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Three Scrambles for Africa

by

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I hereby declare that I have written this thesis independently and that I used only the sources listed.

Prohlašuji, že jsem diplomovou práci vypracoval samostatně a použil jsem pouze uvedené prameny a literaturu.

Prague, 1 December 2010

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Abstract

This thesis examines three pertinent periods regarding Africa's relationship with specific countries and power blocks outside the continent from the period leading up to the colonisation of Africa followed by what is termed the Second Scramble which, analyses the process of competition and geopolitical tension between the two superpowers during the Cold War period, pertaining to expanding their influence amongst African countries and the extent to which the process excited geopolitical competition. The Third Scramble encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War to the present. Reviewing the process of Africa's relationship throughout these specific periods remains unfamiliar to the majority of academics not only in the Czech Republic but also internationally and presents a new field of research. Although Africa continues to be well researched within certain fields of social sciences, it is within the field of political geography and by extension, geopolitics that there remains a deficiency regarding comprehensive study and critical analysis of the subject in general. Compounded to this is the fact that the vast majority of research is by academics who themselves are not from Africa. Hence, a situation prevails, whereby the subject itself is viewed from the periphery as opposed to from within. This thesis, in part seeks to address these challenges.

Abstrakt

Tato teze zkoumá tři navzájem související období, týkající se vztahů Afriky se specifickými zeměmi a mocenskými bloky mimo africký kontinent od doby vedoucí ke kolonizaci Afriky, dále pak období, označeném jako druhý mocenský boj, kde analyzují proces soutěžení a geopolitického napětí mezi dvěma světovými supervelmocemi během Studené války a související s rozšiřováním vlivu mezi samotnými africkými státy, a rozsah, jehož proces vyvolal geopolitickou soutěživost. Třetí kapitola mocenských pŕetek zahrnuje období od konce Studené války po přítomnost. Hodnocením procesu vztahů Afriky v průběhu těchto tří specifických období vidím nedostatek patřičných informací mezi většinou akademiků nejenom v České republice, ale rovněž i na mezinárodním poli, což představuje nové pole pro hlubší výzkum. Přestože Afrika je dobře prozkoumána z hlediska společenských věd, chybí souhrnné studie a kritické analýzy v oblasti geopolitiky a politické geografie. Přispívá k tomu i skutečnost, že velká většina výzkumu je prací akademiků, kteří sami z Afriky nepocházejí. Tudíž přetrvává situace, kdy se na celou problematiku nahlíží periferně, a nikoliv zevnitř. Tato teze se proto pokouší vybědnout a hledat řešení těchto témat.

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I wish to dedicate this thesis to my wife Izabela, my son Michael and daughter Isabelle who found the patience, understanding and sympathy during the long periods that it took me to complete this thesis.

List of Abbreviations

AFRICOM	United States Africa Command
AU	African Union
CACF	China African Cooperative Forum
BBL	British Broadcasting Corporation
BSAC	British South African Company
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
FNLA	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (The Liberation Front of Mozambique)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Front)
FAPLA	Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (People's Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola)
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (The Mozambican National Resistance)
CFA	Communauté Française d'Afrique (French Community of Africa)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
LRP	Lord Resistance Army
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
PRC	People's Republic of Congo
IAA	International African Association
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola – Labour Party)
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation

SPLM	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
US	United States
US\$	United States Dollar
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peace Keeping Operations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UAR	United Arab Republic
UNITA	Unitão Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
ECONOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
AFDC	Alliance of Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RECAMP	Reinforcement des Capacites Africaines au Mainteien de la Paix (Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping)
NGO	Non Government Organisation
EU	European Union
NEPAD	New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
HIV / AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome/Human Immunodeficiency Virus
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
GWOT	Global war on terror
AFRICOM	(page 180)
SAPA	South African Press Association
SADC	Southern African Development Community
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
NIC	National Intelligence Council

FPSO	Floating Production and Offloading Vessel
PSA	Production Sharing Agreement
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
CACF	China African Cooperation Forum
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programmes
CDB	China Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference for Trade and Development
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
SOE	State Operated Enterprises
EIA	Energy Information Administration
CNOOC	China National Offshore Oil Corporation
NOC	National Oil Companies
ADRDF	African Human Resources Development Fund
UNMO	United Nations Military Observers
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference of African Development
SAB	South African Breweries
NSGT	Non-Self Governing Territories

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INTRODUCTION

My PhD thesis reviews three pertinent periods pertaining to Africa's relationship with specific countries and power blocks outside the continent from the period leading up to the colonisation of Africa (formalised at the Conference of Berlin in 1884), followed by what I have termed the Second Scramble which, analyses the process of competition and geopolitical tension between the two superpowers during the Cold War period, regarding expanding their influence on the African continent and amongst African countries and the extent to which the process excited geopolitical competition. The Third Scramble encompasses the period from the end of the Cold War to the present.

Whilst Africa continues to be well researched within the fields of social sciences particularly political science, international relations and sociology it is within the field of geopolitics that there remains a deficiency regarding comprehensive study and critical analysis of the subject in general. Compounded to this is the fact that the vast majority of research done on the subject has been undertaken by academics who themselves are not from Africa. Being an African but residing presently in Europe has allowed me to be placed in the unique position to be able to provide a multi — dimensional perspective to the subject. Further to this is the fact that within the parameters of study that I placed my thesis in, namely developments within the various scrambles for Africa, there is a lack of pertinent information or research undertaken not only in the Czech Republic but internationally. I believe that the research completed by me will provide further capacity to those studying Africa as to the various present as well as future challenges the continent faces from a geopolitical perspective. Furthermore, my thesis allows the reader to place in perspective Africa's relevance within the international arena and could well allow African's to better locate their continents importance globally.

It is very much due to the lack of relevant information within academia owing to the subject of Africa from a geopolitical perspective being under — researched that I was compelled to utilise a descriptive approach as a basis (in some sections of my thesis) when expounding relevant political, social, cultural, economical, historical, military and geopolitical issues. The descriptive approach or as Butler terms it the "*contemporary history*" approach (Butler,D,E. 1958:48), investigates specific events, eras, institutions and people producing "*studies which systematically describe and analyse phenomena that have occurred in the past and which explain contemporary political phenomena with reference to past events*" (Kavanagh, D.

1991:482). As emphasised by de Vaus, the descriptive approach “*deals with the question of what things are like not why they are that way*” (de Vaus, D. 2002: 18 — 19). To allow me to gather, process data and evaluate the results, (thus moving from my original theory to an enlarged theory) my actions advance to an extensive descriptive approach which also allowed me to follow a linear process. It should be stressed that I placed the process dealing with the three scrambles in chronological order thus allowing for a more structured flow and comprehensible method to my research.

I have concentrated on using an empirical approach, which in turn was extremely demanding, both in time and examination regarding the assimilation of relevant research material. I found that by using the empirical method of research that I was able to combine methodical research with thorough case studies and was able to couple the relevance of theory to actual “real world” developments, particularly within the African context. A factor that holds relevance for myself, is the fact that I was able to integrate professional knowledge and experience with the empirical data that I accessed to inform instructional developmental decisions.

To reach objective and greater impartial conclusions within the challenging study of the various Scrambles for Africa I also adopted a historical — analytical approach. Thus historical data and surveys of media content was also researched and then utilised throughout this thesis. The approach itself views history as undergoing a process of continuous (dialectical) change, rather than repeating itself in a circular fashion. With regard to theory, it highlights critical modes of explanation to obtain clarification and understanding of phenomena. Furthermore, it centralises its modes of explanation in the history of all the spheres of human practice.

By following a historical — analytical approach, I was able to maintain a clear and objective stance when seeking objective conclusions, which was extremely challenging when describing issues within the various “scrambles”, which at the same time is inevitably correlated to various phenomenon’s such as colonialism, imperialism, decolonisation, slavery, racism, conflict, apartheid, tribalism, human rights issues, general exploitation, to name but a few of the challenges faced and being experienced by Africa. I have also attempted to extend beyond the historical — analytical approach to that of comparative history and discuss the viewpoints of a range of academics to the various geopolitical developments in Africa from when the initial scramble for the continent commence to the present day.

There are three major functions of comparative history; Firstly and most obvious, “*comparison can create an awareness of alternatives, showing developments to be significant that without a comparative perspective might not appear so.*” Secondly, “*scholars seek to explain historical differences or peculiarities, weighing and eventually isolating variables responsible for particular conditions.*” Lastly, “*historians seek to recognize common patterns and make historical generalizations; indeed, it is only through comparison that such generalizations can be made*” (Kolchin, P. 1982:64 — 65).

Through comparison, one can see the same type forces or processes operating in different national contexts. By looking at similar phenomena in different settings a hypothesis can be rigorously tested. Sewell expanded this factor in an article written in 1967 when he stated that “*If an historian attributes the appearance of phenomenon A in one society to the existence of condition B, he can check this hypothesis by trying to find other societies where A occurs without B or vice versa*” (Sewell, W. H. Jr. 1967:208).

In an article written by Richard W Slatta, he stated that “*the rules of specific variables (culture, economic and transnational) can be clarified.*” Some of the questions that comparatives have difficulty evading are the extent to which people in comparable circumstances are impelled by ‘idealist’ or ‘materialist’ motives; the appropriateness of such concepts as class, caste, race, ethnic group and status group to describe particular forms of social stratification and the cross — cultural meaning of such terms as equality, democracy, fascism, racism and capitalism. “*One of the great values of comparative history is that it forces such issues to the forefront of consciousness and demands that they be resolved in some fashion that is neither parochial nor cultural — bound*” (Slatta, R.W. 2003:1 — 9).

Slatta wrote about world systems analysis and the work undertaken by Christopher Chase — Dunn and Tom Hall who have moved beyond the initial formulation in 1974 by Immanuel Wallerstein of “*The Modern World System.*” Slatta goes on to stress that both provide excellent models for broad and illuminating analysis (Wallerstein, I. 1974:8).

Comparisons can be “*useful in enlarging our theoretical understanding of the kinds of institutions of processes being compared, thereby making a contribution to the development of social — scientific theories and generalizations*” (Fredrickson, GM, 1995:458). Slatta states that most topics lend themselves to international comparisons including revolutions, economic development, slavery, colonialism/imperialism and warfare (Slatta, R.W.2003:4).

In his book, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century, 1974*, Wallerstein provides a theoretical framework to better understand historical changes that took place during the rise of the modern world, which is capitalist in nature. This is opposed to the previous feudal system and in essence, attempts to explain Western Europe's ascension to global supremacy between 1450 and 1670. Wallerstein makes various analytical comparisons between diverse parts of the world during this period. Wallerstein's "*approaches*" is one of *praxis* in which theory and practice are closely interrelated and the objective of the intellectual's activity is to create knowledge that uncovers hidden structure and allows oneself to act upon the world and change it (Martinez — Vela, C.A. 2001:1). In this regard, "*man's ability to participate intelligently in the evolution of his own system is dependent on his ability to perceive the whole*" (Wallerstein, I. 1974:10).

Wallerstein uses dependency theory to attempt to understand and explain the "*periphery*" by researching core — periphery relations and it has progressed markedly in regions such as Africa. Wallerstein stated that "*a world system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimization and coherence. Its life is made up of conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life — span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others*" (Wallerstein, I. 1974:347).

It is inside the centre — periphery model that I have attempted to explain the various processes within the framework of mercantilism and later capitalism and have examined the aspirations of the so — called "*developed core*" as opposed to those within the "*less developed periphery*." It is from the Marxist tradition, which views that in central capitalist countries there is a high organic composition of capital contested by the peripheral countries where there is a low organic composition of capital and in turn wages are low. This also comes about due to the fact that in the peripheral areas/countries the reproduction of labour is often reliant on some degree of non — capitalist production. In effect I have utilised the centre — periphery model to describe the structural relationship between the advanced or so — called metropolitan "*centre*" and the less advanced "*periphery*" as with specific regard to the relationship between developing societies and capitalism. This process is commonly used within political geography.

The centre — periphery model strongly suggests that the economy of the world operates within a structural relationship between economic centres which, by using their political, military and trade power obtain economic surplus from the subordinate peripheral countries. This process has been seen within the period marked as the First Scramble for Africa with reference to the relationship between the colonial powers and their new colonies. During the Second Scramble this process was witnessed on a more ideological, political and military level while during the third scramble, the majority of factors came to the fore with emphasis being placed on trade power. Hall and Chase — Dunn do not necessarily regard the centre — periphery approach as a theory as such but rather a “*heuristic descriptive device*” that implies that changes in the socio — economic structure of society are interlinked to changes in the spatial structure and a “mix of ideas” taken from geographical central (place theory), classical political economy, Marxism and regional development theories (Hall, T. & Chase — Dunn. 1997: 77).

The comparative method is essential when examining the various geopolitical theories and I have utilised this approach when reviewing the different European colonial powers hegemonic stance towards their colonies and the varied and diverse methods of authority that was essentially, a not too subtle policy of “divide and rule” that the British, French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish powers used, with one ultimate objective in mind that of control. The method expands into the second period that I have termed the Second Scramble where the colonial powers relinquish their authority over their colonies although not always voluntarily, allowing for the process of decolonisation to manifest. Comparisons are made between the West as opposed to the East’s regarding their involvement in the continent during the Cold War. In the final section of my thesis entitled the Third Scramble for Africa I have sought comparisons between the relationship between the former colonial powers with their former colonies and how much this correlation had changed and how this relationship has remained in place as opposed to when the European powers maintained power. Comparisons are analysed regarding the association that China has developed with the majority of African countries as opposed to how the United States has managed its influence on the continent. Assessment is made between the Soft Power approach made between these two nations and how the use of this advance is managed. Comparisons between African nations that have been at the receiving end of these approaches were made as were the possible future implications to this policy approach.

Comparative research was used by me as a strategy orientated towards identifying and unravelling the complex patterns of differences and similarities within the Three Scrambles period and amongst the respective African countries. The approach remained the most successful manner to investigate the various diversities as well as interpreting historical and cultural significance and advancing theory. Within the comparative system I used the method of agreement strategy of research, which allowed me to study similar cases (the Three Scrambles for Africa and African countries varied response's over a given period of time). In effect, this process allowed me to compare cases that are as similar as possible, in the belief that the more similar the cases being compared, the more possible it is to isolate the factors responsible for the differences between them. This method is possibly the most candid of John Stuart Mill's orderliness. Placed into perspective by Charles Ragin, "*the method of agreement argues that if two or more instances of a phenomenon under investigation have one of several possible casual circumstances in common, then the circumstance in which all the instances agree is the cause of the phenomenon of interest*" (Ragin,C.C.1989:35).

The method of agreement proceeds by elimination. Ragin notes that "*the method of agreement is a search for patterns of invariance*". All instances of a phenomenon are identified and the investigator attempts to determine, which of the possible casual variables is constant across all instances. Therefore, a constant (in my thesis, an example of this would be the situation surrounding the exploitation of natural resources throughout the continent during the Three Scrambles period) is explained with another constant (the presence of external powers within various countries in Africa, which are exploiting these resources) if all cases agree on only this cause.

I have followed the comparative method and attempted to present "*empirical evidence of some kind in an attempt to compare systematically and explicitly political phenomena*" (Rose, R. 1991:439) when discussing various challenges faced by Africa notably from colonial powers during the colonial period as well as following the process of decolonization and after the Cold War. The comparative method allows me to avoid ethnocentrism analysis and at the same time allowed me to as David Collier notes, to sharpen my ability of description (Collier, D. 1993: 105). I have also undertaken a systematic comparison of a limited number of cases within my comparative study in the realization that it provides less detail than the other two types of comparative analysis (namely case studies of individual African countries and global

comparisons based on statistical analysis) but at the same time allows me to obtain more generalised conclusions.

As mentioned above, I have used a “*most similar*” approach (pertaining to the comparative method) in my thesis and this allows me to make “*a comparison between relatively similar countries,*” which “sets out to neutralize certain differences in order to permit a better analysis of others (Dogan, M & Pelasy, D.1990:133). The fact that the vast majority of African countries were colonized during a narrow period of time in the mid to late 1880s and were brought under the authority of a limited number of European powers, thus utilizing a limited amount of languages made the most similar method almost obligatory. Furthermore, the mass of African countries obtained their independence during the late 1950 and throughout the 1960s and either gravitated to the West or East Blocks, thus allowed me to place the various African countries into easily definable components.

