nonintervention and reciprocity", North Korea is seeking diplomatic diversification. Consequently, it is interested in the western countries. Since 1990s, the foreign policy has changed to the realistic path that stresses benefits and economy rather than ideology and politics. One report of the South Korean institutes summarizes the North Korean foreign policy as follows.⁶

- *Gain the regime security as well as economic benefits through improving relations with western powers such as USA, Japan and EU.*
- *Maintain and improve the traditional friendship with China and Russia.*
- *Intensify the natural resource diplomacy with the South-East Asia.*
- *Strengthen the tie with the international organization and NGOs so as to relieve the food shortage which has continued since 1995.*

2. Development of EU - North Korea Relation

The relation of Europe and North Korea has been influenced by political ideology and economic factors.⁷ North Korea had foreign relation with only a few countries which had same political ideology. From the late 1940s to the early 1950s, it focused on the relation with communist camps, especially Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was physical and ideological supporter for North Korea. During the Korean War, North Korea advanced the diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union and China to get supports for the war. While the Korean War consolidated the relation of North Korea and socialism countries such as the eastern bloc, the relation of North Korea and Western Europe was aggravated. After the Korean War truce was signed, Western Europe countries, which helped South Korea, joined the Geneva conference in 1954 to discuss the Korean unification. At that time, the Western Europe countries agreed to the unification proposal submitted by North Korea rather than South Korea. However, it did not mean that North Korea and Western Europe

⁶ The Education Center for Unification, *Understanding North Korea*, 2009

⁷ The relation of Europe and North Korea is based on the article written by Lee Jong-Sue, *the characteristics of EU policy toward North Korea and research about possibility of EU role as coordinator in the Korean peninsular*, Europe Research, 2008, p.189-p.197

countries made a cooperative relation voluntarily each other. From the mid of 1950s, North Korea started a multilateral diplomacy and enlarged the relation with Asian countries such as Japan, India, Myanmar, and Indonesia, etc. As the multilateral diplomacy increased in 1960s, North Korea became estranged from socialism countries in East Europe. As a result, North Korea started contacting countries in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the mutual exchanges between North Korea and countries in Western Europe ended up in civilian areas, not at the governmental level because of the influence of the cold war system.

From the late 1960s, North Korea tried to acquire loan and technology from the Western Europe to overcome the economic obstacles and develop the economic construction strategies. The Western Europe was also active in establishing diplomatic ties according to the various interests. At last, North Korea made diplomatic relations with some of western countries – Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Austria, Switzerland and Portugal in 1970s. Nonetheless, the diplomatic relations with the major countries in Western Europe such as West Germany, Britain, France and Italy were not attained. During the same period, the relations of North Korea and Western Europe got worse again due to the North Korean moratorium resulting from the accumulated foreign debt. After all, the credit states in Western Europe decided to stop offering loan for North Korea. North Korea tried to recover the relation with Western Europe again in 1980s. Because North Korea needed capital and technology for economic boost, it put the eyes on Western Europe. In 1980s, the Western Europe tried to enhance more independent diplomacy based on the strengthened European community. North Korea also showed initiatives to expand the relations with capitalism countries, keeping its own independent line. For another background, the relief of tension between the two camps of east and west and the improvement of relation between U.S. and China influenced the North Korea's diplomatic enlargement.

After the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc collapsed in 1990s, the relation with the former socialism countries was changed into a pragmatic one. The Eastern Europe made diplomatic ties with South Korea though North Korea opposed it, and stopped the free aids for North Korea. In this political environment, North Korea could not help looking for another way to cope with the changed international environment. The way was to extend the diplomatic area to the Western Europe. However, even if the economic exchange with Western Europe increased, there were remaining limitations which interrupted the advancement of political relation each other because of nuclear weapon issues, foreign

debt problems and human rights.⁸ The EU's political interest in the Korean peninsula increased in the mid 1990s when North Korea asked the aids of the international society. At the EU level, the humanitarian aids were provided to North Korea when the natural disaster, heavy flood, swept it 1995. EU became a member of KEDO's (Korean Peninsular Energy Development Organization) executive board to solve out the nuclear weapon problem in 1997. North Korea and EU had political dialogues, beginning the first meeting in 1998. A variety of agendas for political dialogues were set on the table including security, human rights and economic assistance.

The first inter Korean summit was held successfully in 2000, and the event made two Koreas more cooperative. In the same year, EU commission made a resolution to encourage North Korea to cooperate with South Korea for peace and stability in the Korean peninsula. EU proclaimed a few action plans for North Korea, and EU action guideline was formulated in 2000.⁹ On the basis of this guideline, EU promoted the economic influences on North Korea. It stated the enlargement of KEDO assistance and the intensified political dialogue with North Korea. EU planned to strengthen the assistance program for North Korea by opening more EU market and offering the technical sources. In 2000, North Korea suggested the diplomatic ties with the EU member states which North Korea had not had foreign relation with. EU also started embracing North Korea to increase its influences in the Korean peninsula. The ASEM held in Seoul in 2000 was a starting point to facilitate the relation of the North Korea and EU member states because many European countries including U.K. Germany and Spain announced the intention to have diplomatic relations with North Korea. As a good opportunity to accelerate the diplomatic negotiation, the delegation representing the EU including the president of EU (G. Person) and High Representative (J. Solana) visited North Korea and had a talk with the North Korea leader, Kim Jeong-Il, in May 2001. They discussed peace and security of the Korean peninsula, diplomatic ties and human rights. After that, the EU committee announced the official, diplomatic relation with North Korea in May 2001. Finally, North Korea accomplished the enlargement of diplomatic relations with EU as well as EU 25 member states.

⁸ Park Chae-Bok, *The relation of North Korea and EU and EU's role in the peace establishment in Korean peninsula*, the Institute for Unification Problem Research, 2002, p. 63

⁹ Kim Hak-No, *EU foreign policy toward North Korea and the process of peace establishment between South and North Korea*, the Academic Journal of Korean Politics, 2006, p.295

Table 2: the Treaty of Amity between EU (member states) and North Korea from 2000 to 2001

Nation	Italy	U.K	Nether-land	Belgium	Spain	Germany	Luxem-bourg	Greece	EU	Ireland	France	Estonia
Month/Year	Jan, 2000	Dec, 2000	Jan, 2001	Jan, 2001	Feb, 2001	Mar, 2001	Mar, 2001	Mar, 2001	Jul, 2001	Dec, 2001	no	no

Source: Kim Jeong-Yong, 2003.

The North Korean nuclear weapon issue is a substantial barrier to keep close relation of two parts. Though EU has the inclination to develop mutual relation with North Korea, it is not unconditional. The relation development of two parts depends on progress by North Korea in addressing EU concerns as regards human rights, non-proliferation, security issues, social development, progress in inter-Korean reconciliation, and structural reform of the economy.¹⁰ After the 9/11 attack happened, the relation of North Korea and EU reflected the changed international environment so that the exchange of economic mission between North Korea and EU member states was more centered rather than EU itself.¹¹ Through the political dialogues, EU urged North Korea to take a more responsible attitude in the international community. There were also many unofficial negotiations and contacts between EU (member states) and North Korea. The North Korea has tried to improve relations with countries in Western Europe after the former socialism countries collapsed. EU and member states have been interested in North Korea issues to increase their political position and economic influence in the Korea peninsular and East Asia. However, it is argued that the EU-North Korea diplomatic relation has not increased EU influence on security and politics in North Korea, not least because EU did not become a counterweight of US policies towards North Korea as the Pyongyang expected.¹²

II. Framework of EU Engagement in North Korea

1. Institutional Ground: EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

¹⁰ The European commission, *the EC-Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Country Strategic paper 2001-2004*, 2001, p. 5

¹¹ Park Chae-Bok, *The relation of North Korea and EU and EU's role in the peace establishment in Korean peninsula*, the Institute for Unification Problem Research, 2002, p. 64

¹² Axel Berkofsky, *the EU's relations with china, Japan and North Korea. Implications for the EU's Role and Engagement in Asian Security*, Institute for the Study of International Politics, 2010, p.21

EU has grown with the development of size and institutional intensity. The expansion of EU has continued, and the appropriate institutional reforms have been implemented according to the changed environment.¹³ The initial European community mainly concentrated on the economic cooperation among member states. The economic cooperation was so successful as to get some benefits through the market expansion such as the single currency and the free movement of labor, goods, capital and service. Meanwhile, the community also had the negative sides such as unfair distribution of economic benefits. As the inter-dependence among EU member states got deeper, the need of political cooperation increased. Moreover, EU needed the consistent foreign policy and the credible defense policy to increase its interests by implementing efficient economy policy in the unpredictable international society.

There were other several causes to facilitate the establishment of the EU common foreign and security policy. The end of the cold war system changed the international order. Europe's recognition of NATO system changed. In this context, the strong demand for the independent defense system increased in Europe. These changes urged the common foreign and security policy to be set up. In the international society, one voice for the foreign policy in Europe was required to wield stronger political and diplomatic influences. The need of common foreign policy is one of the reasons that EU has carried out the several institutional reforms.

'European Political Cooperation' as an inter-governmental organization had played a role of coordinating the foreign policy before the treaty of Maastricht was signed in 1992. The military defense had been executed in the framework of NATO and WEU (Western European Union). Then the treaty of Maastricht established the pillar structure of the European Union. One of the three pillars was the Common Foreign and Security Policy which became the institutional basis of EU foreign policy today. When the treaty of Maastricht came into effect, the CFSP was empowered to deal with the foreign-security issue and military defense. Another treaty, which set up the detailed organizations and direction of CFSP, was the treaty of Amsterdam signed in 1997. It strengthened the provision of CFSP introducing the High Representative who would take a responsibility for the EU foreign policy with the president of the council and the European commission. Furthermore, the common strategy was adopted, which enabled European council to decide

¹³ The following statements to explain the history of CFSP establishment are based on the paper written by Lee, Jae-Seong, *the EU policy for the Korean Peninsula*, Hankuk University of Foreign Language, 2009, p.8-12.

the fields of common interests among member states, and established the objective, duration and means used by EU and member states.¹⁴ The objective of CFSP in the treaty of Amsterdam implies the EU's position as a global actor and a decision maker in the world. The objective includes the protection of EU common value and independence, preservation of peace and international security, boost of international cooperation, human rights, democracy and rule of law. In addition to that, the treaty of Nice in 2000 established the many new organizations such as political and security committees to clarify and intensify the treaty of Amsterdam.

The climax of the EU institutional reform is the Lisbon treaty signed in 2007. The treaty of Lisbon is not totally different from the previous EU treaties. It is an amendment of previous two treaties - the treaty of Maastricht (treaty on European Union) and the treaty of Rome (treaty establishing European Community). The treaty of Lisbon has constitutional characteristics, although it is not a perfect constitution like a national one. It is called the constitutional treaty. The treaty of Lisbon manifests the EU's values and objectives, the fundamental principles, the external actions including CFSP. The treaty adopts the innovative institutions which create a long-term president of the European Council and a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The treaty merges two preexisting positions, a High Representative for CFSP and a European Commissioner for External Relation, and creates the position of High Representative of the EU foreign affairs and security policy with European diplomatic service (formally the European External Action Service) at the High Representative's disposal.¹⁵ The treaty of Lisbon also confers the legal personality to the EU so that EU can be a member of the international conventions or organizations. With the increased representation, the agreements signed by EU council on behalf of EU and member states are considered the mixed agreement.¹⁶

Through the institutional reforms, EU has a stronger apparatus to take a common position in the foreign relations. The values and objectives of Union's external action written in the treaty offer the justification for EU to get involved in the international affairs. The values and objectives are soft and normative because the common interests of member states and other countries are reached in the acceptable parts. The fact sheet titled with "the

¹⁴ The treaty of Amsterdam Article J-3

¹⁵ A. Almond, Russel J. Dalton, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Kaare Strom, *European Politics Today*, Pearson Longman, New York, 3rd edition, 2006, p.451

¹⁶ *Ibid.* p.452

Constitution for Europe”¹⁷ introduces the values and objectives of the Union, external action and CFSP written in the constitutional treaty (the treaty of Lisbon). The respect for human rights, equality, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and protection of minorities’ rights are the values of Union’s foundation.¹⁸ The constitutional treaty also contains the internal and external objectives of the Union. The main objectives are to increase the peace, the well-being of its peoples and the Union’s values.¹⁹ To be specific, EU aims at promoting sustainable development, a highly competitive social market economy, scientific and technological advance, economic and social solidarity, etc.... The constitutional treaty also emphasizes the Union’s promotion of its values and interests in relation with other third countries stating the specific objectives as following: peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity and mutual respect among people, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty, protection of human rights, and development of international law.²⁰

The provision of the constitutional treaty related to the EU external action makes consequential amendments to increase the effectiveness of the EU’s action in the international relation. The EU external actions are grouped as following: common foreign and security policy, common security and defense policy, common commercial policy, international agreements, humanitarian aid, financial and technical cooperation with third countries, development cooperation policy, and implementation of a solidarity clause with international organizations.²¹ One of the most notable innovations of the constitutional treaty is the creation of the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs who implements the CFSP and represents the CFSP externally. The European External Action Service is supposed to assist the Minister for foreign Affairs. The other is the creation of the President of the European Council, and he or she takes on the external representation of the Union on issues concerning the CFSP.

EU has advanced the institutional tools such as CFSP and two distinguished posts for foreign policy to expand its economic and political influence in the international stage. Moreover, the constitutional treaty of Union expresses contents of the external actions as well as the values and objectives of EU itself which offer the standard for foreign policy. In this context, EU gets involved in North Korean issues on the basis of the EU’s values

¹⁷ The values and objectives of the Union, external policy and common foreign and security policy in this paper are based on the “*A Constitution for Europe*” which published on the <<http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm>>, search date: 18. Aug. 2011.

¹⁸ The treaty of Lisbon, Article I-2

¹⁹ The treaty of Lisbon, Article I-3

²⁰ “*A Constitution for Europe*”, <<http://europa.eu/scadplus/constitution/index_en.htm>>, search date: 18.Aug. 2011

²¹ *Ibid.*

and objectives, external actions including CFSP, humanitarian aid, and development cooperation policy. By successfully implementing the EU policy towards North Korea with its own style, it is expected to consolidate EU identity and test its capacity as a global actor. Especially, the provisions on EU external actions including the CFSP in the constitutional treaty are offering the institutional basis for EU's engagement in the North Korean problems concerning security, human rights, poverty and development cooperation. The common foreign and security policy is also expected to increase the political solidarity among Member States of Union and enhance the convergence of their actions in foreign relation.

