

**Charles University in Prague**

Faculty of Social Sciences  
Department of International Studies

**Amy Hubbard**

**Internal Westward Migration in Germany:  
1989-1994**

*Master's Thesis*

Prague 2012

Author: **Amy Hubbard**  
Advisor: **PhDr. Tomáš Nigrin, Ph.D.**  
Reviewer:  
Date of Defense:  
Final Score:



## **Bibliography:**

Hubbard, Amy. *Internal Westward Migration: Germany (1989-1994)*. Prague: Charles University, Department of Social Sciences, International Studies, 2012. 102 pages. Thesis Advisor PhDr. Tomáš Nigrin, Ph.D.

## **Anotace:**

Moderní historie Německa byla ovlivněná politickými, sociálními a ekonomickými zvraty. To vše má za následek jeho současné složení. Za jeden takový následek německé minulosti může být viděna vnitřní migrace na západ mezi roky 1989 až 1994. Tato analýza zkoumá ony politické, sociální a ekonomické faktory, které vedly k nárůstu vnitřní západní migrace z bývalé Německé demokratické republiky do bývalé Spolkové republiky Německo. Tyto politické, sociální a ekonomické rozvoje Německé demokratické republiky, spolu s procesem znovusjednocování, vedly k pocitu nejistoty na východě. Lidé s velkými politickými, sociálními a ekonomickými nejistotami měli větší sklony k migraci do stabilnějšího prostředí. Celá škála vládních programů byla vyvinuta, aby se tento problém potlačil, ale všechny byly velmi neúspěšné. Kromě toho se objevila řada záporných následků způsobených existencí interní západní migrace takového měřítka; například, vzestup extrémistických stran ve východních částech Německa.

## **Abstract:**

Contemporary German history has been beleaguered with political, social, and economic upheaval, the consequences of which have led to its modern day composition. One such consequence of Germany's past is the problem of internal westward migration between 1989 and 1994. This analysis looks at the political, social, and economic factors that have led to the increase of internal westward migration from the states of the former German Democratic Republic to the states of the former Federal Republic of Germany. The political, social, and economic developments of the German Democratic Republic combined with the reunification process have led to a feeling of insecurity in the east. People with a strong sense of political, social, or economic insecurity will have a stronger propensity to migration to a stable environment. A variety of governmental programs

have been developed to quell the problem but they have been widely unsuccessful. Additionally, there have been a series of negative consequences caused by the existence of internal westward migration on such a scale, such as, the rise of extremist parties in the eastern states of German

### **Klíčová slova:**

Vnitřní západní migrace, 'neue Länder', znovusjednocování Německa, vládní změna, Německá demokratická republika, německá nezaměstnanost, privatizace, genderové role v Německu, vylidňování.

### **Keywords:**

Internal westward migration, 'neue Länder', German reunification, government transition, German Democratic Republic, German unemployment, privatization, gender roles in Germany, and depopulation.

## **Prohlášení**

1. Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracoval/a samostatně a použil/a jen uvedené prameny a literaturu.
2. Souhlasím s tím, aby práce byla zpřístupněna veřejnosti pro účely výzkumu a studia.

V Praze dne 18.5.2012

Amy Hubbard

## Table of Contents:

<b>1.</b>	<b>INTRODUCTION</b> .....	8
<b>2.</b>	<b>EVALUATION OF SOURCES</b> .....	12
<b>3.</b>	<b>DEFINITIONS</b> .....	15
<b>4.</b>	<b>HISTORICAL ANALYSIS</b> .....	17
4.1	END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR.....	19
4.2	A DIVIDED GERMANY.....	23
4.3	PHASES OF INTERNAL WESTWARD MIGRATION.....	24
4.4	SOCIETY OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.....	29
4.5	THE FALL OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.....	32
4.6	GERMAN REUNIFICATION.....	36
<b>5.</b>	<b>INTERNAL WESTWARD MIGRATION – GERMANY (1989-1994)</b> ..	47
5.1	INCENTIVES FOR INTERNAL WESTWARD MIGRATION.....	47
5.2	INCENTIVES FOR INTERNAL WESTWARD MIGRATION WITHIN THE GERMAN STATE.....	51
5.2.1	<i>Political</i> .....	51
5.2.2	<i>Social</i> .....	53
5.2.2.1	Gender.....	53
5.2.2.2	Education Level.....	63
5.2.3	<i>Economic</i> .....	64
5.2.3.1	Economy and Infrastructure of the German Democratic Republic.....	69
5.2.3.2	Currency and Economic Union’s Affects on Internal Westward Migration.....	71
5.2.3.3	Privatization’s Affects on Internal Westward Migration.....	76
<b>6.</b>	<b>CONCLUSION</b> .....	84
6.1	CONCLUSION OF HISTORICAL FACTORS.....	84
6.2	CONCLUSION OF INTERNAL WESTWARD MIGRATION.....	87
6.3	CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNAL WESTWARD MIGRATION.....	92

## **1. Introduction**

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, November 9<sup>th</sup>, 1989, and German reunification, 1990, the German state has had a series of challenges to overcome. One of these challenges has been the phase of the internal westward migration within the German state since 1989. The consequences of this relocation of people from the eastern German states to the western German states from 1989 to 1994 have been plentiful. The eastern states have been depopulated and are experiencing a ‘brain drain’, due to the large number of educated individuals who chose to migrate. This could greatly affect the position of Germany within the European community and on the world stage today.

The causes of this internal westward migration have varied since reunification and continue to change depending on the people involved; however, the leading cause of a person’s desire to migrate is the economic situation in the eastern states. The economic situation in the east has sparked this exodus and kept it consistent over the years. People have been steadily migrating westward since reunification and this trend does not appear to be coming to an end.

A significant aspect of the internal westward migration is the populace that has migrated westward. Young, educated women are the highest demographic leaving their former lives behind in the east and heading for the west. Germany is a country with a declining fertility rate (1.41 children born per woman)<sup>1</sup> and the depletion of women in the east has had negative effects on the demographics of the eastern German states. The substantial loss of women has caused the fertility rate in the east to be significantly lower

---

<sup>1</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Germany*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.




than in the west. This has led to further inequalities between the eastern and western states in a united Germany.

Since 1989, there have been different governmental programs that have attempted to limit internal westward migration; however, none have been able to curb the problem and to repopulate eastern Germany to date. These governmental programs have offered an array of benefits for those who choose to stay in the eastern states or to those who choose to migrate to the eastern states. However, these programs have been extensively ineffective and the eastern states experience population losses every year. This issue will continue to grow in significance, because it does not appear to be abating even today.

This phase of internal westward migration in Germany has added to an existing form of internal migration. Germany has historically experienced a large portion of internal migration from the rural north to the prosperous, industrial south. This can be displayed in map 1; while there is population decline in Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, it is not as high as the population decline in Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. However, it is important to recognize this historic pull from the north to the south; people choosing to move to better their economic future. Another significant point to be noted is that the area of Berlin has a growing population, despite its location in the former German Democratic Republic. This is on account of the improved economic situation in Berlin; being the capital city, it is more prosperous than the states that surround it. Due to this it has been successful in attracting people to migrate from all over the German state.

Map 1:



Data from Statistisches Bundesamt cited by Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. "Spatial Impacts of German Unification." *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 6.

These demographical changes in Germany are significant due to its position in the international community. Germany is a powerhouse in the European Union (EU), having the largest population<sup>2</sup> and significant influence in this forum. In addition, Germany has

<sup>2</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Germany*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

the fifth largest economy in the world and the largest economy<sup>3</sup> of any European Union member state.<sup>4</sup> For that reason, it is important for this issue to be addressed and for the complexities of it to be fully analyzed. This type of demographic unsettlement could lead to further political, social, and economic instability. Such instability has, in the past, led to the rise in radicalism and been the cause of massive destruction throughout the world. Extremist parties have been increasing in eastern Germany recently. These extremist parties include Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – die Volksunion (NPD) on the right and die Linke on the left.<sup>5</sup> The European Union has continued to promote European integration, the creation of a single market with the Euro and removal of border controls<sup>6</sup>, to promote and support stability and peace; however, extremist parties can have the opposite effect and cause instability throughout the region. Therefore, it is important for the German state to be able to quell the problem of internal westward migration.

While internal migration has existed historically in Germany, it has not previously existed on the scale which has occurred following the Second World War. Additionally, the sheer size of internal westward migration in Germany has not existed, during peacetime, in any other nation throughout history. This paper will analyze the contributing factors to the increase of internal westward migration within Germany between 1989 and 1994. By examining Germany's political, social, and economic situation within its historical context, the reader is able to better understand the

---

<sup>3</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Germany*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Germany*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

<sup>5</sup> The NPD is an extreme, nationalist party and has been labeled as a neo-Nazi organization. While die Linke is the successor party to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), which ruled West Germany until 1989.

<sup>6</sup> Europa: European Union. *Basic Information on the European Union*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012) [http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm).

phenomena of internal westward migration as it has existed in Germany. The effects of contemporary German history have led to the precarious position it is in on account of the mass migration from east to west. By analyzing contemporary German history; incentives for internal westward migration based on political, social, and economic motivators; and the consequences of internal westward migration, this paper intends to shed light on a situation that will have long term effects on Germany's role in the modern world.

## **2. Evaluation of Sources**

A variety of sources were used to analyze the historical context of internal westward migration in Germany. The history of the German nation is pertinent to its modern day situation. Martin Kitchen's book, *A History of Modern Germany: 1800-2000*<sup>7</sup>, provides a concise overview of Germany history. Written from a post-reunification perspective, it has effectively examined a myriad of cultural issues; these issues include economics, politics, class, religion, and gender. Additionally, this text succeeds at not only speaking from a national perspective, but introducing German history in its regional context within Central Europe. However, due to the vast period of time this text covers, it lacks detail of the historical events in depth. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*,<sup>8</sup> written by Frederick Taylor gives a detailed analysis of the events surrounding the lifespan of the Berlin Wall. This work provides an immense amount of specific history surrounding this structure. It was vital for a proper description of this period in history.

---

<sup>7</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006.

In addition to general historical resources, a more detailed look is required to fully understand socialist society and its transition. Stephan Kotkin's work, *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*,<sup>9</sup> allows for the reader to further place East German society in its regional context during its existence. The text is a critic of socialist society and details its flaws throughout its history. This piece was written in cooperation with Jan T. Gross from a post-reunification perspective. A gendered perspective was given by Rachel Alsop, *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in East Germany*,<sup>10</sup> regarding the effects of reunification on the women in the 'neue Länder'. The analysis covers the changing position of women from the beginning of the socialist regime through reunification. The concentration of this book is on the textile industry in Brandenburg. Historical data from a variety of German government agencies and interviews conducted in 1992 are used to support her findings.

The reunification process was an enormous undertaking; while it was deemed an overall success, it did have an abundance of weaknesses which took considerable time to surface. In Elizabeth Pond's, *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*,<sup>11</sup> and Kristina Spohr's, *German Reunification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs*,<sup>12</sup> works accounts of reunification are displayed. Both were written directly after the reunification process and give immense

---

<sup>9</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009.

<sup>10</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000.

<sup>11</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>.

<sup>12</sup> Spohr, Kristina. "German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs". *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>.

insight into it. However, as is often a problem with contemporary history, many crucial documents on the subject had yet to be released by the perspective governments.

The use of traditional migration theory was necessary to fully understand the phenomena of internal westward migration. Classic migration theorists E.G. Ravenstein, *The Laws of Migration*,<sup>13</sup> and Everett Lee, *A Theory of Migration*,<sup>14</sup> were forerunners in this area of study. Ravenstein is seen as one of the originators of theory on migration patterns. Lee added upon Ravenstein's work to broaden the area of study. Both theorists are well respected and can be seen as the basis for contemporary theories. Additionally, Sheila Miller's work, *Family Life Cycle, Extended Family Orientations, and Economic Aspirations as Factors in the Propensity to Migrate*,<sup>15</sup> looked into the motivators behind human migration. The research conducted consisted of a series of questionnaires distributed to random groups; the conclusion supported earlier analyses in motivators by Ravenstein and Lee.

The demographical changes in the 'neue Länder' can be seen as the representation of a significant upheaval in this society. There is a large supply of data on the subject, provided primarily by the German government, such as, census data. Marina Adler's work, *Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany*,<sup>16</sup> provides an analysis of the changes in marriage and fertility in the 'neue Länder'. A

---

<sup>13</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> Lee, Everett S. "A Theory of Migration". *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>.

<sup>15</sup> Miller, Sheila. "Family Life Cycle, Extended Family Orientations, and Economic Aspirations as Factors in the Propensity to Migrate." *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 3, Summer 1976, pages 323-335. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4105954.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>.

distinct fall in the marriage and fertility rates is representative of an insecure economic situation. Data from the *Statische Bundesamt*, the *Bundesanstalt für Arbeit*, and the *Bundesministerium für Frauen und Jugend* was used to draw the conclusion. In addition, Nicholas Eberstadt's paper, *Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989-1993*,<sup>17</sup> used statistics from the *Statisches Bundesamt* to relate the falling fertility and marriage rates combined with the rising mortality rate with economic instability in the 'neue Länder'. Jörg Decressin's work, *Internal Migration in West Germany and Implications for East-West Salary Convergence*,<sup>18</sup> spoke to the effects of equalizing wages on historical internal migration patterns. The conclusions were that unemployment and the risk of unemployment had the greatest affect on a person's decision to migrate. Lastly, Trevor Wild and Philip N. Jones' piece, *Spatial Impacts of German Unification*,<sup>19</sup> gave vision to the current problem. With the use of data from the *Statische Bundesamt* and the *Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (IAB)* they were able to analyze the unemployment rate in the 'neue Länder' in relation to the increase of emigration from this area. Additionally, the text provided a series of maps that are extremely useful in helping the reader visualize the situation.

### 3. Definitions

When looking at the phenomena of internal westward migration in Germany between 1989 and 1994, it is important to understand the terminology and the

---

<sup>17</sup> Eberstadt, Nicholas. "Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989-1993." *Population and Development Review*, Volume 20, Number 1, March 1994, pages 137-152. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2137633.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Decressin, Jörg. "Internal Migration in West Germany and Implication from East-West Salary Convergence." *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 130, H. 2, 1994, pages 231-257. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440283.pdf>.

<sup>19</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. "Spatial Impacts of German Unification." *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>.

geographical region that will be discussed. Migration is often thought of as the movement of a person from one nation to another. Migration can come in many different forms and is not limited to international movement. Internal migration is the movement of citizens from one area within a single nation to another area within that same nation.<sup>20</sup> Another way to look at internal migration is the idea of interregional or domestic migration; the movement of people between regions or areas of a single nation. This has occurred to varying degrees in many areas throughout history for assorted reasons. A common example of internal migration can be seen with the westward migration of the American people throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> century. On the other hand, the term emigration is used to define a person who is leaving their native nation or area for another.

Within Germany, there have been a few different examples of internal migration throughout their history. The industrial regions have always drawn people from other areas that migrate in hope of finding secure higher waged work. Germany has seen a significant increase in internal westward migration that has pulled people, particularly towards the southwest, since reunification. The southwest German states of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria have long been more desirable for workers due to superior labor conditions. “This can be viewed as a response to the north-south gradation in economic growth and employment opportunities within the old *Länder* which has been present since the 1970s”.<sup>21</sup> These two states are home to a significant portion of German industry; most significantly, they house the major auto producers in the German state. They are the two western states that still see the largest influx of internal migration today.

---

<sup>20</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 49.

<sup>21</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 6.



The desire of workers to find steady, high wage employment and a higher standard of living has historically drawn people to these areas.