Bias remains one of the major problems of comparative research (Hague, R. *et al.*1992:29 — 30) and this, according to Marsh and Stocker refers to the values of the researcher, which in turn affects the results of the analysis (Marsh, D. & Stoker, G.1995:181). However this also remains a challenge in other areas of social sciences and must be acknowledged as such.

I have provided a diachronic perspective to my thesis that analyses how the geopolitical relevance of Africa has developed over time. The fact that Africa was seen as important regarding strategic position as far as a potential source of natural resource and its inhabitants as possible producers as well as consumers of various products from Europe gradually diminished when it was seen that the colonies held little significance beyond strategic location and raw materials. This changed little during the First and Second World Wars. The decolonization process saw Europe “letting go” of its responsibilities, coupled with a mixture of responses from both the colonizer and colonized. The domination (within all paradigms of African society) by the European colonizers allows the observer to better understand why the newly independent African states were in the situation they were in at the time. The diachronic approach allows me to review the Cold War period in Africa and to postulate why this period brought about conflict and in many instances, devastation to the continent. My thesis follows the end of the Cold War and the marginalisation of Africa and the sudden and rapid growth of interest in Africa by the United States and China for very much the same reasons undertaken by the original European colonial powers, the need for natural resources

(today in the form of oil and strategic minerals), followed in a distant second position for the need for strategic positioning.

A factor that has not been ignored by myself is the actuality that the diachronic approach (considering a phenomenon as a stage in an evolutionary process) to the evolution of Africa from a geopolitical perspective corresponds in many ways to the thinking of the classical geopolitical theorist such as Ratzel, Kjellen, Mackinder, Mahan, Haushofer and Roosevelt (who all feature prominently in this thesis) with specific regard to their stance pertaining to Social Darwinism and the fact that many of them regarded the state as a organic entity constantly undergoing evolutionary change.

The study of geography (notably political geography) and geopolitics as well as the strong link between the two was emphasized in my thesis. Many geographers see geopolitics as a subfield of geography as noted by the British political geographer Ron Johnson who states that “*geopolitics is not one of the largest of geography’s subfields*” (Johnson, R.J. 1996:279 – 280). Peter J Taylor goes further to characterize geopolitics as the “*periphery of a periphery of a periphery*” (Taylor,P.J. 2000: 379), which according to Mamadouh means that geopolitics (according to Taylor) is the periphery of political geography which is a periphery of geography which in turn is the periphery of social science (Mamadouh,V and Dijkink,G. 2006:352). Mamadouh (as I) does not agree entirely with Taylor’s stance and he sees geopolitics and political geography as almost synonymous, while geopolitics has a political connotation and political geography has scientific connotations. The fact remains that geopolitics is more political than many other subfields of geography. Mamadouh sees Anglo – Saxon political geographers such as Taylor and John O’Loughlin identifying two types of geopolitical theories. Firstly, there is “*practical geopolitics,*” practised by those who perform the foreign policy of states and then “*formal geopolitics*” of “*academics and other observers who reflect upon international politics, in practical geopolitics there is an urge for frames of thinking to guide short term behaviour*” (Mamadouh, V. 1999: 242).

Within the practical study of political geography, Prescott states that the “*richest store of primary sources is the various archives of national governments.*” Further to this he stresses that political geographers with a specific regional interest should establish contact with “*the diplomatic representatives of the countries making up the region; such sources provide much factual material about government material about government policies, administrative*

changes and economic developments which cannot always be easily obtained elsewhere.”

Further on his observation on the collection of (research) material he notes that the two main secondary sources are newspapers and books (Prescott, J.R.V. 1972: 32 — 33). Prescott’s guidance was closely followed regarding the collection of relevant material for this thesis.

Geopolitics has expanded beyond the confines of the classification of being a mere subfield of geography and has certainly developed and gained a great deal of credibility as opposed to when it was classified as “German geopolitics” from the early 1940s when it was regarded as presenting a “*distorted view of the historical, political and geographical relations of the world and its parts*” as written by Isaiah Bowman in his 1942 article entitled “*Geography versus Geopolitics.*”

STRUCTURE OF THESIS

Within the first section challenges surrounding imperialism is reviewed and how the Berlin Conference was used as a mercantilist tool to acquire African colonies by various European powers. The approach by Frederick Ratzel, the father of political geography as complemented by Carl Ritter, is discussed and the very fact that from their perception of the state being an organic entity, places the need at the time to “consume” further territory — into perspective. During that period, the writing of Charles Darwin centralizing on natural selection and places greater understanding on the academic and social thinking of the period. Kjellen’s position that the state/organism was equipped with intellectual and moral capacities is also analysed, bearing in mind the final goal was the attainment of power. This section goes on to review Mahan’s geostrategic approach which centralized on naval strategy and sea power concentrating on naval expansion and hegemony, which in turn complemented the driving ambitions of various European powers pertaining to the “*projection of power*” through navies and impacted on their thrust into Africa.

The writings of Mackinder (the most relevant academic in the field of geostrategy and later geopolitics) are discussed. Mackinder who was a noted imperialist strongly believed in Britain colonial expansion notably in Africa and the fact that he travelled to Africa to make his “mark” as a practical geographer further emphasizes this fact. The five great states identified in his seminar paper entitled *The Geographical Pivot of History* as well as his first book

Britain and the British Seas, notes the role that Britain, France, Germany, Russia and America would play internationally and by implication in Africa. This section also examines the relevance of the “*Insular Crescent*” and Africa’s position within Mackinder’s theory is discussed. His stance on imperialism, specifically regarding the ultimate importance of the British Empire and the fact that imperialism was seen as a “*rationally directed force of nature*” and that the British Empire “*hold its place according the universal law of survival through efficiency and effort*” so as to ascent beyond the inner cycle of rise and decline of empires is analyzed. Mackinder’s strong nationalistic and racist stance — that British people throughout the colonies should “*implement unity and that “Dark man — power”* in colonies should be utilized with specific emphasis on the struggle to come, is discussed.

Developments surrounding colonial rivalry, which contributed to the cause of the First World War, are reviewed, although actions in general, throughout Africa during the War were considered a “side show” compared to events in Europe. The war did place the dynamics of power in perspective for African soldiers who saw that their colonial “masters” were fallible. Another scramble for colonies followed the conflict when the allies divided up the “spoils of war” as reflected by the process of carving up Imperial Germany’s colonies during the Treaty of Versailles, which is discussed in more detail in this section. Attempts by the colonial powers to solidify and justify their authority and power are reviewed as is the different methods used to administrate and control their colonial subjects. This section looks at how the British attempted to exercise control through a process described by Mills as “*a hodgepodge of different relationship and systems.*” French colonial rule fared little better with varied systems that vacillated between “*assimilation*” and “*association.*” Other European powers colonial rule tilted between a myriad of poles such as direct rule by Belgium as exercised in the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, and Italian and Portuguese rule that slanted between tyranny and disassociation respectively.

The first section also discusses various geopolitical approaches between the two wars and seeks specific relevance for Africa. Karl Haushofer’s ability of precognition is mentioned as are his stance on *Geopolitik* and his theories on *Autarky*, Pan — regions, strategic control of key geographic territories and *Lebensraum*. It is noted that Haushofer concentrated on the extension of Germany’s *Lebensraum* in Central and Eastern Europe. However, by extension of his theory there is little doubt that had Germany been more pragmatic as well as successful following the Second World War that Africa would have fallen into his expansionist theories.

The section goes on to look at the writings of Nicholas Spykman who wrote about “*power relations*” and the impact of geography but at the same time was critical of the German’s school approach to *Geopotitik*. Spykman’s stance on regional and world location is discussed as well as his somewhat cynical stance that “*the geographic area of the state is the territorial base from which it operates in time of war and the strategic position, which it escapes during the temporary armistice called peace*” (Spykman, N.J. 1938: 29). Further examination of Spykman’s theories note the fact that the majority of powerful states were large geographically although there were some smaller ones like Great Britain who had been able to maintain larger empires, which included the various countries it had colonized on the African continent.

This section goes on to look at the process of decolonization, the trigger mechanism of which was the Second World War. Attempts made by the various European colonial powers to further reform their policies of hegemony after the War was done in the belief that reform process’s would in some way allow them to retain their colonies, is discussed. One has to take a step backward when reviewing the decolonization process in Africa and review the process whereby Britain granted “limited independence” to Egypt in 1922. However, it was only in 1952 when a *Coup d’état* led by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Nasser, which overthrew King Faruk that the country achieved real “transparent” independence. In many instances the breaking of ties with their “quasi colonial” master(s) further increased African countries desire for rapid and complete independence. The fact that the colonial power of France and Great Britain (supported by Israel) had been humiliated politically after their successful invasion of Egypt in 1956 by the United Nations and United States further allowed their influence to diminish amongst their colonial subjects. Compounded to the rising demand for African independence was the fact that the majority of European powers were both morally and financially exhausted after the Second World War and actually did not have the hegemonic will to enforce their authority on their colonies. The fact that many of these European countries concentrated on rebuilding themselves following the war as well as emphasizing the stimulating of trade with the United States, allowed for the weak trade relationship with the majority of African colonies to further decline. The section goes on to review literature on decolonization from a Commonwealth, imperialistic, romantic nationalist and political economic prospective.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Britain's fear towards the independence process in Africa allowed for a belief to manifest itself that communism was expanding across Africa. Opinion makers in Whitehall equated nationalistic aspirations with communist ideology. France had a different approach pertaining to decolonization and throughout the constitutions of the third (1870 to 1940), fourth (1944 to 1958) and present (fifth) republics, attempts were made surrounding the possibility of co-opting French African colonies into the expanding French Republic. France saw its colonies as part of a *Communauté Française* (extension of the Francophone family). In effect, decolonization was seen by the French as an attempt to break up the family. This sentiment was strongest felt regarding the case of Algeria, which in the constitution of the fourth republic was classified as a *département* of France and not a colony. Belgium's policy towards its colonies in Africa following the war remained stagnant. The fact that the country actually derived some financial benefit from its relationship with its colonies — as reflected by the increase of exports from Congo to Belgium between 1939 and 1953 which increased 14 times reflects the financial fact that Belgium was not eager to release itself of being a colonial master. Portugal, which it had not participated in the Second World War, still remained Europe's poorest colonial power and did not deviate from its strong colonialist position.

The second segment of this document reviews the second scramble for Africa and discusses the period as from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War. The commencement of this period saw — following Ghana's independence in 1957 — a second wave of independence in Africa seeing almost 30 African countries obtaining their liberty during the 1960s. I have also including a table within this section (thus allowing for perspective) providing the various dates of the respective African countries independence and from which colonial power (Figure 1.7). Despite the fragmentation of Africa by the colonial powers the newly independent African countries unanimously agreed to retain their national borders. This stance was seen as sacrosanct to their country's sovereignty as acknowledged by the Organisation of African Union (OAU) in 1963 when it declared all established colonial boundaries to be legitimate. The new African leadership sought to maintain these artificial borders established during the colonial period so as to seize control of the state as an operating system. Part of the reason for the actual survival of the African states (what Jackson and Rosberg term "*juridical states*," later labelled "*quasi — states*" by Jackson) was their usefulness to other more powerful states, predominately outside the continent within the

spectre regarding the competition for global influence (Jackson, R.H & Rosberg, R.H. 1982:14). Herbst who's work partly concentrates on external threats and the consolidation of the state in Africa notes that African states do not experience a great deal of interstate conflict due to the fact that not many boundary changes have taken place since independence (primarily due to the OAU's position taken in 1963), (Herbst, J. 1990:117–139). This position was based on the fear that should one of the artificial borders which separate distinctive ethnic groups throughout the continent be challenged, then all might collapse. Therefore, the state no longer fears for its existence, as their borders are guaranteed. Further to this is the fact that due to their physical geography, low population density combined with "*limited technologies of coercion*," African states see little need to exercise control on their borderlands from "*predatory neighbors*." Thus, the limit of external threat has allowed for weak state structures and inefficient bureaucracies (Herbst, J. 2000: 125).

Throughout this period progress now swung towards "Africanizing", and saw government institution being controlled by the new elites. This element will discuss Africa, which for purposes of ease has been demarcated within the following regions, namely: North Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. The section will go onto providing a brief overview of when the different countries in Africa obtained their independence. France's stance pertaining to its eagerness to retain its geopolitical interests, notably in West Africa will be discussed, within the parameters of the country wanting to retain a leadership role with all its former colonies. Furthermore, the country expected its former colonies to remain within the "*francophone family*". France's position was that these former colonies should be linked both economically and politically to France. Furthermore, the country had an almost passionate belief that linkage should be retained through language and culture. In retrospect the fact remains that France was able to maintain a far more stable and dominant relationship with the vast majority of his former colonies that any of the other European colonial powers.

Southern Africa received the most attention from the various protagonists during the Cold War. Different factors contributed to this, the most prevalent being the strategic location of the various African countries, complimented by a more developed infrastructure which centred on the extraction and availability of strategic minerals and commodities as well as the fact that this region had a large European population mostly located in the more southerly African nations. The event that served as a watershed in Africa and the Southern African

region itself, and impacted directly on the decolonization process, was the *coup d'état* in Portugal in 1974, which allowed for the sudden and rapid withdraw of Europe's last colonial power from Africa.

A brief review in this segment looks at the Angolan civil war and that countries protracted slide towards independence. Geopolitical tensions surrounding third and fourth parties, predominantly from outside Africa and representing both the West and East Block is analyzed as is the use by both Blocks of proxies. The component goes on to analyzing the decolonization process from an anti — geopolitical and colonial anti — geopolitical prism. This concentrates on the popular doctrine of the time and how the colonized obtained their independence from the dominant authority. Routledge's description of this "*geopolitics from below*" challenged the political, military and cultural hegemony of the state and its elites. Actions are classified as "*counter — hegemonic struggles*" as they reflect resistance to the coercive force of all policy actions and delete all consent to be ruled "from above." It is from this perspective that anti — geopolitics emerged. Routledge's writing on anti — geopolitics which challenges the material geopolitical power of states and institutions as well as the representation imposed by political elites upon the world and the different peoples serving their geopolitical interests (militarily and economically) is reviewed. Further to this is the examination of structures of resistance within anti — geopolitics. It is noted that within this hypothesis the state is seen as the main opponent (the example of the majority of liberation wars fought during the decolonization period in Africa is sited). Conflict also extends beyond the borders of the state itself — as also seen during decolonization. The discourse of anti — colonial geopolitics is examined and once again, the example of France's attempt to adapt and change its colonial strategy from exploitation to the promotion of inter — dependence is noted. The continued fluctuation between the policies of "assimilation" and "association" and how attempts were made to co — opt former colonies through such strategies as the *loi cadre* within the framework of the Fourth republic is discussed. Frantz Fanon's writings in his renowned book "*Wretched of the Earth*," saw the stark division between the colonizer and the colonized continuously developing and saw the colonized being "*alienated*" by the Manichean world of the colonizer. Fanon stresses that the colonized can liberate themselves effectively but only by the use of violence. Further to this was the fact that colonization was not just the physical exploitation of land but also affected the psychology of the people colonized. He saw the elites within a colonized country as having been assimilated and

trapped within the dichotomy of searching for independence and at the same time maintaining good relations with the colonizer. Fanon notes that this relationship continuous to this day and believes that the elites become the substitute leadership by which the colonizer would maintain ties of interdependence with the colonized following independence. The section expands beyond Fanon's position and also reviews the psychological effects of decolonization, the case example of Algeria and its nationals is provided. Post — colonialism is reviewed and mention is made of Gayatri Spivak and his views of "*subaltern*" (individuals who are politically, socially and geographically outside the hegemonic power structure). Compounded to this is the work undertaken by Edward Said in his celebrated publication "*Orientalism*" in which he reviews the West's stance wherein it maintains power over the East due to the very structure of name and control, which in turn is vital in understanding colonialism and the process of post — colonialism.

