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Typology as Rhetoric: Reading Jonathan Edwards

Typologie Jonathana Edwardse jako rétorika

Disertační práce
Dissertation

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Prohlašuji, že jsem disertační práci napsala samostatně s využitím pouze uvedených a řádně citovaných pramenů a literatury a že práce nebyla využita v rámci jiného vysokoškolského studia či k získání jiného nebo stejného titulu.

Content

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I am grateful to my family and in-laws for their wonderful manifold help and support. My deepest gratitude goes to my husband Jan.

Over the years, I have come to think of dissertation writing as a search. I do not think I have found some particular *thing*, indeed if there is something to be found it might not be a *thing* at all. This work, then, is not about what I have found; rather, it is a record of a part of that search.

Abbreviations

All references to the works of Jonathan Edwards are from the *Works of Jonathan Edwards (WJE)*, vols. 1-26 (Yale University Press, 1957-2008), general editors Perry Miller and Harry S. Stout, respectively, and from the *Works of Jonathan Edwards Online (WJE Online)*, vols. 27-73 (Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University), as fully noted in the Bibliography.

Quotations from the *WJE* are copied directly without any changes, including editors' brackets and other interventions. Only three dots (" . . .") indicate my own ellipsis.

Chapter 1

Introduction

> The ministers of the early colonial days of New England, though well-read, scholarly men, were more statesmen than theologians. Their minds ran upon the actual arrangements of society, which were in a great degree left in their hands, rather than on doctrinal and metaphysical subtleties. They took their confession of faith just as the great body of Protestant reformers left it, and acted upon it as a practical foundation, without much further discussion, until the time of President Edwards. He was the first man who began the disintegrative process of applying rationalistic methods to the accepted doctrines of religion, and he rationalized far more boldly and widely than any publishers of his biography have ever dared to let the world know. He sawed the great dam and let out the whole waters of discussion over all New England, and that free discussion led to all the shades of opinion of our modern days. Little as he thought it, yet Waldo Emerson and Theodore Parker were the last results of the current set in motion by Jonathan Edwards.
>
> Harriet Beecher Stowe
> *Oldtown Folks*[1]

This work is a study of selected typological writings of the New England theologian, thinker and preacher Jonathan Edwards. It examines the rhetorical aspect of Edwards' typology and the rhetorical form of the type in its connections to other tropes, particularly emblem, symbol and allegory. In doing so, it also addresses the issue of the connections of Edwards' thought to Romanticism and seeks to refine existing interpretations of these links. While it does not avoid a diachronic perspective, this study nevertheless employs a rhetorical rather than a literary historical approach and identifies such problems in Edwards' writings which are properly problems of language and textuality. Finally, by working in a space between rhetoric, metaphysics and intellectual history, this study confronts some existing divisions in the study of Edwards and seeks to find a way beyond certain methodological limitations

[1] Stowe, Harriet Beecher, *Three Novels: Uncle Tom's Cabin, or, Life among the Lowly; The Minister's Wooing; Oldtown Folks* (New York: The Library of America, 1982) 1103-1104.

which exist in Edwards scholarship and in studies of Early American literature. These are now discussed in this introductory chapter.[2]

Jonathan Edwards' double career

At the end of his survey of "Edwards's intellectual legacy" in the *Cambridge Companion to*

[2] Edwards was born in 1703 in East Windsor, Connecticut (now called South Windsor) to Rev. Timothy Edwards and his wife Esther Stoddard Edwards, their only son among eleven children. He was educated at Yale College, receiving his M.A. in 1722. He served briefly as a pastor in New York City and in Bolton, Connecticut, then became a tutor at Yale before settling in Northampton, Massachusetts in 1726 where he first worked as assistant to his grandfather Rev. Solomon Stoddard. In 1727 he was married to Sarah Pierpont whom he had met during his studies in New Haven. They raised ten children. After Stoddard's death, Edwards became the senior minister of the parish. He became more publicly known especially after a religious revival in Northampton in 1734 – 1735. More revivals took place in New England and beyond during the 1740's and Edwards was one of the preachers involved, though by no means the only one; these revivals were later called the Great Awakening (or the First Great Awakening). Edwards became an outspoken advocate of the revivals but also a keen critic of false religious experience. In the 1740's he published a number of works on the topic: *The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God* (1741), *Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival* (1742) and *A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections* (1746). It was during the revival period, in 1741, that he preached what has become his most famous sermon, *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*. Edwards corresponded with pastors in Scotland; together they contrived a plan for an international prayer movement, presented to the world in Edwards' *Humble Attempt to Promote Explicit Agreement and Visible Union of God's People in Extraordinary Prayer* (1747). In the aftermath of the revivals, Edwards' convictions regarding the necessity of giving church membership (and access to communion) only to people who professed to have experienced conversion grew stronger and he publicly opposed the looser practice which had been introduced in Northampton by his grandfather Stoddard. His parishioners disagreed with Edwards' effort to implement stricter rules for church admission. Edwards defended his view of church membership in *An Humble Inquiry into the Rules of the Word of God, Concerning . . . Full Communion* (1749). He was finally dismissed by his congregation in 1750. From 1751 to 1758 the Edwardses lived in Stockbridge, Massachusetts, then a frontier village, where Edwards served as a pastor of a small English congregation and a missionary to the Mohawk and Mahican Indians. He was actively involved in disputes about the local Indian school, arguing that it was poorly managed and pleading for better ways of education, eventually running an Indian boarding school in his home before the French and Indian War upset life in the village. In the mean time Edwards was also working on other large treatises, the *Freedom of the Will* (1754), and posthumously published *Original Sin* (1758) and two dissertations *The Nature of True Virtue* and *The End for Which God Created the World* (1765). Persuaded by the trustees of the College of New Jersey, now Princeton University, Edwards reluctantly agreed to become President of the College and moved to Princeton in early 1758. His death in March of that year was caused by complications from a smallpox inoculation. He left behind plans for more treatises, hundreds of sermon manuscripts and letters and scores of pages of personal notes, ranging from his early philosophical and natural interests to biblical commentary, theological reflections and eschatological speculations. His intellectual and theological legacy, admired by some and condemned by others, established him as a major figure in American intellectual and religious history. Even today Edwards continues to attract attention in both academic and popular circles.

Jonathan Edwards, Stephen Crocco remarks:

> It seems that at every national Edwards conference, usually after a particularly dense paper, someone stands up and says, "I'm no scholar and I haven't been able to follow that last paper at all, though I'm sure that what is says is important. What I want to say is that I'm a minister of the gospel, and I love Jonathan Edwards because he helps me to understand God better. Next to the Bible, Jonathan Edwards is the most inspiring reading I know." These comments are usually followed by an embarrassing period of silence. Some lower their heads. Others gaze out of the window. A few shoot glances around the room, joining in a collective hope that the speaker will sit down. Some raise eyebrows, indicating disapproval, annoyed that Edwardsean fundamentalism continues to be present in scholarly settings. Others are sympathetic with the comment made, though they wince at the way it was made. Still others are amazed that Jonathan Edwards continues to make disciples and provoke controversy more than any other American religious thinker.[3]

Crocco's anecdote stands as a synecdoche for the two careers of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards has not always been a respected academic subject but he has always been an evangelical hero. He was admired as a man of God and a devout Christian by his friends in New England, such as Samuel Hopkins and Edward Bellamy and their successors in the development of New

[3] Crocco, Stephen D., "Edwards's Intellectual Legacy," *The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards*, ed. Stephen J. Stein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) 318.

England theology, and by his friends in Scotland, such as John Erskine, who published his works and looked for his counsel in theological and pastoral issues.[4] He was admired by ordinary Christians who read his account of the religious revival in Northampton, Massachusetts and by thousands of believers who read his "Personal Narrative" or the posthumously published sermon series called *The History of the Work of Redemption.*[5] He was admired as the editor who made available the *Diary of David Brainerd* to the world, a book which many an English speaking Protestant missionary in the 19th century was given to carry with him to Asia or Africa.[6] He was admired by such 20th century influential evangelical figures as the preacher Billy Graham or the academic theologian Richard Niebuhr. And he continues to be admired by thousands of evangelical Christians in today's globalized world, from the USA to South Korea, as new and new editions of his texts are published by evangelical presses and new and new books are written to bring a popularized version of Edwardsean piety to the ordinary believer, and the most influential mainstream evangelical magazine in the USA, *Christianity Today*, features on its cover page a picture of a man wearing a t-shirt with a portrait of Edwards and a line saying "Jonathan Edwards is my homeboy."[7]

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[4] Ministers and theologians Edward Bellamy and Samuel Hopkins, to whom Edwards was a personal friend and mentor, were avid advocates of Edwards' intellectual and theological legacy. Hopkins was the author of the first biography of Edwards. John Erskine, also a minister, was one of Edwards' correspondents in Scotland. Edwards' Scottish friends (whom he never met in person) also helped him to follow the major developments in the Scottish Enlightenment and he read and engaged with the work of Hutcheson, Kames and Hume.

[5] M. X. Lesser notes that just the American Tract Society "produced 70,000 copies of *Life of Brainerd* from 1833 to 1892; 60,100 of *History of Redemption* from 1838 to 1875, both undated, both abridged; and nearly 150,000 copies of *Personal Narrative* between 1823 and 1875"; Lesser, M. X., "Edwards in 'American Culture,'" Stein 282.

[6] See for example Conforti, Joseph A., *Jonathan Edwards, Religious Tradition, and American Culture* (Chapel Hill, N. C., London: University of North Carolina Press, 1995) 74-75. It was through such evangelical missionaries that Edwards' works arrived to Africa and Asia.

[7] *Christianity Today*, September 2006. The cover page headline reads: "Young, Restless, Reformed: Calvinism is making a comeback and shaking up the church." Among the most influential American evangelical popularizers nowadays is John Piper, pastor of a megachurch in Minneapolis, and author of a number of books, including *God's Passion for His Glory: Living the Vision of Jonathan Edwards*

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that academic scholarship on Edwards can simply laugh away the zealous evangelicals. The case is far more complex and requires much more than occasional putting up with a devout reminder of Edwards' exemplary piety and admirable insight into the Word of God and the workings of the Holy Spirit. Academics ought to be aware of the popular Edwards not only because of the sheer number of people impacted by that image but also because the academic and the evangelical spheres are not hermetically closed off. The academic Edwards influences and is influenced by the evangelical Edwards. This was clearly the case in the first half of the twentieth century when Edwards was championed both by American Studies scholars like Perry Miller as well as by several evangelical groups. Joseph Conforti, discussing the twentieth-century Edwards Renaissance, argues that the Progressive Era of the first decades of the twentieth century with its marginalization, when not downright derision, of Puritanism (typified by V. L. Parrington and H. L. Mencken) helped to prepare the ground for the neo-orthodox recovery of Edwards, exemplified by Richard Niebuhr's influential book *The Kingdom of God in America* (1937).[8] Because the neo-orthodox reaction to the Progressives was so powerful and perhaps exaggerated, Conforti continues, it exerted great influence on academic scholarship of Edwards, especially via Perry Miller, who, though not a Christian, was attracted to Niebuhr's existentialist perspective.[9] Both Miller and Niebuhr regarded Edwards as an isolated figure, "largely without a context."[10] Several other Protestant groups helped shape

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(Wheaton, Ill.: Crossway 1998), in which *The End for Which God Created the World* is reprinted in Part Two.

[8] Niebuhr, H. Richard, *The Kingdom of God in America* (New York: HarperCollins, 1959).

[9] Conforti 191, 192.

[10] Crocco 313. "Niebuhr presented Edwards as a prophet of what would later be recognized as religious existentialism" (Conforti 191). So did Perry Miller: "He is unique, an aboriginal and monolithic power, with nothing of that humanity which opens every heart to Franklin; but he is a reminder that, although our civilization has chosen to wander in the more genial meadows to which Franklin beckoned it, there come periods, either through disaster or through self-knowledge, when applied

Edwards' reputation around the mid-century, as Jan Stievermann explains when he notes the disparity between Edwards' contemporary reputation in American and European scholarship and traces it, among other things, to the prominence given to Edwards between the 1930's and the 1950's among three Protestant groups: besides Richard Niebuhr and neo-orthodoxy, popular revivalists such as Billy Graham who repreached *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God* (with telling subtle modifications, yet largely verbatim) during his Los Angeles crusade in 1949, and the "classical Calvinists," exemplified by Presbyterian minister and church historian John Gerstner.[11]

Sometimes the work of evangelical authors which is formally academic makes secular academics wince (as would be the case of Gerstner, whose Edwards is "selectively appropriated," so to speak, in accordance with Gerstner's own Calvinist convictions); at other times, however, evangelical scholarship is acclaimed by secular academics. Such is the case, for example, of George Marsden's much acclaimed biography *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (2003) or Mark Noll's highly respected study of American religious thought, *America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (2002).[12] Church leaders and theologians often view secular academics with distrust, and vice versa, especially when such a subject as Jonathan Edwards is concerned. Kenneth Minkema, executive director of the Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University, remarks for the *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* that while literary and philosophical scholarship is dwindling, both historians and theologians are

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science and Benjamin Franklin's *The Way to Wealth* seem not a sufficient philosophy of national life" (Foreword, *Jonathan Edwards,* New York: Meridian, 1959, n. p.).

[11] Stievermann, Jan, "Constructing America's Theologian: Interpretation of Jonathan Edwards at Mid-Century," Conference "Christianity in Today's World: The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards," Evangelical School of Theology, Wroclaw, Poland, 31 May 2011. On Billy Graham's repreaching of *Sinners*, see "Billy Graham & Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God: A Digital Exhibit," The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University, 23 January 2012 <http://edwards.yale.edu/education/billy-graham>.

[12] Marsden, George M., *Jonathan Edwards: A Life* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2003); Noll, Mark A., *America's God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

currently on the cutting edge of Edwards scholarship; between these two leading groups, however, a certain animosity persists: "Some historicists look down on theologizers as partisan apologists, hagiographers, even whitewashers; some theologizers resent historicists for secularizing Edwards, for reducing him to a tool in their 'humanist agendas.' Both of these views are caricatures, but caricatures that endure."[13] In reality, Minkema points out, the historical Edwards that emerges in the latest scholarship is quite close to the concerns of evangelical engagements with Edwards, so that "ironically and unawares" the two groups "have been working towards similar ends for some time . . . The *motives* and *audiences* may be different, but the pictures that are emerging from each side are remarkably similar."[14]

The confluence of academic and evangelical interest which Conforti noted for the 1930's thus seems to be returning, under different circumstances, nowadays. When Minkema notes that "the number of secondary publications on Edwards fast approaches 4,000, making him one of the most studied figures of Christian thought and *the* most studied American intellectual figure before 1800" it must also be remembered that just in the 1990's "fully one-third of all printed commentary on Edwards was theological in nature" and "*over half* of these theological publications appeared in evangelical publications."[15]

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[13] Minkema, Kenneth P., "Jonathan Edwards in the Twentieth Century," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 47.4 (2004), 23 January 2012 <http://www.etsjets.org/files/JETS-PDFs/47/47-4/47-4-pp659-687_JETS.pdf> 677.

[14] Ibid., 678; original emphasis. This statement must be understood in the context of the latest historical scholarship on Edwards which has long turned away from interpreting him as primarily a protomodernist, in the tradition of Perry Miller: "for historians, Edwards's 'modernity' is now not as much a concern as are his Puritan heritage and his New England and Enlightenment contexts"; this new historical Edwards "is proving to be a supernaturalist, a thoroughgoing theist, a tireless student of Scripture, a parish pastor with an evangelical passion" (677). It should be added, too, that this new turn of Edwards studies (which is part of a change in the broader field of Early American Studies, discussed below) is understandably more attractive to evangelical scholars than the former downplaying of Edwards' theist and evangelical interests.

[15] Ibid., 677, 678; original emphasis. Minkema's survey was written in 2004.

Edwards and Early American literature

As Minkema notes, literary scholarship of Edwards seems to be in the decline. Small wonder, perhaps. "Early American Literature has never been a subject to make the heart leap," says William Spengemann,[16] and the popularity of Jonathan Edwards with literary scholars reflects the trajectory of the developments in the field of Early American Literature. Its origins rather embattled, the discipline has been slow in defining itself and has undergone significant changes even in the second half of the twentieth century. It is important to give a short overview of these transformations as a background for the methodological considerations of the present work.

The first assessments of literature produced on the American soil did not appear until after the Revolution and the first book-length studies of the topic were Samuel Lorenzo Knapp's *Lectures on American Literature* (1829) and Rufus Griswold's *Prose Writers of America* (1846). Their purpose was, importantly, to prove the cultural independence of America. Colonial Puritan authors were generally looked down upon and considered to be of primarily historical interest, their writings otherwise quite lacking in art. Edwards held a somewhat privileged place among them, not, however, because of any literary qualities of his texts but simply because of his credit as a well-published thinker with an international reputation.[17] And even as a thinker, his legacy was questioned. As early as 1787, Ezra Stiles, then President of Yale, remarked that Edwards' works "in another generation will pass into as transient notice perhaps scarce above oblivion, and when posterity occasionally comes across them in the rubbish of Libraries, the rare characters who may read and be pleased with them will be

[16] Spengemann, William C., *A New World of Words: Redefining Early American Literature* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1994) ix.
[17] Gura, Philip F., "Edwards and American Literature," Stein 263-264; Spengemann 1-23.

looked upon as singular and whimsical"[18] and a century later Unitarian ministers in Boston were convinced that Edwards would be remembered "as a powerful thinker, whose thoughts produced no lasting results."[19]

The attitudes towards colonial literature did not change much after the institutionalization of American Literature at the end of the 19th century. Although English departments emerged in the academy via philology, their interests soon turned to literature, even contemporary American authors; writings of the colonial period did not seem literary enough and could hardly bear comparison with English literature of the 17th and 18th centuries. The nationalistic need to define an "American Literature" was epitomized in the *Cambridge History of American Literature* (1917), which included colonial writings on the basis of presenting "a survey of the life of the American people as expressed in their writings rather than a history of belles-lettres alone."[20] The emergence of Modernism and literary criticism which was essentially ahistorical (the work of the New Critics), Spengemann observes, presented a new problem for the field of colonial literature, as the new methods and concerns were hardly compatible with the nature of the colonial writings.[21]

It was at this period, however, that a new approach was developed to the study of Puritan writings. In the late 1930's a group of scholars at Harvard University, most notably Perry Miller, Kenneth Murdock and S. E. Morrison,[22] developed

> a species of intellectual history capable of mediating the conflict between

[18] Qtd. in Conforti 3.
[19] Gura, "Edwards" 266.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Spengemann 15-17.
[22] The interest in Puritanism was not the only element in the rise of American Studies; among the founders of the discipline was, for example, also F. O. Matthiessen whose famous book *American Renaissance* appeared in 1941.

> unliterary national history and ahistorical criticism . . . the intellectual historians posited between the historical and literary poles an abstract middle ground called "the American mind," which expressed itself most clearly in writings of particular formal complexity and connected the writings of very different times and places in a continuous historical development.[23]

Miller and Johnson's influential anthology *The Puritans* appeared in 1938 and was soon followed by Miller's two works called *The New England Mind* (1939 and 1953). Miller was also particularly interested in Edwards; he published Edwards' biography in 1949, edited for the first time Edwards' typological notebook as *Images or Shadows of Divine Things* (1948) and was among those who were at the birth of the Works of Jonathan Edwards publishing project at Yale University, serving as general editor for many years. Most famously perhaps, he wrote an essay tracing the development of the American mind "From Edwards to Emerson" (1940) and despite his later reminder that the continuity should not be understood simplistically, his interpretation created a paradigm for understanding the transformation of Puritanism into Transcendentalism.[24]

Miller's powerful voice determined the scholarship of Early American Literature for decades to come. It was only in the 1960's and 70's with the rise of the new social history that historians began to turn away from the metanarratives of intellectual history to focus on

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[23] Spengemann 18.

[24] Miller, Perry and Thomas H. Johnson, *The Puritans* (New York: American Book Company, 1938); Miller, Perry, *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (New York: Macmillan, 1939); Miller, Perry, *The New England Mind: From Colony to Province* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953); Miller, Perry (ed.), *Images or Shadows of Divine Things* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948); Miller, Perry, "From Edwards to Emerson," *Errand into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Belknap, 1996).

issues of gender, race, and class and to study noncanonical texts such as popular fiction or autobiographical narratives. By the end of the twentieth century Early Americanists have more fully addressed the biases of the history of the scholarship of their field, and their critique has been powerful. Works revising the standing portrayal of the Puritans as a homogenous group with an exalted errand appeared, such as Andrew Delbanco's *The Puritan Ordeal* (1991), presenting the Puritans as emigrants with a troubled conscience, Janice Knight's *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts* (1994), revising Perry Miller's depiction of the Puritans and emphasizing the differences within Puritanism, David Hall's *Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment* (1990), focusing on "popular religious belief in Early New England" (its subtitle) or later Thomas Kidd's book *The Protestant Interest* (2004), replacing the exclusively American perspective with a focus on how post-Puritan New Englanders "came to see themselves as belonging to the international Protestant interest." [25] With new interests also in the marginalized voices of the colonial period and with the ever increasing popularity of "Atlantic history," with attention turned to texts previously left outside the canon, to colonial cultural centers beyond New England and to social and cultural institutions outside print culture, the kind of scholarship of Perry Miller has come to be seen as too restrictive and tribal. The tide has turned, and when in 2002 Mark Noll publishes *America's God*, another grand narrative of the white elite God in America, he knows he is in for trouble.[26]

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[25] Kidd, Thomas S., *The Protestant Interest: New England After Puritanism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004) 2. Delbanco, Andrew, *The Puritan Ordeal* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1991); Knight, Janice, *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts: Rereading American Puritanism* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1994); Hall, David D., *Worlds of Wonder, Days of Judgment: Popular Religious Belief in Early New England* (Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

[26] "Historical practice of recent decades has shown how rewarding it is to push beneath such an elite stratum in order to recover the voices of ordinary people. With full knowledge and approval of such work, I have nonetheless chosen to present my title as *America's God* rather than *Elite America's God* because of two historical convictions: that many nonpublishing citizens read, pondered, and considered themselves part of the circles of debate created by the published theology examined in this

With respect to Early American Literature, the argument of William Spengemann in *A New World of Words* might be mentioned as an example of some of the redefinitions of the field which were called for in the 1990's. Spengemann rightly dismantles the very phrase "Early American Literature," showing how misleading it is. He finds the idea of history behind the concept deeply problematic: as soon as one says "Early American" the idea of future United States is already implied, which is of course anachronistic. There were no "future United States" in the 17th and 18th centuries but British colonies which were parts of the Empire.[27] The idea of historical continuity is merely asserted in the case of American literature and cannot be even grounded in the concept of a national language, as might be the case of other national literatures, as Spengemann argues:

> As a result, American literary history has turned out to be little more than a chronology of texts written in the language of another nation by citizens, actual or imputed, of the United States, with little apparent reason for its existence beyond the wishful thinking and largely political designs of certain nineteenth-century American patriots and twentieth-century English professors.[28]

Instead, Spengemann proposes an understanding of the field as comprised of texts written in English which reflect and respond to the discovery and otherness of the New World, something that brought such profound conceptual changes that the language of the Old

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volume; and that during the years from 1730 to 1865, most residents in the United States, as well as outside, if they thought about 'America' at all, did so in terms of the public realm of discourse that is the focus here" (Noll 18).

[27] Spengemann 23-24.

[28] Ibid., 33.

World had to change to respond to them. Thus defined, Early American literature is writing that strives "to make room in the language for the New World" and starts "with the earliest recorded appearance of the word *America* in the language."[29]

A second example, less representative of the field but important in relationship to Edwards, is Richard De Prospo's critique of the ethnocentric literary historiographical method of Early American scholarship with its two mantras of national originality and historical continuity. Influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, De Prospo criticizes the uncritical acceptance of what he identifies as the discourse of "modernism" and the reading of Early American texts through this lens. He locates the nationalistic tendencies in nineteenth-century thought: this "burden of proving American cultural independence" represents "one of the discourses of modernism that begins in romantic writings and continues to this day."[30] Added to this De Prospo also identifies another element of this nationalistic conception of Early American Literature: environmentalism, the "recognition of nature's power to transform individuals and cultures," and claims that "the discursive foundation of environmentalism in early American literature . . . appears . . . to be remarkably, scandalously weak. The evidence is simply not 'there.'"[31] In a later article De Prospo argues that the assumption of continuity is not unique to the study of American literature but that is the consequence of a neoromantic conception of history; such notion of origins and continuity, moreover, makes Early American literature structurally marginal, creating the condescending attitude toward it as "an aged parent."[32] De Prospo calls for, and

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[29] Ibid., 49, 50; original emphasis.
[30] De Prospo, Richard C., *Theism in the Discourse of Jonathan Edwards* (Newark: University of Delaware Press; London, Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1985) 24, 25.
[31] Ibid., 30, 31.
[32] De Prospo, Richard C., "Marginalizing Early American Literature," *New Literary History* 23.2 (1992): 233-265, *JSTOR*, 23 January 2012, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/469233> 253-254.

notes in a number of works of other scholars, an attitude to Early American literature defined by difference rather than commonality: "What needs ultimately to be done . . . is to theorize American literary history not as a diachronic passage from past to present—continuous, discontinuous or whatever—but as the synchronic differentiation of past from present."[33]

While the critique of Early Americanists has raised relevant points and has certainly been needed as a revision of the older model, it should not be isolated from larger transformations of the field of American Literature as a whole, as those naturally have consequences also for Early American Studies. One project representative of the broader methodological and conceptual changes is the *Cambridge History of American Literature*, with Sacvan Bercovitch as general editor. In introduction to Volume One in 1994, Bercovitch explains the understanding of "American literature" that underlies the project and its approach:

> the term "America" is neither a narrative premise in these volumes nor an objective background. Quite the reverse: it is the complex subject of a series of literary-historical inquiries. "America" is a historical entity, the United States of America. It is also a declaration of community, a people constituted and sustained by a verbal fiat, a set of universal principles, a strategy of social cohesion, a summons to social protest, a prophecy, a dream, an aesthetic ideal, a trope of the modern . . . a semiotics of inclusion . . . and a semiotics of exclusion . . . A nationality so conceived is

[33] Ibid., 255.

a rhetorical battleground.[34]

Transcending the limitations of Millerian intellectual history, Bercovitch conceives nationality not in ethnocentric but in rhetorical terms, as a dynamic cultural construct. In this perspective, old questions about the literariness of Early American Literature or its relevance to the canon are no longer relevant. Moreover, emphasizing the multiplicity of narratives within American literature, Volume One of the *Cambridge History* presents a wide range of topics and approaches, precisely as Early Americanists demanded. It is therefore unfortunate that Bercovitch is still considered among some Early Americanists as "the most famous of the continuities scholars."[35]

This criticism is partly understandable, especially in connection to Bercovitch's earlier works, like *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (1975), *The American Jeremiad* (1978)

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[34] Bercovitch, Sacvan, ed., *The Cambridge History of American Literature, 1590-1820*, associate editor Cyrus R. K. Pattell, volume 1 (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 3.

[35] Gura, "New Century" 603. Volume One includes, for example, a survey of early texts about America written in a number of languages or a discussion of unpublished texts and non-textual dimensions of polite culture in British America—representing precisely the kind of diversity in the field of Early American Studies which has been called for by Early Americanists. Even Gura's own detailed review of Volume One of the *Cambridge History*, "Essaying Early American Literature," is quite sympathetic to the volume as a whole.

One of Gura's comments on Bercovitch's *Cambridge History* makes the reader wonder if behind the Early Americanists' criticism of Bercovitch might be their difficulty of seeing beyond the issues of their own field: "In fairness to Bercovitch, we must also note that in his general introduction to the *Cambridge History of American Literature* . . . he gives his allegiance more to 'dissensus' than to consensus, even if he himself has not re-examined early American Puritanism with that in mind" ("New Century" 604). Tellingly, Gura's strongest criticism of Volume One concentrates on Emory Elliott's section on "New England Puritan Literature." He also notes that "such criticism of Bercovitch has come primarily from historians" (ibid., 604), testifying to the existence of (unnecessary) interdisciplinary divisions. Sadder, yet, is Gura's note in the conclusion of his review of the *Cambridge History*; it may be left to speak for itself: "we can count our blessings that the *Cambridge History* was not written a decade or so ago, when critical theory was all the rage. The contributors to these pages, for example, are much more comfortable with *Representations* than with *Diacritics*, more at home with the history of British North America than with contemporary European philosophical discourse. This new history is, therefore, a very *American* book, but in a healthier sense than the older consensual histories" (Gura, Philip F., "Essaying Early American Literature," review of *The Cambridge History of American Literature, Volume One: 1590-1820,* ed. Sacvan Bercovitch, *The New England Quarterly* 68.1 (1995): 118-138, *JSTOR*, 15 February 2012 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/365968> 137; original emphasis).

or the earlier collection of essays *Typology in Early American Literature* (1972).[36] It is unfortunate, however, in the sense that it does not reflect the difference between Bercovitch (especially his later works) and Miller. Gura points out, for example: "The important thing to recognize is that, while Miller had privileged Edwards for his protomodernism, by focusing on his rhetoric Bercovitch directly engaged his language and thus made him available in a new way as an historical figure for students of literature."[37] True as it this statement might be, it does not capture the core of the difference. Inspired by the New Historicism and cultural anthropology, Bercovitch studies not the development of the "American mind" but the "myth of America," a symbolic cultural construct which upholds the idea of the United States as a nation state. In this respect, he modifies the older interpretations of the Puritans' role in the shaping of America: "The narrative of Puritan origins is true in the sense that the New England colonists provided a main source of the mythic story of America."[38] His recognition is particularly of the *rhetorical* (and performative) nature of the myth and so necessarily invites considerations of difference, as Martin Procházka points out in a commentary on Bercovitch's "Myth of America": "While the rhetorical effect of the myth is undoubtedly integrative, in *discursive* terms the myth opens the difference between the unifying power of the 'Logos' and the power of 'logocracy,' using the very same rhetoric for

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[36] Bercovitch, Sacvan, *The Puritan Origins of the American Self* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1975); Bercovitch, Sacvan (ed.), *Typology in Early American Literature* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Bercovitch, Sacvan, *The American Jeremiad* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 1980). As any large scale interpretation, Bercovitch's work naturally invites revisionist criticism. So Knight takes issue not only with Miller's portrayal of the Puritans but also with Bercovitch's as assuming a "univocality of Puritan culture" (7-8). Bercovitch's reading of Edwards' apocalypticism in *The American Jeremiad* also invites criticism, and may be usefully contrasted with, for instance, Noll's reading (*Jeremiad* 99ff, Noll 47-48).

[37] "Edwards" 272.

[38] Bercovitch, Sacvan, "The Myth of America," *After History,* ed. Martin Procházka (Prague: Litteraria Pragensia, 2006) 338.

their own political, economic or military ends."[39] The recognition of the rhetorical aspects of nationality also precludes a restrictive approach to national literature, as the *Cambridge History* documents.

Even apart from the Bercovitch debate, the multiplicity of themes in the newer approaches to Early American Studies brings various consequences for Edwards scholarship and Edwards reappears and disappears with varying fortunes. Among historical critics, "Early American Literature at the New Century" is marked, as Gura claims in a survey of that name, by the effort "to reconstruct as completely as possible the socio-literary milieu of literary works through the exploration of a broad array of forgotten social and imaginative texts, paving the way for responsible interpretations of canonized works and making possible the rediscovery of lost literature."[40] If this effort is more often than not directed to issues of race and gender, of broadening the understanding of Early American literature in such a way as to see it as part of the writings of the English-speaking world and consequently as a sub-field of comparative literature, once more Edwards might seem to fall outside the categories of interest. He might have a perspective in Transatlantic history, but otherwise his prospects are rather limited:

> Edwards could not find a central place in such scholarship. If anything, on matters of race, gender, and class, he seemed a man inextricably tied to his time, someone inclined to spiritual transcendence but who had not overt concern for the political or philosophical questions that subsequently made figures like Franklin, Jefferson, Olaudah Equiano or

[39] Procházka xxxi; original emphasis.
[40] "New Century" 607.

Judith Sargent Murray of interest.[41]

New scholarship in religious history, however, brings results which might prove to be inspiring to literary scholars. Several studies devoted to the Edwardsean tradition highlight new and until now neglected issues. Joseph Conforti focuses "on the publishing history and appropriation of [Edwards'] work" and examines "the construction of traditions around Edwards's writings, thought, and religious and cultural figure."[42] He adds another voice to the self-awareness of Early American Studies when he remarks that "interpreters of Edwards have been too absorbed in exploring his relationship to the colonial awakening, the Revolution, and the nineteenth-century literary renaissance. We need to recognize how this interpretive agenda derived from a constructed tradition that served the cultural and scholarly need of the mid-twentieth century."[43] Following his lead, Douglas Sweeney pursues the Edwardsean tradition of the New England theology, and Philip Gura takes Sweeney's discovery of an "Edwardsian enculturation of Calvinist New England during the first third of the nineteenth century" and Lawrence Buell's notion of American "Calvinist literary culture"[44] for the suggestion of a new trajectory of Edwards' literary legacy:

> With Buell's and Sweeney's injunctions in mind, Edwards's true legacy in American literature may most reside in his contribution to what literary and cultural historians have termed the discourse of "sentimentalism," particularly as it was conceived, utilized, and modified in its literary

[41] Gura, "Edwards" 273.
[42] Conforti 5.
[43] Ibid., 196.
[44] Gura, "Edwards" 275.

> exfoliation by such newly recovered and appreciated writers as Stowe, Maria Cummings, and Susan Warner as well as by more canonical authors like Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman. In particular, Edwards's emphases on emotion as a central component to the religious life and on disinterested benevolence as one of the signs of true spirituality indelibly marked antebellum literature . . . the vibration of the heart to the stirrings of another, the sympathy which unites souls of all class, race, or gender, a benevolence to being in general, is what more than anything else defined sentimentalism, and this emotion derived in good measure from Edwardsean principles and language.[45]

Methodology

If these are the directions that the scholarship of Early American literature and Edwards literary scholarship is beginning to take, then the present study might seem outmoded. It focuses neither on the trinity of race, gender, and class, nor on the Transatlantic Edwards, nor on the Edwardsean element in sentimentalism, but instead on the worn out subject of typology, on Edwards' most known typological texts, from the perspective of deconstructive criticism, ever an odd method in Early American Literature. But the fact that typology has attracted the attention of literary scholars is not merely the result of Miller's and Bercovitch's influence. Rather, typology is interesting because it is a figurative discipline and as such it invites considerations of its allegorical nature and by implication of the more general issues of meaning and representation in language.

As literary scholarship of Edwards has never been a major voice either in Edwards

[45] Ibid., 275–276.

scholarship or in Early American Literature (where Bradford, Winthrop, Bradstreet and above all, Edward Taylor offer much more promising material for literary discussions), there are relatively few works devoted to literary interpretations of Edwards. Among those, studies of Edwards' typology which border on literary and intellectual/religious history are prominent, from the pioneering work of Perry Miller to the work of Mason Lowance and Sacvan Bercovitch to the revisionist work of Janice Knight. Secondly, there has been a persistent stream of scholarship on the stylistic and rhetorical qualities of Edwards' writings and particularly his sermons, one of the first studies devoted exclusively to this topic being Edwin Cady's 1949 article on "The Artistry of Jonathan Edwards" which has been followed by a host of other articles, typically focusing on *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God*.[46] Such work has also been done by Wilson Kimnach; his introduction to the first volume of Edwards' sermons in the Yale edition, however, is a book-length study of much more than Edwards' style: rather literary history in the true sense of the word, following Edwards' literary sources and influences, the circumstances of his writing and preaching and providing fundamental stylistic and rhetorical categories for an understanding of Edwards' homiletics. New critical approaches have also made their way into Edwards scholarship, such as Richard De Prospo's emphasis on "theism" as Edwards' proper discursive tradition, Wayne Lesser's

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[46] Cady, Edwin H., "The Artistry of Jonathan Edwards," *The New England Quarterly* 22.1 (1949): 61-72, *JSTOR*, 24 May 2004 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/361536>. For more recent articles, see for example: Steele, Thomas J. and Eugene R. Delay, "Vertigo in History: The Threatening Tactility of 'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,'" *Early American Literature* 18.3 (1983/1984): 242-256, *Academic Search Complete*, 23 January 2012 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/ pdfviewer?sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-e4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11&vid=26&hid=21>; Gallagher, Edward J., "'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God': Some Unfinished Business," *The New England Quarterly* 73.2 (2000): 202-221, *JSTOR*, 23 January 2012 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/366800>; Lukasik, Christopher, "Feeling the Force of Certainty: The Divine Science, Newtonianism, and Jonathan Edwards's 'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God,'" *The New England Quarterly* 73.2 (2000): 222-245, *JSTOR*, 23 January 2012 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/366801>; Turley, Stephen R., "Awakened to the Holy: 'Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God' in Ritualized Context," *Christianity and Literature* 57.4 (2008): 507-530, *Academic Search Complete*, 23 January 2012 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/ pdfviewer?sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-e4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11&vid=30& hid =21>.

postmodern analysis of Edwards' "Personal Narrative" ("Jonathan Edwards: Textuality and the Language of Man") or Jennifer Leader's interpretation of Edwards' concept of relational being through the lens of Levinas and Marion ("In Love with the Image").[47]

Richard De Prospo's work deserves to be discussed at some length here because it represents one of the few applications of critical theory to Edwards scholarship, although its concerns are different from those of this study.[48] In his book *Theism in the Discourse of Jonathan Edwards* De Prospo argues that what he calls the "humanist" interpretation of Edwards has obliterated the radical difference of Edwards' discursive tradition, which he labels "theism." He focuses his discussion on Edwards as a synecdoche for "theism" which he defines as "a discursive pattern that is based on the ultimate duality between Creator and creation and that continues indefinitely to generate hierarchical duplicities."[49] Modern "humanist" scholarship has replaced the "theist" Edwards with its own: "Modern commentaries do not corrupt, but are the genesis of Edwards's identity. An Edwards untouched by modern readings is more than difficult to recover. There is simply no such 'thing.'"[50] Nevertheless, this is what De Prospo, in effect, attempts to do. Apparently, however, De Prospo's central argument is not so much about the nuances of Edwards' discursive pattern (and the title of his book is rather misleading in this sense). Rather, his main point is to question the predominance of Early American scholarship of the nationalistic kind by arguing that "depending on nothing so fragile as the conscious respect

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[47] Lesser, Wayne, "Jonathan Edwards: Textuality and the Language of Man," *Critical Essays on Jonathan Edwards,* ed. William J. Scheick (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980) 287-304; Leader, Jennifer L., "'In Love with the Image': Transitive Being and Typological Desire in Jonathan Edwards," *Early American Literature* 41.2 (2006): 153-181, *Academic Search Complete,* 2 July 2010 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11&vid=12&hid=104>.
[48] Stephen Daniel's study *The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994) is another one, a semiotic interpretation of Edwards' thought.
[49] *Theism* 12-13.
[50] Ibid., 54.

of modern theorists for romantic predecessors, unity endures as one of the regularities of the modern discursive pattern."[51] He wishes to find an "other" to the discursive pattern of "humanism" which has so thoroughly pervaded, according to him, the field of Early American Studies, and as that "other" he posits the discourse of "theism."

The resulting reading makes case for "theism" in Jonathan Edwards' discourses of creation, grace, and providence. De Prospo might be right, for example, in identifying those interpretations of Edwards' conception of grace as a Lockean simple idea as governed by a "humanist" outlook but when he comments regarding Edwards' discourse of Providence, for instance, that "the assumption that Providence leads incrementally up to the climax of Christ's ministry and continues to develop in the subsequent history of the Christian religion belongs to a humanist discursive pattern"[52] and is not to be found in Edwards, the case is less convincing. It would require a much more thorough argument to show that Edwards' thought is really devoid of such "humanist" element. In De Prospo's framework, it would seem much more plausible to say that both "theism" and "humanism" are present in Edwards' thought, not as a diachronic transition from one to the other but as a synchronic difference. As it is, his reading often seems rather schematic, at the worst moments creating the impression that De Prospo is trying to show what Edwards "really meant."[53]

De Prospo looks to twentieth-century philosophy and critical theory as bringing a fundamental criticism of the "humanist" discourse. He pleads for the application of "phenomenology," which he uses as an overarching term for the kind of discourse in which

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[51] Ibid., 34.
[52] Ibid., 121.
[53] "The following reading of Edwards's discourse of Grace will attempt no more than the previous ones of Edwards's discourse of Creation and of Providence to restore some original meaning" (148). This impression is particularly unfortunate given De Prospo's claims about his "phenomenological" approach (see below).

the idea of presence or immanence is questioned, to Early American scholarship, explaining why the resistance to it is particularly strong in this field:

> The resistance of modernism to phenomenological analysis . . . is most intense in American culture because phenomenology threatens the identity of the culture and the profession of its students . . . Phenomenology brackets, puts in quotation marks and thereby reveals as no more than a part of a sign, what is acutely hypostatized and acutely in need of punctuation that redundantly calls attention to its status as a signifier: "America," itself. Thus in the United States phenomenology seeks to do battle with humanism allied to nationalism. This coalition enjoys an extraordinarily successful neoteny, and although appearing ungainly and infantile in the broader field of contemporary literary theory, remains a master of the limited one of American culture.[54]

De Prospo's schematic opposition of "theism" and "humanism," then, is created as purposely provocative and is meant primarily to shake American cultural historiography in its stronghold: "the more objectionable [De Prospo's readings] manage to be, the more real and powerful and determinate, and potentially more deficient, becomes . . . modern American cultural historiography, and the more real, and necessary become alternative theories of American culture."[55] It might seem strange that De Prospo thinks it necessary to argue so powerfully for the introduction of critical theory to Early American scholarship in 1985 but

[54] Ibid., 229.
[55] Ibid., 230.

he repeats the same gesture in a 1993 article ("Humanizing the Monster"[56]) on Edwards' and Franklin's personal writings and elsewhere; clearly the resistance of the "neoromantic humanist" outlook has been strong. In sum, De Prospo's major contribution to Early American Literature (and less even to Edwards studies) seems to be rather in highlighting the biases of the earlier scholarship and in arguing for the relevance of critical theory to the field rather than in providing a productive reading of Edwards or offering a viable methodology.[57]

Today it is perhaps no longer necessary to continue the debate against the "continuities thesis" or "American cultural independence" in Early American Studies, and the present study does not address the issue. But neither does it address such issues as does Bercovitch (Edwards' place in the formation of the myth of America) or topics studied by the new kind of literary history, as outlined by Gura. By focusing on the type as a rhetorical form and on certain "deconstructive implications" in Edwards' writings, to borrow De Prospo's phrase for a context for which he does not intend it,[58] the following discussion wishes to focus on issues which are not specific to America nor unique to Edwards himself but to consider his texts from the perspective of rhetorical analysis and links which are of literary theoretical rather than historical nature.