Germany is a nation that today consists of 16 states<sup>22</sup>, or Länder. The concentration of this paper will be on the difference between the former Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)<sup>23</sup> and the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany).<sup>24</sup> Berlin was divided between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic; therefore, it was a city-state in both. The Federal Republic of Germany is referred to today as the ‘alte Länder’ (old German states) and the German Democratic Republic is known today as the ‘neue Länder’ (new German states). In the context of German internal westward migration, people have been moving from the ‘neue Länder’ to ‘alte Länder’ with a concentration on the German states of Baden Württemberg and Bavaria. These areas and the directional flow of internal migration towards the southwest will be the focus of this paper.

#### **4. Historical Analysis**

Europe in the 20<sup>th</sup> century faced more political, social, and economic unrest than during previous the centuries. The people were plagued with a series of bloody and life-altering events that forever changed the contemporary world. The century began with one of the first modern wars, employing new technology that resulted in unprecedented casualties. The First World War was only the beginning; it was followed by the Great

---

<sup>22</sup> Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia.

<sup>23</sup> Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Schleswig-Holstein.

<sup>24</sup> Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia.

Depression that infiltrated the countries that had just seen the total devastation of their nations. The rise of fascist authoritarian regimes – Adolf Hitler and Nazism in Germany, Benito Mussolini in Italy, and Francisco Franco in Spain – demonstrated the potential for extremism in countries that had been ravaged by war. “Instead of seeking for ways to overcome... all too many fell prey to Hitler’s promises that National Socialism would supersede all conflicts of class and interest, and create a harmonious ‘racial community’”.<sup>25</sup> People who had experienced the atrocities related to war were more susceptible to the seductive influence of National Socialism. The rise of this authoritarian leader in Germany would have profound effects on the world that would shape the future.

Germany had a particularly strenuous history throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century: it was a central figure in both World Wars, being divided into two independent nations for over 40 years, and then unifying in the early 1990s. As a result of the Second World War, Germany was divided into two autonomous countries throughout the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Berlin Wall divided its former capital, which can be viewed as a physical representation of the political climate at the time of the Cold War; the political divide between east and west during the Cold War kept many nations in a state of unease with free-market capitalism in the west and state-run socialism in the east. Since the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall and German reunification, Germany has had to face many challenges. “There had been no precedent for this in European history and, therefore, no historical parallel upon which conceptualization and policy could be developed”.<sup>26</sup> The reunification of a nation is a process that does not have a set plan and can have varied

---

<sup>25</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 245.

<sup>26</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 2.

outcomes. The particular outcome of the united German state has been in some senses a success and experienced failure in others.

The consequences of Second World War; the division of Germany; the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border; and German reunification, have all played a role in the development of internal westward migration. Not understanding the influence of these events would prevent full understanding of the different push and pull factors of internal westward migration. These push and pull factors come from a variety of sectors in society, including: the political sphere, the social sphere, and the economic sphere. While the conflicting economic situations in the different areas of Germany prove to be the most significant factor, the political and social aspects of the different regions of Germany have also played a role. Contemporary German historical experiences have resulted in several phases of migration within the German state in the last 70 years. In addition, migration remains a problem today, and the understanding Germany's diverse past will help to solve the current problem.

#### ***4.1 End of the Second World War***

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the structure of Europe was significantly altered. Nowhere was this clearer than within the German state. Once it was clear that the Allied powers would be victorious in defeating the Axis powers, plans for the restructuring of post-war Europe began. The Treaty of Versailles has been seen as a major precursor for the rise of Nazism in Germany and a root cause of the Second World War. In order to avoid similar consequences, the stipulations of surrender at the end of the Second World War were less extreme; however, it was felt that Germany could not go

completely unpunished for their actions. “All political power was now in the hands of the Allied Control Council, and the leaders of the Third Reich who were still alive were called upon to answer for their crimes in front of the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg”.<sup>27</sup> The United States of America, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were to decide the future of Germany and of war-torn Europe. The results of their decisions changed the course of history for the lives of European and, in particular, German citizens. The three allies met twice to discuss the future; they met once for the Yalta Conference (February 1945) and again at the Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945).<sup>28</sup> The central goal for the Allied powers was to secure the total surrender of Germany and to determine what should be done with Germany following their defeat. The Second World War truly was a world event involving nations from across the globe; therefore, it was necessary to discuss what the future of Europe and all nations involved would look like once peace was established.

The important results of the peace conferences, in terms of the development of internal westward migration in Germany, were the decisions made regarding the management of Germany following the Second World War. “In 1945 Germany was a pile of rubble with a starving population, a little Germany between the Rhine and Oder, once again a power vacuum, divided into four occupation zones”.<sup>29</sup> The four occupied zones were the United States of America in the southeast, the Soviet Union in the northeast, Great Britain in the northwest, and added later were the French in the southwest.<sup>30</sup> This

---

<sup>27</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 316.

<sup>28</sup> Cecil, Robert. “Potsdam and Its Legends”. *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Volume 46, Number 3, July 1970, pages 455-465. *JSTOR* (accessed May 1, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2613222.pdf>, 455-465.

<sup>29</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 5.

<sup>30</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 316.

was imitated with the German capital as well; as a result, the city of Berlin was divided into four occupied zones. These occupational zones eventually led to the Soviet Union being able to have complete control over East Germany and East Berlin.<sup>31</sup> The creation of two German states was a direct result of this decision, further dividing east and west on political, social, and economic fronts, with the free-market democratic states occupying West Germany and the state-run socialist Soviet Union occupying East Germany. Another result of these conferences was the tolerance of Soviet influence in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Thus the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was marred by a divided east and west, and allowed for the development of the Cold War.

The end of the Second World War has been referred to as Germany's 'Stunde Null' ('zero hour'), because of the extensive amount of damage left behind by war and what would be required to rebuild.<sup>32</sup> Essentially, Germany was devastated by the Second World War;<sup>33</sup> however, there was a certain degree of continuity that cannot be ignored. "They had hit rock bottom and longed for a normal life with a steady job, food on the table, and a roof over their heads".<sup>34</sup> The desire for a certain amount of continuity in Germany left the German people faced with the challenge to rebuild and restore their nation. Additionally, the Allied powers were charged with helping ensure the rebuilding process was performed without threatening the stability of the world.

---

<sup>31</sup> Cecil, Robert. "Potsdam and Its Legends". *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Volume 46, Number 3, July 1970, pages 455-465. *JSTOR* (accessed May 1, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2613222.pdf>, 455.

<sup>32</sup> Rolleston, James. "After Zero Hour: The Visual Texts of Post-War Germany". *South Atlantic Review*, Volume 64, Number 2, Spring 1999, pages 1-19. *JSTOR* (accessed May 1, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3201979.pdf>, 2.

<sup>33</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 31-32.

<sup>34</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 318.

Germany was forced to demilitarize and was held accountable for their actions by the international community.<sup>35</sup> In addition, the process of de-nazification was undertaken by the occupying powers;<sup>36</sup> the most notable trials were held in Nuremberg from 1945-1946, punishing the most severe war criminals of the period. "... an extraordinary effort was made to confront the past, and no country has ever made such an effort to atone for its crimes".<sup>37</sup> The different occupied zones took over the rebuilding of Germany in different manners. "De-Nazification for the Soviets meant the extirpation of all remaining vestiges of capitalism, and the creation of a socialist society".<sup>38</sup> In the western areas of Germany, capitalism and the rebuilding of German industry were promoted. As well, the Soviets took a stronger position on the punishment of the German state that was due following the Second World War; in other words, they treated eastern Germany quite harshly, which inspired the British and Americans to heavily subsidize the western states.<sup>39</sup> The Soviets also began to eliminate private property in the eastern states of Germany and industry became nationalized. Socialist parties began to succeed in the east and were unsuccessful the west. With the changes at the time, it became clear that Germany was moving in two different directions based on the influences of the occupying nations. The rise of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union was clearly seen in eastern and western Germany. Neither would give up influence nor control over their sectors of Germany, because of the risk of the other developing

---

<sup>35</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 39.

<sup>36</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 39.

<sup>37</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 5.

<sup>38</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 317.

<sup>39</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 32.

hegemony over the entire German state. For that reason, the prospect of two German states became a reality as time passed.

#### ***4.2 A Divided Germany***

Over time, the international scene changed and those who had been allies in the Second World War became fierce competitors.<sup>40</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union were in a struggle of opposing political ideologies and economic systems. This had noteworthy implications for Germany as a nation divided between two world powers that could no longer compromise. While struggling for international influence and political domination, the United States and the Soviet Union helped to seal the fate of a divided Germany. Both nations felt they could not let Germany become fully independent and reunify because they were worried it would be absorbed by the countering ideology. “The Americans and the British considered that a neutral Germany would mean Soviet hegemony over Europe”.<sup>41</sup> On the other hand, in the Soviet Union the opposite fear was present; if they let the eastern states of Germany join with western states of Germany, the eastern states of Germany would succumb to western ideology and a key ally would be lost. Germany could be seen as a display of the rising worldwide tension: a place where the Cold War was being played out.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created to hinder the expansion of the Soviet Union, deter nationalism in Europe, and to promote European integration in 1949.<sup>42</sup> At this time the western powers of NATO put their support behind

---

<sup>40</sup> Flint, Colin. *Introduction to Geopolitics*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

<sup>41</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 328.

<sup>42</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization: History. *A Short History of NATO*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <http://www.nato.int/history/index.html>.

the western German states. "... a week after the Allies recognized the Federal Republic of Germany as a semi-sovereign state, Stalin gave the go-ahead for the formation of a state to be known as the German Democratic Republic (DDR)".<sup>43</sup> The establishment of these two states in 1949 signified the end of the chance for reunification in the near future. In 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany was recognized as a sovereign state and joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>44</sup> In response, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Treaty Organization of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact). "It was clear from the tame assurances of the Western Powers to the contrary that the division of Germany was now accepted by both sides in the cold war".<sup>45</sup> The acceptance of a divided Germany shaped contemporary German history and has had resounding effects on its current composition.

#### ***4.3 Phases of Internal Westward German Migration***

The end of the Second World War brought great devastation throughout Germany. The fighting resulted in the destruction of a significant portion of Germany's cities and infrastructure.<sup>46</sup> The loss of basic infrastructure left millions of people displaced throughout the nation and it would take a great effort to provide a suitable solution to this problem. The Allies took responsibility for the rebuilding of their respective occupied regions and attempted to solve the problem of displaced people throughout the land.<sup>47</sup> Due to the general chaos at the time, it was vital for the Allies to establish a strong control over their particular occupied regions in order to prevent the

---

<sup>43</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 325.

<sup>44</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization: History. *A Short History of NATO*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <http://www.nato.int/history/index.html>.

<sup>45</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 332.

<sup>46</sup> Large, David Clay. *Berlin: A Modern History*. New York: Basic Books, 2001, 371.

<sup>47</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 316-318.



escape of wanted war criminals and to manage the flow of refugees.<sup>48</sup> Therefore, the freedom of movement of German's was limited, but not abolished. Over time, the American, British, and French sectors lowered the level of security on the borders they protected; however, the Soviets continued to increase security on theirs. While hidden behind the rhetoric that it was for the protection of the East German citizenry, the Soviets' real intentions were to prevent refugees from leaving East Germany for West Germany. Even with the increase in security between the eastern and western sectors, the borders remained fairly open and people were able to move between the different German sectors. There have been three distinct phases of internal westward migration within Germany; the flow of this migration has been predominantly people moving from east to west.

The first phase of internal westward migration began directly after the end of the Second World War. These migrants were the people hoping to escape the Soviet sector and the early German Democratic Republic. Initially there were not many restrictions set on the flow of people between the different areas of Germany;<sup>49</sup> however, as the Soviet Union's relations with the United States and Great Britain became hostile, more restrictions were put into place. The Soviet Union steadily increased the security at border crossings along the inner-German border, which ran from the Baltic Sea to the Czechoslovakian border.<sup>50</sup> In addition, deterrents (such as barricades, fences, walls, barbed wire, etc.) were put into place to prevent people from crossing in unauthorized

---

<sup>48</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 75.

<sup>49</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 61.

<sup>50</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 74.

areas. However, these added security measures did little to dissuade people from crossing the border; it was easy for people to cross illegally or to bribe the border guards to allow for passage. Therefore, people were able to move quite freely from east to west for vacation or to conduct business. This ease of crossing the border also resulted in the ability of people to emigrate without difficulty. The consistently large number of people emigrating caused the government to completely close the inner-German border in 1952.<sup>51</sup> This was done to help ensure the security and stability of the East German state and to ensure its continuity.

The second phase of internal westward migration developed due to the tightening of border control between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. With such a great number of citizens emigrating west each year, eradicating this problem was a necessary challenge for the German Democratic Republic; consequently, they implemented stronger border control on the inner-German border. The majority of people who were migrating were higher educated individuals, which resulted in the loss of human capital in West Germany. “The runaways included entrepreneurs and skilled professionals (one day the entire Mathematics Department of the University of Leipzig defected)”.<sup>52</sup> However, the tightening of border controls on the inner-German border were not enough to prevent people from migrating. They were no longer able to leave the German Democratic Republic through the 1,381 kilometers (858 miles)<sup>53</sup> of border with the Federal Republic of Germany. Nevertheless, there was still one major

---

<sup>51</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 75-77.

<sup>52</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 47.

<sup>53</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 74.

loophole through which the citizens of East Germany were able to emigrate: Berlin. The border in Berlin remained porous following the closing of the inner-German border, due to the fact that Berlin still operated, mostly, as a single city.

“There were signs showing sector borders, occasional checkpoints and restrictions, temporary or permanent, but for a dozen years after the end of the Berlin Blockade, citizens moved freely around the former German capital. Up until this point telephone lines, sewage, transport were all shared”.<sup>54</sup>

An East German citizen could simply travel by S Bahn to West Berlin. Once the refugees had arrived in West Berlin they went to Marienfelde reception camp where they would register to be processed.<sup>55</sup> West Berlin was unable to support all of the incoming refugees. On account of this, once registered the people would travel by plane through western air channels to West Germany where employment and housing had been set up for them.<sup>56</sup>

The emigration that occurred through Berlin was overwhelming for the East German state. “It was a hole in the iron curtain, through which passed many of the most talented people in East Germany. More than 2,500,000 had used this escape hatch since 1949”.<sup>57</sup> This resulted in labor shortages across East Germany and the state was unable to sustain this loss of workers. Therefore, something more drastic had to be done to prevent the continued emigration of East German citizens. The leaders of the East German state decided that the building of the Berlin Wall would help contain emigration. When the Berlin Wall was built, it left an enclave of West Berlin completely blocked off from the

---

<sup>54</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 74.

<sup>55</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 123.

<sup>56</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 123-124.

<sup>57</sup> Judge, Edward and Langdon, John. *A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1996, 167.

rest of West Germany and other western nations. “In the early morning of August 13 1961 work was begun to seal off West Berlin with an ‘antifascist defensive wall,’ which made it virtually impossible for anyone to leave the DDR”.<sup>58</sup> Despite the original reason the Berlin Wall was built, to help quell emigration, the leaders of East Germany portrayed the building of the Berlin Wall as a necessary evil to keep the influence of the morally corrupt capitalists of West Berlin from infiltrating and harming East Germany.

The Berlin Wall was regulated very stringently to prevent people from leaving the German Democratic Republic. West German citizens were able to visit East Germany, to varying degrees throughout history, relatively effortlessly; however, the same cannot be said for the East German citizens. Emigration was illegal and only those with special permission were able to cross into the west. This privilege was reserved for those citizens whom the East German government believed would return and not be susceptible to western influence during their time abroad. In addition, the Berlin Wall was lined with watch towers and the guards had shoot to kill orders for those attempting to cross the border illegally.<sup>59</sup> “The ‘no man’s land’ between East and West was littered with lethal obstacles, alarms, and self-activating searchlights, with an eleven-foot-high clamber-proofed slab fence representing the final, on its own near-insuperable obstacle”.<sup>60</sup> The building of the Berlin Wall and its heavy security were able to bring emigration to a virtual a standstill.

---

<sup>58</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 338.