This component progresses to discuss the Soviet Union's actions and role within Africa during the Cold War period. As many writers note, Africa was seen as a place "where the Cold War turned hot". And it was during the period of independence where the majority of African countries had to make a stark choice between supporting either the East or West block. Ironically there were few realistic alternatives. It is noted that Africa was in many ways regarded as strategic within the paradigm of the USSR having an "encirclement complex" due to the fact that this Block perceived itself to be threatened within the doctrine of containment. In this regard the USSR developed an aggressive policy of extending its boundaries of influence expansion, which at the time dovetailed with the communist ideology of creating an international revolution of the Proletariat. The USSR wished to show itself as an ally of independent Africa, which was reflected by the sympathetic regard (due to shared ideology) that these countries received when they declared themselves as socialist at independence. In the mid 1960's the USSR was restricted to providing weapons, training and limited technical and educational assistance. This changed remarkably when the Soviet Union upgraded its Blue water navy and long distance heavy transport aircraft in the late 1960's and early 1970's. A paradigm shift by which Africa became a focal point in the Cold War came in the mid — 1970's with international focus shifting from South — East Asia to Africa. Compounded to this was the increase in geopolitical tensions that emerged on the African continent following the 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal, which in effect allowed for a power vacuum to develop, which due to the US's lack of interest, was rapidly filled by the USSR (Clapham,C. 1996: 43).

Regarding Africa, Soviet leadership followed the maximum / minimum principal whereby the continent offered maximum gains for winning influence with minimum risk for the Soviet Union. The USSR had successfully penetrated independent movements in Africa and maintained its position of influence. During this period progress was seen in Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea–Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Academics differ on various issues surrounding US and USSR tension pertaining to Africa with some believing that both these blocks sought opportunities to antagonize each other. In this regard when the US saw Africa as a part of its strategic interest, the USSR believed that its involvement would directly limit US influence. Brayton argues that the USSR did not follow a specific geopolitical strategy — one territory was as good as another. In his analysis he looked at “penetrated African states” regarding Soviet activity. In this regard he provided six indicators to measure USSR’s influence as well as 3 categories of penetration which, has been expanded on in this component. Mention is made of Jay, who notes that the two super — powers used other actors in the system to compete on their behalf within their spheres of influence, thereby allowing both the US and the USSR to not face each other directly and always within the territories of third parties. In many incidences a third country was sought as a potential ally to be included into each respective superpower’s sphere of influence. In Africa, for the USSR this was to a lesser extent Cuba and for the US it was the United Kingdom.

A brief overview of how both the USA and the USSR became the mainstay for the supply of weapons, training, policy advises and even troops (in the form of Cuban soldiers) which also increased regional and domestic conflicts. Two specific regions are analyzed as well as the intense geopolitical manipulations that were undertaken by the two blocks to conduct their proxy wars. In this case the Soviet / US actions in the Horn of Africa and within Angola from the mid 1970’s until the late 1980’s are discussed. Mention is made of 1975 which saw the Soviet Union “changing the rules of the game” when the country transported Cuban troops (which reach an estimated 50 000 in Angola alone in 1988) as well as vast quantities of weapons to its proxy representatives in both the Horn of Africa and Angola. Developments surrounding the USSR’s interests in Angola are highlighted, which in effect centred on the countries reserves and materials and also, according to Vennemen and James, was to deny minerals of strategic value to the West and China. Sullivan expands on this position by noting that the USSR also wanted to use Angola as a “*springboard from which its naval forces*

would threaten the Cape route". Developments surrounding the Carter administration's lack of interest in Africa to the Reagan doctrine which concentrated in assisting all countries that were resisting "Soviet aggression" are discussed. Extended to this issue is the fact that bipolar international tension almost guaranteed that the two superpowers would take opposing sides in Third world conflicts.

The other conflict discussed surrounds the US and USSR involvement in the Horn of Africa, that began as early as 1961 when Nikita Khrushchev gave his "*secret wars of liberation*" speech, which centred on USSR foreign policy and the fact that the block intended to influence the region and challenged western hegemony by offering economic and military assistance to developing countries "*free of any political and military obligations*". This component highlights the shift in geopolitical alliances between USSR and Somalia and the USA and Ethiopia and will analyze how these specific alliances shifted on a 180 degree axis, which by 1977 saw the alliance between Somalia and USSR disintegrating and the US taking the position as the leading patron to the Mogadishu regime. In turn the USSR upgraded its relationship with Ethiopia to the level that the country moved its relations from the US to USSR. This was followed by a massive Soviet airlift which allowed for an estimated US\$ 1 billion worth of weapons to be provided to the regime in Addis Ababa. As with the airlift to Angola in 1975, the USSR had displayed both the willingness and ability to project military force in Africa, so as to achieve its foreign policy objectives. This action also displayed the actual level the USSR was willing to go to save the Marxist government of Ethiopia. The position retained by Seversky on air power and air supremacy remains prevalent in this section. The fact that a vast part of Africa fell under Soviet dominance reflects the ease by which the Soviet Union was able to airlift supplies to Ethiopia, while Angola — which fell within the "area of decision" where both the US and USSR's air dominance overlapped also allowed for the USSR to provide massive "packages of assistance" to Angola. This section also discusses the process led by France that maintained a "virtual" empire in Africa during the Cold War and managed a balanced policy between national interest and national advantage. The fact that the country control strategic natural resources such as oil and uranium highlights this position. France — from the presidencies of de Gaulle to Mitterrand maintained a complicated and multi — layered relationship with Africa, complemented within the framework of defence and security during the Cold War. France intervened militarily in the continent at least 19 times from 1962 to 1995 (Gregory, S. 2000: 437), thus allowing for

numerous governance to be overthrown by violent means. As mentioned in the previous section *francophone* states obtained their political independence without economic independence. As Philcox notes, during the period when decolonization took place, France under President de Gaulle was “*more interested on keeping the African continent within the bosom of France than liberating it*”. France’s policy to centre its geopolitical strategy in cultural interest is examined in more detail in this division. This position allowed France as Miburn notes, to regard Africa as its *chasse garde* (private hunting ground). France’s activities towards other western countries with specific reference to the US, seemed to be designed to annoy but as Friedman notes, the country’s behaviour came from “geopolitical realities and not, as many Americans believe, out of sheer malice”. Friedman states that France’s national interests during the Cold War within its *chasse garde* allowed the country to be “*torn between resistance and accommodation*”.

The final part of this division’s analyzes China’s relations with the continent during the Cold War. This partnership was cemented at the 1959 Bandung conference. The country was eager to promote social revolution in Africa but on the whole, due to the fact that it was economically weak only provide modest support for anti — colonial liberation movements. In effect, China only managed to penetrate one African country; Tanzania, which due to strong Chinese influence possibly became the most radicalised African country. Internal policy within China constrained the country’s relationship during the Cold War as reflected by the closure of all Chinese Embassies in Africa, with the exception of Egypt during the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960’s.

The third and final section reviews Africa during what has been termed The Third Scramble for the continent. This chapter begins as from 1989 with the end of the Cold War and Moscow’s disengagement from Africa. External patrons rapidly became unwilling to fund proxy wars which saw rapid change in Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia and Zaire, to name just a portion. Africa began to go through a challenging period where its relevance was being ignored although former colonial powers still ensured that assistance was provided as reflected by attempts by the United Kingdom and France that the former colonies obtain preferential trading status through the Lomé convention. With the superpower retreat came some assistance — namely from former colonial powers. However, political conditions were attached. France and Britain gravitated towards stressing that should African nations obtain aid that certain human and political right conditions had to be maintained. As Baynhan noted

there was “a global shift away from authoritarianism and a virtual end to the international ideological struggle between political pluralism and Marxism/Leninism, in favour of democracy and democratization”. The sudden “*demise of highly repressive regime in Eastern Europe*” had profound repercussions for Africa which in term provided the catalyst for demands regarding democratic reforms and an end to single party hegemony. Africa’s elites came under intense internal and external pressures which impacted in a process that saw nine African heads of state lose their position due to different political changes between June 1990 and June 1991. This was the highest “turnover” since the OAU had been established in 1960. Ironically, with the end of the Cold War major conflicts had decreased but the capacity of African states to make war had been greatly enhanced due to their role as Cold War proxies. As Lodge notes in this section, the end of international bipolar geostrategic competitions in Africa weakened African states and rebellions against the authority of the political elites intensified. Lodge gives seven reasons why conflicts have expanded since 1990, these been; ethnic competition for control of the state, regional or secessionist rebellions, continuation of liberation conflicts, fundamentalist — religious opposition to secular authority, warfare arising from state regeneration of state collapse, protracted conflict within politicised militaries and border disputes.(Herbst, J. 2000: 66).

As Manger wrote, Africa became marginalized, and “*without indispensable strategic choke points and no competing power blocks, the strategic role faded*”. African governments on the whole became less able to exercise administrative control over large areas of their countries. Furthermore, globalization reduced the continent’s geopolitical relevance. A practical example of Africa’s diminished strategic value was the fall of President Mobutu of Zaire, which saw little reaction from his traditional external ally. Following the Cold War France seemed to be more concerned with Anglophone encroachment in Africa. The case study of Rwanda is provided, which until recently has used French as its second language. The country is on a “*political fault — line*” between *francophone* central and Anglophone east Africa. This issue as well as the fact that France did little to prevent the genocidal “final solution” that took place in Rwanda during 1994 is also discussed. When President Chirac became president in 1995, the country continued to involve itself in African affairs. With the collapse of the Mobutu regime and the genocide in Rwanda, France’s geopolitical influence began to decline markedly, despite the fact that there are about 240 000 French nationals residing on the continent and the continent’s commodities play an important role in France’s industrial

development. With President Sarkozy came a seemingly new position towards Africa as reflected by him stressing that about 26 military accords with various *francophone* countries would be reviewed. However, for France the fact remains that the countries geopolitical paradigm has been destabilized. In the contemporary world, from a moral as well imperial perspective the country's relationship with Africa is no longer beneficial for either Africa or France. Britain's position is also discussed in this section. This country maintained a low — profile in Africa but attempted to raise a strong diplomatic voice which came to the fore with Prime Minister John Mayor and Tony Blair attempting to raise the United Kingdom's profile on the continent. The success by Britain in Sierra Leone gave Britain much needed recognition for its new approach towards Africa. At present the country maintains a relatively non — interventionist approach and as Cumming notes, the United Kingdom “*focused heavily on the 17 African countries that had experienced British colonial rule*”.

Initial US involvement in Africa following the Cold War was brief, with the Clinton administration seen as supporting African authorial leaders in Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Congo. President Bush brought a twin — track policy to his relationship with Africa. The first concentrated on security issues following the September 2001 attacks on the US while the second was a Soft Power approach based on various social and developmental challenges the continent faces. This section reviews Joseph Nye's approach towards Soft Power, which will be discussed within the African context. Nye's writings within his books “*Bound to Lead*” and “*Soft Power and Paradox of American Power*” are also included. This approach is reviewed within the US's framework of international relations specifically with regard to its relationships with Africa. Discussion is made surrounding Nossel and her Smart Power approach which at present seems to be the route that President Barack Obama will follow pertaining to his emerging relationships with Africa. The Hard Power approach to foreign policy and this components' relevance with Africa is also highlighted. Africa's geopolitical significance within the framework of America's energy needs is examined. The fact that the US is expected to obtain up to 25 % of its imported oil by 2015 from Africa is noted. Compounded to this, is the fact that 60 billion barrels of proven oil reserves are in Africa, which places this scenario into greater perception. According to Foster the US has developed a “*grand strategy*” to ensure its hegemony internationally and Africa falls within its perspective of *Pax Americana*. The country sees various geopolitical challenges in Africa, the most predominant being China's continued and developing involvement on the continent.

China's relation with Africa expanded rapidly following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, which saw the majority of western countries placing diplomatic and commercial restrictions on the Beijing regime. Ironically African countries responses were the opposite with many congratulated China for its robust reaction to its crack — down on its citizens. As Mawdsley notes, many African and Chinese leaders believe that *“the West's complaints about democracy and human rights was founded in neo — imperialist arrogance”*. This section will also review how this new relationship between Africa and China has commercially benefited both parties. China's *“peaceful rise”* and its policy of non — interference, which is based on the five Principles of Peaceful Co — existence as identified at the 1955 Bandung Conference within its relationship with Africa, is analyzed. Divisions between China's notion of sovereignty and equality amongst nations as well as its position on human rights, as opposed to the West's stance are discussed. It is noted that these fundamental issues all have a strong bearing on how they benefit the country's relations with Africa. This issue is complemented by the fact that the majority of African states follow a similar approach.

China's contemporary approach regarding its relationship with Africa is reviewed within three parameters, namely development aid, investment and trade. These three foreign relation “tools” are discussed as are the various secondary “tools” used to implement the country's foreign policy. The most relevant institution is the China — African Cooperative Forum (CACF), which remains an effective body regarding enacting the country's relationship with Africa. The strengths and weaknesses of China's relations are also reviewed as are the factors that have allowed trade to grow to such an astronomical level that it had peaked at US \$ 106.75 billion in 2008. Geopolitical “drivers” such as oil and minerals remain the primary focus of China's advance into Africa and this section will examine the various motivators behind this development. A micro — analysis has also been undertaken in this section with specific regard to China's rapidly developing economic relationship with the key energy supplying countries of Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Congo (Brazzaville) and Equatorial Guinea.

China's Soft Power approach in Africa, which in effect has allowed the country to establish diplomatic relations with 48 countries on the continent, is reviewed. It should be noted that Joseph Nye's theory on Soft Power has received a great deal of attention amongst academics as well as decision — makers in China. Glaser and Murphy note that there are two schools of thought in China as to which course China's Soft Power should follow. The primary approach sees the core of Soft Power in culture while the secondary position believes that political

power is the very core of Soft Power. The section goes on to look at the various methods used by China to expand its Soft Power, for example, the opening of 500 Confucius institutions to disseminate Chinese culture and language throughout the world. Other examples are also seen such as the expansion of media programmes in various languages internationally. China continues to maintain a low — profile and does not want to be seen as challenging America's hegemony. However, as Nye notes, China has a long way to go before it can match America's soft power. One of the greatest challenges comes from within China itself pertaining to the fact that China has no civil society structures in the form of NGOs, which serves to promote a great deal of America's Soft Power. Research undertaken by Horta on China's influence in Africa is discussed in this section. Various conclusions are drawn which in general reflects purely on China's image. The fact that the country brings the majority of its labourers from China restricts work opportunities for Africans and that illegal Chinese immigrants are plying their trade in different African cities thus restricting African traders, does little to allow for China to project itself as a leading influential country. China has also attempted to establish its Hard power position by involving itself in United Nation's peace keeping operations specifically in Africa. It should be noted that the country has made massive strikes from when it first involved itself in peacekeeping operations in Namibia. Recently China has become the 14th largest troop contributing country to the UNDPKO (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributions).

The next section provides an overview on what is described as the modern day scramble for Africa's land and examines the fact that as much as 20 million hectares of farmland — an area as large as France's entire farmland, which is comparable to a fifth of the entire European Union's farmland worth between US\$ 20 and US\$ 30 billion was purchased in various African countries in 2008/2009 alone. It is noted that the above figure is only what is reported. The fact remains that the majority of sales are not known. Countries involved include China, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, India, Egypt and South Africa. These "land grabs" will possibly lead to an escalation in geopolitical tension due to the fact that present African occupants are moved off their land and a great deal of the land is not actually used to produce agricultural products for consumption but rather to grow plants to be used in the production of bio — fuels.