The method of the present work follows the kind of deconstructive criticism practiced by Paul de Man and J. Hillis Miller, and Jacques Derrida's work provides the general methodological framework. Of the large corpus of Derrida's texts only a few are used;

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[56] De Prospo, Richard C., "Humanizing the Monster: Integral Self Versus Bodied Soul in the Personal Writings of Franklin and Edwards," *Benjamin Franklin, Jonathan Edwards, and the Representation of American Culture,* eds. Barbara B. Oberg and Harry S. Stout (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) 204-217.

[57] No major study of Edwards followed De Prospo's approach.

[58] *Theism* 231.

particularly those that have a bearing to issues of the nature of language and figuration. The various works referred to are discussed in their respective places of the argument. The fact that the work of these authors (or a portion of it) is sometimes referred to as the "Yale school of deconstruction" gives an amusing twist to applying their methods and insights to Edwards, who was himself a Yale alumnus and whose contemporary textual and digital presence (considering the vast number of his writings published in print and online) is to a large extent also the product of Yale, but in no way is this meant to suggest any grounds for the applying their theoretical approaches to Edwards.

That, in fact, requires some justification. While the present work uses deconstructive criticism as a premise and does not defend it *as such*, there are several aspects which particularly stand out as possible disadvantages of such approach to the writings of Jonathan Edwards. First of all, as is well known, literary deconstructive interpretations are typically associated with late eighteenth-, nineteenth- and twentieth-century texts.[59] Paul de Man engages with, for example, the work of English and German Romantic authors, Nietzsche, or Proust, texts of widely different nature than Edwards' theological treatises, sermons, or private philosophical and theological notes. Hillis Miller writes on nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature. On the other hand, however, even if deconstructive readings prevail in the field of literature of the two last centuries, Derrida's focus is on the entire tradition of Western metaphysics and his analysis of "logocentrism" can hardly leave Edwards untouched. Edwards is a Christian philosophical theologian of the 18th century; his

[59] Paul de Man's cursory remark in "Rhetoric of Temporality" is telling: "One has to return, in the history of European literature, to the moment when the rhetorical key-terms undergo significant changes and are at the center of important tensions. A *first and obvious example* would be the change that takes place in the latter half of the eighteenth century, when the word "symbol" tends to supplant other denominations for figural language, including that of allegory" (Man, Paul de, "The Rhetoric of Temporality," *Blindness and Insight*, introduction Wlad Godzich, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 188; my emphasis).

categories are those of the Western metaphysical tradition. Walter Ong suggests that logocentrism reaches its peak in the work of Peter Ramus ("in his dialectic or logic Ramus provided a virtually unsurpassable example of logocentrism"[60]) and even if Ramist logic was what Edwards later dismissed as an influence which he had overcome, it was still a significant shaping force for his thought.[61]

Although the present work does not attempt to analyze Edwards' particular version of logocentrism, Derrida's general arguments about language and meaning in language and similar general presuppositions in the work of de Man and Hillis Miller are consequently used for a rhetorical reading of Edwards' typology. One of these suppositions which is operative in the following interpretation of Edwards is that "literature" brings out in a more salient way what is part of all language, not just of literary works like poetry or fiction: in the words of Miller, "this large-scale indirection characteristic of literary language, indeed of language generally."[62] The consideration of Jonathan Edwards' typology from the perspective of rhetorical criticism proceeds from the recognition of the fundamentally tropological nature of all literature. Miller defines it by a succession of several rhetorical concepts. Literature is to be understood as a trope, "the way the figures of speech turn aside the telling of a story or the presentation of a lyrical theme." Once this tropological dimension of literature is recognized, all works of literature are seen to be "parabolic, 'thrown beside' their

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[60] Ong, Walter J., *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word* (London, New York: Methuen, 1982) 168.

[61] "One reason why at first, before I knew other logic, I used to be mightily pleased with the study of the old logic, was because it was very pleasant to see my thoughts, that before lay in my mind jumbled without any distinction, ranged into order and distributed into classes and subdivisions, that I could tell where they all belonged, and run them up to their general heads. For this logic consisted much in distributions and definitions; and their maxims gave occasion to observe new and strange dependencies of ideas, and a seeming agreement of multitudes of them in the same thing, that I never observed before" ("The Mind," no. 17; *WJE* 6: 345).

[62] Miller, Hillis J., *Tropes, Parables, Performatives: Essays on Twentieth-Century Literature* (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1991) ix.

real meaning." And parables are performative, "they use words to try to make something happen in relation to the 'other' that resonates in the work."[63] In such a view of language and literature, the problem of the "literariness" of Edwards' texts fades from view.

A second objection to the possibilities of a deconstructive reading might be the theological nature of Edwards' work. The relation of Christian theology (except perhaps the more liberal streams) to postmodernism has often been one of uneasiness. But that is perhaps a part of a more general resistance to the deconstructivist challenging such fundamental concepts of the Western metaphysical tradition as presence or the self. Derrida himself remarks that we cannot think outside the Western metaphysico-theological tradition ("Of course, it is not a question of 'rejecting' these notions; they are necessary and, at least at present, nothing is conceivable for us without them"[64]) and it is perhaps understandable that the postmodern challenge feels threatening or confusing, and this is not confined to conservative Christian theologians. Robert Alter and Frank Kermode, for instance, explain that they find it better not to include any deconstructive reading in *The Literary Guide to the Bible,* an anthology of literary readings of the Bible: "Given our aim to provide illumination, we have not included critics . . . like the Deconstructionists and some feminist critics who seek to demonstrate that the text is necessarily divided against itself. The general validity of such approaches is not at issue here, only their inapplicability to our project as we have defined it."[65] Apparently, a deconstructivist reading of a biblical passage would not provide "illumination."

Some scholars have attempted to articulate alternatives to the Christian wariness

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[63] Ibid.

[64] Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology,* trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) 13.

[65] Alter, Robert and Frank Kermode (eds.), *The Literary Guide to the Bible* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, 1997) 6.

towards deconstruction. There are authors who argue for a compatibility of the Christian faith and deconstruction; John Caputo, for example, asserts that Derrida's deconstruction is not an enemy of faith and emphasizes the religious element in Derrida's thought as a point of contact which affirms the possibility of faith.[66] Others oppose such a move and argue that what Derrida deconstructs is a Hellenized version of Christianity, which has indeed become an ontotheology, but that Christianity ought to be disengaged from Greek conceptuality. Drawing on the theological work of Jürgen Moltmann and others, Brian Ingraffia, for example, argues that "a Christian tradition can be identified which resists the influence of Greek and modern metaphysics,"[67] that "the logos of biblical theology is radically different from the logos of Greek philosophy and modern rationalism,"[68] and that "Christian faith has all too easily been conflated with ontotheology in modernism and then criticized for being ontotheology in postmodernism."[69]

More generally, Derrida's focus on the Western metaphysical tradition has been used by some scholars to point out to the possible limits of deconstructive criticism. Walter Ong, who looks beyond the tradition of Western philosophy in his study of *Orality and Literacy*, criticizes Derrida's connection of logocentrism with phonocentrism as mistaken because logocentrism is "encouraged by textuality" and argues that the "textualist critique" (such as New Criticism, structuralism and deconstruction) is "the most text-bound of all ideologies, because it plays with the paradoxes of textuality alone and in historical isolation, as though the text were a closed system," and even more forcefully, "the work of deconstructionists and

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[66] Caputo, John D. (ed.), *Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997) 157-180.
[67] Ingraffia, Brian D., *Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology: Vanquishing God's Shadow* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 13.
[68] Ibid., 237. Ingraffia uses the term "biblical theology" to distinguish it from ontotheology (see 11).
[69] Ibid., 6.

other textualists . . . derives its appeal in part from historically unreflective, uncritical literacy."[70] Ong's criticism is a useful reminder that even the Western metaphysical tradition has its limits, and that these are also the limits of deconstruction. Such reservations ought to be kept in mind even as a deconstructivist approach is employed.[71]

Although the central impulse behind the present study is a kind of deconstructive reading of Edwards' typology, no little attention is paid to the history of typology and to the links between Edwards' typology and other allegorical traditions. This has been considered necessary for a responsible discussion of the rhetorical nature of Edwards' typology and its formal issues. The point is not to argue for any particular position of Edwards in literary and intellectual history, though of course such impression might arise at certain moments; the implications, anyway, are inevitable. Even when the reading draws in a literary or intellectual context or turns to comparisons, the first impulse is nevertheless that of a kind of "close reading," following, however, not so much the demands of the New Criticism but responding rather to what J. Hillis Miller calls the "categorical imperative" of his "ethics of reading." Miller's close reading is defined by two main features: "Close reading is the only way to get into any proximity to that 'other' to which the work of any author seems to give access"; and "The effort of reading must be constantly renewed because no one reading suffices."[72] In the following chapters, such reading brings out issues which demand a broader consideration: if the close reading of the type suggests, for example, that its rhetorical structure is more properly allegorical than symbolical, the issue of type's relation to allegory is considered. In sum, it might be said that the present work attempts to show how the tropological, parabolic

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[70] Ong 168, 169.

[71] These references to the responses to deconstruction mentioned here are, it must be emphasized, introduced only by way of example. Negative theology, for instance, is omitted; no mention is made, for example, of the debate between Derrida and Ricoeur.

[72] *Tropes* iix.

and performative dimensions of language are at work in Edwards' texts.

Structure and content

The study begins with an outline of the history of typology as a theological and literary field in Chapter Two. Starting from the etymological meaning of the Greek word *typos* and of terms which were in close connection to it, a brief history of typology as an exegetical method in early Christianity is given. By the time of the Fathers, typology co-exists and competes with allegory and a complex system of figurative interpretation of Scripture develops. Substantial revision of the allegorical tradition is effected by the Reformation, bringing typology to greater prominence; theological debates about the possibility of typological interpretation continue until present times. A more particular discussion of typology as it was understood by the Puritans shows that it was inextricably connected to other elements of their religious and literary culture, such as emblematics or their views on rhetoric. The close connection of typology to literary interpretation has also made it subject of literary studies, from Erich Auerbach's discussion of the *figura* to Northrop Frye's recognition of typology as a form of rhetoric.

Chapter Three examines Edwards' theory of natural typology and his definition of it as language. His typological reflections are juxtaposed with his understanding of language and his attitude to rhetoric. Thus, using Edwards' own texts, some initial problems of his typology are identified: his bold claims for the necessity of natural typology contrast with the difficulty of discerning true types from false types, his conviction that types provide access to the knowledge of spiritual things contrasts with his remarks on types as a veil; all these framed by similar conflicts in Edwards' views on language. In rhetorical terms, this difficulty can be expressed as one of distinguishing between types and tropes, which is also reflected

practically at the textual level when Edwards develops biblical imagery in sermons. What underlies these tensions, as is argued with the help of Jacques Derrida's study, is a more general problem of metaphor in metaphysics.

Starting with a consideration of Edwards' notebook on natural typology "Images of Divine Things," Chapter Four pursues the tropological implications of approaching typology rhetorically and examines the rhetorical form of the type. Opposing existing interpretations of the natural type as metonymy or as a proto-Romantic symbol, a strong formal resemblance is argued between the types in "Images of Divine Things" and Renaissance emblems; this connection is further supported by historical arguments. Comparison of Edwards' typology and Romantic nature poetry calls for a reconsideration of existing interpretations of Edwards' links to Romanticism.

To address further issues opened up by a rhetorical approach to Edwards' typology, Chapter Five considers typology in light of J. L. Austin's speech act theory and Derrida's criticism of it. A reading of Edwards' typological theory suggests that his typology can be understood performatively. Derrida's and Hillis Miller's analyses of Austin's theory highlight the problems which underlie Austin's distinction as the assumption of primacy of literal meaning and of a reliable self. It is the role of the self in Edwards' typology that must also be addressed, since the main criticism of Edwards' typological project is that of subjectivism.

Chapter Six resumes the consideration of the type from a tropological perspective and compares the type to two kinds of allegory, high allegory in the Renaissance and allegory in early Romanticism. Historically Edwards is situated between these two and his typology shows similarities and differences in comparison with each; the argument of the previous chapters, however, suggests strong links to Romantic allegory as interpreted by Paul de Man.

Drawing on the arguments for rhetorical and tropological dimensions of Edwards' typology, the chapter closes with a reading of the *History of the Work of Redemption* as a parable.

Chapter 2

Outline of Christian Typology

For Gilbert to carry to his Teacher—

The Bumble Bee's Religion—

His little Hearse like Figure
Unto itself a Dirge
To a delusive Lilac
The vanity divulge
Of Industry and Morals
And every righteous thing
For the divine Perdition
Of Idleness and Spring—

"All Liars shall have their part"—
Jonathan Edwards—
"And let him that is athirst come"—
Jesus—

Emily Dickinson[1]

This chapter provides some background to the history of Christian typology and its status in twentieth-century scholarship. Typology has primarily been a theological discipline and its roots are religious; therefore this section will be to a certain extent devoted to the theological history of typology and its interpretations. While this study focuses on Edwards' typology from a rhetorical perspective it is important to consider the relationship of the type to tropes also in a wider historical perspective. Precisely this relation has a long and troubled theological history; without at least some knowledge of its theological significance and

[1] Qtd. in "Emily Dickinson and the Bumble Bee," The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University, 25 February 2012 <*edwards.yale.edu/node/156*>. "Interestingly, there is only one explicit mention of [Edwards] in all of [Dickinson's] work—in a letter to a child. That child, Thomas Gilbert Dickinson, her nephew, was to die before reaching his teenaged years. In 1881, when Gilbert was six years old, his aunt gave him a note for his teacher, which included one of her poems—and, reportedly, a dead bee. The gnomic poem (no. 1522) is here given a title, which explains the strange enclosure. . . . In this note, there is also a postscript—like the title, not included in the poem—citing Edwards and Jesus" (ibid.).

history typology can hardly be properly understood. Many of the issues which shaped Christian hermeneutic in the very early times persisted until the early modern era and created a background for Edwards' own development of the discipline.

To provide a full discussion of the historical development of typology or of its status in modern theology or literary studies, however, is not a task to be attempted here; indeed giving such an overview would amount to the history of a core segment of biblical interpretation which is not the purpose of the present work. Only selected moments in the history of typology will therefore be observed, and even those but briefly; in post-Reformation contexts the focus will be on Protestant theology. Particular attention will be paid to typology in the Puritan tradition; literary contexts of typology will also be discussed.

Type: meaning and etymology

Although the present concern is with Christian typology, the roots of the term typology reach to non-biblical Greek. The word "type" comes from the Greek word *typos* which derives etymologically from *typto*, to strike. The basic meaning of *typos* is "the impress made by the blow, what is formed, what leaves its impress, the form-giving form, hence form gen. as outline"; from there the meaning of the word broadens to include impress, mark, stamp, relief, image, mould, form, model, outline, figure, kind.[2] The term was introduced into the Septuagint; there it occurs four times in the sense of model, idol, wording or text, and example.[3] The most important occurrence is in Exodus 25 where God reveals to Moses a

[2] Goppelt, Leonhard, "Typos, Antitypos, Typikos, Hypotyposis," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,* ed. Gerhard Friedrich Kittel, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromley, volume 8 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982) 246-247.
[3] Ibid., 248.

pattern or model for the sanctuary he is to build; *typos* refers to the pattern in verse 40.[4] In the New Testament *typos* appears in the senses mentioned, mark, idol, text, example[5] but also in a new, specifically hermeneutic sense. Goppelt lists the uses of the term in the New Testament and explains that "under Paul's influence *typos* became a hermeneutical term in the whole Church."[6]

Next to *typos* the Latin Church Fathers introduced the term *figura.* In the first section of his classic study "Figura" Erich Auerbach outlines the history of the Latin term and the changes of its use. The word first appears as one of Latin equivalents for the various Greek words for "form." The Greek *morphe* and *eidos* (which Auerbach explains as form or idea which informs matter) were rendered by the Latin word *forma* while the word *figura* translated the Greek *schema* (the purely perceptual shape). *Figura* appears to have first denoted "plastic form" but gradually the term acquired a much more abstract meaning. The sense of "plastic" was weakened and since *typos* also contained an "inclination toward the universal, lawful, and exemplary . . . this in turn helped to efface the already faint dividing line with *forma.*"[7] In Lucretius' use of the term Auerbach finds a "transition from the form to its imitation, from model to copy"[8] and Cicero is the first author to use *figura* as a rhetorical term.

Besides these shifts the term also acquired a specialized theological sense in the works of the Church Fathers. In their writings *figura* gradually replaced the Greek *typos.* Auerbach comments that the reason why the term *typos* was gradually replaced by *figura* in the works of

[4] Jan Heller observes that in verse 9 the same Hebrew word which is translated as *typos* in v. 40 is rendered in the Septuagint as *paradeigma* (Heller, Jan, *Bůh sestupující: Pokus o christologii Starého zákona,* Praha: Kalich, 1994, 60, n. 2).
[5] See Goppelt 249-250.
[6] Ibid., 248-9, 253.
[7] Auerbach, Erich, "Figura," *Scenes from the Drama of European Literature,* trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Meridian Books, 1959) 15.
[8] Ibid., 16.

the Latin Fathers was "that it was a foreign word" [9] but Thomas Davis disagrees with Auerbach and offers a more nuanced view:

> *Typos* is the term invariably used in the interpretations of the school of Antioch, for its connotations were those of the *koiné* Greek of the New Testament. *Figura* (the term which Augustine normally uses), as Auerbach correctly observes, "more or less consciously evoked all the notions involved in its [classical] history" (p. 48). One of the "notions" the term evokes is Greek allegorism, and subsequently the allegory of Philo, Origen, Jerome and Augustine.[10]

For the present purposes no distinction will be made between the two terms; Jonathan Edwards himself used the English word "type," though not exclusively. However, a discussion of these terms can no longer be separated from their hermeneutic use; etymological history inevitably leads to the history of *typos* and *figura* as hermeneutical terms.

Context and background of typology

It is sometimes claimed that typology begins with the New Testament.[11] Put this way the statement is highly misleading. What begins with the New Testament is Christian typology,

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[9] Ibid., 48.

[10] Davis, Thomas M., "The Traditions of Puritan Typology," *Typology in Early American Literature,* ed. Sacvan Bercovitch (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1972) 28.

[11] Davis writes that "typology proper begins with the work of the authors of the New Testament" (13); see also Woollcombe: "The methods of handling the Old Testament which were already practiced in Judaism were allegorism and the study of the fulfillment of prophecy. Historical typology . . . came into existence with Christendom" (Lampe, G. W. H. and K. J. Woollcombe, *Essays on Typology,* London: SCM Press, 1957, 42).

but not typology as such. Old Testament scholars agree that typology has roots that extend beyond the scope of Christian typology and further in the past. Christian typology emerged as a development and transformation of older beliefs and methods into specific new ideas about the relationship of the new faith to the traditions of which it considered itself to be a continuation and consummation. Among the main sources of Christian typology are ancient oriental beliefs in analogies of heavenly and earthly things, Old Testament prophecy and Messianic expectation, Hebrew liturgy and rabbinical interpretations. It will also be noted that there are other various references to and quotations from the Old Testament in the New which helped foster the Christian typological interpretations but are not typology proper.

A kind of typology was common in ancient oriental religions; it can even be traced in the Old Testament itself. So Heller explains the background of Exodus 25:40 in the context of religious beliefs of Israel's neighbors:

> Behind this apparently lies an idea which was quite common in ancient Orient that the earthly temple is an image, or an antitype of the heavenly temple, the garden by the temple is an image, or an antitype of paradise, etc. The heavenly thing is of course always more perfect than the earthly which only imitates its heavenly model or prototype . . . This was the basis of Babylonian oracles, particularly of astrology.[12]

Commenting on the same Old Testament passage, Goppelt and von Rad add that this particular context is nevertheless rare in the Old Testament: "Faith in Yahweh adopts such

[12] Heller 59-60; my translation.

ideas only infrequently."[13]

Despite undeniable connections, many Old Testament scholars agree that Hebrew thinking differed essentially from other religions. It was fundamentally prophetic and eschatological. Von Rad explains that such prefigurative dimension is ubiquitous in Jewish interpretations of the sacred writings:

> even within the Old Testament one and the same event could be given so many interpretations . . . "Radical openness for the future" has been rightly called the characteristic of the understanding of existence in the Old and the New Testament alike . . . This forward-looking is certainly not always the same. Sometimes it is more obvious, sometimes less: but it is present everywhere, for even the stories which were concerned only with their own day were adapted to a larger literary context, in whose light they are now to be interpreted, and this points them forward to the future.[14]

Hebrew thinking, in other words, was uniquely shaped by a different understanding of history: as linear and eschatological rather than cyclical. This characteristic also influenced Old Testament typology. Contrary to other oriental religions, von Rad suggests, Jewish prophets developed "a typology based not on myth and speculation, but on history and eschatology . . . the correspondence between original and copy was projected into the

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[13] Goppelt 256-257; to the same purport Rad, Gerhard von, *The Theology of Israel's Prophetic Traditions,* trans. D.M.G. Stalker, introduction Walter Brueggemann, *Old Testament Theology*, volume 2, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1965) 365.
[14] Von Rad 361.

temporal realm, *i.e.*, these were understood in the sense of historical succession (the original and the eschatological Exodus, the original and the eschatological David, Zion, and Covenant)."[15] Instead of a correspondence between an eternal heavenly prototype and its earthly copy, in most cases of Old Testament typology the two instances are linked in time.

Von Rad uses an emphasis developed earlier by Leonhard Goppelt. Goppelt locates the roots of New Testament typology in Hebrew prophetic eschatology and the election traditions and emphasizes that the antitype fulfills, enhances the type; accordingly, renewal of the earlier manifestations "does not just correspond to what has gone before; it transcends it . . . this shaping of prophecy has its controlling source in a thinking orientated to the consummation of salvation history."[16] This concept of the transcending of the type by the antitype (what he calls *Steigerung*) is a key point for Goppelt; it distinguishes Old Testament typology from the cyclical concept of time of other oriental religions.[17]

Christianity can thus hardly be said to be the inventor of typology as a hermeneutic method. Rather, the writers of the New Testament and later Christian authors borrowed and modified tendencies embedded in the Hebrew Scriptures and consciously developed in rabbinical exegesis. By the time of the emergence of Christianity, R. P. C. Hanson explains, there existed established typological and allegorical practices in rabbinical interpretations of the sacred writings; the typological interpretations of the early Church grew out of them. From a study of the New Testament it is

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[15] Von Rad 365.
[16] Goppelt 254.
[17] See Fabiny, Tibor, "Typology: Pros and Cons in Biblical Hermeneutics and Literary Criticism (From Leonhard Goppelt to Northrop Frye)," *RILCE. Revista de Filología Hispánica* 25.1 (2009): 138-152, *Academic Search Complete*, 26 May 2011 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=16&hid=21&sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-e4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11> 138.

> clear that there existed in the early Christian Church a corpus, more or less definitely limited, of types taken from the Old Testament and used for illuminating the Christian gospel; this corpus must have been in large part inherited from Jewish liturgical forms, though it would necessarily have been added to and modified to meet the needs of preaching the gospel of the Christian church.[18]

Von Rad goes even further to claim that "the new faith actually needed the Old Testament for its own self-expression."[19]

While typological interpretations of the Old Testament are common in the New Testament they are not uniform. First of all, it must be noted that there are various kinds of references to the Old Testament in the New. James Barr offers the following list: a) explicit types (e.g., Moses and Christ); b) real allegory (e.g. the muzzled ox in I Corinthians 9:9); c) paraenesis (e.g., exhortation to women to be like Sarah in I Peter 3:6); d) fulfillment of prophecies cited; e) proofs from linguistic details (e.g., "seed," not "seeds" in Galatians 3:16); f) situation similarities in style and language (e.g., the Magnificat); g) situation similarities in action (e.g., Sermon on the Mount and the circumstances of the Law of Moses).[20] The gospels also present various references to the Old Testament; gospel writers clearly intend to present Jesus' words and the events of his life in connection with the Old Testament. Von Rad observes: "The ways in which New Testament narratives parallel Old Testament texts vary greatly in detail; as is well known the passion story is absolutely full of such references to

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[18] Hanson, R. P. C., *Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen's Interpretation of Scripture,* introduction Joseph W. Trigg (Louisville, London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002) 67.
[19] Von Rad 335.
[20] Barr, James, *Old and New in Interpretation: A Study of the Two Testaments,* 2nd edition (London: SCM Press, 1982) 113-115.

things foretold in the Old Testament."[21] But the clearest instances of specifically typological references to the Old Testament in the New are in Paul and in the epistle to the Hebrews, and even these are different from each other.[22]

Even a short glimpse at the varieties of the uses of the Old Testament in the New suggests that it will be difficult to draw boundaries between the various kinds of typology and references. For the purposes this chapter, the chief focus will be on the connections between type and allegory. As a hermeneutical discipline typology developed in close connection to allegory and allegorical interpretations and this proximity has shaped Christian hermeneutic to a great extent. The ambiguities created by their interwoven history were an important issue in Puritanism and an important background of Jonathan Edwards' typology. Therefore some attention must now be paid to the theological history of allegory.

Typology and allegory in hermeneutical traditions

History of the Greek term *allegoreo* suggests the close relationship between allegory and type. The roots of the Greek term derive from the words *allos*, other, and *agoreuein*, to speak.[23] While the first known use of *allegoreo* dates probably from the 3rd century BC the term did not become common until in the 1st century BC.[24] The verb "to allegorize" derives from the Hellenistic period and from Cynic-Stoic philosophy; among the Greeks the practice of allegorical exposition was chiefly used for reinterpretations of myths and Homeric tales of

[21] Von Rad 366.
[22] See for example Goppelt's discussion, 251ff. He nevertheless concludes that despite the significant differences "the typology of Hb. agrees with that of Paul, though its development is original and the only relationship is through the gen. tradition of primitive Christianity" (258).
[23] Whitman, Jon, "Allegory," *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics,* eds. Alex Preminger, T.V.F. Brogan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) 31.
[24] Hanson 38.

the gods which were considered offensive.[25] "Philo and Heracleitus are the first authors to use the noun in the meaning of 'figurative interpretation of an authoritative text.'" [26] Originally, then, allegory was a method of interpretation. Copeland and Struck explain that while the term "allegory" denotes both a method of interpretation and a mode of writing, it is the former practice, allegorical interpretation as a "search for esoteric truths," [27] which emerged first, even before it was called allegory: "the central concepts of ancient allegorical reading are represented in a cluster of terms: 'symbol' (*symbolon*), *hyponoia* ('under-meaning'), and 'enigma' (*aenigma*)."[28] It was only later that allegory came to denote a poetical practice. So, for example, in the 1st century AD Demetrius in *On Style* "commends allegory as a useful way of conveying meaning darkly, and especially menacing meaning" and Quintilian defines it as "sustained metaphor."[29] Copeland and Struck explain the shift from the philosophical to the rhetorical dimension of allegory by a semantic difference between the Greek and the Latin use of the term:

> In Roman times, the Greek term *allêgoria* came to substitute for the term *hyponoia*, that is, "other-speaking" for "under-standing" . . . the conceptual shift from "meaning" (*hyponoia*) to "speaking" (*allêgoria*) also paved the way for the reception of the Greek term in Latin, where its emphasis on the text as "speaking" rather than merely "meaning" allowed the Latin term *allegoria* to gravitate into the orbit of the rhetoricians . . .

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[25] Büchsel, Friedrich, "Allegoreo," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament,* ed. Gerhard Kittel, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromley, Volume 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964) 260.
[26] Hanson 39.
[27] Copeland, Rita and Peter T. Struck, Introduction, *The Cambridge Companion to Allegory,* eds. Rita Copeland and Peter T. Struck (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 3.
[28] Ibid., 2.
[29] Hanson 38.

> Thus it was that allegory, which had begun in philosophy, moved into poetics.[30]

Later medieval Christian thinkers, as the semantic history of the term was unknown to them, understood the double valence of allegory as a "distinction between sacred meaning and human language, or sometimes between sacred and secular texts."[31]

Although scholars disagree to what extent Christian allegory was an original development or a specific continuation of certain allegorical traditions, the roots of Christian allegorical exegesis are clearly in Palestinian and Greek traditions. That allegorical exposition was practiced in Jewish scribal circles is evident from the canonicity of the Song of Solomon; "only by means of allegorising could this collection of love songs be understood as a representation of the love which binds Israel to God."[32] Hanson adds that in rabbinic interpretations allegorizing was an established practice; evidence suggests, however, that it was not a major development but a rather early phenomenon which was later discouraged.[33]

There existed two traditions of Greek allegorizing: the Alexandrian allegory (with Philo as the chief representative) and Hellenistic allegory (as found for example in Stoic defenses of Homer in the 4th and 3rd century BC). According to Hanson, Alexandrian allegory was derived from Hellenistic allegory; Palestinian allegory, however, developed independently of the Hellenistic tradition: "they belong to quite different cultural traditions, and we can account for their historical origins quite independently of each other."[34] Christian allegory, in Hanson's argument, developed from the rabbinical allegory and Messianic

[30] Copeland and Struck 4.
[31] Ibid., 5.
[32] Büchsel 262.
[33] Hanson 33ff.
[34] Ibid., 64.

interpretations; it appeared "as a by-product, rather tentative and sparse, of Christian typology."[35]

Contrary to Hanson's contention, Büchsel holds that Jewish allegory developed directly out of the Greek tradition. The first Jew who is known to have practiced allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament was Aristobulus (2nd century BC): "It can hardly be doubted that he took over the allegorical method from the Greeks, for he is saturated with Greek culture and uses the same method to interpret Greek poetry."[36] The difference between Palestinian allegory and Greek allegory is only a "difference of degree," not of principle, according to Büchsel; in Palestinian allegory "the distance between the literal meaning and the allegorical is much less." [37] Allegorical interpretation of the Bible then grew in prominence from the work of Aristobulus to the time of Philo and became an important tool in the hands of the early Christian writers.

Allegory is found also in the canonical texts of the New Testament, though commentators agree that in a lesser degree than typology. One particular case in I Corinthians 9:9 is mentioned by Barr, as quoted above. Hanson points out that there are allegorical interpretations of some of Jesus' parables in the gospels;[38] Büchsel finds "no allegorical handling of Scripture either in the Synoptic sayings of Jesus or in John" but agrees that there are several examples of Paul's allegorizing in I Corinthians.[39] He describes Paul's allegorizing as closer to the Palestinian kind than to the Greek allegory and sees, questionably, the allegory of the New Testament as a "new beginning in this field which

[35] Ibid., 125.
[36] Büchsel 260.
[37] Ibid., 262.
[38] Hanson 76.
[39] Büchsel 263.

demonstrates the independence of Christianity."[40]

Among the non-canonical writers, the degree of allegorizing varied and not all of them embraced the possibilities of allegorical interpretation. Büchsel holds that Philo, for example, held a middle position; the literal sense of Scripture was essential for him but compared to the allegorical exposition it was subordinate.[41] From Philo the allegorical hermeneutic passes to Clement of Alexandria who sees "the text of Scripture as containing hidden meaning everywhere" and then to Origen who has an even stronger tendency to "undermine historical narratives by allegory."[42] It was Origen who most influentially divided the meaning of Scripture into three senses. The literal is the least important; moral exegesis is higher. Higher yet, and accessible only to some, is the third allegorical level, spiritual or mystical. Some passages should be interpreted only spiritually, other texts can be interpreted on all three levels. Hanson notes, however, that in practical exegesis Origen often found it impossible to maintain the distinction between the moral and the spiritual sense.[43]

Origen's hermeneutic set the tone for much of typological and allegorical exegesis of the Latin Fathers from Augustine to Aquinas and his influence continued throughout the Middle Ages.[44] His threefold exegesis was later developed by Jerome and Augustine into the fourfold method, adding the anagogical (eschatological) sense. Although the Fathers of the Antiochian tradition insisted on the literal meaning of Scripture and some (e.g., Chrysostom)

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[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid., 261-262.
[42] Hanson 117, 120.
[43] Ibid., 239, 243.
[44] Heller 58. The following example taken from Augustine's interpretation of the parable of the Good Samaritan gives an idea of the kind of exegesis made possible by allegorical interpretation: "The man is Adam; Jericho is the moon, and signifies our mortality, which waxes and wanes; the thieves are the devil and his angels; the beast upon which the wounded man is set is the flesh of the incarnation, and so on" (Barr 106-107).

attempted to distinguish between legitimate types and misleading allegories,[45] the allegorical tradition of the Latin Fathers prevailed:

> Types continue to appear, of course, in the works of the succeeding commentators, particularly in relation to the literal sense. In general, however, the typological reading is allotted only a minor role in such exegesis; further, when related to the "higher" senses of scripture, it is ordinarily subordinated to the "spiritual" interpretation or so completely absorbed in it, that, in fact, typology ceases to exist, in the historical New Testament pattern at any rate.[46]

Scholastic authors were particularly concerned with the correct classification of the levels of meaning of Scripture and three or four senses of biblical passages were firmly distinguished. Allegorical methods were thus widely used until the Reformation rejected them; no theological school has continued to develop allegorical hermeneutic since that time.[47]

There are various criteria according to which scholars have attempted to define type and allegory and distinguish them in their use in the early times of Christian hermeneutic. For some typology is a distinctly Hebrew way of thinking and relates essentially to an understanding of history while allegory is associated with Greek thought and timeless, Platonic correspondences. In his overview of Origen scholarship, for example, Joseph Trigg mentions that the criticism of Origen's allegedly Platonic reinterpretation of the Bible is in many cases based on the assumption that Greek and Hebrew thought are "distinct and

[45] Davis 26.
[46] Ibid., 21.
[47] Heller 58-59.

antithetical."[48] In the same vein, Lampe writes:

> If it can be claimed for typology, in the sense of the recognition of historical correspondences, that it is grounded upon the Biblical writers' own understanding of history, allegory must be referred to Hellenistic ideas about the correspondence of the earthly order as the shadow with the intelligible sphere as the reality, to the Alexandrian tradition of the moralizing allegorization of the Homeric poems, and to a lesser extent to Rabbinic exegesis with its disregard of the context and the original meaning of proof-texts.[49]

Such schematic distinctions beg the question. Büchsel criticizes such attempts, saying that they "miss the decisive point" which is "the attitude to the Greek Enlightenment and its biblical criticism. Philo was open to this, though not without reservations; the Palestinians were closed to it, though not completely."[50]

But historicity indeed seems to be the distinguishing feature of the type, according to many scholars. Woollcombe offers the following distinction between typology and allegory:

> Typological exegesis is the search for linkages between events, persons or things *within the historical framework of revelation*, whereas allegorism is the search for a secondary and hidden meaning underlying the primary and obvious meaning of a narrative. This secondary sense of a narrative,

[48] Trigg, Joseph W., Introduction, Hanson xii.
[49] Lampe and Woollcombe 32.
[50] Büchsel 262.

> discovered by allegorism, does not necessarily have any connexion at all with the historical framework of revelation.[51]

With less emphasis on the historical framework, Hanson offers the following distinction between typology and allegory:

> Typology is the interpreting of an event belonging to the present or the recent past as the fulfillment of a similar situation recorded in Scripture. Allegory is the interpretation of an object or person or a number of objects and persons as in reality meaning some object or person of a later time, with no attempt made to trace a relationship of "similar situation" between them. [52]

Hanson's attention to "similarity" as the touchstone of typology seems at first to be an important emphasis but later in his study he follows the focus on the historical nature of the type as its primary characteristic, as is evident from the way he contrasts allegorical approaches of the Hellenistic and the Alexandrian tradition to typology. Both differ from typology by being unhistorical, their "ultimate aim is to empty the text of any particular connection with historical events."[53]

In some views of typology and allegory, the difference is sought in the consequences of the method for the literal meaning of Scripture. For example to distinguish Palestinian allegory from the Alexandrian tradition, Hanson states that "rabbinic allegory is

[51] Lampe and Woollcombe 40; original emphasis.
[52] Hanson 7.
[53] Ibid., 63.

characterized by the fact that it never for a moment impugns the validity of the literal sense. Behind Alexandrian allegory lies the assumption that the allegorical sense is the deeper, more important one, to which the literal is only the shell or outer part."[54] Woollcombe notes that the shift in the sub-apostolic age toward Hellenistic Platonism took place under the influence of Gnosticism: "Gnosticism affected historical typology because of its contempt for the historical value of Scripture. The plain sense of Scripture was considered suitable only for beginners—the simple faithful; the deeper allegorical sense was for the true Gnostics—the fully initiated."[55]

No conclusive definition of the distinction between type and allegory in the beginnings of Christian figurative interpretations seems to come out of the attempts mentioned; rather than consensus there are varying perspectives. A similar situation prevails among modern theologians who attempt to find grounds for rejecting, accepting or redefining typology. This is not merely an antiquarian interest; the reason why typology is still in debate in theology is that it touches one of the central issues of the Christian faith: the continuity between the Old and New Testaments and the ways in which the Old Testament is appropriated in Christianity. It is unnecessary here to follow the details of the theological debate[56] but it will be interesting to consider at least two examples of twentieth-century Protestant attempts to redefine typology and give it new content.

Gerhard von Rad gives the following perceptive assessment of the theological history of typology which deserves to be quoted at some length:

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[54] Ibid., 25.
[55] Lampe and Woollcombe 70.
[56] The main positions are conveniently summarized in Tibor Fabiny's overview of the typological debate in 20th century theology in his article "Typology: Pros and Cons in Biblical Hermeneutics and Literary Criticism (From Leonhard Goppelt to Northrop Frye)." Fabiny focuses exclusively on Protestant authors.

Allegorical exegesis of the Old Testament, which first occurred in the early post-Apostolic age and later became the most dominant method used in the West because of the work of Augustine, ended with the Reformation and the subsequent return to an attempt to understand the historical sense of scripture. It was at that time too that the typological method of Scriptural exposition began to be distinguished from the allegorical; and during the seventeenth century it took on a new lease of life, more from the support of Calvin's followers than Luther's (Cocceius). Its subsequent decay is an interesting phenomenon of in the history of thought. The damage was not so much due to the way in which it was allowed to run wild, *i.e.*, by the fanciful production of extremely far-fetched "types." . . . In the secular world . . . classical and historical scholarship had by now begun to undermine the old idea of saving history. Typology began unconsciously to alter completely. It more and more lost its old connexion with historical facts and concerned itself . . . with "the general truths of religion," which were regarded as "symbolically set forth for all time" in the Old Testament. Typology thus turned into a general study of symbols and pictures, and so it is understandable that Herder could enthusiastically appeal to "the Bible's finest branch of study," namely its symbolism. At this juncture then, there was not the least concern for the special phenomena in the saving history, but only for the light which the symbolic language of the Bible threw on man in general. . . . This borrowing from general philosophy was fatal to the final phase of the typological exposition of the Old Testament; for, once the

> "organic view of history" was shown to be a philosophic fiction, the basis of typology was completely destroyed.[57]

Although von Rad finds that typology as has been practiced over the centuries of Christian exegesis is no longer tenable, rather than dismissing typology completely or defending its alleged "scriptural basis" he defends the principle of typology by defining it as a form of analogy: "typological thinking is in itself very far from being an esoteric form of proof which belongs only to theology. It rises out of man's universal effort to understand the phenomena about him on the basis of concrete analogies, an effort to which both philosophers and poets of every age have devoted themselves."[58] At the same time he is persuaded that there really is a unique link between the Old and the New Testament. He defines it as an analogy between "the saving events in both Testaments"; the correspondences, however, go "far beyond the purely formal establishment of a general structural analogy" and are unique to the two Testaments: "Within the orbit of the word of God addressed to Israel there are constant occurrences—promises, calls, acts of rejection, of judgment and guidance, of comfort and trial—which are absolutely without analogy in the religions and cultures of Israel's environment, but which correspond to the saving events of the New Testament."[59]

As a second and last example of a more sustained contemporary theological engagement with typology, the work of Jan Heller may be mentioned. Heller too attempts to rewrite the discredited kind of typology in his Christology of the Old Testament. He

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[57] Von Rad 366-367.
[58] Ibid., 364.
[59] Ibid., 363.

contrasts the flawed "jesusology"[60] with his theory of God's condescension, criticizing the former for being necessarily arbitrary: "The fundamental shortcoming of the typological method is the fact that the decision remains in the hands of the exegete; he determines what and where the type and antitype are."[61] As the basis for the theological connection of the two Testaments Heller proposes a continuity of God's condescension; this leads him to rewrite Calvin's teaching of the three offices of Christ, the backbone of Reformation typology (Luther propounded two offices of Christ which secure the connection between the Old and the New Testament: priest and king; Calvin added the third office of prophet). Heller proposes to connect the three offices with a theology of the cross to highlight a different set of continuities: instead of priest Christ the sacrifice, instead of king Christ the servant, and instead of prophet/lawgiver Christ the condemned.

Although the height of the theological debate on typology as a hermeneutic approach is probably over Heller's more recent work confirms once more that typology is related to issues which are at the heart of Scriptural interpretation. In this sense typology will remain involved in theological arguments. On a broader level, typology draws attention to questions of text interpretation in general and to itself as a rhetorical device and interpretative strategy.