<sup>59</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, XIX.

<sup>60</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, XIX.

The third phase of internal westward migration began in 1989, following the demands for reform from the East German populous. The East German state was no longer able to ignore these demands and opened the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border in November of 1989. After the opening of the borders, people began to travel from East to West Germany with ease. “Within a week, between 2 million and 3 million people had crossed into West Berlin...”<sup>61</sup> The increase in the movement of people can be seen as the starting point for the third phase of internal westward migration in Germany. The ability of the German people to freely travel between East Germany and West Germany had not been a possibility in the past 28 years. Suddenly, anyone with a desire to emigrate was now able to do so. This continued through the reunification process and into the unified German state. The increase in the movement of people from the ‘neue Länder’ in this phase of migration is the central focus of this paper and will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.

#### ***4.4 Society of the German Democratic Republic***

The socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe developed differently than their Western counterparts on account of their varying ideologies. The existence of democratic capitalism in the west allowed for a different development than the nondemocratic socialist nations of the east. Therefore, the two halves of Europe saw their paths diverge following the Second World War. The political, social, and economic structures of these nations had significant divisions separating them at this time. The following section will look at the path that the socialist societies took following the

---

<sup>61</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 63.

Second World War in relation to that of their western counterparts. The political, social, and economic systems of Central and Eastern Europe will be analyzed concentrating on the society as a whole.

The socialist societies of Central and Eastern Europe were troubled from the beginning; despite the promise of free and fair elections, it became exceedingly clear early on that this was not the reality. "... in the German Democratic Republic 'People's Democracy' was quickly transformed into one-party dictatorship".<sup>62</sup> Single-party, non-democratic leadership was given varying degrees of power, but in all cases allowed for corruption within the state. Walter Ulbricht<sup>63</sup> was quoted saying "It has to look democratic, but we have to hold everything in our hands".<sup>64</sup> In other words, the leadership of the German Democratic Republic did not have strong intentions to ensure democratic freedom. This resulted in the formation of a non-democratic totalitarian regime in East Germany.

In addition to a non-democratic government, there were faults throughout the entire East German system. "...the regimes were constantly undermined by internal resistance and hidden forms of sabotage *at all system levels*".<sup>65</sup> Sabotage and inefficiency plagued the nations of Central and Eastern Europe in much of the post-Second World War time. The sabotage existed in all areas of society, from the head of state abusing power to a butcher taking the best cuts of meat for his own benefit. "East German planners blindly followed the outmoded and inefficient Stalinist model of

---

<sup>62</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 328.

<sup>63</sup> Walter Ulbricht was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

<sup>64</sup> Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005, 131.

<sup>65</sup> Verdery, Katherine. *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996, 20.

industrialization, and as a result the DDR's economy was hamstrung for the state. Consumer goods were scarce, prohibitively expensive, and of extremely poor quality".<sup>66</sup> Therefore, in a society founded on an ideology based on mutual assistance, the existence of sabotage and inefficiency did not allow for socialist societies to succeed. Internal corruption paired with external pressure would be the eventual downfall of the socialist societies.

The notion of the 'civil' versus 'uncivil' society is introduced by Kotkin in his book, *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*.<sup>67</sup> The dissolution of the 'civil' society in Central and Eastern Europe led to the development of the 'uncivil' society over time. "Civil society,' if it means anything, signifies people taking responsibility for themselves".<sup>68</sup> In other words, people who are accountable for their own actions and able to function in a society constitute a civil society. However, the socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe were unable to continue with the existence of internal sabotage, inefficient means of production, stagnation of the economy, and coercion by the government of its people. Kotkin describes the socialist societies as 'uncivil societies', because they were unable to maintain a 'civil society'. The uncivil societies that existed in Europe were unable to function properly. "Indeed, the paradox of uncivil society was that its members had unlimited authority and command over almost all national resources, yet they were paralyzed".<sup>69</sup> Therefore, despite the existence of complete control by the government, they were unable to have power over

---

<sup>66</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 329.

<sup>67</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009.

<sup>68</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 8.

<sup>69</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 13.

the direction the state was heading. The nations had become paralyzed by their ideological standards and their promises of ever raising standards of living. However, due to corruption and mismanagement they were never able to deliver the higher standards of living the people desired.

#### ***4.5 The Fall of the German Democratic Republic***

Sabotage and inefficiency within the uncivil societies Central and Eastern Europe can be seen as an overarching cause for further problems within the states. One of the most significant was the effect that it had on their economies. The German Democratic Republic was often seen as the forerunner of industry and development in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>70</sup> Despite this title, it was still plagued with sabotage and inefficiencies, as the other nations experienced. These inefficiencies would allow for the states of Central and Eastern Europe to be repeatedly outperformed by their Western counterparts. In addition, when the new ferocious competitors of Southeast Asia emerged, the socialist nations were unable to compete on the global market.<sup>71</sup> Throughout the 1980s, Central and Eastern Europe experienced many significant changes. This section will concentrate on these changes within East Germany. It is important to remember that socialism took on diverse forms in different European nations. Therefore, East Germany can be seen as only one example of socialism in the area at the time, and there were varying outcomes in other areas.

---

<sup>70</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. "Spatial Impacts of German Unification." *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 2.

<sup>71</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 29.



As previously mentioned, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe were filled with sabotage and inefficiencies. These faults had a negative effect on their manufacturing operations, which eventually was a leading cause of the failed continuity of these national economies. In particular, the inefficiency of the East German industry led to the stagnation of their economy. "...socialist economies had locked in low productivity, even as they kept promising ever-higher living standards".<sup>72</sup> The people of the socialist nations of Europe were promised an equal, if not a higher, standard of living compared to Western Europe. These promises were soon revealed to be improbable. It was a shock to the socialist governments when they were surpassed by the nations of Western Europe in almost every field.

"The problem was simple: on top of the outsized expenses for military-security and elite perquisites, the daily-life subsidies were ever more costly but indispensable because, unlike the Soviet Union in the 1930s (the time of the capitalist Great Depression), the Eastern European satellites faced a capitalist world – in many cases, right across the border – that underwent its greatest-ever consumer boom in the 1950s and '60s".<sup>73</sup>

This was in no place more apparent than in East Germany. East Germany was supposed to boast one of the highest standards of living in the Eastern bloc, as it was the leading manufacturer of goods and had the furthest developed industry. However, it became clearer every day how far behind West Germany it truly was.

The broadcast of Western radio and television to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was common and promoted as a fight against European socialism, for this

---

<sup>72</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 26.

<sup>73</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 27.

purpose Radio Free Europe was established in 1950.<sup>74</sup> Additionally, East German's were able to receive the signals from West German radio and television stations. Therefore, they had an advantage over other Central and Eastern European Countries, because the radio and television were in their native language. Other nations were unable to receive these nightly broadcasts in their native language; therefore, many did not understand the broadcasts or they did not understand them very well. "The influence of 'West-TV' was to be a constant problem. As the saying went, many Easterners 'spent their days in the East and their nights in the 'West''".<sup>75</sup> They were able to see the actual quality of life in West Germany with full understanding and realized that their system was not living up to its promises. "Communism had an insurmountable problem: it was locked in competition with the better-performing West".<sup>76</sup> This ever-constant competition caused the socialists to persistently strive for better standards of living; however, they were unable to deliver, which led to low morale throughout the Soviet bloc. Western radio and television showed the people just how far behind they truly were. The socialists attempted to use their ideology to improve morale, claiming that socialist ideology gave them a 'social and moral superiority'<sup>77</sup> to the West.

In addition to the loss of morale and the subpar living standards, the economies of the socialist republics were suffering as well. The stagnated and dilapidated economies of Central and Eastern Europe were at the core of the inevitable end of socialism. Over time,

---

<sup>74</sup> Radio Free Europe/Liberty Radio. History. *Then and Now: Free Media in Unfree Societies*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <http://www.rferl.org/section/history/133.html>.

<sup>75</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 180.

<sup>76</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 27.

<sup>77</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 27.

it became clear that the socialist nations were not only unable to provide the standard of living they promised, but were unable to provide even a suitable standard of living without borrowing large sums of money from the countries in the West. “Across the bloc, the total hard-currency debt shot up from \$6 billion in 1970 to \$21 billion by 1975, \$56 billion by 1980, and \$90 billion by 1989, with no end of the escalation in sight”.<sup>78</sup> The rise in borrowing crippled the economies of Central and Eastern Europe. The loans were used in an attempt to update their industry and, in the case of East Germany, to invest in new technology. “Ostensibly, the goal was to manufacture export-quality goods... to pay off the loans. But that depended on steady market demand for East bloc goods abroad... But even Eastern Europe’s supposed Western-export-grade goods left a lot to be desired”.<sup>79</sup> This left the socialist governments with low quality goods that were not suitable for sale abroad, and they were unable to make enough profits to repay the loans.

The only way the Central and Eastern European countries would be able to stay afloat would be to have huge cuts in spending and greatly lower the standard of living throughout their nations. “Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania would demonstrate the brutal cost of paying off the debt – blackouts, ice-cold interiors, severe rationing of food. This was a price the East German and Polish establishments could not pay”.<sup>80</sup> Therefore, despite the lower standard of living compared to West Germany, the East Germans had a significantly higher quality of life than those in other Soviet bloc nations. Any further cuts in the standard of living would have caused social upheaval that the government was

---

<sup>78</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 29.

<sup>79</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 28.

<sup>80</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 29.

unable to counter. Consequently, the East German government had to continuously borrow from the west to ensure the current standard of living was maintained.

The final blow to the economies of Central and Eastern Europe occurred as a result of globalization. “In the 1980s, East Asian manufacturers blindsided the Eastern European uncivil societies. Lower-cost exports turned out to be a game others in the global economy could play, with far cheaper labor and higher quality”.<sup>81</sup> The plan to export their goods to the West was unsuccessful and devastating to the fragile indebted economies. East Germany was hit hard by their inability to export their goods to the West; they had taken out loans that were to be repaid through their exports. “In the international political economy, socialist East Germany was not capitalist East Asia – as would soon be poignantly demonstrated when East Asian goods, produced under market discipline, trounced East German goods on global export markets”.<sup>82</sup> Free-market capitalism in East Asia was able to provide better goods and services at a lower cost. Therefore, the capitalist nations of the west were more interested in doing business with the nations of East Asia, than those of Central and Eastern Europe.

#### ***4.6 German Reunification***

Once the reform minded Mikhail Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union in 1985,<sup>83</sup> it became clear that there would be major changes throughout the region. It was not readily apparent that the total collapse of the socialist systems was on its way but it

---

<sup>81</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 29.

<sup>82</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 49.

<sup>83</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Russia*. Web (accessed March 27, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>

was clear that liberalization in these countries would increase. "...the Soviet changeover to perestroika and glasnost from Brezhnevism was game-changing for all of Eastern Europe's uncivil societies".<sup>84</sup> Gorbachev introduced the ideas of perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness of government),<sup>85</sup> which had a direct hand in leading to the collapse of socialist systems throughout Europe. Perestroika allowed for necessary restructuring of the Soviet political and economic systems that were failing, while glasnost would increase the transparency of the Soviet government. Therefore, the government would begin to be held accountable for their actions by the people with the increase in transparency during the restructuring process. These two changes to Soviet policy allowed for the people of Central and Eastern Europe to demand the freedoms they had long desired. On the other hand, it did not lead to instant reforms. The leaders of East Germany were not interested in losing power; therefore, they had little desire to implement reforms.

The late 1970s and the 1980s brought a series of protests and mass movements across Central and Eastern Europe; by the general populace or were larger and more influential, such as, Charter 77<sup>86</sup> or Solidarity.<sup>87</sup> In the East German city of Leipzig weekly marches began in 1989 and thousands of citizens would gather every week for what became known as the Montagsdemonstrationen (Monday demonstrations).<sup>88</sup> During this time, these groups were often suppressed and stopped by strong forces from above. Towards the end of the 1980s, things began to change to, "...what could be called

---

<sup>84</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 39.

<sup>85</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 377.

<sup>86</sup> Havel, Václav. *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965-1990*. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.

<sup>87</sup> Garton-Ash, Timothy. *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*. New York: Random House, 1985.

<sup>88</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 402.

nonorganized mobilization, which in 1989 was actually the norm across Eastern Europe”.<sup>89</sup> People took to the streets to demand change within the government; in East Germany, the turnout, at these demonstrations, was high.

In addition to the mobilization of people, there was one final blow to the little remaining stability of the East German state. The demilitarization and opening of the Hungarian border to Austria was announced on May 2, 1989 and would significantly affect the East German state.<sup>90</sup> East Germany’s ability to keep its citizens from migrating westward relied on the security of other socialist states’ borders. Travel between the socialist satellite states was not unrestricted and required one to obtain a visa; however, it was relatively easy for people to attain travel visas to other socialist states. “It took a while for the significance to sink in, but by 1 July more than 25,000 East Germans who had decided to ‘vacation’ in Hungary, somehow ended up in Austria”.<sup>91</sup> The West German state recognized any German passport for citizenship; in other words, an East German passport was accepted like a West German passport. This meant that any East German citizen that made it to West Germany was treated as a West German citizen and was able to reside there. However, very soon the East German government realized the people were emigrating while vacationing in Hungary and no longer granted visas for this type of travel. In addition to the opening of the Hungarian and Austrian border, East German citizens poured over the walls of the West German embassies in Prague, Budapest, and Warsaw. “They packed their bags and took themselves to the capitals of

---

<sup>89</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 6.

<sup>90</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 55.

<sup>91</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 401.

neighbouring, still technically ‘socialist’ countries and headed for the West Germany embassy. There they sought asylum”.<sup>92</sup> These East German citizens went to the West German embassies in hopes of emigrating westward. These embassies attempted to house the thousands of refugees, but it was a near impossible task and negotiations had to be made to allow for their migration to West Germany. In the end, the East German government had little other choice but to let these people migrate westward.

In the past, the socialist governments had looked to the more powerful Soviet government in Moscow for help when the citizenry demanded reform, such as, the East German uprising in 1953,<sup>93</sup> the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,<sup>94</sup> or Prague Spring in 1968.<sup>95</sup> When the East German leaders consulted Moscow in the late 1980s, “Gorbachev stated that ‘matters affecting the GDR are decided not in Moscow but in Berlin’ – signaling that there would be no Soviet military intervention”.<sup>96</sup> Therefore, there was no chance for Soviet mediation and the people of East Germany were forced to handle the consequences of the new Hungarian border policy on their own. While the East German government attempted to stop emigration through a series of policies, the damage had already been done. People continued to take to the streets, with massive peaceful marches becoming a recurring event throughout the nation. As a result, on November 9, 1989 it was announced that East Germans would be able to travel to West Germany, including

---

<sup>92</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 404.

<sup>93</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 43-44.

<sup>94</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 16-19.

<sup>95</sup> Havel, Václav. *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965-1990*. New York: Vintage Books, 1991, 36-49.

<sup>96</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 58.

through the Berlin Wall. November 9, 1989<sup>97</sup> is considered the date that the Berlin Wall fell, though it did take several years to dismantle it, and sections still stand in Berlin today.

On November 28, 1989 Helmut Kohl (Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany) introduced a rough outline for German reunification in response to the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border. “We know now that the nineteen days following the fall of the Berlin wall were decisive for the process of German unification and especially for the development of a West Germany policy programme as to how unification could happen”<sup>98</sup>. It was clear that the Kohl administration was not fully prepared with a reunification plan when the Berlin Wall fell.<sup>99</sup> Rather, the policy program that Kohl introduced was a rough guideline; a concise program for German reunification had not been created since the 1960s.<sup>100</sup> Therefore, the Ten Point Program that Kohl presented was created over a period of 19 days, which set the precedent for the rushed manner reunification would exhibit. Additionally, it was widely misinterpreted; Kohl intended it to slow down the call for reunification, instead it was seen as his desire to hasten the process.<sup>101</sup> “Kohl’s immediate political targets seemed to be: direct

---

<sup>97</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 384-385.