2. EU's New Asia Strategy and the Korean Peninsular Strategy

North Korea is located in the East Asia surrounded by Asian powers such as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea. Compared with other surrounding powers, it is in the position of political and economic weakness. It seems that EU has no interests in relation with North Korea. EU has a geopolitical distance with the Korean Peninsular, so North Korea is not a direct security concern for EU. If looking at the economic relation, the total trade volume between North Korea and EU is just below 0.015% in 2000.²² North Korea is not a significant partner to EU politically or economically. Nevertheless, EU has been involved in the North Korean issues, especially since the mid of 1990s and continued to have a relation with North Korea in various forms. Despite these small economic interests and political concerns, EU has expressed the consistent interests in the North Korean human rights, nuclear weapon problems and economic assistances because EU has expectation of acquiring political interests as well as economic interests at the level of Asia relation. Therefore, it is fragmentary to comprehend the EU policy towards North Korea at the level of relation between EU and North Korea. It is needed to analyze the EU policy towards North Korea at the level of Asia-EU relation. If what interests and goals EU has in Asia, and what strategies EU plans and implements to do attain the goals are examined, the EU policy towards North Korea is understood more distinctively.

After the Second World War, the Europe influence in Asia was replaced by United States. U.S. is wielding the significant influence in the Asia. Meanwhile, EU was initiated to build a powerful Europe. It has been much developed. EU tries to increase the economic

²² Ruediger Frank, *EU-North Korean Relations: No efforts without reason*, International Journal of Unification Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2002, p. 107

cooperation with Asia, and adopts the common policy to advance the political position in Asia because EU thinks that the improvement of relation with Asian countries is hugely beneficial for the EU growth as an international actor. Asia is a valuable trade partner to EU. EU exports to Asia reach 21% of total export volume. The export size to Asia is ranking 3rd after EU member states (31%) and North America (NAFTA, 28%).²³ EU also expects that the cooperation with Asia in the security, military and diplomacy will enhance the EU status in Asia. Obviously, the North Korean nuclear weapon is the issue in which EU can play a role as a global actor because the security problem is relevant to all countries in the world. It is anticipated that EU can protect and keep its interests in this region by strengthening economic activities and consolidating the stability, peace, human rights and democracy in Asia through international cooperation.²⁴ EU designed the new Asia Strategies in the framework of common foreign and security policy to improve the status in Asia comparable to U.S. There are two representative strategies announced by EU commission. One is “towards a New Asia Strategy” in 1994, and the other is “Europe and Asia: A Strategy Framework for Enhanced Partnership” in 2001.

In “towards a New Asia Strategy”, the EU’s need of furthering ties with Asia is stated in order to have an equal partnership in the international issues and play a constructive and stable role. The policy strategy primarily emphasizes the expansion of EU accession to Asia markets and the promotion of economic cooperation between two parties. It also stresses the development of political dialogue between EU and Asia. This report indicates the comprehensive and consistent policy route at the EU level. According to the strategy report, EU would like to contribute to the stability, the economic development, and the enhancement of human rights in Asia. Through this report, EU had opportunities to have talks concerning reduction of armaments and non-proliferation in Asia so that EU can contribute to the regional security at the military level such as North Korean nuclear weapon. Above all, the human rights become the significant factor in relation with Asia. The “towards a New Asia Strategy” contains the details as following: sharing knowledge through the various media tools and the mutual visits program of Asian scholars and politicians, inducing Asian countries to participate in the multilateral cooperation organization, and dismantling the trade barriers for market driven economic structure.²⁵

²³ Jung, Byung-Ki, *the changes of EU policy towards Asia and the prospect of EU policy towards the Korean peninsula after enlargement towards middle and eastern Europe*, Korean politic research, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2005, p. 278

²⁴ Park, Cha-Bok, *EU foreign policy towards North Korea and its implication to South Korea*, a collections of treaties of international politic, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2002, p. 169-170

²⁵ Lee, Jae-Sung, *EU’s Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula*, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2009, p. 28

The “Europe and Asia: A Strategy Framework for Enhanced Partnership” supplements the previous “towards a New Asia Strategy”. It contains the Korean peninsular strategy. The report states the need to intensify the political dialogue with Asian countries and the mutual trade investment. It introduces the direction of main policies in detail according to the region or countries.²⁶ Most of all, “Northeast Asia Strategy” in the regional level seeks to promote relations with China, Japan and South Korea while it strengthens the overall economic and trade relation with Northeast countries and supports their reform endeavors. The report “Europe and Asia: A Strategy Framework for Enhanced Partnership” indicates the specific strategies aiming at enhancing EU’s economic and political engagement in Asia: actively participating in Asia, contributing to peace and stability of Asia, promoting mutual investment, eradicating poverty, supporting the development of underdeveloped countries, enhancing the democracy and the rule of law, propelling the global partnership, and intensifying the mutual recognition.²⁷

Since the mid of 1990s, EU’s interest in Asia has rapidly increased. The EU’s interest in North Korea has also increased accordingly. As a result of Asia’s economic growth, Asia’s international status has been improved. After the collapse of the Cold War, EU has tried to increase its influence in Asia. These are background of EU’s interest in Asia. EU realizes the increasing importance of triangle structure composed of EU-U.S.-Asia in the world, and hopes to keep the multi-polar system by strengthening the relation of EU-Asia.²⁸ EU has the intention to hold U.S. which has dominant power in Asia by establishing the multi-polar system.²⁹ It does not mean that EU would like to replace the U.S. policy towards North Korea. Rather, EU wants to improve the international status by checking U.S. dominance and supplementing its policy towards North Korea.

The EU policy towards North Korea is one aspect of EU’s Asia Strategy. In this context, EU published three reports which have played a role of guideline for relation with North Korea. First, the EU approach towards the Korean peninsula and North Korea was set out in the Council conclusion of July 1999. The report proclaims the EU’s consistent policy regarding the relation with North Korea. It also states that EU is going to put the continuous pressures on North Korea to take more responsible actions for the human

²⁶ Lee, Jae-Sung, *EU’s Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula*, Korean Social Science, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2002, p. 24

²⁷ European Commission, “*Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced partnerships*”, 2001

²⁸ European Commission, “*Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme: for Multi-Country Programme in Asia 2005-2006*”.

²⁹ Lee, Sun-Phil, *The meaning and role of human rights policy in the EU policy towards North Korea*, International region research, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2009, p. 271

security, and promote the international supports for the stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula. Second report, “EU lines of action towards North Korea”, was published in 2000, which is called the Council conclusions of 9 October and 20 November 2000. The report includes many contents from security to humanitarian aid: inducing North Korea’s transition through humanitarian aid, supporting the improvement of human rights, backing the South Korean engagement policy, establishing the consistent policy and action plan concerning the nuclear weapon, supporting inter-Korean reconciliation and the Korean Peninsular peace. The conspicuous thing is that this report amends the previous conditions for the improvement of EU-North Korea relation.

The other report is “the EC-DPRK, Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004” published in 2001, which systematized the EU policy towards North Korea at first time. The report evaluated the politic, economy and society of North Korea in detail and promised to give the technical supports for the economic recovery until 2004. In other words, the EC-DPRK Country Paper set out the strategic framework and objective for the technical supports in North Korea. The EU Commission’s priorities for technical supports are categorized into three areas: (1) institutional supports and capacity building to assist North Korea with the necessary capacity to work out and implement effective development policies, (2) sustainable management and use of natural resources including access to sustainable energy services, and (3) reliable and sustainable transport sector within an integrated approach.³⁰

The EU policy towards North Korea has been implemented in the framework of the EU-Asia relation. Though EU appears to have no direct and instant economic interests in relation with North Korea, there are enough interests and motives for EU to engage itself in North Korea issues at the higher level - “towards Asia Strategy”. By carrying out the common policy in the EU-Asia level, EU can have economic benefits from having trades and economic cooperation with Asian countries. EU can increase the diplomatic influence and the international position by being engaged in the security issues related to the peace establishment in the Korean peninsula. In the process of EU’s inducing North Korean transition by supporting the economic recovery and the improvement of human rights, it is possible to enlarge EU’s diplomatic power and influence. The North Korean issue can be a chance to test the EU’s common foreign and security policy.

³⁰ European commission, *the EC-Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Country Strategic paper 200-2001*, 2001, p. 3-4

3. EU and inter-Korean Reconciliation

There is a need to pay attention to the fact that the EU's policy towards North Korea is driven by the relation with South Korea. The EU expert on the Korean affairs, M. Fernandez who visited the Seoul in 2005 spoke the viewpoints regarding EU's approach to North Korea. He said, "EU's gradual involvement in North Korea should be analyzed by two frames. One is linked to the EU-South Korea relation that EU supports the South Korean endeavors to put up the inter-Korean issues for the purpose of establishing peace and reconciliation. The other is the EU's strategy to extend its political and economic access to East Asia."³¹ EU has a willingness to have the South Korea as a political and economic partner in Asia because the South Korea has grown the international status due to the development of market economy and free democracy. EU has implemented the foreign policy towards North Korea having close links with South Korea including U.S. and Japan. This can be ascertained in the statement spoken by the EU representatives who visited South and North Korea in 2001. The EU representatives said, "EU has enough communication with U.S. and South Korea and Japan to deal with North Korean issues, and EU is not willing to replace the U.S's role."³² It is natural that EU should not implement the policies regarding North Korea without having ties and dialogues with South Korea, the direct concerned party. EU has actively expressed the supports for the inter-Korean reconciliation and peace establishment of the Korean peninsula in several strategic papers.

EU and South Korea have been key partners for trade and investment based on the market economy and democratic values. In the economic perspective, they have kept the close collaboration and developed mutual interests. To further the economic exchange, the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement was signed. It came into effect in July 2011. It is expected that the economic exchanges and the strategic partnership between two parties will be increased. The EU-Korea FTA is also expected to be a showcase to test the EU's competitiveness and sustainability. South Korea is only one country which establishes FTA with EU in the East Asia. The EU-Korea FTA can be a gateway to link EU with Japanese and Chinese market. South Korea is the EU's 8th largest partner, and EU is the South Korea's 2nd largest partner. In 2008, the volume of bilateral trade amounted to more than

³¹ Masami Kodama, *The EU's Relations with the DPRK: Involvement of the EU and its Implications on the International Politics over the Korean Peninsula*, Europe Research, Vol. 22, 2005. p. 184

³² Kim, Hak-Sung, *EU Involvement in the Korean Question: Background and Implication*, East Asia Review, Vol. 13, No. 2001, p. 48

EUR 65 billion.³³ In foreign direct investment, EU is Korea's largest investor and EU's FDI in Korea accounted for 33% of the cumulative total in 2008.³⁴

Table 3: EU's Major Trading Partners (merchandise), 2005

Imports			Exports		
Partner	Millions of Euro	% of total	Partner	Millions of Euro	% of total
1 USA	162.926	13,9	1 USA	251.291	23,7
2 China	158.040	13,5	2 Switzerland	81.913	7,7
3 Russia	106.729	9,1	3 Russia	56.398	5,3
4 Japan	73.039	6,2	4 China	51.746	4,9
5 Norway	67.127	5,7	5 Japan	43.655	4,1
6 Switzerland	66.080	5,6	6 Turkey	41.825	3,9
7 Turkey	33.451	2,8	7 Norway	33.810	3,2
8 Korea, South	33.227	2,8	8 United Arab E	25.281	2,4
9 Taiwan	23.815	2,0	9 Canada	23.672	2,2
10 Brazil	23.225	2,0	10 Romania	21.804	2,1
11 Saudi Arabia	22.060	1,9	11 India	21.101	2,0
12 Algeria	20.729	1,8	12 Australia	20.694	2,0
13 Libya	19.473	1,7	13 Hong Kong	20.438	1,9
14 India	18.904	1,6	14 Korea, South	20.134	1,9
15 Singapore	18.203	1,5	15 South Africa	18.071	1,7
Rest of the world	327.606	27,9	Rest of the world	329.178	31,0
World total	1.174.633	100,0	World total	1.061.013	100,0

Source: Copenhagen Economics & J. F. Francois, 2007

Along with the economic relation, EU and South Korea has developed the political relation since EU was involved in the process of inter-Korean reconciliation in 1990s. EU and South Korea have had annual minister-level conference to deal with political issues since the mid of 1990s. They have shared the information regarding policies towards North Korea regularly through official or non-official conferences. Basically, EU has supported the international efforts and the direct inter-Korean dialogues to accomplish the inter-Korean reconciliation and peace establishment in the Korean peninsula.³⁵ In regard to the 2000 inter-Korean summit, EU welcomed it and hoped the development of inter-Korean reconciliation. Most of all, EU strongly supported the "Sunshine Policy" for North Korea innovated by Kim Dae-Jung who took office as the South Korean president in 1998 because the "Sunshine Policy" was identified with the goals, values and norms which EU sought to advance in external relation.³⁶ The "Sunshine Policy" was oriented to induce the North Korean reform and gradual opening by giving the assistance.

³³ Woosik Moon, Jan Wouters, Tim Corthaut, Steven Sterkx and Sonia Ujupan, *EU-Korean Relations and the EU-Korea Free Trade Agreement*, 2010, p. 3

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Lee, Jae-Seung, *EU's policy towards the Korean Peninsular and Correspondence of Korean Diplomatic Policy*, Foreign Security Research, Vol. 4, 2002, P. 245

³⁶ Lee, Sun-Phil, *The meaning and role of human rights policy in the EU policy towards North Korea*, International region research, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2009, p. 272

Since taking office as president in 1998, Kim Dae-Jung executed the proactive engagement policies. He changed the past South Korean policy isolating the North Korea. Based on the principle of “zero tolerance for aggression, abandonment of unification through absorption, and active drive for reconciliation and mutual exchange,” the “sunshine policy” strongly tried to utilize political, economic, and cultural cooperation to restore mutual trust, and to create conditions that would be helpful to a long-term reform and liberalization of North Korea³⁷. The policy appears to coincide with the EU’s approach to the Korean peninsula because EU would rather adopt engagement policy than hard-line policy. In abreast with the “Sunshine Policy”, EU produced the Conclusion of 9 October and 20 November 2000 which contained the expansion of EU’s supports in accordance with the change of North Korean attitudes towards international concerns such as inter-Korean reconciliation, prevention of proliferation, respects for human rights and reform of the economic system.