Typology and the Puritans

Returning to a context more immediately pertinent to Edwards, closer attention must be paid to the treatment of typology and allegorical interpretation of Scripture in the Reformation and particularly in the Puritan tradition. In the 15th and 16th centuries, the allegorical

[60] "This is my, deliberately ugly, word for that kind of teaching or that kind of approach in which links are sought between the human features of Jesus and various Old Testament characters or between the experiences of an Old Testament character and Jesus Christ" (65; my translation).
[61] 66; my translation.

tradition came under criticism of the Reformers. Luther and Calvin, and also Tyndale in England, opposed the alleged denigration of the literal sense in allegorizing. They replaced the fourfold method with a notion of a twofold sense of Scripture, literal-historical and spiritual, conceding that New Testament writers themselves sometimes used allegory but rejecting a pervasive allegorical hermeneutic as merely a human contrivance and misinterpretation of the Word. For Luther typology was a way of linking the literal and the spiritual sense, with Christ as the focal point which necessarily connects the Old and the New Testament. However, as Barbara Kiefer Lewalski explains: "the mode of that signifying is no longer a separable spiritual or prophetic sense; rather it is an integral part of the literal-historical meaning of the text, which contains as its prophetic dimension figures and promises referred to the future for their clarification and fulfillment."[62]

Similarly to Luther, Calvin insisted on a simple twofold meaning of Scripture and understood types to have been fulfilled in Christ. However, unlike Luther, Calvin "regarded both the Old and New Testaments as a prefiguration of the spiritual kingdom that was to come and thus released to Puritanism a view of the Bible filled with prophetic and eschatological symbols."[63] Herein consists an important change brought about by the Reformation, as Lewalski points out: "In the usual medieval conception, Old Testament personages and typical things are merely literal signs, shadows, or corporal figures, important only as they point to the substance, the body, the spiritual reality found solely in Christ and the New Testament."[64] For Protestants, however, the fulfillment of the types is not only in the incarnate Christ and the gospel but also in the Christ of the Second Coming: "Protestants

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[62] Lewalski, Barbara Kiefer, *Protestant Poetics and the Seventeenth-Century Religious Lyric* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) 118.
[63] Lowance, Mason I., *The Language of Canaan: Metaphor and Symbol in New England from the Puritans to the Transcendentalists* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 1980) 26.
[64] *Poetics* 125-126.

saw the spiritual situation of Christians to be notably advantaged by the New Covenant but not different in *essence* from that of the Old Testament people, since both alike depended on signs which will be fulfilled in Christ at the end of time."[65]

Influenced more directly by Calvin than by Luther, the English Puritans adopted Calvin's slightly different treatment of typological interpretation and carried it even further. John Wilson shows that while the Swiss theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth century increasingly used typology, they did so "always within a conservative framework" in which types pointed to and were fulfilled in Christ; a more significant expansion of typology began in the theology of English and Scottish Protestants.[66] By expanding the principle of typology to contemporary world, these theologians were able to see connections between their own situation and the events described in Scripture. It was this particular exegetical practice that inspired the Puritans to see continuity between themselves as a group and the Old Testament Israel, to interpret events of their life and society through the prism of typology and find their spiritual meaning by analogy to biblical stories.

The Puritans continued to distinguish hermeneutically between types and allegories. While they focused closely on the former, they were suspicious of the latter interpretations. Typology was believed to be part of God's revelation in Scripture, as Lewalski summarizes the position of Samuel Mather: "types differ from arbitrary similes and comparisons (such as the comparison of the union of Christ and the Church to marriage) by reason of their divine institution to foreshadow Christ and his benefits, and from parables and allegories by reason of their historical reality."[67] Toward allegory they were distrustful. They agreed that some parts of Scripture were allegorical (Canticles, Revelation) but this acknowledgment never

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[65] Ibid.; original emphasis.
[66] Wilson, John F., Editor's Introduction, *A History of the Work of Redemption, WJE* 9: 46.
[67] *Poetics* 124.

lead to complex spiritualizing or disregard for the literal meaning of the kind which appeared in the allegorical interpretations of the Alexandrian tradition.[68] Lewalski adds: "Protestant theory generally eschewed the concept of a pervasive allegorical and spiritual sense, and sought rather to define allegory as a literary mode invoked at particular times for special reason."[69] For this reason, the Puritans were particularly ready to criticize the papist teaching of the fourfold method and fanciful allegorical interpretations common among some of the sophisticated Anglican clergy. In his successful Reformed preaching manual called *The Arte of Prophecying* (1607 in English) the moderate Puritan William Perkins proclaims: "But this here deuice of the fourfold meaning must be exploded and rejected. THERE IS ONE ONLIE SENSE, AND THE SAME IS THE LITERALL. An Allegorie is onely a certaine manner of vttering the same sense. The Analogue and Tropologie are waies, whereby the sense may be applied." At the same time he insisted on a "mysterious dimension in Scripture, explicable only through the 'analogy of faith'";[70] this would in no way undermine or remove the literal sense. For his contemporary in the separatist camp, Henry Ainsworth, too, "the figurative reading did not replace or invalidate the literal but enriched and amplified it."[71]

This shows that the Reformed understanding of the literal sense was in fact quite complex. Following Calvin, "Calvinists customarily distinguished typological meaning from allegory and all other figurative modes in Scripture, identifying it as part of the full or entire or perfect literal sense—the symbolic dimension of the literal sense which, in the course of time, is uncovered and fulfilled."[72] Brian Cummings argues that even Perkins with all his

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[68] Rowe, Karen E., *Saint and Singer: Edward Taylor's Typology and the Poetics of Meditation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986) 11.
[69] *Poetics* 122.
[70] Qtd. in Lowance, *Canaan* 28, 29.
[71] Ibid., 32.
[72] Lewalski, *Poetics* 120.

outspoken defense of the literal sense presses his understanding of it to include allegorical, anagogical and tropological meanings as "simply 'applied' forms of the same, single, literal sense" to such an extent that he nearly empties the distinction, despite insisting on its validity.[73]

The considerable number of Puritan works which appeared in the 17th century and which were devoted specifically to typology suggests how important and how popular the discipline was. A select list of titles[74] illustrates what typology was meant to secure, namely a correct understanding of the supernatural links between the two Testaments: William Guild's *Moses Unveiled: Or, those Figures Which Served unto the patterne and shaddow of heavenly things pointing out the Messiah Jesus Christ* (1620); Thomas Taylor's *Christ Revealed; or, the Old Testament Explained* (1635); Henry Vertue's *Christ and the Church: or Parallels* (1659); Benjamin Keach's *Tropologia: A Key To Open Scripture-Metaphors* (1681); and Samuel Mather's *The Figures or Types of the Old Testament by which Christ and the Heavenly Things of the Gospel were Preached and Shadowed to the People of God of Old* (1683). These reformed theologians understood types and their fulfillment historically but they did not seek typological significance in every Old Testament detail. Samuel Mather, for example, explains that a typological interpretation is appropriate only in those cases when the Scriptures themselves provide it, when there is a permutation of names (Christ called the second Adam) or when "by comparing several Scriptures together, there doth appear *an evident and manifest* Analogy *and parallel between Things under the Law, and things under the Gospel.*"[75]

Besides its hermeneutic use in interpreting the Old Testament, typology also played an important role in other areas of Puritan theology. It was "an integral part of covenant

[73] Cummings, Brian, "Protestant Allegory," Copeland and Struck 184, 185.
[74] Based on Rowe 8.
[75] Qtd. in Rowe 9.

theology" and was crucial to the "historical and theological defenses of the New England Way."[76] Typology had also implications for ecclesiology: one of the issues raised by typology was the question of the efficacy of the types. On the one hand, the fulfillment of Old Testament types in Christ meant the nullification of Old Testament ceremonies in the church, on the other hand the Puritans asserted continuing relevance of at least some types for the spiritual life of the believer. Their solution lay in distinguishing between the temporal relevance of Old Testament figures, foreshadowing the new dispensation in Christ, and the eternal validity of God's dispensations, "that is, whereas the ceremonies as rites were to be abolished in worship among the Puritans because they had been abrogated by the coming of the flesh, their figural significance might be viewed differently if they were also regarded to be metaphors of the process of salvation, abrogated temporally but verifiable eternally."[77]

From a different angle, the Puritan attitude toward type and allegory belongs also to the wider context of their understanding of rhetoric and its connection to homiletics. For the Puritans, there existed serious theological reasons to study the rhetorical features of the Bible: "the Reformation focus upon the literal text led Calvin and his English followers to pay the closest attention to the tropes and figures of Scripture as the very vehicle of the Holy Ghost. Tropes are now perceived as God's chosen formulation of his revealed truth which man must strive to understand rightly, in themselves, and not as a stimulus to a higher vision."[78] So Calvin opposed the Catholic teaching of transsubstantiation by accusing the Catholics of being, wrongly, literalists in their interpretation of Christ's words about his body and blood.[79] Lewalski highlights the many instances in which the Bible was treated as a handbook of

[76] Rowe 20, 21.
[77] Lowance, *Canaan* 38.
[78] Lewalski, *Poetics* 77.
[79] Ibid.

rhetoric, *ars rhetoricae*, its tropes and style subject to close scrutiny and held up as example to preachers and also as an example of the highest rhetorical and stylistic qualities in general. The various genres of the biblical books were the subject of theoretical discussions and Protestant poetics derived to a great extent from discussions and paraphrases of the Book of Psalms.[80]

Much has been said about the "plain style" of the Puritans and their alleged rejection of rhetoric; it is important to understand, however, that what Puritan authors rejected was not so much rhetoric in itself as what they feared was an extravagant use of rhetorical embellishment and the confusion of rhetoric and "sound meaning." Janice Knight in *Orthodoxies in Massachusetts* has moreover shown convincingly that a portrait of the plain style as the unified code of Puritan homiletic does not reflect the various emphases and preaching styles that existed within Puritanism and is misleading. Lewalski stresses that there were stronger similarities between Anglican and Puritan notions of preaching than there were differences, especially because both parties shared a common fundamental source, Augustine's *De Doctrina Christiana*, where minor importance is allowed to rhetoric and eloquence, although the supreme emphasis is on a correct explication of the Scriptures. The stricter Puritans were more radically dismissive of theology (in Perkins' view, for example, "the preacher becomes the vehicle for that power [resident in the Word itself] precisely as he avoids any display of rhetoric"[81]), while the moderate Puritans, together with moderate Anglicans, argued for a modest use of rhetoric and learning in preaching.

Exemplifying the Puritan immersion in such debates, Cotton Mather's handbook *Manuductio ad Ministerium* (1726), which exercised considerable influence in New England,

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[80] *Poetics* 72ff, 31ff, 213ff.
[81] *Poetics* 225.

explains the mentor's opinions on rhetoric to future ministers thus:

> Instead of Squandering away your Time, on the RHETORIC . . . and upon all the *Tropes* and *Schemes* . . . the very Possession whereof usually is little more than to furnish out a *Stage-Player*; My Advice to you, is, That you observe the Flowres and Airs of such *Writings*, as are most in Reputation for their *Elegancy*. Yet I am willing that you should attentively Read over Smith, his, *Mystery of Rhetoric Unveiled*, that you may not be Ignorant of what *Figures* they pretend unto.
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> But I will take this Opportunity to tell you, That there is no where to be found any such *Rhetoric*, as there is in our *Sacred Scriptures*. Even a Pagan *Longinus* himself, will confess, The *Sublime*, shining in them. There can be nothing so *Beautiful*, or so *Affectuous* as the *Figures* every where used in them. They are *Life*. All meer *Humane Flourishes* are but *Chaff* to the *Wheat* that is there. Yea, they are *as Hammer that breaks the Rocks to Pieces*. In them the *GOD of Glory thunders*, yea, does it very *marvellously*![82]

The goal of such preaching style was to let the miraculous beauties of Scripture shine forth unencumbered by the necessarily inferior human wit. If human rhetoric was to be kept in the service of the rhetoric of Scriptures this itself was, of course, a rhetorical strategy, to help in the minister's most important task (in which appropriate figures of speech and style were, as Mather's own text proves, permissible and desirable): "with all possible Dexterity spread *the*

[82] Mather, Cotton, *Manuductio ad Ministerium: Directions for the Candidate of the Ministry*, 1726, biographical note by Thomas J. Holmes and Kenneth B. Murdock (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), 34-35.

Nets of Salvation . . . set the *Truths* on *Fire* . . . and let them come *Flaming* out of your Hand with Excitations to some *Devotion* and *Affection* of Godliness, into the *Hearts* of those whom they are address'd unto."[83]

Jonathan Edwards' father Timothy, who as a student sat under Increase and Cotton Mathers' pulpit at the First Church of Boston, structured his sermons into numberless heads and subheads and yet at times employed "a highly emotional language"[84] and Jonathan's grandfather Solomon Stoddard evocatively thundered fire and brimstone from the pulpit as an act of compassion to sinners heading to hell.[85] Clearly, the goal was not always to eradicate eloquence by the plainest style possible. The difficulty that Puritans had with rhetoric lay in distinguishing properly between the uses of language and employing rhetorical devices only within the limits felt to be appropriate, using rhetoric as a tool in the service of homiletic goals. For this reason too it was so important to distinguish between types and human allegories and to define how types could be correctly discovered and interpreted so that God's Word would not be thwarted by human invention.

From a yet broader perspective, Lewalski provides a rich overview of the various traditions which contributed to the Puritan religious culture; although her focus is on the Puritan religious lyric, the background she gives is equally useful for a consideration of the contexts of Puritan typology. In fact, Lewalski discusses typology precisely as one of the key elements of the Puritan, and generally Protestant, tradition. Apart from the engagements with rhetoric and the rhetoric of the Bible, she also highlights some "ancillary genres" which helped to create the environment for the Protestant lyric; they include Protestant

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[83] Ibid., 104-105.
[84] Minkema, Kenneth P., "The Edwardses: A Ministerial Family in Eighteenth-Century New England," diss. (University of Connecticut, 1988) 79.
[85] Marsden 119-120.

meditations and emblem books, and these particularly deserve to be noted in the context of Puritan typology.

Of the several kinds of Protestant meditation, "meditation beginning from the creatures" is particularly interesting, especially in connection to Edwards' natural typology, as there are many similarities between them. Such meditation was not a uniquely Protestant invention but it differed from the allegorizations of medieval bestiaries and from the "notion of a meditative scale of ascent from the creatures, to man, to God himself."[86] The texts could take their starting point either directly in nature or in creatures as they were mentioned in Scripture. Sometimes nature served as a "rich source of moral lessons and *exempla* which the meditator should derive and apply to his own life";[87] sometimes nature was seen as endowed with a symbolical meaning and read "as a true manifestation or revelation of God (*vestigia Dei*), invested with spiritual significance which the meditator does not piously devise but rather discovers,"[88] a point very similar to Edwards' theory of natural typology, as will be seen later.

The other element in the tradition, emblematics, was likewise shared broadly across the spectrum of Christian traditions; it also existed in many secular forms. The Renaissance tradition of emblem books originates from the rhetorical traditions (emblems as epigrams, contrived conceits) and from Neoplatonic roots and contemporary scholarly interest in Egyptian hieroglyphs. Religious emblem books were a slightly later development which came only after the emergence of natural, historical and moral emblems. The first sacred emblems appeared just a few decades after the publication of what is considered the very first emblem book, Alciati's *Emblematum liber* (1531). Interestingly, they were written by Protestant

[86] *Poetics* 162.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid., 164.

authors: Georgette de Montenay created *Emblemes, ou Devices Chrestiennes* (1571) and John van der Noot compiled *A Theatre for Worldlings* (1568, 1569). The religious emblem books then flourished especially in the seventeenth century, often "produced by a simple transformation of characteristic figures from the love emblem books."[89] Many of them were written by Jesuit authors; Protestants either produced their own or modified the Catholic collections, with significant differences. Probably the most popular Protestant emblem book, Francis Quarles' *Emblemes* (1635), was a reworking of two sources, the Jesuit emblem book *Pia Desideria* by Hermannus Hugo and Philippe de Malery's *Typus Mundi.* This new emblematic tradition abandoned the earlier roots of the genre:

> The sacred-emblem books, especially books by Protestants, moved resolutely away from Neoplatonic esotericism. These theorists did, however, reinforce the view of emblems as grounded in the divine order of things rather than simply in the conceits of the human wit—that is, as symbols, or allegories found, not made. They did this, however, on a biblical ground, reinforcing from the story of the creation the conception of nature as God's emblematics.[90]

The conviction that emblematic connections are "found, not made" bears, again, a strong resemblance to Edwards' typological theory.

In an important reminder to literary scholars who are "almost exclusively interested in printed emblems" and who "tend to regard the emblem as an illustrated form of allegory"

[89] Ibid., 184.
[90] Ibid., 185.

Peter Daly explains that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emblem books were but one part of a much broader emblematic tradition which comprised "notably portraits and paintings, wall decorations (painted cloths and tapestries), embroidery, stained glass, carvings, jewelry and the like. These manifestations of the emblem art were probably more numerous and influential than were the books of emblems, especially in England."[91] Emblem books in English, moreover, "are an extremely small, derivative and unrepresentative sample of the European emblem tradition."[92]

Emblematics even in its textual variety ought to be understood more broadly than a certain kind of graphic-literary art. Daly makes two important observations:

> German scholars view the emblem as both an art form and a mode of thought. As an art form it properly denotes the combination of graphic pictures with verbal text. This combination is based upon the symbolic value of the object, figure, scene or action depicted by the picture. As a distinct mode of thought the emblem has its intellectual origins in medieval traditions of exegesis on the one hand and in the Renaissance fascination with hieroglyphics on the other; and like iconography, it depends upon a shared knowledge of concepts associated with motifs and things.[93]

Emblematics was a "mode of thought," then, which developed in close connection to

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[91] Daly, Peter M., "Shakespeare and the Emblem: The Use of Evidence and Allegory in Establishing Iconographic and Emblematic Effects in the Plays," *Shakespeare and the Emblem: Studies in Renaissance Iconography and Iconology,* ed. Tibor Fabiny (Szeged: Attila József University, 1984) 153-154.
[92] Ibid., 156.
[93] Ibid., 119.

biblical exegesis. Karl Keller's observation that typology was, by Edwards' times, a structure of thought rather than a set of theological ideas,[94] creates interesting connections in this context. While typology is much older than the Renaissance emblem tradition, in this light it would be mistaken to ask whether in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries emblematics was a genre ancillary to typology or whether typology was secondary to emblematics. Rather there appears to be a close proximity of emblematics and typology, each influencing and feeding into the other.

This understanding of typology as a mode of thought also helps to explain the changes typology underwent in the Puritan tradition. While the Puritans wished to separate typology from other figurative methods of interpretation, typology itself branched out into several kinds. In American intellectual history and in the history of American literature the New England Puritans are particularly known for a kind of typology which has been called "developmental" or "recapitulative" typology.[95] This was based on Calvin's theory, as mentioned above; it was a method of finding parallels between biblical events and contemporary history. The term "developmental" typology was coined by Sacvan Bercovitch who offered a useful distinction between "correlative" and "developmental" typology. The latter kind

> related Old Testament figures not only to the Incarnation but to the Second Coming. Thus typical objects, institutions, and events . . . come to pre-figure end-time events as well as aspects of the story of Christ. This

[94] Keller, Karl, "Alephs, Zahirs, and the Triumph of Ambiguity: Typology in Nineteenth-Century American Literature," *Literary Uses of Typology from the Late Middle Ages to the Present*, ed. Earl Miner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977) 276.
[95] See Lowance, *Canaan* 62.

> historiographic view is complemented by the static biographical parallelism offered by correlative typology, in which the focus is not primarily upon Christ but upon certain Old Testament heroes.[96]

That this open, eschatological dimension of typology should develop from the strictly biblical focus of the Puritans is perhaps not surprising since it is essentially an extension of one and the same theoretical principle which combines the traditional typological interpretations of the Old Testament, prophecy and millenial expectation, and this in an era when the standard practice was to interpret the book of Revelation as describing, in symbols and images, real historical events which will sooner or later take place on earth.

It was this protuberance of exegetical typology into contemporary life and history that enabled the New England Puritans, famously, to speak of themselves as the new Israel and of the New World as Canaan. Rowe notes that "Puritan historians fluctuated between applying the types as parallels or models for contemporary events and outright claims of New England's antitypal fulfillments despite an acknowledgment of Christ's antitypal abrogations."[97] The range of such developmental typology was broad, from merely illustrative correspondences in stories of exemplary saints to the belief that the experiences of the New England Puritans and prospects for the future blessing in the New World were really antitypical fulfillments of biblical shadows. Richard Mather writes in 1643: "Many things that literally concerned the Jewes were types and figures signifying the like things concerning the people of God in these latter days."[98] Typology of this kind was not far from prophecy.

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[96] Qtd. in Lowance, *Canaan* 33.
[97] Rowe 13.
[98] Qtd. in Rowe 13.

While typology was used as an apologetic method for the Puritan errand into the wilderness, its uses in the New World changed with the changing conditions of the Puritan society. From the high hopes of the first generation settlers typology became a source for the jeremiads in the second and third generation and again a source for the consolation and invitation to Christ's love later. Emory Elliott shows the shift in Puritan rhetoric, including the use of typology, in the New World. He argues that the second- and third-generation Puritans were struggling with fears about themselves as their society underwent a series of crucial changes and events in the second half of the 17th century which they interpreted as God's wrath and punishment. In Puritan homiletic of this period, Elliott argues, "there occurred a significant shift in typological emphasis from the Old Testament image of the angry and wrathful God the Father to the New Testament image of the gentle, loving, and protective Christ,"[99] a shift from the jeremiads lamenting the decay of the society and condemning the younger generation to the assurance and exuberance present in the homiletic of the 1690's. Elliott traces this shift even in the work of a single man, Increase Mather.

Another shift was also happening in the manner of typology. Increase Mather's brother Samuel Mather in his influential book on typology called *Figures or Types of the Old Testament* (1683) propounds a conservative Puritan typology, arguing that the type must be historically verifiable and that allegorizing of Scripture is unbiblical. He distinguishes between "personal" and "real" types; the latter are either occasional or perpetual but both kinds have also moral value and ought to be used as examples. In stark contrast to Mather's *Figures or Types* but also very popular was an earlier work, John Flavel's *Husbandry*

[99] Elliott, Emory, "From Father to Son: The Evolution of Typology in Puritan New England," Miner 208.

Spiritualized (1669). Flavel's business is to discover spiritual significances of husbandry and nature; his method is the opposite of the conservative search for typological correspondences in Scripture. Flavel does not proceed from antitype to type, as conservative exegetes would do, looking first at Christ and then finding typical prefigurations in the Old Testament. Rather, he starts from the work of farming and proceeds to find spiritual analogies which would suit it, effectually spiritualizing nature.[100]

All these sources must be taken into account as the background of Edwards' own development of typology. Wallace Anderson emphasizes that Edwards' typology developed, besides the Reformed and Puritan traditions, also in the context of debates with deists and under the influences of Edwards' reading in Newton and his own metaphysical speculations, possibly even his interest in Kabbalah.[101] Edwards' texts which deal with typology present a range of approaches, from the very traditional correspondences between the Old and the New Testament and typological prefigurations of Christ in "Types of the Messiah" to the radical demand in the "Types" notebook to expand the search for types beyond Scripture precisely because authors of biblical books themselves use and rely on analogy and types. Edwards never published a treatise which would deal specifically with typology but he kept several private notebooks on that topic, including the theoretical "Types" notebook and its practical companion piece, "Images of Divine Things" where he practiced a typological approach to nature.[102]

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[100] Lowance, *Canaan* 57-88.

[101] See Anderson, Wallace E., Editor's Introduction to "Images of Divine Things" and "Types," *Typological Writings, WJE* 11: 11-33.

[102] Other typological texts are "Types of the Messiah" and "Harmony of the Old and New Testaments."

Typology in literary criticism

The proximity of typology and rhetoric, which troubled theologians for centuries, makes typology interesting for literary scholars. Even historically it would be misleading to think that typology was an exclusively theological discipline. In fact it was so pervasive that it made its way into poetry and non-theological prose. Erich Auerbach has emphasized the figural dimension of Dante's *Divine Comedy* in "Figura" but typology has been discussed in the works of many other poets, in prose fiction and in political satire. In English literature, for example, in the works of Donne, Herbert, Vaughan, Milton, and Bunyan Lewalski traces

> the emergence in seventeenth-century Protestant England of some special uses of this time-honored symbol system—to examine personal experience and the human condition in relation to certain recognized typological paradigms; to trace the "progress of the soul" of a particular speaker, or contemporary Christian individual, or historical personage; to probe the question of how to write worthy Christian poetry.[103]

She argues that this personal use of typology was deeply embedded in the Puritan teaching of the twofold sense of Scripture and that it replaced the tropological, moral level in the rejected fourfold method.[104] Steven Zwicker follows the rise and fall of political typology in Marvell, Dryden and Pope: "From Marvell to Pope, the history of types is twofold: the wide proliferation, but final discrediting, of typology as a political language, and the related narrowing of typology as a vehicle for personal praise once the individual as christic

[103] Lewalski, Barbara Kiefer, "Typological Symbolism and the 'Progress of the Soul' in Seventeenth-Century Literature," Miner 113-114.
[104] Ibid., 81.

redeemer is separated from the life of the state."[105] Paul Korshin surveys the field in his study of "abstracted typology" in England between 1650 and 1820; by "abstracted typology" he refers to a "typological mode considerably removed from *traditional* theological concerns"[106] found in non-theological texts. He argues for a considerable rise of this abstracted typology over the course of the 17th century which was due to a confusion of terminology, the politicizing of theological contexts, the post-Reformation expansion of the number of genres using typology, and theological debates about the meaning of the Old Testament. Korshin traces its developments in fables and character sketches to Wordsworth, Shelley and Blake. What unifies this abstracted typology or "prefigurative style," as Korshin calls it, is that "the language of types in this period works through a recognizable code—a type always has an antitype, an antitype always presupposes a type somewhere in its past."[107]

Standing out in the literary scholarship of the Anglo-American world is the study of typology in the literature of colonial New England. One cannot omit the looming presence of Perry Miller whose work was mentioned in the previous chapter. His edition of Edwards' *Images or Shadows of Divine Things* made the notebook available for the first time in print and sparked interest in Edwards' typology. While the theological debate about typology was particularly strong in the 1950's and 1960's, in American Studies scholarship related to typology culminated in the 1970's. Following Miller's earlier interpretation of the development from the Puritans to the Transcendentalists via Edwards Mason Lowance produced a detailed study of the changes of typology in America called *The Language of Canaan: Metaphor and Symbol in New England from the Puritans to the Transcendentalists* (1980),

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[105] Zwicker, Steven N., "Politics and Panegyric: The Figural Mode from Marvell to Pope," Miner 118-119.
[106] Korshin, Paul, "The Development of Abstracted Typology in England, 1605-1820," Miner 148; original emphasis.
[107] Ibid., 201.

focused particularly on the transformations of typology into symbolism. There exists a number of other studies and articles focused on typology in New England colonial literature; Edward Taylor and Jonathan Edwards attract particular attention for what appears to be a productive tension between conservative uses of typology and practices which deviate from the established hermeneutic traditions.[108]

Besides discovering connections to typology in literary works, literary critics also address the issue of defining the type and of the relationship between types and other tropes. In "Figura" Erich Auerbach not only gives the history of the term, as has already been quoted, he also offers the following definition of figural or typological interpretation:

> Figural interpretation establishes a connection between two events or persons, the first of which signifies not only itself but also the second, while the second encompasses or fulfills the first. The two poles of the figure are separate in time, but both, being real events or figures, are within time, within the stream of historical life. Only the understanding of the two persons or events is a spiritual act, but this spiritual act deals with concrete events whether past, present, or future, and not with concepts or abstractions; these are quite secondary, since promise and fulfillment are real historical events, which have either happened in the incarnation of the Word, or will happen in the second coming. . . . Since in figural interpretation one thing stands for another, since one thing represents and signifies the other, figural interpretation is "allegorical" in the widest sense. But it differs from most of the allegorical forms known

[108] Some of the books and articles are mentioned in various parts of this study.

> to us by the historicity both of the sign and what it signifies. Most of the allegories we find in literature or art represent a virtue (e.g., wisdom), or a passion (jealousy), an institution (justice), or at most a very general synthesis of historical phenomena (peace, the fatherland)—never a definite event in its full historicity.[109]

Type for Auerbach is a species of allegory; what distinguishes the former from the latter is the historical nature of the type. Auerbach thus locates the essential characteristic of typology in history; the distinction between typology and allegory is once again, like in the theological debates, being decided by the test of historicity.

Northrop Frye in *The Great Code*, similarly, asserts that what distinguishes the typological phase of language from the metaphorical, metonymical and descriptive phases as he presents them in his theory of the development of language, is precisely that unlike the three other phases which are "based on two units assumed to exist simultaneously . . . typology is a figure of speech that moves in time."[110] But if Frye means that merely the fact that the type and antitype are not both located in the present is what distinguishes type from metaphor and metonymy then his definition of the type is very broad indeed (and Auerbach's too). In such case, every metaphorical identification of, for example a contemporary politician with, say, Nero or Winston Churchill, would be typological. Moreover, if in typology the antitype is in some cases assumed to be eternal, then "simultaneity" is a highly problematic category.

Both Auerbach and Frye point out that typological interpretation is essentially an

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[109] Auerbach 53-54.
[110] Frye, Northrop, *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature* (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1990) 80.

interpretation of history. For Auerbach it is a method fundamentally alien to modern thinking:

> In the modern view, the provisional event is treated as a step in an unbroken historical process; in the figural system the interpretation is always sought from above; events are considered not in their unbroken relation to one another, but torn apart, individually, each in relation to something other that is promised and not yet present. Whereas in the modern view the event is always self-sufficient and secure, while the interpretation is fundamentally incomplete, in the figural interpretation the fact is subordinated to an interpretation which is fully secured to begin with: the event is enacted according to an ideal model which is a prototype situated in the future and thus far only promised.[111]

His contrast between the "modern view" and the typological understanding of history partly recalls the difficulty with typology described by von Rad and is not far from Northrop Frye's emphasis on typology as an interpretation of history:[112]

> Typology is a figure of speech that moves in time: the type exists in the past and the antitype in the present, or the type exists in the present and

[111] Auerbach 59.

[112] Frye essentially agrees with the theologians' emphasis on the uniqueness of the Jewish understanding of history: "the typological structure and shape of the Bible make its mythology diachronic, in contrast to the synchronic mythology characteristic of most of the religions outside it. This is the basis for the commonplace that Biblical religions have a distinct sense of history, to which we may add personality, as it is only within a historical context that personality can emerge" (83).

> the antitype in the future. What typology really is as a mode of thought, what it both assumes and leads to, is a theory of history, or more accurately of historical process: an assumption that there is some meaning and point to history, and that sooner or later some event or events will occur which will indicate what that meaning or point is, and so become an antitype of what has happened previously.[113]

Thus typology moves from a reading of the Bible to an understanding of history; as will be seen in Edwards, typology can easily become a very elastic theory of everything that has ever been and will be. This creates a difficulty for a rhetorical study of typology: as a mode of hermeneutic, of thought and of interpreting history typology immediately leads to theological and philosophical criticism. Despite this tendency toward theology and metaphysics, however, it is possible to study typology from a rhetorical perspective as a mode of thought. Frye puts it well: "I am concerned here with typology as a mode of thought and as a figure of speech. I say 'and,' because a mode of thought does not exist until it has developed its own particular way of arranging words. Typology is a form of rhetoric, and can be studied critically like any other form of rhetoric."[114] It is a practice which arises directly from a figurative understanding of text; a rhetorical study of the type as the pivot of typology is therefore also in place.

One of the difficulties in studying typology particularly in a literary context is a

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[113] Frye 80-81.

[114] Frye 80. Frye contrasts typology as a form of rhetoric to causality, which is also a form of rhetoric (cause can be said to be the antitype of effect). While causality is past-oriented and based on reason, typology is future-oriented and based on faith (82-83). Frye's binary opposition of typology and causality would not work for Auerbach; for Auerbach typology is not the reversal of causality but primarily the fragmentation of sequence.

confusion of terminology. Because historical authors often employ the words type, symbol, emblem, image or other terms without precise distinctions and partly interchangeably, scholars who write about typology are often compelled to begin their own work with their own definition of the type or the related terms. As a result, a great number of definitions exists in literature and probably no single one of them does justice to the many versions of typology that have existed. Indeed, rather than a single definition it will be more useful to think of typology as an area defined by the two extremes of the real, historical fulfillment of Old Testament types in Jesus and the liberal understanding in which typology amounts almost to polysemousness.[115] The purpose of this study is not, therefore, to add yet another definition, and no new definition of typology will be attempted; rather, the chapters that follow attempt to approach the rhetorical aspects of Jonathan Edwards' typology in greater complexity than a simple definition could accomplish.

[115] Miner 376-377.

Chapter 3

Edwards on Typology as Language

Monday 10th. This Day Mr. Edwards was so kind as to go with us to [a]
very high mountain in Northampton called Mount Tom, about 8
miles from his House <the way we went>; we rose I believe above seven miles, & got up Part of
the Hill without Horses with much Difficulty & Fatigue, &
then [leaving] our Horses, & went on Foot to the highest Part of the Mount[ain]
it was very steep, & full of small loose stones, which made the Ascen[t]
difficult, I found the Fatigue almost too much for me, & my
strength much spent, & a considerable Faintness, but thro' God's
Goodness I recovered my strength after I had rested at the Top of
the Mountain; & here indeed was a very beautifull Prospect, to see
the Valleys round about, the River appearing some Places [illeg.]
[illeg.], & a great Number of Mountains heaving up one beyond
another, & some of a vast Distance supposd to be 60 or 70 Mi[les]
off; I hope the Prospect open'd my Heart a little & [illeg.] some
Thoughts of God; we descended the Mountain, & came to our
Horses, where we rested a little While, & I hope the Conversa[tion]
was something suitable; we then got up on our Horses, & rod[e]
to the Bottom of the Mountain, [illeg.] there dismounted, & fille[d]
a Bottle with some clear cool Water that ran in a little str[eam]
from out of the Mountain; we then sat down under the Tree[s]
& refreshed ourselves with a short meal on what Mr. Edwards had
brought from home, & I think the Ground served us both for
seat & Table, & the air for a Canopy I think I had a comfortable
sense of God's Presence with me in this Wilderness, & that wherever [I]
went, my good God & Father was with me; I had some free
Conversation with Mr. Edwards this Day while riding & his Disc[ourse]
was indeed pleasant & edifying; we got back to his House abou[t]
the middle of the afternoon

John Walley,
"Diary," 10th September 1743[1]

Jonathan Edwards devoted considerable effort to typological interpretation of Scripture and exploration of typological connections between the Old and the New Testaments. It is, however, his extension of the typological principle to nature that has attracted most attention

[1] Walley, John, "Diary, 1742-59," entry for 10 September 1743, MS, Ipswich Public Library, Ipswich, Mass., transcript by Douglas Winiarski, on deposit at the Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University, n.p. Walley was traveling through New England with Samuel Buel; they stayed with the Edwardses for several days.

in literary scholarship, and it is also at the center of this study. This chapter examines Edwards' arguments for the possibility of natural typology and outlines some of the most important implications of his definition of it as language, arguing from Edwards' texts that his typological theory raises some problems which cannot be addressed apart from a reading which focuses on its rhetorical aspects.

For Edwards as for so many theologians before and after him, the created world is a Book of Nature in which God reveals Himself to man, a source of revelation complementing the Book of Scripture. So he argues: "as the system of nature and the system of revelation are both divine works, so both are in different senses a divine word. Both are the voice of God to intelligent creatures, a manifestation and declaration of himself to mankind."[2] Edwards believes that "the Book of Scripture is the interpreter of the Book of Nature."[3] One way in which the Book of Nature, as the Book of Scripture, communicates divine revelation is through the language of types: "Types are a certain sort of language, as it were, in which God is wont to speak to us."[4] Edwards considers this explanation of typology as a divine language so apt and felicitous that he uses it as a ground for his arguments in defense of his typological convictions in several important passages of his notebook on the "Types," including this one:

> I expect by very ridicule and contempt to be called a man of a very fruitful brain and copious fancy, but they are welcome to it. I am not ashamed to own that I believe that the whole universe, heaven and earth, air and seas, and the divine constitution and history of the holy Scriptures, be full of images of divine things, as full as a language is of words; and that the

[2] "Miscellanies," no. 1340; *WJE* 13: 374.
[3] "Images," no. 156; *WJE* 11: 106.
[4] "Types"; *WJE* 11: 150.

> multitude of those things that I have mentioned are but a very small part of what is really intended to be signified and typified by these things: but that there is room for persons to be learning more and more of this language and seeing more of that which is declared in it to the end of the world without discovering all.[5]

By anticipating criticism of his typological theory, Edwards suggests that his natural typology is controversial in some aspects. If he expects to be called a man of copious fancy, it implies that the most arguable aspect of his natural typology will be the question of discerning true types (which God instituted and which are part of the order of creation) from false types (which are merely the product of human fancy and not part of divine revelation). He refutes the suspicion that typological interpretations are nothing but subjective inventions and claims that the typological connections are secured by their divine origin. He wishes to "show how there is a medium between those that cry down all types, and those that are for turning all into nothing but allegory and not having it to be true history; and also the way of the rabbis that find so many mysteries in letters, etc."[6] To find this "medium" Edwards attempts to articulate some rules or conditions for correct typology. In this defense and explanation, Edwards continues to argue within the paradigm of typology as language:

> And there is, as it were, a certain idiom in that language which is to be learnt the same that the idiom of any language is, viz. by good acquaintance with the language, either by being naturally trained up in it,

[5] *WJE* 11: 152.
[6] Ibid., 151.

> learning it by education (but that is not the way in which corrupt mankind learned divine language), or by much use and acquaintance together with a good taste or judgment, by comparing one thing with another and having our senses as it were exercised to discern it (which is the way that adult persons must come to speak any language, and in its true idiom, that is not their native tongue).
>
> Great care should be used, and we should endeavor to be well and thoroughly acquainted, or we shall never understand [or] have a right notion of the idiom of the language. If we go to interpret divine types without this, we shall be just like one that pretends to speak any language that han't thoroughly learnt it. We shall use many barbarous expressions that fail entirely of the proper beauty of the language, that are very harsh in the ears of those that are well versed in the language.
>
> God han't expressly explained all the types of Scriptures, but has done so much as is sufficient to teach us the language.[7]

Edwards intends this passage as a defense of his typological beliefs; he wishes to show prudence and caution to make clear that he is no enthusiast dangerously mistaking his imaginations for divine revelation. But the text raises more questions than it answers. Although true spiritual understanding of types is available only to the regenerate, apparently even their perception of the divine in nature can be wrong. "Much use and acquaintance together with a good taste and judgment" is a vague formulation, to say the least. And what precisely are those "barbarous expressions" or who determines the criteria of "a good taste"?

[7] "Types"; *WJE* 11: 150-151.

(If the answer was "those that are well versed in the language," the solution would be rather disturbing.) Compared to Edwards' argumentative precision in other theological or philosophical discussions, this passage is clearly lacking in force. His defense of his conception of natural typology hardly answers the charges he anticipates.

But even beyond the deficiencies of this argument, it is necessary to consider the implications and consequences of Edwards' use of language as a metaphorical definition and paradigmatic explanation of typology. By bringing the conception of language to the discipline of typology, Edwards not only indirectly confirms Frye's point about typology being both a mode of thought and a figure of speech but also introduces to typology issues which make the discipline less simple and straightforward. The problem of typology is epistemological and theological, of course, metaphysical in the broadest sense. By stating the problem metaphorically, however, and even by a metaphor of language, Edwards introduces into the problem also the issue of language, representation and figuration. To be more precise, he does not *introduce* the issue of language to the problem of typology; rather, it is already there and inherent to it, as will be argued, and Edwards' move only brings it out more clearly. To approach the problem of typology from a perspective not confined to a narrow theological argument, it is therefore necessary to follow Edwards' suggestion and consider it in connection with language and representation.

In his philosophical speculations on the nature of language, Edwards sometimes seems to be convinced that language is, at least on the most general level, referentially and epistemologically accurate and reliable. When considering philosophically the subject of ideas in the mind, Edwards argues in a way which suggests that at least in some cases there is a direct connection between ideas and the manner of their representation in language:

> Sensation. Self-evidence. Things that we know by immediate sensation, we know intuitively, and they are properly self-evident truths: as, grass is green, the sun shines, honey is sweet. When we say that grass is green, all that we can be supposed to mean by it is, that in constant course, when we see grass, the idea of green is excited with it; and this we know self-evidently.[8]

Further, while "the tying of ideas together in genera and species is not merely the calling of them by the same name, but such an union of them that the consideration of one shall naturally excite the idea of others,[9] Edwards also argues that this natural association of ideas, though more than merely a name given to it, can sometimes be reflected in the structure of language. This is how he reasons regarding the names of mixed modes:

> As there is great foundation in nature for those abstract ideas which we call universals, so there is great foundation in the common circumstances and necessities of mankind and the constant method of things proceeding, for such a tying of simple modes together to the constituting such mixed modes. This appears from the agreement of languages, for language is very much made up of the names of mixed modes, and we find that almost all those names in one language have names that answer to them in other languages. The same mixed mode has a name given to it by most nations; whence it appears that most of the inhabitants of the earth have agreed

[8] "The Mind," no. 19; *WJE* 6: 346.
[9] "The Mind," no. 43; *WJE* 6: 361.

> upon putting together the same simple modes into mixed ones, and in the same manner. The learned and polished have indeed many more than others, and herein chiefly it is that languages do not answer one to another.[10]

The type has for Edwards, according to some interpreters, precisely this quality: the connection between the type and its antitype is thought to be direct and straightforward, as in the case of names of simple ideas. Perry Miller, for example, writes that "the beauty of a type was exactly that, if it existed at all, it needed only to be seen, not argued,"[11] in other words its effect would be the same as that of the name of a simple idea. And Wilson Kimnach expresses a similar thought in a different context: the type "could be both true (according to the analogy of the world) and real (according to the evidence of the senses)."[12] To regenerate perception, at least, the natural type would provide a similar certainty as a simple idea.