<sup>98</sup> Spohr, Kristina. “German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs”. *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>, 873.

<sup>99</sup> Weidenfeld, Werner. “Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90.” *Geschichte der deutschen Einheit*, Band 4, Stuttgart, 1998.

<sup>100</sup> Spohr, Kristina. “German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs”. *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>, 873.

<sup>101</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 57.



negotiations with the GDR, free and democratic elections in the GDR, and a German economic monetary unity”.<sup>102</sup>

Reunification was not inevitable, but with the opening of the Berlin Wall and inner-German border feelings in the divided Germany began to change. Elizabeth Pond presents in *A Wall Destroyed: the Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*, the idea that the feelings of the people of East and West Germany were truly changed by the opening of the Berlin Wall and inner-German border; the East and West Germans were ‘truly one people’.<sup>103</sup> The results were an overwhelming call from the people for reunification. Additionally, Helmut Kohl’s, while it may not have been his intention, Ten Point Program influenced the people’s desire for reunification.

“When Kohl announced the Ten Point Programme on 28 November 1989, he moved towards a completely new operative unification policy which gave ‘unification from below’ justification ‘from above’. The East Germans’ demand for first democracy and then unification on the basis of the people’s right to self-determination – as revealed in the mass demonstrations and their mass-migration movement to West Germany during summer and autumn 1989 – was a revolt from below which started off a dynamic unification process that continued to evolve”.<sup>104</sup>

---

<sup>102</sup> Spohr, Kristina. “German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs”. *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>, 875.

<sup>103</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 49.

<sup>104</sup> Spohr, Kristina. “German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs”. *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>, 886.

In other words, the people felt that their mass support for reunification had been validated by one of the most powerful Germans at the time. Therefore, reunification was hastened and completed within less than a year of the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>105</sup>

The East German leadership saw the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border as a way to help quell migration. “With a stroke of the pen, turning the refugees into simple travelers who no longer mocked state authority, this would restore stability to the GDR and would put the Communists in the avant-garde of the ongoing changes”<sup>106</sup>. Ergon Krenz<sup>107</sup> thought that it would solve the problems of people migrating via the Austrian and Hungarian border and foreign embassies.<sup>108</sup> This seems counterintuitive, because the closing of the inner-German border and the building of the Berlin Wall had been undertaken to prevent westward migration. “In the GDR itself the new tourism diverted East Germans neither from emigration nor from political agitation. Millions of them visited West Germany (and returned home) every weekend after November 9, but tens of thousands of workers continued to abandon their jobs to move West...”.<sup>109</sup> With the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border the German Democratic Republic was faced with the same problem it experienced before

---

<sup>105</sup> Spohr, Kristina. “German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs”. *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>, 870.

<sup>106</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 47.

<sup>107</sup> The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany from October 18, 1989 to December 3, 1989.

<sup>108</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 48.

<sup>109</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 51.

their creation; the resurgence of the mass exodus to west and the calls for reform from its people.

As previously mentioned, reunification was not guaranteed and there was opposition domestically and from the international community.<sup>110</sup> Eventually it was agreed that the decision on reunification would be made involving the two German states and the former four allies of the Second World War. It was important for many leaders of the international community that a unified German state was neutral and a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.<sup>111</sup> Votes were taken in East Germany, “The result was an overwhelming popular endorsement for unification with the Federal Republic at the earliest possible opportunity”.<sup>112</sup> The process of German reunification took place in 1990<sup>113</sup> and formally united East and West Germany. October 3<sup>rd</sup> is celebrated annually as der Tag Deutschen Einheit (the day of German unity). “Unification was politically, culturally, historically, and from the point of view of national and international security, a resounding success. Economically it was an unmitigated disaster”.<sup>114</sup> The problems associated with the East German economy at the time of reunification led to further internal westward migration throughout the early 1990s.

As a result of the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border, thousands of East Germans began migrating to West Germany every day.<sup>115</sup> This was a major blow to the East German government; after all, east to west migration had been the

---

<sup>110</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 434-435.

<sup>111</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 387.

<sup>112</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 390.

<sup>113</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Germany*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

<sup>114</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 390.

<sup>115</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 57.

initial reason for the closing of the borders to begin with.<sup>116</sup> Therefore, East Germany was faced with the same problems of depopulation and loss of human capital it had faced before the building of the Berlin Wall. “Emigration was continuing unabated, and was aggravating economic decline; in January alone, 73,000 abandoned the GDR to move to the Federal Republic”.<sup>117</sup> However, there was a significant portion of the population who chose to remain in East Germany; those who remained were determined to see reforms in the East German system. The call for reforms from below, combined with the steady outflow of human capital, was placing the German Democratic Republic in a precarious position that they were no longer able to control. “Now the worry was not disorder, but sheer collapse”.<sup>118</sup> The first free elections in East Germany since 1933 were held on March 18, 1990 and brought an end to the party’s control; as a result, there would be little to stand in the way of German reunification. The key division of East and West Germany in the past was the differing ideologies, and once there were no longer battling ideologies there was no longer a reason for a divided Germany. The populous voted for a speedy union, which would be adapted under article 23.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, the West German Basic

---

<sup>116</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 76.

<sup>117</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. International Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 62.

<sup>118</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. International Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 62.

<sup>119</sup> Article 23 calls for the application of the existing Basic Law to any territory that joins with the Federal Republic of Germany; in other words, they are accepting the existing constitution. While Article 146 calls for a new agreed upon constitution to supersede the existing Basic Law.

Law was applied to the ‘neue Länder’; rather than, adopting a new constitution for the unified state.<sup>120</sup>

The eagerness of the East German people for reunification was obvious and it set the tone for the unification process. “The unification of East and West Germany was a one-way process, based upon the rapid introduction of West German systems, standards and practices into East Germany”.<sup>121</sup> The idea of the reunification of a nation had not been seen like this before in history; therefore, there was no set plan for how it should take place. Without any precedence the process was likely to have its flaws. “East Germans showed their overwhelming support for a rapid unification process and in doing so handed near total control of the unification process to West Germany”.<sup>122</sup> The East German state had completely crumbled and the people were enthusiastic to be reunited with West Germany and welcomed their policies and practices. The single-sided nature that was chosen would have negative and positive outcomes for the reunited German state. “In the new market economy the potential to have a higher standard of living may be greater but so is the potential for greater relative poverty, unemployment and homelessness”.<sup>123</sup> These hardships have plagued the ‘neue Länder’ since German reunification. Unemployment can be seen as the most significant crisis in the ‘neue

---

<sup>120</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. International Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 62.

<sup>121</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 13.

<sup>122</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 45.

<sup>123</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 15.

Länder'; the transition from the near full employment in the German Democratic Republic to massive unemployment has greatly affected the people of this area.<sup>124</sup>

While, arguably, the adverse consequences of reunification have been felt more harshly by those in the east, the west was not completely immune to negative aspects of reunification. At the time the reunification process began, the degree to which the socialist economies had failed was unclear to those of the east and west.<sup>125</sup> The amount of debt the socialist societies had accrued was a sum that neither side was prepared for or able to payback. As would become clear with the peaceful revolutions of 1989, none of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe were able to fully repay the loans their socialist predecessors had taken.<sup>126</sup> In addition, it became clear that further funding would be required to bring these nations up to the level of Western Europe. This was the case of East Germany; West Germany had no idea the amount of money that would be required to bring East Germany up to western standards. "West Germany also assumed responsibility not only for East Germany's state debt, some \$26.5 billion, but for infrastructure and economic overhaul, at a cost estimated at more than \$2 trillion".<sup>127</sup> Therefore, reunification was costly for the people of West Germany who were not entirely prepared for a financial burden of that magnitude. Promises to not increase West German taxes by Chancellor Helmut Kohl proved futile and taxes were raised as a result of reunification.<sup>128</sup> The result was hardships felt across the newly united German state

---

<sup>124</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 72.

<sup>125</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 399-400.

<sup>126</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 65 and 131.

<sup>127</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 65.

<sup>128</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 390.

and has continued into the future. The consequences of socialism and the resulting reunification have impacted the internal migration patterns of the German people; that is to say, the impact that these major events had on the East German economy.

## **5. Internal Westward Migration – Germany (1989-1994)**

### ***5.1 Incentives for Internal Migration***

Human migration has increased significantly since the start of the 19<sup>th</sup> century; the causes of this escalation in migration are varied. Industrialization can be regarded as the cause for the initial increase in the movement of people. The 20<sup>th</sup> century saw an increase in conflict-based migration in Europe due to the First World War, Second World War, and the Cold War.

“Migration is defined broadly as a permanent or semipermanent change of residence. No restriction is placed upon the distance of the move or upon the voluntary or involuntary nature of the act, and no distinction is made between external and internal migration”.<sup>129</sup>

This definition of migration shows what a broad concept it is. The following section will concentrate on the incentives for internal migration and will introduce two influential scholars of migration theory. In addition, this section will look at how these scholars’ theories apply to internal westward migration in Germany.

Traditionally, internal migration has predominantly been the movement of people out of the countryside and into the cities, a process which began with industrialization. While this may be seen as the starting point of modern-day migration, it is simply only one form of migration. However, many incentives for migration have remained consistent

---

<sup>129</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 49.

throughout history; for example, economic incentives have remained the leading motivator for migration. In addition, the trends in the demographics of migrants have remained the same. The likelihood of an individual to migrate is often dependent on the age and gender of the individual. While these consistencies can be seen in the case of internal westward migration in Germany, it is important to remember that the situation in Germany was an unprecedented, unique circumstance that does have differences from general internal migration. Moreover, migration patterns are not rigid and are often influenced and determined by human intervention; such as, war, genocide, forced relocation, etc.<sup>130</sup>

Towards the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, E. G. Ravenstein<sup>131</sup> introduced several ‘laws’ of migration. While some these ‘laws’ or theories have been improved upon or changed since their initial introduction, many still hold a good basis as the incentives for people to migrate. Not all of the laws are related to internal westward migration within Germany, but the following laws are quite pertinent. First, a majority of those who migrate only move a short distance,<sup>132</sup> and those who do move a long distance choose a large city destination.<sup>133</sup> Second, young adults or young families are more likely to migrate than older adults or older families; young female adults are more likely to migrate than young

---

<sup>130</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 47.

<sup>131</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>.

<sup>132</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>, 286.

<sup>133</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>, 287.



male adults.<sup>134</sup> Additionally, females are more likely to migrate within their native country, while males are more likely to migrate to another country. Finally, and most importantly, economic incentives are the largest factor in an individual's decision to migrate.

“Bad or oppressive laws, heavy taxation, an unattractive climate, uncongenial social surroundings, and even compulsion (slave trade, transportation), all have produced and are still producing currents of migration, but none of these currents can compare in volume with that which arises from the desire inherent in most men to ‘better’ themselves in material respect”.<sup>135</sup>

These theories on migration apply to the situation of internal westward migration in Germany. The majority of individuals moving from the ‘neue Länder’ to the ‘alte Länder’ are represented in these categories and are influenced by these incentives.

Another influential scholar of migration theory is Everett S. Lee, who has effectively analyzed the migration incentives and given insight into the subject. By analyzing the area of origin, area of destination, intervening obstacles, and personal factors involved, he was able to draw a few conclusions.<sup>136</sup> The idea of ‘push and pull factors’ as incentives for migration applies directly to internal westward migration in Germany. “The push factors are those life situations that give one reason to be dissatisfied with one’s present locale; the pull factors are those attributes of distant places

---

<sup>134</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>, 288.

<sup>135</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>, 286.

<sup>136</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 50.

that make them appear appealing”.<sup>137</sup> Therefore, these factors, combined with the how severe the intervening obstacles and personal factors are, will determine a person’s desire to relocate. ‘Push factors’, in relation to internal westward migration in Germany, are low political freedom, corrupt governmental organs, low standard of living, high unemployment, and low wages. On the other hand, the ‘pull factors’ in relation to internal westward migration in Germany are high political freedom, transparent government organizations, high standard of living, relatively low unemployment, and high wages. Additionally, the thought that people are more likely to migrate at certain stages of life is supported.

Furthermore, there is an idea of positively-selected versus negatively-selected migrants. Positively-selected migrants do not migrate out of necessity, but rather, because they perceive the situation elsewhere as superior to their current situation.<sup>138</sup> This often includes educated migrants, who are well situated in their current location, but are willing to relocate to receive a higher return for their work. Migrants who are negatively selected migrate, because they are overwhelmed by the negative aspects of their current location. It is thought that they can no longer remain living under the conditions that surround them.<sup>139</sup> Both positively- and negatively-selected migrants existed among those who chose to migrate from the areas of eastern Germany to areas of western Germany.

---

<sup>137</sup> Dorigo, Guido and Tobler, Waldo. “Push-Pull Migration Laws.” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Volume 73, Number 1 (March 1983), pages 1-17. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2569342.pdf>, 1.

<sup>138</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 56.

<sup>139</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 56.

In conclusion, ‘push and pull factors’ caused both positively- and negatively-selected migrants to relocate from east to west within the German state directly before and following reunification. The following chapter will discuss the unique situation that existed in Germany and the different factors that allowed for the increased mobility of its people. By analyzing the political, social, and economic climate of the eastern regions of Germany at the time of reunification, one can see how the necessary ‘push factors’ increased emigration. By viewing this climate in relation to the climate of the western regions of Germany, it is clear that people decided to relocate in order to improve their life chances. In addition, one can observe clear patterns in relation to the demographics of migrants towards the ‘alte Länder’.

## ***5.2 Incentives for Internal Westward Migration within the German State***

### ***5.2.1 Political***

Throughout the world, there exists a wide variety of political ideologies and political systems. Oftentimes, the different political systems that exist are not the complete will of the people they govern. Therefore, when people do not feel that their government or political system is fully representing them, they may choose to immigrate to a state that does. This can be defined as ‘political migration’ and the people who choose to immigrate can be defined as ‘political immigrants or refugees’. Throughout the history of the German Democratic Republic, there has been a noteworthy amount of ‘political immigrants’. This category of migration has not accounted for all of the migrants from the Germany Democratic Republic throughout the three phases of

migration, but political ideology has, also, played a significant role in the relatively high level of emigration.

‘Political migration’ played its most significant role during the first and second phases of internal westward migration in Germany. As the socialist state became more established, the people who did not like the changes to Germany escaped to the west through Berlin. In addition, any time the state decided to pursue a harder line there was an upswing in emigration. In other words, as the socialist government became stricter and harsher in their treatment of the people, people would leave in larger numbers.<sup>140</sup>

“With the propaganda offensive against West Germany increasing in virulence, and the gradual tightening of restrictions on movement between East and West Berlin, a sense was spreading throughout the GDR that can only be expressed by a German word: *Torschlusspanik* – literally, panic that the door will be closed”.<sup>141</sup>

These ‘political refugees’ were then transported from Berlin to the rest of Germany through the western controlled air-channels. As mentioned before, the building of the Berlin Wall brought an end to the migration of people for political reasons. There were cases of successful emigration from East Germany, but those cases were limited and rare. In addition, several people lost their lives in their attempts to defect from the east.<sup>142</sup>

As the East German state began to collapse and the borders were opened, there was a resurgence of this type of migration. People who had grown tired of the corrupted socialist system, and desired the political freedoms offered in the west, decided to leave East Germany for good. However, this type of migration became virtually unnecessary

---

<sup>140</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 76.

<sup>141</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 76.

<sup>142</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 293-296.

following the political unity of East and West Germany in 1990. With reunification, the two political systems merged and there was no longer a differing political ideology, thereby eliminating any reason from internal westward migration on a political basis.