The president, Kim Dae-Jung, urged EU to show the concern and cooperation for the peace settlement in the Korean peninsula. According to his recommendation, the EU representatives visited the Pyongyang (the capital of North Korea) and Seoul (the capital of South Korea) and had talks with both leaders. As a result, the talks resulted in making a contribution to the improved relation between South and North Korea and between EU and North Korea. EU also expressed the continuous supports for peace development in the Korean peninsula and the inter-Korean reconciliation when the ASEM meeting was held in Seoul, 2000 and Copenhagen, 2002. Since EU expressed the supports for the inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, EU has implemented the own policies. For example, EU became a member of the KEDO’s executive board to deal with the North Korean nuclear issues and donated money to develop energy for North Korea in exchange of dismantling the nuclear facilities. EU has continued the policies towards North Korea with the soft powers, focusing on political dialogues, humanitarian aid, protection of human rights and economic assistances. Though the “Sunshine Policy” is criticized by the some opponents arguing the policy did not change the North Korea, it is undeniable that the “Sunshine Policy” promoted the inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Both Korea advanced the relation through the engagement policy, having many direct talks including two times summits, humanitarian aid and social-cultural-economic exchanges. EU’s policy

³⁷ “Sunshine Policy in a Nutshell”, <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/rok/1999/reunification22.html>>, Search date: 7. Sep. 2011

has similarities with the “Sunshine Policy” in that EU does not take hard-line policy and seeks to boost up frequent dialogues and exchanges.

III. Conclusion.

North Korea has been pursuing a diplomatic variety to survive in the changing international environment. It is seeking to get the regime security and the economic benefits by improving relationships with Western powers such as U.S. and EU. North Korea and EU established the formal diplomatic relation in 2001, but the relation has not been developed as expected. The EU foreign policy towards North Korea has been implemented based on the institutional grounds. EU has developed the Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to take common positions in the diplomatic relations. The EU constitutional treaty grants legal personality to EU. As a result, the EU diplomatic capacity has been intensified. The constitutional treaty defines the direction of foreign policy by prescribing the external actions such as CFSP. In a broader perspective, EU recognizes the importance of relations with Asia and utilizes the new Asia Strategies to gain political and economic interests. The EU’s North Korea policy is one aspect of the Asian policy. Even if there are no direct and immediate interests in relations with North Korea, EU has the motivation for engagement in the dimensions of Asia Strategies. In particular, it is aiming to promote relations with China, Japan and South Korea. EU is taking the North Korea policy in the context of relations with South Korea because it wants to have South Korea a political and economic partner in Asia. The EU’s North Korea policy is characterized by the preventive diplomacy based on the value-oriented soft power. This approach strategy differentiates EU from other powers surrounding the Korean peninsula.

CHAPTER II

THE EU ENGAGEMENT IN POLITICAL ISSUES OF NORTH KOREA

I. Concerning the Security

1. Military First Policy and Nuclear weapon in North Korea

Military First Policy

Officially the state power of North Korea is shared by 3 individuals. First is the chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly who represents the nation externally. Second is the premier of the cabinet who represents the government internally. Third is the chairman of the National Defense of Commission who presides over national defense. Regardless of power sharing system, the real power is concentrated on one leader, Kim Jung Il who holds the Worker's Party and the National Defense Commission. Kim Jung Il is seizing the political and military power by being a head of the ruling party and military organization. The North Korean politics is characterized as one person dominating and one party ruling system. The military is the most crucial part of state affairs related to all national areas such as defense, politics, security, diplomacy, economy, society and culture.

The military first policy has been used as a governing ideology in a wartime state system because a military organization is easy to control. The military in North Korea is perceived as a fortress to protect the regime and a basis of reign internally. It is also conceived as a force for self defense and revolution power. The North People's Army in North Korea is often called 'the army of the Worker's Party', and 'the revolutionary army and the supreme leader's army'. The goal of the North People's Army can be inferred from the statute of the Worker's Party³⁸. It is to protect the supreme leader and the regime internally. Outwardly, it is to attain the political purpose of the Worker's Party and the supreme leader by accomplishing the communization of Korean peninsula, proclaiming the self defense and revolutionary independence of South Korea.

"the invincibility and future of revolution depend on the military first policy. Now, we have had a nuclear deterrent". (North Korean New Year's Joint Editorial, 2007)³⁹

³⁸ Worker's Party is the ruling party in North Korea. Kim, Jung-Il is currently a general secretary of the Worker's Party. There are several parties in North Korea, but they are just puppets which can not compete with the ruling party.

³⁹ the Institute of National Unification, *Analysis of 2007 the New Year's Joint Editorial*, 2007

In North Korea, the military affairs have been thought only one group for the leader to rely on in order to keep current leadership and its rule, so the military is paid intensive attention and strategically privileged. Thanks to the military first policy, members of the National Defense Commission and other military generals occupy top positions in North Korea's political hierarchy and form the inner circle of power in its regime.⁴⁰

Recently, North Korean army has turned into focusing on the development of nuclear and strategic arms, and implemented the 'Brinkmanship'. The developing the strategic arms including nuclear weapon is aiming at keeping the regime and getting recompense from the international society. Occasionally, the military forces are used to overcome economic difficulties as the North Korean economy is deteriorating. For example, military troops construct bridges and roads, manage business on commission and facilitate agricultural irrigation projects. North Korea has the world's highest military forces to population ratio. It is keeping a state of constant mobilization and preparing to take an initiative in a war with Special Forces.

Nuclear Weapon and Its Implication

The North Korean nuclear weapon has been delicate international issues because it is connected with the world peace as well as the regional security. In addition to that, the world powers including U.S., Japan and China want to increase their national interests and influences in the international relation while dealing with the critical security issues in the Korean peninsula. EU is also interested in the Korean affairs with the similar motivation. Historically, the North Korean nuclear weapon problem has been mainly in the hand of U.S. and North Korea. Both they have their own interests and motivation in the security problem related to the Nuclear weapon. They have repeated conflicts and negotiation about the nuclear weapon problem. Apparently, the phase of the North Korean nuclear weapon development is more easily understood if it is examined according to the relation of North Korea and U.S. concerning the problem.

The U.S. approach to the North Korea has been varied according to the change of the president and administration. The administration supported the accommodation and engagement policy in some cases, while sometimes it preferred the coercive sanction-based approach. According to Jonathan D. Pollack, the Korean denuclearization is narrowed

⁴⁰ Ministry of Unification of Korea, *North Korean General Information*, << <http://www.unikorea.go.kr>>>, search date: 25, June 2011

down into 2 approaches. He explains two approaches as follows⁴¹: One is the Incentive-based approach which emphasizes political and economic inducements. It assumes that the North Korea will not attach to the nuclear weapons if assurance and inducement are pursued with consistency. This strategy has contained engagement, economic aid, energy provision and assistance for the nuclear security. The other is the prevention-oriented approach which prevents the North Korea from having means to pursue a nuclear program. It also seeks to mitigate the already existing potential threats. This approach has included defense and deterrence such as pressure, sanction and attempted isolation. The policies of the U.S. administration towards North Korea have showed 2 approaches mentioned above, but it has not always been consistent and distinct.

Why does North Korea want to preserve the nuclear weapon under the strong pressures from the international community? The key point is that North Korea wants to survive their regime by having the nuclear weapon as negotiation leverage. North Korea is sternly isolated country, surrounded by many potential powers like Russia, China, and Japan geographically. After the bipolar system broke down, the isolation has been deeper. North Korea feels a threat that its regime may break down by other super power, United States. As the United States prepared and then carried out the invasion of Iraq, this event conjured many possible lessons for the leader, Kim Jeong IL that the United States might attack any potential adversary that lacked weapons of mass destruction.⁴² The current international structure around the Korean peninsular is not favorable to North Korea politically and economically. China, which has had close relation with North Korea, improved the economic and diplomatic relation with South Korea. The balance of power in the Korean peninsula is tilted toward one side. The U.S foreign policy is not always generous to the North Korea as much as it is expected. After 9/11 attack, U.S. adopted a more hardening security strategy which has a possibility of deteriorating relation with North Korea. The increase in regime insecurity of North Korea made it choose nuclear weapon as assurance for the current regime.⁴³

In this context, the North Korean nuclear weapon problem is a delicate pitfall to U.S. The North Korean nuclear issue is a case to test U.S. foreign policy to consolidate its dominant position. There are several potential powers surrounding Korean peninsula such as Russia, China, and Japan. Unless U.S. solve out the North Korean nuclear weapon

⁴¹ Jonathan D. Pollack, *The North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development*, Security Studies Center, 2008, p.11

⁴² Walter C. Clemens, Jr. *Negotiation with North Korea: Clinton VS Bush*, Global ASIA, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2009, p. 62

⁴³ Liu Lin, *the North Korean Nuclear Test*, PLA academy of military science, China, 2006, p.2

problem successfully, there is a possibility to cause another conflict among potential powers. U.S. should keep the global non-proliferation regime through multilateral procedures which are intended not to hurt other countries' national pride and prestige. It is one of ways to relieve other countries' sense of threat from outside. The U.S.'s failures to non-proliferation in the Korean peninsula may make North Korean case a catalyst for an arms race in Asia. Japan and South Korea can have a reasonable cause to enhance nuclear weapon as a reason of security. The arms race in Asia can cause new balance of power against the unipolar system and the increased security dilemma⁴⁴. China is intervened in North Korean nuclear problem. China still wants to play a significant role in controlling the security problem around Asia as a regional power. Hence, the North Korean nuclear weapon is likely to be a challenging and delicate issue between U.S.A and China.

2. EU's Seeking Multilateral Cooperation for Nuclear Weapon issue

EU had made a contribution to the North Korean nuclear issue after it joined the KEDO and became the member of KEDO's Executive Board. KEDO is a multilateral cooperation organization to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis at the international level. KEDO is the first multilateral project to support North Korea with the necessary energy to dismantle the nuclear facilities. EU preferred the dialogues and cooperation through the institutional framework to the hard-line policy such like the Bush's pressures and sanctions. Later, EU's attitudes to the North Korea were influenced by the EU's adoption of 2003 European security strategy and the changed world security system after September 11 attack. EU put the more weight on the peaceful settlement through the diplomatic method. At the beginning, EU took the flexible attitude to the North Korean nuclear weapons. EU urged the North Korea to observe the international norms and discard all nuclear programs with the rapid and verifiable method according to the IAEA regulation. At the same time, EU showed the inclination to deal with the security problem peacefully by taking a diplomatic way. However, EU began taking more coercive attitudes when watching North Korea continue the disrespect of the international norms and the violation of the nuclear freeze accord. EU warned that there would be a possibility of reconsidering the relation with North Korea unless it did not give up the nuclear program.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ A tendency of states to view the defensive arming of adversaries as threatening, causing them to arm in response, so that all states' security declines. (Charles W. Kegley, JR. *world politics, trend and transformation*, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, 12th edition, 2009)

⁴⁵ Park, Chae-Bok, *North Korea's nuclear weapons Programme and the EU's role*, the Academic Bulletin of North Korea Research, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2003, p. 175


According to the 1994 Agreed Framework, the North Korea accepted the freezing and dismantling its nuclear programs. United States promised to finance and construct the two light-water reactors in North Korea in exchange for the termination of nuclear programs. Until the first reactor was finished, 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil each year was supposed to be delivered to North Korea as an alternative energy. KEDO was founded in 1995 to accomplish these goals, initially consisting of Japan, South Korea and United States. There was room to accept additional states and international organization as a member of KEDO. EU joined the KEDO and became a KEDO's Executive Board member in 1997. Shortly afterwards, Poland joined in 1997 and Czech Republic joined in 1999. They became a member of the KEDO and supplied the material and financial supports. EU extended its membership in KEDO for another five years and increased its annual contribution from 15 to 20 Euros in 2001.⁴⁶ The EU's engagement in KEDO backed the credibility of KEDO on the side of North Korea because it increased the confidence on the international supports for the Agreed Framework.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, the suspect of an undeclared nuclear program was revealed in 2002. The KEDO with EU support decided to suspend the delivery of heavy oil to the North Korea until it took the credible actions to get rid of its highly-enriched uranium program. Though there were several diplomatic initiatives to draw the solutions to the crisis, the suspension continued. After all, the KEDO's Executive Board including EU made a decision to terminate the Light Water Reactor Project in 2006. Currently, the prospect for the resumption of the KEDO is unclear. EU is just on the wait and watch. EU had contributed total 115 million Euro to KEDO from 1996 to 2002. When EU joined the KEDO in 1997, it promised to support 15 million Euro every year for the next 5 years. At the time of EU's making another contract with KEDO in 2001, it promised to give 20 million Euro for the next 5 years. The amount of EU's contribution to KEDO is 6.3% of the total. Other individual EU members had also made the bilateral contribution additionally. Even though the proportion of EU contribution to KEDO was small when it is compared with other major participants such as South Korea (50%), Japan (20.5%), United States (21.4%), EU's engagement in KEDO gave a meaningful implication in that it extended the EU a multilateral cooperation system and left the EU a possibility to be a new player in the North Korean nuclear negotiation.

⁴⁶ KEDO, <http://www.kedo.org/au_history/asp>, search date: 9 Sep, 2011.

⁴⁷ Dr Axel Berkofsky, *EU's policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or standstill?*, EIAS Publication BP 03/01, 2003, p. 7

Graph 1: EU's Contribution for KEDO



Source: EC-DPRK Country Strategy 2001-2004, own computation

The six-party talks are another institutional tool and multilateral cooperation system to talk about the North Korean nuclear weapons. The six-party talks were founded as a multilateral framework in 2003 to persuade North Korea to relinquish the nuclear programs. The concerned parties are composed of United States, Japan, Korea, China and Russia. The talks continued with the incident of nuclear crises. The endeavor to eradicate the security threat was tried in the form of six-party talks. The most memorable feat of the six-party talks is that it drew the 2007 Agreement which promised the aids of economy, finance and energy for North Korea in return for the verifiable and sustainable end of the nuclear programs. EU showed the willingness to be a member of the six-party talks, but it is not fully participating in the talk as a member yet. In fact, EU lost a crucial institutional instrument to be engaged in the Korean peninsular security related to the nuclear weapons when KEDO project was closed. On the other hand, the EU's long term economic project for the economic development in North Korea stopped when the 2002 nuclear crisis happened.