The final section briefly reviews the lesser countries from outside Africa and their role on the continent. There is no doubt that interest is high in what the continent can offer within the

realm of commodities. Even the voting power that Africa retains within relevant multilateral institutions including the United Nations still acts as important draw card, hence the escalation in interest in the development of relations from such countries as Japan, Iran and Turkey. The most significant relationship from countries that have traditionally not retained strong commercial ties with the continent is from Russia. The country's strategic advance into Africa has been well deliberated with objects centralising on the provision of nuclear energy to certain select states and obtaining natural gas resources. The most ambitious project that the country has planned is for the construction of a massive US\$ 13 billion gas pipeline, which when completed will extend from Nigeria through the Sahara desert to Algeria and cover a total of 4 000km's. The project under the leadership of the Russian company Gazprom will allow for Africa and Russia to theoretically control the provision of natural gas to Europe thus in turn allowing for Russia and by extension Africa, to use energy strategy as a geopolitical tool.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Source material can be found in the state archives of ex — imperial and former colonial powers as well as those of African states, although many archives of African nations are in a bad state. Historically these archives might be of great interest to academics. However, many politicians and civil servants in these countries where the local population, in general is close to starvation, do not regard the conservation of old material as being so important and financially viable as meeting the more basic requirements of their people. The majority of information obtained for this study primarily came via the World Wide Web and various Universities in Africa, Europe and the United States. Furthermore various think — tanks and research institutions were also consulted. I found that South African non government organization (NGOs) had a great amount of contemporary data on developments pertaining to Africa. In this regard I obtained information from the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS), (Pretoria), South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), (Johannesburg) and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), (Kwa — Zulu Natal), of high value. University libraries such as the University of Pretoria, Charles University in Prague and the Anglo — American University in Prague were also approached although the last two were somewhat limited in the availability of research material in

English. However, the most concise academic material obtained was via the Charles University CZ — proxy portal. Various articles obtained were written by the above mentioned authors and were published in renowned academic journals such as *Asian and African Studies*, *International Studies*, *Peace Research*, *Contemporary History*, *Political Research Quarterly*, *Strategic Studies*, *Comparative Political Studies*, *Politics and Society as well as the Geographical Journal and Political Journal*. Due to the fact that these publications are peer – review journal and are held in high regard within academia they are regarded as an important secondary source for my thesis. Other (declassified) background information on certain issues was obtained from the South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs. The English language media was also utilised as reflected by the various newspaper articles listed in my reference.

Within the first section of my thesis I used literature and articles that concentrated on the period leading up to the First Scramble for Africa. I was mindful of the fact that what was regarded as African history before the 1950's fell within the established tradition of “imperial history”, a genre dominated by accounts of the African careers of European explorers, missionaries, proconsuls and businessmen. Africans themselves were very much regarded as objects rather than actors in the making and unmaking of European empires within Africa (Miller, J.C:1999:11). Thus I also attempted to balance my accumulation of data with contemporary interpretation of the period. Regarding the phase itself I utilized various historical literature written by Moberly (1931), Vansina (1965), Crowder (1967), Collins (1970), Blinkorn (1984), Bernard (1987), Killingray (1989), Iliffe (1995), Shillington (1995), Hochschild (1998), Schmiechen (1999), Lenman (2000), Keylor (2001), Strachan (2001), Athoe & Blanthier (2002), Mallett (2003), Anderson (2004) and Roberts (2004). To assist me in obtaining greater understanding of the various classical geopolitical theories presented by the leading theorists of the period as well as research on international relations and political developments of the era in question, I examined publications written by Leroy — Beaulieu (1874), Fabri (1879), Mackinder (1904), (1911), (1919), (1943), Spykman (1938), (1942), Sprout (1939), (1962), Gyorgy (1944), Walsh (1947), Percy & Fifield (1948), Melinger (1955), Raymond (1961), Fischer (1968), Collins (1974), Fieldhouse (1981), Sullivan (1984), Kost (1989), Smith (1989), Pakenham (1991), O'Tuathail (1992), Sempa (1996), Ekelund & Hebert (1997), Murphy (1997), James (1999), Lowe (2002), Blouet (2004) and Herwig (2006).

Literature regarding the Second Scramble period centre on the process of decolonization, the independence process throughout the continent, conflict during the Cold War period, the geopolitical interests of the East and the West and the divisions on the continent regarding to which ideology was supported and practiced by what African country. The actual level of strategic interest and the value attached by members of each opposing Block was reviewed. Furthermore, African opinions from an anti — geopolitical and colonial anti — geopolitical standpoint were researched. The theories of Fanon, Memmi, Arendt and Said, etc. were prevalent during this period. Authors whose works were researched included Cooper (1951), (1968), Jones (1955), Fanon (1961), Alexander (1963), Young (1965), Crowder (1967), Sills (1968), Woolman (1968), Campbell (1970), Barker (1971), Venneman & James (1976), Grey (1977), Hansen (1977), Lefebvre Fontaine (1978), Van Rensburg (1978), Brayton (1979), Jay (1979), Aspatunan (1980), Bissel (1980), Jackson & Rosberg (1982), Cyril (1984), Wiggins (1984), Vayrynen (1984), Anderson (1986), Liebenos (1986), Nzongola — Ntalaja (1986), Petterson (1986), Kent — Butts & Thomas (1986), (1996), (1998), Minter (1988), Herbst (1990), (2000), Albright (1991), Baynham (1991), (1991), (1992), Nijman (1992), Owusa — Ansah & McFarland (1995), Rothbart (1997), Cullather (1999), Miller (1999), Curry (2000), Garoupa & Gata (2000), Gregory (2000), Milbuurn (2001), Ross (2003), Wallerstein (1974), (2003), Tetteh Osabu — Kle (2004), Thomson (2004), Ferguson (2004), (2006), (2007), Pham (2006), Clapham (2006), Gaddis (2007), Henderson (2007), Reifer (2007), Boddy — Evans (2009).

The Third and final Scramble discusses the gradual re—emergence of former colonial powers on the continent and (in the absence of Cold War rivalry), Africa’s marginalization for the first decade following the disengagement of the two superpowers from the continent. Literature in this chapter concentrates on the escalation of conflict, the process of democratization, France’s rapid declining status and relevance on the continent and the emergence of both China and the USA in Africa due to the rapid growth in significance due to the continent’s natural resources and developing strategic importance. Furthermore, the strategic use by both the US and China of Soft Power and Hard Power in Africa, as expanded on by Nye *et al* and Hard Power (a combination of both Hard Power and Soft Power) as identified by Nossel as early as 2004 is reviewed. To assist me in writing this section I researched literature from the following a theorists and authors:

Larkin (1971), Francis (1978), Jay (1979), Camilleri (1980), Zinn, H. (1980), Jackson & Rosberg (1982), Kolchin (1982), Drysdale & Blake (1985), Parker (1985), Butts & Thomas (1986), Freeman (1986), Neuberger (1986), Frankel (1988), Snow (1988), Dogan & Pelasy (1990), Baynham (1991), Krause & von der Ropp (1991), Nye (1991), Shuofeng (1992), Fairchild, H. (1994), Snow (1995), Beri (1996), Glassner (1996), O'Tuathail (1996), De Blij & Muller (1997), Johnson (1997), Evans (1998), Goucher, C, Le Guin & Walton (1998), Howard (1998), Lévy (1998), Panter — Brick (1998), Taylor (1998), Lodge (1999), Mainger (1999), Mamadouh (1999), Philcox (1999), Dikshit (2000), Fettweis (2000), Peterson (2000), Schraeder (2000), Taylor (2000), Cilliers (2001), Jian, H. *et al.* (2001), Maritinez — Vera (2001), Schraeder (2001), Huntington (2002), Sempa (2002), Hay (2003), Aicardi (2004), Cumming (2004), Evelyn (2004), Hele (2004), Jones & Woods (2004), Le Billion (2004), Mamdani (2004), Muekalia (2004), Nossel (2004), Richards (2004), Venier (2004), Williams (2004), Zhang, J. (2004), Chiantera — Stutte (2005), Lyman (2005), Mooney (2005), Thompson (2005), Zweng, D. & Jianhai, B. (2005), Foster (2006), Gattamorta, (2006), MacGillivray (2006), Mamadouh & Dijkink (2006), Sautman (2006), Sempa (2006), Tull (2006), Van de Looy (2006), Wacker (2006), Anshan (2007), Dodds (2007), Greory, Johnston, Praat & Watts (2007), Hanson (2007), Johnson (2007), Kurlantzick (2007), Mawdsley (2007), Melander (2007), Melber (2007), Naidu (2007), Sempa (2007), Shinn (2007), Thompson (2007), Wenping (2007), White (2007), Glaser & Murphy (2008), Houser (2008), Mahbubant (2008), Reidy (2008), Rogers (2008), Sharp (2008), Soares de Oliveira (2008), Verschave (2008), Wuthnow, J. (2008), Bates & Huang (2009), Horta (2009), Kisiangani (2009), Majis (2009), Mesfin, (2009).

I should stress that my choice of authors was not random and I attempted to include as many significant theorists from as many diverse cultural and political backgrounds as possible. Thus, approaches from Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas were incorporated into my thesis and were represented in my analysis. A challenge remained the lack of quality (and quantity) data from Africa itself. South Africa is without doubt the most pertinent centre regarding research on the continent but even there, there remains a deficiency as to the amount of academic research conducted. A direct example of this is the fact that from the numerous authors identified above and whose works I researched; only nineteen are from Africa and of these, only five are from outside South Africa.

1. THE SCRAMBLE COMMENCES: THE FORMAL PROCESS

1.1 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW: MERCANTILISM — THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF THE FIRST SCRAMBLE (1550 TO 1800)

Europe's geopolitical relationship with Africa can be traced back to the prevalent economic policy in Europe during the sixteenth to well into the eighteenth centuries, namely Mercantilism. The policy was characterised not so much by a formal doctrine as it was by a set of generally held beliefs. The objective of mercantilism was to enhance the state's power by increasing wealth. The term Mercantilism was created by the British economist Adam Smith in 1776 from the Latin word "*mercari*" which means to "*run a trade*" and *merx*, meaning "*community*" (www.whitter.edu). Mercantilism can be characterised as a basic economic activity that involves the purchasing of goods in a country or region where these goods are common, moving them to a region where this merchandise is not so prevalent and then selling them for a profit.

Mercantilist ideas were the prevailing economic ideology throughout Europe and were specifically centred in England and France although the practice was also the dominant economic concept in Spain, Portugal, Prussia, Italy and Russia. France had a unique form of the practice which was entitled "*Colbertism*", which had been named after the French Minister of Finance, Jean — Baptiste Colbert who encouraged strong measures of protectionism. Rothbard describes mercantilism, which reached its height in Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a "*system of stateism which employed economic fallacy to build up a structure of imperial state power, as well as special subsidy and monopolistic privilege to individuals or groups favoured by the state.*" Thus, mercantilism stressed that exports should be encouraged by the government and imports discouraged (Rothbard, M. 1997: 43).

The Austrian academic and legal expert, Phillip Wilhelm von Hornick gave a comprehensive description of what he regarded as an effective national economy (within the mercantilist system) in his book *Austria Over All, If Only She Will (1684)*, Von Hornick stressed that —

the raw materials in the country should be used for domestic purposes due to the fact that once they become finished goods they have a greater value than their original form. Other issues that were motivated were that a large working population be developed and that all parts of a nation's territory be used for mining, manufacturing or agriculture. He further stressed that the importation of foreign goods should be discouraged and that raw materials be finished off in the home country and that all methods are used to sell the country's surplus manufactured goods to outside countries. Von Harrick believed that if goods could be produced within the country that there was no reason to import these type goods to the country itself unless it was absolutely necessary and that this be done only if goods could not be found within the country itself. Furthermore, he was adamant that the export of gold and silver from a country should be prohibited and that domestic money not be allowed to leave the country (Ekelund, R.B., Jr & Hebert, R. F. 1997: 40 — 49).

Over time during this "Age of Mercantilism" the demand for slaves grew and was intrinsically linked to the European demand for sugar and later tobacco. Before the 16th century the only source of sugar was from bees. With the growing appropriation of colonies the Spanish and Portuguese plantations on Atlantic islands off the west coast of Africa such as Madeires and São Tomé and Príncipe with developing slave labour from Africa, was used to meet the spiralling demand for sugar. The demand for sugar increased and the commodity was regarded as a rare spice or as medicine. The price increased and new uses for sugar were found. Dutch and French merchants competed for power motivated by Europe's craving for sugar, which increased greatly with the introduction of new products such as tea and coffee (Goucher, C. Le Guin, C & Walton, L. 1998: 8). On the Africa's mainland by the fifteenth century castles and forts were being constructed by European powers on land either rented or provided by local African leaders. Of relevance regarding the fortifications was the fact that the cannons protecting these installations all pointed seaward (for example with the fortifications built by the Portuguese in the Gold Coast, which was later captured by the Dutch), so as to counter other European competitors in the developing slave trade and not towards land.

In the attachment, at the end of my thesis, a map of the continent marked as Figure 1.1 clearly reflects the lack of foreign interest in Africa up to the late nineteenth century. There are only "pockets" of foreign presence, which are centred on coastal areas where natural harbours and forts were located.

African slaves became popular with the progression of plantations in the Americas. Apart from the fact that African slaves were physically stronger and developed better resistance to deadly epidemics including smallpox, malaria and other tropical diseases was the fact that they were — especially in the New World — easily identifiable. As demand for slaves continued to grow so too did the process of “triangular trade” within the structure of mercantilism. This was the trade pattern that emerged whereby the Atlantic Ocean was seen as the centre of a triangle of a sea voyage that started in England, where articles such as manufactured goods were shipped to the West Indies and Africa. Slaves were bought with the profits made by selling the English goods or bartered directly for slaves. On the second leg, referred to as the “dreaded Middle Passage,” the purchased or captured slaves were taken to slave markets in the New World. Capital made from the sale of slaves in the America’s was used to purchase sugar and tobacco, which was then shipped back to English ports where they were sold for the next cargo of manufactured goods. The triangular trade structure had a profound effect on the cultures and lives of the people of West and Central Africa. The processes foundation was deeply entrenched in merchant capitalism and slavery. Atlantic trade had rapidly developed into a set of unbalanced and exploitive relationships (Goucher, C. Le Guin, C., & Walton, L. 1998: 17).

In effect, each port of call provided the shipper with a payoff and a cargo. The slave trade increased markedly after 1659 as demand grew. The majority of slaves were purchased from African merchants and Kings of the Gold Coast and Slave Coasts who had obtained the slaves as prisoners captured during conflicts between the different African Kingdoms. Slaves were normally sold for Indian textiles and European goods (www.coursenotes.org). In reality, the Atlantic (slave) trade was based on a partnership between African politicians and merchants with European traders. At the same time, while triangular trade between Africa, Europe and the America’s allowed for development on both sides of the Atlantic, the competition between France, Britain and Spain over trade, slaves and territory in the Caribbean, North America and Africa “shaped eighteenth century geopolitics” (Hay, A.2003:7).

The practise of Bullionism (the acquisition of bullion in the form of precious metals, with specific reference to silver and gold ingots), extends from mercantilism. In turn bullionism allowed for the creation of improved and faster fleets and armies that encouraged territorial expansion. In effect mercantilism encouraged European voyages of exploration thus expanding European activities outside the borders of their countries, which firstly allowed for

the establishment of trading posts and then of colonies. The states wealth and power was further extended by merchants and the colonies reflected the European power interests (Goucher, C. *et al.* 1998: 5).

As mentioned by Jacob Viner, the dual objectives of Mercantilist policy were “*power and plenty*,” which were not in conflict with each other. The states naval power sustained its trade and economic success and improved the country’s military prowess. Great Britain proved to be the most dominant contender during this global competition, which was reflected in its victories over the Dutch and later the French (Sills, L. 1969: 776). Alfred Mahan, who’s geostrategic theories is discussed within the section dedicated to early geopolitical theories, reinforces Viner’s conjecture and states that the most vital process for the status and significance of a country is the effective control of the sea, hence the need for a large navy. Mahan and Viner speak within one voice on this subject and note that a country’s greatness (in both individual’s writings, Great Britain serves as the *pro forma*) is through its commercial and naval expansion. John Evelyn stated that, “*Whoever commands the ocean commands the trade of the world, and whoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and whoever is master of that commands the world itself*” (Evelyn, J. 1674: 245). Naval power hinged on access to timber and naval timber supply and the drive to secure this resource was a preoccupation for European powers throughout the 17th century and it was England that led this drive so as to ensure a policy of “*open sea at all cost*” so that trade and its imperialist ambition could be actualised (Le Billon, P. 2004: 1).