On the other hand, Edwards, not unlike Locke in the *Essay on Human Understanding,* shows a definite wariness toward an overly simplistic understanding of language.[13] He argues that the connection between words and ideas is arbitrary and the way in which words are linked together does not necessarily reflect the way ideas themselves are linked:

> Words. We are used to apply the same words a hundred different ways; and ideas being so much tied and associated with the words, they lead us into a

[10] "The Mind," no. 41; *WJE* 6: 359-360.
[11] Miller, Perry, "Introduction," *Images or Shadows of Divine Things* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948) 26.
[12] Kimnach, Wilson, Editor's Introduction, *Sermons and Discourses 1720-1723, WJE* 10: 230.
[13] The mention of Locke in this context should not revive Perry Miller's mistake. In Miller's interpretation, Locke seems to be the key to the secret of Edwards the protomodernist. Edwards did read Locke's *Essay* but it is misleading to interpret it as the central shaping force of his thought, as has been well documented by later scholars.

> thousand real mistakes. For where we find that the words may be connected, the ideas being by custom tied with them, we think that the ideas may be connected likewise, and applied everywhere and in every way as the words.[14]

This particularly jeopardizes the communicative function of language and its epistemological reliability and casts a shadow over Edwards' assertion that God's revelation in typology is a sort of language.

Any time language relates to spiritual matters the case is even more complex. There is an interesting tension in Edwards' writings between the human and the divine element in language. On the one hand, Edwards reasons that language originated from man's necessity to refer to material things and that reference to spiritual subjects was derived from its primary use:

> The reason why the names of spiritual things are all, or most of them, derived from the names of sensible or corporeal ones, as "imagination," "conception," "apprehend," etc., is because there was no other way of making others readily understand men's meaning when they first signified things by sounds, than by giving of them the names of things sensible to which they had an analogy. They could thus point it out with the finger, and so explain themselves as in sensible things.[15]

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[14] "The Mind," no. 18; *WJE* 6: 345-346.
[15] "The Mind," no. 23; *WJE* 6: 349.

At the same time, Edwards holds that God himself has condescended to communicate to mankind in this indirect way: "And it was the manner in those ancient times to deliver divine instructions in general in symbols and emblems, and in their speeches and discourses to make use of types and figures and enigmatical speeches, into which holy men were led by the Spirit of God. This manner of delivering wisdom was originally divine."[16] Implied in these two passages is an argument for an essentially figurative nature of metaphysical language, both as direct divine communication and as human reference to transcendental matters. Necessarily, this includes typology. Again, the argument that typology is a figure of speech finds further support here. In what way, then, does the type represent and how does the language of typology convey divine revelation?

On the one hand Edwards assumes that the purpose of typology is to communicate spiritual knowledge; indeed, this is the highest purpose of all communication: "No speech can be any means of grace, but by conveying knowledge. Otherwise the speech is as much lost as if there had been no man there, and he that spoke, had spoken only into the air."[17] On the other hand Edwards seems to believe that divine communication must necessarily be—to a degree—incomprehensible. Hence his argument on the "enigmatical speeches" as "originally divine." The following statement in the "Types of Messiah" brings the understanding of divine communication into an interesting context:

> Thus when future things were made known in visions, the things that were seen were not the future things themselves, but some other things that were made use of as shadows, symbols or types of the things. . . . the

[16] "Types of the Messiah"; *WJE* 11: 193.
[17] *The Importance and Advantage of a Thorough Knowledge of Divine Truth*; *WJE* 22: 88.

> prophecies are given forth in allegories, and the things foretold spoken of not under the proper names of the things them[selves], but under the names of other things that are made use of in the prophecy as symbols or types of the things foretold.[18]

And even more clearly when Edwards elaborates on the metaphor of type as shadow in his "Notes on Scripture," no. 288:

> *Hebrews 10:1*. "The law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things." Here a shadow is distinguished from images or pictures, as being a more imperfect representation of the things represented by it. The types of the Old Testament are compared to this kind of representations of things, not only here, but *Hebrews 8:5* and *Colossians 2:17*, which fitly resemble them on several accounts.
>
> The shadow of a thing is an exceeding imperfect representation of it, and yet has such a resemblance that it has a most evident relation to the thing, of which it is the shadow. Again, shadows are dark resemblances; though there be a resemblance, yet the image is accompanied with darkness, or hiding of the light. The light is beyond the substance, so that it is hid. So was it with the types of the Old Testament; they were obscure and dark. The light was beyond the substance; the light that was plainly to reveal gospel things came after Christ, the substance of all ancient types. The shadow was accompanied with darkness and obscurity; gospel things

[18] *WJE* 11: 192, 193.

were then hid under a veil.[19]

Conceived as shadow, the function of the type is to *hide* the substance. (It must be recalled that Edwards' first title of his typological notebook was "Shadows of Divine Things."[20]) This stands in direct contrast to the previous arguments on the importance of communicating knowledge. His remark that what prophets saw in visions were not the things themselves but some other things that were made to represent them also complicates any expectations of a smooth connection between the intended content of the message and the form it actually takes. If, as these passages seem to suggest, figuration and obscurity necessarily attending it are inherent to divine communication and to human communication about divine matters, the type seems to be approaching, dangerously, the trope. Edwards' descriptions of the type as a veil and shadow recall descriptions of metaphors and allegories. The perennial problem of distinguishing between type and trope surfaces here once again, though Edwards does not address it directly.

It seems that Edwards wants to have it both ways. On the one hand, he acknowledges that the connection between language and ideas is arbitrary and can be misleading, and that even when language relates to spiritual things it is indirect and necessarily attended by obscurity, as are divine communications themselves. On the other hand, he seems to assume that figurative representation may be understood directly, that divine communications to prophets, for example, were attended with certainty (this he argues in "The Mind," no. 20 on "Inspiration," concluding nevertheless with a tantalizing qualification that "yet there are

[19] *WJE* 15: 247-248.
[20] See *WJE* 11: 51 n. 5

doubtless various degrees in inspiration").[21] In a long entry in the "Miscellanies," no. 1340 on "Reason and Revelation," he explains at length that it is reasonable to suppose that divine communication to men will be attended with mystery and obscurity.[22] There is a tension, even a clash of two different perspectives: the functioning of language appears to be different when considered from the vantage point of spiritual things and from the human perspective. This tension is captured in an interesting entry in "Images," no. 45 where Edwards replaces the opposition of "literal" and "figurative" meaning with "literal" and "true," claiming that it is the figurative meaning which is the true one, and not vice versa:

> That natural things were ordered for types of spiritual things seems evident by these texts: *John 1:9*, "This was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world"; and *John 15:1* "I am the true vine." Things are thus said to be true in Scripture, in contradistinction to what is typical. The type is only the representation or shadow of the thing, but the antitype is the very substance, and is the true thing. Thus heaven is said to be the true holy of holies, in opposition to the holy of holies in the tabernacle and temple. . . . So the spiritual gospel tabernacle is said to be the true tabernacle, in opposition to the legal typical tabernacle which was

[21] "[20]. INSPIRATION. The evidence of immediate inspiration that the prophets had when they were immediately inspired by the Spirit of God with any truth is an absolute sort of certainty; and the knowledge is in a sense intuitive, much in the same manner as faith and spiritual knowledge of the truth of religion. Such bright ideas are raised, and such a clear view of a perfect agreement with the excellencies of the divine nature, that it's known to be a communication from him. All the Deity appears in the thing, and in everything pertaining to it. The prophet has so divine a sense, such a divine disposition, such a divine pleasure, and sees so divine an excellency and so divine a power in what is revealed, that he sees as immediately that God is there as we perceive one another's presence when we are talking together face to face. And our features, our voice and our shapes are not so clear manifestations of us, as those spiritual resemblances of God that are in the inspiration are manifestations of him. But yet there are doubtless various degrees in inspiration" (*WJE* 6: 346).
[22] *WJE* 23: 359-376.

> literally a tabernacle. . . . And that, though the legal tabernacle was much more properly a tabernacle, according to the literal meaning of the word, than the other. So Christ is said to be the true bread from heaven, in opposition to the manna that was typical, though that was literally bread from heaven. . . . So, in those forementioned texts, 'tis evidently in the same sense that Christ is said to be the true vine and the true light of the world; and is the true vine in opposition to vines literally so called, which are types, the union and dependence of whose branches on the stock and root is a type of the union and dependence of Christ's members on him. So he is the true light of the world in opposition to the sun, the literal light of the world, that is a type of the Sun of Righteousness.[23]

While true meaning is usually associated with literal meaning and figurative meaning is thought of as deviation from the true, Edwards here argues that it is the figurative meaning which is true and the literal meaning is a mere image or shadow, ultimately untrue. This model is based on the theology of typology: the antitype is the true meaning because it is so spiritually, the type seems to be the literal meaning from the point of view of human language but given the divine constitution of the world it is merely a vehicle pointing beyond itself to the true meaning in the antitype. But this stands in contrast to Edwards' argument in the "Mind," no. 23, quoted above, that names of spiritual things are derived by analogy with sensible things. If the spiritual meaning is the true one, how could it be derived? Can meaning in typology (and theology) be different from meaning in language? Obviously, Edwards' argument is that the typological relationships are ontological and therefore primary

[23] *WJE* 11: 62-63.

but limited human knowledge only names them secondarily, on the basis of analogy—but this does not help solve the difficulty of determining true types.

To continue a consideration of Edwards' views on language it is also necessary to look at his attitude toward rhetoric and rhetorical uses of language. Again, Edwards does not really attempt a sustained commentary on the rhetorical use of language but there are a number of passages in which he touches upon the problem. As has been noted in the previous chapter, rhetoric was an important issue which the Puritans felt compelled to address and to articulate a clear stance toward it. Rhetorical uses of language were discussed in preaching manuals and Edwards was familiar with such reflections. Moreover, he also considered issues of style through his engagements with contemporary polite literature, not to mention Locke's famous denunciation of rhetoric in the *Essay*. His thoughts on the subject suggest that Edwards did not dismiss rhetorical uses of language but wished to approach it with caution and moderation.

In preaching, for example, where it may legitimately play a greater role, rhetoric must always be contained within safe limits. Edwards does not reject a homiletic appeal to the passions which his grandfather Stoddard, for example, promoted so vigorously. So he ponders: "why is it proper for orators and preachers to move the passions—needful to show earnestness, etc. How this tends to convince the judgment, and many other ways is good and absolutely necessary."[24] In the tumults of the awakening, however, Edwards realized the disruptive and sometimes destructive potential of arousing the passions of the audience in preaching. He also discovered that rhetorical devices used in preaching may, instead of providing people with more vivid ideas of spiritual things, lead them astray and produce false religious affections:

[24] "Subjects to Be Handled in the Treatise on the Mind," no. 6; *WJE* 6: 388.

> Thus persons are deceived by the use of figurative and metaphorical expressions. When we speak of light let into the soul in this case, nothing is meant of any resemblance to any brightness that we see with our bodily eyes . . . this is a very gross notion of spiritual light, such light is not spiritual but outward. Spiritual light is the light of the mind. . . . Not but that persons when under the lively sense of the glory of spiritual objects may naturally continue in their minds a lively idea of an outward glory and brightness. But that is only an idea in the imagination, and is not the thing that the essence of spiritual light consists in.[25]

Edwards also duly denounces any "style" on his own part, as in the Preface to *Discourses on Various Important Subjects*, a collection of sermons published in 1738: "However unable I am to preach or write politely, if I would, yet I have this to comfort me under such a defect, that God has showed us he does not need such talents in men to carry on his own work, and that he has been pleased to smile upon and bless a very plain, unfashionable way of preaching."[26] However, he also studies carefully the rules for good writing from Steele's *Ladies' Library*.[27] For speculative treatises and argumentation, his plan is to "extricate all questions from the least confusion or ambiguity of words, so that the ideas shall be left

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[25] Sermon on II Corinthians 13:5; qtd. in Miller, Introduction 31-32. At this point this 1735 sermon has not been edited by the Jonathan Edwards Center. The transcript can be found in *Sermons, Series II, 1735, WJE Online*, Vol. 50, listed as 368. Sermon on II Cor. 13:5 (1735).

[26] *WJE* 19: 797. Kimnach quotes this passage and comments that it is "characteristic of the tone of most of Edwards' prefaces, though the discussion is a little more explicit and fully developed. It is defensive, condemning wit and style out of hand as irrelevant to effective preaching, while also suggesting an incapacity for stylistic excellence on his own part" (23).

[27] *The Ladies' Library*, by Richard Steele, first published in 1714. On *The Ladies' Library* and its use by Edwards see Kimnach 182.

naked."[28] Though a speculative argument does not call for a moving of the passions of the readers, it still requires a clear distinction between rhetorical devices and sound rational argumentation lest rhetorical connections between words excite wrong connections between ideas.

For Edwards, then, the difference between type and trope is epistemological and theological, and on that level his theory is strict: types are ontologically given by the divine constitution of the world; tropes are merely the product of human fancy, as are false types. The need for the theological distinction clear, Edwards nevertheless does not always maintain a strict separation when he engages with biblical imagery more closely. How problematic it is to distinguish between type and rhetorical image (which might well be biblical but without a distinctly typological meaning) becomes apparent immediately upon reading a random sermon. *Honey from the Rock* (1730) may serve as an example. The Scripture text on which Edwards preaches comes from Deuteronomy 32:13, "And he made him to suck honey out of the rock, and oil out of the flinty rock." The various meanings of the biblical image are spelled out explicitly at first in the opening of the text and the passage could almost serve as a handbook of at least a threefold method. Edwards opens the text thus:

> There are several things signified by the words of our text. God causes his people to suck honey out of a rock; that is, he causes good to arise to them when they are in a state that is very remote from it, and one would think it impossible that they should receive it. He gives them oil and honey in the wilderness, where there is nothing but dry sands and barren rocks, which is represented, by the rocks yielding it to them, by an

[28] "Cover-Leaf Memoranda," no. 7; *WJE* 6: 193.

elegant metaphor and not unlike to other Scripture metaphors.

Thus it was, God did by Israel. God "found him in a desert land, in a waste howling wilderness," as it is said in *Deuteronomy 32:10*. He found him in a wilderness where was nothing but sands and rocks for the supply of his necessities. But yet there God fed and nourished him with angels' food, so that he did, as it were, suck honey out of the dry sands or flinty rocks.

And another thing seems to be signified by it, and that is that God is wont to bring good to his people out of those things that seem the most unlikely to yield it, things that men are ready to imagine such good could not come from.

And particularly hereby is signified the great good [they] have from Christ, who is often called a rock and is so called in *Deuteronomy 32:4* of this chapter; "He is the Rock, his work is perfect: for all his ways are judgment: a God of truth and without iniquity, just and right is he"; and so in many other places in this song. It was Christ that was typified by that rock out of which the water gushed [at] Meribah, that quenched the thirst of the congregation in the wilderness; *1 Corinthians 10:4*, "They drank of that spiritual rock that followed them: and that rock was Christ."[29]

Edwards explains the "elegant metaphor," points to its historical interpretation, to its allegorical meanings and closes the passage by a typological interpretation. The rich interpretive potential of the biblical passage is reflected by the three doctrines Edwards draws

[29] *WJE* 17: 123-124.

from it. The type then opens possibilities for a more literary outworking in which the boundaries between the various levels of interpretation virtually disappear:

> Christ, when he finds those that God has given him, he finds 'em in a lost and a doleful condition. They wander desolate in a land of pits and of drought and fiery flying serpents, a land of darkness and the shadow of death. Christ finds his people poor, blind, and naked, poor creatures in rags, in the highways and hedges.
>
> God finds them in a very miserable condition in that he finds 'em under the dominion of sin. They have lost all holiness which was their beauty and glory. They are become sordid and loathsome with the rags and filth of sin. They have lost their liberty and are become slaves to sin and Satan; they are "sold under sin" [*Romans 7:14*]. They are sick of a most foul and mortal disease, with which they are blind and deaf and halt and maimed. . . .
>
> He finds 'em in this wilderness amongst those flinty rocks and causes such good to arise to them as they stand in need of. He finds them in this poor, famishing, perishing condition and causes waters to break out in the wilderness and streams in the desert; *Isaiah 35:6*, "Then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing: for in the wilderness shall waters break out, and streams in the desert." God spreads a table for them in this wilderness, and from being in such an indigent and necessitous condition, he causes 'em to [be] encompassed about with blessings. Their souls are not only fed but feasted: the "rock pours" them

"out rivers of oil" (*Job 29:6*).[30]

Several things come into play in this passage. The journey through wilderness is a type of the soul's situation before it receives God's help: "The state that all God's elect are in at first, before God finds them or comes to them, is very fitly represented by that wilderness that the children of Israel were so long in."[31] Implicit is also the typological interpretation of the story of the Jews wandering through the desert and God's provision for them as types of "what should be accomplished towards God's people in the Messiah's times."[32] But Edwards also enriches the text with references to other Scriptural passages, quoting directly or indirectly, and elaborating on the imagery. The original image is transformed into a collage of quotes and allusions, opening up possibilities for new variations of the central theme. The example of *Honey from the Rock* does not imply, of course, that Edwards forgets the distinction between types and tropes; rather it suggests the close connections of the various aspects of biblical imagery, as illustration, typology and intertextual allusion, in his thought and testifies to how the various uses of biblical imagery intertwined with and influenced one another. But it also suggests how hard and virtually impossible in such a kind of discourse it is to maintain the distinction between type and trope.

Returning to the consideration of Edwards' typology in connection with his conception of language, it becomes clear that what is at stake here is the relationship between theology (or metaphysics, philosophy) and figurative language broadly conceived (or rhetoric). In Edwards' theory the identification and determination of instances in which language is used rhetorically is of crucial importance. Such uses are permissible, even

[30] Ibid., 125-126, 127.
[31] Ibid., 124.
[32] "Types of the Messiah"; *WJE* 11: 212.

desirable, under certain circumstances and in certain conditions but never in such a way that would cause confusion when precise expression and sound meaning are desired. This demand extends to typology: type is not trope, and trope must not be confused with type, as so many theologians asserted before and after Edwards, and as Edwards also assumed. To be sure, the distinction is meant to be epistemological but how is it to be defined? In language which is rid of the dangers of rhetoric? Edwards' typological theory would seem to assume this. But at the same it thwarts the expectation immediately when the definition which might secure types from tropes is based on a metaphor and holds on to it, stubbornly, throughout: "types are a certain sort of language, as it were." The difficulty, then, is not limited to the homiletical text with a rich interplay of meanings and allusions. Edwards' struggles to articulate a clear definition and defense of his natural typology suggest the same. The problem which surfaces in two different ways in his sermon and his typological theory is one and the same, and it has to do with the difficulty of delimiting the figurative aspect of language.

The problem, however, is not restricted only to Edwards' theology where figurative uses of language cannot be but pervasive simply because the language of the Bible is itself, in the most crucial moments and persistently, figurative. What emerges in the difficulties of Edwards' typological theory is a more general issue. Paul de Man observes, for instance, how Locke, Kant, and Condillac also fail in their effort to separate rhetoric and philosophy and he argues that "in each case, it turns out to be impossible to maintain a clear line of distinction between rhetoric, abstraction, symbol, and all other forms of language. In each case, the resulting undecidability is due to the asymmetry of the binary model that opposes the figural

to the proper meaning of the figure."[33] As de Man suggests here, it does not suffice to merely point out, with a knowing sarcasm, how philosophers like Locke or theologians like Edwards strive to restrict rhetoric while using language figuratively and rhetorically themselves in the very process. The fact that it happens signals a more general philosophical problem, which must be noted here as the horizon of the present discussion of Edwards but which for its generality can only be touched upon.

To secure the distinction between type and trope, one would need first to secure the distinction between direct and figurative meaning of language. But this could only be done in a discipline or language to which the rhetorical aspect of language would be external. Traditionally philosophy has thought itself to be such a discipline and the demand for philosophy to be separate from, and in control of, tropes has been a persistent theme in its history, as Jacques Derrida remarks in the course of his study "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy." Derrida notes that such desire to "describe a philosophical rhetoric in the service of an autonomous theory constituted before and outside its own language, manipulating its tropes like tools . . . is undoubtedly philosophic, and certainly Platonic, ideal . . . produced in the separation (and order) between philosophy or dialectics on the one hand and (sophistic) rhetoric on the other."[34] To separate itself from rhetoric, however, philosophy would first need to address its own metaphors because "metaphor seems to involve the usage of philosophical language in its entirety, nothing less than the usage of so-called natural language *in* philosophical discourse, that is, the usage of natural language *as* philosophical language."[35] Metaphor is not *outside* philosophy; even the most fundamental

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[33] Man, Paul de, "The Epistemology of Metaphor," *Critical Inquiry* 5.1 (Fall 1978) 28.
[34] Derrida, Jacques, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy," *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) 224.
[35] Ibid., 209; original emphasis.

philosophical concepts can be shown, etymologically, to be tropes. Moreover, "the concept of metaphor" itself, Derrida continues, "along with all the predicates that permit its ordered extension and comprehension, is a philosopheme" [36] and this has two contradictory consequences:

> On the one hand it is impossible to dominate philosophical metaphorics as such, *from the exterior*, by using a concept of metaphor which remains a philosophical product. Only philosophy would seem to wield any authority over its own metaphorical productions. But, on the other hand, for the same reason philosophy is deprived of what it provides itself. Its instruments belonging to its field, philosophy is incapable of dominating its general tropology and metaphorics. It could perceive its metaphorics only around a blind spot or central deafness. The concept of metaphor would describe this contour, but it is not even certain that the concept thereby circumscribes an organizing center; and this formal law holds for every philosopheme.[37]

And yet philosophical discourse inevitably wishes to master metaphor, to turn it into something external which it could wield or discard. This tension between philosophy and rhetoric proceeds from philosophy's tendency to dominate what it considers its margins: philosophy, Derrida argues, has always "insisted upon assuring itself mastery over the limit . . . it has believed that it controls the margin of its volume and that it thinks its

[36] Ibid., 228.
[37] Ibid.; original emphasis.

other."[38] Philosophy attempts to control metaphor as its margin by treating it as polysemy: "Univocity is the essence, or better, the *telos* of language. No philosophy, as such, has ever renounced this Aristotelian ideal. This ideal is philosophy. This is a fact. But this fact has right of entry into language only in the extent to which the polysemia is finite, the different significations are limited in number, and above all, sufficiently *distinct*, each remaining one and identifiable." [39] Derrida's point is, precisely, that metaphor cannot be reduced to polysemy. Instead, it opens the play of dissemination which philosophy cannot master; it is outside language itself: "Language is what it is, language, only insofar as it can then master and analyze polysemia. With no remainder. A nonmasterable dissemination is not even a polysemia, it belongs to what is outside language."[40]

Derrida's discussion addresses a philosophical problem that is more general than the present reading of Edwards can adequately address. It is mentioned here not only to identify a tendency in Edwards' theology to restrict rhetoric; certainly some of the assumptions behind Edwards' attitude to rhetoric could be described in this way, and some of the tensions in his typological theory could be related to the tendency of philosophy to control what escapes it. More pertinently to the present discussion, Derrida's attention to the resistance of metaphor to philosophy's tendency to appropriate it invites the reader to pay more attention to this resistance in Edwards' texts, to consider the tropological and literary aspects of Edwards' typology more carefully. As has been seen, there are many moments in Edwards' writings in which the basic assumption that the language of metaphysics can treat rhetorical language from a detached and superior position is questioned. A rhetorical approach to Edwards' typology which focuses on typology as a rhetorical as well as a metaphysical

[38] Derrida, Jacques, "Tympan," *Margins of Philosophy* x.
[39] "White Mythology" 247; original emphasis.
[40] Ibid., 248.

discipline and pursues those moments in which metaphor escapes this philosophical pressure for univocity of meaning highlights how pervasive this subtle questioning is: perhaps not even a complication of Edwards' project but rather one of its important elements.

Chapter 4

Type and Emblem

Stockbridge, March 28, 1753

Dear Child,

We are glad to hear that you are in any respect better, but concerned at your remaining great weakness. . . . You are like to spend the rest of your life (if you should get over this illness) at a great distance from your parents; but care not much for that. If you lived near us, yet our breath and yours would soon go forth, and we should return to our dust, whither we are all hastening. 'Tis of infinitely more importance to have the presence of an heavenly Father, and to make progress towards an heavenly home. Let us all take care that we may meet there at last.

As to means for your health, we have procured one rattlesnake, which is all we could get. It is a medicine that has been very serviceable to you heretofore, and I would have you try it still. If your stomach is very weak and will bear but little, you must take it in smaller quantities. . . .

Commending you to God, before whom we daily remember you in our prayers, I am

Your affectionate father, Jonathan Edwards[1]

Having suggested the necessity for a literary approach to Edwards' typology, the question now arises: what is type in rhetorical terms? What rhetorical figure would best describe the structure of the typological relationship as Edwards conceives it? To that end, this chapter considers rhetorical interpretations of the type as they exist in Edwards scholarship and attempts a revisionist argument before the issue is addressed on a more general level. Since the focus of Edwards literary scholars has been primarily on the natural type, a brief introduction is necessary first to the chief text of practical natural typology among Edwards' writings, the notebook called "Images of Divine Things."

[1] Jonathan Edwards to Esther Edwards Burr, *WJE* 16: 576-578. Esther met her parents several times after this letter was written. She was married to the Rev. Aaron Burr and living in Newark, New Jersey. Burr served as the president of the College of New Jersey and it was following his death in 1757 that Edwards was offered the post. Esther died just a few days after her father, on April 4, 1758.

Edwards began this private notebook probably soon after his arrival to Northampton and kept adding entries throughout his life.[2] It consists of a series of numbered entries (and several indexes) which can be divided into two kinds. Most of them provide a typological explanation of natural objects or events in human history; a smaller number of the entries are theoretical arguments for the very possibility of a typological interpretation of nature. In these entries[3] Edwards argues for natural typology from Scriptural references to the natural world and from the order of creation which, as he believes, reflects God's wisdom. The argument of these passages in "Images" is corroborated by a more sustained reasoning in the "Types" notebook in which Edwards focuses exclusively on finding support for his idea of natural typology and refuting objections. The other entries in the "Images" notebook are explanations of the typological meanings of specific phenomena. As an example of the difference between the two kinds, the following two short passages may be contrasted:

> That the things of the world are ordered [and] designed to shadow forth spiritual things, appears by the Apostle's arguing spiritual things from them. *1 Corinthians 15:36*, "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die." If the sowing of seed and its springing were not designedly ordered to have an agreeableness to the resurrection, there could be no sort of argument in that which the Apostle alleges; either to argue the resurrection itself or the manner of it, either its certainty, or probability, or possibility. See how the Apostle's argument is thus founded

[2] Anderson, Introduction to "Images" 37-38.
[3] For example nos. 7, 8, 45, 57, 95, 156, 169.

(*Hebrews 9:16–17*) about the validity of a testament.[4]

> In its being so contrived, that the life of man should be continually maintained by breath, respect was had to the continual influence of the Spirit of God that maintains the life of the soul.[5]

The first type, the argumentative entries, is important for an understanding of Edwards' theory. For the purposes of this chapter, the second type of entries, which might be understood as examples, will be more important. No. 17 is a good representative of a typical entry of this kind. An object in nature, a general human experience, an institution or a situation in human history is mentioned and its spiritual significance is explained.

Neither kind of entries in "Images of Divine Things" can be said to contain types as rhetorical figures. There might be an occasional use of tropes in the text but the type discussed in a particular entry is always described and explained, not used in a figurative manner. The entries describe a figure or figures, rhetorically they are not the figures themselves but explanations. If, however, as Wilson Kimnach writes, "the type is, in literary terms, fundamentally an image,"[6] what kind of image or trope is it that the text implies?

Scholars who study Edwards' writings from a literary perspective have attempted to answer this question. The prevalent interpretation of Edwards' natural typology suggests a connection between Edwards and Romanticism,[7] although no sustained interpretation of

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[4] No. 7; *WJE* 11: 53.
[5] No. 17; *WJE* 11: 55.
[6] Kimnach 230.
[7] The connections between Edwards and Transcendentalism are, of course, also a well established topic, famously highlighted by Perry Miller's essay "From Edwards to Emerson"; see also Lowance, *Canaan* 277-295.

Edwards as a Pre-Romantic has been attempted so far. Starting with Perry Miller, however, several links have been identified and pursued. The comparison has several grounds: Edwards' concept of the sense of the heart which opens, as it were, the eyes of the believer so that everything looks different than before, the emotional intensity of religious experience as Edwards describes it of himself in the "Personal Narrative" or of his parishioners during the revivals, his fascination with nature as communicating divine attributes during those intense moments, his use of imagery in sermons to bridge the gap between mere words and the will and affections of his audience, all these are relevant arguments for connecting Edwards to Romanticism. So, for example, Perry Miller finds "so many startling parallels" between Edwards and Wordsworth.[8] According to Miller, Edwards' "rhetoric of sensation" (the title of one of his essays) is Edwards' attempt to bridge the gap between word and idea, identified by Locke and accepted by Edwards, and there are similarities between Edwards' concept of "naked ideas" and Coleridge's and Emerson's "imagination."[9] The natural type belongs in that strategy: like the Romantic symbol, it unites word and idea, mind and nature, subject and object: "As Edwards read the new sensationalism, far from setting up a dualism of subject and object, it fused them in the moment of perception. The thing could then appear as concept and concept as thing . . . the image was no longer a detachable adornment on the surface of truth; it *was* truth."[10] In a similar manner, in their article which compares Edwards and Samuel Taylor Coleridge in terms of "philosophical sympathy, preoccupation with language, and sense of the artist's vocation" Stuart Piggin and Dianne Cook speak of "the anticipation of Coleridge's Romanticism by Edwards" and argue that "for both, the symbol or type was a concrete, temporal, physical and lower expression of an immaterial, eternal,

[8] Introduction 33.
[9] Ibid., 21.
[10] Ibid., 19-20; original emphasis.

metaphysical, and higher truth. These symbols or types were not the product of arbitrary human fabrication but of eternal decree and divine generation."[11] Wilson Kimnach writes of Edwards' typology: "At the heart of those literary-theological studies was an attempt to define a vocabulary that would bridge the apparent gap between the eternal world of spiritual reality and the Lockean world of sensational experience in which men lived."[12]

Indeed there is much that brings out this connection. If the relationship between the self and nature is one of the main themes of Romantic poetry, this is addressed also in Edwards' typology. There are passages in Edwards' writings where a correspondence between mind and nature is explicitly stated. In the "Miscellanies," no. 108 where he in fact lays grounds for his natural typology, Edwards writes:

> And there is really likewise an analogy, or consent, between the beauty of the skies, trees, fields, flowers, etc. and spiritual excellencies; though the agreement be more hid and requires a more discerning, feeling mind to perceive it than the other . . . This makes it natural in such frames of mind to think of them, and fancy ourselves in the midst of them. Thus there seems to be love and complacency in flowers and bespangled meadows; this makes lovers delight so much in them. So there is a rejoicing in the green trees and fields, [and] majesty in thunder beyond all other noises

[11] Piggin, Stuart and Dianne Cook, "Keeping Alive the Heart in the Head: The Significance of 'Eternal Language' in the Aesthetics of Jonathan Edwards and S. T. Coleridge," *Literature & Theology* 18:4 (2004) 383, 394, 387. Their article is the only sustained but still rather initial comparison of the two authors; the possible links between Edwards and Coleridge, or other Romantic authors, are still awaiting a thorough study.
[12] Kimnach 10.

whatever.[13]

Similar ideas underlie passages of the "Personal Narrative" and "Beauty of the World."[14] Seen in this light, Edwards' natural type has strong affinities with the Romantic symbol as a trope which unites the temporal and the eternal and which establishes a connection between nature and the mind in the world of Lockean schism between language and ideas and Newtonian science.

Bringing Edwards to the proximity of Romantic theories has, however, at least one unpleasant consequence, namely that it raises, with renewed strength, the problem of the subjectivity of the typological endeavor, the chief argument against the extension of typology which Edwards was trying to refute. While in Romanticism the meaning of nature is discovered individually by the speaker in the specific situation of the poem, Edwards maintains that the spiritual meaning of nature is ontological and objective and accessible to all who have the spiritual sense of things. Consequently, some scholars have attempted to propose a different interpretation of the rhetorical form of the type which would take seriously Edwards' defense against the charge of subjectivism.

In her article "In Love with the Image" Jennifer Leader reads Edwards' typology in the light of Jean-Luc Marion and Emmanuel Levinas and proposes "a more intricate diagram of subjectivity in Edwards' thinking."[15] His natural typology is where his conception of relational being is played out:

> Edwards uses the natural types as a literary device that, first, enacts his

[13] *WJE* 13: 278-279.
[14] *WJE* 16: 790-804 and *WJE* 6: 305-307.
[15] Leader 155.

> ontological notion of "being's consent to being"—that is, being-as-relation-to-the-Other—and that, second, invites reader participation in the same, that is, in the ongoing lovers' conversation between God and the created universe that occurs in the communicative relations between natural type and supernatural antitype.[16]

The relational nature of Edwards' ontology has indeed been noted by a number of scholars and Leader's pioneering venture is highly interesting and worthwhile. When Leader argues, however, that Edwards' typology "creates what might be best understood as a metonymical, semiotic relationship between the three positions of perceiver/reader, natural type, and divine antitypes"[17] there arise certain questions regarding her approach. Building on Stephen Daniel's semiotic interpretation of Edwards' typology, Leader claims to derive her interpretation from "close attention to the textual level operations of Edwards' types."[18] To show the metonymical nature of the typological link, she discusses entry no. 3 of "Images of Divine Things":

> Roses grow upon briers, which is to signify that all temporal sweets are mixed with bitter. But what seems more especially to be meant by it, is that true happiness, the crown of glory, is to be come at in no other way than by bearing Christ's cross by a life of mortification, self-denial and labor, and bearing all things for Christ. The rose, the chief of all flowers, is the last thing that comes out. The briery prickly bush grows before, but

[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.

the end and crown of all is the beautiful and fragrant rose.[19]

Leader comments: "Instead of having an allegorical correspondence with one another based on an implied similarity of individual essence or on a stable, noun-based metaphorical equation of 'this is to that,' type and antitype metonymically signify each other through their shared qualities."[20]

Leader's anti-metaphorical argument is not without grounds and deserves serious consideration. First, in entry no. 45 of "Images," quoted earlier, Edwards ponders the nature of the typological link and claims that the basis for the correlation is not likeness of appearance. Rather, the entry implies that there is a likeness of how we think about the respective constituents of the typological pair: "So the spiritual gospel tabernacle is said to be the true tabernacle, in opposition to the legal typical tabernacle which was literally a tabernacle." [21] Leader rightly notices that Edwards here implies that the typological relationship is not based on external resemblance of different objects.

Secondly, there are entries in which the typological connection might be said to be metonymic, as in no. 46:

> We, in our fallen state, need garments to hide our nakedness (having lost our primitive glory) which were needless in our state of innocency. And whatsoever God has provided for mankind to clothe themselves with, seems to represent Jesus Christ and his righteousness: whether it be anything made of skin, as the coats of skins that God made our first

[19] *WJE* 11: 52.
[20] Leader 160.
[21] *WJE* 11: 62.

> parents represented the righteousness of Christ; or the fleeces of sheep do represent the righteousness of him who is the Lamb of God, and who was dumb as a sheep before his shearers. And the beautiful clothing from the silkworm, that that worm yields us at his death, represents the glorious clothing we have for our souls by the death of him who became a man, who is a worm; and the son of man, who is a worm, and who said he was a worm and no man [*Psalms 22:6*].[22]

It might be said that the type and the antitype are here connected metonymically by indirect biblical quotations and references to Christ as the Lamb of God. In entry no. 17 quoted above, too, the relationship between breath and spirit really could be said to be metonymic. It would be an etymological metonymy, based on the fact that the Hebrew word for "spirit" also means "wind" or "breath." But such entries are exceptional when seen in the context of the entire "Images" notebook and even here the metonymic aspect is rather an extra dimension of the analogy, not its constituting feature. In most other entries metonymy cannot be found but the metonymic relationship between the constituents of the type (between roses and briers or between life and breath) can be mistaken for a metonymic connection of type and antitype. That is also the case of "Images," no. 3: while there might be a metonymic relationship between the rose and the thorns (type), and between "temporal sweets" and "bitter" (antitype), the connection between the type and antitype is still that of analogy. That type and antitype have certain "shared qualities" does not yet rid the typological relationship of its analogical basis.

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[22] *WJE* 11: 63.

Leader's alleged use of "close reading"[23] is misleading because she derives her analysis from the broader context of Edwards' theology, and reasons for the metonymic interpretation lie, as she herself notes, outside the text itself. Type and antitype can be considered a metonymic pair in Edwards' system because they are connected in the hierarchy of God's emanations in creation. Apart from this theological context, however, the metonymic interpretation does not stand. The relationship between the type and the antitype is always an analogy based on some kind of similarity but not of contiguity. This of course questions Leader's project of showing "the way the metonymic relationship between the types and the perceiver mimics this semiotic, relational ontology."[24] Leader, working to redefine Edwards' understanding of subjectivity, not unconvincingly,[25] recourses to Edwards' concept of the "consent of being to being" as a key element for her reading and does not stop to ask whether the text indeed supports Edwards' intentions.

In the course of her argument, Leader opposes both an allegorical and a symbolic interpretation of Edwards' natural typology. She asserts that "Edwards' typology functions as far more than a figural device for allegorizing nature" and that "the discursive, mutually signifying 'consent of being to being' inherent to the typological structure protects the types from being converted into symbol and so subsumed into the ego of the perceiver."[26] (It is apparently the Romantic symbol that Leader has in mind in this passage.) Leader thus joins Edwards himself in refuting the charge of subjectivism in typology. But here an interesting paradox arises. In trying to rescue Edwards' types from subjectivity, Leader defines them as

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[23] Leader 158.
[24] Ibid., 160.
[25] In this discussion, only the first part of Leader's argument is considered in which she discusses his typology "at the level of individual entries in his *Images of Divine Things* and *Miscellanies* notebooks" (155).
[26] Ibid., 155, 161.

metonymy—but it is the symbol that has the structure of metonymy, or more precisely of a synecdochic connection between a part and a whole, as Paul de Man argues: "Its structure is that of the synecdoche, for the symbol is always a part of the totality that it represents."[27] To describe the relationship between the type and the antitype as synecdochic rather than metonymic would actually be more precise: although the type has its own independent existence, it is also incomplete without its antitype, it is always "a part of the totality that it represents," to use de Man's words. Nevertheless, if Leader's metonymic interpretation was right, the type would have the same structure as symbol but it would escape the subjectivism associated with the Romantic symbol.

Leader's argument, however, suggests another possibility for the type's rhetorical form, not mentioned in her article. If the typological connection represents the connections that exist in the divine order and "being's consent to being," if it is meant to be metonymic but not subjective, then it can be also related to another figure. Besides its connections to the symbol, the type can also be examined in the context of the older tradition of emblematics. Historically, there are strong arguments for possible links between typology and emblematics, as has been suggested in a previous chapter: Barbara Lewalski's study of the elements of seventeenth-century Puritan culture makes abundantly clear that the two disciplines existed not only simultaneously, but in close connection, and shared many common sources. Surprisingly, no study of Edwards' typology has pursued these links. Tibor Fabiny has noticed this curious gap in Edwards scholarship[28] but a study of Edwards and the emblematic

[27] "Rhetoric of Temporality" 191.
[28] Fabiny, Tibor, "Edwards and Biblical Typology," *Understanding Jonathan Edwards: An Introduction to America's Theologian*, ed. Gerald R. McDermott (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) 101.

tradition is yet to appear.[29]

Besides the proximity of typology and emblematics as influences in Puritan culture, there are also many thematic and structural similarities between the type and the emblem. The emblem, a literary device which was prominent in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance, is an essentially allegorical figure, taken from a generally shared stock of images, with a settled, often commonplace meaning.[30] When a comparison between the emblem and Edwards' natural type is attempted, certain affinities become apparent. The entries in "Images of Divine Things" tend to be quite general, simple images which often have parallels in literature and tradition and their meaning is assumed to be widely intelligible. Edwards certainly thinks of a material rose in entry no. 3, of a real snake luring a real mouse, of sunlight experienced by the senses or of the physical difficulty of climbing up a steep hill, while in emblem literature the actual existence of an object is unimportant, what matters is rather the meaning traditionally ascribed to it. But the examples in "Images of Divine Things" are in most cases taken from the most general level of human experience and whether or not the object or situation described exists in reality has no significant influence on its spiritual meaning. Edwards is looking for principles and general meanings rather than for the significance of particular objects or situations. The thorny rose of entry 3 is a good example: there is nothing which would restrict the spiritual interpretation to any particular

[29] To my knowledge, only William Wainwright (Wainwright, William J., "Jonathan Edwards and the Language of God," *The Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 48 (1980): 519-530) argues for understanding the type as emblem; writing from a theological perspective, however, Wainwright uses the term to defend Edwards' typological project and argues that "because emblems are consciously invented, their occurrence implies theism" (519).

[30] For a basic definition the following one may be used: "A picture with a symbolic meaning, as in heraldry or visual allegory; or a simple kind of literary symbol with a fixed and relatively clear significance. In the 16th and 17th centuries the term was applied to a popular kind of woodcut or engraving accompanied by a motto and a short verse explanation of its meaning" (Baldick, Chris, *The Oxford Dictionary of Literary Terms*, 3rd edition, London, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 106). Obviously it is the literary emblem which comes into consideration for Edwards.

rose or any particular experience in time and space.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that some entries are different and refer to specific historical events or perhaps even to a specific place. These include Roman polity in entry 91, Roman triumph in entry 81 and Edwards' famous typological interpretation of the invention of the telescope in entry no. 146. "Images," no. 152 regarding spring contains one of the few implicit references to local conditions and Perry Miller eagerly seizes this opportunity to assert that "it is a more accurate image of that season in New England than all the poetry of Whittier and Longfellow."[31] The text itself is, however, much more sober; instead of dwelling on the specific conditions of New England climate it quickly moves to the general, spiritual meaning:

> The changes that pass on the face of the earth by the gradual approach of the sun is a remarkable type of what will come to pass in the visible church of God and world of mankind, in the approach of the church's latter-day glory. The latter will be gradual, as the former is. The light and warmth of the sun in the former is often interrupted by returns of clouds and cold, and the fruits of the earth kept back from a too-sudden growth, and a too-quick transition from their dead state in winter to their summer's glory, which in the end would be hurtful to them and would kill them. So it is in the spiritual world. If there should be such warm weather constantly without interruption, as we have sometimes in February, March and April, the fruits of the earth would flourish mightily for a little while, but would not be prepared for the summer's heat, but that would

[31] Introduction 41.