EU has never been asked to a member of the six-party talks officially, but it expressed the supports for the six-party talks. Many concerned persons argued that EU should play a role in the talks. For example, the EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner announced the EU's political support for the six-party talks in October 2006. In 2007, the High Representative for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy announced that EU would request to be a player from now on, merely not

to be a payer in the nuclear problem and security in the Korean peninsula. The announcement implied the intention that there would be no unconditional supports without any saying. Unfortunately, EU has not detailed the practical contents concerning the political supports for the six-party talks. It has the limitation that the political supports stay just in the verbal action. Some scholars ascribe the reasons of engagement limitation to the international environment which the concerned parties such as Japan and United States do not want to coordinate their policies towards North Korea with EU. Ralph Cossa, President of the Pacific Forum CSIS prospected the U.S willingness to put the EU into the policy approach to North Korea would remain limited.⁴⁸

The willingness to participate in the six-party talks has been manifested by the EU parliament. Many members of parliament expressed disappointments about EU's non-participation at the six-party talks and they also requested EU participation end the nuclear weapons. The EU parliament made the resolution on North Korea in 2005 that the six-party talks would be a best vehicle to deal with the nuclear issue. Furthermore, Dorian Prince, the ambassador of the European Commission in Seoul said, "EU is ready to participate at such a time when EU participation is meaningful, for instance, discussing a substance."⁴⁹ Recently, EU announced a disappointment about the failure of the latest six-party talks, saying the European Union's aim is to dismantle the North Korean nuclear programs thoroughly, verifiably and irreversibly for the denuclearization, peace and stability in the Korean peninsula.

*"The European Union supports the six-party talks, whose progress it has noted over the past two years, but regrets that it was not possible to reach consensus on the establishment of a verification regime at its last session. We call on the DPRK to uphold its commitments in this respect."*⁵⁰

EU wants to be engaged in the North Korean nuclear issue, and it prefers the peaceful settlement through the dialogues and diplomatic approach. EU recognizes that the nuclear issue is an international problem, not only the North Korea-United States or North East Asian problem. It clearly expresses the position of not allowing the North Korean nuclear weapons. EU has persuaded North Korea to give up the nuclear programs and

⁴⁸ Axel Berkofsky, *The European Union in North Korea: Player or only Payer*, ISPI, 2009, p. 3

⁴⁹ Masami Kodama, *The EU's Relations with the DPRK: Involvement of the EU and its Implications on the international Politics over the Korean Peninsula*, Europe Research, Vol. 22, 2005, 198-199.

⁵⁰ Council of the European Union, *Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU following the failure of the latest six-party talks on the resolution of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue*, 23,12, 2008.

subject to the international duties regarding the non-proliferation. It stresses an institutional approach to deal with the sensitive issues at the level of the multilateral system. If possible, it wants to have a chance to participate in the six-party talks as a member. EU can be a mediator in order to relieve the tension between North Korea and United States and induce international cooperation if the standstill of six-party talks continues for a long time. Meanwhile, EU thinks much of a strategic cooperation with United States and plays a supplementary role, not replacing the U.S policy towards North Korea. It can not disregard the U.S. power and position concerning the nuclear issue. It is predicted that EU will continue to expand its influence in the Korean peninsula within the framework of the institutional and multilateral cooperation system, and reinforce its international status by contributing to the peaceful solution of the nuclear problem.

“U.S. is quicker to use coercive or military forces to get desirable results with no patience for the diplomatic settlement, meanwhile, EU stresses the preventive diplomacy and put the weights on the international law and cooperation.”⁵¹

II. Concerning Human Rights

1. Vulnerability of Human Rights in North Korea


The Rights to Food and Health

Graph 2 shows the poor food production in North Korea. The annual average food production is 400~450 ten thousand ton. It has caused the chronic famine being short of about 100 ten thousand ton. In 1990s, North Korea faced the economic plagues in the changed international environment and natural disasters. The supports from the socialist countries and raw materials for agriculture sharply decreased. The food production was not sufficient to feed people. The gap between demand and production has been existed until now. Fortunately, the food production increased from 2002 above 400 ten thousand ton because South Korea sent fertilizers to North Korea during the amicable inter-Korean relation and the international organizations continued aids. In 2006, the food production was at peak producing more than 450 then thousand ton. Unfortunately, the consecutive natural disasters kept the food production from increasing in the coming year. There has

⁵¹ Erkki, Tuomilja, *the Role of Soft Power in EU Common Foreign Policy*, International Symposium on Cultural Diplomacy Berlin, 2009.

still remained the food shortage in North Korea. The rights to food is not guaranteed.

Graph 2: Food Production in North Korea



Source: *The Education Center for Unification: Understanding North Korea, 2009*

* Demand is the estimated figure according to anticipated food ration, 546g per person

* Production is grain yield of the previous year

North Korea asked food aids of the international society in the early 2011. According to the North Korea's request, WFP, FAO and UNICEF started the rapid food security assessment on 10th Feb, 2011. This mission drew much attention from the international society because if severe food insecurity was revealed, the possibility of resuming food aids from the international society would be so strong. North Korea also showed cooperative attitudes differently from past by allowing access to the restricted areas.⁵² In April, WFP launched an emergency operation to reach 3.5 million of the most vulnerable children, women and the elderly in North Korea.⁵³ WFP's new operation acquired a strongest monitoring condition guaranteed by North Korea so that WFP can have freer access to all parts of the operational chain, markets and state shop. The rapid food security assessment in February/March of 2011 by WFP, FAO and UNICEF, revealed the poor food situation in North Korea. The assessment report highlighted the main points as following.⁵⁴

⁵² The Kyunghyung Shinmun, <<http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201102142153295&code=910303>>, search date: 11 Aug, 2011


⁵³ WFP, <<<http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk>>>, search date: 1 July, 2011

⁵⁴ WFP, FAO and UNICEF, *Rapid Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea*, 2011, p. 4

- DPRK has suffered a series of shocks in recent months, leaving the country highly vulnerable to a food crisis. The Public Distribution System (PDS) will run out of food at the beginning of the lean season.
- More than six million vulnerable people are in urgent need of international food assistance, due to a substantial reduction of agricultural production and commercial imports, as well as a decrease or curtailment of bilateral assistance.

To examine the gravity of situation, the mission for food security assessment interviewed hundred twenty two households in both rural and urban area, and implemented an experiment for household food consumption. The experiment measured how well the people consume food. As the graph 3 shows, most households (about 77%) have poor food consumption. North Korean people have suffered from the continuing food and economic crisis. The public distribution system (food security by the government) does not normally function, and authority reduces or stops rations for people. For these reasons, many North Korean households are forced to seek other survival strategies. For instance, when food is scarcer, coping strategies include reducing food intake, eating less preferred foods, foraging for wild foods and receiving assistance from relatives.⁵⁵ Hillside farming, kitchen garden and raising livestock is another way to supplement people’s diet.

Graph 3: Food Consumption Patterns in North Korea



Source: WFP, FAO and UNICEP: Rapid Food Security Assessment Mission to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 2011

⁵⁵ Amnesty International, *The Crumbling State of Health Care in North Korea*, 2010, p.10

Millions of North Korean have suffered the severe and chronic health problems caused by a long term food shortage. People have insufficient and poor diet, which weakens the resistance against diseases and causes malnutrition. The CFSAM (Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission) in 2010 noted that a small shock in the future could trigger a severe crisis which would be difficult to contain if these chronic deficits were not effectively managed.⁵⁶ North Korean law proclaims the health rights of the vulnerable groups and especially guarantees the rights of the elders to have free medical benefits under the state's responsibility. Despite this provision, the medical service for people has not been normally offered. The food crisis has brought about the deterioration of health status of the vulnerable groups such as children, women and elders. According to the 2009 UNICEF Report and the WFP report, many children and women in North Korea have been put in the critical health condition.⁵⁷ From 2003 to 2008, approximate 45% of children under 5 years old were stunted. For the same age, 9% children suffered from wasting, and 25% children were underweight. The 37% of children under 5 years old and one third of women were put in malnutrition. A quarter of all pregnant and breast-feeding women were also malnourished. A large number of populations in North Korea have been inflicted by food shortage and chronic malnutrition. This situation results in weakening people's immune system and making them easily fall into infections. They have high risks of being caught with infectious disease and low possibility to be recovered from illnesses. According to the 2007 WHO statistics, it is known that about 5% of North Korea population is infected with tuberculosis (TB) and 15,000 people died from TB epidemic. One third of North Korea women are suffering from anaemia due to iron deficiency.

In spite of this poor diet and health, the government is not operating normal health care system. The government does not supply the proper health care service. Therefore, many people who are ill due to hunger do not get suitable medical treatments. The WHO survey indicated that North Korea spent the lowest per capital total expenditure on health in 2006. The free medical care is supposed to be offered to people as North Korean Public Health Law says. According to the testimonies of refugees from North Korea, the reality is significantly different from the provision. The patients who come to the hospitals should pay unofficial and illegal in-kind goods or money to doctors and medical workers in order to get diagnosis. For example, the patients or their family prepare alcohol, cigarette or food and give those to the medical staffs. The access to medicines is also not easy. Officially all

⁵⁶ WFP, <<<http://www.wfp.org/countries/korea-democratic-peoples-republic-dprk>>>, search date: 1 July, 2011

⁵⁷ Amnesty International, *The Crumbling State of Health Care in North Korea*, 2010, p.14

medicines are supposed to be distributed to patients with no charges, but hospitals do not have stocks of medicines and supplies to offer them for people. Medical equipments and health facilities are so poor that they are usually recycled without caring about sanitation. The cases of reusing the medical supplies are often, and sanitation is not paid attention much. The shortage of medicines and medical equipments facilitate the smuggling of illegal drugs from China. These drugs are available in markets and vendor's homes. They are highly addictive drugs, so people who use the drugs hurt their body. For instance, they are morphine and narcotic painkillers, which are used for a wide range of different health problems. Moreover, the hospital ambulances rarely operate to transport patients because of fuel shortage. Poor mobility disables patients to access to the hospitals. To make matters worse, civilians' movement from one region to other one is strictly controlled by the authority, so patients are deprived of choosing the better equipped hospital located in other regions.

Misery of Defectors and Correctional Facilities

A large number of North Korean people, who are tired of the economic crisis, long term starvation and violation of human rights, have fled the country since 1990s. In many cases, they fled into China which North Korea has a border with by Duman River. Otherwise, they come to South Korea by way of the third countries. Though there are many defectors, and they stay illegally in other countries, the exact numbers are not easily calculated. Most defectors use the Duman River route which divides the territory of North Korea and China. Some civilian activists and researchers argue that the number of defectors in China is between 100 thousand and 400 thousand.⁵⁸ With some obstacles, the systematic survey has not yet done to calculate the defectors who stay in China. Recently, the food supports from the international society and the strengthened surveillance of China authority contributed to the decrease in North Korean defectors crossing Duman River. In 2008 and 2009, the total number of defectors decreased, but the defectors who stayed in the Korean-Chinese villages where are far away from the national border increased. Many defectors hope to come to South Korea, and the number is increasing. Other defectors attempt to move to the Russia, CIS countries, Mongolia and Southeast Asia. By virtue of many NGOs and activists, they are seeking for asylum and safe place in the world.

⁵⁸ Korea institute for National Unification, *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea*, 2010, p.487

Thailand, Japan, Canada, United States and EU states are countries which defectors choose for their asylum. Asylum seekers are increasing, for instance, they apply for political asylum in Britain and other EU member states.

The defectors live a miserable life with continued threats. Their living condition is wretched. They move around from one place to another to find jobs and keep livings. They try to escape the arrest and not to return home back. Their life as defectors continues in anxiety and fear. A numerous defectors' testimonies reflect the pitiful life vividly. The life of North Korean women who defect to China is analogous to the slavery. According to the survey of Good Friends, from 1998 to 1999, 75% of North Korean defectors were composed of women, and 59% of them married Chinese men in the form of "live-in" marriages.⁵⁹ The women come to China to escape the severe poverty and marry Chinese men for a living. They are not only singles, but also married people who have already had children in North Korea. Many women are sold involuntarily to Chinese men by the third party and are forced to live as "live-in maid". They should endure humiliation and inhumane treatment from Chinese husband or masters. Some of them try to escape the slavery situation, but others give up their hope and stay in the poor living condition because of fear of arrest and forcible repatriation. In many cases, many North Korean women are sold as goods. Needless to say, they suffer painful life under surveillance of the masters. In reality, it is hard for them to survive unless the women who stay in China illegally have fake marriage with Chinese men. The North Korean defectors lose fundamental human rights in exchange for hope to have a better life.

As it is revealed by many witnesses, human rights violations are committed in all kind of correctional centers in North Korea. There are two types of operating prisons. One is designed to detain political criminals, and the other is facilities to detain non- political criminals and general culprits. North Korean punishment is largely categorized by "basic punishment" and "additional punishment". Basic punishment includes death, unlimited term of correctional labor, limited term of correctional labor and labor training. Those who are sentenced to unlimited term or limited term of correctional labor should complete corrections through hard labor. In these correctional centers, the prisoners are often beaten up by correctional officers or the inmates according to the instruction of the officers.⁶⁰ It is

⁵⁹ Korea institute for National Unification, *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea*, 2010, p.493

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p.124

claimed that human rights abuse including death in the correctional centers is rampant.⁶¹ The living condition of correctional centers is so frustrating. For example, the Kaechun-Kyohwaso, which was built to house over 600 persons (approximately 20 persons per prison cell), is said to hold around 6,000 prisoners, and 2,000 of them are female inmates.⁶² Besides the official correctional centers, there exist a number of “political concentration camps, collection centers and labor training camps.”⁶³ The 2011 UN Special Rapporteur reported that arbitrary detention and torture is committed without a proper law process in these camps.

Yonhap News revealed the current situation of political concentration camps in North Korea including the size of the camps and living condition of inmates by citing the report published by Amnesty International on the homepage on 3rd May 2011.⁶⁴ The number of political concentration camps is assumed to be largely increased, and about 2 million people are put in the camps. According to the yonhap news, the inmates in the camps are exposed to inhumane condition such as forcible labor and torture. They should work like slavery and face terrible mistreatment including public execution. After the inmates finish 12 hour hard work, they are obliged to get ideology education and self-criticism. A minimum amount of the meal is not provided unless they do finish the daily given tasks. People in the camps are deprived of all fundamental human rights, being forbidden to contact and correspond with families and relatives.