An important component pertaining to the establishment of colonies was the belief that the colonies would provide raw materials, which would then be exported to the home country, be manufactured into a finished product and then exported back to the colony of origin once again, for a profit. In theory colonialism was an “*important component of mercantilism practice for two reasons: it would lead to a favourable balance of trade, by which a state sells more than it buys and thus to autarky, the establishment of a self — sufficient and independent (home) economy*” (Goucher, C., Le Guin, C., & Walton, L. 1998: 6). In the chapter dealing with geopolitical theorists between the wars and their relevance to Africa, the expression of autarky (or tariff protectionism) once again becomes prominent within the framework of geopolitics. This is reflected in the writings of Karl Haushofer who stresses that the objective of autarky in the twentieth century (notably for Germany) was to achieve economic self sufficiency. Further to this, Haushofer was of mind that autarky should be

made a policy goal. At the time Nazi Germany was keen to maximise trade within the economic bloc it operated in and to minimize trade outside it. Germany was eager to limit trade with countries such as the USSR and France as they would at some (early) stage go to war against them and thus Germany needed to minimize dependency on trade so as to be less reliant on products from future enemy countries (Smith, W. D. 1989:113).

Wallerstein who has a deep understanding of Africa (a vast majority of his publications were devoted to the continent until the 1970's) believed that Europe gravitated towards capitalism to ensure continued economic growth. This allowed for the growth of the world as known then. It also allowed for the development of different "*divisions of labour*" as well as for strong state machineries to emerge in Western Europe. This allowed for the world economic system to progress in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. For the first time, economic links went beyond national and political boundaries. The new world economy was very different from the previous empire system(s) due to the fact that it was not a single political unit. Empires had relied on a government system which used force and commercial monopolies to direct the flow of economic goods from the periphery to the centre. Empires retained political boundaries in which they maintained control via an extensive bureaucracy and a dedicated army. It was only due to modern capitalism that the modern world economy was able to extend beyond the political boundaries of any empire (Halsall, P. 1997:1-5).

As mentioned above, the capitalist world system was based on an international division of labour, which determined relationships between different regions as well as different types of labour conditions. The system also related to each regions position within the world economy. Wallerstein identified four different regional categories, namely:

The Core: The regions within the core benefit the most from the capitalist world economy. Countries within this environment came from north-western Europe (France, England and Holland). They had strong central governments and bureaucracies as well as powerful armies. This development allowed international commerce to be controlled by local bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the rural population grew and landless wage earners provided labour for farms and factory's. Many peasants were pressed from the land and many moved to the cities to provide cheap labour.

The Periphery: These areas did not have strong governments, exporting their raw materials to the core and had to rely on coercive labour and they were controlled by other states. The areas

of Latin America and Eastern Europe (especially Poland), showed these characteristics of being periphery regions. The core drained the capital surplus of the periphery through unequal relations.

The Semi-Periphery: Between the Core and the Periphery lie the semi-Peripheries. These areas are either core regions in decline or peripheries trying to improve their position in the world economic system. These regions serve as buffers between the core and the peripheries. Countries during the period under review are Portugal and Spain as well as Italy, southern Germany and southern France. Wallerstein believed that the semi-peripheries were exploited by the core. However, in the case of the American empires of Portugal and Spain, they became exploiters of peripheries themselves. Spain for example, exported silver and gold from its American colonies – most of it having been obtained through coercive labour.

External Areas

Areas within this structure maintained their own economic system and remained outside the modern world economy. Russia was such a country at that time.

Different stages of growth

The growth of the modern world system took many centuries and in this time the different regions positions changed. Wallerstein divided the history of the capitalist world into four stages. For ease of reference, I have subdivided these four stages into two phases:

Stage 1 and 2: This period centres on the rise of the modern world system between 1450 and 1670. The Hapsburg Empire was not able to convert the emerging world system into a world empire. All other western European states tried to strengthen their position in the world order. Most of these states tried to consolidate their positions by;

- Bureaucratization: This process helped the growing status of the King. By making the state stronger to collect taxes, the King increased his power to borrow money and thus expand state bureaucracy. At the end of this phase the country obtained an “*absolute monarchy*.”
- Homogenization of the local population: Many core states expelled minorities as they were seen as threats to the core states. Jews in France and Spain and Protestants – who were often industrious merchants – were expelled from Catholic countries. The military in these

countries advanced and the local bourgeoisie developed economically. England is an example of such a core state that went through this process.

Trade with the Americas and the East provided a great deal of benefits. Profits reached as high as 200% to 300% for the small merchant elite. Profits from trans-Atlantic trade trickled down to smaller merchants. Larger merchants provided the capital for the industrialization of European core states.

Stage 3 and 4:(18th Century and beyond): This period saw Industrial expansion come to the fore. Various developments took place in this era. European core states took place in the exploitation of new markets. Africa and Asia entered this system in the 19th Century – both regions entered as peripheral states.

By the 1900's due to the movement towards manufacturing, core areas were encouraging the rise of industries in the peripheral and semi-peripheral zones so that machinery could be sold to these regions.

1.2 EUROPE'S FORMALISATION OF THE PROCESS

German chancellor Otto von Bismarck called the various aspirant colonial powers together to the Berlin Conference of 1884 — 1885. The moral justification for this Conference was to promote the civilization of the African 'natives' by opening the interior of the continent to commerce. However, the purpose of the Conference was to establish international guidelines for the acquisition of Africa territory. Ultimately these rules on how to partition Africa formalized "New Imperialism". Fourteen countries were represented but not one African representative was present. Countries represented included Austria — Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden — Norway, Turkey and the United States of America. At that stage, of the countries represented, only France, Germany, Portugal and Britain actually had acquired territory in Africa.

The Berlin Conference lasted for three months during which time European powers debated the geometric boundaries in the interior of the continent ignored the cultural and linguistic boundaries already established by the indigenous African population. The General Act of the Conference signed in 1885 established freedom of navigation on African rivers and free trade

areas. It also laid down the operational rules of effective control of African territory's, which in turn allowed for a degree of justification for the Scramble for Africa.

With the actions undertaken at the Berlin Conference sub — Saharan Africa was fast becoming an attractive entity to Europe due to numerous economic and racial reasons. The irony was that a region that had been greatly ignored by Western civilization and “informal imperialism” was now to feel the full impact of both approaches. Africa was offering colonial powers such as Britain and France as well as aspiring colonial powers like Germany, Belgium and Italy the opportunity to garner their trade surpluses in a new market. Interestingly, Africa received little European investment (before or after the Berlin Conference) with the exception of the Union of South Africa and to a lesser extent, Rhodesia, where companies such as Cecil Rhodes's De Beers Mining Company and the British South African Company began to establish themselves and develop trading routes, gravitating closer to Africa's interior.

Legitimacy had now been given to European countries that had the political and economic will, to take portions of Africa, at their convenience. These countries included Great Britain, France, Belgium and its sovereign King Leopold II, Portugal, Italy, Germany and Spain. These nations were establishing political empires in Africa as well as in Asia. This “*new imperialism*” which developed between 1880 and 1900 was characterised by European countries scrambling for territory. White people (Europeans) ruled over millions of black and brown people in Asia and Africa. Although there were numerous geopolitical causes for this movement the most dominant were; competition for trade, European power politics (a racist belief that Europeans were superior to Africans) and the fact that these powers all had superior military force (Schmiechen, J. 1999: 441 — 442).

Various commercial and strategic tensions led to the “Scramble for Africa”, “the period from 1884 when Europeans raced each other to annex African territory at an astonishing rate. The Scramble was not just military, but commercial and religious, and was facilitated by European superiority in weaponry, transport and communications. By 1913, Britain had nearly 30 per cent of Africa's population under its control, France 15 per cent, Germany a tenth and Belgium another seven per cent” (MacGillivray, A. 2006: 156 — 157).

At the beginning of the First World War in 1914, the Conference participants had divided Africa amongst themselves into fifty countries. It was at this time that Western civilization had reached the absolute extent of its global expansion. In total, Europe had included an

additional 23 million km², one fifth of the land area of the globe to its possessions. After the conference, the give and take continued but the divided continent was claimed by the following colonial power who by 1914 had established their claims and “holdings” within fifty countries as follows:

Great Britain aspired for a Cape to Cairo collection of colonies and almost succeeded in linkage though their control of Egypt, Sudan (Anglo — Egyptian Sudan), Uganda, Kenya (British East Africa), South Africa, and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia), Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia) and Botswana. The British also controlled Nigeria and Ghana (Gold Coast).

France took much of western Africa, from Mauritania to Chad (French West Africa) and Gabon and the Republic of Congo (French Equatorial Africa).

Belgium and King Leopold II controlled the Democratic Republic of Congo (Belgian Congo).

Portugal took Mozambique in the east and Angola in the west.

Italy's holdings were Somalia (Italian Somaliland) and a portion of Ethiopia.

Germany took Namibia (German Southwest Africa) and Tanzania (German East Africa).

Spain claimed the smallest territory — Equatorial Guinea (Rio Muni).

Figure 1.2 in the attachment at the end of this thesis indicated how the partition of the continent had been undertaken by 1887.

1.3 EUROPE MANIFESTS ITS AUTHORITY OVER AFRICA

Each European power had their separate methods of rule within their specific colonies. Administrators with different personalities and objectives also had their own *modus operandi* depending on numerous factors including the level of control exercised by the colonial power as well as the actual significance of the colony. As Martin Glassner notes in his book *Political Geography, 1996*, the United Kingdom had its unique strategy pertaining to its colonial policy. In the case of South Africa for example given the “bruising” historical circumstances to its control over the country, it is understandable that Britain implemented and maintained a policy of indirect rule. This type of administration also allowed for many indigenous cultural

and legal practises to continue. An interesting observation is the realisation that one of the foundations of the apartheid policy, namely the pass law was implemented by the British General, Lord Roberts who initiated this course of action to regulate the movement(s) of the “native” population during the Anglo — Boer war.

Britain’s approach (for example) to colonial rule in its various colonies was also related to the size and character of the European settler population (Glassner M, I. 1996: 253 — 254). The majority of the settler population in South Africa saw themselves in a unique position. The vast majority of these individuals did not originate from the United Kingdom. Thus they had no cultural or language (English) affiliation with the colonial power. Furthermore, the Afrikaners began to regard themselves not as European *per se* but rather as what their name stated (Africans, albeit white Africans) with little to no alliance or loyalty to the British colonial authorities. However, this attitude did not prevent thousands of South African’s volunteering for the South African Defence Force, which served under British Imperial Command during the First and Second World Wars.

France’s initial position towards their new colonies (soon after the Berlin Conference) was based on the need for outlets (for export). A prevailing attitude that the French, and Europeans in general were of a higher race and were according to Jules Ferry, Prime Minister of France (from 1880 to 1881 and again from 1883 to 1885), a superior race that *“have a right because they have a duty to civilize the inferior races.”* At the time that Prime Minister Ferry made these comments (just prior to the Berlin Conference), there was a strong realisation that the taking of overseas colonies had to be legitimised. Adding to this was the awareness that geopolitics played a strong role in this process. Prime Minister Ferry stated to the French Chamber of Deputies that ...*“at present, as you know, a warship, however perfect its design, cannot carry more than two weeks’ supply of coal; and a vessel without coal is a wreck on the high seas, abandoned to the first occupier. Hence the need to have places of supply, shelters, ports for defence and provisioning... And that is why we needed Tunisia; that is why we needed Saigon and Indochina; that is why we needed Madagascar... and why we shall never leave them... Gentleman, in Europe such as it is today, in this competition of the many rivals we see rising up around us, some by military or naval improvements, others by the prodigious development of a constantly growing population; in a Europe, or rather in a universe thus constituted, a policy of withdrawal or abstention is simply the road to decadence! In our time nations are great only through the activity they deploy; it is not by spreading the peaceful*

light of their institutions...that they are great in the present day” (Jules Francois Cammile Ferry, Speech Before the French Chamber of Deputies, March 28, 1884).

The French saw themselves as having a right to involve themselves in “less civilized” countries and the process of imperialism and colonialism was best justified by the French economist and author Paul Leroy — Beaulieu when he wrote in his popular book *Of Colonization Among Modern People*, 1874 that “*a great part of the world is inhabited by barbarian tribes or savages, some given over to wars without end and to brutal customs, and others knowing so little of the arts and being so little accustomed to work and to invention that they do not know how to exploit their land and its natural riches. They live in little groups, impoverished and scattered, in enormous territories which could nourish vast numbers of people with ease.*”

Leroy — Beaulieu justified (French) imperialism by noting that “*this state of the world implies for the civilized people a right of intervention ... in the affairs of the peoples of the last two categories.*” The expansion of European powers into other countries outside their own continent was acceptable in Leroy — Beaulieu’s eyes due to the fact that: “*It is neither natural nor just for the civilized people of the West to be cooped up indefinitely and jammed into the restricted spaces which were their first home. Nor is it natural and just that they accumulate the marvels of science, the arts and civilization, that they see the rate of interest fall more each day for lack of good investment opportunities, while they leave perhaps half the world to little groups of ignorant, ineffectual men who are like feeble children ... or to exhausted populations, without energy, without direction, who may be compared to old men.*”

The process and position on Imperialism was clarified — in a somewhat paternalistic manner by Leroy — Beaulieu when he stated that “*imperialism is often confused with commerce or with the opening of commercial markets... ... Imperialism means something quite different from the sale or purchase of commodities. It entails a profound action on a people and a territory, providing the inhabitants with some education and regular justice, teaching them the division of labour and the uses of capital when they are ignorant of these things. It opens an area not only to the merchandise of the mother country, but to its capital and its savings, to its engineers, to its overseers, to its emigrants.....Such a transformation of a barbarian country cannot be accomplished by simple commercial relations. Imperialism is thus the systematic action of an organized people upon another people whose organization is*

defective; and it presupposes that it is the state itself, and not only some individuals, which is responsible for the mission” (Leroy — Beaulieu, P. 1874: 841 — 846).

Leroy — Beaulieu’s position on colonialism dovetailed strongly with his stance on imperialism when he stated that “*colonization by capital is a very important phenomenon... ... European capitalists (and by this word we mean not only a banker, but every person putting aside a little money, a modest employee, a peasant, a worker, a spinster or a widow), can work effectively at colonization, the exploitation of the globe, without leaving their firesides... ... All they need do is place their savings in an industrial enterprise which constructs railroads, digs canals, erects factories, and clears the land in the young countries. In putting their savings to this use, the inhabitants of the old world are not in any way delinquent in their duty to their home country. The countries where civilization is old, like England or France, are enormous producers of capital, and the difficulties in employing their colossal annual savings remuneratively in their own lands becomes great. Of course, the substantial funds of the old countries can always be put into industrial, agricultural or social improvements; but the export of a part of these funds across the seas to the adolescent countries, is much more productive for the entire human race. The same capital which will produce 3 or 4 per cent when invested in agriculture in France brings 10, 15, or 20 per cent in an agricultural enterprise in the United States, in Canada, on the Plata River, in Australia, or in New Zealand. It is the same for funds put into building railroads. ... In general terms, the old countries thus are becoming investors to which the rest of the world offers growing profit” (Leroy — Beaulieu, P. 1874: 820 — 824). Africa was also seen as offering similar financial and commercial opportunities.*

There was no doubt that colonies had a strong intrinsic value for France and by extension to Leroy — Beaulieu. This position was best expressed in his writings when he stated that “*the great value of colonies ... is not only that they serve to catch the overflow population of the mother country, nor even that they open a particularly reliable area of investment for excess capital, it is also that they give a sharp stimulus to the commerce of the country, that they strengthen and support its industry and furnish to its inhabitants — industrialists, workers, consumer — a growth of profits, of wages, or of interest. But ... these advantages resulting from the prosperity of the colonies are not limited just to the mother countries; they extend to all the countries of the old world and in fact there is not a nation which does not derive a real benefit from this increase in the productivity of humanity..... Imperialism has caused the*

opening of new sources of production..... It is thus that unknown products have been brought to the consumers of Europe to increase their comfort..... That is the first and incontestable result of imperialism. And this is the second: It is to open the new markets for the sale of products manufactured in Europe, markets more profitable and more expandable than those we have been limited to previously, because the new societies have an ability to grow and to create and accumulate riches infinitely greater than the old societies. Thus trade is stimulated and extended, the division of labour is augmented; industry having before it wider openings can and must produce more and such production on a greater scale calls for new improvements and new advances” (Leroy — Beaulieu, P. 1874: 737 — 740).

