

North Korea's nuclear program has become an international issue in the early 1990s. Even though the United States and the DPRK signed the Agreed Framework under which the program should have been stopped the agreement's provisions were not fulfilled in the coming years. In the late 1990s North Korea began secretly working on uranium enrichment program. The second nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula started after this program was discovered by the CIA. The United States knew that previous bilateral efforts were not successful and therefore called for a multilateral solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. It aimed to apply joint pressure on the DPRK and that is why China, South Korea and Japan were invited to participate in the negotiations. Russia was invited to the Talks by the DRPK. The representatives of these four states together with the U.S. and North Korea met for a total of six rounds of the Six-Party Talks between 2003 and 2007. The main goal of denuclearization of North Korea was not achieved, however. The Six-Party Talks ended in April 2009 when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Talks. The failure of the Six-Party Talks was caused mainly by the unpredictability of the North Korean regime. Moreover, the interests and priorities of individual actors were far too different to allow for a widely acceptable compromise. The first part of this thesis offers an outline of the development of the North Korean nuclear program and introduces the concept of the Six-Party Talks. The second part briefly summarizes previous rounds of the talks and the third part focuses on the attitudes, interests and expectations of the individual players. The final part comprehensively evaluates the concept of the Six-Party Talks and aims to place it into the general framework of multilateral negotiations as an alternative solution of international crises.