### 5.2.2 *Social*

#### 5.2.2.1 Gender

When speaking about the social motivations for migration, it is difficult to understand the exact meaning. In the case of the ‘neue Länder’ in Germany, this cause for migration greatly affects the female population, in relation to social services that were lost after the fall of socialism. The German Democratic Republic existed as a social welfare state that was dedicated, in many ways, to supporting women in the workforce. As a result of reunification, an overwhelming reduction in state-supported childcare greatly hindered women in the ‘neue Länder’ who wished to rejoin the workforce after childbirth.<sup>143</sup> This has caused an increase in the mobility of the women in the ‘neue Länder’, for a variety of reasons, and thus increased their tendency to migrate to the ‘alte Länder’. The following section will first address how the position of women will increase their mobility and propensity for migration. Then, it will analyze how the reunification process caused changes for women in the ‘neue Länder’; thereby, increasing their mobility and propensity for migration.

A person’s desires to migrate are strongly dependent upon their economic aspirations and the economic conditions they are living within. However, economics is rarely the only factor that is considered when one is making the choice to migrate to a

---

<sup>143</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 81.

new location. There are a variety of factors that either push or pull one towards migration or factors that keep one from migrating altogether.<sup>144</sup> One of these factors is the relative age of the individual or family. Younger individuals are more likely to migrate and, among those, females are more likely to migrate.<sup>145</sup> However, it is quite clear that young individuals are not the only demographic that chooses to leave their homes for somewhere new. People who are single or newly married are more likely to migrate; additionally, those who do not have children or have young children are, also, more likely to migrate. Sheila Miller suggests that there are three stages of the family life cycle; the preschool stage (children under five years of age), the elementary stage (oldest child is between six and twelve years of age), and the teenage stage (oldest child is between thirteen and nineteen years of age).<sup>146</sup> The role of the family combined with economic aspirations is examined to see ones inclination towards migration. The result is that migration is most likely in the first stage of the family life cycle and declining throughout the later ones.<sup>147</sup> In conclusion, for those who are married and have children, the propensity to migrate greatly declines as time passes; the older the children are, the less likely it is that a family will relocate. Oftentimes, this represents a parents desire to maintain a stable household and environment for their children, including, a consistent

---

<sup>144</sup> Dorigo, Guido and Tobler, Waldo. "Push-Pull Migration Laws." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Volume 73, Number 1 (March 1983), pages 1-17. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2569342.pdf>, 1.

<sup>145</sup> Ravenstein, E. G. *The Laws of Migration*. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>, 288.

<sup>146</sup> Miller, Sheila. "Family Life Cycle, Extended Family Orientations, and Economic Aspirations as Factors in the Propensity to Migrate." *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 3, Summer 1976, pages 323-335. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4105954.pdf>, 328.

<sup>147</sup> Miller, Sheila. "Family Life Cycle, Extended Family Orientations, and Economic Aspirations as Factors in the Propensity to Migrate." *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 3, Summer 1976, pages 323-335. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4105954.pdf>, 325.

educational experience; therefore, once children have reached school age it is less likely that their parent will choose to move to a new area.

As a socialist nation, the German Democratic Republic provided certain social services that were not available in most capitalist societies.

“In the East the state provided economic security through guaranteed employment, subsidized marriage and births, easy access to divorce, extensive family leave, and free child care and abortion. By contrast, West German policies reflect that the state considers marriage and child care predominantly a private matter, based on the traditional model of the male breadwinner and the female homemaker”.<sup>148</sup>

As close to full employment as possible is essential for socialist states and in many of those states it is a criminal offense to be unemployed. As was the case of East Germany, table 1 presents the data of East German women’s employment rates in 1989 and 1994. Of the portion of the population that was employed, 48.9%<sup>149</sup> of them were women, which was 91%<sup>150</sup> of the female population of working age. This represents close to the entire female population in East Germany; in addition, it is significantly higher than the 58%<sup>151</sup> of West German women who were employed in 1989.

---

<sup>148</sup> Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 39.

<sup>149</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 19 and Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Bundesministerium für Frauen und Jugend, Statistisches Bundesamt, and Winkler cited by Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>.

<sup>150</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 19 and Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Bundesministerium für Frauen und Jugend, Statistisches Bundesamt, and Winkler cited by Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>.

<sup>151</sup> Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Bundesministerium für Frauen und Jugend, Statistisches Bundesamt, and Winkler cited by Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>.

Table 1:

<b>Percentage of Women in the Workforce</b>				
	<b>German Democratic Republic (1989)</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany (1989)</b>	<b>'neue Länder' (1994)</b>	<b>'alte Länder' (1994)</b>
<b>Full-Time</b>	91.0	58.0	73.8	60.0
<b>Women as Percent of the Workforce</b>	48.9	38.9	46.3	42.8
<b>Married Mothers</b>	62.0	28.0	N/A	N/A
<b>Single Mothers</b>	89.0	45.0	N/A	N/A

Data from Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, Bundesministerium für Frauen und Jugend, Statistisches Bundesamt, and Winkler cited in Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 42.

It was not only important for women to have full-time employment in socialist states; there was also a significant amount of stress on the importance of having a family.<sup>152</sup> For that reason, in order for a woman to be a good citizen, she was not only employed, she was also a mother.

In order to ensure this near full employment and guarantee the possibility for its citizens to reproduce, it was fundamental to have extensive social services for working parents. The existence of state-run and affordable childcare was the most vital of these systems. Childcare facilities were available for women in the German Democratic

<sup>152</sup> Bütow and Winkler cited in Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 40.



Republic at little or no cost to the mother; as a result, combining full-time employment with motherhood was possible. In addition, many workplaces or factories had childcare facilities;<sup>153</sup> in other words, childcare was provided at the woman's place of employment. Single-mothers found childcare facilities affordable even for a single-income family.<sup>154</sup> These governmental programs promoted and encouraged a lifestyle that women were full-time workers and mothers.

Moreover, this type of state support influenced the populous' views on marriage and children. "Marriage and children were considered part of the normative life patterns followed by citizens of the GDR".<sup>155</sup> Adler cites surveys performed by Bütow and Winkler which showed that nearly all East German women had planned to have children one day. Additionally, 91%<sup>156</sup> of women in East Germany viewed children as important and 90%<sup>157</sup> of women eventually had children in their lifetime. The large number of women in the German Democratic Republic who chose to take on full-time employment with motherhood suggests that, this was not only the desire of the state, but of the women themselves.

---

<sup>153</sup> Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 43.

<sup>154</sup> Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 43.

<sup>155</sup> Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 40.

<sup>156</sup> Bütow and Winkler cited in Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 40.

<sup>157</sup> Trappe cited in Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 40.

With German reunification, the situation in the ‘neue Länder’ was drastically changed and, in many cases, it was changed virtually overnight.<sup>158</sup> The most significant of these reforms for East German women were the reforms to the social service benefits for mothers. The number of women in the workforce in East Germany suggests that there was a high level of emancipation of women. However, the emancipation of East German women existed very much on the surface. The socialist government regarded women’s emancipation, “...as something that can be given to women without affecting the position of men”.<sup>159</sup> However, this is not possible; in order to fully emancipate women, men must be willing to undertake childcare and household duties, but gender roles were still very stringent within the family structure in East Germany. “The division of labour within the home remained relatively unchanged despite women’s near equal involvement in paid labour outside the home”.<sup>160</sup> In practical terms, women still performed the majority of the cleaning, cooking, and childcare all while maintaining full-time employment. The lack of deep social reform, in regards to gender roles, would have negative effects on the results reunification. Once there was a loss in social services, women were the ones who were expected to give up their careers to care for the children and the home. Conversely, this was not the desire for many young women from the ‘neue Länder’, even after reunification, many still desired to maintain full-time employment in addition to their household duties.<sup>161</sup>

---

<sup>158</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 59.

<sup>159</sup> Scott cited by Einhorn: Einhorn, Barbara. *Cinderella Goes to Market*. London: Verso, 1993, 32.

<sup>160</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 40.

<sup>161</sup> Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 40.

West German women had a completely dissimilar experience before reunification. In West Germany, family structure involved two-parent households where the mother stayed home to care for the children while the father went to work to provide for the family economically. With reunification, the transition to the West German model had detrimental impacts on the capacity of East German women to continue working.

“In the West German system, where the state provides incentives for the homemaker-mother role and child care is expensive, the decision of women, who tend to have lower-paying jobs than their male partners, to relinquish employment in favor of caring for their child at home is economically rational”.<sup>162</sup>

Since reunification was a one-sided event, a good portion of the services that allowed for East German women to maintain full-time employment and motherhood were taken away in exchange for the West German model. For that reason, East German women were negatively affected and their lives lost a large degree of stability that had once existed, due to their inability to combine employment and motherhood as they had in the past. Between 56% and 94% (dependent on child’s age) of free childcare was lost in the ‘neue Länder’ following reunification.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>162</sup> Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 40.

<sup>163</sup> Bundesministerium für Frauen und Jugend cited by Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 43.

Table 2:

<b>Number of Marriages and Births Per 1,000 and the Average Age of Women for First Marriage and First Birth</b>				
	<b>German Democratic Republic (1989)</b>	<b>Federal Republic of Germany (1989)</b>	<b>‘neue Länder’ (1994)</b>	<b>‘alte Länder’ (1994)</b>
<b>Live Births</b>	12.0	11.0	5.1	10.5
<b>Marriages</b>	7.9	6.4	3.4	5.9
<b>Age at First Marriage</b>	23.2	25.7	N/A	N/A
<b>Age at First Birth</b>	22.9	26.7	26.2 (1993)	27.0 (estimate)

Data from Conrad et al., Eberstadt, Statistisches Bundesamt, Snyder, and Winkler cited in Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 41.

The loss of childcare has led to a rapid decline in marriages and child births in the ‘neue Länder’. This rapid decline in births began exactly nine months after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border (August 1990).<sup>164</sup> Additionally, the decline in marriages of East German women coincided with the currency union (July 1990).<sup>165</sup> Table 2 shows that the number of births per 1,000 women dropped from 12.0 in 1989 to 5.1 in 1994 in the ‘neue Länder’, while in the ‘alte Länder’ births per 1,000 women dropped, as well, but in this case only slightly from 11.0 in 1989 to 10.5 in 1994. “Such

<sup>164</sup> Eberstadt, Nicholas. “Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989-1993.” *Population and Development Review*, Volume 20, Number 1, March 1994, pages 137-152. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2137633.pdf>, 139.

<sup>165</sup> Eberstadt, Nicholas. “Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989-1993.” *Population and Development Review*, Volume 20, Number 1, March 1994, pages 137-152. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2137633.pdf>, 144.

an abrupt and precipitous drop in fertility is unprecedented for an industrialized society during peacetime”.<sup>166</sup> This type of fluctuation in a country’s demographics is unparalleled; with exception only during times of great strain on a society. The birthrate in Germany has been falling steadily for a long period of time; however, the sudden drop in the early 1990s was an unpredicted consequence of the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border.

Moreover, one can see the decline in marriages per 1,000 women in the ‘neue Länder’ which were cut by more than half from 7.9 in 1989 to 3.4 in 1994; again marriages per 1,000 women in the ‘alte Länder’ have also seen a decline from 6.4 in 1989 to 5.9 in 1994. However, this is, again, only a slight reduction in comparison to the ‘neue Länder’. As with the drop in birth rate, a drop like this in marriages was unique in an industrialized country at a time of peace. These types of dramatic changes represent the extreme strain that had been put on the people of the ‘neue Länder’. Consequently, it also demonstrated that the women in the ‘neue Länder’ have drastically changed their attitudes towards children and marriage since the opening of the Berlin Wall and inner-German border, currency union, and reunification. There are no longer social welfare programs to ensure these women’s futures; which has led to an increase in vulnerability and this is reflected in the extreme drop in births and marriages in the ‘neue Länder’ between 1989 and 1994.

Furthermore, table 2 demonstrates the differences in the age at which these life events occur. It is shown that the average age of women at the birth of their first child has

---

<sup>166</sup> Eberstadt, Nicholas. “Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989-1993.” *Population and Development Review*, Volume 20, Number 1, March 1994, pages 137-152. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2137633.pdf>, 138.

increased from 22.9 in 1989 to 26.2 in 1993 in the ‘neue Länder’, whereas, we see that the average age of women at the birth of their first child has increased, just slightly, from 26.7 in 1989 to 27.0 in 1994 in the ‘alte Länder’. In other words, women are not only having fewer children; they are, also, waiting until a later stage of life to become first-time mothers. The transformations in regards to children and marriage have greatly changed the demographics of the ‘neue Länder’. The reasons behind this vary, but overall it can be seen as a reaction to the economic hardships combined with a loss of state support that women of the ‘neue Länder’ have experienced since 1989. These have both undermined the position of women in society and have led to further instability concerning their future.

“...the insecure economic conditions and lower social provisions after transition from a centrally planned state economy to the Western free market do not meet the level of economic security East German women consider a prerequisite for the responsibility of getting married and raising children”<sup>167</sup>

Moreover, the transition to the traditional values system in West German society has left women from the east feeling more vulnerable than before. The women of the ‘neue Länder’ have had their status in society reduced as a result of this transition; in many ways, it is a movement backwards for them. It is unlikely this trend of low birthrates and marriage rates will change until there is an increase in the sense of security in their position felt by women in the ‘neue Länder’.

As long as the women of the ‘neue Länder’ continue to have fewer children and to have their children at a later stage in life, the more mobile they become. This increase in mobility has allowed for the increase in internal westward migration of women from the

---

<sup>167</sup> Adler, Marina. “Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany.” *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>, 37.

‘neue Länder’ to the ‘alte Länder’. By waiting for or foregoing marriage and reproduction the women of the ‘neue Länder’ have increased their mobility. This has allowed for the later stages of the family lifecycle to be pushed back and for women to remain single and childless for a longer period of time. As a result, the women of the ‘neue Länder’ do not have the family obligations keeping them from emigrating, as they would have before. For that reason, women from the ‘neue Länder’ are able to pursue career goals that would have been difficult with children and they are no longer limited by their geography. In conclusion, the loss of state support and increased insecurity allowed for the decline in marriage and childbirth in the ‘neue Länder’. As a result, the women of the ‘neue Länder’ have had an increase in their mobility and this has resulted in a swell in emigration to the ‘alte Länder’.

#### 5.2.2.2 Education Level

The people whom the German Democratic Republic lost to internal westward migration were overwhelmingly young and educated. Young and educated individuals saw more opportunities for their skill set in the west before and after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border.<sup>168</sup> Under the East German system, people who came from backgrounds with educated parents, in particular, those who had been educated in the West, were often discriminated against within the workers state.<sup>169</sup> “West-students who have been studying a social science subject in West Berlin – including those in their final semester – are to be placed without exception into the

---

<sup>168</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 56.

<sup>169</sup> Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 191.

production process”.<sup>170</sup> In other words, those who had been educated in the west would not use their education in their work; rather they would be given unskilled labor positions. This was done as a form of punishment for disloyalty to the state and meant to subdue those who had been educated outside the Germany Democratic Republic. It was thought that those who had been educated in the west would rebel or sabotage the socialist government; therefore, it was vital to keep them away from positions of power. In a socialist state, the workers were seen as the top priority, so coming from the intelligentsia was not seen as a positive quality in a person.

Within the German Democratic Republic, salaries in different fields were comparable. In other words, a doctor would earn a similar income to a waiter. The prospect of lower wages for educated individuals in East Germany compared to West Germany promoted emigration; “...highly educated persons who are already comfortably situated frequently migrate because they receive better offers elsewhere”.<sup>171</sup> These educated individuals were pulled to the west where they felt their education would have a higher return. The wage differential between the ‘neue Länder’ and the ‘alte Länder’ did not end with reunification. In the next section the wealth gap between the ‘neue Länder’ and the ‘alte Länder’ will be discussed in greater detail.

### 5.2.3 *Economic*

The economic hardships in the ‘neue Länder’ are regarded as the leading cause for the increase in internal westward migration in Germany from 1989 to 1994. Internal

---

<sup>170</sup> Circular from Stoph. Bundes Archiv. *Sicherheitsmaßnahmen der DDR vom 13.8.1961* cited by Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006, 191.