Despite the obvious racist and jingoistic attitude displayed by Prime Minister Jules Ferry and by Paul Leroy — Beaulieu, which was symptomatic of that time, the French began to display an approach whereby they stated that France was prepared to treat Africans as equals “*but only if they learned to speak French properly and adopted the values of French culture.*” Should African’s reach a certain level of education they could possibly be accepted as French citizens but to be below that level was to be treated as racially inferior. By the commencement of the First World War there was already an African politician in the French National Assembly, Blaise Diagne who represented Senegal. Another prominent African was Leopold Senghor who by the 1930s was a senior classics teacher at the Lycee in Tours, France (www.bbc.co.uk). There is no doubt that a situation like this would not be allowed in any other European country at that time.

France gravitated towards the concept of a *France d’Outre Mer* — an Overseas France, which was discarded when the Fourth Republic dissolved. In general, the French brought their cultural mores and values to their colonies and wanted to develop educated elite, which would promote France and its interests. In Africa, those countries which regarded themselves as being close to France both historically and culturally were placed in a form of hierarchy with Algeria (due its location to France and its large settler population) at the very apex of the “pecking order” (Glassner, M. 1996: 253).

As mentioned earlier, Portugal’s involvement in Africa began in 1439 and was the first European country to establish colonies in Africa. The country’s rule in Africa was autocratic and the African countries were seen as “*overseas provinces*” of Portugal. In general the Portuguese had less colour prejudice than most other European peoples and a higher tendency

to intermarry (young adventurers going out to the colonies in hopes of making their fortunes often did not have wives); thus, over long periods of time in their colonies, the Portuguese created and merged with a mulatto population. The Portuguese claimed that their colonialism was free of racism, but this was only partly true. The practice of granting citizenship to anyone who could meet the education and assimilation criteria in fact benefited the mulatto population primarily, not the general African population. In fact, it was possible (for a standard fee) for a mulatto to “*acquire the legal rights and privileges of a white*” through payment to the crown (Ferguson, N. 2007: 11). This practice allowed for small local elite to be created. These *assimilados* were classified as Portuguese citizens and were represented in the Portuguese government.

Belgium undertook its colonial responsibility in a highly paternalistic manner. King Leopold II of Belgium initially felt kept out of Africa by the British and French Empires as well as the rising power of Germany. The king studied various forms of colonialism from the Dutch East Indies, to the British possessions in India and Africa. *Java or How to Manage a Colony*, by the English lawyer J.W.B Money, appealed to him because it showed how a small country like Holland had perfected the technique of exploiting vast colonies. Money concluded that the huge profits made from Java depended on forced labour. Leopold concurred and went on to state that forced labour was “*the only way to civilize and uplift these indolent and corrupt peoples of the Far East*” (Hochschild, A. 1998:37).

King Leopold II established the International African Association (IAA) in 1876, at a conference of famous explorers in Brussels. As its first secretary, King Leopold opened the conference by proclaiming that the venture into Africa was “*to open to civilisation the only part of our globe which it has not yet penetrated, to pierce the darkness which hangs over entire peoples, is, I dare say, a crusade worthy of this century of progress....*” The objective of the conference was proclaimed to allow for “abolishing the (Arab) slave trade, establishing peace among the chiefs, and procuring them just and impartial arbitration” (Hochschild, A. 1998:44).

Gradually, King Leopold established a dictatorship over a country some 76 times the size of Belgium. To maintain order he made use of mercenaries who by 1888 were transferred into the “*Force Publique*”. At its apex, this force had up to 19 000 black conscripts and 420 white officers. Rubber sap almost became the primary reason for the Congo’s existence as a colony.

Joint economic ventures between Belgium, British and Dutch firms allowed for massive profits to be made (up to 700%) for companies involved in the rubber industry, the most dominant being the Indian Rubber and Exploration Company (ABIR). "*Ruthless and inhuman action*" was undertaken by the officials in the *Force Publique* to ensure that production of rubber continued. An account in 1884 describes the actions of an officer known as Fievez taken against those who refused to collect rubber or failed to meet their quota: "*I made war against them. One example was enough: a hundred heads cut off, and there have been plenty of supplies ever since. My goal is ultimately humanitarian. I killed a hundred people... but that allowed five hundred others to live.*" The *Force Publique* had a combined counter — insurgency role: as a force to suppress the natives and as a "corporate labour force." Their murderous assaults against the native population were described as "pacification", as it was during the Vietnam War. The demand was for labour, and they destroyed all obstacles in their way (Hochschild, A. 1998:64).

Hochschild quotes the Governor of the Equatorial District of the Congo Free State when the demand for rubber became ferocious: "*As soon as it was a question of rubber, I wrote to the government, 'to gather rubber in the district... one must cut off hands, noses and ears'.*" Following tribal wars, state officials would see to it that the victors severed the hands of dead warriors. During expeditions, *Force Publique* soldiers were instructed to bring back a hand or head for each bullet fired, to make sure that none had been wasted or hidden for use in rebellions. A soldier with the macabre title of "*keeper of hands*" accompanied each expedition.

Latter, in 1907 the Belgium state took over from King Leopold II the responsibility of the Congo Free State, which until then had been run as the King's own private fiefdom. This massive country was divided up into six provinces, each one having their own separate capital (Glassner, M. 1996:252).

The Chancellor of the new Germany, Otto von Bismarck had identified Germany's aspirations regarding colonial aspirations before the Berlin Conference (despite changing his mind various times before finally determining that the colonies for Germany in Africa might be of importance). By 1884, Germany had become the third largest colonial power in Africa with an overall empire of 2.6 million square kilometres (five times the size of the Reich) with 14

million colonial subjects, mostly situated in Africa in the colonies of Southwest Africa, Togoland, the Cameroons and Tanganyika (Pakenham, T. 1991: 201 — 204).

German aspirations for colonial expansion were similar to those of France and Britain. The challenge Germany had was that the country had little foreign trade or previous colonial experience to utilise in its sudden demand for colonies. By the late 1870s, Germany like the rest of Europe was going through an economic depression. However, there was a strong belief that by securing territory in Africa (and by extension acquiring raw materials and commodities), Germany, like other colonial powers could well be able to solve its economic problems. The German Missionary Society had been active in Africa for some time and was energetic regarding the promotion of colonial development. The Director of the society, Dr. Friedrich Fabri had influenced prominent members in German Society — intellectuals, businessmen, military leaders — to establish the German Colonial Union (*Kolonialverein*) and other similar type organisations. Public opinion developed to the extent that Chancellor Bismarck was compelled to appropriate some portions of Africa — as mentioned in the above paragraph.

In his book *Does Germany Need Colonies* published in 1879, Fabri made a strong nationalist argument toward German colonial expansion. He argued that Germany had an obligation to advance its culture. Indeed, if the new Germany expected to survive and protect its new status, it had to obtain colonies and expand its *Kultur* — mission. Fabri, regarded as the “*father of the German colonial movement*” made a convincing argument at the time when he wrote ... “*should not the German nation, so seaworthy, so industrially and commercially minded, successfully hew a new path on the road of imperialism? We are convinced beyond doubt that the colonial question has become a matter of life or death for the development of Germany. Colonies will have a salutary effect on our economic situation as well as on our entire national process. Here is a solution for many of the problems that face us. In this new Reich [i.e., the new Imperial Germany] of ours there is so much bitterness, so much unfruitful, sour, and poisoned political wrangling, that the opening of a new, promising road of national effort will act as a kind of liberating influence. Our national spirit will be renewed, a gratifying thing, a great asset. A people that have been led to a high level of power can maintain its historical position only as long as it understands and proves itself to be the bearer of a culture mission. At the same time, this is the only way to stability and to the growth of national welfare, the necessary foundation for a lasting expansion of power. At one*

time Germany contributed only intellectual and literary activity to the tasks of our century. That era is now over. As a people we have become politically minded and powerful. But if political power becomes the primal goal of a nation, it will lead to harshness, even to barbarism. We must be ready to serve for the ideal, moral, and economic culture — tasks of our time” (Fabri, F. 1879: 116 — 7).

Italy’s unification in 1861 brought a belief that the country also deserved its own empire overseas — much the same as other European powers. Furthermore, a notion of *mare nostrum* (Latin for “*Our Sea*”) developed. In essence, this idiom was used by Italian Nationalists of that period who believed that Italy was the successor state to the Roman Empire (Lowe, C. J. 2002: 34). However, due to the fact that the country was newly established it was late regarding its position within the “Scramble for Africa” and thus had to rely on the good will of Britain, France and Germany. After trying to secure the Ottoman province of Tunisia (in part due the large Italian community residing there) and being beaten to this colonial prize by France, Italy decided (due to this incident, and a feeling of general isolation in Europe) to strengthen its future actions by entering into the “*Triple Alliance*” with Germany and the Austro — Hungarian Empire in 1882 (Lowe, C. J. 2002: 27).

By 1885 Italy concluded a secret agreement with Britain, which allowed it to secure the Eritrean port of Massawa on the Red Sea. This portion of the continent had formally been a part of the Ethiopian Empire. Italy’s actions denied the Abyssinian Empire, ruled by Emperor Yohannes IV access to the sea and also restricted any further growth of French Somaliland (Pakenham, T. 1991: 201 — 280). During this period Italy also occupied the southern part of the Horn of Africa, which was named Italian Somaliland. In 1887 Italy invaded Abyssinia and lost almost five hundred soldiers at the Battle of Dogali. Following this conflict the treaty of Wuchale was concluded, which ceded the former colony of Eritrea to Italy. Italy argued (despite Ethiopian objection) that the treaty made Ethiopia an Italian protectorate (Pakenham, T. 1991: 470). Relations between Italy and Ethiopia deteriorated and by 1895 the First Ital — Abyssinian War had started. In 1896 the Italians were defeated in the Battle of Adwa by a superior Ethiopian army. The Italians suffered about 7,000 killed and 1,500 wounded in the battle and subsequent retreat back into Eritrea, with 3,000 taken prisoner. Ethiopian losses were believed to be between 4 000 and 5 000, with 8 000 wounded. This was the first defeat of a colonial power by an indigenous people (Pakenham, T. 1991: 7) and served to be a great humiliation to the future colonial aspirations of the new Italian empire. Italy was eager to not

be left out of the Scramble for Africa and after the country's defeat in the First Italian — Ethiopian War (1895 — 96); it acquired Somaliland and Eritrea — both in 1899. By 1911, Italy had been confident enough that it undertook a war with the Ottoman Empire over the regions of Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (present day Libya), which Italy won (www.groupstate.com/apps/pbes).

Italy's neighbour, Spain was also keen to obtain its "slice of Africa". Spain had been involved in various actions and had during the late 15th century and early 16th century established numerous small exclaves along the North African coast. An example of this is the island of Melilla and the enclave of Ceuta, which is only 19.7 km². Boundaries for both these territories were formally established in 1860 when Spain signed a treaty with Morocco and both enclaves remain part of Spain to this day.

In 1778, the two small islands of Fernando Póo and Rio Muni became Spanish Guinea (today known as Equatorial Guinea) and formally became a Spanish colony. By 1881, due to the insistence of the Society of Canary — African Fisherman, an enclave and trading post was established on the Rio de Ore, an inlet opposite the Canary Islands, in the region that would later become known as the Spanish Sahara. By 1916 Spain began to build military garrisons along the African coast within the Spanish Sahara. These actions were guaranteed in a secret treaty (1913) that Spain signed with France thus ensuring that the Spanish protectorates of Ifni and the Spanish Sahara become one (Tofino — Quesado, I. 2003: 140).

The background to Spain's involvement in Africa, like most other European countries centred on the 1880s. A group of adventurers and geographers were keen for the Spanish state to retain colonial possessions in Africa and asked the government for prompt intervention in Western Sahara and the Gulf of Guinea, in order to keep alive the Spanish presence in those parts of the world. The Spanish colonialist intellectuals of the nineteenth century were concerned as they saw that Spain was losing the battle over Africa; other European countries were getting "a slice of the cake," and they wanted their share too. However, instead of using the rhetoric of civilization and modernization, they stressed that there was an inherent Spanish vocation in Africa, which constitutes one side of Spanish Orientalism. While the civilization, modernization and Christianization argument could be made by other European nations, the African vocation argument was unique to Spain; Spanish Orientalism worked two ways: it allowed both the inherent vocation argument and capitalized on European's exotic,

Orientalised fantasy of Spain. Their argument was that Spain was indeed part of Africa because of its historical links to the continent and its geographical proximity to it. Joaquín Costa expressed it in a very graphic manner when he wrote: “*Spain and Morocco are two parts of a geographical unit, sort of a river basin whose borders are the Atlas in the south and the Pyrenees in the north.... The Straits of Gibraltar are not a wall that separates one house from another; on the contrary, it is a door opened by Nature to communicate two rooms of the same house.*” In December 1883, the *Sociedad española de africanistas y colonistas* was founded in Madrid, and its members started very soon to lobby the government for a more active presence in the African continent. Their interests were economic and political, but they used another, uniquely Spanish argument about the Muslim past. Since Morocco founded a civilization in Spain during the Middle Ages, it was Spain’s “*providential mission*” to promote a civilization in Morocco (Tofino — Quesado, I. 2003: 143).

Even distant America involved itself in the colonization process in Africa. In 1816 the American Colonization Society (ACS) was established. The ACS offered emigration to Liberia (Land of the Free). Transportation was offered to free blacks from the United States so that that could (re)settle in Africa. The premise to this approach was that free slaves would never be able to operate in American society on the same level as white American’s. Capital was raised — with government assistance and by 1821 land had been purchased in Africa. The area purchased was called Monrovia — after the President of America at that time — in the newly established country of Liberia (<http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/libhtml/liberia.html>). Between 1821 and 1867 some 10 000 black Americans were resettled. The ACS basically controlled Liberia until 1847 when, believing that the British Empire might annex the settlement, Liberia was made a free and independent state, thereby becoming the first African decolonised state. The development of Liberia came about as a true irony of the times. The first President of the ACS was James Monroe who went on to become the fifth President of the United States (1817 to 1825). Thus, one of the main supporters of American colonization of Africa was the same individual who in 1823 stated that European powers should no longer colonize the Americas. At the same time the U.S would stay neutral in wars between European powers and in wars between a European power and its colonies. But, if these type conflicts were to occur in the Americas, the U.S would regard such action as hostile to itself. This stance known as the Monroe

Doctrine and was the very cornerstone of American isolationist policy during the 19th century (Lenman, B. P. 2000: 547).

At the Berlin Conference there was a general consensus reached about how certain “rules” were to be observed, No country could claim territory without first informing other powers of their intentions and no territory could be claimed unless it had been effectively occupied. All the competitors either stretched the rules or ignored them. These type actions led to conflict and on some occasions war was narrowly averted.

The British were eager to secure the source of the Nile River. In 1882 Egypt was occupied by the British while Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya and Uganda were brought under British rule in the 1880s. In South Africa the Cape Colony, which was taken by the British in 1795 provided a foundation for all future actions against the Boer Republics; newly established countries that had been created by Afrikaner settlers who had left the Cape so as to avoid British rule. With the discovery of massive gold and diamond deposits in the South African Republic (Transvaal) and Orange Free State Republic’s, the British expressed a determined interest in these two countries. In 1880 the First Boer War (1880 to 1881) led to a peace treaty, which effectively restricted British involvement in these two Republics. However, by 1899 the Second Boer War (1899 to 1902) took place, at the end of which the two Boer Republics were defeated and immersed into the British Empire.

1.4 EARLY GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO AFRICA - BERLIN CONFERENCE TO WORLD WAR ONE

This section will centre on geopolitical (or rather geographical) approaches that were developed and studied during the period that European countries were colonising Africa. This process began just prior to the Berlin Conference and will for the purposes of this segment conclude with the commencement of the First World War, and then this will be discussed through a geopolitical prism.