2. EU’s relying on Political Dialogues and International Institutions for Human Rights Issue

The value of human rights is the most significant criteria which EU applies to the external relation. Of course, this criterion has been consistently applied to the relation with North Korea. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty, 1999 Amsterdam Treaty and 2000 Nice Treaty are offering the foundation for the EU’s human rights policy. Since the establishment of Maastricht Treaty, EU has started stressing the human rights in the reciprocal relation with all 3rd countries. The EU commission announced the condition that an agreement with the 3rd countries should contain the provision to protect human rights and democracy This

⁶¹ Korea institute for National Unification, *White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea*, 2010, p.125

⁶² UN General Assembly, *Report of the special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea*, 2011, p. 13


⁶³ *Ibid.* p.13

⁶⁴ Yonhap News (4th May, 2011), << <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/>>>, search date: 1 July 2011.

condition is applied without any exception when the agreement with the 3rd countries is concluded. Park, Chae-Bok argues that EU has insisted human rights in the foreign policy, and reinforced its identity as a normative power by taking actions to institutionalize the active participation in the development of human rights, democracy and international cooperation.⁶⁵ EU set up the 5 guidelines for human rights in relations with the 3rd countries in 1998. The contents of guideline contain the abolishment of the death penalty, the political dialogues and improvement of cruel treatment such as detention and torture. It also demands the respects for the children's human rights. The EU's attention for the human rights diplomacy is discovered well if looking at the EU activities related to the human rights in the United Nation. When examining the EU's submission of the resolutions on human rights to U.N, it is found that EU's activities regarding human rights are increasing.

Graph 4: Number of EU's submission of the Resolution to UN (UNHRC and UN the third Committee) concerning Human Rights

(Unit: number)



Source: Karen E. Smith: *Speaking with one voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at the United Nations*, 2006.

EU emphasizes human rights in relation with the 3rd countries because EU believes that the protection of human rights and democracy in the global level is the way to go for the world peace. EU is eager to spread the European values (humanitarianism, democracy and human rights), which EU is based on, into the world as the universal values. With this reason, EU has implemented the human rights diplomacy. In that regard, the poor situation

⁶⁵ Park, Chae-Bok, *EU's Human Rights Diplomacy towards North Korea: the peaceful settlement of the North Korean Nuclear issues and connection with human rights issue*, a collection of treatises of Korean & North East Asia, Vol. 42, 2007, p. 203

of North Korean human rights is the object which EU pays attention to. EU placed human rights on the negotiation table as the main agenda in the principle of EU foreign policy when the establishment of diplomatic relation between EU and North Korea was discussed. There were opinion differences among EU member states due to the poor North Korean human rights in the course of the establishment of diplomatic relation. In the case of French, the establishment of diplomatic relation with North Korea failed because French suggested the condition for the diplomatic relation. The condition was referring to the North Korean security and human rights. It demanded the release of the foreign NGO's and opening of concentration camps. The position towards the North Korean human rights was manifested well in the "EU Lines of Action towards North Korea" adopted by EU General Council in 2000. In detail, it suggested that North Korea should observe the UN agreement concerning human rights, allow access to the North Korean people, and provide satisfying conditions for the foreign NGO's activities.

EU and North Korea agreed that they would have annual dialogues to discuss the human rights problems when they had negotiations for the establishment of diplomatic relation. The first human rights dialogue was held in 2001 according to the agreement. In the first human rights dialogue, EU and North Korea checked the mutual stance towards human rights. Afterwards, the EU-North Korea decided to regularly discuss the human rights issues in the political dialogues instead of opening the specific human rights dialogues. After the second human rights dialogue, there were no specific dialogues for human rights. The political dialogues had dealt with the human rights issues until North Korea refused the political dialogues in 2005 because EU's presentation of the resolution on the North Korean human rights provoked North Korea. The respect for human rights and democracy has been main agenda since the beginning of dialogue with North Korea. Through these human rights dialogues and political dialogues for discussing the human rights, EU could occupy the leading position in human rights issue.

*"EU is using the human rights issues in order to gain the differentiated status from other actors by linking the human rights diplomacy to the humanitarian aid and economic assistance."*⁶⁶

⁶⁶ Lee, Jae-sung, *EU's Foreign Policy Towards the Korean Peninsula*, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2009, p.60

North Korea did not show enough endeavors to improve the situation of human rights although the international society including EU strongly demanded it. Because the North Korean people still suffered from the poor human rights situation, EU's attitude was changed to take the leading and strong role in dealing with the human rights problems. The nuclear weapon crises also prevented the EU-North Korea from advancing their relation and influenced the EU's attitude. EU presented the resolutions on the North Korean human rights to the U.N. for the 3 consecutive years from 2003 to 2005. The resolution on the North Korean human rights was adopted by the UN human rights commission under the EU's initiative. Nonetheless, North Korea continuously rejected the international demands. After all, EU presented the North Korean human rights resolution to the EU General Assembly. EU argued that it was indispensable to adopt a resolution on the human rights because North Korea still continued abusing human rights. The resolution was adopted at the EU General Assembly in 2005, and the human rights in North Korea became more international issue. In response to this resolution, North Korea reacted angrily criticizing the resolution as the EU's interference in domestic affairs. North Korean recognition in the human rights abuse is showing the significant difference from that of the international society. Thus, there would be a turbulent reaction from North Korea if the international pressures for human rights got stronger. Recently, the 16th session of the UN Human Rights Council (the successor of the UN Commission on the Human Rights), which was tabled by EU, adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in North Korea in March 2011. It also adopted resolutions from 2008 to 2010. In addition to that, resolutions on the situation of human rights were adopted at the UN Commission on Human Rights from 2003 to 2005, and at the UN General Assembly from 2005 to 2010.⁶⁷

The UN human rights commission depicted the human rights situation in North Korea repeatedly pointing out the torture, inhuman punishment, public execution, illegal detention, concentration camps and compulsory labor. Additionally, the 2004 resolution of the UN human rights commission pointed out the infanticide, human trafficking and compulsory abortion. According to the adopted resolution by the UN human rights commission in 2005, Viti Muntarbhorn was appointed the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea). He was supposed to submit the reports concerning human rights in North Korea to the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on Human Rights after he gathered all

⁶⁷ Embassy of Republic of Korea in USA, <<http://dynamic-korea.com/news>>, search date: 19 Sep, 2011.

information related to the human rights and analyzed them. He was authorized to get all supports from the UN Secretary General for his tasks. He was going to visit North Korea and interview the civilians to look at the human rights situation. The result was that he could not succeed in fully implementing his tasks because North Korea rejected his visit.

EU tried to protect the North Korean defectors from the severe human rights abuses. EU member states granted the refugee status (or equivalent) to rescue them from the infringement on human rights. The following table 4 is showing some examples. Furthermore, the EU Parliament opened the human rights hearing in 2006 to notify the North Korean human rights. In the hearing, the real situation of human trafficking, public execution and concentration camps were revealed by the defectors who attended the hearing. This hearing led by EU Parliament drew the international attentions and opinions. The EU Parliament passed the “EU Parliament’s resolution on the North Korean human rights” in 2006. It pressed North Korea to abolish the death penalty and guarantee the freedom of movement and fundamental rights. It also urged the North Korean government to allow the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights to visit North Korea, and stop the discrimination of food ration.

Table 4: EU member state’s granting North Korean defectors refugee status

(Unit: number)

country	Germany	U.K	Denmark	Netherlands	Belgium	Sweden	Norway
number	232	25	7	6	6	5	2

Source: Kim, Yeo-Jeong: the EU policy toward North Korea in the perspective of Human Security, 2006, own computation

North Korea revised some part of the criminal law due to the strong pressures from the international society. It is assumed that the positive response to the international demands is a result of EU human rights policy towards North Korea. The human rights problem in North Korea is ascribed to the inefficiency of the totalitarian control and system to construct the communism monolithic regime. There are remaining limitations on the improvement of human rights without attaining the political democracy and the system change in the territory. To overcome the inherent limitations, the outside intervention of the international society including EU is required. It is argued that the external intervention

such as EU should persuade North Korea to realize that the improvement of human rights does not necessarily result in the regime collapse, and, at the same time, the political pressure as well as the economic compensation should be continuously provided.⁶⁸ The EU human rights diplomacy has been taken in the framework of EU common foreign and security policy which strives to induce the North Korean reform by the many sided approaches and the consistent dialogues. Disappointingly, the North Korean human rights situation has not been much improved. EU realized that the situation of human rights was unlikely to be improved by the existing dialogues and contacts. Thus, EU has showed the firm attitude leading the several resolutions on the human rights in North Korea. EU led resolutions on human rights to be adopted at UN, and achieved the international consents that all countries and human rights organizations should be involved in the North Korean human rights problem. The EU human rights policy towards North Korea provided EU with opportunities to spread its values and strengthen its position.

III. Conclusion

North Korea has been continuing the military first policy and the nuclear program development. Above all, nuclear weapons are used as a negotiation lever to obtain regime security and financial compensation from the international community. EU was oriented to take multilateral cooperation approaches to resolve the North Korean nuclear weapons. For instance, it participated in KEDO and offered financial and material contributions. Though not being a member of the six party talks, EU expressed the supports for the multilateral talks to negotiate the nuclear weapons. The EU intervention is expected to increase the reliability of multilateral cooperation system and international agreements among the concerned parties related to the North Korean nuclear negotiations. After KEDO program was closed, EU lost the channel to participate in the nuclear negotiations. Currently, it just keeps an eye on the political environment changes regarding security issues saying the political supports for the six party talks. On the other hand, many North Koreans are in the poor human rights situation. They are deprived of the right to food and health. The various human rights violations are also committed in the several types of concentration camps, and many refugees are enduring the wretched life abroad. Human rights issue in North Korea is a clear motive of EU involvement because Human right is the most crucial criteria which EU applies to the external relations with the third countries. EU wanted to have

⁶⁸ Kim, Yeo-Jeong, *the EU Policy toward North Korea in the perspective of Human Security*, University of North Korean Studies, 2006, p.51-52

political dialogues to discuss North Korea human rights issues. Despite the dialogues, they did not result in conspicuous consequences, so EU led the resolutions of human rights in the international institution. The security issue in North Korea is not a policy priority for EU because it is a weak entity. Rather, EU expands the engagement areas and influences in North Korea by taking a strong stance against the human rights problem.

CHAPTER III


EU ENGAGEMENT IN ECONOMIC ISSUES OF NORTH KOREA

I. Economic Crisis of North Korea

1. Features of Economic System

North Korean economic system is characterized by socialistic ownership of production means, state planned economy and heavy industry priority. Privatization of property is strictly limited, and most production means are owned by the state. The socialistic ownership of production means is defined as social or collective possession of production means and production itself which are based on socialistic production relation.⁶⁹ Though the strict ownership system has been slightly changed since the economy was deteriorated in 1990s, nationalization and communization of production means is still basic framework of North Korean economy. In 1958, nationalization and communization in North Korea were almost completed as shown in graph 5.

Graph 5: Nationalization and Communization in North Korea



Source: Korea institute for National Unification: Summary of North Korea, 2009

North Korean economy is managed under the principle of centrally planned economy. All plans and decisions for the economy are coming from the central authority. Sub-organizations should be subordinated to order from center. Another economic feature is that North Korea put the priority on the heavy industry to establish the basis of self sufficient economy. It invested intensively in energy, machinery manufacturing and chemical industry. This unbalanced economy policy resulted in ceaseless shortage of consumer goods and food. North Korea has implemented the strategy of building military


⁶⁹ *Korean Gross Encyclopedia 3*, encyclopedia press, 2000, p. 88.

strength and economy construction since Kim Il Sung stressed increasing military force in the mid 1960s.

2. Economic Indicators

The accumulation of contradiction of socialist economy system and the collapse of economic blocks of socialist countries caused the consecutive minus economic growth in North Korea for the 9 years in 1990s. Its aftermath gave the affliction on North Koreans, who suffered the shortage of food, energy, raw materials and foreign exchange. North Korea has brought the dual strategy forward, which promotes both the regime keeping and economy recovery by supporting the military first politics. The principal economic principles prepared by the center authority are to construct economy based on military first politics and practical socialism with purpose of accomplishing self-sufficient national economy. These principles are enormous obstacles in North Korean economy because this economy system prevents North Korea from getting the interests of division of labor and importing the advanced technologies and foreign investment from outside.

Graph 6: Economic Growth Rate of South and North Korea




Source: Statistics Korea: North Korea Statistics, 2009, own computation

The above graph 6 indicates that North Korea had the end of minus economic growth and beginning of plus growth around 2.8% in 1999. There were several backgrounds to contribute to the positive trend from 1999 to 2005. It is attributed to the economy recovery policy of North Korea, the free aids from foreign countries, and the inter-Korean economic

cooperation. The North Korean economy fell into the minus growth again from 2006 to 2007 because of the unfavorable environment of foreign economy which resulted from the mass destruction arms tests and natural disasters. The world economy institutes such as UN argued that North Korea should attain a continuous plus growth rate above average 5% each year to get out of the severe swap of poverty. North Korea is still struggling with painful economic recession.

The international credit rating of North Korea was at the lowest as it was included in moratorium countries in the mid-1980s. The current credit rating is still the lowest. What is worse is that the foreign debt has gradually increased as graph 7 says. In the past, most foreign debt of North Korea came from the former Soviet Union, China and other socialist countries to invest in increasing military force and developing economy. The western countries that lent money in the early 1970s were not paid back due to North Korean insolvency. The foreign debt from western countries reached 124.6 billion dollars in 2000. North Korea needs to change the current closed economic system, and take more open trade policy in order to resume the credit. To gain favorable condition, it needs to get rid of all economic sanctions triggered by the nuclear threat and human right abuse.

Graph 7: Foreign Debt of North Korea



Source: The Bank of Korea: North Korean Economy Data, 2009, own computation

The trade volume of North Korea has increased since 1998. It recorded 3.8 billion dollars in 2008. The trade decreased sharply in 1990s because the trades with the socialist states including former Soviet Union were significantly constrained. To make matters

worse, the 1997-1998 financial turmoil in the Asian region and reduction of trade with China was attributed to the trade decline of North Korea. As a result, the trade volume decreased into 1.44 billion dollars in 1998. The average change of trade volume from 1990 to 1998 was about -11% and recorded downturn in both export and import. During the same period, the average decline of export was about -10.2% and the average decline of import was -11.8%. On the contrary, the North Korean trade volume had increased since 2000 when the inter-Korean relation got better and inter-Korean trade was activated vividly except for 2006 and 2007. The table 5 shows that the North Korean trade volume fell down again with -0.2 and -1.8% growth rates in 2006 and 2007. The main reason of the minus growth is the international sanction resulting from the nuclear weapon and missile test by North Korea. The North Korean trade was influenced by the inter-Korean relation and international environment. The consistent feature of North Korean trade structure is that the import volume has always been higher than that of export. For example, the trade balance in 2008 is -1.6 billion, which means the import volume minus the export volume.