<sup>171</sup> Lee, Everett S. “A Theory of Migration”. *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>, 56.



westward migration in Germany is a direct consequence of the poor economic condition of the German Democratic Republic; furthermore, as the outcome of failures within the reunification process. “Unification was politically, culturally, historically, and from the point of view of national and international security, a resounding success. Economically it was an unmitigated disaster”.<sup>172</sup> The unification of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany has had negative and positive effects. Primarily, the economic sector has continued to suffer and, as a result, has led to an increase in migration from the ‘neue Länder’ to the ‘alte Länder’.

While women appear to be the largest demographic that have been affected by the rise of the wealth disparity and in unemployment rates since 1990,<sup>173</sup> few in the ‘neue Länder’ have not felt the transformation. The reunification of the two Germany’s was a unique event and there was no set plan to follow. While German reunification has been heralded as a success there have been distinct problems that accompanied it; explicitly, struggles within the economic sector. The following will look into the problems associated with the East German economy following its transformation to free-market capitalism in relation to internal westward migration. By analyzing the key decisions in the reunification process – difficulties associated with the East German economy prior to 1989, currency union, wealth disparity, and privatization – the incentives for internal westward migration will become clearer.

Despite some opposition, by late 1989, reunification appeared to be imminent to many citizens of East and West Germany. The initial openings of the borders between the

---

<sup>172</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 399.

<sup>173</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000.

two Germanys caused great celebration and rejoicing as people traveled between east and west without restriction.<sup>174</sup> Once the celebrations and initial shock had worn off, citizens began to think about what reunification meant for the people of East and West Germany.

“But now that union was virtually a given, the man on the street began worrying about the conditions: the looming unemployment in East Germany’s uncompetitive industries; the buying out and export by speculators of subsidized goods from the GDR; the potential reclaiming of houses and lands by West German owners who had been dispossessed of their holdings forty years ago; the eventual worth of East-mark savings in real money”.<sup>175</sup>

These were all concerns from the East German citizens at the time of reunification. The West German citizens had concerns over the terms and, predominantly, over the cost of reunification.<sup>176</sup> Despite the general enthusiasm for reunification, insecurities existed among the populous of both German States. The reunification of a state that had been divided physically, economically, politically, and ideologically for forty years would involve many risks. This sense of insecurity shows in the amount of people who, despite the progression towards reunification and the economic and monetary union, still decided to migrate.

“Between October 1989 and January 1990, 300,000 people left the GDR for the Federal Republic. This caused the west German government to accelerate the movement towards German unification. However, regardless of Chancellor Kohl’s public commitment to a rapid move towards monetary unification in February 1990, the total number of migrants increased to 540,000 until July 1990”.<sup>177</sup>

---

<sup>174</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. International Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 60-61.


<sup>175</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. International Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 60-61.

<sup>176</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 391.

<sup>177</sup> Deceessin, Jörg. “Internal Migration in West Germany and Implication from East-West Salary Convergence.” *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 130, H. 2, 1994, pages 231-257. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440283.pdf>, 231-232.

Currency and economic union, as well as, reunification did slow the amount of people migrating to the West; however, the number of immigrants remained high due to an increased feeling of insecurity, paradoxically leading to further instability in the ‘neue Länder’.

Map 2:



Data from Statistisches Bundesamt cited by Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 8.

Map 2 displays this change in the population between the opening of the German borders and the time reunification was complete. It shows that the overall area of East Germany was losing an overwhelming amount of people due to emigration, while the states of West Germany were experiencing a rise in population due to an increase in migrants to this area. Additionally, it can be noted that the areas surrounding the border of East and West Germany, as well as, the prosperous southern states have experienced the highest gains in population. Areas within the 'alte Länder' in the rural north have, also, felt a steady loss of population due to emigration to the cities and more affluent south; however, this population decline has been more gradual than in the 'neue Länder'.

Three points can be seen as essential ideas from Kohl's Ten Point Program for internal westward migration in Germany. The first was unification under article 23<sup>178</sup> of the Basic Law, predominantly affecting the loss of an expansive welfare state. The second was the introduction of a 1:1 exchange rate for the currency and economic union; which resulted in taking away the east's advantage as a cheap exporter and causing regional inflation. The third was the commitment to an equalized standard of living and salaries, and, although the standard of living and salaries have continued to rise in the 'neue Länder', they are still not up to the levels of the 'alte Länder'. Originally, these points were intended to prevent an increase in migration with the union of east and west; however, they were widely ineffective in quelling the outflow of people. The following sections will further analyze how these points of reunification have led to an increase in economic instability in the 'neue Länder' and have pushed people towards migration.

---

<sup>178</sup> Article 23 calls for the application of the existing Basic Law to any territory that joins with the Federal Republic of Germany; in other words, they are accepting the existing constitution. While Article 146 calls for a new agreed upon constitution to supersede the existing Basic Law.

### 5.2.3.1 Economy and Infrastructure of the German Democratic Republic

The East German economy prior to the implementation of 1:1 currency union and reunification was in a tremendous amount of debt to western creditors. The German Democratic Republic was created based on the Soviet model of a planned economy which had become severely outdated over the years. Before the building of the Berlin Wall, times of economic hardship and uncertainty were met with an enlargement in the number of emigrants leaving East Germany. While the building of the Berlin Wall helped suppress the problems with migration at the time, it was unable to solve the problems related to the East German economy. The East German leadership had become well versed in making it seem as if the German Democratic Republic were an overall economic success. Despite shockingly high international debt the East Germans did not experience significant drops in the standard of living in order to maintain this image. It was not until Erich Honecker<sup>179</sup> resigned from his position as General Secretary of the Party, that the true state of the economy was realized. The actual amount of debt was significantly higher than had been originally estimated and far greater than anyone was prepared for.<sup>180</sup>

“The Central Committee of the SED met on November 8 and listed in horror to a series of reports to the effect that the state was virtually bankrupt. Some party stalwarts suddenly realized that they had been persistently lied to over the years, and their blind faith in the SED was shattered”.<sup>181</sup>

---

<sup>179</sup> Erich Honecker was the General Secretary of the General Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany from May 3, 1971 to October 18, 1989.

<sup>180</sup> Pond, Elizabeth. *A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR*. International Security, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>, 53.

<sup>181</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 384.

It had become clear to a few privileged party members, as early as the 1970s, that the only way to save the East German economy from large foreign debts was an overwhelming drop in the standard of living.<sup>182</sup> Rather than allow a lower standard of living and the risk of rebellion, instead in the 1970s the East German government began to procure hard currency loans in order to further industrialize. The thought was that the currency loans would be used to improve the industry. Once the industry was improved, East Germany would be able to export the goods produced and repay the loans with its earnings.<sup>183</sup> “This, however, presupposed a Western demand for East German goods – as well as no competition from other low-price exporters”.<sup>184</sup> However, the demand for the poor quality East German goods simply did not exist; new producers in Southeast Asia began to produce higher quality good at a lower cost. Consequently, East German borrowing continued through the 1980s. “By 1989, East German foreign debt reached DM 49 billion, or \$26.5 billion. The annual cost of servicing this obligation was \$4.5 billion, nearly 60 percent of export earnings”.<sup>185</sup> It had become impossible for the German Democratic Republic to repay the loans they had taken from the west.

The astonishing amount of debt that was procured by many of the socialist nations can be seen as a symptom of an overarching problem. This problem was inefficient and outdated means of production. The industry in the German Democratic Republic was unable to compete with those of other nations. “The German Democratic Republic was developed in the Cold War era as Eastern Europe’s most ‘successful’ economy and

---

<sup>182</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 384.

<sup>183</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 48.

<sup>184</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 48.

<sup>185</sup> Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009, 50.

showpiece of Communist state planning”.<sup>186</sup> While East Germany was one of the forerunners of production in the Soviet bloc, it was beleaguered with problems. Old industry and lack of efficiency led to lower quality goods that were unable to sell in large enough quantities outside of the Soviet bloc. Hence, when the nations of Central and Eastern Europe began a series of peaceful revolutions and the liberalization process in the late 1980s, which resulted in the end of the socialist governments, the German Democratic Republic found itself without a market for its low quality goods.<sup>187</sup> “The unproductive and antiquated industries of the East were totally unable to compete with Western firms on the domestic market”.<sup>188</sup> In other words, what had been competitive on the market in the closed socialist economies would no longer be competitive in the new free-market domestic system. The decrepit East German industry, in combination with its inefficiency, would become problematic with the implementation of currency and economic union along with the start of the privatization process in the future.

#### 5.2.3.2 Currency and Economic Union’s Affects on Internal Westward Migration

Currency and economic union occurred in July of 1990, which resulted in the joining of the economic system of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. East Germany would transition into a free-market economy with its new currency as the Deutschmark (West German currency). It was decided that it would be done at a 1:1 exchange rate; in other words, the relatively worthless Ostmark

---

<sup>186</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 2.

<sup>187</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 3.

<sup>188</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 392.

(East German currency) was given equal value to the Deutschmark, an estimated increase in worth between 300-400 percent.<sup>189</sup> This exchange rate was given to children under the age of 14 for up to 2,000 Ostmarks, adults aged 15-59 for up to 4,000 Ostmarks, and elders aged over 60 for up to 6,000 Ostmarks.<sup>190</sup> Anything over this amount was still given the liberal exchange rate of 2:1; so two Ostmarks for every one Deutschmark. Furthermore, all East German salaries and pensions were to be paid in Deutschmarks from this point onward, which greatly increased the value of East German earnings and pensions.<sup>191</sup>

“Massive loans were given to cover pensions and unemployment benefits. The Kohl government pretended that this could be financed by a balanced growth in the economy, but they were deliberately deceiving the electorate in the West by having them believe that unification could be had on the cheap”.<sup>192</sup>

Therefore, the fears that the reunification would come at a high cost were validated.

The attempted implementation of salary equalization took away the only advantage the East German industry had.<sup>193</sup> The ability to pay lower wages and produce lower cost goods had benefitted the East German industry. By the attempted equalization of salaries the competitiveness of East German industry was effectively removed. The East German workers had been earning a relatively low salary, compared to West German workers in the same field, most of all once converted into Deutschmarks. Once their salaries were paid in Deutschmarks it was worth considerably more than it had been in Ostmarks. This meant that the various employers in East Germany were going to have

---

<sup>189</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 189.

<sup>190</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 391.

<sup>191</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 391.

<sup>192</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 391.

<sup>193</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 3.



to pay the East German employees significantly more than they had previously paid. This increased the cost of labor meant that the East German employers would have to either raise the costs of their goods or to fire some of their employees, in many cases they had to do both. Therefore, East German products and labor were not as cheap as they had once been, which caused East Germany to lose its advantage to the west. In addition, people were unwilling to pay the higher prices for low quality East German goods; which resulted in mass layoffs and firm closures.

Currency and economic union between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of German was a heavily debated issue and had its opponents. Only after guarantees that a unified German State would work towards the creation of a single European Currency (Euro) and further promote European integration did more members of the international community approve the decision. International opposition was on account of the fear that reunification would cause instability in Europe. Fears that a united Germany would become too powerful and risk the peace of Europe still existed; therefore, it was vital for Germany to agree to the rigorous promotion of European integration in the future. Moreover, the decision for an equal exchange rate was met with a significant amount of backlash. Internal opposition even came from the Bundesbank (central bank of Germany) president, Karl-Otto Pöhl.<sup>194</sup> This included arguing that the 1:1 exchange rate would come at too great a cost for the West German economy.

One of the main reasons that the 1:1 exchange rate was chosen was to help deter internal westward migration. Since the opening of the inner-German border and the

---

<sup>194</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 189.

Berlin Wall migration had resulted in the revival of migration from east to west. It was hoped that East Germans would be placated by the freedom of travel and the favorable currency and economic union; however, this was not the case. "...in the first year following monetary unification, another 182,000 East Germans migrated to join the West German labor force and by the second quarter of 1991 approximately 212,000 commuted to West Germany to work".<sup>195</sup> This was due to the great deal of uncertainty that was still felt among the people of the 'neue Länder'. The people who commuted represent a group of people that speaks to the wealth disparity that existed between the 'alte Länder' and the 'neue Länder' despite promises to equalize wages and the standard of living; not limited to simply those who commuted, rather can be seen as an additional push factor for migrants.

Table 3:

<b>Percentage of 'alte Länder' Average Individual Income Earned by Workers in the 'neue Länder',<sup>196</sup></b>	
1990	33%
1991	50%
1992	65%
1993	71%
1994	72%

Data from Blum and Scharfe, German Federal Statistical Office, and Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder (AKVGRL) cited by Burda, Michael C. and Hunt, Jennifer. "From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Germany". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Volume 2001, Number 2, 2001, pages 1-71. *JSTOR* (accessed April 15, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1209133.pdf>, 10.

<sup>195</sup> Decressin, Jörg. "Internal Migration in West Germany and Implication from East-West Salary Convergence." *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 130, H. 2, 1994, pages 231-257. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440283.pdf>, 232.

<sup>196</sup> This data includes West Berlin with the 'alte Länder' and East Berlin with the 'neue Länder'.

The wealth disparity between the ‘alte Länder’ and ‘neue Länder’ was not something that one would be able to solve quickly. Years of neglect to East German infrastructure would take years to rectify and countless building projects to bring them up to West German standards. Moreover, the manner in which currency and economic union took place allowed for the wealth inequality to be felt severely. Along with the 1:1 exchange rate, the process to equalize salaries was started; however, salaries were never equalized. Still today, a person who works in the ‘neue Länder’, in most cases, has a lower salary than someone who performs the same work in the ‘alte Länder’. Table 3 shows that at the time of currency and economic union, wages in the ‘neue Länder’ were, on average, 33% of those in the ‘alte Länder’<sup>197</sup>. Additionally, wages have increased by more than double in the years following currency and economic union. Nevertheless, this percentage stagnated at 76% in 1996, lasting through the late 1990s; furthermore, decreasing by 3% to 73% in 2000<sup>198</sup>. While these wage differentials have risen again since 2000, they have never been equal to those of the ‘alte Länder’. Lower wage employment in the ‘neue Länder’ can be seen as a push factor for people to migrate or to commute to the ‘alte Länder’ for work.

Another aspect of the wealth disparity can be seen in the ‘regional inflation’ experienced by the ‘neue Länder’. The people of the ‘neue Länder’ were, additionally, no

---

<sup>197</sup> Blum and Scarfe, German Federal Statistical Office, and Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder (AKVGRL) cited by Burda, Michael C. and Hunt, Jennifer. “From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Germany”. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Volume 2001, Number 2, 2001, pages 1-71. *JSTOR* (accessed April 15, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1209133.pdf>.

<sup>198</sup> Blum and Scarfe, German Federal Statistical Office, and Arbeitskreis Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder (AKVGRL) cited by Burda, Michael C. and Hunt, Jennifer. “From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Germany”. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Volume 2001, Number 2, 2001, pages 1-71. *JSTOR* (accessed April 15, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1209133.pdf>.

longer paying the prices of the highly subsidized and relatively low cost goods of the German Democratic Republic. While the quality of goods was greatly improved from the past, their lower salaries could not pay the price increase that occurred universally throughout the ‘neue Länder’. This created a phenomenon of ‘regional inflation’; simply the effects of inflation are felt simply in one region of an area, rather than affecting the entire area linked to that currency. In other words, the cost of goods and services significantly increased in the ‘neue Länder’ while prices remained steady in the ‘alte Länder’; which was an outcome of the currency and economic union between the two Germanys. The increase in the prices of goods was hoped to be supplemented by the equalization of salaries in the ‘neue Länder’ to the levels of the ‘alte Länder’. Except, we have seen that the increase in wages in the ‘neue Länder’ was slow going and never achieved the ultimate goal of salary equalization.

