

## **Abstract**

This bachelor thesis is concerned with Plotinus's and Augustine's conception of evil and its main aim is to compare both views and reveal which Plotinus's thoughts inspired Augustine and at which points he had to divert from Plotinus. The key question is in what way both philosophers attempt to answer the question about ontological status and origin of evil. While examining the differences between both conceptions it will be important to explain them with regard to different metaphysical concepts which constitute Plotinus's and Augustine's thinking. First part of the thesis investigates in what sense in Plotinus's theory matter - the last point of emanation of reality from the One - is the principle of evil. Later we encounter *tolma*, certain illegitimate audacity to become independent from the higher levels which is present in the soul and also at the very emergence of reality as such from the One. However, since soul has a divine origin, it cannot really sin. Plotinus ascribes the ultimate responsibility for evil to matter, utter privation and form of non-being, which can act as a sort of trap for the soul. In the second part we will see that thanks to neoplatonic thinking Augustine too perceives evil as privation but he ascribes its origin to a free decision of created, and thus mutable rational being. In his concept there is no place for principle of evil which would "infect" the soul because creation is good on its every level. Evil originates in bad will, key aspect of which is pride. There are certain similarities between pride and plotinian *tolma*. However, pride is not present at the emergence of reality as such but only on the level of individual free being. Against Plotinus's necessity of evil in reality emanating from the One stands Augustine's possibility of evil in the universe created from nothing, plenitude of which depends also upon the presence of free action of moral agents responsible toward personal God.