Table 5: External Trade of North Korea

(Unit: million dollars)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
export	1,733	945	933	990	858	736	727	905	559	515	556	650	735	777	1,020	998	947	918	1,130
import	2,437	1,639	1,622	1,656	1,242	1,316	1,250	1,272	883	965	1,413	1,620	1,525	1,614	1,837	2,003	2,049	2,022	2,685
total	4,170	2,584	2,555	2,646	2,100	2,052	1,977	2,177	1,442	1,480	1,969	2,270	2,260	2,391	2,857	3,002	2,996	2,941	3,816
balance	-704	-694	-689	-666	-384	-580	-523	-367	-324	-450	-857	-970	-790	-837	-817	-1,005	-1,102	-1,104	-1,555

Source: Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency: North Korea External Trade, 2008

One of the most urgent tasks required to be tackled so as to overcome the North Korean economic difficulties is the energy problem. Increase in energy production is slow as seen in table 6. As other economic indicators, energy resources such as coal production, petroleum import and power generation dropped suddenly in 1990s. North Korea has depended on coal for main energy resources, but the coal production has decreased since 1990. It is the core reason of energy shortage. Petroleum import also suddenly dropped in the early 1990s. North Korea has used the petroleum as supplementary energy source for

indispensable consumption in the industries and transportation fields. The minimum amount of petroleum should be secured to manage the national economy. Nevertheless, North Korea was not able to import the petroleum cheaply from the former Soviet Union under friendship trade after the demise of the socialist block. After all, the decrease in coal production and petroleum import resulted in power shortage which destroyed the industries.

Table 6: Energy Supply in North Korea

(Unit: ten thousand ton, hundred million KWH)

	1989	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
coal production	3,508	3,315	2,920	2,540	2,100	1,860	2,250	2,310	2,190	2,230	2,280	2,405	2,468	2,410
petroleum import	-	252	152	91	94	50	38.9	57.9	59.7	57.4	61.3	52.3	54.9	52.3
power generation	294	277	247	231	213	170	194	202	190	196	206	215	225	237

Source: Statistics Korea: North Korea Statistics, 2009, own computation.

3. July 2002 Economic Reforms

In the poor economic situation, North Korea planned and implemented ‘DPRK’s July 2002 Economic Reforms’ in 2002. North Korea’s finance Minister Mun Il-Bong addressed the parliament as follows on March 26th, 2003.

*“In all institutions and enterprises, a system of calculation based on money will have to be correctly installed, production and financial accounting systems be strengthened, production and management activities be carried out thoroughly by calculating the actual profits.”*⁷⁰

The Economic Reform allowed partial function of market economy in the boundary of center planned economy. It introduced three key structural changes of the North Korean economic structure as following.⁷¹

⁷⁰ ⁷⁰ Axel Berkofsky, *EU’s Policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, p.22

⁷¹ *Ibid.* p. 22

- *Changes of the pricing system through the removal of state subsidies for goods and services*
- *Increases in salaries seeking to providing incentives to expand production and to enable the population handle the increased prices for goods and services*
- *Reform of the foreign exchanges system*

This reform also contained the enlargement of autonomy of enterprise management and private arable land. Though the July reform in 2002 contributed to the part of production increase and economy vitalization, it also gave births to many problems. It gave rise to the chronic inflation and widened gaps between the rich and the poor. The reform measures resulted in huge devaluation of the North Korean currency against the US dollar by about 7,000 (%), and increased the price for rice and goods. The price for rice and goods soared up extraordinarily high so that people could not buy enough food to feed their family. The price of one kilo of rice had gone up about 237 times from 2002 to 2003. The covert market transaction prevailed. With these reasons, the private economic activities and market driven economy was controlled again by the authority after the October 2005. The North Korean government has strengthened the authoritarian economy and tightened the market to mobilize the national resources since 2009.

II. EU's Humanitarian Aid and Economic Cooperation

According to the report by the Yonhap News(26 August 1998), the starvation and humanitarian crisis resulted in death of approximate 270,000 people during the mid of 1990s. The humanitarian crisis has continued for a long time and become the chronic disaster. In 1995, the natural disaster caused the shortage of food, so North Korea appealed to the national society for humanitarian aid at the first time. EU started delivering the humanitarian relief supplies aid to North Korea through the EU Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) in response to the appeal. The conspicuous feature of EU's humanitarian aid to North Korea is that it separates humanitarian aid from security and political issues. EU has been active in supplying humanitarian aid to North Korea since 1995. EU is taking the position that there will be no links between politics and humanitarian aid issues in relation with other 3rd countries. Though mutual relation between EU and North Korea is not advanced due to the nuclear problem, EU expresses the position that it will watch the North Korean humanitarian situation and get ready to

consider the increase in humanitarian aid if the humanitarian situation is aggravated.⁷² Even right after the nuclear crisis happened, EU Commission adopted another humanitarian aid resolution and decided to supply 9.5 million Euro to North Korea in 2003. For another case, EU Commission approved 7.5 million euro to support the humanitarian aid program for the North Korean health sector. North Korea faced the severe international criticism and the U.N. Security Council's Sanctions because it took the nuclear test in 2006. Nevertheless, EU Commission proclaimed that it would continue humanitarian aid to North Korea consistently and arranged the 8 million euro for 2007 humanitarian aid.⁷³ These sequent decisions make it possible to assume that EU considers humanitarian aid to North Korea necessary regardless of the nuclear crisis.


EU has conducted food aid through several routes. EU itself has "Food Aid and Food Security Program". Food aid is also achieved by EU NGOs and WFP. At first, EU started food aid through the Food Aid and Food Security budget after North Korea asked relief supplies of the international society in 1995. From 1997 to 2008, EU supported 58 ten thousand metric tons food to North Korea. As the below graph 8 shows, though there happened the 2002 nuclear crisis, EU food aid continued. However, food aid has gradually decreased because the initial food aid was changed to the structural food security assistance such as agricultural inputs and technologies in order to increase food production. EU's food aid program was mainly oriented to deliver food to North Korea, but later, it included the assistance of agricultural rehabilitation and agricultural production. EU Commission introduced the strategy of combining food aid with agricultural rehabilitation and production in 1998. The food security budget in 2000 reflected this strategy so that EU could focus on agricultural rehabilitation and production, and support pilot projects on cooperative farms and technical assistance.⁷⁴

Graph 8: EU Food Aid Deliveries in Metric tons for North Korea

⁷² The Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Korea, <<http://www.delkor.ec.europa.eu/home/relations/dprkrelations/dprkrelations.html>>, search date: 22 Sep, 2011.

⁷³ Le Monde, *Direction of DPRK-EU Economic Relation after the North Korean Nuclear Crisis*, Global Business Report, Vol. 07-007, p.19

⁷⁴ Axel Berkofsky, *EU's Policy Towards the DPRK; Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, p. 29




Source: *World Food Programme, 2010.*

The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) in the Pyongyang of North Korea was closed in 2008. It phased out its humanitarian aid operations in order to adopt longer term development type assistance. North Korea has not been a recipient of large scale EU funded humanitarian assistance since ECHO office in North Korea was closed and its humanitarian aid was phased out in favor of long term European Commission funding more suitable to tackle the structural problems of the country's economic system.⁷⁵ No matter how it is, the European Commission provided about 124 million Euro in humanitarian aid through ECHO from 1995 to 2008. The main works of ECHO were to supply emergency food, improve the health services and provide access to clean water and sanitation for the most vulnerable people in North Korea. The Commission provided 2 hundred thousand euro to the IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies) to help the North Korean communities inflicted by flood in 2010. Recently, the European Commission decided to give emergency food aid to North Korea in July 2011. An ECHO expert was delegated to North Korea in June 2011 to investigate the deteriorating humanitarian situation. After the investigation, the need of emergency aid was confirmed. It was true that the current North Korea had a food crisis caused by the low crop harvest and some 650,000 vulnerable people are at the risk of dying from the serious malnutrition. Thus, EU announced 10 million euro aid package for food assistance to North Korea to save the lives. The European Commission invested the 35 million euro

⁷⁵ European Commission: Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, <http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/asia/dprk_en.htm>, search date: 22 Sep, 2011.

from 2007 to 2010 to relieve the structural food insecurity before this announcement and a next program is scheduled to be carried out from 2011 to 2013 by European NGOs.⁷⁶

Graph 9: EU (ECHO) Humanitarian Aid for North Korea



Source: The Delegation of the European Commission to the Republic of Korea, 2011, own computation

Besides the food aid, the humanitarian aid to North Korea includes providing safe water and sanitation, medicine and medical facilities. These aid activities have been done through EU institutions as well as EU NGOs.⁷⁷ Many EU member states' NGOs are working to give aids, supports and help in various field in North Korea. They usually support food aid, agricultural rehabilitation, publish health and medical service. For example, the representative NGOs are Caritas International, Triangle, ADRA and PMU Interlife, etc.... Looking at the details of their works, "Caritas International" supports orphanages dotted around the country, and distributes medicines to the hospitals nationwide. "ADRA" works for health and nutrition, food aid, development of rural energy and business development. In addition to that, it supports equipments and technologies for the hot water system and operates a bread factory to make food for orphanages and child care facilities. "Triangle" manages businesses concerning reforestation, labour training, and renovation of public health center. "PMU Interlife" supports the agricultural development; greenhouse, milk process facilities, farm machine service center and potato storehouse. It also works for schools and nursing home.

⁷⁶ European Commission: Press Release,

<<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/826&format=>>, search date: 22 Sep 2011.

⁷⁷ The Description about NGOs Activities are based on "the EU Policy toward North Korea in the perspective of Human Security" written by Kim, Yeo-Jeong, University of North Korean Studies, 2006.

The problems of NGOs' activities were pointed out that their aid programs were partially concentrated on limited areas. The aid programs in the military base regions and the remote places were excluded. Furthermore, the monitoring performance of food aid was not apparent due to North Korea government's control and non-cooperation. With these reasons, a few NGOs stopped their businesses and withdrew their workers. The conflict between North Korea and EU NGOs reached a climax when EU presented the resolution on human rights to U.N. in 2005. On account of EU's presenting the resolution on human rights to U.N., North Korea notified the EU NGOs to stop their works and leave the country. Afterwards, EU ECHO and North Korea made a negotiation and agreed that EU (member states') NGOs would work under the name of "EU Program Support", not under the name of individual organizations. Even under the North Korean control, EU NGOs have implemented long term aid strategies on the basis of plural and local approach.

After EU judged that food aid, public health and medical supports did not fundamentally contribute to the economic recovery and development in North Korea, it changed the previous aid strategy with the technical assistance. In other words, EU thought that the food shortage in North Korea came from the structural problem of economy, so the existing humanitarian aid was not a reliable way to accomplish the sustainable development. North Korea tried "July 2002 reform" to overcome the economic crisis, but it failed the original goals and entailed many side effects. This shows that the economic reform is unlikely to be attained without external intervention and technical assistance because North Korea has structural problems which hinder successful policies. North Korea expressed interests in the technical assistance from EU and other donors in order to carry on the sustainable growth. EU made the project for the technical assistance to North Korea, and it was supposed to be started in 2002. The details of technical assistance were described in the two strategic papers, "the EC-DPRK: Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004 (CSP)" and "the EU's National Indicative Programme 2002-2004 (NIP)". Unfortunately, the project was on hold after the relation of EU-North Korea deteriorated on account of the nuclear problem and the introduction of military first policy in North Korea. EU maintains the condition that it will resume the technical assistance project sooner or later if the critical situation is progressed.

CSP and NIP indicated the framework and objectives of technical assistance projects. They also enumerated three fields which the Commission's priorities are going to

be put on.⁷⁸ First, EU was going to start institutional support and capacity building for the North Korean development. It was expected to offer North Korea capacity to prepare future development policies. It would intensify the capacity of key institutions and human resources so that they could make plans for the economic and democratic development, and take poverty reduction policies. The project is planned to train the relevant government officials by giving them institutional experiences and study tours to EU, which made the government officials learn international finance and trade. These training supports were going to get the technologies and knowledge transferred to the key ministries and institutions. Second field was the sustainable management and use of natural resources including energy services. This project was aiming at transferring technologies and knowledge of the systematic management of natural resources and training the relevant people. Most of all, energy is a serious development project area to recover the North Korean economy and alleviate its poverty. There is a need to boost up North Korean capacity to implement a long term economic development by developing energy balance and environment management. Third field was the reliable and sustainable development actions in the transportation system and rural areas. This project was purposed to modernize the transportation system and transfer technologies for rural development. In particular, the education for water resources management, soil quality production and forestation was targeted. The National Indicative Programme, which described the project of “the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004” in detail, suggested the three technical assistance projects with the arrangement of 1,500 euros from 2002 to 2004.

Table 7: NIP Technical Assistance Projects (2002-2004)


Projects	Budget	Activities (Selection)
Institutional support and capacity building	€7 million	Training in key ministries, study tours to the EU; training for ministry officials on international finance, international trade, market economy principles
Sustainable management and the use of natural resources	€3 million	Training, technical advice and transfer of know-how to manage the energy sector in a sustainable way; training to improve energy production and energy efficiency
Sustainable rural development actions	€5 million	Training and transfer of technical expertise promoting sustained rural development; training in the field of water resources management and soil quality production

Source: Axel Berkofsky, 2003

⁷⁸ The Description of Commission's priorities are based on the “EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004”.

EU member states have had trade exchanges with North Korea at the individual level. EU member states' companies have done businesses in North Korea to preoccupy the natural resources and the key industries with their investment increased.⁷⁹ EU is the 3rd largest trade partner of North Korea in trade volume forming about 10% of total trade volume of North Korea. When the South-North Korea Summit took place and the establishment of official relation between EU and North Korea was discussed, the trade volume between two parties was enlarged. On the contrary, the trade volume continuously declined after the nuclear crisis broke out in the end of 2002. North Korea pushed ahead with nuclear and missile tests in 2006 and 2009, and it made more recession of trade exchange. EU's trade exchange with North Korea has been significantly influenced by the political issues such as human rights and nuclear problem, but EU still has the willingness to participate in North Korean trade and economy. It would like to expand mutual trade and investment to get benefits from the vivid economic exchanges if the critical concerns are improved.