Before the theoretical process of geopolitics was formalized, Europe’s monarchies represented themselves with a growing authority and their countries became centres of

national consciousness. These new nations engaged in mercantilism and they competed with each other. At the time, mercantilism was regarded as the best economic policy so as to benefit the “*general interest*.” It should be stressed that mercantilists were wholly self-centred and self-regarding in their approach. In particular mercantilists argued that the development of state policy would seek to increase exports and decrease imports relative to a given level of economic activity. In theory, one state’s exports are another states imports. This doctrine of seeking selfish advantage has in recent time come to be seen as a “*beggar-my-neighbour*” policy (Even, G. 1998:321). During the initial period of mercantilism, wealth was determined by the accumulation of large amounts of gold and silver. The demand for precious metals ensured that large numbers of ships (mostly from western European countries) departed for lands yet to be discovered (Glassner, M. I. 1996: 52-53). The demand for wealth - be it in the form of gold, ivory or slaves and the evolution of European mercantile competition are the actual origins of European expansion and is the very first phase of colonialism (Gregory, S. 2002:93). By the late nineteenth century colonial expansion allowed for the world economy to enlarge to a greater extent. By 1900 the world was formalised into European colonial empires or were dominated commercially by one of the European Great Powers. Further developments on mercantilism and the impact on the process have been discussed in some detail earlier in this document.

A point of departure regarding colonialism and (at that stage) the linkage to Political Geography during the European colonial expansion period, is the “father” of the specialization, the German Fredrich Ratzel (1844 –1904). A great deal of his work also came from the writings of another German, Carl Ritter who was the first professor of geography at the University of Berlin. Ritter had developed a cycle theory of state growth structured on an analogy with organisms. Thus, the state was conceptualized as an organic being. The fact that Ritter had originally trained in biology and chemistry allowed him to further view the state from an organic perspective. Compounded to this was the fact that Ritter had been strongly influenced by Social Darwinism and Darwin’s approach toward natural selection.

Ratzel expanded on Ritter’s hypothesis and began to create a firm foundation for the organic state theory. His specific area of interest centred on the area occupied by the state and its location on the map of the world. Ratzel’s book *Politische Geographie (1896)* used metaphors and similes from biology to analyse geography and political science. Ratzel wrote that states, very much like people need living space (*Lebensraum*) and resources, and continuously

compete with each other for them. States were regarded as organic and thus continue to grow and borders depict a temporary halt to its movements. To survive and develop, states must expand into other territories to reflect their “*vitality*”. Only those species that are best accustomed to their surroundings will survive and develop. This process of natural selection leads to the demand for *Lebensraum* either in Europe or overseas.

The State was – according to Ratzel – an organism attached to the land. At the same time Ratzel stressed that his analogy was not to be taken literally. States are involved in an ongoing process of evolution and they (like organisms) must grow or decay and die, since (by their very nature) they cannot stand still and be motionless (Dikshit, R.D, 2000:18-19).

Ratzel was seen by many observers as being amongst the leading and formative theorists regarding the establishment of political geography. To him the State appeared to be the most significant reality of the modern world. His study of geography was transplanted into studies on environmental influences on human history. Added to this was the fact that Ratzel stressed those cultural factors as well as physical ones, shaped human behaviour and history in general. At the time of Ratzel’s writing, Germany had begun the process of industrialisation. The nation had just won the Franco-Prussian war (1870/71) and the country was actively seeking new markets, which allowed for the country to enter into competition with England. It should be noted that a great deal of Ratzel’s work concentrated on trying to intellectually justify Germany’s territorial expansion (Jones, M. 2004: 4-5) as well as attempting to validate the *raison d’être* for imperial expansion. He attempted to rationalise the growth process of a state, which he said began as “*territorial cells*” and then expanded due to the inclusion of people and land and finally “evolved into States or even empires” (Glassner, M. I. 1996: 104).

According to Ratzel, the expansion of a state’s border reflects the health of a nation. Therefore, the vitality of a country can be evaluated by the size of that country at a certain time. It was logical, according to Ratzel to study the recurring patterns of a state’s growth so as to identify what he termed as the “*laws of the spatial growth of States*”. These laws were published in 1896. Ratzel’s “*seven laws of State growth*” can be summarised as follows these being:

1. “*Political geography deals primarily with the bases of population movements and States are dependent both in their size and in their form upon their inhabitants. In other words, States take on the mobility of their population as expressed in the phenomena of their*

growth and decline. A body of people is joined to the area of the State. They live on its soil, draw their sustenance from it, and are otherwise attached to it by a spiritual relationship. Together with this piece of territory they form the State.

- 2. For political geography, each group of people living on an essential fixed area represents a living body which has extended itself over a part of the earth surface and has differentiated itself from other such bodies which have similarly expanded either by boundaries or by empty spaces.*
- 3. The population of the State is involved in a continuous internal movement which is transformed into an external movement whenever a fragment of land is newly occupied, or an earlier possession is relinquished.*
- 4. These expansions are seldom known to take place in unpossessed areas. Usually, they lead to penetration or displacements; or small areas together with their population may be combined into larger units without changing their location. Likewise, these larger States may disintegrate again. This process of union and disintegration, of growth and disintegration, of growth and diminution, represents a major portion of the historical developments of States, which are geographically depicted as an interchange of smaller and larger surfaces.*
- 5. Each spatial transformation has unavoidable consequences on all neighbouring areas and transformation of territory from one area to another is one of the most potent "motifs" of historical development.*
- 6. Within this spatial motif there are two tendencies: enlargement and reproduction, both of which operate continuously as incitements to mobility. To this is added a third motif, establishment, i.e. the nature of the relationship of the State to the land, which determines the rate of its growth and in particular, the permanence of its results" (Dikshit, R.D. 2000:18-19).*

Ratzel remained scientific in his approach and retained the position of an uninvolved observer and did not make any recommendations. His descriptions remained centred on the analogy to an organism and considered the interrelationships between people and their environment.

Rudolf Kjellen was one of the most relevant post-Ratzelian students of political geography. Kjellen was a professor of Government at the University of Goteborg and was influenced by Ratzel's ideas pertaining to the state as an organism within the ambit of politico-geographic ideas. Kjellen viewed the state not only as a living organism but went further and believed

that the state/organism was also equipped with intellectual as well as moral capacities. Furthermore he saw that the final goal for the state was the attainment of power. In this quest, the state did not have to follow the (simple) organic laws of territorial expansion. It could use modern cultural advantages and techniques regarding it reaching its objectives.

The term “*geopolitics*” was created by Kjellen and he stated that it was “*the theory of the State as a geographic organism or phenomenon in space*”, i.e., as a land, territory, area or most especially as a country (Alexander, L. M. 1963: 19). In essence he regarded States - not so much as legal bodies but rather as powers, competing and involved in a continuous struggle for supremacy. For Kjellen, the highest objective of a State’s political development was “*to acquire good natural frontiers externally and harmonious unity internally*” (Gyorgy, A. 1944: 166).

Kjellen laid emphasis on the contest for power and less attention on the rule of law and morality. This contest for power led to the obvious conclusion of a select number of large and powerful states. In his view, the breaches of international law, expansion and wars was not a factor that operated outside man’s realm but rather to man’s drive, self preservation and the way leaders of nations regarding their State’s determination. Seen through this perception, the Scramble for African territory by the larger European powers could be seen as a justified process. Kjellen’s writings attracted strong attention from German scholars who researched the relationship between politics and geography. The flow and development of ideas on this topic owed a great deal to the geographical proximity of German and Scandinavian scholars. This close location allowed strong interchange to develop between academics within this specific region (Dodds, K. 2008: 28).

Staaen som Lifsform (1916) remains Kjellen’s most important work on geopolitics. It was in this publication that he developed the concept that the State was an organism that was engaged in an everlasting struggle for geopolitical space – the arsenal of all resources – since in the struggle for existence among states only the fittest and the most dominant survive. He stated that “*vital vigorous States with limited space obey the categorical political importance of expanding their space by colonization, amalgamation and conquest*”. To him the most appropriate attributes for a great power were spaciousness, internal cohesion and the simplicity of external communication. Kjellen felt that Germany did not have many of these essential “ingredients” and believed that the country had to develop these characteristics if it

were to survive as a great power. The solution for Kjellen was in the creation of a “*broad based German Empire encompassing the whole of central Europe with its corner-stones at Dunkerque, Riga, Hamburg and Bagdad.*” In his essay “*The Ideas of 1914, A Perspective of World History*” (1915), Kjellen had encouraged the perspective of German war-euphoria. Due to this factor, his writings became widely popular and his contributed a great deal to the rapid rise of geopolitics in Germany (Kost, K. 1989: 369-85).

In his analysis of states Kjellen centred on the following five steps: *Geopolitik* or geography of the State; *Demopolitik*, or population of the State; *Oekopolitik*, or economic resources of the State; *Sosiopolitik*, or social structure of the State, and *Kratopolitik* or government of the State. In his research Percy stressed the importance of the fact that Kjellen had situated the geography of the State first and the government of the State last. Kjellen was of the opinion that the strength of maritime empires would overtime pass over to compact land empires, which would then also control the seas. He believed that Germany would emerge as a giant European state and would go on to spread itself to Europe, Western Asia and Africa (Percy, G., & Fifield, R. 1948: 25).

During the period under review, apart from the hypotheses expanded upon regarding the organic state as expanded on by both Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen another area of research which came from the United States and United Kingdom developed, namely that of “*Geostrategy*”. The American, Admiral Alfred Mahan who was a naval historian played an influencing role regarding the theory of sea power and naval strategy Mahan’s writings altered naval thinking in France, Italy, Russia, Japan as well as smaller powers. Mahan argued that the path to national greatness was in commercial and naval expansionism. All true powers were naval powers and it was not, according to Mahan necessary to acquire whole territories and formally occupy them (America was theoretically against colonialism and regarded itself as an anti-colonial country). In its place the United States required an informal empire based on “*open door*” trade and various overseas naval bases that would allow the navy to project power whenever it needed to do so (O’Tuathail, G. 1998: 22).

Interestingly, Mahan’s ideas about global strategy cannot be found in any single book or article. His theory had to be extracted from various statements throughout his large number of writings. Mahan was a naval historian who wrote about twenty books on the subject. His most significant contributions included the following books: *The Influence of Sea Power upon*

History, 1660 - 1783 (1890) and *The Influence of Sea Power upon History: the French Revolution and Empire, 1793 - 1812 (1892)* and *The Life of Nelson (1897)*. All his writings are linked through a common cord, derived through his belief that the most vital component for world power status for any country was an effective control of the sea (Sprout, M. 1939: 415).

Mahan stressed the need for a large navy and there were six fundamental factors that a sea power had to develop and continuously maintain these were:

1. Physical “*conformation*” of the State (the nature of the state’s coast). If a states coastline has inlets, estuaries, inlets, natural harbours and outlets. If there are no harbours it will prevent the people of the state from having their own sea trade, shipping industry or navy. An interesting juxtaposition exists pertaining to navigable rivers, which help promote internal trade while at the same time they could well serve as avenues of penetration by enemies.
2. Geographic position (location). If a State has a coast on an ocean or sea or more than one opening. Whether these waters are interconnected, if there are exposed land boundaries, if the country can control important trade bases and whether the State is able to maintain strategic bases overseas.
3. Extent of territory (the coast-lines length). The capacity regarding how well a coast can be defended.
4. Population size. A State with a large population will be more able to maintain a navy and merchant marine than a State with a smaller population
5. Character of the Government. If government policy has allowed for opportunities as developed by the population and the environment to promote sea power.
6. National character. The ability of the people to develop “*commercial pursuits.*” Mahan stressed that sea power is “really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce.” (Glassner, M., I. 1996: 324-325).

Mahan saw the sea as a great highway; “*a wide common over which men may pass in all directions but which some well-known paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose lines of travel rather than others.*” In the modern world where trade dominated, suitable oceanic location offered “a distinct politico-economic advantage and a landlocked

location was in this regard a definite disadvantage” (Dikshit, R. D. 2000:185). Mahan noted that command of seaborne commerce was the key to winning wars and an “*overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it*” was required to achieve this objective. It should be noted that Mahan strongly stressed the issue of national “*will*”. Mahan’s thinking in many ways ran parallel to Kajellen’s. However, Mahan (who was a naval man) was writing at a time when European imperialism and colonialism has at its height and which, the United States was beginning to copy. As with Kajellen, Mahan was influenced by social Darwinism and he believed that a State could only survive if it was fit, specifically in terms of military strength.

The Russian empire was regarded as the typical example of a land power, with all its strengths and weaknesses. Russia was in a landlocked position and could easily be shut off by a hostile sea power. In direct contrast was the geographical position of Great Britain. The country, despite her small land base had established herself as a massive empire due to her “*advantageous sea frontage,*” which had allowed the country to become the strongest sea power as well as a world power of the time. Despite the Russian empires ambitions and size it could easily be contained by a strong British navy with its various bases throughout the world.

Due to her insularity, Britain was to a greater extent secure from outside attack. The country did not have to spend money on defence structures and could rather place capital in the navy. The country’s geographic location, between the northern European countries and the Atlantic provided Britain with immense strategic advantage pertaining to trade and commerce as deep-sea commerce of all European ports lying north of London and had to pass through the English Channel. The British navy could block the deep-sea commerce of the entire northern and Western Europe. Due to the country’s oceanic location, Britain succeeded in controlling most of the strategic points on almost all of the major routes of world trade. The fact that the country had control over the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, Singapore, Hong Kong and the Strait of Magellan allowed Britain to retain the dominant position in Europe, Asia, and the Pacific (Dikshit,R.D. 2000:185). The author of *The Fruits of War, 2007*, Michael White placed this situation in perspective when he stressed that conflict and war allowed the design of ships to progress. This included the way they were designed and the roles they performed. Furthermore, “*all the great cities of the world are built next to water. They grew up around ports and harbours because, until the middle of the twentieth century, all trade was conducted using land or sea transportation.*” Further to this White

states that *“the oceans, seas, rivers and lakes of the world have provided the infrastructure for civilisation, for the two constants in human evolution are war and trade; these are inextricably linked and each has been facilitated by seafaring. Command of the seas gave nations huge power and the development of the ship has guided the ebb and flow of culture, economic and military power, breathing life into the dreams of imperialists and turning tiny nations into global rulers”* (White, M. 2007: 243-244).

Mahan’s ideas have gained a great deal of popularity and today one sees a growing following in Asia, notably China and India. The securing of China’s sea lanes against aggressive powers had become a highly prioritised stance amongst strategic planners within that country. More than four-fifths of the country’s crude oil crosses the Indian Ocean through the strategically positioned Malacca Strait huge shipments of coal, iron ore bauxite and coal and other raw materials, vital for China’s growth pass through the Strait. India imports four-fifths of its oil, mostly from the Persian Gulf as well as natural gas from Qatar and Indonesia through the same location. Thus the entire Indian Ocean seaboard can be described as *“a vast web of energy trade.”* Although many observers would regard threats to peace in Asian waters as coming from Somali pirates, non-state or pariah-state actors, North Korean nuclear smugglers as well as jihadists, drug and people smugglers, it is believed that China regards India and America as the greatest threat (The Economist, June 13, 2009: 58).

Although he was an American, Mahan’s influenced German, British and Japanese geostrategists more so than he did in his own country. His approach dovetailed with the visions of prominent imperialists of that time in the United States, namely Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. These two influential American’s along with Mahan believed in social Darwinian ideology that states, people’s and races were in a struggle with each other and that only the most aggressive and fittest would survive. Roosevelt went so far as to state that *“there is no place in the world for nations who have become enervated by soft and easy life or who have lost their fibre of vigorous hardness and manliness.”* Today, Roosevelt would be regarded as a white supremacist who believed in the natural hierarchy of races. The Anglo -Saxon was at the top while other races such as the Negro and Chinese fell under them. When Roosevelt became the American President in 1901, his foreign policy concentrated on the fact that the United States was a *“masterful race”* which should *“speak softly, but carry a big stick.”* Roosevelt began an aggressive policy of geopolitical interventionism throughout the Pacific, Caribbean and Latin and Central America. At the commencement of his second

term in 1905, Roosevelt formalised his geopolitical approach into the so-called “*corollary*” of the Monroe Doctrine. The doctrine, which had been established by President James Monroe in 1823 stressed that European powers should not “*extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere.*” Roosevelt went further by stressing that due to the fact that the United States was the most superior and civilised state, that the country had a right - almost an obligation to “*exercise an international police power*” in the region to ensure that uncivilised and troublesome states were kept in line. “*This action of enforcing the rule of law was the process of ‘the white man’s burden’ as articulated by Rudyard Kipling. This ‘responsibility’ came at that time due to the perceived superiority by leaders such as President Roosevelt*” (O’Tuathail, G. 1998: 22).