> kill 'em. This is typical of what is true concerning the church of God, and particular souls. The earth being stripped of its white winter garments, in which all looked clean but all was dead, and the making of it so dirty, as it is early in the spring, in order to fit it for more beautiful clothing in a living state in summer, is also typical of what passes in the spiritual change of the world, and also, a particular soul. The surface of the earth is as it were dissolved in the spring. The ground is loosened and broke up, and softened with moisture, and its filthiness never so much appears as then; and then is the most windy turbulent season of all.[32]

This entry, perhaps together with no. 147 on America's supplying the world with spiritual treasures and an indirect reference to the Olympic Games in no. 101, contains a more specific reference. But it is clear that even here the description of the type remains at a very general level. None of them are really specific; even those referring to concrete historical events such as the Olympic Games draw on common knowledge. Most other types described in the notebook, moreover, do not have even this bit of geographical or historical setting. Although they are based on analogies, the analogies themselves are mostly common and traditional rather than free or idiosyncratic. There is no detail which would position these images geographically or historically and many of them are simply commonplaces. In this sense Edwards' natural types are very close to traditional emblems.

A rhetorical interpretation of the type as an emblem finds further support in a historical argument which, though not central to the present discussion, is strong enough to

[32] *WJE* 11: 103-104.

be noted here. In a resourceful study of the parallels between the emblem and 16th and 17th century literature, Peter Daly argues that the traditional emblem of the emblem books is reflected in various ways in other kinds of literature. A comparison of his characterization of the "word-emblem" with Edwards' natural types in "Images of Divine Things" makes a strong case for viewing his natural typology in the light of the emblematic tradition. Here are several characteristics Daly mentions:

> The meaning of the emblem is unambiguous. It is in fact univalent; that is, the context calls for only one of the several meanings which could be associated with the natural object. . . . The *object* and its *meaning*, wherever stated, remain *distinct* and *separate*; there is no rich interaction of vehicle and tenor, picture and meaning, as in the more modern poetic symbol. . . . Where the word-emblem does convey a plurality of meanings, these do not interweave, as in the more modern poetic symbol, but rather form a list of distinct and separate meanings, deriving from different qualities of the pictured object . . . Essentially the word-emblem is a visual image conveying an intellectual meaning; any emotional reverberations are secondary.[33]

These characteristics have much in common with those of the type. In the type, too, the object and the meaning remain separate and where one image might have multiple typological meanings (as for example in the case of water, which Edwards associates with

[33] Daly, Peter M., *Literature in the Light of the Emblem: Structural Parallels between the Emblem and Literature in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979) 72, 87, 89; original emphasis.

misery and also with God's grace)[34] these are not perceived as influencing or contradicting one another, in fact they do not interact at all, but are always distinct. Of course there are differences, the most important being the notion of the antitypical fulfilling or completing of the type. This dynamic is absent in the emblem.

Although the purpose of this argument is not to trace individual natural types to their emblematic counterparts, Daly's comment on a poem by the seventeenth-century German poet Martin Opitz, "Glück und Unglück," is worth mentioning because it throws light on the possible connections between some of Edwards' types and the widespread emblematic tradition. Opitz uses the images of bees and sting, rose and thorns and Daly explains their emblematic character thus:

> It is a fact that the bee makes sweet honey, but stings sharply, and that the rose is inseparable from the thorn. These two things of nature, presented concretely and visually, are real, and at the same time they point to a general idea or embody a general meaning, and these meanings embody the truth of Opitz's general and literal statement about fortune and misfortune. Needless to say, the emblem-books have many examples of the "bee" and "rose" used in this way and carrying these meanings.[35]

Edwards was familiar with the popular emblem to some degree; he lists the most popular emblem book published in England, Francis Quarles' *Emblemes*, in his "Catalogue" which means that he certainly knew about it, though he might not have actually read this

[34] For example in "Images," no. 15 and 27. See Wallace Anderson's introduction to "Images of Divine Things" and "Types" in *WJE* 11: 30.
[35] *Literature* 74.

collection of prints accompanied by texts.[36] A preface found in that emblem book is fascinating in connection to Edwards; though its quotation here does not pretend to argue for any historical evidence of the influence of Quarles on Edwards, it still shows certain common grounds and common vocabulary of emblematics and Edwards' natural typology. Consider Quarles' words "To the Reader":

> An *Emblem* is but a silent Parable: Let not the tender Eye check, to see the allusion to our blessed Saviour figured in these types. In Holy Scripture he is sometimes called a Sower; sometimes a Fisher; sometimes a Physician: And why not presented so, as well to the eye as to the ear? Before the knowledge of Letters, God was known by *Hieroglyphicks*. And indeed what are the Heavens, the Earth, nay, every Creature, but *Hieroglyphicks* and *Emblems* of his Glory?[37]

Again, these historical affinities are not mentioned here to argue for specific influences of emblem writers on Edwards; there seems to be very little evidence for such a claim. The similarities are nevertheless striking and they testify to a shared tradition and common

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[36] Peter Thuesen explains the nature of Edwards' "Catalogue" in his Introduction to *Catalogues of Books*: "Edwards' 'Catalogue' appears to have been an ongoing record of his reading priorities and interests rather than a tally of books he actually read. Though he did in fact read many of the books listed, the mere inclusion of a title in the 'Catalogue' proves only that he was aware of a particular book, not that he owned it or had read it. Only when Edwards cites information from a book can we be sure he had obtained it (Thuesen, Peter J., Editor's Introduction, *Catalogues of Books, WJE* 26: 9).

Here is Thuesen's note on Quarles' presence in the "Catalogue": "Another religious poet named twice in the 'Catalogue' (nos. 52 and 466) is Francis Quarles, whose oft-reprinted *Emblemes* (1635) was a series of verse meditations on engravings derived from a Jesuit devotional manual. More than any other figure, Quarles (1592–1644), who worked briefly as a Royalist pamphleteer during the Civil War, popularized the emblem book as a genre" (86).

[37] Quarles, Francis, *Emblems, divine and moral, together with Hieroglyphicks of the life of man, English Emblem Books Project* at Pennsylvania State University, 2 July 2010 <http://emblem.libraries.psu.edu/quarltoc.htm>.

sources of Renaissance emblematics and Edwards' typology, no matter how original Edwards considered his endeavor to be.

If the close reading of Edwards' types in "Images of Divine Things" does not, pace Leader, support its metonymic interpretation, the structure of the typological relationship must be understood as metaphor or allegory of some kind. The rhetorical interpretation leads to a consideration of the broader historical context of Edwards' typology. Mason Lowance, though he does not focus on the emblem in particular, does argue for a strong resemblance between Edwards' natural typology in "Images of Divine Things" and the medieval tradition of spiritualizing nature. Lowance sees a significant difference between Edwards' more conservative biblical typology, which is linear and historical, as in his sermon series called *The History of the Work of Redemption*, and between "Images of Divine Things": "Edwards' typology here [in "Images"] is in all respects a very different order of perception from the epistemology that is based on biblical exegesis and scriptural typology . . . [it] is analogous to the medieval habit of mind by which the physical universe was believed to represent the spiritual in a Platonic or allegorical fashion."[38] Lowance goes even so far as to say that "Edwards' typology of nature is significantly medieval rather than Puritan."[39]

Alongside such affinities between Edwards' typology and an older medieval tradition of Christian analogies between physical and spiritual world, the general context of allegorical interpretations of nature in emblems or analogies also introduces another point which might also prove to be one of the possible connections between Edwards and Romanticism, if M. H. Abrams' argument in "Structure and Style in the Greater Romantic Lyric" is correct. Abrams

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[38] *Canaan* 260-261. Janice Knight is among those who disagree with Lowance's claim that natural typology and scriptural typology differ in their epistemological foundations; see her article "Learning the Language of God," *William and Mary Quarterly* 48.4 (1991): 531-551.
[39] Ibid., 262.

here traces the development of Romantic nature poetry and argues that its chief but not the only source was the eighteenth-century loco-descriptive poem. The meditation in Romantic lyric, however, where "the issue is one of a recurrent state often called by the specialized term 'dejection,'"[40] does not have precedent in eighteenth-century local poetry, Abrams argues, but "in the devotional poems of the seventeenth century,"[41] and particularly in the meditation on the creatures. Seventeenth-century meditative poems, although they seldom follow strictly the structure of the meditation with its standard three parts,[42] examine the spiritual relevance of the natural scene "in sorrow, anguish, or dejection" and "close in reconciliation and the hope of rebirth."[43] It is here that Abrams finds the source of the dejection in Romantic lyrical poems. He also points out an important difference between the seventeenth-century meditation and the Romantic lyric: in the meditation on created nature,

> the "composition of place" was not a specific locality, nor did it need to be present to the eyes of the speaker, but was a typical scene or object, usually called up, as St. Ignatius and other preceptors said, before "the eyes of the imagination," in order to set off and guide the thought by means of correspondences whose interpretation was firmly controlled by an

[40] Abrams, M. H., "Structure and Style in the Greater Romantic Lyric," *From Sensibility to Romanticism: Essays Presented to Frederick A. Pottle*, eds. Frederick W. Hilles and Harold Bloom (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970): 553.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Abrams explains that the meditative procedure consisted in three steps: "The first involved what Loyola called the 'composition of place, seeing the spot'; that is, envisioning in vivid detail the person, object, or scene which initiates the meditation. The second, the meditation proper, was the analysis of the relevance to our salvation of this scene, interpreted analogically . . . The last specified the results of this meditation for our affections and will, and either included, or concluded with, a 'colloquy'—usually a prayer, or discourse with God" (553).
[43] Ibid., 554.

inherited typology.[44]

Abrams' point here also highlights what Edwards' natural typology in particular has in common with the meditation on creation, and so concurs with the argument for a connection of typology and other literary traditions in English Protestant culture as described by Lewalski: Edwards does not need specific locality for his spiritual interpretation of nature; there is little evidence in "Images of Divine Things" that the images need to exist in reality or provide an occasion for a consideration of their spiritual meaning, they might just as well be present only before "the eyes of the imagination." Secondly, although Edwards apparently considers his theory of natural typology rather original and does not expect it will be readily accepted by others, the meanings he finds in various natural phenomena are often quite commonplace and would not surprise a reader familiar with the traditional emblems. He does venture, in some cases, to interpret more unusual or specific scenes; on the whole, however, his natural types seem to have much more in common with the tradition of meditation on the creatures and Renaissance emblems than with Romantic nature poetry.

The case would be different, though, with Edwards' relation of his spiritual experience in connection with particular natural settings in his "Personal Narrative." Any links between Edwards' experience of nature and Romantic nature poetry ought to be sought in such passages as where Edwards describes the thunderstorm, which used to frighten him, as an occasion for a celebration of God after his conversion or where he speaks of his walks in the fields, meadows and woods of East Windsor and Northampton where he goes to pray or sing forth his meditations.[45] Mason Lowance, in his search for the epistemology behind

[44] Ibid., 556.
[45] "Personal Narrative"; *WJE* 16: 793-794, 801.

Edwards' understanding of nature, makes no distinction between the sense of nature in "Images" and in the "Personal Narrative." He uses the thunderstorm passage in the "Personal Narrative"[46] to characterize Edwards' typology in "Images." Having just quoted the passage, he proceeds to say:

> The transformation of the natural phenomenon into an object for mystical contemplation and meditation characterizes Edwards' method in *Images or Shadows*, where natural objects are endowed with allegorical significance leading to spiritual truth . . . Edwards has turned to nature for a direct apprehension of God's glory and majesty, through which he arrives at a sense of tranquility and an experience of the restorative power of grace.[47]

If Lowance is right and the epistemology is the same, the literary form is nevertheless very different, and the scene of the solitary Edwards watching the thunderstorm and engaging in "sweet contemplations" of God's greatness cannot be, on the literary level, lumped with "the blood comes from the heart, to intimate that 'out of the heart are the issues of life' *(Proverbs 4: 23).*"[48] Only in connection to such passages where there is a direct connection of spiritual experience and a particular nature scene or setting could Edwards' natural typology possibly be linked with the Romantic symbol; the list of isolated entries in the "Images" notebook in itself, however, shows a much stronger affinity with the emblematic tradition. Rather than

[46] "I felt God at the first appearance of a thunderstorm. And used to take the opportunity at such times, to fix myself to view the clouds, and see the lightnings play, and hear the majestic and awful voice of God's thunder: which often times was exceeding entertaining, leading me to sweet contemplations of my great and glorious God. And while I viewed, used to spend my time, as it always seemed natural to me, to sing or chant forth my meditations; to speak my thoughts in soliloquies, and speak with a singing voice" (*WJE* 16: 794).
[47] *Canaan* 272.
[48] "Images," no. 6; *WJE* 11: 53.

focusing one-sidedly on finding Edwards' affinities with Romanticism, Edwards' rootedness in the older traditions of emblematics and meditation should also be taken into account and his anticipation of Romanticism established in carefully selected points.

Paul de Man's discussion of the natural image in Yeats' poetry suggests that the conception of the natural image as emblem still exists in Romantic poetry. Yeats of course approaches it in a manner widely different from the older tradition but de Man's interpretation of the themes which Yeats' poetry addresses throws light also on some of the themes which lie behind the problem of typological representation as Edwards conceives it. The conception of the natural image in the early Yeats, de Man argues, is one of Romantic unity of mind and matter, in keeping with the "latent pantheism which is so deeply rooted in the tradition of the West"[49]: meaning is assumed to inhere in object, a tradition that connects the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Romanticism. Later, however, Yeats develops a different understanding of the natural image: as an emblem in which meaning of the object does not come from natural association but from tradition (which Yeats considers divine), it is not inherent in the object but artificial, ascribed to it. The divine is separated from the object. Herein, de Man argues, Yeats abandons the safe waters of Western art and embarks "on strange seas of thought."[50] Eventually shrinking back from these radical implications, Yeats later returns to the pantheistic conception of the natural image. Yeats' emblem, then, in de Man's interpretation, is in some ways the opposite of the Renaissance emblem. In the Renaissance, the meaning of emblem is also determined by tradition but it is a tradition which assumes, in de Man's terms, a unity of the object and the sacred. In Yeats' conception the meaning of the natural object must be provided artificially by tradition because it is not

[49] Man, Paul de, "Image and Emblem in Yeats," *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984) 177.
[50] Ibid., 168.

contained in the object itself.

To mention de Man's study of Yeats in the context of Edwards might be far fetched; his discussion, however, brings out, even if in extreme contrast, the very same issue which engaged Edwards: how does the natural type represent the meaning of the object? Is the spiritual meaning inherent in the object or is it given by the typologist? Although in Edwards' typological theory meaning is certainly assumed to be inherent in nature, objectively there and identifiable, some difficulties arise when Edwards addresses the details of how this is precisely done and when he attempts to capture the typological correspondences in text. De Man's study of Yeats, a very early text in his career, also anticipates some of the more general issues which he articulates more fully on a more general level later. The contrast which he here finds between Yeats' early natural image and his later emblem anticipates the contrast he highlights between Romantic symbol and Romantic allegory. To apply the themes opened up in this chapter to Edwards more fully, it becomes necessary to move beyond the realm of existing Edwards scholarship and consider them in a broader theoretical perspective. Two of the most pressing issues, the performative nature of Edwards' natural typology and the problem of subjectivity are considered in the next chapter and the issue of the type's rhetorical form as a species of allegory and the manner of typological representation in the following.

Chapter 5

Typology and Performative

Continuously until near midnight I wallowed and reeked with Jonathan in his insane debauch; rose immediately refreshed and fine at 10 this morning, but with a strange and haunting sense of having been on a three days' tear with a drunken lunatic . . . All through the book is the glare of a resplendent intellect gone mad—a marvellous spectacle. No, not *all* through the book—the drunk does not come on until the last third, where what I take to be Calvinism and its God begins to show up and shine red and hideous in the glow from the fires of hell, their only right and proper adornment. By God I was ashamed to be in such company.

Samuel Langhorne Clemens on reading the *Freedom of the Will*[1]

In an already quoted passage in the "Types" notebook Edwards speaks of typology as a language which the believer is to learn and become well acquainted with. When Edwards explains his typological theory he talks about the believer's task, indeed duty, to learn to *interpret* types in Scripture and in nature. His conception of typology as language, however, also implies that types are a language which the believer must learn to *speak*. This is suggested in the passage:

> And there is, as it were, a certain idiom in that language which is to be learnt the same that the idiom of any language is . . . Great care should be used, and we should endeavor to be well and thoroughly acquainted, or we shall never understand [or] have a right notion of the idiom of the language. If we go to interpret divine types without this, we shall be just

[1] In a letter to the Reverend J. H. Twichell, February 1902. Qtd. in May, Henry F., "Jonathan Edwards and America," *Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience,* eds. Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (Oxford, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1988) 23.

> like one that pretends to speak any language that han't thoroughly learnt it . . .
>
> God han't expressly explained all the types of Scriptures, but has done so much as is sufficient to teach us the language.[2]

"We shall be like one that pretends to speak any language that han't thoroughly learnt it." Clearly the believer's participation in the language of typology is different from a detached examination of a closed set of types. The believer must enter the language and become an active participant. Edwards insists in the "Types" that the believer must actively seek out new types in the Bible and in the created world and he practices this in "Images of Divine Things." To discover a new type: what else is that than to *name* it, to pronounce it to be a type? But that opens immediately a new question, one which Edwards and many of his critics would consider the most pressing one and which has already been mentioned: does the believer discover an existing type and *state* the fact, or does he or she *proclaim* something to be a type and so in fact create or invent a new type? Put this way, the question reflects a distinction made by J. L. Austin between a "constative" and a "performative" utterance. This chapter considers if an examination of Edwards' typology from the perspective of Austin's speech act theory can shed light on some of the issues involved in Edwards' project.

In *How to Do Things with Words* Austin challenges the general presupposition of treating sentences as stating facts and considers utterances as acts of speech. He argues that some utterances are performative; instead of stating a fact, they perform an act. These are, for example, "I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth,*" "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow,"

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[2] *WJE* 11: 151.

"I declare war" or "I promise to."[3] "In these examples it seems clear," Austin explains, "that to utter the sentence (in, of course, appropriate circumstances) is not to *describe* my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it."[4] These utterances cannot be said to be either true or false. Rather, one must consider the efficacy of such speech acts and Austin proceeds to define the conditions of the "felicity" (success) of the performative utterance. He lays down six rules "necessary for the smooth or 'happy' functioning of a performative" and warns that "if we sin against any one (or more) of these six rules, our performative utterance will be (in one way or another) unhappy."[5] At the other pole of Austin's binary is the constative utterance which describes something or states some fact and which, consequently, is said to be either true or false.

Applied to Edwards' typology, Austin's basic categories of constative and performative utterance appear to correspond to the two different outlooks on Edwards' theory. In Edwards' theological framework, the believer's utterance (whether actually spoken, written or merely thought) would be constative: it would state a fact, describe an existing state of affairs. On the other hand the opponents of Edwards' confidence in discovering new types (those whom Edwards expects would call him a "man of a very fruitful brain and copious fancy"[6]) together with later critics such as Perry Miller (who has not failed to point out that at the end of Edwards' effort was an universe governed not by the will of God but by the insight of Jonathan Edwards)[7] would tend to see the believer's typological "speech acts"

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[3] Austin, J. L., *How to Do Things with Words,* ed. J. O. Urmson and Maria Sbisa, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) 5, 7, 9.
[4] Ibid., 6; original emphasis.
[5] Ibid., 14, 15.
[6] *WJE* 11: 152.
[7] "After studying his manuscript, the reader may indeed wonder whether Edwards recognized that in reverting to typology he was actually furthering the revolution, that while professing to be a Calvinist he was reaching out for a method of interpreting both revelation and providence in which the

as performative, of the kind which Austin exemplifies by "I name this ship the *Queen Elizabeth.*" Edwards looks at silkworm and pronounces it to be a type of Christ; if the appropriate conditions are met, the thing or event is thereby ranked with the typological order.

Of course Edwards' sole guarantee for his typological claims is theological: he assumes an objectively existing and verifiably discoverable divine order of the universe and its inherent meaningfulness; the typological meaning of the phenomena of nature has been divinely instituted. He hopes that with the help of the Holy Spirit the believer will learn to distinguish between the erroneous and the correct interpretation of the spiritual meaning of the cosmos, in other words not use "barbarous expressions" but learn the proper "idiom of the language." But it might be said that from Edwards' theological perspective the typological utterance is both constative and performative: when Edwards sees the silkworm and pronounces it to be a type of Christ, his speech act is constative (I have discovered that the silkworm is a part of the typological order and that it signifies Christ) and also performative (I therefore declare it to be a type).

Austin himself questions the distinction between constative and performative even as he attempts to establish it. Later in his book he modifies the simple dichotomy and subdivides speech acts into "illocutionary acts" (performed *in* saying something) and "perlocutionary acts" (performed *by* saying something) while he uses the term "locutionary acts" for the general sense of saying something "which includes the utterance of certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e. with a certain

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governing principle would be not the will of God but the insight of Jonathan Edwards" (Introduction 40).

sense and with a certain reference."[8] Despite this refinement of his initial classification Austin acknowledges that the distinction between the categories is difficult to maintain. He concedes:

> What then finally is left of the distinction of the performative and constative utterance? Really we may say that what we had in mind here was this:
>
> (*a*) With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects of the speech-act, and we concentrate on the locutionary; moreover, we use an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts—over-simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. This is the ideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances for any purpose, to any audience, &c. Perhaps it is sometimes realized.
>
> (*b*) With the performative utterance, we attend as much as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondence with facts . . .
>
> Furthermore, in general the locutionary act as much as the illocutionary act is an abstraction only: every genuine speech-act is both.[9]

"Constative" and "performative" are thus ideal categories which are "perhaps sometimes realized" and likewise "locutionary" and "illocutionary" are abstractions.

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[8] Austin 94.
[9] Ibid., 145-147.

Later Austin finds it necessary again to attempt a yet more nuanced and precise classification. This, however, results in a tedious proliferation of categories which attempt to do justice to the manifold uses of everyday language. The last example of an application of his theory to a specific problem at the very end of his final lecture (the really "interesting" thing to which his theory would lead and which he regrettably does not have time to do), the uses of the word "good," in particular shows this, and Hillis Miller rightly points out that "the project frays out into increasingly unmanageable complexity, the complexity of everyday usage in ordinary language."[10]

Nevertheless, Austin's discovery of a difference between the constative and the performative utterance remains valid, and relevant to an examination of Edwards' typology. But the point is not to decide whether Edwards' typology is constative or performative. At that level a consideration of Edwards' typology in terms of Austin's theory would not go beyond the repetition of the two sides in a debate which remains essentially theological. But Austin's own suggestion that "constative" and "performative" are not simply opposites opens a different venue for the consideration of the problems of Edwards' typology. Austin's observation has been further discussed by Jacques Derrida in his response to *How to Do Things with Words* in "Signature Event Context" and, his critique having received a critical response from J. R. Searle, in his response to Searle entitled "Limited Inc a b c . . ." Derrida's pursuit of the implications of Austin's classification and his analysis of the assumptions behind Austin's theory will help address some problems in Edwards' typology from a different perspective, apart from the pervasive question of "could Edwards possibly be right?"

Derrida's criticism of Austin not only touches upon certain points of his theory but

[10] Miller, Hillis J., *Speech Acts in Literature* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001) 13.

more fundamentally is based on a different view of language. Derrida argues that the primary conception of language as *spoken* language is a specific feature and product of the epoch of logocentrism, characterized by the "determination of the meaning of being in general as *presence.*"[11] Writing is consequently considered secondary: "The epoch of the logos thus debases writing considered as mediation of mediation and as a fall into the exteriority of meaning."[12] Writing has two main predicates: absence (it functions in the absence of the sender and of the receiver) and iterability (both repetition and difference, "the possibility of every mark to be repeated and still to function as a meaningful mark in new contexts that are cut off entirely from the original context, the 'intention to communicate' of the original maker of the mark," in the words of Hillis Miller[13]). Derrida holds that the traits of the classical concept of writing apply to all language and that consequently language should be primarily understood as writing.[14] Writing cannot be subsumed under communication while Austin, Derrida argues, precisely understands speech acts as merely acts of communication. Secondly, iterability as one the essential characteristics of writing carries with itself the impossibility of determining context, one of the crucial suppositions of Austin's book. Derrida shows this on an impasse which arises, inevitably, in Austin's theory: Austin's difficulty with citation.

At the beginning of *How to Do Things with Words* Austin makes an important qualification. His theory will consider only "serious utterances" for only those can become felicitous performatives: "Surely the words must be spoken 'seriously' and so as to be taken

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[11] *Grammatology* 12; original emphasis.
[12] Ibid., 13.
[13] *Speech Acts* 78.
[14] Derrida, Jacques, *Limited Inc.*, trans. Samuel Weber, Jeffrey Mehlman, Alan Bass (Evanston, Il.: Northwestern University Press, 1988) 10.

'seriously'? . . . I must not be joking, for example, nor writing a poem."[15] And a little further:

> a performative utterance will, for example, be *in a peculiar way* hollow or void if said by an actor on the stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy. This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance—a sea-change in special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways—intelligibly—used not seriously, but in ways *parasitic* upon its normal use—ways which fall under the doctrine of the *etiolations* of language. All this we are *excluding* from consideration. Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary circumstances.[16]

(In fact, when Austin calls the literary use of language "parasitic" upon normal use he seems to be repeating the same gesture as John Locke in his *Essay* or as the Puritans who wished to bridle rhetoric and figurative use of language so as not to obscure the "serious" sense of Scripture.) Derrida's contention is that figurative language, literature and jokes are not parasitic. Instead, the conditions for such aspects of language are a possibility always inherent in all language and they cannot therefore be "excluded."[17]

Derrida argues that all performative utterances can be cited—for example on the stage. But Austin considers citation not normal, parasitic upon discourse. Derrida points out that citation is, on the contrary, an essential trait of a performative and demonstrates Austin's impasse in his discussion of the performative function of signature. A performative

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[15] Austin 9.
[16] Ibid., 22; original emphasis.
[17] *Limited Inc* 57.

does not necessarily have to be a verb in the first person, indicative mood, active voice. Austin provides the following variants of performative utterances: "'You are warned that the bull is dangerous' is equivalent to 'I, John Jones, warn you that the bull is dangerous' or This bull is dangerous. (Signed) John Jones."[18] Derrida shows that while Austin on the one hand excludes citation as parasitic upon normal discourse, signature has to be iterable in order to be performative, indeed in order to function as a signature at all: "In order to function, that is, to be readable, a signature must have a repeatable, iterable, imitable form; it must be able to be detached from the present and singular intention of its production."[19]

This is but one particular instance in which the difficulties of Austin's theory become especially clear. Derrida, and together with him Hillis Miller, point out the problems of Austin's rules for distinguishing between a constative and a performative utterance. Miller explains that if iterability is indeed an original trait of any utterance, the most fundamental presuppositions of Austin's theory are challenged[20]: the self-presence of the "I" (the "I" in full possession of his senses who is in a position to utter a performative sentence at a given moment, his intention not disturbed by any interference of the unconscious), the assumption of intention and of the single receiver as the destination of the message, and the assumption of determinable context. The conditions for a happy performative as Austin lays them down can never be met.

What, then, of the distinction between a performative and a constative utterance? Austin himself concedes at one point: "Surely, to state is every bit as much to perform an illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce";[21] statements are liable to the very same

[18] Austin 62.
[19] *Limited Inc* 20.
[20] *Speech Acts* 86-111.
[21] Austin 134.

kinds of infelicity as performatives. And Hillis Miller asks: is *How to Do Things with Words* constative or performative—the very same question that one is tempted to ask about Edwards' typology. What comes out in Miller's consideration of the issue is the impossibility of giving an either/or answer. Indeed, the question is beside the point for what must be considered are rather the grounds for constative and performative functions or uses of language. Any link between speech act theory and Edwards' typology should also be considered from this perspective.

The two basic assumptions which uphold Austin's theory and which Derrida's analysis dismantles are, as Hillis Miller puts it, the authority of the "I" and the subordination of the fictive to the real. The latter, as has already been suggested, is not unlike Edwards' subordination of rhetoric to theology, discussed in a previous chapter. The authority of the "I" is, again, the core of the contention between Edwards and those who see his typology as a highly subjective enterprise. A close examination of the role of the self in typology is therefore in place. To escape the narrow limits of the debate and to get beyond the theological argument, however, typology will first be considered in a larger context in its relationship to Derrida's notion of language as writing and to what Derrida calls logocentrism. From that perspective, other aspects of Edwards' typology and the role of the self in it might become apparent.

The epoch of the logos, Derrida argues in *Of Grammatology*, privileges the conception of language as speech. The conception of the sign as a unity of the signifier and the signified belongs to this age of "phonocentrism." In this conception, the signified, the thing referred to, is marked by its proximity to the logos:

> The semiological or, more specifically, linguistic "science" cannot therefore

> hold on to the difference between signifier and signified—the very idea of the sign—without the difference between sensible and intelligible, certainly, but also not without retaining, more profoundly and more implicitly, and by the same token the reference to a signified able to "take place" in its intelligibility, before its "fall," before any expulsion into the exteriority of the sensible here below. As the face of pure intelligibility, it refers to an absolute logos to which it is immediately united. This absolute logos was an infinite creative subjectivity in medieval theology: the intelligible face of the sign remains turned toward the word and the face of God.[22]

In consequence, writing in this age cannot be considered but secondary. Writing is thought of as "dead letter" which kills life. There is, even in this epoch, however, also another conception of writing, in contrast to the understanding of writing as a mediation of mediation. It is the conception of natural, universal writing, divine inscription: "the writing of the truth in the soul, opposed by *Phaedrus* (278a) to bad writing (writing in the 'literal' [*propre*] and ordinary sense, 'sensible' writing, 'in space'), the book of Nature and God's writing, especially in the Middle Ages."[23] But this notion of a good, natural language, Derrida argues, is made possible by a metaphor of immediacy. Thus the natural writing only confirms the primacy of the logos:

> Writing in the common sense is the dead letter, it is the carrier of death. It

[22] *Grammatology* 13.
[23] Ibid., 15.

> exhausts life. On the other hand, on the other face of the same proposition, writing in the metaphoric sense, natural, divine, and living writing, is venerated; it is equal in the dignity to the origin of value, to the voice of conscience as divine law, to the heart, to sentiment, and so forth. . . . Natural writing is immediately united to the voice and breath. Its nature is not grammatological but pneumatological.[24]

What then, precisely, is the epoch of logocentrism to which this double conception of writing belongs, according to Derrida? It is "covered by the history of metaphysics, and in a more explicit and more systematically articulated way to the narrower epoch of Christian creationism and infinitism when these appropriate the resources of Greek conceptuality."[25] It is, indeed, the history of Western thought, and Derrida concedes that it is impossible, at least at present, to abandon its way of thinking. Clearly, Edwards the Christian philosopher must be quite immersed in this logocentric-metaphysical-theological view.

Derrida is particularly interested in the "theme of God's book,"[26] in the idea of the book of nature which has to do with the conception of "good" writing. Because this kind of writing is divine and universal, it is also necessarily comprehended:

> Comprehended, therefore, within a totality, and enveloped in a volume of a book. The idea of the book is the idea of a totality, finite or infinite, of the signifier; this totality of the signifier cannot be a totality unless a totality constituted by the signified preexists it, supervises its inscriptions and its

[24] Ibid., 17.
[25] Ibid., 13.
[26] Ibid., 15.

> signs, and is independent of it in its ideality. The idea of the book, which always refers to a natural totality, is profoundly alien to the sense of writing. It is the encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentrism against the disruption of writing, against its aphoristic energy, and, as I shall specify later, against difference in general.[27]

It is this tension, if it may be so called, between the totality implied in the idea of the book of nature and the "disruption of writing" which will be found in Edwards' natural typology. The two different conceptions of writing which Derrida discusses are also present in Edwards. Other than the two general themes, the Book of Scripture and the Book of Nature, Edwards does not frequently employ the notion of good writing; language as spoken language has primacy in his thought. Even the writing of the Book of Scripture is essentially pneumatological, to put it with Derrida. The Bible has been inspired by the Holy Spirit; inspiration and spirit, of course, mean breath and are on the side of speaking. When Edwards speaks of conversion he often puts it in terms of a new principle "infused" into the soul and of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, rather than of a new law written in the heart. Most clearly, without the Holy Spirit, even the Scripture is "dead letter" and has no power to change a person's heart: "The Word alone, however managed, explained, confirmed and applied, is nothing but a dead letter without the Spirit."[28] Edwards' metaphors for conversion and for the difference between the unregenerate and the regenerate life are often based on sense experience: sight or taste, most typically, which can hardly have any bearing to a written text. In this contrast, the word enlivened by the Holy Spirit is associated with life and

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[27] Ibid., 18.

[28] *The Threefold Work of the Holy Ghost; WJE* 14: 433. See also *Religious Affections; WJE* 2: 274 or "Miscellanies," no. 204; *WJE* 13: 340.

so belongs alongside those metaphors of sense which imply the perceptions of a living organism. Without the Spirit, the word remains but dead letter, even liable to be misused by the devil against the life-giving breath of the Holy Spirit.[29]

And yet, despite Edwards' logocentrism, there are aspects in his thought, and particularly in his typological theory, in which the "encyclopedic protection of theology and of logocentrism" with its assumption of a present subject gives way, if not to the "disruption of writing," at least to a certain destabilizing of the presence of the subject. This will be seen as certain fissures in Edwards' typological theory become apparent in a consideration of the role of the self in typology. It has been mentioned above that the sole guarantee which Edwards has for his typology is theological. In that theological outlook, it is the role of the self which both Edwards and his opponents consider of key importance in the typological project. To understand this more precisely, the role of judgment in typology must be followed closely and in connections with Edwards' understanding of the mind.

Edwards argues that believers must use their own judgment in identifying and interpreting types in the natural world. He realizes that this is the main point of contention and he repeatedly tries to prove his point by deducing its necessity from Scripture. First, the believer must discover new types in *Scripture*:

> When we are sufficiently instructed that all these things [in the Old Testament] were typical and had their spiritual signification, it would be on some accounts as unreasonable to say that we must interpret no more of them than the Scripture has interpreted for us, and than we are told the

[29] By the time Edwards writes the *Religious Affections* the "enthusiasm" he has witnessed during the religious revivals leads him to speak, unlike in some of his earlier texts, of the imagination as the "devil's grand lurking place, the very nest of foul and delusive spirits" (*WJE* 2: 288).

> meaning of in the New Testament, as it would be to say that we must interpret prophecy, or prophetical visions and types, no further than the Scripture has interpreted it to our hand.[30]

In natural typology the problem of correct understanding becomes even more pressing. Even identifying and understanding types of Christ and the new dispensation in the Old Testament is not always correct, as Edwards' argument for the importance of typological interpretation of Scripture suggests, but if an object in nature or a part of general human experience is to be interpreted, the believer has even less help available. Spiritual analogies to some phenomena of nature might be found in Scripture but compared to the vast ocean of possibilities ("I believe the whole universe . . . be full of images of divine things"[31]) the sum of those offered in the Bible is a miniscule fragment. And yet Edwards argues for natural typology just as he does for the interpretation of types in the Bible. In that central passage of his typological theory where natural typology is metaphorically described as language, he writes (to highlight again those points which are most pertinent to the question of judgment): "And there is, as it were, a certain idiom in that language which is to be learnt the same that the idiom of any language is . . . by much use and acquaintance together with a good taste or judgment, by comparing one thing with another and having our senses as it were exercised to discern it."[32] Since this is a crucial passage in which Edwards explains how natural typology is actually "done" it deserves close attention. Articulated within this metaphorical paradigm, the use of judgment in typology is described as the process of language learning. To learn the language of types, judgment must be trained and practiced.

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[30] "Types"; *WJE* 11: 146-147.
[31] *WJE* 11: 152.
[32] *WJE* 11: 151.

For an understanding of the background of Edwards' view of judgment a brief look at Edwards' philosophical notes is in place. In Edwards' notebook on "The Mind" judgment is discussed several times in connection to sensation. By judgment, sense experience is interpreted. Senses are certain in no other way than "by constant experience"; if they seem to deceive us it is only "because our situation does not allow us to make trial, or our circumstances do not lead us to it, and so we are apt to judge by our experience in other and different cases."[33] The category of truth or fallibility is thus reserved for the judgment.

Edwards distinguishes between judgment which relies directly on innate dispositions and judgment developed by experience. The former kind relies on the knowledge of self-evident truths which precede any act of judgment. So ideas are united in universals in the mind "without deliberation."[34] And, "things that we know by immediate sensation, we know intuitively, and they are properly self-evident truths."[35] Consequently, all demonstrative reasoning consists in "the knowledge of self-evident truths."[36] Different from this is the other kind of judgment, developed from experience. This judgment is involved in reasoning but also in many situations where habit has come to supply the deliberate act of reflection: "The mind passes a judgment in multitudes of cases where it has learned to judge by perpetual experience, not only exceedingly quick, as soon as one thought can follow another, but absolutely without any reflection at all, and at the same moment without any time intervening."[37]

When Edwards thinks about judgment in typology, it is this latter kind that he has in mind, judgment formed by experience. It is impossible that judgment exercised in typology

[33] No. 53; *WJE* 6: 369.
[34] No. 43; *WJE* 6: 362.
[35] No. 19; *WJE* 6: 346.
[36] No. 58; *WJE* 6: 373.
[37] No. 59; *WJE* 6: 373.

be intuitive. Typological truth is not self-evident. The mind is not "naturally trained up in it," "that is not the way in which corrupt mankind learned divine language."[38] Typological judgment does not even become intuitive after regeneration. Even then it must be developed, Edwards maintains, "by much use and acquaintance" and the believer's senses must be "exercised" in typology. That means that the regenerate believer, even when he or she is given a new disposition in regeneration, will not see the typological meaning of the world immediately and intuitively. In Edwards' theology, however, the mistakes the believer might make in learning the language will be sooner or later recognized as such and the believer, because enabled by the Holy Spirit, will eventually learn to distinguish between the erroneous and the correct interpretation of the spiritual meaning of the cosmos ("God . . . has done so much as is sufficient to teach us the language"[39]).

Nevertheless, the implication persists that the only way to learn correct typology is by a training of judgment, by practice. In other words, by a method of trial and error. This might be a rough way of putting it but Edwards does not do much to withstand the force of this suggestion. Of course Edwards attempts to lay down some rules for this language learning. There is, in fact, only one specific rule which Edwards articulates for the process of learning the language of typology[40]:

> First, to lay down that persons ought to be exceeding careful in interpreting of types, that they don't give way to a wild fancy; not to fix an interpretation unless warranted by some hint in the New Testament of its

[38] "Types"; *WJE* 11: 151.
[39] Ibid.
[40] The vague formulation of "much use and acquaintance together with a good taste and judgment" has been already noticed in a previous chapter on Edwards' understanding of typology as language.

> being the true interpretation, or a lively figure and representation contained or warranted by an analogy to other types that we interpret on sure grounds.[41]

If there is no other way to learn typology than by training and practice, everything depends on the possibility of verifying typological judgment. Just as judgment in sensation can be certain only when sensation is constantly verified by experience, typological judgment must be verified against Scriptures. But Edwards' solution does not remove the difficulty. Even God's own revelation comes in "symbols and emblems" and in "types and figures and enigmatical speeches," as Edwards writes in the "Types of the Messiah."[42] Furthermore, all language referring to spiritual things is but secondary, derived by analogy to material things, as has been discussed in a previous chapter. And even if some types could be interpreted on "sure grounds" the analogy between them and other newly discovered types could still be misconstrued. When Edwards' arguments are brought side by side, the consequence for typological judgment is that it can only be verified against more typology or figurative expressions which are in turn liable to the same problems of interpretation.

Edwards' attempt to secure the use of judgment in typology by subordinating the authority of the self to the authority of Scripture is ill-fated and, to a modern mind, impossible. Ultimately, it is the believer who must decide on a "correct" interpretation of Scripture. It seems, then, that Edwards' thought relies indeed on the authority the self: the "I" who tries his or her hand at typology and then determines if the type which might have been discovered is in agreement with other approved types in nature or in Scripture and if it

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[41] "Types"; *WJE* 11: 148.
[42] *WJE* 11: 193.

is in agreement with the doctrines of the (Protestant and Calvinist, in Edwards' case) Christian faith. Like Austin's assumption of the speaking "I" in full possession of his senses and in the authority to utter a performative, Edwards seems to assume this controlling "I," the ultimate authority higher even, by implication, than Scripture itself. Like Austin's rules for a felicitous performative, Edwards' rules for a correct typological utterance reveal some serious blind spots. And yet there are reasons to look beyond this simple comparison and to qualify the conclusion of Edwards' critics who see the main problem of his typology in subjectivity. Although Edwards of course assumes the self to be in control of its utterances and able to distinguish between a description or statement of facts and what Austin would call a performative, there are moments when this authority of the "I" is questioned. One of them is precisely Edwards' difficulty in finding convincing rules for the practice of typology and the ensuing suggestion that typology is learned by trial and error. Further, it might be argued following the implications of Edwards' thought that the self is *already articulated* within the discourse of typology, even as it acts as if it was in control over it, distinguishing the true from the false type and inventing or discovering this field of discourse. If the world is *full* of types, as Edwards says, is not the self also a type? There are several arguments which support this contention.

On a general level, first of all, the self's very existence implies God, according to Edwards. In the notebook on "The Mind" Edwards finds it inconceivable that there should be absolute nothing: such possibility is a "dreadful contradiction."[43] In Edwards' theology the self is part of the divine order and harmony of creation and participates in the great consent of being to being which Edwards discusses in his treatise on *The Nature of True Virtue.* And even more straightforwardly, Edwards argues for a typological significance of the self:

[43] No. 30; *WJE* 6: 352.