Graph 10: North Korean Trade with EU



Source: KOTRA, 2008, own computation

EU offered many assistance programs to visualize the economic exchange with North Korea. In 2004, EUCCK (European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea) established the “Korea-Europe Technology & Economy Service office” in Pyongyang to support European companies’ trade and investment in North Korea. This office assisted European companies’ investment in North Korea and North Korean companies’ export to Europe. It also offered education programs related to trade. On the other hand, “Europe-

⁷⁹ Lee Jong-Sue, *A study on the EU Policy's feature with the DPRK and the Possibility of a Stabilizer for the Korean Peninsula*, the Europe Research, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, p.211.

Korea Foundation” was established in 2001. It gave investment information to the EU Commission for the European companies. It operated education programs to train business men and economic experts in Pyongyang and gave the relevant people a chance to study in the Europe colleges and Europe companies. In addition to that, there were many economic cooperation cases between EU and North Korea. North Korea-EU business men had workshops. People from EU and member states visited North Korea and the “Gaeseong industry complex”.⁸⁰ A few industry exhibitions took place with EU and North Korean companies’ participation. The companies from EU member states have invested in various areas since 2000. For instance⁸¹, Germany invested in internet services and travel products in 2004. Sweden established a company to produce medicine in 2001. U.K. opened the branch office of “Korea Business Consulting” in Pyongyang to start a consulting business from 2006. Austria started manufacturing pianos in 2003.

III. Conclusion

North Korea has suffered the chronic hunger and humanitarian crisis. It attempted the voluntary ‘July 2002 economic reforms’, but rather the attempt resulted in many other side effects. EU has assisted North Korea to cope with the food and economic crisis through humanitarian aid and economic cooperation. In particular, EU maintains the position that it separates humanitarian aid from the security and political issues. It has a more independent policy on the humanitarian aid than on the security issue. At first, EU and EU NGOs conducted food aid. Afterwards, they helped the structural improvement to rehabilitate agricultures and increase food production. It is difficult for North Korea to achieve the economic recovery and food security without the involvement and technical assistance from outside because it has the structural problems that hinders the economic reforms. Therefore, EU established the technical assistance project with the purpose of creating fundamental reform capacity of North Korea. Unfortunately, this project has been discontinued in conjunction with the political issues. The trade and economic exchanges has also been influenced by the political issues. Meanwhile, if the political environment improves, economic exchanges and cooperation will be enlarged. EU is a potential to help North Korea’s economic development and social reforms in the future.

⁸⁰ It is a special Industrial zone for a collaborative economic development project between South and North Korea. The South Korea supplies capital and technology, and the North Korea supplies land and labor to produce goods

⁸¹ Lee Jong-Sue, *A study on the EU Policy’s feature with the DPRK and the Possibility of a Stabilizer for the Korean Peninsula*, the Europe Research, Vol. 26, No. 3, 2008, p. 208.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPLICATION OF EU ENGAGEMENT IN NORTH KOREA

I. Effects and Limitations of EU Policy and (Neo)liberal Approach

EU's approach to North Korea is connected with the realization of CFSP goals to expand the values of democracy and human rights based on the basic principles of conflict prevention diplomacy and multilateral peace building cooperation strategy. EU has emphasized utilizing the multilateral cooperation and international institutions in regard to the settlement of nuclear weapon and human rights issues. In terms of human security, humanitarian assistance and economic cooperation has been promoted by EU. These are elements that are associated with (Neo)liberal thinking. Nevertheless, EU's foreign policy towards North Korea has effects and limitations according to the engagement fields. In reality, the (Neo)liberal thinking has limitations to explain the political phenomena. One of those is the poor prospect of cooperation. The expectation of cooperation is a core concern to maximize mutual benefits, but the realization of cooperation is interrupted in many cases. In particular, the cooperation is not easy for security issues. Rather, the strategic competition is more general.

1. Concerning the Security Issue

EU has considered the North Korean nuclear problem as a security threat in Europe and world wide as well as in the Korean peninsula. Therefore, it has emphasized international cooperation and EU's contribution to the peace settlement. It has tried to make multilateral cooperation system and utilize international institutions as approach mechanism to the sensitive issues. Participating in KEDO and supporting the six-party talks are outstanding examples. EU's participation in KEDO was aligned with the CFSP's goals to tackle nuclear proliferation, intensify non-proliferation regime, and contribute to the regional security in the Korean peninsula and the East Asia. KEDO's main members - U.S., Japan and South Korea - also needed a neutral member to back up the international credibility for the institution. EU expanded the multilateral cooperation by participation the KEDO institution. EU can be a potential stabilizer as international guarantee under the international cooperation system to disallow the North Korean nuclear weapons, wield collective pressures, preserve the principles of diplomatic and peaceful settlement, and

watch the international agreement.⁸² EU can be a pressure to guarantee international promises and duties reached in the course of North Korean nuclear negotiation. EU is not perceived as a direct regime threat to North Korea, so it is well placed to increase the credibility of international promises and negotiations in the process of dealing with the North Korean nuclear issues.

EU's influence in the Korean peninsula is less than that of U.S. and other surrounding powers, but it has played a significant role to convey the stances of the international society on human rights, nuclear weapons and missiles by institutionalizing the political dialogues and discussing various agendas. EU had dialogue channels without provoking North Korea. EU can become a channel to make North Korea interact with the international community and restore North Korea-U.S. relation. Unless the six-party talks get out of the current stalemate, a multilateral dialogue format including EU can be accepted. EU is expected to help improve the North Korea-U.S. relation and draw the concerned parties' cooperation. EU has a different position from U.S., China, and Japan which want to gain relative and direct interests in the Korean peninsula. It seeks the normative powers and multilateral cooperation to embrace all concerned parties in the process of nuclear negotiation.

*"It is not the number of poles which counts, but rather the basis on which they operate. Our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral institutions...for putting the world in good, multilateral order (Ferrero-Walder, 2005)."*⁸³

However, there is the limitation on EU policy concerning North Korean nuclear weapons. The EU' foreign policy is influenced by the international political structure. It is not an official strategy in international relation that EU seeks a multilateral balancing against the US-led unipolar system. Instead, EU stresses cooperation with NATO for Europe security and wants to have cooperative relations with U.S. than conflicts. EU acknowledges the U.S.'s dominant position and play a complementary role, rather than replacing the U.S. policy towards North Korea. EU's foreign policy towards North Korea is a basic consensus on the non-proliferation and anti-terrorism with U.S., merely taking different methodological approach.⁸⁴ EU decided to follow the U.S. policy line which

⁸² Park, Chae-Bok, *North Korea's nuclear weapons Programme and the EU's role*, the Academic Bulletin of North Korea Research, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2003, p. 174.

⁸³ Terry Narramore, *China and Europe: engagement, multi-polarity and strategy*, The Pacific Review, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2008, p. 96-97

⁸⁴ Lee, Jae-Seung, *the two Faces of EU-North Korea Relations*, the Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005, p.48

focused on the anti-terrorism and non-proliferation, and adopted the 2003 European Security Strategy to cope with the changed international security order. Though EU wants to involve itself in the internal or external security issues, it has not sufficient military forces to act as a world police like U.S. EU does not have much capability to take military action beyond Europe. On the North Korean side, EU is not a military power to influence the U.S. strategy and protect its regime. With this reason, EU is not perceived to be a serious partner in the negotiation table.

On the other hand, the main members of the six-party talks such like U.S. and Japan do not take EU into serious consideration as a relevant partner to negotiate the security issue. They do not take EU into nuclear weapon negotiation table due to poor perception of EU relevance. Powers surrounding the Korean peninsula has competed for the interests of their countries and has been historically intertwined. Thus, they have sought to acquire the relative benefits instead of guaranteeing the absolute interests of all concerned countries under cooperation. On the contrary, EU is conceived that it is not related directly to the Korean security issue in terms of geopolitics. After KEDO program was closed, EU lost the multilateral cooperation channel to intervene in security matters. Currently, it is stranded in a political declaration against pending reproachable issues. The EU desire to cooperate in the peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue through the multilateral system has been frustrated by concerned powers' less interests in EU engagement. EU will remain main supplier of soft security such as food aid, humanitarian and economic assistance rather than engagement in security issues in the North-East Asia and the Korean peninsula.⁸⁵

2. Concerning the Human Rights Issue

EU is not related directly to the Korean security issues, but human rights issues become a tool to engage EU indirectly in the security concerns. Human rights are indisputable values for EU. Spreading democracy, rule of law and non-proliferation are vital values EU is seeking. From time to time, EU linked human rights issues to the political dialogues and economic assistances for the purpose of spreading its values. While EU has a weak position to voice the security problems in the Korean peninsula, Human

⁸⁵ Axel Berkofsky, *the EU's relations with china, Japan and North Korea. Implications for the EU's Role and Engagement in Asian Security*, Institute for the Study of International Politics, 2010, p. 27

rights is a highly useful theme which EU can have a strong voice because human rights is deviated from negotiation priority in U.S. and South Korea. Human rights are the field where member states can reach an agreement with an ease and confirm their solidarity at the EU community. EU has become a front runner in dealing with the North Korean human rights problems, and it is enhancing the status in the East-North Asia and the Korean peninsula through this human rights policy. EU discussed human rights problems with North Korea using the institutionalized political dialogues. It is a few cases, but the EU's consistent human rights policy sometimes derived internal changes in North Korea. For instances, the relevant persons from North Korea took human rights education that EU offered in 2000s. To avoid the international pressures and criticisms, North Korea amended some parts of the national criminal law in 2004. It submitted the second report to the international human rights B agreement in 2001, and joined the international agreement for the abolishment of women discrimination.

However, there has still been continuing obstacles in accomplishing the EU's requests for improvement of North Korean human rights. The EU's pressures on human rights are not easily accepted because North Korea considers it infringement on the sovereignty and strongly criticizes EU's human rights policy with a furious expression. North Korea feels that EU pressures can be a regime threat. It has not wanted to place the human rights on the dialogue table as agenda to discuss with EU. There were several political dialogues to discuss human rights, but they made no advanced results. The representative from North Korea acknowledged the importance of human rights at the first dialogue in 2001, but he said, "*North Korea has the own standards for human rights and the main concerns for human rights in North Korea are the rights to subsistence, rights to development and equality.*"⁸⁶ This statement confirmed that North Korea did not match EU in the human rights problems. Though human rights were an unavoidable theme in the political dialogues, EU did not attain satisfactory results. EU made a conclusion that the political dialogues did not produce any visible achievement and turned to make use of UN.⁸⁷ EU changed its strategy and adopted multilateral approach through UN human rights committee. EU wants to keep the unchallenged position in the human rights policy and expands its normative power. From this phase, it is inferred that the human rights issues

⁸⁶ Axel Berkofsky, *EU's Policy Towards the DPRK – Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, p. 17

⁸⁷ Choi, Eui-Chul, *EU's human rights policy towards North Korea and North Korean response*, Korea Institute for National Unification, 2005, p. 80-132

have a possibility of slowing the development of EU-North Korea relation in the near future.

3. Concerning the Humanitarian Aid and Economic Cooperation

The consistent humanitarian aid is a conspicuous feature of EU's policy towards North Korea differentiating itself from other countries. Since starting the political dialogues from 1998, EU has stressed inducing North Korean opening and integrating it into international society through assistance policy rather than isolation policy. Even though the relations of U.S.-North Korea and South Korea-North Korea fell into stagnation due to the nuclear weapon and the human rights problem, EU's assistance continued. EU underlined it would separate assistance from political security issues and continue supporting for economic crisis and food shortage.⁸⁸ These EU assistance actions have contributed to the establishment of trust and positive image from North Korea. On the other hand, EU member states can reach an agreement more easily in the humanitarian aid comparing with other fields.

Besides official EU organizations, EU NGOs have managed humanitarian aid activities such like food aid and health service in North Korea. Many people in an emergent need have effective benefits from these humanitarian aids because the NGOs work mainly in the underdeveloped areas. The EU NGOs have more chances to contact North Koreans through humanitarian aid actions than other official organizations, so they have favorable position to monitor the humanitarian situation in detail and convey external information to North Koreans. The authorities and residents in North Korea have less antagonism against the EU NGOs because their humanitarian aid actions are characterized with the non-political tendency and pure humanitarian approach. EU has accumulated trust from North Korea through humanitarian aid actions. These humanitarian assistance projects have the potential to increase contact with North Koreans and influence change of their consciousness. Furthermore, the humanitarian assistance programs make it possible to keep dialogues channels with the North Korean authorities.

However, EU's food and humanitarian aid is not enough to relieve the famine in North Korea. EU's humanitarian aid has been gradually shrinking. When compared with other donors, EU does not take up a large proportion to eliminate North Korean

⁸⁸ Lee, Jae-Seung, *the two Faces of EU-North Korea Relations*, the Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2005, p. 33-52

humanitarian need. If EU is perceived not to meet the humanitarian aid as much as North Korea expects, its position as an alternative to U.S. will be smaller. Moreover, the opaque monitoring of food and humanitarian assistance becomes a stumbling block for effective support policies. The support of the international community including EU recently declined because the free and transparent monitoring procedures were not guaranteed. U.S. claimed that the food aid to North Korea was misused for the purpose of military uses. Due to this suspect, the volunteers from outside have also reduced humanitarian supports. The steady and reliable monitoring system should be ensured so that EU member states can agree to expand humanitarian aid for North Korea.

With regard to technical assistance, EU has already laid the foundation to induce North Korea's reform and opening by making particular strategy. The typical reports, "the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004" and "the National Indicative Programme for 2002-2004", indicates the EU plan to help North Korea with the purpose of building an independent foundation and capacity for a long term development instead of single emergency relief and short term economic assistance. This attractive proposal makes North Korea feel that EU is a trustworthy and helpful partner for the economic development. EU can deepen the engagement in North Korea with this proposal. North Korea also expressed a positive interest in the technical assistance from EU. The economic assistance plans go beyond the slogans to promote the development and transformation of the North Korean economy so that North Korea can be integrated into the global economy.