#### 5.2.3.3 Privatization’s Affects on Internal Westward Migration

Socialism considers the existence of private property as a significant hindrance to equality; it is believed there should be common ownership of property.<sup>199</sup> The Soviet Union adapted this thought and proceeded to nationalize private property into state collectives.<sup>200</sup> Since East Germany had followed the Soviet economic model, its wealth and property was predominantly state owned. Therefore, with the fall of Soviet-style socialism in Central and Eastern Europe there was a mass movement of privatization across this area. There were many different methods that were implemented to complete this process, all of which contained benefits and drawbacks. Similar to most of the

---

<sup>199</sup> Heywood, Andrew. *Political Ideologies*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 109.

<sup>200</sup> Heywood, Andrew. *Political Ideologies*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 109.

reunification process, this was a relatively unprecedented phenomenon and would require a lot of guesswork.

After reunification, the 'neue Länder' began to privatize the large amounts of state owned property with the assistance of the 'alte Länder'. This was done differently than many of the other nations of Central and East Europe; being the only nation to unify with a well established free-market capitalist society after the fall of the socialist regime. This in some ways was an advantage to Germany; they had experienced experts from the west working with the industry in the east. On the other hand, the process had its drawbacks. There was a high amount of firm closures, which led to an exorbitant rise in unemployment in the 'neue Länder'. This directly affected the number of people choosing to migrate westward at this time. Those who had lost their jobs or were worried that they would lose their jobs in the near future were more likely to migrate westward. The 'alte Länder' did not experience the extreme spike in unemployment and was seen to possess a higher level of economic security.

The Treuhandanstalt (THA) was established following reunification in 1990 to help facilitate the privatization of former German Democratic Republic state property.<sup>201</sup> This included 8,500 enterprises, 2.4 million hectares of agriculture and forest lands, property of the Stasi and National People's Army, and all public housing in the 'neue Länder'.<sup>202</sup> Half of the workforce (four million people) was employed by places that were to be privatized by this agency. The responsibilities of the Treuhandanstalt were to

---

<sup>201</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 72.

<sup>202</sup> Siegmund, Uwe. *Dokumentation 1990-1994 by Treuhandanstalt: Review*. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 131, H. 3 (1995), pages 614-617. *JSTOR* (accessed April 30, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440430.pdf>, 614.

privatize, municipalize, restructure, liquefy, or renationalize these different firms or property.<sup>203</sup> As was seen with most of the reunification process, the people of Germany desired the transformation of property to be quick. “As the main aim of the THA was to privatize as much as possible, streamlining took place at every level to ensure maximum efficiency and competitiveness”.<sup>204</sup> Oftentimes, larger pieces of property were broken into smaller units and tested for their efficiency. Then it was determined if it would be able to or if it would not be able to make a profit. Those areas that were able to make a profit would be privatized and those that were unable to make a profit were shut down. This was an extensive undertaking that required years. The Treuhandanstalt was in existence until 1994, when it was dissolved into several successor organizations to finish the process.

There was a significant amount of opposition to the operations of the Treuhandanstalt. The main complaint from the people was in regards to the amount of firm closures and job losses that were connected with the agency. People believed that the Treuhandanstalt did not take an adequate amount of time in deciding if a company needed to be closed; for that reason, causing unnecessary job losses to many people in the ‘neue Länder’.<sup>205</sup> Additionally, they believed that the Treuhandanstalt was not working towards rehabilitation of the economy of the ‘neue Länder’.<sup>206</sup> “Defending its policy, the Treuhandanstalt maintained that it was able to ascertain within a short period of time

---

<sup>203</sup> Siegmund, Uwe. *Dokumentation 1990-1994 by Treuhandanstalt: Review*. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd. 131, H. 3 (1995), pages 614-617. *JSTOR* (accessed April 30, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440430.pdf>, 615.

<sup>204</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 141.

<sup>205</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 72.

<sup>206</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 72.

whether a firm had the chance of long-term survival”.<sup>207</sup> The activities of the Treuhandanstalt were expensive due to the mass scale of privatization that was necessary; at the time of the Treuhandanstalt’s closure it left around 270 million Deutschmarks of debt,<sup>208</sup> further adding to the far-reaching cost of reunification.

After reunification the ‘neue Länder’ faced an overwhelming amount of firm closures across a variety of industries. The effects of these firms’ closures impacted the people of this area in a negative manner and led to an increase in internal westward migration. While there are those who believe that many firms were closed unnecessarily; but, most businesses in the ‘neue Länder’ were unsalvageable. “The entire infrastructure of the country was in a disastrous state of decay. Experts estimated that only one-third of East German enterprises was capable of making a modest profit”.<sup>209</sup> Thus, the Treuhandanstalt was forced to push through countless firm closures. In an exorbitant amount of cases, it was not possible to rehabilitate the firms to become profitable; it was necessary to close the firm and open new up-to-date businesses. “East Germany was thus de-industrialized, a process quite unique in the history of an industrial nation”.<sup>210</sup> The phenomena of de-industrialization had not been seen on this scale before or after the case of East Germany. Generally, firms and industry that have become outdated would be renovated and updated over time, so the process of de-industrialization and rebuilding was unnecessary.

---

<sup>207</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 72.

<sup>208</sup> Siegmund, Uwe. *Dokumentation 1990-1994 by Treuhandanstalt: Review*. *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 131, H. 3 (1995), pages 614-617. *JSTOR* (accessed April 30, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440430.pdf>, 614.

<sup>209</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 391.

<sup>210</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 392.

As a result of the mass systematic closure of firms across the eastern parts of Germany, there were significant shocks to the employment rates. “In the immediate post-Wende period firm closures and rationalization programmes led to a mass of redundancies and a sharp increase in unemployment”.<sup>211</sup> In many cases this rise in unemployment could not be avoided. Under the Socialist government of the German Democratic Republic, firms that were not profitable were kept open at a loss to ensure that there was near full-employment. However, it was not possible to allow for thousands of firms to remain open at a loss with the new capitalist free-market system. Overall, these firms that were not profitable were closed down and this greatly affected the unemployment rate in the ‘neue Länder’. “Three-quarters of the workforce lost their jobs as a result of these transfers”.<sup>212</sup> No one in the workforce of the ‘neue Länder’ was left unaffected by firm closures; the entire job market was vulnerable. A series of programs to combat job loss were implemented to avoid three-quarters of the workforce remaining unemployed, which will be discussed further below.

Unemployment plagued Germany following reunification. The different areas of Germany experienced this rise in overall unemployment differently. The ‘neue Länder’ were most directly affected by this spike in unemployment. “By June 1993 unemployment in East Germany as a whole stood at 15.1 percent, almost double that in West Germany”.<sup>213</sup> Map 4 displays the unemployment rate as a total percent of the workforce in 1993. While the unemployment rate fluctuated following reunification it is

---

<sup>211</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 72.


<sup>212</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 392.

<sup>213</sup> Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000, 87.



an accurate display of the trends in unemployment; predominantly, it being concentrated in the 'neue Länder'.

Map 3:



Data from Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (IAB). *Materialien*. (6), 1991, 1-11 cited by Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. "Spatial Impacts of German Unification." *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 10.

It is clear that the 'neue Länder' experienced the most significant rise in unemployment following reunification; in many areas over 15 percent of the population was left unemployed. These overpowering unemployment rates have had a significant impact on the people of the 'neue Länder'. It has resulted in many choosing to migrate westward in hopes of avoiding job loss and long-term unemployment.

Since there was an inability for the old firms to compete and the new firms had not been soundly established, unemployment continued to rise following the reunification of Germany. The newly unified government attempted to combat this devastating climb in unemployment.

“The government tried to relieve the situation with make-work programmes, by encouraging early retirement, and by providing funds to save firms from bankruptcy. By 1994 50 percent of East German workers had participated in a make-work programme, and 60 billion marks have been spent on such measures by 1997”.<sup>214</sup>

In other words, the government attempted to create new short-term and long-term employment opportunities; allowing and pushing people towards retirement at a younger age; and offering funds to bail out companies which were on the edge of failure. These programs have been widely unsuccessful in lessening the problem of unemployment in the 'neue Länder'.

With the loss of large firms to certain areas of the 'neue Länder' there has been a decrease in the desire of people to live there. This is not a phenomenon that is unique to the eastern states of Germany; most industrialized nations have experienced this to some degree. With the growing globalization of nations, more and more firms are outsourcing their factories to cheaper areas of the world; therefore, closing down local industry. The

---

<sup>214</sup> Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 392-393.

main difference between other industrialized nations and Germany is the scale on which it occurred.

“Briefly in April 1991, numbers of short-time workers in eastern Germany exceeded two million; by then, within less than a full year of economic unification, 48 percent of full-time jobs had been lost, creating what Kind (1991) describes as *Geisterstädte*, or ‘ghost towns’, which are empty of working people and where there is no longer any noise of industrial activity”.<sup>215</sup>

These ‘ghost towns’ are prevalent across the countryside of the ‘neue Länder’. Since reunification, many areas have not seen a revival of the industry that used to thrive there. These towns have lost a significant portion of their population due to internal westward migration; once there were no longer opportunities for work, the younger generations emigrated away from these areas. Now these areas are predominantly occupied by a small aging population if there is a population at all and attempts to repopulate the areas have been widely ineffective.

Overall, the manner in which the reunification process took place allowed for the increase in internal westward migration in Germany from 1989 to 1994. It had a detrimental effect on the people of the ‘neue Länder’ with a high rise in unemployment and the loss of financial security. While there were programs to help resolve the problems associated with the rising unemployment, they were widely unsuccessful in reducing its impact. Therefore, many people chose to migrate westward in order to ensure their financial future. German reunification was meant to bring together a people who had been separated for 40 years; however, the process was marred with difficulties. “...western and eastern Germany have diverged rather than converged since unification

---

<sup>215</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 8 and Kind, G. “Perspektiven der räumlichen Entwicklung in den neuen Bundesländern“. *Inf z. Raumentwickl.* 11/12: 687-701.

in such crucial spheres as economic output, unemployment and population migration”.<sup>216</sup> These difficulties led to further separation of the ‘neue Länder’ from the ‘alte Länder’. The people of the ‘neue Länder’ still face the problems that began directly after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border. Wealth disparity and high unemployment still plagues those of the ‘neue Länder’; additionally, internal westward migration has slowed but not ended since this time.

## **6. Conclusion**

### ***6.1 Conclusion of Historical Factors***

The history of the German state is a complicated and diverse subject, though significant for those who wish to gain insight into its modern challenges. As a result of the Second World War, the German state was divided into two separate nations and its capital became, arguably, the focal point of the Cold War. As the United States and the Soviet Union fought to increase their spheres of influence, both desired hegemony over the German state. This desire, combined with international fear of a unified Germany, led to the political, social, and economic divergence of west from east. Additionally, the implementation of a free-market capitalist society in West Germany and of a state-run socialist society in East Germany led to the separation of the German state lasting for 40 years. The founding and progress of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic had detrimental effects on the development of the unified German state. It led to the significant problem of internal westward migration within Germany from 1989-1994.

---

<sup>216</sup> Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. “Spatial Impacts of German Unification.” *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>, 12.

In total, there have been three major phases of internal westward migration in Germany. The first phase occurred because of Soviet hegemony in eastern Germany. Many people desired to migrate westward to escape the new socialist society that was being established, the result of which was the closing of the inner-German border. The second phase was a reaction to this event; the desire to emigrate remained, following the border closure. Therefore, relatively unrestricted travel between East and West Berlin allowed for thousands more to emigrate westward. This phase of migration resulted in the building of the Berlin Wall, which can be seen as, arguably, the most poignant symbol of German division. The third phase of migration began following the opening of these two borders; that had become a representation of the devastating division of a people for almost half a century. The results of these border openings were overwhelming and set the tone for the future of the German state. Nevertheless, westward migration was not quelled by the opening of these borders and continues to this day.

The development of the German Democratic Republic's society would have resounding effects on the future of the German state and the reunification process. This can be seen most clearly in the development of East German industry. It evolved into a society that was ridden with sabotage and inefficiency. Despite being displayed and labeled as an industrial success, the East German society was completely paralyzed. The state had promised an ever-increasing standard of living that it was simply unable to deliver, while its western counterpart experienced one of its largest economical booms, known as the *Wirtschaftswunder* (economic wonder). This was apparent to almost every East German citizen through television and radio. East German industry grew less competitive overtime, and with the rise of East Asian industrial power, they were losing

their ability to export goods to the west. The combination of West German success and East German failure allowed for an extensive gap to form between the two nations.

Despite the resounding failure of the German Democratic Republic's industry, it was portrayed as a success. To keep of this façade required the constant rise in the standard of living every year, which resulted in the growth of national debt. The continued growth of East German debt was unsustainable; failure was inevitable. As the nations across Central and East Europe began to demand reform in the late 1980s, so did East Germany. Additionally, once Gorbachev came to power and promoted the liberalization of the Soviet Union, it became clear that East Germany no longer had the Soviets to support the regime. This liberalization, combined with the opening of the border between Hungary and Austria, was more than the German Democratic Republic could combat. As East German citizens fled through the newly opened border and stormed West German embassies demanding permission to migration, it became clear the socialist system would not be able to avoid reform.

One of the first of these reforms was the change in border policy: the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border. The first glimpse of the possibility of reunification began with the opening of these borders. While the German Democratic Republic hoped that the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border would help to decrease migration, it, in fact, had the opposite effect. With their newfound freedom, many people chose to migrate westward. Meanwhile, reunification became the desire of the majority of those who chose to stay in East Germany. Despite hesitations among the people, once voted upon, it was clear that a quick transition to the West German system was the desire of the majority of citizens. This decision would have the

largest impact on the people of the East and West German states and would lead to the continuation of consistent internal westward migration.

## ***6.2 Conclusion of Internal Westward Migration***

Migration has dramatically increased since the industrial revolution and can be seen as a relatively modern phenomenon. Migration is greatly impacted by human intervention, and a series of events can influence the migration patterns of people. On the other hand, certain trends have emerged among those who choose to migrate to a new area. They are predominantly young educated women; this is, also, the case among those who have migrated from the 'neue Länder' to the 'alte Länder'. Furthermore, the main drives for an individual to migrate tend to be predominantly based on economic incentives. In other words, to pursue a more lucrative or higher paying career in a new area. This, also, correlates with the situation of internal westward migration in Germany. The people of the 'neue Länder' have experienced certain 'push' factors that have inspired their emigration; or, in contrast, they have felt certain 'pull' factors that increase their desire to migrate to the 'alte Länder'.

These 'push' and 'pull' factors have been analyzed according to political, social, and economic incentives for migration. These categories are not mutually exclusive; and, oftentimes, migrants fall into one or more of these categories. Political migrants can be found around the globe. It is not possible to create a political ideology which encompasses all of the people that live in a given territory. This was the case in the German Democratic Republic; the results were that the East German citizens felt their true political desires were not being represented by the East German Government.

Therefore, many East German citizens felt that migration westward would allow them to live in a political system that better represented their values. While this type of migration became irrelevant after reunification, it did represent a significant group of people prior to reunification. Additionally, it represented the majority of migrants who chose to migrate from the Federal Republic of Germany to the German Democratic Republic throughout its history.

The transition from the German Democratic Republic's strong welfare state to a predominantly privately-funded society was difficult for many people in the 'neue Länder'. Women appear to be the most significantly affected by this transition. There was an enormous loss of social services, which had been there to promote the near-full-employment of women. The women of the 'neue Länder' had been expected to work and raise a family; responsibilities that many took on with enthusiasm. However, the transition from the East German system to the West German system saw huge cutbacks in the governmental provisions to help promote this lifestyle. This can be seen, predominantly, in the childcare sector.