"There is also an image of [the Trinity] in every created mind: there is the mind, and its understanding or idea, and the will or affection or love."[44] The "I" which learns to speak the language of types is one of them; it already exists in the discourse which it seems to produce and control.

The self's lack of distance from the language of typology becomes apparent in a telling moment of indetermination which is an inherent part of the process of learning the language of typology. Since Edwards' theory precludes, as has been argued, an easy way of verifying typological judgment, the possibility of an erroneous typology ought to be seriously considered. The inability, even if temporary, of the regenerate self to recognize the truth even with divine assistance is always contained as a possibility in the typological endeavor. If learning the language of typology proceeds by trial and error, the possibility of error must be taken as seriously as the possibility of success. The moment the believing subject "speaks" a type, he or she cannot yet know whether it is true or false, whether a divine type has been discovered or merely a human trope invented. At this particular moment at least the self cannot make the distinction between "barbarous expressions" and "the proper beauty of the language." The self, itself a type, is revealed, at a crucial moment, not to be in control of the discourse of typology.

Obviously these are implications in Edwards' typology, not a major point of his theory. If this is correct, however, those Edwards' critics who, like Perry Miller, see the major problem of his typology in the danger of subjectivity, need to modify their argument. For Edwards' thought itself thwarts the assumption that is at the heart of the argument thus formulated, the assumption that the self *either* reliably discovers divine order of creation *or* invents spiritual analogies by its own imagination. Although Edwards does not present a full

[44] "Miscellanies," no. 362; *WJE* 13: 435.

fledged theory of the self there are arguments in some of his writings from which one may gather some notes toward an understanding of the self. These are particularly connected with his views on identity, formulated to a certain extent as a response to Locke, in some of the shorter notes in "The Mind" and in the "Miscellanies" and also at the end of the *Original Sin.* Although the *Religious Affections* are a work of practical theology and not of philosophy, the general tenor is also of relevance, as is Edwards' construction of the self in his own "Personal Narrative." A closer look at Edwards' understanding of the self in these contexts will help to suggest that Edwards should not be taken too easily to understand the self to be as reliable and in control of its language as might seem from his more confident typological arguments.

From a philosophical perspective, in "The Mind" notebook Edwards looks at the self in terms of consciousness and identity. Consciousness is defined as the mind's capacity for self-reflection, "a sort of feeling within itself."[45] He argues that in itself consciousness is not what ultimately constitutes identity. In entry 72 Edwards notes that "identity of person is what seems never yet to have been explained. It is a mistake that it consists in sameness or identity of consciousness."[46] He argues, specifically against Locke, that identity of persons cannot consist in the identity of consciousness because God can create two persons with identical consciousness and yet they would be two separate persons:

> Yea, there seems to be nothing of impossibility in the nature of things, but that the Most High could, if he saw fit, cause there to be another being who should begin to exist, in some distant part of the universe, with the same ideas I now have after the manner of memory, and should henceforward

[45] No. 16; *WJE* 6: 345.
[46] *WJE* 6: 385.

> coexist with me, we both retaining a consciousness of what was before the moment of his first existence in like manner, but thenceforward should have a different train of ideas. Will anyone say that he, in such a case, is the same person with me, when I know nothing of his sufferings and am never the better for his joys?[47]

In other words, my consciousness and memory does not yet constitute my identity as a subject. Rather, for Edwards, identity is secured by the idea of the self in the mind of God—I am insofar as God has the idea of me.[48] And more precisely, the continuation of my identity as a person does not inhere in any substance of the self but solely in the power and unceasing activity of God, as Edwards makes clear in his argument against the philosophical assumption of substance in "The Mind," no. 61 where he concedes that it is "so exceedingly natural" for men to assume that bodies are upheld and continued in existence by some "latent substance": "All therefore agree that there is something that is there, and upholds these properties [of bodies]; and it is most true, there undoubtedly is. But men are wont to content themselves in saying merely that it is something; but that 'something' is he by whom all things consist."[49] Opposing the materialist notion that substance is matter, Edwards looks for an idealist explanation. He ponders if resistance could be the substance of bodies and finally dismisses the possibility. Anderson summarizes his position[50]:

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[47] *WJE* 6: 386.
[48] Cf. "The Mind," nos. 34, 40; *WJE* 6: 353, 356.
[49] *WJE* 6: 380.
[50] Anderson, Wallace E., Editor's Introduction, *Scientific and Philosophical Writings*, *WJE* 6: 1-141. Anderson gives an overview of Edwards' early philosophy in the context of contemporary philosophy (Locke, Newton, More, Berkeley, Descartes and others) in 54-75.

> The actual resistance of a body, he argues, is something that needs a causal explanation, and therefore cannot be the essence of a substance. Nevertheless, he holds, resistance is the essence of bodies: it depends upon no other property of bodies, but all the other real properties of bodies depend upon it. It follows, therefore, that bodies cannot be substances, and cannot exist by themselves, but must depend upon some other substance which causes their resistance.
>
> Edwards describes this cause as God's infinite power, and resistance is the immediate effect of God's voluntarily exerting his power, or his "acting in that particular manner in those parts of space where he thinks fit." Resistance is not to be conceived as an extraneous product of such action as though something made by it, for it endures only so long as God's action continues. Resistance results immediately from God's acting rather as a performance results from the performing of it, for example, as the raising of an arm results from the act of raising it. It is in this way that Edwards understands God and his power to be the substance of bodies, and indeed to be *ens entium*, the substance of all things.[51]

The suggestion of Edwards' idealism and occasionalism is pursued further by Michael Colacurcio. Colacurcio argues that throughout his career Edwards "is keeping the terms of his early idealist speculations steadily before him,"[52] even while engaging in debates

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[51] Ibid., 67.

[52] Colacurcio, Michael J., "The Example of Edwards: Puritan Imagination and the Metaphysics of Sovereignty," *Doctrine and Difference: Essays in the Literature of New England* (New York, London: Routledge, 1997) 68.

regarding the revival and while writing the *Religious Affections*, and he makes a powerful case for the culmination of Edwards' idealism in the *Original Sin*. Even if his emphasis might be somewhat one-sided,[53] it seems to be not entirely mistaken. It is particularly relevant to the understanding of the self in Edwards' thought. Clyde Holbrook also suggests, in his introduction to the *Original Sin*, that Edwards may have returned to his speculations on identity in "The Mind" while writing the *Original Sin*[54] which is very plausible, given his mention of Locke's theory of identity in a passage quoted below.

In the *Original Sin*, it is particularly Part Four, "Containing Answers to Objections," and its Chapter Three, "That great objection against the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity considered, that such imputation is unjust and unreasonable, inasmuch as Adam and his posterity are not one and the same,"[55] which is of relevance to the issue of the self. Colacurcio notes how the main problem of the doctrine of original sin, the imputation of Adam's sin to all mankind, is redefined by Edwards into a problem of identity: "'imputation' turns from the moralistic question of how, in all justice, God could make or declare all men to be sinners before any human act on their part into the ontological question of how, in all reason, God could possibly treat Adam and all other men as the same moral person."[56] The passage in which Edwards turns to this philosophical problem deserves to be quoted at some length:

> The objection, however specious, is really founded on a false

[53] There are of course studies which argue against the understanding of Edwards as an idealist. See Colacurcio 263, n. 12.
[54] Holbrook, Clyde A., Editor's Introduction, *Original Sin, WJE* 3: 78. Colacurcio quotes Holbrook in his essay but not this particular suggestion.
[55] *WJE* 3: 389.
[56] Colacurcio 88.

hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call *sameness* or *oneness*, among created things; and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree, in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and Disposer of the universe. . . .

And if we come even to the *personal identity* of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i.e. *same consciousness*; yet I think it can't be denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But 'tis evident, that the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity, that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. . . .

From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature; and so, on the sovereign will and agency of God; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution: and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be the only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that, suppose sameness of substance requisite. For if same consciousness be one thing necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's sovereign constitution, it will still follow, that personal identity depends on God's sovereign constitution.

> And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its duration, I think, we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute independent identity of the First Being, whereby "he is the same yesterday, today, and forever." Nay, on the contrary, it may be demonstrated, that even this oneness of created substance, existing at different times, is a merely *dependent* identity; dependent on the pleasure and sovereign constitution of him who worketh all in all. This will follow from what is generally allowed, and is certainly true, that God not only created all things, and gave them being at first, but continually preserves them, and upholds them in being.[57]

All identity depends on the arbitrary constitution of God, hence if God has established a unity of Adam and mankind, the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity is inevitable and results equally from God's arbitrary constitution. Edwards then continues and expands the scope of arbitrary divine constitution to the "whole course of nature":

> And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the *arbitrary* constitution of the Creator; who by his wise sovereign establishment so unites these successive new effects, that he *treats them as one*, by communicating to them like properties, relations, and circumstances; and so, leads us to regard and treat them as one. When I call this an arbitrary constitution, I mean, that it is a constitution which depends on nothing but the divine will; which *divine will* depends on

[57] *WJE* 3: 397–400.

> nothing but the *divine wisdom*. In this sense, the whole course of nature, with all that belongs to it, all its laws and methods, and constancy and regularity, continuance and proceeding, is an *arbitrary constitution*. In this sense, the continuance of the very being of the world and all its parts, as well as the manner of continued being, depends entirely on an arbitrary constitution: for it don't all *necessarily* follow, that because there was sound, or light, or color, or resistance, or gravity, or thought, or consciousness, or any other dependent thing the last moment, that therefore there shall be the like at the next. All dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun. "In him we live, and move, and have our being."
>
> Thus it appears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, existing at different times, but what depends on *God's sovereign constitution*.[58]

No reason can therefore be given why God's constitution should not treat Adam and his posterity as one; for not only the union of Adam and mankind but indeed all natural laws and the entire created world depend solely of God's sovereign arbitrary constitution. And so, Edwards proceeds, since God's wisdom appears always in "a beautiful *analogy* and *harmony* with *other* laws or constitutions" and in "the good *ends* obtained, or useful *consequences* of such a constitution," the only other thinkable objection against this particular constitution must

[58] *WJE* 3: 402-404.

be that it not as wise in these respects as other cases of oneness of created things. "But what extreme arrogance would it be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of the laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the universe?" asks Edwards rhetorically.[59]

Allowing some relevance of Locke's argument concerning the sameness of consciousness to the conception of identity, Edwards nevertheless does away with everything by which the self would be constituted except the immediate act of God. Continuation of consciousness is a necessary part of identity but not its constitution; the self, together with all nature, depends on nothing else but God himself.[60] This of course is a disturbing claim in many respects and having followed Edwards' argument throughout this chapter of the *Original Sin*, Michael Colacurcio concludes observing "the implication that the Edwardsian metaphysic solves the Problem of Man by making it disappear."[61]

Thomas Schafer finds this problem explicitly present in Edwards' philosophical notes. He argues, from a number of notes in the "Miscellanies" and other texts, that the theme of consciousness and perception and the argument that existence depends on perception is a

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[59] *WJE* 3: 406.

[60] See also Holbrook: "He explicitly stated that personal memory or consciousness was 'one thing essential' to personal identity and then passed on to assert that consciousness itself was not self-sustained, but dependent upon the divine constitution, thus showing that Locke's formulation was acceptable only in part" (81).

[61] Colacurcio 95. James Hoopes finds that Edwards' argument does not answer but in fact confirms the objection that God is, by implication, the author of sin: "By rejecting the view that human identity is constituted substantially, Edwards's metaphysics denied God the possibility of operating through second causes and implied that God's will is the immediate cause of human sin" (Hoopes, James, "Philosophy of the Mind and Self in New Divinity Theology," *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 22.2 (1986): 189-216, *Academic Search Complete*, 1 September 2011 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-e4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11&vid=22&hid=21> 194). Hoopes' article gives an overview of the development of this problem and of the understanding of human identity among Edwards' followers in the New Divinity.

"dominant motif in much of his theology."[62] Commenting on Edwards' late "Notes on Knowledge and Existence" where the theme of arbitrarily constituted identity is continued (in the manner of Part Four, Chapter Three of the *Original Sin*) Schafer adds: "Edwards' doctrine of perception leaves God finally alone, talking to a reflection of himself in a mirror. That, of course, was not Edwards' intention, but it is curious that he never seems to have been aware of this potential objection."[63] Again, though, it would be misleading not to allow for some qualifications of the sweeping implications of this argument; Edwards accomplishes many different things and the "disappearance of Man" is but one perspective of looking at his thought.[64] The mere fact that Colacurcio stops his interpretation of Edwards' works at the *Original Sin* tends to support the impression, shared also by Schafer, that the collapse of everything in God was Edwards' "final word" while in fact Edwards was working on a number of other projects at the same time.[65] Some of Edwards' imagery of the exchange between God and man hovers just at the edge. "Not only does the sun [God] shine in the saints, but they also become little suns, partaking of the nature of the fountain of their

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[62] Schafer, Thomas A., Editor's Introduction, *The "Miscellanies," (Entry Nos. a-z, aa-zz, 1-500), WJE* 13: 48. Colacurcio (104) points out this passage in Schafer's introduction to the first volume of Edwards' "Miscellanies."

[63] Ibid., 49.

[64] There are, of course, scholars who discuss Edwards' understanding of identity without making the suggestion of the self's disappearance in God; see for example Leader; Weddle, David L., "The Image of the Self in Jonathan Edwards: A Study of Autobiography and Theology," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 43.1 (1975): 70-83, *ATLA*, 1 September 2011 <http://ovidsp.tx.ovid.com/sp-3.5.1a/ovidweb.cgi?&S=OPOEFPOCFHDDDLIKNCALNGGCBCMHAA00&Link+Set=S.sh.15|1|sl_170>; Bushman, Richard L., "Jonathan Edwards and Puritan Consciousness," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 5.3 (1966): 383-396, *ATLA*, 1 September 2011 <http://ovidsp.tx.ovid.com/sp-3.5.1a/ovidweb.cgi?&S=OPOEFPOCFHDDDLIKNCALNGGCBCMHAA00&Complete+Reference=S.sh.34|3|1>.

[65] *The End for Which God Created the World* and the project for the "History of the Work of Redemption," to name just two larger ones; see Minkema, Kenneth P., "A Chronology of Edwards' Life and Writings," The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University, 1 September 2011 <http://edwards.yale.edu/research/chronology>.

light."[66] The saints reciprocate God's own nature.[67] With some qualifications, Schafer and Colacurcio make a valid point.

Colacurcio's interpretation of Edwards' sublation of the self in God coincides also, interestingly, with Wayne Lesser's earlier reading of Edwards' "Personal Narrative." Lesser interprets the text as Edwards' search for "a language which will capture the self becoming less a self and more a part of God, a language which does not purport to define what is, but to suggest what is coming into being."[68] Although his approach, possibly inspired by negative theology,[69] and especially his contention that Edwards does find the transformation of language when he turns to the expression "sweet principle," might be slightly far fetched and would deserve broader evidence than Lesser offers from the "Personal Narrative" alone, his perception of Edwards' desire for "the spiritual field where feelings of the self as subject are transvalued into a selfless love for and joy in God"[70] does capture the tenor of many passages in the "Personal Narrative" and corroborates Colacurcio's reading.[71]

Other places in Edwards' writings provide further evidence that Edwards' particular kind of idealism and occasionalism has consequences for his understanding of the self.

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[66] *Religious Affections; WJE* 2: 343.

[67] The reciprocation of God's glory is also the main theme of *The End for Which God Created the World.* For similar imagery see also "Notes on Scripture," no. 348; *WJE* 15: 333 or *Charity and Its Fruits; WJE* 8: 386.

[68] Lesser, Wayne, "Jonathan Edwards: Textuality and the Language of Man," *Critical Essays on Jonathan Edwards,* ed. William J. Scheick (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1980) 296.

[69] "What actually occurs, I believe, is that the human word, unlike scripture, makes the writer-listener aware of the *absence* of the Spirit, of the absence of an ineffable holiness, the presence of which then becomes the object of intense desire" (Lesser 290; original emphasis).

[70] Ibid., 291.

[71] See also De Prospo's observation in a comparison of Edwards' "Personal Narrative" and Franklin's *Autobiography*: "His account may be as revealing 'in its way' as Franklin's, but its way is to reveal God in the extinction of the self rather than to reward prudence in the exaltation of the self" (De Prospo, Richard C., "The 'New Simple Idea' of Edwards' Personal Narrative," *Early American Literature* 14.2 (1979): 193-204, *Academic Search Complete,* 1 September 2011 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=14&hid=21&sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-e4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11> 203).

Besides the philosophical notes in "The Mind" Edwards' practical theology also reflects the same fundamental dependence of the self on God's idea or act.[72] The *Religious Affections* are an interesting case in point, for Edwards' painstaking search for reliable signs of true religious experience shows a deep distrust of the self as an arbiter of its own feelings and experiences (let alone of others' piety). His collection of twelve signs of holy affections in which true religion consists pivots in a large part on the notion of the new spiritual nature given to the believer, the new spiritual sense which involves both the understanding and affections at the same time and is not a new faculty added to a soul but rather an entirely new nature or a new principle through which the believer's soul and all its faculties are transformed.

John Smith argues that while Edwards' conception of the communication of the Spirit in conversion implies a break between nature and grace, Edwards is not entirely consistent on this point and also maintains that "some things are common to gracious affections with other affections."[73] Smith explains Edwards' heavier emphasis on the discontinuity between nature and grace in the *Religious Affections* by Edwards' need to make a strong case in the revival debates and, in a footnote, adds: "JE always maintained the integrity of the self in all actions and affections. There are, of course, problems left over which involve explaining how the new nature bestowed in grace is related to the natural structures of the creature. The underlying theological problem . . . concerns the relation between the activity of God as Creator and as Redeemer."[74] Contrary to Smith, Colacurcio interprets God's supernatural communication to the soul in terms of idealism, as the "unique

[72] Colacurcio (102) also draws attention to entry no. 267 in the "Miscellanies" where Edwards states clearly that the only possible substance of the soul is God himself; *WJE* 13: 373.
[73] *Religious Affections; WJE* 2: 208. See Smith, John E., Editor's Introduction, *Religious Affections, WJE* 2: 25ff.
[74] Ibid., 27 n. 1.

communication of his Spirit as a 'new simple idea'"[75] but like Smith, he finds that the *Religious Affections* raise a problem concerning the self. What Smith describes theologically as the problem of God's activity both as creator and redeemer Colacurcio in effect rephrases from the point of view of the subject; the problem identified by them is essentially the same:

> If God is the only substance, and if ideas are His only a form [sic] of creative expression, what can Edwards say about the ontological status of that human form of consciousness which regularly receives those ideas called nature or, by a different law no less regular, the special idea called grace, and which reflects on the conditions and meaning of that reception?[76]

In this sense, the *Religious Affections*, for all their grounding in practical theology, raise similar questions about the role of the self as Edwards' more philosophical texts.

This digression into the nuances of Edwards' conception of identity and the self has accomplished several goals in the present discussion of typology. This chapter started out linking typology with speech act theory, observing Edwards' interesting suggestion that the believer must learn to speak the language of types. Such typological utterance could be considered, in Austin's terms, constative or performative, depending on whether one accepts Edwards' theory or dismisses it as an enterprise in subjective associations of thoughts. Moreover, a link was sought between Austin's rules for felicitous performatives and Edwards' conditions of correct typology and more specifically, in the possible shortcomings of these

[75] Colacurcio 76.
[76] Ibid., 77.

rules. It has been obvious to many readers that Edwards' rules for typology fail. Derrida has argued that Austin's rules fail, and his analysis considers the problems of Austin's distinction between constative and performative from the perspective of language as writing. Hillis Miller specifies that the difficulties of Austin's theory are based on the assumption of the "I" fully in control of his language and on the exclusion of the "parasitic" kind of discourse.

Those Edwards' critics whom he anticipates in the "Types" and modern readers, exemplified by Perry Miller, to whom Edwards' theory of human possibility to uncover a divinely constituted correspondence between the natural and the spiritual world seems altogether implausible, would see, similarly, problems in Edwards' distinction between the true and the false type and would argue that ultimately the distinction collapses. In a previous chapter it has been argued that Edwards' distinction between a true and a false type must fail, because of Edwards' effort to separate rhetoric from philosophy, to prevent human figurative language from clouding the Word of Scripture, an effort not unlike Austin's removal of poetry from "serious" discourse. It has then been suggested that the failure of Edwards' typological theory also has to do, again similarly to Austin's case, with the assumption that the believer is ultimately the one who decides whether his or her typology is true or false. This is the purport of Perry Miller's argument about the "insight of Jonathan Edwards" replacing the "will of God." And it has been suggested that Edwards' theory can be seen to fail in itself, upon a closer look at his idea of learning the language of typology by a method of trial and error.

But the "failure" is only a failure if the problem centers on the "I" that is or is not in control of typological language. If those scholars who challenge this unquestioned assumption of the self are right, Edwards' dismissal of the substantial self in his philosophy and theology and his radical dependence on God's continuing action for the identity of the

subject opens the matter from a new perspective. In that light, the moment of indeterminacy in typology, the possibility of an erroneous typology inherent in the project, *confirms* the sublation of the self. The self is not apart from typology, there is a possibility that the self is unable to judge typology and that the self is only one of the types: this too points, if indirectly, to Edwards' philosophical refusal of any "substance" of the self which would make it independent of God's direct constitution. The ground of the argument concerning typology might be, ultimately, like that of the *Original Sin*: if God has so constituted the universe that natural things typologically signify spiritual things, He might have so constituted man to communicate to him ideas of this spiritual meaning of nature according to a course He has established, sometimes have him understand and sometimes perhaps not. The implications of the tensions in Edwards' typological theory corroborate the argument-of-last-resort found in the *Original Sin*, like the questions raised by the *Religious Affections* and the textual struggle of the "Personal Narrative" do in terms of practical theology.

Colacurcio's assessment of Edwards' accomplishment as a Christian Philosopher (if not entirely sympathetic, yet clearly convinced that Edwards' achievement was formidable and that Edwards consequently deserves to be included in academic discussions of Early Modern philosophy as well as of Puritanism) warns that Edwards' move brings, in effect, not only the disappearance of man but also the end of philosophy: "Above all else, therefore, the example of Edwards provides the opportunity to observe that Christian Philosophy—even in its Puritanic variety—is interesting only so long as its practitioner can keep the world from collapsing back into the capacious and omnicompetent mind of God."[77] Perhaps the extreme

[77] Colacurcio 95. Colacurcio explicitly defends Edwards' place in Early Modern philosophy "from Descartes to Hume" and points out that those philosophers "have similar embarrassments with the idea of substance—material, or spiritual, or both—as something which depends on nothing else, *except*

consequences of Edwards' Christian Philosophy show the dead end of logocentric thinking. Perhaps this extreme of logocentrism, however, is closer in some respects to the concerns of postmodernism.[78] Certainly Edwards' idea that "all dependent existence whatsoever is in a constant flux, ever passing and returning; renewed every moment, as the colors of bodies are every moment renewed by the light that shines upon them; and all is constantly proceeding from God, as light from the sun"[79] not only calls for a modification in the criticism of Edwards' typological project but also challenges the expectation of a substantial and present self.

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perhaps God, for its own real existence. It is, pretty clearly, all one extended, early modern family" (105; original emphasis).

[78] See also Colacurcio 98-99 and Lesser 292.

[79] *Original Sin*; *WJE* 3: 404.

Chapter 6

Type and Allegory

I love you faded,
old, exiled and afraid
to leave your last flock, a dozen
Houssatonic Indian children;

afraid to leave
all your writing, writing, writing,
denying the Freedom of the Will.
You were afraid to be president

of Princeton, and wrote:
"My defects are well known;
I have a constitution
peculiarly unhappy:

flaccid solids,
vapid, sizzy, scarse fluids,
causing a childish weakness,
a low tide of spirits.

I am contemptible,
stiff and dull.

Why should I leave behind
my delight and entertainment,
those studies
that have swallowed up my mind?"

Robert Lowell
"Jonathan Edwards in Western Massachusetts"[1]

Having discussed the problem of subjectivity in typology, this chapter now returns to a consideration of the manner of the type's representation from a rhetorical perspective. Several other goals are accomplished along the way: typological representation is here related to allegory, or rather to two particular theories of allegory which provide a broader and also a historical context for understanding Edwards' typology and so contribute to the issue of

[1] Lowell, Robert, *For the Union Dead* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1965) 43-44.

Edwards' possible anticipation of Romanticism. The suggestion made in the previous chapter that typology can be considered in terms of its constative and performative functions is then resumed and revised in a reading of Edwards' *History of the Work of Redemption*.

The various scholars who suggest that several points in Edwards' theology might be linked to certain aspects of Romantic theories (such as his emphasis on the sense of the heart or finding divine communications inherently contained in the natural world) or even that his theory of natural typology anticipates Romantic theories of the symbol create the impression that Romanticism is the only literary context for a discussion of Edwards' typology. The older emblematic tradition, for example, which has been explored in a previous chapter receives little or no attention. The result of this bias is a curious neglect in Edwards' literary scholarship of an issue which ought to be one of the most obvious themes to discuss and which consequently remains only in the domain of those studies of Edwards which are conducted from the perspective of historical theology, namely the relationship between type and allegory. The hermeneutical aspects of the connection have already been briefly discussed here, but what of its rhetorical dimension?

This immediately raises a question about precisely what kind of allegory should be considered. It is not necessary to dwell on the perennial complaint that allegory is an extremely broad term and can be defined in many different, often competing or even contradictory ways. For the purposes of this discussion it will suffice to focus on two selected theories of allegory which might help shed some light on the rhetorical connections between allegory and Edwards' type. Michael Murrin argues that Romanticism transforms but also, importantly, continues the key aspects of Renaissance allegorical theory and Paul de Man contrasts allegory in early Romanticism to the Romantic theory of the symbol. The choice is not an obvious one, but it has a double benefit: it introduces two different theories of allegory,

both of which contain points which are relevant for a study of Edwards' type, and it places the interpretations of Edwards' type as an early Romantic symbol in a broader perspective, offering two different views on the symbol itself.

In his "notes towards a theory of allegorical rhetoric in the English Renaissance," which is the subtitle of his book *The Veil of Allegory,* Michael Murrin constructs a theory of Renaissance allegorical poetry focusing in particular on the high allegory of the English Renaissance with Spenser as its chief representative and he draws a very distinct boundary between this allegory and the low, popular kinds. The key feature of the high allegorical tradition by which he distinguishes it from popular allegories is its orientation toward and dependence on an elite audience, an "inner circle" of those who will understand the deep, hidden sense of allegory while the multitude will only be entertained and instructed by the superficial level of the story. In this Renaissance allegorical poetry differs from morality drama and "popular literature of ethical instruction," such as "Puritan polemics" and "similar literature written for the ordinary citizen."[2] In considering Murrin's theory of Renaissance allegory here, then, typology will not be related to allegories like *The Pilgrim's Progress* or popular spiritualizing. This was partly done in previous chapters which discussed typology's connections to emblematics, a literary form which had both an elitist (especially in its early connection to hieroglyphics and Neoplatonism) and a popular dimension. In Murrin's theory, such forms, however, are not considered: "Although a modern mind might classify them as allegories, Harrington, Spenser, and those in the late classical tradition of allegory would not call them so . . . Such art obeys the laws of oratory and never depends

[2] Murrin, Michael, *The Veil of Allegory: Some Notes toward a Theory of Allegorical Rhetoric in the English Renaissance* (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1969) 14.

upon an elite audience. There is no inner circle."[3]

What also makes a discussion of Renaissance allegory of the elitist kind worthwhile in the discussion of Edwards' typology is Murrin's argument that it is this kind of allegorical tradition which is rediscovered and transformed in Romanticism.[4] His claim is that the Romantics revive (and also transform) the older allegorical theory of the poetic process. In so doing, they also create a confusion in terminology: "Coleridge further confused matters, as Angus Fletcher has explained in his study, *Allegory* (1964), in which he distinguished allegory from symbol, meaning by the word *allegory* something closer to an *exemplum* and using the word *symbol* to denote something more like Spenserian allegory."[5] A consideration of Renaissance allegory might provide a fuller context for the understanding of the rhetorical nature of the type and for its connections to the symbol.

First, then, an overview of the key themes of Murrin's theory. Allegory had three meanings in the Renaissance: it meant a particular trope, it was a descriptive term for all extended tropological discourse (and so an overarching term for various tropes, including, for example, riddle, hyperbole, irony, etc.), and most importantly, allegory was practically synonymous with poetry.[6] The poet receives a divine truth in inspiration which he then cloaks with the "veil of allegory" to protect it from being debased by the ignorant multitude. The truth remains accessible to the select few who can understand the tropological code. Murrin summarizes his theory as follows:

> Allegory, then, is an oral art in which the poet expresses a truth he has

[3] Ibid.
[4] Other scholars also make this suggestion, as will be seen.
[5] Ibid., 198.
[6] Ibid., 55.

> received in contemplation . . . through the medium of tropological figures. The learned auditor, knowing how to interpret this kind of language, sees through the veil to the poet's own truth . . . Allegory functions as the visible sign of inward truth in the poet, which the auditor expresses rationally by his interpretations.[7]

Murrin places great emphasis on the fact that poetry was considered an oral art in Tudor England; this helps to explain some features of Renaissance allegories which seem odd to later readers, such as their lack of unity.[8]

The oral nature of allegorical poetry also placed it into the proximity of rhetoric. When poetry was considered an oral art, critics naturally turned to classical handbooks on oratory to find categories for handling poetry. This caused a discrepancy between the two approaches because the goals of the Renaissance allegorical poet were quite different and even contrary to the goals of the orator.[9] While the allegorical poet needs to protect the truth from the multitude by the veil of allegory, making his meaning hidden and accessible to but the select few, the orator on the contrary must be guided by the ideas of his audience and must, most importantly, make his meaning clear to all members of the audience.

Besides the context of oratory Murrin argues that the concept of the veil of allegory cannot be understood without considering also the figures of the prophet and the priest. They provide a context for understanding the role of the allegorical poet. Unlike the classical

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[7] Ibid., 70.
[8] 73. It is, of course, secondary orality, in Walter Ong's terms.
[9] One of the reasons why Renaissance allegory seems so distant to modern readers is, according to Murrin, the fact that "formal English criticism practically begins with Sidney, Puttenham, and Jonson . . . who rejected the traditional identification of poetry with allegory and tried to bring the poet closer to the orator" (4). Modeling their theory of poetry on classical orators and on Aristotle's theory of drama, they necessarily demanded clarity from the poet.

orator, the Jewish prophet cannot yield to the opinions of his audience but must speak the truth which has been revealed to him and in the act of communicating the divine message the prophet in effect creates a separation in his audience between those who would believe and those who would reject: "The prophet finds himself in a paradoxical situation. God is his authority, for no one will listen to a false prophet; but no one will listen to a true one either. Alienation of an audience is actually a sign of divine inspiration."[10] The allegorical poet also practices an exclusive rhetoric but unlike the prophet he determines the division in his audience in advance and by his own consideration. He attempts to overcome the prophetic dilemma in the manner of the other source figure, the wise man (priest, philosopher or poet).

The figure of the priest of the ancient mystery religions became an important context for the Renaissance conception of allegory particularly through the work of the Florentine Platonists, such as Pico della Mirandolla, who read the works of Roman writers. Theirs was an elitist interpretation which was not shared by everyone in the Renaissance, as Murrin admits, but it "developed for allegory a philosophical and psychological justification beyond the reach of the ordinary critic" and "influenced many writers of the sixteenth century."[11] In this understanding, the hierophant, or the philosopher or poet in the Roman world, was, like the Hebrew prophet, dependent on divine inspiration. To avoid the prophetic paradox, however, the poet or the hierophant cloaked his truth with myth so that while addressing everyone, only the elite could see through the veil and understand the deep truth hidden beneath it. The multitude could grasp the moral appeal of the message but not its metaphysical sense. The elite audience could interpret the myth because they shared a common theory of the universe with the poet,

[10] Ibid., 30.
[11] Ibid., 20.

> namely, that the soul mirrors the universe as microcosm to macrocosm . . . the interrelationship of the three worlds which make up the universe: the supercelestial, the celestial, and the sublunary . . . The poet moves up and down the chain of concord, literally exchanging natures as well as names among the three orders. He practices allegory, speaking in a symbolic fashion which he bases not on his subjective imagination but on the objective order of the universe.[12]

Edwards' situation has, of course, much more in common with the prophet than with the hierophant or wise man, though Murrin's comment regarding the poet's certainty that his symbolic mode is based "not on his subjective imagination but on the objective order of the universe" concords with Edwards' convictions regarding his natural typology. The order Edwards assumes is of course different in many respect from that assumed in Renaissance cosmology, although some of the large contours are very similar: it is still an order which is superhuman and transcendental and which includes correspondences between the mind and the universe. But if Edwards' world is one of divine order and hierarchies, it is so in a very different way, a divine order of Newtonian physical laws and scientific explanations of how spiders fly.

The prophetic paradox described by Murrin, however, applies to him part and parcel; the role of the preacher is quite like the role of the prophet. Murrin rightly analyzes the double task of the prophet: to bring divine truth to people and to effect moral reform among them, which is also what Edwards must do as a preacher. To succeed where the prophet fails, Murrin argues, the mythical poet devises a different strategy and uses the veil of allegory:

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[12] Ibid., 47-48.

> The cosmos, then, solved for the poet the most difficult part of the prophet's dilemma. Assuming a common theory of the universe, the poet could safely cloak his truth with myth and expect the educated few to perceive his "unheard of" revelation through the veils of allegory. He could simultaneously affect the morals of the multitude and create gnosis among the few. He did all the prophet had tried to do by separating the two aspects of the prophetic mission: his revelation of truth and his desire for moral reform. The prophet had attempted to stimulate moral improvement directly by the truth he had received from God, and the result was failure. The allegorist, dividing truth from morality by the veil of myth, achieved both ends—at least in theory. The people learned morality from the story of the poet, and the wise understood it.[13]

This shows quite clearly the depth of difference between Edwards and the allegorical tradition. Edwards does not divide truth from morality by the veil of myth and he does not create a separation in his audience in advance by choosing the veil. His is the prophetic dilemma. The division that the Renaissance poet creates in his audience is in typology drawn along different lines: not between those who have the knowledge and erudition to penetrate the veil of allegory and the simple multitude who can only follow the superficial level, but between those who have the true spiritual knowledge of things and those who have a merely speculative understanding of spiritual things.[14] The separation among Edwards' listeners is caused by the divine message itself, in fact has been predetermined from eternity since God

[13] Ibid., 50.
[14] Edwards develops this distinction in "Miscellanies," no. 782 (*WJE* 18: 452-466) and uses it in the *Religious Affections* and a number of sermons.

sovereignly elects those whom he saves and those whom he will leave to damnation. In the understanding of his role as preacher, Edwards is clearly much closer to the Hebrew prophet than the allegorical poet who cloaks the divine truth with myth.

But the role of the preacher and of the typologist are not one and the same, and besides the tempting comparison between the prophet and the preacher there are yet other aspects of Renaissance allegory which pertain to some less obvious but important issues in Edwards' typology. It is particularly the concept of the veil which deserves more attention. The veil is necessary for two reasons: it not only protects the truth from being debased by the multitude but it is inevitable also by an inner necessity, caused by the very nature of the sacred truth. Because the truth received by the poet in inspiration is transcendental, it causes a difficulty in communicating about it:

> The poet must speak in allegories because the truth which he has received is inexpressible and comes to him by divine inspiration . . . Allegory, then, depends upon inspiration or *furor* . . . Both the poet and his auditor have difficulty in explaining tropological discourse, once the *furor* is passed . . . the allegorical truth . . . is experienced in rapture rather than by reason.[15]

This recalls Edwards' views on language regarding spiritual matters and his struggles to define how language can represent spiritual things. His thoughts on this topic have been discussed earlier; here it will suffice to recall them but briefly. First, Edwards' double view of spiritual discourse. Language referring to spiritual matters is secondary, derived by analogy to material things; so the prophets of old had no other way of making their meaning

[15] Murrin 70, 72.

comprehensible than to "point it out with the finger, and so explain themselves as in sensible things."[16] At the same time God himself condescends to communicate to men in this way; figurative language is the chosen divine medium of communication. Secondly, Edwards' double view of types. Types veil, as well as reveal; type are images but also shadows of divine things.[17] Although Edwards does not particularly dwell on the "hiding" aspect of the type, it is a central point of all Christian typology: the type is always inferior to the antitype, imperfect, partial, lacking the fullness of the antitype. This applies to Edwards' natural types as well as traditional Scriptural typology.

Juxtaposing typology and the veil of allegory brings out this important theme more clearly. The Renaissance poet must use allegory because the truth he received in *furor* is inexpressible otherwise. Divine inspiration is translated into allegory, it incites allegory. Allegory not only hides the truth from the multitude; it also functions on several levels and so calls forth multi-layered response of the reader or critic: "this conception of inspiration likewise provides a rationale for the polysemous or allegorical readings of a critic," Murrin explains. "The various levels of allegory represent the attempts by critics to represent this truth in rational terms. They cannot rest content with a single explanation because the allegorical truth, which they wish to define, is inexpressible and is experienced in rapture rather than by reason."[18] According to Murrin, the inexpressible nature of the sacred truth calls forth the multiple meanings of allegory and its multiple interpretations; the attempt to capture the transcendental in language leads to a multiplication of meanings, to polysemousness. What fails is the simple rational explanation once the *furor* is passed; not allegory itself. The multiplicity of levels on which allegory operates, Murrin's interpretation

[16] "The Mind," no. 23; *WJE* 6: 349.
[17] As has been quoted in a previous chapter; "Notes on Scripture," no. 288; *WJE* 15: 247-248.
[18] Murrin 72.

seems to suggest, is the poet's *appropriate* way of representing the inexpressible nature of the sacred truth; the transcendental nature of the truth is reflected in the multiplicity of meaning which is what makes allegory different from ordinary kinds of discourse.

Type, on the other hand, relates to the sacred truth in a very different way. First, while Edwards believes that a type can have more antitypes and an antitype can be represented by multiple types, the issue of multiple levels of meaning is not central at all to his typology. No matter how many types represent one antitype, the multiplicity of connections does not alter the typological relationship; the typological correspondence does not consists in the multiplicity of types but in the analogy between each individual type and the antitype. Secondly, the antitype, properly understood only by the regenerate by their spiritual sense of the heart, always fundamentally excels the type which the believer discovers as its image. The type hides precisely *because* it is merely a figure, a representation, and it reveals only as a figure reveals, imperfectly, as a shadow. Although the type has its own independent existence in relation to the antitype it is always incomplete. By its very nature, the type falls short of representing the antitype adequately; what fails is not the attempt at a simple rational explanation but the type itself. In Murrin's theory, there is no notion of the limit of allegory in representing the sacred truth; the multiple levels of meanings are the sign of the divine truth and capture the transcendental. In typology, the inexpressible nature of the antitype is reflected in the type's essential incompleteness.

Before developing this point further in connection with de Man, it will be useful to resume the thread of Murrin's theory and follow his arguments on the later transformations of allegory. Murrin goes on to argue that the allegorical rhetoric in England climaxes in Spenser's *Faerie Queene* and is then dismissed in Neoclassicism. The major difference, according to Murrin, is the loss of the metaphysical dimension of poetry. Neoclassicism turns

away from divine truth to poetic genius: "If the poet does not receive divine truth, he no longer possesses a special kind of truth beyond ordinary human comprehension and has no justification for concealing it."[19] For Murrin, Neoclassicism brought about a revolution greater than that of Romanticism:

> What happened at the end of the sixteenth century was a shift from a Platonic, metaphysical conception of the poetic art to a craftsmanlike concern for the finished product—without the metaphysics . . . poetry moved from a prophetic mode into the orator's normal mode. Poetry no longer stirred men's memories and recalled them to their true natures; it pleased their minds. It did not change men's lives and create new thought-modes, it informed one's manners and morals . . . allegory ceased to be synonymous with poetry.[20]

Petrus Ramus, who was a highly influential authority among the Puritans before the arrival of the new logic,[21] like Philip Sidney, dismisses the notion of an elite audience, as Murrin comments:

> Sidney and the Ramists envisage a popular audience for the poet. For Sidney this wide audience is absolutely necessary to his argument. The philosopher teaches morality to a limited circle, but the poet stirs up the multitude to moral action. Ramus treats the whole question with a

[19] Ibid., 169.
[20] Ibid., 176.
[21] Cf. Edwards' gloss on the old and new logic in "The Mind," no. 17; *WJE* 6: 345.

> contempt worthy of his attitude (he considered poetry appropriate to small boys) and argues that the prudential method or in medias res technique exists solely for the vulgar masses, the beast with many heads.[22]

This is an important point because it is related to Edwards quite closely; Ramus was a major influence among the Puritans and Edwards' most immediate literary environment was shaped to a large extent by the eighteenth-century polite culture, flourishing even in the New World, separated from the older Renaissance tradition by the gulf of Neoclassicism.

Murrin treats Sidney and the metaphysical poets as standing in between the two concepts, a transition from the Renaissance to the Restoration, Milton standing out among them as one who "combined the oratorical and the allegorical modes more than Sidney or Donne."[23] As has been mentioned, Murrin finds that the Romantic conception of poetry continues, and of course at the same time transforms, the Renaissance understanding of allegorical poetry. Discussing the examples of Wordsworth and Shelley, he finds that their structuring of the poetic process "corresponds point by point to the model used by the Renaissance allegorist"[24] (e.g., the poet has a special experience which he tries to recreate in his audience, the poetic subject concerns man and nature). What changes, importantly, is the understanding of the content of the process. (It is not needful here to list the details of Murrin's argument; it will suffice to say that he sees Shelley as reviving the "allegorical theory almost in toto"[25] and in Wordsworth Murrin finds significant continuities with the Renaissance theories, even if Wordsworth is much closer to the oratorical conception of

[22] Murrin 171.
[23] Ibid., 197.
[24] Ibid., 200.
[25] Ibid.

language and can no longer assume the unity between man and nature in the same confident manner as the allegorical poets before him.[26]) In sum, Murrin attempts to articulate the main difference between the Renaissance theory of allegory and Romantic poetic theory by saying that Romanticism "substituted imagination for memory,"[27] or more fundamentally that the Renaissance conception of truth is Platonic and cosmological while the Romantic truth is psychological. Nevertheless, he finds that these distinctions ultimately break down and he stresses the continuity of the allegorical form[28]:

> One must say that allegory did in fact revive among some of the Romantics, but at the same time one must add that the understanding of allegory had altered, sometimes radically. The allegorists' structuring of the poetic process reappeared, but not always the content. And yet this structure had tremendous influence on all the Romantics. It jostled with neoclassicism in Wordsworth's *Preface* and survived—all the way up to the twentieth century.[29]

Having arrived to Romanticism from the Renaissance by way of Murrin's argument, it is time to look at the other theory of allegory announced at the beginning of this chapter, Paul de Man's interpretation of allegory in early Romanticism. De Man emphasizes the Pre-

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[26] Ibid., 200-205.
[27] Ibid., 209.
[28] Murrin's emphasis on the continuity between the Renaissance and Romanticism should be complemented by more a detailed study of the Romantic theories of poetic creation, such as M. H. Abrams' in *The Mirror and the Lamp,* to counterbalance the impression of seamless continuity between the two traditions. As Abrams shows, Romantic theories of literary invention have their roots also in Neoclassical concepts of poetic genius, such as eighteenth-century understanding of inspiration, poetic grace and natural genius (Abrams, M. H., *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition,* New York: W. W. Norton, 1958, 184-198).
[29] Murrin 212.