EU affected North Korea with economic exchanges. For example, EU operated programs to transfer advanced technologies in Europe to North Korea and provided education about the market economy for the relevant people. It also operated the institutional organizations to help Europe companies' investment in North Korea. This series of economic cooperation made the governmental officials in North Korea understand the market economy and change their perception. This cooperation processes are expected to arrange a foundation to promote the economic policy change and the opening of North Korea. As another expectation, EU can be an encourager to boost up the cash flow from the international financial institutions into North Korea for the economic development if the current political situation is advanced.⁸⁹ EU is an attractive potential to help the economic development in North Korea.

⁸⁹ Axel Berkofsky, *EU's Policy towards the DPRK-Engagement or Standstill?*, European Institute for Asian Studies, 2003, p. 26.

However, the attractive EU's economic and technical support strategies were conjunction with political issues, so it has not been more progressed. Especially, EU's ambitious technical assistance plans are halted because they are under the precondition that the nuclear and human rights problem should be solved. The core economic assistance, so-called technical assistance, is not unconditional support. If North Korea does not accept EU concerns and show the attitude changes, the economic exchanges and cooperation will be constrained, and the technical assistance will be continuously interrupted. If so, EU's policy will stay at the humanitarian aid in accordance with security crisis caused by the nuclear and missile tests. The security crisis in North Korea makes the external forces including EU reluctant to invest in North Korea.

II. Prospect of the future EU Foreign Policy towards North Korea

So far, this paper has examined the EU foreign policy and its effects and limitations. The effects and limitations give the implication for the future orientation of EU policy towards North Korea. At this point, I want to predict the future EU foreign policy in my personal view. As discussed above, the EU's entity and influence are still not so strong that it can not maintain its independent policy and position without considering other surrounding powers and international political structure. The EU's foreign policy is constrained by political variables and international relation surrounding the Korean peninsula. This political phenomenon is more appropriately explained in terms of (Neo)realism because it argues that state's behavior is determined by differences in their relative power within the global hierarchy, defined by primarily by the distribution of capability.⁹⁰

Another factor that constrains the EU foreign policy can be found inside EU. The internal constitutive problems cause obstacles in wielding diplomatic influence. EU is composed of 27 member states, so the consensus on foreign policy among member states is strenuous work. As member states showed different positions on Iraq attack of United States, there are differences and conflicts in regard to foreign policy among member states. There is a possibility of internal cohesion shortage when they should decide EU position externally. The nuclear tests in North Korea damaged North Korean image in international society, and they interrupted the EU's active engagement policy. The criticism against

⁹⁰ Charles W. & Kegley, JR. *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 12th edition, 2009, p. 30.

relation with North Korea arose inside EU. Moreover, the constitutional treaty, Lisbon Treaty, prescribes the unanimity in the common foreign and security policy in general. It requires lots of time and efforts to take a decision process and reach a final agreement to implement the official policy. In addition, some doubts about the EU confidence and credibility among member states are brought about due to the shortage of democracy and equality in the EU organizations. Many small countries are worrying that the powerful countries will dominate the EU policy decision. This anxiety seems to be true. Accordingly, EU does not reflect the positions of whole member states. It is not easy to implement the foreign policy towards North Korea with the internal cohesion all the time. Rather, EU will put policy priority on Europe and neighboring areas than on the Korean peninsula. EU is still going to final destination. It is still under construction. Nobody can predict exactly how EU will be shaped in the future. If the democratic problems within EU were settled and more member states' sovereignty were transferred to EU, the EU representatives would be further enhanced. Because the foreign policy is related to sovereignty, EU will pursue independent and active actions in accordance with the degree of sovereignty transfer from member states to EU level. It is difficult to forecast the future EU direction. If the assumption that EU would deepen its integration drastically and accomplish a unitary actor came into reality, the EU foreign policy might be stronger and more independent. It is an question to wait and watch that EU will grow to the entity with hard power and soft power.

Ostensibly, the EU's engagement in North Korea has been implemented through (Neo)liberal approach. From another angle, this approach strategy is inevitable choice. EU needs to claim undeniable slogans and norms which can be accepted internationally in order to be evolved into a unitary international actor by integrating member states. The EU values and principles have been applied to foreign relation to strengthen its own position and identity in the world. The EU foreign policy towards North Korea has been conducted in a large framework of realizing the EU goals in international relation, rather than simply developing bilateral relations between EU and North Korea. At present, the above mentioned limitations put EU capability in constraint. In particular, the Korean peninsular security issues do not allow much room for the EU involvement. EU does not seem to have another alternative but to keep current engagement trend in the North Korean issues. Thus, the EU foreign policy is prospected to maintain the current features for foreseeable time. It will continue underline undeniable international regimes and law, and ethical norms. It will

feature the human security continuously and humanitarian assistance and expand the engagement room and its influence. The ambitious and conditional technical assistance programs will remain as a carrot to induce the changes in North Korea. Regarding the nuclear issue, EU will wait and watch what will happen in the negotiation table, and show its willingness to support the peaceful resolution. It will put an emphasis on multilateral cooperation and cooperate the U.S. policy stance. If the nuclear problem were resolved peacefully, EU would expand the economic assistance and cooperation plans prepared long time ago.

III. Can EU be an alternative to resolve the North Korean Issues?

As the research examines, the EU policy has not produced many effects, not leading to induce the North Korean transition and inter-Korean reconciliation as much as expected. Therefore, can we jump into the conclusion that EU can not be another alternative to solve out the North Korean issues? I argue that the answer is “No” in part because the EU approach has different strengths from other relevant parties to influence North Korea.

First, EU gains a favorable position to access to North Korea which is given by the soft and normative power approach. North Korea has less hostility and antagonism to EU because it thinks EU is not its regime threat. They have not been intertwined in the history and politics. Rather, the historically or politically intertwined countries in the Korean peninsula have been competing to get strategic interests with doubts and antagonism. The agreement and conflicts among the six-party talks members have been reiterated, and the goal of accomplishing peace in the Korean peninsula has been far off. The hard-line policy like U.S. provoked North Korea and made it more closed country. At this point, the soft and normative power of EU can be effectively used to persuade North Korea as a different approach method. To open North Korea and make it reformed, the different approach method needs to be considered such like embracing policy. EU has strengths in this point. The consistent humanitarian aids and economic cooperation can produce the positive image of EU, and widen access to North Korea. As a result, EU and its NGOs can increase the economic and social activities in North Korea, which, after all, influence the changes of the North Korean consciousness and gradually induce internal changes. It goes from economic and social exchanges to fundamental reforms including democracy and market economy. As another strategy, EU and South Korea can invest together to boost up the economic development in North Korea. It is a win-win strategy because EU can expand the

market, and two Koreas can progress the inter reconciliation. For another benefit, South Korea can obtain the humanitarian aid transparency by collaborating with EU NGOs.⁹¹

Secondly, EU can be a mediator to relieve the tensions and conflicts among the nuclear negotiation parties. The six party talks did not succeed in dismantling the nuclear weapon facilities in North Korea. The multilateral talks stopped after the nuclear tests. North Korea has high conflicts with U.S. and South Korea now. If allowed, EU wants to join the multilateral talks because it put emphasis on the multilateral cooperation to end up the nuclear threat. If the six party talks did not produce any successful fruits, or did not get the responsible changes from North Korea, EU might play a significant role to induce the international cooperation as a member of the new multilateral talks or an observer. In the case that the KEDO program is resumed, EU will participate actively in the nuclear negotiation as a channel to persuade North Korea and share the cost burden. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the EU's participation can reduce the discredit among the nuclear negotiation members.

Thirdly, EU and member states can offer ideas for the North Korean transition and inter-Korean reconciliation because EU experienced the integration processes, and the Eastern Europe underwent the regime transition. Two Koreas has been separated for a long time under the different political and economic system. The separation has produced the huge economic and social gab which should be overcome for the Korean unification. As Germany case shows, the unification required demanding cost to stabilize two separated parts. The unification cost is one of reasons why some people oppose the unification. Narrowing the economic and social gab between the two parts is required in order to relieve anguish burdens after unification. While EU integrated 27 members, it faced many problems and acquired lessons. These experiences are expected to give ideas for the social and economic integration of two Koreas. The Middle-Eastern Europe can also help guide the orientation of North Korean transition because they had already passed the history. How can the economic and social chaos be prevented during transition? What path should be chosen to make North Korea go to the democracy and market economy? The ideas for these questions can be offered by the Middle-Eastern Europe. Hence, South Korea need consolidate the partnership with EU and member states and increase mutual recognition on

⁹¹ Lee Jong-Sue, *the features of EU Policy towards DPRK: Normative Power vs. Gaining Strategic Interests*, Jeju Peace Institute, 2010, p.19.

the need of inter Korean reconciliation. The former ideological friends of North Korea, Middle-Eastern Europe, joined EU in 2004. They have still warm relations and exchanges with North Korea. They also have good relations with South Korea. The Middle-Eastern Europe is a wonderful partner with which South Korea can implement the inter-Korean reconciliation strategy because they communicate with both Koreas. At the present, North Korea wants to have closer relations with European countries so that it can get through the predicament of the six-party talks and United States-North Korea relation. In this context, EU has an opportunity to increase its influence on North Korea.

IV. Conclusion

Seemingly, the EU's approach to North Korea is associated with the (Neo)liberal elements because it has stressed the multilateral cooperation, international institutions, political dialogues, human security and economic cooperation. These EU policy trends have shown the effects and limitations in the political and economic areas. On the other hand, the main concern of (Neo)liberalism, expectation of cooperation, is frustrated by reason of the international political environment and EU constitutive problems. EU will maintain the current policy trend for a near future. Concerning the nuclear issue, EU will wait and watch what will happen in the negotiation tables. EU wants to enhance its status as an international actor and strengthen the identity by contributing to the peaceful settlement of nuclear issues and human rights issue in North Korea. It will widen the position in the Korean peninsula by continuing humanitarian aid and economic cooperation. EU can be another alternative to solve out the North Korean issues in that it has strengths to influence North Korea as the soft and normative power.

CONCLUSION

EU has grown much over last 60 years. Accordingly, its diplomatic capacity has been increased with the development of the institutional framework. The EU engagement in North Korea is not just bilateral relation, but it has been implemented in the Asia Strategy context based on the value-oriented soft power. Using soft power distinguishes EU from other powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. EU proclaimed Asia Strategies (1994, 2001) and established more advanced CFSP. Ostensibly, the EU foreign policy is connected with (Neo)liberal thinking in that it has showed the (Neo)liberal approaches to North Korea by seeking multilateral cooperation for a nuclear weapon issue, relying on political dialogues and international institutions for human rights issue, and continuing humanitarian aid and economic cooperation. EU participated in the multilateral cooperation system (KEDO) and manifested political supports for the multilateral 6 party talks to reach a peaceful settlement of nuclear problem. Besides, EU utilized political dialogues to discuss nuclear weapon and human rights with North Korea. Most of all, human rights are issues in which EU became the front runner. EU pressed North Korea to improve human rights and drew international interests and cooperation by presenting human rights resolutions to the international institution (UN). It also urged North Korea to observe the international laws and agreements related to nuclear weapon and human rights. On the other hand, EU has maintained the position to separate assistance policy from political security issues, being different from other countries's strategies, and it has continued humanitarian aid to North Korea. It also offered various economic cooperation programs.

These EU foreign policies towards North Korea have some effects and limitations in each area. While the EU engagement increased the efficiency of multilateral cooperation and international institutions, it did not exert significant influence on the security issue because the concerned parties did not perceive EU as a relevant negotiation partner. Rather, EU showed more active posture on human rights issue rather than security issue. However, placing human rights issue on a political dialogue table is difficult because North Korea considers it a matter of national sovereignty. Besides, there has remained the possibility for EU to maintain the contacts and dialogue channels with North Korea through humanitarian aid and economic cooperation. However, the amount of EU humanitarian aid were not enough to survive vulnerable North Koreans, and the economic cooperation was often interrupted by the reasons of North Korean uncooperative attitude and political condition.

The official EU approach to North Korea is much linked to (Neo)liberalism, but the reality is beyond (Neo)liberalism because the expectation of cooperation is frustrated by the international political environment and EU constitutive problems. In particular, the EU foreign policy is affected by political variables and international relation of powers surrounding the Korean peninsula. Carefully, if the personal prospect of the future EU policy towards North Korea is added here, EU will maintain current features of its engagement in the foreseeable future. EU will wait and watch the change of the political situation regarding nuclear weapon issue because there is little room for EU to be engaged in the security issues. EU will continue to keep the human rights policy and focus on humanitarian assistance to expand its influence and engagement areas. If the security problem takes favorable turn, the economic exchange and cooperation will be enlarged.

Finally, i argue that EU can be another alternative in part to resolve North Korean issues because EU approach has different strengths from other relevant parties to influence North Korea. I pick up 3 points as strengths.

- First, EU gains a favorable position to access to North Korea, which is given by the soft and normative power approach.
- Secondly, EU can be a mediator to relieve the tensions and conflicts among the nuclear negotiation parties.
- Thirdly, EU and member states can offer ideas for the North Korean transition and inter-Korean reconciliation from their own experiences.

Abstract

EU has been engaged in North Korean affairs since it started humanitarian aid in 1990s. EU has developed institutional grounds for the diplomatic relation and it has implemented foreign policy towards North Korea in the context of Asia strategy. Its approach to North Korea is connected with Neo-liberal thinking. It stressed the international cooperation to resolve the nuclear problem, and utilized political dialogues and international institution to improve the poor human rights in North Korea. It also continued humanitarian aid irrespective of security problem, and offered economic cooperation programs for the economic development of North Korea. However, EU is not in the strong position to affect the security issue in the Korean peninsula due to various causes such as the geopolitical distance. Moreover, EU's economic cooperation programs are often frustrated by the political constraints. Rather, it puts the energy in keeping the position by playing a leading role in the improvement of human rights and continuing humanitarian aid. This policy trend will be continued in the near future. Though there are limited capacity, EU has strengths in part to contribute to the settlement of the North Korean issues with a few reasons. First, EU gains a favorable position to access to North Korea, which is given by the soft and normative power approach. Secondly, EU can be a mediator to relieve the tensions and conflicts among the nuclear negotiation parties. Thirdly, EU and member states can offer ideas for the North Korean transition and inter-Korean reconciliation.

Keywords: *EU, North Korea, Foreign Policy, (Neo)liberalism, Soft Power, Multilateral Cooperation, International Institution, Humanitarian Aid*

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