The loss of these social services has resulted in a major demographic upset in the 'neue Länder'. This type of social upheaval is rare; it is, principally, only caused by major crises in a nation, such as during wartime. For it to occur in a nation at peace was entirely unprecedented and has had major negative impacts on that society. The overall decline in marriages and births in the 'neue Länder' represents this dramatic change in demographics. These two areas have seen significant drops from their previous levels and have fallen severely below the levels of the 'alte Länder'. This can be seen as a representation of the strain on the society as a whole. The women of the 'neue Länder'



are more hesitant to marry and have children because of the economic instability in the area.

This drastic change in demographics has resulted in the increased mobility of women from the 'neue Länder'. Women are more prone to domestic migration; however, this level of migration drops significantly once the woman is married or has children. Single individuals and childless individuals are more likely to migrate due to their increased mobility. Therefore, the declining marriage rate and birth rate have increased women's mobility in the 'neue Länder'. Without partners or children, women feel that they are able to relocate to a new area to pursue career and educational goals with relative ease. In other words, the loss of state welfare programs in the childcare sector has led to a demographical upset that has increased women's mobility. Additionally, Germany is a country with a relatively low birth rate, so it is detrimental to their continuity to have such a dramatic drop in births.

Educational background is another factor related to the social incentives for migration. The educated populous, particularly those educated in the west, were generally mistrusted in the German Democratic Republic. As a result, they were not given the opportunity to work in their desired fields and were often treated poorly. This mistreatment and the knowledge that they would be able to use their skills in a more productive manner inspired many people to emigrate. It was clear that they would be offered higher wages in the west and would be able to use their education in their work. This resulted in a 'brain drain' in the east; there were not enough educated and skilled individuals to provide the services that are needed.

Economic 'push' and 'pull' factors can be seen as the leading incentive for internal westward migration in Germany. The loss of the social welfare state, the 1:1 currency union, and the attempted equalization of salaries resulted in the economic downfall of the 'neue Länder'. The condition of East German industry after the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border did not allow for an easy transition to free-market capitalism. In addition, West Germany took on the enormous debt East Germany had accumulated.

The 1:1 exchange rate that was used with currency and economic union had many critics; however, it was thought to be a way to prevent continued internal westward migration. In addition to offering this exchange rate, pensions and salaries were given the 1:1 exchange rate. It was thought that people would not feel the necessity to migrate once they were given equal value for their money. This was not the case; the exchange rate did little to slow internal westward migration in Germany. In fact, the main impact that this exchange rate had was to take away the main competitiveness of the East German industry. The payment of peoples' salaries in Deutschmarks instantly increased the amount they were earning, the same for pensions. Therefore, their employers were expected to be able to pay their employees the larger sum, which was not possible for the East German industry at that time. Employers were forced to raise their prices of goods or to lay off workers to make up the difference. Few people wanted to buy the low cost East German goods, now that their cost was being raised they were complete uncompetitive on the market.

An additional problem with the 1:1 currency exchange was the creation of 'regional inflation'. The people of the 'neue Länder' were faced with an overnight rise in

the cost of goods. Before, they had access to highly subsidized goods under the socialist system; conversely, following the economic and currency union the prices of most goods were equalized with the prices of goods in the 'alte Länder'. The government had planned to counter this with the convergence of east and west salaries. The fact is that, the salaries in the 'neue Länder' never grew to be equivalent to those of the 'alte Länder'. Even today an individual earns significantly less in the 'neue Länder' than in the 'alte Länder'. This has resulted in significant wealth inequality between the eastern German states and the western German states. The prospect for a higher wage for the same labor can be seen as a 'pull' factor for internal westward migration. The failure to equalize salaries created 'regional inflation' and led to an increase in emigration from the 'neue Länder' to the 'alte Länder' in hopes of procuring higher waged work.

After the fall of European socialism there was an expansive amount of state owned property that needed to be privatized. There were significant differences between the handling of this enormous task among the different nations. In East Germany this process was taken over by the Treuhandanstalt, which was responsible for making the decisions regarding a firm's profitability. Those that were deemed unable to make a profit were shut down, while those that were able to make a profit were privatized. When considering the state of the majority of East German industry at the time of reunification and privatization there were mass amounts of firm closures. These firm closures resulted in immense amounts of layoffs throughout the 'neue Länder'. While the government attempted to counter the rise in unemployment through make-work programs, early retirement schemes, and by providing funds to avoid bankruptcy, it was not enough to prevent it. As a result, many of those who were unemployed or feared the high risk of

unemployment decided to emigrate from the 'neue Länder'. While unemployment has seen a slight decrease over the years, it still stands higher than most industrialized nations and the 'alte Länder'. Until the problem of high unemployment in the 'neue Länder' is solved, it is expected to contribute to the incentives for internal westward migration in Germany.

### ***6.3 Consequences of Internal Westward Migration***

Internal westward migration in the German state has had a variety of consequences; these include, but are not limited to, the creation of 'ghost towns', low birthrate, loss of specialists, and the rise in extremist parties. As firm closures have spread across the 'neue Länder', there has been an increase in 'ghost towns'. This means that there are a variety of places that have been abandoned by their populations. Oftentimes, once the large industries have been closed in an area, a significant portion of the population finds itself unemployed. As a result of this unemployment, people tend to move away from the area in high numbers to find work elsewhere. This has occurred across the 'neue Länder', particularly, in cities for which the economies were based on one or two large industrial firms which were closed due to the privatization process.

Dangerously low birthrates in industrialized nations have led to growing concerns among demographers. Germany is a country with a notoriously low birthrate in all areas; once combined with the economic insecurity felt by the people in the 'neue Länder', it has fallen even more severely in this area. This has resulted in a birthrate in the 'neue Länder' that is about half of that of the 'alte Länder'. A low birthrate can be problematic for the future of a nation. When a nation is no longer able to replenish its population naturally, this can lead to an unstable future. This is true particularly in regards to social

security: without a sufficiently sized younger generation to pay taxes, there is no way to support the elderly. It is vital that the birthrate in Germany increases, primarily in the 'neue Länder', to ensure continuity.

Another problem associated with internal westward migration is the loss of specialists throughout many industries. This is primarily due to the 'brain drain' that has affected the 'neue Länder'. Since the creation of the German Democratic Republic, an overwhelming amount of its educated citizens have opted for migration. This did not end with reunification and people with higher education still make up a significant portion of those who choose to emigrate. The result of this has been a loss of individuals who have specialized knowledge; for example, doctors, lawyers, dentists, etc. This has created a shortage of people who are trained in these professions throughout the 'neue Länder'. The lack of trained specialists could negatively impact the health and well-being of the citizens of the 'neue Länder'.

Lastly, the rise of extremist parties in the 'neue Länder' can be seen as a direct result of the reunification process. Many young people who find themselves chronically unemployed may turn to radical ideologies; this is done with the desire of securing a more stable future. Those who have chosen to forego westward migration have faced a series of challenges, the most significant being a loss of financial and economic security. The rise in popularity of extremist parties has, also, seen the increase in discriminatory behavior. This rise in xenophobia in the 'neue Länder' is overwhelming. The German Democratic Republic did not have a high immigrant population. With the opening of the Berlin Wall and the inner-German border, the number of immigrants in the 'neue Länder' has significantly risen. As the competition for different professions between immigrant

populations and people of the 'neue Länder' continues, tension is mounting between the two groups. Many people within the united German state are concerned with the radicalism of fringe groups in the 'neue Länder'. These groups have caused instability in the past and can be expected to continue to do so into the future.

Overall, these consequences of internal westward migration have the potential to have a negative effect on the future of the united German state. It is vital to enact policy that will solve the problems associated with the political, social, and economic makeup of the 'neue Länder'. As Germany continues to grow in significance in Europe and the rest of the world, it will be important to maintain a stable government. With the rise of extremist parties and the ever-present dissatisfaction of people in the 'neue Länder', this will become more difficult. German policy, as a central figure in the European Union, is to pursue European integration, but without stability in its own territory this could be difficult in the future.

## **Resumé:**

Politické, sociální a ekonomické faktory všechny přispěli k neustálému přísunu emigrantů z východní části do západní části Německa. Proces znovusjednocování vedl ke ztrátám v programech pro sociální dávky, zejména v oblasti péče o děti. Zastaralá a neefektivní produkce vedla k masovému propouštění a krachu firem. To mělo za následek prudký nárůst nezaměstnanosti v celé škále průmyslu. Vzrůst nezaměstnanosti ve východní části, spolu s drtivým národním dluhem, mělo vážný dopad na bezpečí populace. Dále, znatelný rozdíl v platech vedla k nespokojenosti mnohých východních pracujících. Nárůst nejistoty v hustě obydleném východním Německu vedla k nárůstu vntřní západní migrace. Vládní pokusy o zpomalení tohoto jevu byli velmi neúspěšné. Následkem tohoto typu migrace byli málo obydlená města, nízká porodnost, ztráta specializovaného průmyslu a vzestup extrémistických stran.

## **Summary:**

Political, social, and economic factors have all contributed to the constant flow of migrants from the 'neue Länder' to the 'alte Länder' in Germany. The reunification process led to the loss of social welfare programs, predominantly in the childcare sector. The outdated and inefficient means of production led to mass firm closures and layoffs. This resulted in a steep rise in unemployment across a variety of industries. The rise in unemployment in the 'neue Länder', combined with an overwhelming national debt, had severe consequences for the security of its population. Additionally, the sizeable wage differential has led to the dissatisfaction of many workers in the 'neue Länder'. The increase in insecurity among the populous has led to the increase in internal westward

migration. Governmental efforts to slow this phenomenon have been widely unsuccessful. Consequences of this type of migration have been the creation of 'ghost towns', low birthrate, loss of specialists, and the rise of extremist parties. Unless something is done to curb the problem of internal westward migration, it could have the potentially cause instability within the German state.



## Bibliography:

- Adler, Marina. "Social Change and Declines in Marriage and Fertility in Eastern Germany." *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Volume 59, Number 1, February 1997, pages 37-49. JSTOR (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/353660.pdf>.
- Alsop, Rachel. *A Reversal of Fortunes? Women, Work and Change in West Germany*. New York: Berghahn, 2000.
- Bundes Archiv. *Sicherheitsmaßnahmen der DDR vom 13.8.1961*. Web (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.bundesarchiv.de>.
- Burda, Michael C. and Hunt, Jennifer. "From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Germany". *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, Volume 2001, Number 2, 2001, pages 1-71. JSTOR (accessed April 15, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1209133.pdf>.
- Bütow, B. "Frauenerwerbsarbeit in den neuen Bundesländern und Anforderungen an Frauenpolitik – am Beispiel von empirischen Ergebnissen einer soziologischen Studie aus Sachsen". *Sozialwissenschaften und Berufspraxis*, 1992, 376-393.
- Cecil, Robert. "Potsdam and Its Legends". *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*, Volume 46, Number 3, July 1970, pages 455-465. JSTOR (accessed May 1, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2613222.pdf>.
- Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Germany*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gm.html>.

- Central Intelligence Agency: The World Factbook. *Russia*. Web (accessed March 27, 2012), <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>.
- Decressin, Jörg. "Internal Migration in West Germany and Implication from East-West Salary Convergence." *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Bd. 130, H. 2, 1994, pages 231-257. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40440283.pdf>.
- Dorigo, Guido and Tobler, Waldo. "Push-Pull Migration Laws." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Volume 73, Number 1 (March 1983), pages 1-17. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2569342.pdf>.
- Eberstadt, Nicholas. "Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany, 1989-1993." *Population and Development Review*, Volume 20, Number 1, March 1994, pages 137-152. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2137633.pdf>.
- Einhorn, Barbara. *Cinderella Goes to Market*. London: Verso, 1993.
- Europa: Gateway to the European Union. *Germany*. Web (accessed January 27, 2012) [http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/germany/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/germany/index_en.htm).
- Europa: European Union. *Basic Information on the European Union*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012) [http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/index_en.htm).
- Flint, Colin. *Introduction to Geopolitics*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Garton-Ash, Timothy. *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity*. New York: Random House, 1985.

- Havel, Václav. *Open Letters: Selected Writings 1965-1990*. New York: Vintage Books, 1991.
- Heywood, Andrew. *Political Ideologies*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
- Hunt, Jennifer. "Staunching Emigration from West Germany: Age and the Determinants of Migration." *Journal of the European Economic Association*, Volume 4, Number 5, September 2006, pages 1014-1037. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40004963.pdf>.
- Index Mundi: Germany – Economy. *Germany Unemployment Rate*. Web (accessed May 2, 2012), [http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/unemployment\\_rate.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/germany/unemployment_rate.html).
- Institut für Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (IAB). *Materialien*. (6), 1991, 1-11
- Jones, Phillip and Wild, Trevor. "Spatial Impacts of German Unification." *The Geographical Journal*, Volume 160, Number 1, March 1994, pages 1-16. *JSTOR* (accessed October 24, 2011), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3060137.pdf>.
- Judge, Edward and Langdon, John. *A Hard and Bitter Peace: A Global History of the Cold War*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1996.
- Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. New York: Penguin Press, 2005.
- Kind, G. "Perspektiven der räumlichen Entwicklung in den neuen Bundesländern". *Inf z. Raumentwickl.* 11/12: 687-701.
- Kitchen, Martin. *A History of Modern Germany 1800-2000*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2006.

- Kotkin, Stephan. *Uncivil Society: 1989 and the Implosion of the Communist Establishment*. New York: Random House, 2009.
- Large, David Clay. *Berlin: A Modern History*. New York: Basic Books, 2001.
- Lee, Everett S. "A Theory of Migration". *Demography*, Volume 3, Number 1 (1966), pages 47-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2060063.pdf>.
- Maier, Charles S. *Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of West Germany*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997.
- Miller, Sheila. "Family Life Cycle, Extended Family Orientations, and Economic Aspirations as Factors in the Propensity to Migrate." *The Sociological Quarterly*, Volume 17, Number 3, Summer 1976, pages 323-335. *JSTOR* (accessed February 24, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/4105954.pdf>.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization: History. *A Short History of NATO*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <http://www.nato.int/history/index.html>.
- Pond, Elizabeth. "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR". *International Security*, Volume 15, Number 2 (Autumn, 1990), pages 35-66. *JSTOR* (accessed April 12, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2538865.pdf>.
- Radio Free Europe/Liberty Radio. History. *Then and Now: Free Media in Unfree Societies*. Web (accessed March 17, 2012), <http://www.rferl.org/section/history/133.html>.

- Ravenstein, E. G. "The Laws of Migration". *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Volume 52, Number 2 (June 1889), pages 241-305. *JSTOR* (accessed April 2, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2979333.pdf>.
- Rolleston, James. "After Zero Hour: The Visual Texts of Post-War Germany". *South Atlantic Review*, Volume 64, Number 2, Spring 1999, pages 1-19. *JSTOR* (accessed May 1, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3201979.pdf>.
- Scott, Hilda. *Women and Socialism: Experiences from Eastern Europe*. London: Allison & Busby, 1976.
- Siegmund, Uwe. *Dokumentation 1990-1994 by Treuhandanstalt: Review*. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Bd. 131, H. 3 (1995), pages 614-617. *JSTOR*
- Spohr, Kristina. "German Unification: Between Official History, Academic Scholarship, and Political Memoirs". *The Historical Journal*, Volume 43, Number 3, September 2000, pages 869-888. *JSTOR* (accessed April 10, 2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3020982.pdf>.
- Taylor, Fredrick. *The Berlin Wall: A World Divided, 1961-1989*. Great Britain: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2006.
- Trappe, Heike. "Work and Family in Women's Lives in the German Democratic Republic". *Work and Occupations*, Volume 23, Number 4, November 1996, pages 354-377.
- Verdery, Katherine. *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1996.

Weidenfeld, Werner. "Außenpolitik für die deutsche Einheit: Die Entscheidungsjahre 1989/90." *Geschichte der deutschen Einheit*, Band 4, Stuttgart, 1998.

Winkler, Gunnar. *Frauenreport 90*. Berlin: Verlag Die Wirtschaft, 1990.