Romantic period, roughly the last quarter of the eighteenth century, over the Romanticism of the later nineteenth century, and focuses on symbol and allegory and on the Romantic response to the tradition of associative analogy current in the eighteenth century. His study "The Rhetoric of Temporality" accomplishes several things (only the first part of the essay which discusses allegory is treated here): it challenges the standard view of literary criticism that the symbol is the main achievement of Romantic poetry and the dialectic of subject and object, mind and nature, the central issue of Romanticism (exemplified in his essay by critics like M. H. Abrams and Earl Wasserman) and in so doing, it also addresses the issue of the Romantic response to the analogical tradition of Neoclassicism; and it draws attention to the importance of allegory in the literature of the early Romantic writers and argues, which is its central point, that the inherently temporal nature of allegory, as used by the Pre-Romantic writers, opposes the promise of the symbol to express the alleged unity between man and the outside world and shows it to be illusory. It must also be added here that in those considerations of Edwards as a Pre-Romantic which have been mentioned, the understanding of Romanticism is largely that of Abrams, and so very different from the interpretation of Romanticism which de Man presents. Consequently the choice of de Man's essay makes the discussion of Edwards' typology more complex because it involves two different conceptions of Romanticism; the themes which de Man considers are, however, relevant and they help highlight some issues which might otherwise go unnoticed in relating Edwards to interpretations of Romanticism of the Abrams kind.

Both Murrin and de Man agree that Romanticism opposes the Neoclassical concept of natural analogy; de Man exemplifies a tendency current in all European Romantic literature: "Wordsworth reproaches Pope for having abandoned the imaginative use of figural diction in

favor of a merely decorative allegorization."[30] On the other hand, de Man corrects Abrams' reading which makes it seem "as if the romantic theory of imagination did away with analogy altogether . . . Analogy as such is certainly never abandoned as an epistemological pattern for natural images."[31] It is true, de Man continues, that "the relationship between mind and nature becomes indeed a lot less formal, less purely associative and external" and that it is newly described by terms like "affinity" or "sympathy" rather than analogy. This terminology implies that "the relationship with nature has been superseded by an intersubjective, interpersonal relationship that, in the last analysis, is a relationship of the subject toward itself. Thus the priority has passed from the outside world entirely within the subject, and we end up with something that resembles a radical idealism."[32] If, however, Abrams and Wasserman suggest that "romanticism is, in fact, such an idealism,"[33] de Man argues that they contradict themselves because they also argue for an organic conception of language in Romanticism, which implies the priority of Nature.

Part of the problem, according to de Man, consists in a misinterpretation of Coleridge's influential definition of the symbol. As representatives of such position, Abrams and Wasserman are among those "who see Coleridge as the great synthesizer and who take his dialectic of subject and object to be the authentic pattern of romantic imagery."[34] De Man argues that the authentic Romantic statement is to be sought not in the symbol and the subject-object dialectic but in allegory and the accompanying discovery of two different conceptions of the self. He contends that this emphasis on the symbol and the subject-object dialectic originates in a neglect of the allegorical element which he finds present in the works

[30] Man, Paul de, "Intentional Structure of the Romantic Image," *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* 1.
[31] "Rhetoric of Temporality" 195.
[32] Ibid., 196.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid., 197.

of the early Romantic writers and in the focus on later nineteenth-century authors among whom the symbolical conception of language prevails despite the ambivalences that attend it.

First, de Man establishes the importance of allegory in early Romanticism (Rousseau and Wordsworth in particular) and defines its relationship to the older allegorical traditions. Discussing the allegorical elements in Rousseau's novel *Julie*, de Man argues that the central role of allegory in Rousseau turns the subject-object dialectic into merely "one passing moment" which is overcome in the novel;[35] and "similar allegorical tendencies . . . are present . . . in all European literature between 1760 and 1800."[36] William Wimsatt has observed the importance of allegory and claims, as de Man quotes him, that "these early romantic poets are examples of the Biblical, classical, and Renaissance tradition of allegory as it approaches the romantic condition of landscape naturalism."[37] Wimsatt's view, de Man counters, does not do justice to the deep differences that separate early Romanticism from the older traditions. De Man sees no such smooth development as Wimsatt suggests but argues that there is a radical break, a loss and renunciation that separates the Pre-Romantics from the allegorical authors:

> Rather than such a continuous development from allegory to romantic naturalism, the example of Rousseau shows that we are dealing instead with the rediscovery of an allegorical tradition beyond the sensualistic analogism of the eighteenth century. This rediscovery, far from being spontaneous and easy, implies instead the discontinuity of a renunciation,

[35] Ibid., 204.
[36] Ibid., 205.
[37] Qtd. in "Rhetoric of Temporality" 205.

even of sacrifice.[38]

What precisely is involved in this break?

De Man gives an essentially historical answer when he says that "the secularized thought of the pre-romantic period no longer allows a transcendance [sic] of the antinomies between the created world and the act of creation by means of a positive recourse to the notion of the divine will."[39] In broad terms, his and Murrin's explanations emphasize the same point: Romantic writers can no longer rely on the correspondence between man and nature, or the cosmos, for, in Murrin's words, "Copernicus and Descartes had killed the old cosmos. What remained was a dead machine, separated from the living minds of men."[40] This has consequences for the early Romantic allegory which can no longer be determined by a shared cosmology or theology. The structure remains but the relationship between the elements changes, as de Man argues:

> the relationship between the allegorical sign and its meaning (*signifié*) is not decreed by dogma . . . We have, instead, a relationship between signs in which the reference to their respective meanings has become of secondary importance. But this relationship between signs necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element; it remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only

[38] Ibid., 205.
[39] Ibid., 206.
[40] Murrin 211. M. H. Abrams makes this topic the subject of his study called *Natural Supernaturalism;* Abrams, M. H., *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1971).

> in the *repetition* (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this previous sign to be pure anteriority.[41]

If the symbol is conceived "as an expression of unity between the representative and the semantic function of language,"[42] allegory of this kind becomes its opposite: "whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or identification, allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin."[43] The allegorical relationship, then, is characterized by its essentially temporal nature, contrary to the symbol, in which time is merely a contingent category. This unveiling of the temporal distance between the elements in early Romantic allegory also points to a different issue than the subject-object dialectic associated with the symbol. The symbol gives the temporal, passing self a promise of permanence and stability in the union with nature; allegory shows that the promise cannot be fulfilled. "Renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide," allegory, as de Man interprets it in Rousseau and Wordsworth, consequently also "prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self, which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as non-self."[44] The most important Romantic statement is not, de Man argues, an articulation of a dialectic of mind and nature, but a conflict of two different temporal conceptions of the self: "this dialectic is now located entirely in the temporal relationships that exist within a system of allegorical signs. It becomes a conflict between a conception of the self seen in its authentically temporal predicament and a defensive strategy that tries to hide from this

[41] "Rhetoric of Temporality" 207; original emphasis.
[42] Ibid., 189.
[43] Ibid., 207.
[44] Ibid., 207.

negative self-knowledge."[45] De Man laments that this essential insight is soon lost in Romanticism and overshadowed by symbolical language, "a veil thrown over a light one no longer wishes to perceive."[46]

Before considering the problems of the type's representation once more in a closer comparison with allegory and analogy, it will be good to look at Edwards' historical position with respect to the different literary traditions discussed in this chapter. It has been observed that Edwards shares some important elements with the Renaissance theory of allegorical poetry, namely the assumption of a common theory of universe on which both the poet/typologist and his audience/other believers draw to understand the divine truth behind the poetic/typological images. His theory is not primarily Platonic and has nothing of the esoteric; it is determined by his Christian and Calvinist doctrine, although it is of course not devoid of Platonic and Neoplatonic influences (moreover, as some scholars have argued, his natural typology in particular is strongly Platonic[47]). In this respect Edwards' thought differs markedly from the "secularized thought of the pre-romantic period."[48] For him man is essentially part of the created order of beings and nature tells him of divine truths.

On the other hand, Edwards' is no longer an "enchanted" world of the Renaissance. He first learns Ramist logic of divisions and classifications, then abandons it gladly for Locke's philosophy of sensations and Newton's physical laws; he learns good writing from Richard Steele, reads Samuel Richardson and engages in criticism of Shaftesbury. His natural typology, no matter how mystical it might be (and Edwards' has been dubbed a mystic), has some very rational aspects. It must be slowly learned and carefully practiced, scrutinized for

[45] Ibid., 208.
[46] Ibid.
[47] See for example Lowance, Mason I., Jr., Editor's Introduction to the "Types of the Messiah," *Typological Writings*, *WJE* 11: 161.
[48] "Rhetoric of Temporality" 206.

mistakes lest it be the product of mere human fancy, and deduced from Scriptural models. The typological relationship is discovered on basis of analogy which is rationally explained; types were, it is true, established by God, to be images of antitypes, but somehow God managed to include a very rational reason why each type should represent a given antitype. The sacrifice of Isaac is the type of the sacrifice of Christ because in each case an innocent son is sacrificed, the silkworm is a type of Christ because it gives men fabric which clothes them just as Christ clothes believers with his righteousness. This is obviously quite distant from the way the Renaissance allegorical poet understands the sacred truth which he receives in inspiration.

On the other hand, again, Edwards' concept of the "sense of the heart" escapes the rational emphasis of Neoclassical thinking. The "new sense of things," the true spiritual knowledge which is not merely speculative but also experimental, is a vision beyond the means of a merely natural man; when one's eyes are opened in this way he realizes that before he lived in a land of shadows. *This* experience cannot be communicated by any rational comparison or explanation. When this sense is particularly intensified,[49] for example as Edwards describes it about himself in his "Personal Narrative" or about some of his parishioners during the revivals, it seizes the believer, leaving him or her at a loss at how to properly translate it into words (unlike the Renaissance poet, however, the Protestant New Englander does not go to share his or her experience in an allegorical poem).[50] This capacity for new vision which transforms one's sense of the surrounding world has quite reasonably

[49] The intense spiritual experience is disturbingly close to enthusiasm but also to melancholy, a point which would deserve a separate discussion.

[50] While there is a distinct difference in the Renaissance theory between the poet and his audience, Edwards' Protestant typology has no such distinction: every believer is a typologist. Edwards does see a difference between the minister and the congregation but that distinction does not mean that the minister has access to a deeper spiritual experience or knowledge than the ordinary believer.

been linked by scholars to the creative power of the Romantic imagination, as has been noticed repeatedly. M. H. Abrams for example quotes Edwards in his list of characteristics of the Romantic vision: "In America Jonathan Edwards, the instant he fully accepted the doctrine of God's justice in preelection, experienced 'a wonderful alteration in my mind' which effected a correspondent alteration of sensation."[51]

In considering the relationship between typology and nature poetry of the Romantics, another issue arises. De Man again opposes Abrams' interpretation of the latter and summarizes: in Abrams' study, "the distinction between seventeenth-century and late eighteenth-century poetry is made in terms of the determining role played by the geographical *place* as establishing the link between the language of the poem and the empirical experience of the reader."[52] De Man challenges this point with reference to a number of Wordsworth's poems and argues that

> in observing the development of even as geographically concrete a poet as Wordsworth, the significance of the locale can extend so far as to include a meaning that is no longer circumscribed by the literal horizon of a given place . . . one ends up no longer at a specific place but with a mere name whose geographical significance has become almost meaningless . . . passages of this kind no longer depend on the choice of a specific locale, but are controlled by "a traditional and inherited typology," exactly as in the case of the poems from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—with this distinction, however, that the typology is no longer the same and that

[51] *Natural Supernaturalism* 383-384.
[52] "Rhetoric of Temporality" 205-206; original emphasis.

> the poet, sometimes after long and difficult inner struggle, had to renounce the seductiveness and the poetic resources of a symbolical diction.[53]

De Man thus redefines the specificity of Romantic nature poetry as distinguished from the earlier tradition not in terms of its geographic specificity but in terms of a different typology which determines the way in which the meaning of the place is established.

In the previous chapter on emblem it has been argued that Edwards' natural typology is closer to the emblem tradition precisely because, among other things, it is not site-specific but engages the phenomena of nature generally, often in accordance with commonplace views and traditions. Wordsworth, according to de Man, might begin with a specific locale but then expands its significance so that what is site-specific becomes unimportant. Edwards does not even begin with a specific place or object (this is a real difference, even compared to de Man's objection to Abrams' argument), as has been argued previously: he looks at general experience and phenomena, there is nothing properly "local" in the "Images of Divine Things." The tradition which controls his typology is shaped by the common understanding of the world according to a Protestant and Enlightened worldview. To understand de Man's point more precisely it will be useful to turn to his discussion of the responses to analogy in nature poetry of the early Romantics before the comparison of Edwards' typology and Romantic nature poetry is resumed.

De Man's observation that in Romanticism "the typology is no longer the same" can be explained, again, by his emphasis on the secularized thought of the period. Murrin describes the different issues which the Romantic poet faces in contrast to the Renaissance

[53] Ibid., 206.

allegorist: "Descartes had already killed the external world and isolated man from it, so Wordsworth reunites the two through poetry. The allegorist had no such doubts. Man by his very nature reflects the cosmos and poetry expresses this relationship. Poetry need not create it."[54] Yet the lure of the unproblematic correspondence between mind and nature remains strong for the poets, as de Man comments in a study of a passage of Wordsworth's *Prelude.* He notes "the charm of this world" where "the analogical correspondence between man and nature is so perfect that one passes from the one to the other without difficulty or conflict, in a dialogue full of echo and joyful exchange."[55] In the view of scholars like Abrams (and Murrin) Romanticism tries to recreate this bond between man and nature, in a deeper fashion than the eighteenth-century associative analogy, by the symbolical conception of language. De Man argues, on the contrary, that the early Romantics, while acknowledging this desire, renounce it and exchange it for the more fundamental insight into the *separation* between man and the world. The world of correspondences is "a world associated with fancy and abandoned for the more exciting world of imagination. Imagination, however, also introduces an anxiety, which consists in the connection between the loss of the sense of correspondence and the experience of death."[56] Contrary to the views of the synthesizing power of the symbol and of the Romantic imagination, de Man finds that imagination does not simply guarantee such union. Rather, it unveils the distance between man and nature.

In contrast to the traditional interpretations of Romantic imagination as a faculty of spontaneous, organic creation, de Man argues that the conception of imagination in the early Romantic writers tends toward a construction of consciousness which would contain all and be entirely self-contained: "But this 'imagination' has little in common with the faculty that

[54] Murrin 202.
[55] Man, Paul de, "Wordsworth and Hölderlin," trans. Timothy Bahti, *The Rhetoric of Romanticism* 51.
[56] Ibid., 53.

produces natural images born 'as flowers originate.' It marks instead a possibility of consciousness to exist entirely by and for itself, independently of all relationship with the outside world, without being moved by an intent aimed at a part of this world."[57] De Man admits that "the works of the early romantics give us no actual examples, for they are, at most, *underway* toward renewed insights"[58] but he considers this to be one of the most important aspects of their thought. It is an insight, in fact, into the workings language. The symbolical conception of language which prevails in later Romanticism is inevitably ill-fated because it attempts to do something that goes against the very nature of language:

> it is in the essence of language to be capable of origination, but of never achieving the absolute identity with itself that exists in the natural object. Poetic language can do nothing but originate anew over and over again; it is always constitutive, able to posit regardless of presence but, by the same token, unable to give a foundation to what it posits except as an intent of consciousness. The word is always a free presence to the mind, the means by which the permanence of natural entities can be put into question and thus negated, time and again, in the endlessly widening spiral of the dialectic.[59]

De Man's emphasis on the power of language to posit but to posit without giving a foundation is another important point of connection with Edwards' typology. In Renaissance literature, the veil of allegory was the sign of divine truth and presence; in Romanticism, the

[57] "Romantic Image" 16.
[58] Ibid.; original emphasis.
[59] Ibid., 6.

poetic image "is inspired by a nostalgia for the natural object, expanding to become nostalgia for the origin of this object . . . The nostalgia can only exist when the transcendental presence is forgotten . . . The existence of the poetic image is itself a sign of divine absence, and the conscious use of poetic imagery an admission of this absence."[60] Edwards' natural type promises to be a sign of divine presence; it ought to be a connection as unproblematic and given as in Renaissance allegory, according to Edwards' theology, and certainly one should not read a "nostalgia for the natural object" or for "the origin of this object" into Edwards' natural type. At the same time, however, his typology is seen to fall short of this promise, as has been argued: Edwards' typology opens a possibility of error, of misinterpretation, which is, in other words, a possibility of the self's distance from the order of creation. This might be said to be a counterpart of the negative moment which de Man finds in Romantic literature: "the negative moment which in Rousseau is that of renunciation, in Wordsworth that of the loss of self in death or in error."[61] The boldness of the believer to expand the spectrum of typological correspondences through spiritual interpretations of the natural world as encouraged by Edwards necessarily opens a danger: not only that some of the typological correspondences discovered in the world might be false, but that one might not be always able to distinguish between those that are right and those that are wrong. When this is no longer guaranteed, typology approaches the Pre-Romantic allegory as de Man describes it: the foundation of the typological link being put in question, what remains is the structure, and, thus bared, the structure is seen to be allegorical. The common argument against Edwards' typology that it is subjective does not address the core of the issue. Not only it does not reflect Edwards' radical redefinition of the notion of a stable and epistemologically

[60] Ibid., 6.
[61] "Rhetoric of Temporality" 207.

reliable self, as has been argued, more fundamentally it misses the point that the reason why the typological endeavor can never be quite secure originates in the inability of language itself to coincide with what it represents. Unlike Renaissance allegory, it is in the very nature of Edwards' type to fail in its representative function, inevitably and by definition; the way Edwards deals with this aspect of typology anticipates the way the early Romantic poets in de Man's interpretation deal with their insight into the nature of allegory.

Leaving now the discussion of Edwards' links to Romanticism but not leaving the important theme of the type's representation, it will be useful to turn once again to a consideration of Edwards' text and to conclude this examination with a reading of a work of "applied typology," if it may be so called, a sermon series called *A History of the Work of Redemption*. Here typology becomes a theory of history, an important aspect which has been been omitted from consideration so far. It is a fitting text to consider at this point for several reasons. Although it is not exactly a work of natural typology, it is Edwards' major typological endeavor and the principle which lies behind natural typology operates here also, as do the ambiguities that accompany it. Having acquired the terminology of the discussions in this and the previous chapter, it will be possible to consider the themes that are contained and implied in this work and to draw some concluding remarks on Edwards' typology.

The title calls forth, in fact, a cluster of texts and so a brief introduction is necessary. First of all, it refers to a sermon series published posthumously by John Erskine, a correspondent of Edwards' in Edinburgh, in 1774. It was a heavily edited version of a series of thirty sermons which Edwards preached to his church in Northampton between March and August 1739 and the manuscripts of which are also extant. Among Edwards' sermon

cycles, this one is by far the longest, and "no extant series is like the Redemption Discourse, which sustained, or rather transformed, the structure of a single sermon across thirty separate preaching occasions."[62] Edwards takes his text from Isaiah 51:8, "For the moth shall eat them up like a garment, and the worm shall eat them like wool: but my righteousness shall be forever, and my salvation from generation to generation," and draws the following doctrine: "The work of Redemption is a work that God carries on from the fall of man to the end of the world."[63] Besides the published text and Edwards' preaching booklets, there are also three working notebooks which bear the title "History of the Work of Redemption."[64] Finally, in 1757, while he was living in Stockbridge, Edwards mentioned in a letter his plans for a new treatise which he referred to as *A History of the Work of Redemption*; he died before he was able to make any significant progress. The discussion in this chapter will relate to the sermon cycle as published in the Yale edition.

In this work Edwards follows the theme of redemption through human history, effectually turning the history of the world into a powerfully unifying narrative of God's redemption of his people. He proceeds more or less along the lines of biblical chronology and divides history into three eras: from the fall of man to Christ's incarnation, the period of Christ's life on earth, and the period from Christ's resurrection to the end of the world. The principle which lies behind this periodization, and also behind the way in which the three eras are connected, is typology: both a typological interpretation of the connection between the Old and the New Testament and Edwards' less traditional extensions of typology. Wilson lists the several ways in which Edwards employs the typological principle,

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[62] Wilson 1. "Redemption Discourse" is a term by which Wilson distinguishes the preached sermon cycle and its manuscript from the version published by Erskine (2 n.1).
[63] Sermon 1; *WJE* 9: 116.
[64] See *WJE Online* 31.

> adapting a figural, even typological framework for understanding the third period, that of the application of redemption. For him Old Testament types were fulfilled not only in Christ but also in those who were believers . . . He explicitly located in the events of history (not only in canonical scriptural accounts) patterns constraining both the redeemed and the rejected of God. In other words, his typology broadened to the point that paradigmatic events outside Scripture had a figural relationship to the rest of history . . . Finally, Edwards stepped altogether outside history to find patterns of redemption in nature as well . . . It is not too much to claim that in his Redemption Discourse he so transformed conventional typological assumption that the discourse became as much a celebration of the God of nature as a hymn to the Lord of history.[65]

Wilson here points to what is the most ambitious aspect of the work: the implied connection of effectually *everything* to the pattern of God's redemption of his people. Sacred history is no longer restricted to the chronology of events recounted in the Bible or to church history. All human history, political events (such as the fall of the Persian or Greek empires), important developments of human culture (such as the invention of writing) and the natural world itself are involved in the drama of redemption and everything tends together towards the climax of history in the apocalypse and the full realization of God's kingdom.

Although Edwards goes beyond the traditional uses of typology in finding patterns of redemption in secular history and in nature, his expansive use of typology in the *History of Redemption* is confident and shows none of the doubts that are present in his private

[65] Wilson 49-50.

considerations of natural typology—quite understandably, since it is a public and a homiletic text. However, the principle behind this extension is clearly the same as in natural typology: "I believe the whole universe to be full of images of divine things"[66]—or here, full of images of God's redemption. [67] The same questions regarding the validity of the various interpretations of historical events would apply to Edwards' approach in the *History of Redemption.* But it is not just the problem of Edwards' innovations. Present here is also the issue of the performative nature of typology which has been discussed in the previous chapter. Here, too, typology as a theory of history ought to be constative according to Edwards' theology but like in the "Types" notebook, its performative nature becomes apparent.

This can be argued, first, from Edwards' almost straightforward acknowledgment of the performative nature of his exegesis of history at the beginning of the sermon series. Edwards introduces his theory of history by a brief outline of what it is that he wants the audience to find in the sermons and explains this by the following declaration:

> Having thus explained what I mean by the terms of the doctrine I now, that you may the more clearly know [that] the great design and Work of Redemption is carried on from the fall <of man to the end of the world>, I say in order to this I now proceed in the,
>
> Second place, to show what is the design of this great work or what things are designed to be done by it. In order to see how a design is

[66] "Types"; *WJE* 11: 152.

[67] Wallace Anderson summarizes Edwards' view of history as follows: "As the growth of a plant, or the development of a fetus in the womb, or conversion, are 'growing things,' so Edwards perceived the world to be in a 'progressive state' because of the unfolding of the work of redemption—a major idea behind his History of Redemption discourse" (Introduction to "Images" 10).

> carried [to] an end, we must first know what the design is. To know how a workman proceeds and to understand the various steps he takes in order to accomplish a piece of work, we need to be informed what he is about or what the thing is that he intends to accomplish. Otherwise we may stand by and see him do one thing after another and be quite puzzled and in the dark about it, seeing nothing of his scheme and understanding nothing [of] what he means by it. If an architect with a great number of hands were about building some great palace, and one that was a stranger to such things should stand by and see some men digging in the earth, others bringing timbers, others hewing stones and the like, he might reason that there was a great deal done. But if he knew not the design, it would all appear confusion to him. And therefore that the great works and dispensations of God that belong to this great affair of redemption may not appear like confusion to you, I would set before you briefly the main things as designed to be accomplished in this great work, to accomplish which God began to work presently after the fall of man and will continue to the end of the world when the whole work will appear completely finished.[68]

It seems that the meaning of history cannot be gathered from simply observing historical events and not easily even from listening to an exposition of history of the work of redemption. If Edwards' interpretation was properly constative, the regenerate who share with him true spiritual knowledge of things would not need this external explanation but

[68] Sermon 1; *WJE* 9: 122-123.

would naturally see it themselves. The difficulty is exactly the same as in natural typology: the meaning represented should be accessible to and shared by all believers but somehow it needs extra explanation because they cannot gather it themselves, and the extra explanation itself potentially engenders further explanations of explanations.

Secondly, the performative nature of the text is enhanced and made more obvious by the text's distinctly literary nature. Although there is quite much teaching of doctrine in the sermon series and the style and structure is generally that of an Edwardsean lecture,[69] including various propositions, observations, and improvements, the bulk of the text is made up by narrative passages recounting the historical events. The story is further supported by another prominent literary feature: the conspicuous use of images which, unlike in some other sermons, are not used for an extensive elaboration of their poetic potential but which account, in fact, for much of the unifying impression created by the text. Editor J. F. Wilson, though a religious historian, devotes a considerable part of his introduction to the work to the discussion of the literary effect of these "master patterns" and points out, quite rightly, that "Edwards repeatedly uses the notion of shadows and images as a more specific literary device to connect events in the various periods of his study . . . Through the use of such analogies he suggests the coherent impulse lying behind the whole of the drama of redemption and binding together otherwise unrelated actions."[70]

By subtly reinforcing the idea of a unified progress of events the images account for the text's literary power in a great measure. Time and again, and more towards the end of the

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[69] "There is only one significant variation in the form which is called a 'lecture.' The lecture is differentiated from the sermon only through the altered proportions in the Doctrine and Application. For whereas in the sermon the Application is usually a little longer than the Doctrine and often several times as long, in the lecture the Doctrine is substantially longer than the Application" (Kimnach 36).

[70] Wilson 57.

sermon cycle (thus intensifying the rhetorical effect as the climactic conclusion approaches), Edwards inserts into the account of history a comment as, for example: "Thus the gospel sun that had lately risen on the Jews, now rose and began to enlighten the heathen world, after they had continued in gross heathenish darkness for so many ages . . . Now that great building that God began soon after the fall of man rises gloriously."[71] All of the images are essentially metaphors of unity: tributaries flowing into one great river, a tree growing from roots to branches, wheels revolving within wheels, raising a great army, constructing a building or the dawning of a new day. The images of dawning and of construction are used especially often in the text and revolving wheels is an image in which Edwards was particularly interested;[72] but all them convey the idea of a synecdochic bringing together of various parts.[73]

In general, the most important thing is that Edwards sets out to present his theory of history in a markedly literary manner, as if the meaning of history could only be given by literary means.[74] For a consideration of the text as Edwards' performative speech act, Hillis

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[71] Sermon 20; *WJE* 9: 380.

[72] James Hewitson follows Edwards' repeated use of this image in several works and explains its particular advantage: "By using the images of the machine to present this process, Edwards was able to radically reconfigure the way in which God's providence was understood. Most immediately, the machine metaphor allowed him to transform church and, by implication, human history from a record of advancements and reversals into a narrative of uninterrupted linear progress: the complex system of wheels, which appear to move in opposing directions but ultimately combine to achieve a single end, allowed apparent defeats to be interpreted as deliberately establishing the preconditions for latter, more profound communications of God's nature to his church" (Hewitson, James, "'As ordered and governed by divine providence': Jonathan Edwards' Use of the Machine as Master Metaphor," *Interdisciplinary Humanities* 24.1 (2007): 6-20, *Academic Search Complete*, 24 November 2010 <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=fc7b4826-0871-4d20-832b-e4c8ced05018%40sessionmgr11&vid=9&hid=21> 11).

[73] In Hayden White's classification, Edwards' theory of history would correspond to the synecdochic interpretation; see White, Hayden, "Introduction: The Poetics of History," *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975) 31 - 37.

[74] Edwards' later plans for writing a treatise which would be called *A History of the Work of Redemption* ought to be noted here. The few things that are known of Edwards' intentions are highly interesting in this respect for they suggest that his interest in the possibilities of literary language in theology might

Miller will once again be helpful. His essay "Parable and Performative" describes the difference between constative and performative language in sacred and secular parables. Like the author of a parable, Edwards makes "something happen": he constructs a "fabulous

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have been growing. Edwards mentions his plans in a letter to the trustees of the College of New Jersey as an argument why he is reluctant to accept their invitation to serve as President of the College (besides his unhappy constitution, as recounted in Lowell's poem): "I have had on my mind and heart . . . a great work, which I call *A History of the Work of Redemption*, a body of divinity in an entire new method, being thrown into the form of an history, considering the affair of Christian theology, as the whole of it, in each part, stands in reference to the great work of redemption by Jesus Christ . . . This history will be carried on with regard to all three worlds, heaven, earth, and hell: considering the connected, successive events and alterations, in each so far as the Scriptures give any light; introducing all parts of divinity in that order which is most scriptural and most natural: which is a method which appears to me the most beautiful and entertaining, wherein every divine doctrine, will appear to greatest advantage in the brightest light, in the most striking manner, showing the admirable contexture and harmony of the whole" (Letter to Richard Stockton, written in Stockbridge, October 19, 1757; *WJE* 16: 727-728). Besides this note, there are also three working notebooks entitled "History of Redemption" and it is very likely that Edwards was planning to use the original sermon series from 1739 as raw material for his intended treatise. Taken together, these sources of information suggest that this great *History of Redemption* was a project different from other Edwards' texts: neither an argumentative treatise, like the *Freedom of the Will* or the *Original Sin*, nor a record of things past; instead, as Wilson Kimnach points out, a "mythic narrative" (256), a story which would give meaning to the history of the world.

Edwards' approach appears to be quite unique, indeed an "entirely new method" for a work of theology. The most salient point is the radical transformation of the treatise genre by the typological-narrative method, a transformation which amounts to a radical upsetting of the category of treatise. Edwards himself might have been in search for a more fitting description than "treatise"; he calls the project, rather generically, "a body of divinity" in his letter. At the same time it is obvious that he was not going to record the story of events in world history for its own sake; the work was to be something more like a theological summa which would, it might be assumed, relate the various disciplines of theology to redemption: the work would comprise, one might infer, soteriology in the first place but also church history, and perhaps angelology and demonology, ecclesiology, missiology, etc. and all the true doctrines of the Christian church according to Edwards' Calvinist understanding of them. It would also involve fields not typically associated with theology, such as secular history and scientific discoveries. But the philosophical reasoning and the argumentative style which are expected in a treatise would be replaced by a figurative principle and by narrative.

In one of the notebooks containing working comments and observations in preparation for writing the *History of Redemption* Edwards puts down an interesting point. Editor Stephen Stein highlights this surprising entry: "let there be large marginal notes at the bottom of the page and the reflections, doctrinal observations and disputations be in them" (Stein, Stephen J., Editor's Introduction, *Apocalyptic Writings*, *WJE* 5: 49; see "History of Redemption" Book I, *WJE Online* 31: [103]). This seems to be the opposite of what would have been conventional practice in a treatise—to develop speculative argument and doctrinal discussions in the body of the text and use the margins for giving examples, illustrations and comparisons to support dogma. Perhaps this implies, on the one hand, that Edwards was reluctant to embrace his new method of theology wholeheartedly and still wished to reserve some room to make sure that the reader finds the right doctrine at the right point of the *History*. But what this note in fact suggests is that narrative would oust doctrine to the margins. The main point of the summa would not be contained in explanations of doctrinal nuances but in the story itself. In a sense doctrine would become the margin of mythic narrative.

yonder" and he is inviting the listener to cross over.[75] In this case the "fabulous yonder" is not spatial but temporal: in de Man's terms, it might be described as an offer to the temporal self to find its place in the stable progression of history and its happy ending, not unlike the promise of the symbol to provide the temporal self with a link to the stability of the natural world. Perry Miller observed succinctly that the fascination of typology was "its promise of delivering a unified meaning for history."[76] The fulfillment of the promise, however, will be seen to involve a genuine paradox, and Edwards' text does not pretend to ignore this.

The difference between Edwards' sermon cycle and parable might not be so great as might first appear. Not only it is, to a significant extent, a narrative and its meaning given figuratively in images. The unity of history is anchored typologically, and since typology has been argued to be a figurative and allegorical structure, what Edwards does in the *History of Redemption* can be said to be an allegorical interpretation of history: the text is an allegory of history. Moreover, as an allegorical commentary on a sacred subject, the text itself becomes parabolic, as Hillis Miller argues with respect to any commentary on Christ's parables: "Any interpretation of these parables is itself parabolic."[77] In this sense it might be said that the history of redemption is a figure, a parable, and Edwards' exposition of it itself a parabolic commentary on it. A sacred, or a secular parable, one might like to ask?

Hillis Miller proposes two major points of distinction between secular parables and the parables of Christ: "a different nature and standing place in each case for the speaker or writer of the parable and . . . a different relation in each case to the distinction between

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[75] Miller, *Tropes* 145. In using the expression "fabulous yonder" Miller is referring to Kafka's "On Parables."
[76] Introduction 7.
[77] *Tropes* 138.

performative and constative language."[78] The first point is clear: unlike the speaker of a secular parable, "Christ as Logos is also the basis of the correspondence within the realm of language, for example the correspondence between visible vehicle and invisible and unnamed tenor in a parable."[79] The second point refers to the simultaneously performative and constative nature of the sacred parable while secular parable is simply performative. Both kinds "make something happen"; "in the case of the parables of Jesus, however, the performative word makes something happen in the minds and hearts of the hearers, but this happening is a knowledge of a state of affairs already existing, the kingdom of heaven and the way to get there. In that sense, a biblical parable is constative, not performative at all."[80] This is an essential difference between any human performative and sacred performative:

> The "Let there be light" of God produces the basic condition of visibility and therefore of knowledge. . . . Human performatives, on the other hand, can never be the object of an epistemological act whereby subject confronts something that has been brought to life and knows it. Human performatives are always from beginning to end baseless positings, acts of *Ersetzen* rather than of *Erkennen*. A secular parable is an *Ersetzen* that must, impossibly, become an *Erkennen.*[81]

Miller's distinctions apply, as he observes here, to any kind of sacred, divine discourse as opposed to the merely human. So they apply, too, to Edwards' situation and

[78] Ibid., 147.
[79] Ibid., 137.
[80] Ibid., 139.
[81] Ibid., 147.

recall, first of all, the homiletic paradox in Edwards' theology. Edwards is God's mouthpiece to the congregation, at the same time his are only human words and teachings. He hopes his words will be empowered by the Holy Spirit but since making this happen is entirely outside his power, he must go to work *as if* his words could have the power to affect his auditors in a truly spiritual way and wait if God transforms them into means of conversion. While Edwards solves this paradox theologically by explaining that preaching is the appointed means which God often pleases to use to a man's conversion though He is in no way bound to actually use it as such, on the literary level he must remain within the tension. His *History of the Work of Redemption* is a parable facing the same difficulty: it is also "an *Ersetzen* that must, impossibly, become an *Erkennen.*"

Left at this point comparing Edwards' sermon series to Miller's analysis of parables would do no more than describe the homiletic paradox in just slightly different terms. But what Hillis Miller's essay highlights, most interestingly, is that the distinction between the kinds is itself paradoxical. The sacred parable cannot be understood by those who do not believe, but those who already believe do not need the parable, and so it asks the impossible of the reader/listener; and the secular parable always implicitly pretends to be, at least in part, like the sacred parable even if it acknowledges the impossibility of its invitation.[82] But again, this paradox which Miller so rightly points out does not apply only to the parable. Rather it is the paradox of all performatives, divine or human, and so an inseparable part of language itself. Seen from this perspective, the question whether Edwards' typology is performative or constative appears to be misleading.

"Parable" means "thrown beside," as Miller explains, and this might be as good a description of Edwards' typology as one can find. If typology has the structure of allegory, its

[82] Ibid., 148-149.

elements do not necessarily meet in the firm bond of correspondence in which they ought, as de Man argues in his theory of allegory. In typology, too, language is able to "posit but regardless of presence but, by the same token, unable to give a foundation to what it posits except as an intent of consciousness."[83] One is left, in Edwards' case, on the one hand with the promise of typology and on the other with signals that the fulfillment is always "thrown beside" the place where one might think to reach it.

Finally, a piece of history to counterbalance too much performative theorizing with some solid, down to earth evidence. Edwards' grandson Timothy Dwight in his *Travels in New England and New York* records the story of Nehemiah Strong, Esq. who as a young man sat under Edwards' pulpit and listened to him preach *A History of the Work of Redemption*:

> When Mr. Edwards came to a consideration of the final judgment, Mr. Strong said, his own mind was wrought up to such a pitch that he expected without one thought to the contrary the awful scene to be unfolded on that day and in that place. Accordingly, he waited with the deepest and the most solemn solicitude to hear the trumpet sound and the archangel call; to see the graves open, the dead arise, and the judge descend in the glory of his Father, with all his holy angels; and was deeply disappointed when the day terminated and left the world in its usual state of tranquility.[84]

[83] "Romantic Image" 6.
[84] Qtd. in Wilson 8-9.

Apparently, in this case Edwards' promise of typology promised too much, or ended up "thrown beside" a bit too far. Perhaps Nehemiah Strong found later some other way to cross over and step into the parable. One might at least hope so.

Chapter 7

Conclusion

> Some days now passed during which, at leisure intervals, I looked a little into "Edwards on the Will" and "Priestley on Necessity." Under the circumstances, those books induced a salutary feeling. Gradually I slid into the persuasion that these troubles of mine touching the scrivener had been all predestinated from eternity, and Bartleby was billeted upon me for some mysterious purpose of an all-wise Providence, which it was not for a mere mortal like me to fathom.
>
> Herman Melville
> "Bartleby"[1]

Focusing on Jonathan Edwards' natural typology, this study has attempted to overcome some limitations of existing studies of a well-discussed topic. Although typology is primarily a theological discipline and an exegetical principle, in Edwards studies it has received considerable attention as one of the indicators by which to interpret Edwards' position in American intellectual history. Rather than following this trend, this work has taken as its starting point Northrop Frye's suggestion that typology is to be treated "as a mode of thought and as a figure of speech. . . . a mode of thought does not exist until it has developed its own particular way of arranging words. Typology is a form of rhetoric, and can be studied critically like any other form of rhetoric."[2] In a sense, this discussion of Edwards' typology has been a way of testing Frye's claim, by pursuing two of its implications: that typology as a discipline can be studied rhetorically, and that the type itself is also a rhetorical form which may be considered from a tropological perspective. It would be possible to argue for a general

[1] Melville, Herman, "Bartleby," *Bartleby and Benito Cereno* (New York: Dover Publications, 1990) 26.
[2] Frye 80.

proximity of typology and rhetoric historically, from typology's historical status as a method of interpretation and its closeness to allegory as a theological hermeneutic (a brief outline of such arguments has also been given here), but close attention to selected Edwards' texts themselves also offers arguments for a rhetorical reading of his typology along the two implications of Frye's statement.

Such reading, first of all, highlights some inherent tensions in Edwards' typological theory. On the one hand, Edwards argues that typological interpretations of nature must be attempted and that the believer can confidently expect to find and understand revelations of spiritual truths which have been instituted in the natural world by God. On the other hand, he warns that believers must learn typological interpretation by way of trial and error, and his defense of his theory fails to sufficiently secure the distinction between true and false types. His overarching explanation of typology as a language, moreover, is itself not without problems; his views on language as such also suggest that language, even language relating to spiritual things, often thwarts the purposes of communication.

The difficulties, however, are not limited to Edwards' typology. Rather, the tensions into which his theology runs are the result of a wider problem of language and of the relationship of theology (or philosophy more broadly conceived) to the figurative and rhetorical dimension of language. Jacques Derrida notices that it is philosophy's persistent tendency to master metaphor and be in control of the rhetorical aspects of language, and he points out the difficulty, even impossibility of philosophy's achieving it. Metaphysic cannot externalize metaphor; metaphor is in its very language and the concept of metaphor is philosophy's own product. The language of philosophy cannot treat rhetorical language as if it was detached from it, and, by consequence, Edwards' theological project cannot escape the ambiguity of the figurative nature of typology by laying down rules for distinguishing

between true types and false types.

This argument for the impossibility of dividing (ultimately, securely) between a non-rhetorical and rhetorical use of language is also a central point of Derrida's criticism of J. L. Austin's speech act theory. Edwards' emphasis that the believer must learn to *speak* the language of types invites a comparison with Austin's distinction between performatives and constatives. That distinction seems to be a useful way of describing the two perspectives on Edwards' typological project: as either constatively describing a true state of things (as he claims in his theology), or performatively creating connections which do not exist in the world (as those who criticize his typology for being subjective point out). However, Derrida's and Hillis Miller's critique of the premises of Austin's categories shows how Austin's theory is driven by the same desire of philosophy to dominate metaphor and how, consequently, his distinction between constative and performative utterances does not ultimately hold.

Simply applying Austin's distinctions to Edwards' typology does no more than restate the theological dilemma; taking the deconstructionist criticism of Austin into account, however, invites a reconsideration of the grounds on which the dilemma is articulated. When such criticism identifies the assumption of a stable and reliable self as one of the premises of Austin's theory, the same assumption of the centrality of the self could be criticized in Edwards' typology; upon closer consideration, however, Edwards' conception of the self is one of radical dependence upon God's immediate constitutive action, not of an independent reliable self. But such assumption of the centrality of the self in typology is also involved in the most common criticism of Edwards' typology as being merely an exercise in subjective associations of ideas; perhaps, then, such criticism ought to be based on other grounds. By the same implication, even the rhetorical criticism of the failure of Edwards' typology as the inevitable failure of his effort to master rhetoric by theology must be revised; there are such

important moments in his texts which go against this claim that they ought to be seen as properly belonging to his project, not merely as an unwanted undercurrent which subverts it.

Regarding the second implication of approaching typology from a rhetorical perspective, the rhetorical form of the type is examined by considering its possible affinities with Renaissance emblem and Renaissance high allegory and allegory in early Romanticism. The differences are greatest in the comparison of the natural type with Renaissance allegory; while allegory is the appropriate way of the poet's expressing the divine truths, type is by its very definition incomplete and imperfect and fails in its representative function. There is, however, significant formal (and also historical) overlap between the type and the emblem: both being general and often commonplace, not bound to any particular place or actual experience and both connecting a natural object or common situation to a spiritual truth. Considering the type in light of the findings of a rhetorical reading of typology also suggests important affinities with early Romantic allegory as studied by Paul de Man: Edwards' typology, while it posits the possibility of the type's representation of a transcendental truth, also keeps its fulfillment out of reach by insisting on the possibility of mistake and by not securing a reliable distinction between a true and a false type. If the believer cannot be certain whether he or she pronounces a true or a false type (even if this uncertainty is implied only as a possibility; it is nevertheless potentially still there), typology's promise of providing a spiritual connection between the believer and the natural world is questioned. In this respect, natural type is similar to Romantic allegory which, in de Man's interpretation, contrasts with the symbol's promise of unity of subject and object.

These tropological comparisons also contribute to a revision of existing literary interpretations of Edwards' type and of readings which seek to establish a link between Edwards and Romanticism. Edwards' sense of nature might be compared to that in

Romanticism, but only in certain passages, like in his "Personal Narrative"; his types, however, are radically different from the Romantic symbolic understanding of nature: formally closer to the Renaissance emblem, in their theoretical implications closer to de Man's interpretation of early Romantic allegory.

By arguing that the problem of Edwards' typology must be considered in the context of more general problems of language and representation, this study avoids and transcends some of the limitations of existing Edwards (and Early American) scholarship. While an uncritical theological appropriation of Edwards might admire the gist of his natural typology, if not perhaps some of the details, and a strictly secularizing approach might point out that Edwards' project is nothing but his personal ideas disguised as universal truth by a thin layer of pious phrases, this study points out that the typological project is inherently conflicted not because Edwards is wrong but because it cannot be otherwise, because such conflict is not even a failure of his theory but part of language itself.

Focusing on typology as a mode of thought and a form of rhetoric has not only the advantage of abandoning the limits of the field in which Edwards' typology is considered as a theological and epistemological problem, it also provides an alternative to studies of the literary uses of typology, to use Miner's phrase, as these would be not applicable to Edwards' theological texts. This is a particular advantage for the literary study of Early American texts like Edwards' for which any criteria of "literariness" have always been problematic and which, nevertheless, need not be read as theological texts exclusively or be interpreted only in the course of discovering the social and historical circumstances of literary works.

This persistent focus on the *rhetoric* of Edwards' typology might, however, also be seen as a limitation. By working on the level of text and the rhetorical dimension of Edwards' typology, this work has nothing say about Edwards' thought world or about the otherness of

his discursive pattern, about the "American mind" or even about the "myth of America," nor does it join the new literary historical scholarship. However, while it takes the critical tradition of the Yale deconstructionists, it not only uses it for a reading of texts which are not typically the subject of deconstructionist readings, but it also combines the textual approach with broader contextual connections. This enables an interpretation which engages themes that are more properly literary theoretical rather than literary historical. The combination of close reading with formal (and necessarily also historical) contextualization has a double advantage: the problems identified are seen to inhere in the texts themselves and not to be imputed to them, to use a good Edwardsean expression, externally, and yet the reading does not merely show how the text is internally divided against itself (as deconstructionist readings are sometimes blamed to do no more than that) but also shows how the themes identified can be related to more general literary theoretical issues and so invite new interpretations.

Precisely by focusing on the rhetorical issues this dissertation examines Edwards in a perspective which transcends the discussion of the American mind and its continuity, of the myth of America and of the theological-epistemological debate. It shows the affinity of Edwards' typology with the rhetoric of early Romantic nature poetry, at the same time it argues for a more complex understanding of Edwards' Early Modern typological theory and it links to the older Renaissance allegorical tradition. In this respect the study suggests that texts such as Edwards' which belong to the peak of colonial American literature can be fruitfully studied in a broader perspective and be examined for more general themes than the existing interpretations of American history of ideas and Early American Literature make possible.

Summary

Chapter One, "Introduction," gives an overview of the scholarship on Jonathan Edwards and of the field of Early American Literature and develops the methodological framework of the dissertation. Considering existing approaches to Edwards, it is argued that academic study of Edwards needs to be aware of the fact that he has been and continues to be a hero of faith for many believing Christians and although there is lingering prejudice and distrust between these two groups of interpreters of Edwards, it is important to recognize how evangelical interpreters have influenced the academic study of Edwards, and vice versa. In the particular context of Early American Literature, Edwards' reputation as an academic subject reflects the changing goals and interests of the field. It was not until the 1930's and the rise of American Studies that Puritan writings of colonial America received sustained scholarly attention; before they had been considered to be of merely historical interest and often dismissed for their lack of literary qualities and outdated theology. The work of Perry Miller particularly sparked interest in New England Puritan literature and his study of the development of the "American mind" determined the concerns of Early Americanists for the following decades. The underlying idea of a continual American intellectual development later came under criticism of revisionist scholars whose work not only identified differences overlooked by Miller but, concurring with the concerns of the new social history, also looked at previously neglected texts and themes. The field of Early American Literature came to be considered in a much broader perspective, the older approach of Perry Miller being criticized for constructing a continuity of American intellectual history based on a highly selective choice of texts. Examples of such opposition to the "continuities thesis" may be found, among

others, in the work of William Spengemann or of Richard De Prospo. More importantly, the significant diversifying of the entire field of American Literature was confirmed in the *Cambridge History of American Literature* edited by Sacvan Bercovitch. Most recently, scholarship on Early American Literature pursues a historical reconstruction of the social milieu of literary works and a retrieval of previously neglected voices.

Existing literary scholarship on Edwards often focuses on the stylistic and rhetorical qualities of his writings or proceeds from the perspective of literary history. Richard De Prospo is among the few authors who attempt a postmodern (foucaultian) critical approach to Edwards. He uses Edwards to argue for the existence of a discursive pattern in American literature which is different from that of "humanism" ("humanism" being the reason, according to him, for the bias of historical continuity in Early American scholarship) and which he calls "theism"; Edwards' writings being a prime representative of such theist discourse. This dissertation attempts a different critical approach: building upon the work of the Yale deconstructionists, it focuses on typology as a rhetoric and operates on the level of the text; going beyond the scope of close reading, however, it also looks for more general literary theoretical connections.

Chapter Two, an "Outline of Christian Typology," provides a historical overview of typology as an exegetical discipline, particularly its use by the Puritans and its status in 20th century theological and literary scholarship. The word type came from the Greek *typos* and later co-existed with the Latin term *figura*; the roots of typological interpretation reach to ancient Oriental religions. Typological interpretation was used for the exegesis of the Hebrew Scriptures and became particularly prominent in Christianity as a way of establishing its connection to Judaism: parts of the Old Testament came to be seen as types, prefigurations, of parts of the New, their fulfillment (antitypes). Typological interpretation always existed in

close connection to allegorical interpretation which, too, was used in the Greek and Palestinian traditions. Exegetical considerations in Patristics engaged these various figurative methods of interpretation; the most famous development of exegetical methods later was the fourfold method of Augustine. Since typology concerns the very relation of the Old and the New Testament, it has continued to be discussed by theologians until the present.

The Reformation brought a check against the manifold figurative interpretations of the Bible but typology remained important because it was believed to be intrinsic to the Scriptures, even part of its historical and literal sense. However, typology also developed into a rather general principle of spiritual interpretation, not only of Scripture but also of church history and even of the individual believer's life. Calvin's understanding of typology was open to such extension, more than Luther's, and it was Calvin's Protestantism that influenced the English Puritans more. They insisted strongly on the difference between types and tropes and to that end they had to pay attention to the figurative nature of typological interpretation; typology related to their understanding of rhetoric and its role in homiletics. Typology was also closely connected to other elements of the Puritan spiritual culture, such as meditation and emblematics.

As a figurative principle, typology has also been the subject of literary studies, starting with Erich Auerbach's study "Figura." His discussion of the figural dimension in Dante inspired other scholars to look for figural (typological) elements in literary works. Literary scholars have also discussed the relationship between types and tropes. This dissertation follows particularly Northrop Frye's suggestion that typology is a mode of thought and, consequently, a mode of rhetoric.

Chapter Three, "Edwards on Typology as Language," looks at Edwards' arguments for a typological understanding of nature as being full of "images of divine things." Edwards

anticipates that his typological beliefs will receive criticism for being merely a product of his fancy. In his defense, he explains that natural types are a kind of divine language which the believer is encouraged to gradually learn to know. A juxtaposition of his arguments with his understanding of language and communication in language, however, shows that such explanation introduces more problems to typology. While Edwards believes that language can convey meaning directly in some cases and that there is some universal foundation for the connection of words and ideas, he also argues that the relationship between words and ideas is arbitrary and can easily be misleading; when language refers to spiritual things, moreover, names of ideas are analogically derived from names of material things, and yet God chooses figurative language as the original medium of his revelation. Even types themselves, Edwards points out, not only reveal but also veil and hide. In this respect, they are not unlike tropes; typology is a kind of figurative representation and so can be considered in connection to Edwards' understanding of rhetoric as permissible, even desirable, but only within appropriate limits.

While it is one of the basic premises of typology that types are divinely instituted and ontological, and so different fundamentally from tropes, Edwards' homiletic practice suggests how hard it is to maintain this distinction in writing: typological interpretations blur with allegorical meanings, intertextual allusions and elaborations on biblical imagery. The problem, however, is the same in his typological theory as in homiletics. The distinction between type and trope could be reliably given only in language which itself would be somehow free of its rhetorical dimension. Here the discussion touches upon a general philosophical problem of the relationship of philosophy to metaphor; Jacques Derrida argues that it is philosophy's tendency to try to master metaphor and treat it as external to itself but

that metaphor is in the very text of philosophy and its own product, philosophy's blind spot which it cannot perceive nor master.

Chapter Four on "Type and Emblem" looks at Edwards' typological notebook "Images of Divine Things" and considers several possibilities for a tropological interpretation of the rhetorical form of the type. Most existing literary interpretations of Edwards' natural typology suggest that it is a forerunner of Romantic nature poetry and the connection of nature with emotional or spiritual experience. To counter the subjective implications of such reading, Jennifer Leader attempts to rescue Edwards' theological understanding of typology by arguing that the relationship between type and antitype is one of metonymy. Leader claims to base her metonymical interpretation on a close reading of "Images." Upon consideration, such close reading reveals, however, that the relationship between the type and antitype is based on analogy and always some kind of similarity. Metonymic contiguity can be found between the constituents of the type itself (such as between rose and thorns); the link between type and antitype can be of metonymical nature only when the premises of Edwards' theology are accepted (universe as a network of harmonious relationships; being's consent to being).

Edwards' types in "Images of Divine Things" show considerable affinities with Renaissance emblems. There are close historical connections between the two genres but the type and emblem also reveal significant formal and thematic similarities. Both use images taken from nature or general human experience; their meaning is simple, unambiguous, even commonplace; the actual existence of the object described is not important in itself and any particular details or specific circumstances are disregarded. This lack of particularity and the unimportance of actual experience of the objects depicted is also characteristic of the meditation on the creatures, one of the sources, according to M. H. Abrams, of Romantic

nature poetry and the mood of dejection. This suggests a refined understanding of Edwards' typology as anticipation of the Romantic symbol: such connections might be argued either via the closeness of natural typology to meditation on the creatures, following Abrams, or in passages in which Edwards describes his spiritual experiences in particular natural settings (as in the "Personal Narrative"). Typological entries in "Images of Divine Things" reveal much greater affinity with the Renaissance emblem than with Romantic nature poetry.

Chapter Five, "Typology and Performative," focuses once again on typological theory in general and its problems. Taking clue from Edwards' interesting note that the believer must learn to *speak* the language of types, J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts is considered as a possible tool for an analysis of Edwards' typology: in speaking the type, does the believer state an existing fact, or does he or she proclaim something to be a type; put in Austin's terms, is it a constative or a performative utterance? This would merely put the theological dilemma in different terms; Austin, however, himself complicates the categories and concedes that they are abstractions and that speech acts are rather both constative and performative. Derrida pursues this implication in an extended critique of Austin, proceeding from a different understanding of language as writing, with two main characteristics: absence and iterability. Writing defies the premises of Austin's theory: it cannot be subsumed under communication and it carries with itself the impossibility of determining context. Hillis Miller points out that Derrida's criticism dismantles the basic assumptions of Austin's theory: the authority of the "I" and the subordination of the fictive to the real.

Edwards' typology is an example of what Derrida calls logocentrism but there are also moments in which his theory gives way to the disruption of writing. This can be argued particularly from his explanation of learning typology by a training of the judgment, and by implication, by a method of trial and error. Even the regenerate believer might make

mistakes in the language of typology and Edwards' defense suggests that typological judgment can only be verified against more typology and figurative expressions; in effect, the ultimate decision regarding the truthfulness or the falsity of types depends on the believer. So Edwards' typology seems to be dependent, like Austin's theory, on the authority of the self; this is the basis of the criticism of the theory as inevitably subjective.

There are, however, reasons to go beyond this obvious criticism. Edwards' conception of the "I" as one of the self's radical dependence upon the immediate and continuing action of God precludes an interpretation of the self as the implied arbiter of typological connections. His idealism and occasionalism climaxes, as Michael Colacurcio argues, at the end of the *Original Sin* and its consequences for Edwards' notion of the self are discernible also elsewhere. It is telling that despite Edwards' defense his typology leaves so much ambiguity and, consequently, it is questionable whether a criticism of it may be based on the argument that its ultimate implication is that the self, rather than divine revelation, is the true arbiter of typology. Rather, if Edwards' idealism is taken into account, typology may be seen to be in accordance with his conception of the self's radical dependence on God's immediate action.

Chapter Six on "Type and Allegory" returns to the discussion of the rhetorical form of the type and considers the type in connection to two forms of allegory, high allegory in the Renaissance and allegory in early Romanticism. For the former, Michael Murrin's interpretation is used. Renaissance allegory is essentially elitist: the poet expresses a divine truth which he received in inspiration and veils it in allegory to protect it from the multitude who have no knowledge of the cosmological order and cannot understand the true meaning of the message. The calling of the allegorical poet must be understood against the background of the figure of the ancient prophet and the wise man. The former finds himself

in a paradoxical situation: he must communicate divine message to an audience which refuses to listen; the latter attempts to overcome the paradox by making his message accessible only to a select few. The allegorical poet follows the method of the wise man and veils divine truths in allegory, making the true meaning understandable to the wise and leaving the moral comprehensible to the many. While Edwards' situation as a preacher is closer to that of the preacher, the veil of allegory throws light on some central features of the type: while for the Renaissance poet the inexpressible nature of the sacred truth demands and calls forth allegorical polysemy and it is the rational explanation of the truth that fails, in typology what falls short is not explanation but the type itself, by its very definition, being essentially incomplete without its antitype.

Paul de Man focuses on allegory in early Romanticism, arguing against the more common perspective that Romanticism's main achievement is the dialectic of subject and object, expressed in the symbol. De Man establishes the importance of allegory in early Romanticism and also points out that there is no continuous development from Renaissance allegory to Romantic naturalism but that they are separated by the loss of dogma: the early Romantic period can no longer overcome the antinomies between nature and the mind by relying on the notion of the divine will, which was the basis of the older allegorical traditions. Consequently, in Romantic allegory the relationship between the signs is not based on dogma, what remains is only the constitutive temporal difference between them. Allegory is the opposite of the symbol: while the latter offers to the temporal self a promise of connection to the stability of nature, the former unmasks the promise as illusory. De Man also argues that it is precisely the secularization of the Romantic thought in which it differs most from the eighteenth-century local poems: the early Romantic poet acknowledges the desire to find a symbolical connection to nature (which would go beyond Neoclassical associative analogy),

and yet the imagination to which he turns introduces an anxiety of the loss of this connection. Imagination questions the connection between consciousness and the world; the poetic language of Romantic allegory is capable of positioning, but positioning without foundation. Edwards' typology with its moment of indeterminacy between false and true types can be seen to have an affinity to the early Romantic allegory precisely in this light: the typological endeavor cannot be secure precisely because of the inability of language to coincide with itself.

The chapter concludes with a rhetorical reading of Edwards' typological interpretation of history in his sermon series *A History of the Work of Redemption.* Edwards here extends the typological principle to relate virtually all events in the history (and future) of humanity to Christ's redemption of saints. The same issues raised by natural typology arise also in this project. The performative nature of typology can be argued from the distinctly literary nature of the text, such as the use of images of unity which convey the idea of a unified teleological progress of history. Edwards' text can be interpreted with the help of Hillis Miller's discussion of the distinction between sacred and secular parables, raising again the question of their constative or performative nature. Miller shows that the distinction itself involves a paradox: the sacred parable asks the impossible of the listener and the secular parable always pretends to be, implicitly, like the sacred parable. Edwards' typology, too, is a parable: it promises a unified meaning of history and at the same time suggests that the fulfillment of the promise is parabolic, "thrown beside."

"Conclusion" summarizes the main arguments of the dissertation and considers its contribution to the study of Edwards and of the field of Early American Literature. By focusing on Edwards' typology as rhetoric, this dissertation opens an examination of Edwards' texts in connection to more general issues than the existing frameworks of

interpretation of Early American writings make possible: it discusses the affinities of the rhetoric of Edwards' typology to that of early Romantic nature poetry but also its connections to Renaissance allegory, and it argues for a more complex criticism of Edwards' Early Modern typological theory than is afforded by an exclusively historical interpretation.

Shrnutí

První kapitola, „Úvod“, nastiňuje přehled vědeckého bádání o Jonathanu Edwardsovi a o oboru rané americké literatury a rozvíjí metodologický rámec disertace. I v akademickém studiu je třeba mít na zřeteli skutečnost, že Edwards také byl a je pro mnoho věřících křesťanů hrdinou víry, a ačkoli mezi těmito skupinami Edwardsových interpretů přetrvává vzájemná nedůvěra a předsudky, je důležité uvědomit si, jak evangelikální vykladači ovlivnili podobu akademického zkoumání Edwardse a naopak. V kontextu rané americké literatury dráha Edwardse coby předmětu akademického studia odráží měnící se cíle a zájmy oboru. Puritánské písemnictví koloniální Ameriky se stalo předmětem soustavnějšího akademického zájmu až ve 30. letech 20. století se vznikem amerických studií. Do té doby se považovalo za zajímavé jen z historického hlediska a často bylo opomíjeno pro nedostatečné literární kvality a překonanou teologii. Zájem o novoanglickou puritánskou literaturu pomohla vzbudit zvláště práce Perryho Millera. Jeho studium vývoje „americké mysli“ ovlivnilo zájmy raných amerikanistů po následující desetiletí. Základní předpoklad kontinuálního amerického intelektuální vývoje prošel později kritikou revizionistů; jejich práce poukázala nejen na rozdíly, které Miller přehlížel, ale v souladu s novou sociální historií také otevřela pohled na dříve opomíjené texty a témata. Obor rané americké literatury začal být nahlížen v širší perspektivě a staršímu přístupu Perryho Millera bylo vytýkáno, že kontinuitu americké intelektuální historie staví na velmi selektivním výběru textů. Příklad kritiky této „teze kontinuity“ lze najít mimo jiné v práci Williama Spengemanna nebo Richarda De Prospa. Ještě důležitějším počinem bylo vydání *Cambridge History of American Literature* pod vedením Sacvana Bercovitche, potvrzující zásadní rozšíření

celého oboru americké literatury. Bádání v oblasti rané americké literatury se nejnověji zaměřuje na historickou rekonstrukci společenského prostředí literárních děl a znovu-objevování doposud opomíjených autorů.

Stávající edwardsovské literární bádání se často soustředí na stylistické a rétorické kvality jeho díla nebo je zaměřeno literárně historicky. K nemnohým autorům, kteří se snaží o postmoderní kritický přístup k Edwardsovi, patří Richard De Prospo. Pomocí Edwardse De Prospo ukazuje, že v americké literatuře existuje diskursivní vzorec odlišný od „humanismu" („humanismus" je podle něj důvodem, proč v raně americkém bádání převládá myšlenka historické kontinuity), který označuje „teismus"; podle něho je Edwardsovo dílo zvláště vhodným představitelem tohoto teistického diskursu. Disertace se pokouší o odlišný kritický přístup: navazuje na práci yaleské školy dekonstrukce, nahlíží typologii jako rétoriku a pohybuje se na rovině textu, zároveň však překračuje záběr pečlivého čtení a hledá obecnější literárně teoretické souvislosti.

Druhá kapitola, „Nástin křesťanské typologie", podává stručný průřez dějinami typologie jakožto exegetické disciplíny se zvláštním přihlédnutím k jejímu užití v puritanismu a jejímu statu v teologickém a literárním bádání 20. století. Slovo pochází z řeckého *typos*, později se vyskytovalo společně s latinským termínem *figura*. Kořeny typologické exegeze sahají ke starověkým východním náboženstvím. Typologických interpretací se používalo při výkladu židovských Písem; na významu později zvláště posílily s nástupem křesťanství, neboť nabízely spojení s judaismem: části Starého zákona se považovaly za typy, předobrazy, částí Nového, které byly jejich naplněním (antitypem). Typologické interpretace ovšem vždy existovaly v těsné blízkosti interpretací alegorických, které se v řecké i palestinské tradici rovněž používaly. Těmito různými způsoby figurativní interpretace se dále zabývaly exegetické úvahy v patristice. Nejznámějším rozpracováním

exegetických postupů byla později Augustinova čtverá metoda. Protože se typologie dotýká samotného vztahu Starého a Nového zákona, zůstává předmětem teologických debat až do současnosti.

Reformace sice pozastavila mnohonásobné obrazné interpretace Bible, ale význam typologie se nezmenšil, neboť byla považována za vlastní Písmu a součást jeho historického a doslovného významu. Rozvinula se ovšem dále do dosti obecného principu duchovní interpretace nejen Písma, ale i církevních dějin a dokonce života jednotlivého věřícího. Tomuto rozšíření byla typologie Kalvínova otevřena více než Lutherova, a byl to právě spíše Kalvínův protestantismus, který měl vliv na anglické puritány. Ve snaze rozlišit mezi typy a tropy se museli podrobně zabývat obraznou povahou typologické interpretace. Typologie tedy souvisela i s jejich chápáním rétoriky a role rétoriky v homiletice. Typologie dále úzce souvisela i s dašími prvky puritánské duchovní kultury, např. s rozjímáním nebo emblematikou.

Coby figurativní princip se typologie také stala předmětem literárního bádání, počínaje studií Ericha Auerbacha „Figura“. Jeho rozbor figurálního rozměru Dantova díla inspiroval další badatele k hledání figurálních (typologických) prvků v literárních dílech i k rozboru vztahu typu a tropů. Disertace staví zvláště na tvrzení Northropa Frye, že typologie je způsob myšlení, a tedy i způsob rétoriky.

Třetí kapitola, „Edwards o typologii jako jazyku“, pojednává o Edwardsových argumentech pro typologické chápání přírody jako plné „obrazů božských věcí“. Edwards očekává, že jeho typologické přesvědčení bude kritizováno v tom smyslu, že je pouhým plodem jeho představivosti. Hájí se tím, že přírodní typy jsou určitým druhem božského jazyka, který se má věřící postupně naučit znát. Jsou-li však jeho argumenty postaveny vedle jeho chápání jazyka a komunikace v jazyce, ukazuje se, že takové vysvětlení typologii dále

problematizuje. Edwards sice věří, že jazyk může předávat význam přímo a že spojení slov a idejí má určitý univerzální základ, zároveň však tvrdí, že vztah mezi slovy a idejemi je arbitrární a může být snadno zavádějící. Nadto když jazyk odkazuje na věci duchovní, jsou jména idejí odvozena analogicky od jmen hmotných věcí; a přesto Bůh volí obrazný jazyk jako původní médium zjevení. I samotné typy, jak Edwards podotýká, nejen vyjevují, ale i halí a skrývají. V tomto smyslu nejsou nepodobné tropům. Typologie je druh figurativní reprezentace a lze ji proto nahlížet v souvislosti s Edwardsovým pojetím rétoriky, tedy že tato je přípustná, dokonce i žádoucí, ovšem jen v patřičných mezích.

Ačkoli jednou ze základních premis typologie je, že typy jsou božsky ustavené a ontologické, a tudíž zásadně odlišné od tropů, Edwardsova homiletická praxe naznačuje, jak obtížné je tento rozdíl udržet v textu: typologické interpretace splývají s alegorickými významy, intertextuálními narážkami a rozpracováním biblických obrazů. Tento problém homiletického textu je ovšem totožný s problémem typologické teorie. Rozdíl mezi typem a tropem by bylo možno spolehlivě stanovit jen v jazyce, který by sám byl nějak oproštěn od svých rétorických rozměrů. Zde se rozbor dotýká obecného filozofického problému, tedy vztahu filozofie a metafory. Jacques Derrida poukazuje, že filozofie má tendenci metaforu ovládnout a považovat ji za vně sebe sama, ale metafora je obsažena v samotném textu filozofie a je jejím vlastním plodem, je slepou skvrnou, kterou filozofie nedokáže vnímat a tedy ani ovládnout.

Čtvrtá kapitola o „Typu a emblému“ se zabývá Edwardsovým typologickým zápisníkem „Obrazy božských věcí“ a zvažuje několik možností tropologické interpretace rétorické formy typu. Většina stávajících literárních výkladů Edwardsovy přírodní typologie navrhuje, že typos je předchůdcem romantické přírodní poezie a její rétoriky spojení přírody s emocionálním nebo duchovním prožitkem. Proti subjektivistickým implikacím takové

interpretace se staví Jennifer Leader a pokouší se zachránit Edwardsovo teologické pojetí typologie argumentem, že spojení mezi typem a antitypem je metonymické. Metonymickou interpretaci Leader údajně zakládá na pečlivém čtení „Obrazů". Při bližším pohledu ovšem vychází najevo, že v pečlivém čtení se vztah mezi typem a antitypem zakládá na analogii a vždy nějaké podobnosti. Metonymickou blízkost lze nalézt spíše mezi součástmi typu samotného (např. mezi růží a trním), spojení mezi typem a antitypem jako takové ovšem může být metonymické povahy jen tehdy, jsou-li zohledněny premisy Edwardsovy teologie (vesmír jako předivo harmonických vztahů, vzájemný souhlas jsoucen).

Edwardsovy typy v „Obrazech božských věcí" vykazují ale nemalé souvislosti s renesančními emblémy. Oba žánry si jsou historicky blízké, mezi typem a emblémem jsou ovšem i výrazné formální a tematické podobnosti. Oba užívají obrazy převzaté z přírody nebo obecné lidské zkušenosti, mají jednoduchý a jednoznačný, až obecně známý význam, skutečná existence popisovaného předmětu není sama o sobě důležitá a konkrétní podrobnosti nebo specifické okolnosti nejsou zohledněny. Podle M. H. Abramse se podobnou absencí konkrétnosti a nezájmem o skutečné zakoušení předmětu vykazuje také rozjímání nad tvory, které je podle něho jedním ze zdrojů romantické přírodní poezie a skleslosti. Zde se tedy nastiňuje zpřesněné chápání Edwardsovy typologie jakožto předchůdce romantického symbolu. Takovou spojitost lze odvodit buď z blízkosti přírodní typologie a rozjímání nad tvory, podle Abramsova výkladu, nebo z pasáží, v nichž Edwards popisuje duchovní prožitek v konkrétním přírodním prostředí (například v „Osobním vyprávění"). Typologické zápisky v „Obrazech božských věcí" vykazují však mnohem silnější souvislost s renesančním emblémem než s romantickou přírodní poezií.

Pátá kapitola, „Typologie a performativ", se znovu obrací k Edwardsově typologické teorii jako celku a jejím problémům. Ve světle Edwardsovy zajímavé poznámky, že věřící se

musí naučit jazykem typologie mluvit, se jako možný nástroj pro rozbor jeho typologie nabízí teorie řečových aktů J. L. Austina. Když věřící vysloví typos, konstatuje tak existující skutečnost nebo něco teprve prohlašuje typem? neboli řečeno s Austinem: jedná se o konstativní nebo o performativní výrok? Takto by se ovšem teologické dilema jen zopakovalo v jiných pojmech. Austin sám ale uvedené kategorie problematizuje a uznává, že jsou abstrakcemi a že řečové akty jsou spíše zároveň konstativní i performativní. Derrida tuto implikaci sleduje v obšírné kritice Austina. Vychází ovšem z odlišného chápání jazyka jako psaní, které má dva hlavní rysy: absence a iterabilita. Psaní popírá premisy Austinovy teorie: nelze je zahrnout pod komunikaci a přináší s sebou nemožnost determinovat kontext. Hillis Miller upozorňuje, že Derridova kritika rozkládá základní předpoklady Austinovy teorie: autoritu „já“ a podřízení fiktivního reálnému.

Edwardsova typologie je příkladem toho, co Derrida nazývá logocentrismus, jsou v ní ale i okamžiky, kdy jeho teorie ustupuje rozrušování, jež s sebou přináší psaní. To lze ukázat zvláště na jeho vysvětlení, že typologii se člověk učí cvičením úsudku, a tudíž, nepřímo řečeno, metodou pokusů a omylů. I znovuzrozený věřící se může v jazyce typologie dopustit omylů a Edwardsova obrana naznačuje, že typologický úsudek lze ověřit pouze srovnáním s další typologií a obraznými vyjádřeními. V konečném důsledku zůstává poslední rozhodnutí o pravdivosti nebo nepravdivosti typů na jednotlivci. Zdá se tedy, že Edwardsova typologie je stejně jako Austinova teorie závislá na autoritě osobnosti. To je také základem kritiky, že je jeho typologie nevyhnutelně subjektivní.

Existují však důvody, proč tuto zřejmou kritiku opustit. V Edwardsově pojetí je „já“ radikálně závislé na bezprostředním a trvajícím Božím působení, což znemožňuje pojímat osobnost jako implikovaného arbitra typologických spojení. Vrcholem jeho idealismu a okasionalismu je, jak tvrdí Michael Colacurcio, závěr pojednání *O původním*

hříchu; jeho důsledky pro chápání osobnosti jsou patrné i v dalších textech. Není bez významu, že Edwardsova typologie i přes jeho obhajobu zůstává dosti nejednoznačná, a lze proto pochybovat, zda je možné ji kritizovat na základě tvrzení, že v konečném důsledku je typologickou autoritou osobnost, a nikoli božské zjevení. S ohledem na Edwardsův idealismus je možno říci, že typologie je v souladu s jeho pojetím radikální závislosti osobnosti na Božím bezprostředním působení.

Šestá kapitola o „Typu a alegorii" se vrací k úvaze o rétorické formě typu a zvažuje jej v souvislosti s dvěma formami alegorie, s vrcholnou renesanční alegorií a s alegorií v raném romantismu. V prvním ohledu se úvaha opírá o interpretaci Michaela Murrina. Vrcholná renesanční alegorie je v zásadě elitářská: básník vyjadřuje božskou pravdu, již přijal v inspiraci, a zahaluje ji závojem alegorie, aby ji ochránil před davem, který nezná kosmologický řád a nemůže pochopit pravý smysl sdělení. Povolání alegorického básníka je nutno chápat na pozadí postav starověkého proroka a mudrce. První se ocitá v paradoxní situaci: musí předat božské sdělení posluchačům, kteří odmítají naslouchat, druhý se tento paradox pokouší překonat tím, že sdělení zpřístupňuje několika vyvoleným. Alegorický básník následuje mudrcův způsob a božské pravdy zahaluje do alegorie, moudří tak mohou pochopit pravý význam a většina alespoň mravní ponaučení. Jako kazatel má Edwards blíže k situaci proroka, závoj alegorie ale pomáhá osvětlit některé ústřední rysy typu: v případě renesančního básníka nevyslovitelná povaha posvátné pravdy přímo vyžaduje a vyvolává alegorickou polysémii a selhání nastává v případě rozumového vysvětlení, v typologii nedostačuje nikoli vysvětlení, ale samotný typos, ex definitio, neboť je bez antitypu zásadně neúplný.

Alegorií v raném romantismu se zabývá Paul de Man. Staví ji proti běžnějšímu pohledu, totiž že hlavním přínosem romantismu je dialektika subjektu a objektu, vyjádřená

v symbolu. De Man dokládá význam alegorie v raném romantismu a podotýká také, že se zde nejedná o kontinuální vývoj od renesanční alegorie k romantickému naturalismu, ale že je odděluje ztráta dogmatu: raně romantická doba již antinomie mezi přírodou a myslí nedokáže vyřešit odkazem na Boží vůli, což bylo základem starších alegorických tradic. V romantické alegorii není tedy vztah mezi znaky založen na dogmatu, zbývá v něm jedině konstitutivní temporální rozdíl mezi nimi. Alegorie je tedy opak symbolu: ten nabízí časově omezené osobnosti slib spojení se stabilitou přírody, ale alegorie tento slib odkrývá jako iluzorní. De Man také tvrdí, že především touto sekularizací se romantická poezie odlišuje od lokální poezie 18. století. Raně romantický básník uznává touhu po symbolickém spojení s přírodou (které by přesahovalo neoklasickou asociativní analogii), a přesto obrazotvornost, k níž se uchyluje, vyvolává úzkost ze ztráty tohoto spojení. Obrazotvornost zpochybňuje spojení mezi vědomím a vnějším světem; básnický jazyk romantické alegorie dokáže postulovat, ovšem bez základu. Edwardsovu typologii a v ní implikovaný okamžik nerozhodnosti mezi pravými a falešnými typy lze nahlížet v souvislosti s raně romantickou alegorií právě v tomto smyslu: typologické úsilí nemůže být zaručeno právě proto, že jazyk není schopen překrývat se sám se sebou.

Kapitolu uzavírá rétorické čtení Edwardsovy typologické interpretace dějin v jeho sérii kázání *Dějiny díla spásy*. Edwards zde typologický princip rozšiřuje a pomocí něj vztahuje v podstatě všechny události dějin (i budoucnosti) lidstva ke Kristovu vykoupení svatých. Vyvstávají zde tytéž otázky jako v jeho přírodní typologii. Pro performativní povahu typologie lze argumentovat ze zřetelně literární povahy textu, například z výskytu obrazů jednoty, které vyjadřují myšlenku jednotného teleologického postupu dějin. Edwardsův text je možno interpretovat pomocí rozboru rozdílu mezi posvátným a sekulárním podobenstvím od Hillise Millera, kde opět vyvstává otázka jejich konstativní nebo performativní povahy.

Miller ukazuje, že samotné rozlišení obsahuje paradox: posvátné podobenství vyžaduje od posluchače nemožné, sekulární podobenství vždy implicitně předstírá posvátnost. Edwardsova typologie je tedy podobenství: slibuje jednotný význam dějin a zároveň naznačuje, že splnění slibu je parabolické, tedy „vedle sebe hozené".

„Závěr" rekapituluje hlavní argumenty disertace a zvažuje její přínos pro edwardsovské bádání i pro obor rané americké literatury. Důrazem na Edwardsovu typologii jako rétoriku disertace otevírá její zkoumání v souvislostech s obecnějšími tématy než jaká se nabízejí ve stávajících interpretačních rámcích raného amerického písemnictví. Pojednává o spojitostech mezi rétorikou Edwardsovy typologie a raně romantické přírodní poezie, ale také renesanční alegorie, a navrhuje komplexnější kritiku Edwardsovy raně moderní typologické teorie, než umožňují výlučně historické interpretace.

Abstract

This work is a study of selected typological writings of the New England theologian, thinker and preacher Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758). Typology is primarily a Christian exegetical practice connecting the Old and the New Testament on the basis of prefigurative analogies. Edwards expands the typological principle to nature and argues that the world and general human experience contain types or images of divine things, that these typological connections are objectively existing and may be discovered by the believer. The dissertation examines the rhetorical aspect of Edwards' natural typology and the rhetorical form of the type in its connections to other tropes, particularly emblem, symbol and allegory. In doing so, it also addresses the issue of the connections of Edwards' texts to Romanticism and seeks to refine existing interpretations of these links. Edwards has been interpreted, in the tradition of Perry Miller, as anticipating Transcendentalism and Romanticism, one of the arguments being precisely that his natural types anticipate Romantic symbol. On a more general level, this work addresses and seeks to overcome some existing methodological limitations in the scholarship on Edwards, who is typically studied from the perspective of theology or religious and intellectual history, and on Early American Literature, which has too often been studied in isolation from more recent literary critical concerns. The methodology of the present work follows largely the deconstructive rhetorical criticism as practiced by Yale deconstructionists (Paul de Man, J. Hillis Miller, Jacques Derrida) but engages also a broader historical perspective (history of typology, relationship of typology and allegory).

The rhetorical reading of Edwards' natural typology highlights some inherent tensions in his theory which are identified, with the help of Derrida's work, as part of the larger problem of the relationship of philosophy and metaphor. The performative nature of Edwards' typology is discussed against the background of J. L. Austin's speech act theory and Derrida's and Hillis Miller's criticism of it, redefining the persistent theological-epistemological discussion of subjectivity as the main problem of Edwards' project and opening a way for reading, with the help of Hillis Miller, Edwards' typology as parable. Secondly, the rhetorical form of the type as trope is examined by considering its connections to Renaissance emblem (as described by Peter Daly and others), Renaissance high allegory (as described by Michael Murrin) and early Romantic allegory (as described by Paul de Man). While the differences are greatest in comparison of the type to the high allegory of the Renaissance, there is significant formal and historical overlap between types and emblems; the rhetorical reading of Edwards, however, also emphasizes certain inherent tendencies and implications which complicate the asserted connection between the natural world and the self and so connect it to early Romantic allegory. By bringing Edwards' natural typology to such theoretical context, the dissertation suggests a way for studying major works of colonial American literature in a broader theoretical perspective than some existing interpretations of American history of ideas and Early American Literature make possible.

Abstrakt

Disertace zkoumá vybrané typologické spisy novoanglického teologa, myslitele a kazatele Jonathana Edwardse (1703-1758). Typologie je především křesťanská exegetická metoda, která spojuje Starý a Nový zákon na základě předobrazujících analogií. Edwards typologický princip rozšiřuje na přírodu a prohlašuje, že svět a obecná lidská zkušenost obsahují typy nebo obrazy božských věcí, že tyto typologické souvislosti objektivně existují a věřící člověk je může objevovat. Disertace se zabývá rétorickým aspektem Edwardsovy přírodní typologie a rétorickou formou typu ve vztahu k dalším tropům, konkrétně emblému, symbolu a alegorii. Tím se zároveň věnuje vztahu Edwardsových textů a romantismu a pokouší se zpřesnit stávající interpretace. Interpretační tradice Perryho Millera vykládá Edwardse jako předchůdce transcendentalismu a romantismu, přičemž jeden z argumentů uvádí, že právě jeho přírodní typos předjímá romantický symbol. V obecnější rovině práce identifikuje a snaží se překonat některé stávající metodologické limity v edwardsovském bádání (Edwards bývá nejčastěji interpretován z pohledu teologie nebo historie náboženství a idejí) a v rané americké literatuře, která je příliš často zkoumána odděleně od novějších literárně kritických směrů. Metodologicky práce navazuje především na dekonstruktivistickou rétorickou kritiku yaleské školy (Paul de Man, J. Hillis Miller, Jacques Derrida), ale zohledňuje také širší historickou perspektivu (dějiny typologie, vztah typologie a alegorie).

Rétorická interpretace Edwardsovy přírodní typologie poukazuje na některá napětí, která jeho teorie inherentně obsahuje; pomocí některých Derridových prací jsou tato identifikována jako součást širšího problému vztahu filozofie a metafory. Performativní povaha Edwardsovy typologie je rozebírána na pozadí teorie řečových aktů J. L. Austina a její kritiky, kterou provedli Derrida a Hillis Miller. Díky tomu je možné posunout debatu o Edwardsově typologii za přetrvávající teologicko-epistemologickou kritiku subjektivnosti jako hlavního problému Edwardsovy teorie. Otvírá se zároveň možnost interpretovat, za pomoci Hillise Millera, Edwardsovu typologii jako podobenství. Práce se dále zabývá rétorickou formou typu jakožto tropu a zkoumá ji v souvislosti s renesančním emblémem (jak jej popisuje Peter Daly a další), s vrcholnou renesanční alegorií (jak ji popisuje Michael Murrin) a s raně romantickou alegorií (jak ji popisuje Paul de Man). Největší rozdíly se ukazují ve srovnání typu s vrcholnou renesanční alegorií, naopak se ukazuje výrazná formální i historická podobnost mezi typy a emblémy. Tato rétorická interpretace Edwardse však poukazuje také na určité inherentní tendence a implikace, které jím předkládané spojení mezi přírodním světem a osobností problematizují; v tomto smyslu se otvírá souvislost mezi typem a raně romantickou alegorií. Zasazením Edwardsovy přírodní typologie do tohoto teoretického kontextu práce nastiňuje možnost zkoumání vrcholných textů americké koloniální literatury v širším teoretickém pohledu, než umožňují některé stávající interpretace americké intelektuální historie a rané americké literatury.

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