The last figure to be discussed in this section of the paper is, without doubt the most significant within the field of geostrategy and later geopolitics. The geographer Sir Halford Mackinder is the most renowned and respected thinker within this area of expertise. Even before Mackinder established his standing as a theorist of the heartland and the architect of British geography he had established his reputation as a geographer. At that time, being British provided almost tacit approval for what in present times would be regarded as eccentric. British explorers were laying claim to large swathes throughout the world. The majority of areas that were unmapped at that time were found near the poles, under water or at the top of mountains. This is where British (and for that matter, other Europeans) explorers gravitated to. By the end of the nineteenth century high spaces were regarded by explorers as “*valuable commodities.*”

Halford Mackinder fell within the above mentioned category. He had spend his formative years being educated in the “*British, imperial, scientific-exploratory tradition*” by Professor Henry Nottidge Moseley, Linacre Professor of Human and Comparative Anatomy. As a youth, Mackinder’s Victorian childhood was influenced with stories about Captain Cook’s voyages and he was almost conditioned to obtain an understanding of the empires adventures, its interests and competitions (Blouet, B.W. 2004:1). He had a “*strong curiosity about natural phenomena... a love of the history of travel and exploration, an interest in international affairs, and a passion for making maps*” (Sempa, F.P. 1996:1-2). Mackinder studied at Oxford University and was responsible for helping to establish geography as an independent area of study in the United Kingdom. In 1886 he became a lecturer in natural science and economic history and also became a member of the Royal Geographical Society. Members of

the Society were individuals who had a strong interest in global affairs and were academics, colonial administrators, diplomats, naval and army officers. A year later Mackinder wrote his first significant paper entitled "*On the Scope and Methods of Geography.*" The article was seen as a point of departure as far as the development of British geography. Mackinder stressed that "*rational*" political geography was "*built upon and subsequent to physical geography.*" Political geography's purpose was "*to trace the interaction between and environment.*" Mackinder said that this included the "*configuration of the earth's surface,*" climate and weather conditions, and the absence or presence of natural resources (Mackinder, H. J. 1962: 213-217).

Academics note that the key to understand Mackinder's succeeding writings on geopolitics are four ideas found within "*On the Scope and Methods of Geography*" these being:

- The goal of a geographer was to "*look at the past (so) that he may interpret the present.*"
- Man had almost discovered all that had been discovered and that there were very few "*blanks on our maps.*"
- Mackinder classified two types of political conquerors, namely "*land-wolves and sea wolves.*"
- Finally he recognised that technological advancements made "*the great size of modern states*" possible (Sempa, F. P. 2002: 9-10).

In 1887 Mackinder was made Reader in Geography at Oxford and commenced to lecture on geographic influences on European history. By 1892 he visited the United States where he lectured at various universities. In the same year he was also appointed as the Principle of Reading College at Oxford, a position he retained for eleven years. It was during this period that Mackinder also gave a series of ten lectures on the importance of geography in history in Europe and Asia (Sempa, F.P.2002: 11).

It was in 1899 that Mackinder went beyond the parameters of theory and travelled to Africa so as to lead an attempt to climb to the summit of Mt Kenya (17 050 ft). In essence Mackinder had enacted on the reality of the present situation and that he wanted to make some achievement, as time was literally running out as there were very few "*blanks on our maps.*" It is obvious that he would have wanted to be the explorer who would be the first to climb to

Africa's highest summit but that had already been achieved by the German geologist, Hans Meyer who was successful in reaching the summit of Mt. Kilimanjaro in 1889.

Numerous factors seemed to converge at the time to make Mackinder's summit ascent possible. Technology and science create horizontal space, through lines of longitude and latitude, telegraph cables, timetables, railroads and trigonometric surveys. Michael Reidy describes railroads as the "*quintessential horizontal engines of empire.*" These railroads have allowed Europeans access to the different continents of the world. The railroad system in Africa opened Africa's interior plateau and allowed access to the fertile highland regions. For Mackinder, the climbing of Mt Kenya would not have been possible without the railway. It was almost impossible to reach the interior without the railway, as reflected by previous failed attempts to conquer the summit made by Joseph Thompson in 1883, Count Teliki in 1887 and J.W Gregory in 1893. Mackinder closely monitored the evolution of the Uganda Railway when construction started in 1895 and by 1899, when it reached Nairobi he rapidly made arrangements as access to the mountain was now possible.

As mentioned above, Mackinder (who was a product of his era) undertook the ascent of Mt Kenya for several reasons; the most important was for him to establish his (practical) reputation and future credibility as a geographer and the climb would act "*as a springboard for his new professorship.*" British national prestige also played an important role. There was a great deal of symbolism attached in "*capturing the summit*" and this had to be done before the German's did it. Britain was at the height of its empire and such action had a great deal of nationalistic sentiment as well as practical imperial significance attached. The attempt was "*a means to measure geographic space and controlling and defining the place of empire.*" At that time, Victorians regarded the world within a certain prism. They were determined to map out (remaining) spaces; be it land, ocean, atmospheric or even mining spaces and within these parameters also "*imperial spaces of struggle and domination.*" Mackinder's goal to "*break into the great plateau in the heart of Africa*" belonged to the larger geopolitical strategy of establishing control of the upper "*reaches*" of the Nile thus controlling the water reserve for the whole of northeast Africa (Reidy, M.S. 2008: 1-5).

Mackinder's conquering of Mt Kenya also has some parallels with other more forbidding "travel journals" of Africa. Reidy highlights that Mackinder mimics Joseph Conrad's fictional narrative of Charlie Marlow's adventures in the Congo. Mackinder travels upward while

Marlow follows the river Congo. Mackinder moves further and further away from civilization and enters a “*savage*” darkness. Lines between immorality and morality become distorted. At Mombasa, Mackinder wrote, “*I never saw aggressive straight immorality. Almost all the bodies were plump and clean – they shave under the arms*”. As he climbed higher into the plateau and gains height, he states that “*gradually the houses become poorer*” and their owners “*have not morals.*” This almost allows Mackinder to justify the acquisition of territory and the expansion of Western civilization and the British Empire. Most significantly, as in Conrad’s book, events turn objectionable, so to, does it occur with Mackinder’s exhibition when eight porters were “*shot by orders*” for insubordination close to the final base camp (Reidy, M.S. 2008: 3).

There is no doubt that Mackinder’s Mount Kenya expedition was a part of Britain’s imperial expansion and with this action Britain further cemented its imperial control over Kenya and Uganda. As O’Tuathail states, Mackinder wanted “*to penetrate and map the vast interiors of Africa*” and this “*expedition to Mount Kenya was to write on this blank page*”. Furthermore, Mackinder had an element of protection as his “*eye’s were sovereign, his authority guaranteed by his male body, his white skin, and his European learning*” (O’Tuathail, G. 1996: 76-81).

As Mackinder departed Africa for Oxford in 1899 events in South Africa altered his view of the continent and his future vision of the empire. The Anglo-Boer War or South African War began and continued from 1899 to 1902. More than half a million British troops aided by additional soldiers from Australia, Canada and other parts of the British empire were involved in a war that brought high casualties. This conflict questioned the efficiency of the army and allowed for a re-evaluation of imperial defence to take place. These factors impacted on Mackinder’s stance and helped him to question his global view and vision before he wrote his “*Pivot paper*” (Mackinder, H. J. 1943. 595-605).

In the same year Mackinder delivered a series of lectures on “*The great trade routes.*” Initially Mackinder had been extremely positive about Britain’s economic future but had seen that a free-trade Britain would not be able to compete with the other great powers. All of them had protective tariffs. This encouraged Mackinder to convert from free trade to protectionism. In 1900 Mackinder unsuccessfully attempted to win a seat in Parliament as a Liberal Imperialist. In 1902 Mackinder’s first book entitled *Britain and the British Seas* was

published. Chapters within the book that concentrated on “*The Position of Britain*,” “*Imperial Britain*,” and “*Strategic Geography*” allowed the early reader an insight of his early geopolitical works. Mackinder went on to state that a “new balance of power” was evolving and it included five great states, namely Britain, France, Germany, Russia and America. Furthermore, Britain’s position was endangered due to “*permanent factors of physical geography*” due to “*the presence of vast Powers broad-based on the resources of half continents*” (the United States and Russia), (Sempa, F. P. 2002:11).

1904 was the year that Mackinder came into the forefront of geographical and geopolitical thinking, which propelled him to the vanguard on early twentieth century international relations debates and thinking on strategic analysis. At a lecture given at the Royal Geographical Society in that year, Mackinder who was Director of the London School of Economics presented a seminal paper entitled “*The Geographical Pivot of History*.” Mackinder contended that Central Asia was the central zone of continental drainage and had for some time been the geographical pivot of history and would continue to remain the pivot of world politics. Furthermore, he stated that European history was subordinate to Asian history (Venier, P. 2004: 1-2).

From a physical map of the world Mackinder identified a huge landmass comprising Europe, Asia (entitled Euro-Asia the name was changed in 1919 to Eurasia) and Africa. This massive landmass - which was viewed as one landmass he named the “*World Island*,” which he further sub-divided into six regions. It was noted that three-fourths of the earth’s surface is water and one fourth was land. Of the one-fourth, two-thirds are part of the World Island and only a remaining third is covered by the lasting continents. Seven-eighths of the world’s population is in the area. Mackinder pictured the landmasses in three tiers. The most significant was the “*pivot area*” (in his later writings (1919) Mackinder called this area the “*Heartland*”) and the country that controlled the pivot was referred to as the “*pivot state*”. This area, which was the inner core of Euro-Asia region, had abundant resources (Drysdale, A., & Blake, G. H. 1985: 23 - 26).

Figure 1.3 in the attachment at the end of the thesis provides a map indicating Mackinder’s *Pivot Area, the inner and outer crescents* as described by him within his paper entitled, “*The Geographical Pivot of History*” (1904), in *The Geographical Journal*, 23. 1904.

The pivot area was surrounded by a “*marginal (or inner) crescent*” and are the landmass that today makes up Germany, Austria, Turkey, India and China, the Middle East and basically the whole of Euro-Asia outside the Pivot region. The third tier was the Outer/Periphery or “*Insular Crescent*” in which lie Britain, South Africa, as well as Africa South of the Sahara, Australia, the United States, Japan and basically those countries that are within “*Oceania*.” The Periphery, which is smaller than the World Island and these countries depend on “*naval power*” to project their power and develop their economies through conquest and trade. Mackinder saw the Periphery as being able to use its naval power to reach the World Island’s coastal areas but would not be able to reach its resources that were situated deep inside the land mass. The pivot area (Heartland) was “*the greatest natural fortress on earth*” and extended from the Volga river in the west to Western Siberia in the east and from the Himalayas and the mountains in the south to the Arctic in the north. What was a distinguishing feature of the pivot area was that it was surrounded by “mountain-barriers on three sides and an ice-bound sea on the fourth, it was not accessible to sea powers and was therefore strategically secure like a fortress” (Dikshit, R. D. 2000:187). The fortress has one weakness, Mackinder acknowledged and that was from and opening in the west - between the Baltic and Black Seas. This gap was not blocked geographically. Thus the pivot area was vulnerable to land forces in the southwest through Eastern Europe (Fettweis, C. 2000: 5). Comparing countries to cogs in a machine, he theorized that the Heartland was the largest cog, and countries surrounding it were the smaller cogs that moved as it moved. Mackinder used history to better illustrate the “*strategic significance of geography*.” From the fifth century and commencing with the Huns, successive waves of “*mobile hordes emerged from the Heartland to conquer or threaten the coastlands of Europe and Asia*.” The various hordes however, were never able to completely conquer the entire World-Island (Sempa, F. P. 2002: 16).

Mackinder noted that the last stages of geographic exploration (named the Columbian Epoch) were nearing its end. For 400 years the world has been exposed to various individuals – ranging from missionaries to conquerors – who had outlined the “*map of the world*” with “*appropriate accuracy*,” Due to this the world was becoming a “*closed political system*.” Mackinder saw world history as being in continuous conflict between land and sea powers. During the Columbian Epoch, the mobility that sea powers had provided was a distinct advantage to sea powers but sea power was coming to an end (Mackinder, H, J 1904: 421)

and the maritime empires were vulnerable. Furthermore, the system of railroads allowed land powers to become nearly as mobile as those powers at sea. Land powers on the World Island had less distance to travel than sea powers operating on its periphery and any advantage in mobility could “*tip the balance.*” These “*interior lines*” gave the power with the “*central position*” on the World Island the opportunity to project power at any place and more rapidly than sea powers could defend. At the same time, the Heartland power had a strong geopolitical advantage at the conclusion of the Columbian Epoch as technological changes allowed for “*rapid troop movement and power projection*”. Land powers were coming on par with sea powers and the Heartland was in the best position to exploit this situation due to new technology and mobility which allowed for shorter, “*interior lines of movement*” (Fettweis, C. 2000: 2-6).

As the historian Paul Kennedy wrote in the Guardian newspaper, Mackinder argued that the “*coming of steam power, electricity and the railways was at last permitting continental nations to overcome the physical obstacles that had hampered their development in the past.*” An example of this was the railroad that allowed tsarist Russia to exploit its huge resources and to make strategic inroads towards India and the Far East. Britain, its imperial rival could not counter this process. “*Land Power was thus eroding the geopolitical advantages that had been enjoyed by the western sea power*” (The Guardian, 19 June, 2004: 12). White makes the argument that the construction of railways in industrial country’s were ostensibly for the public but was driven by a military imperative. Governments soon realised that a well maintained railway network could be used to move troops and equipment quickly and far more easily than traditional methods. The Germans were the first to grasp this significance and by 1852 the German government had assisted in financing eleven new railway lines between the French border and major German cities. This was followed by similar railway lines going east until the Russian border. France and Russia both began to meet these challenges by building their own railway network(s).

The Germans expanded the building of railway lines to their growing empire and between 1860 and 1900 the Germans laid thousands of miles of railroad track in German colonial territories in Africa and the Far East. It should be noted that it was due to the effective German army operational skills and efficiency with transportation that they crushed French forces in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1. Following the German victory, the Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Molke the elder declared: “*Build no more fortresses, build*

railways.” Germany’s competitors’ began doing just that and by 1895 Russia had built 22 000 miles of railway track – a massive accomplishment, taking into consideration that in 1856 the country only had six hundred throughout the entire Russia.. Progress in Europe between 1871 and 1914 saw the length of railway track treble from almost 65 000 miles to just over 180 000 miles. At the beginning of the First World War in 1914 the French used 10 000 trains to transport their armies to the various fronts and the Germans took 2 070 000 men, 118 000 horses and 400 000 tonnes of supplies in 20 800 trains to war (White, M. 2007: 243-244).

Following the defeat of Napoleon, Mackinder felt that British sea power should contain “pivot state” Russian land power (a continuous geopolitical struggle later called the “*great game*” by Kipling). Mackinder wrote that... “*We are opposed to Russian Czardom, because Russia was the dominating, threatening force both in East Europe and the Heartland for a half century*”. He saw the development of Russia, “*the pivot state*” as a replacement of the Mongol Empire. “*Her pressure on Finland, on Scandinavia, on Poland, on Turkey, on Persia, on India, and on China, replaces the centrifugal raids of the steppemen. In the world at large she occupies the central strategic position held by Germany in Europe*” (Mackinder, H. J. 1904: 436).

A point of criticism on Mackinder’s “*pivot paper*” is the level of concern he showed regarding the threat that he perceived Russia showed. He clearly overestimated Russia’s potential and seemed to overextend this by stressing the absolute necessity for Britain to contain Russia and thwart the “*pivot state*” from gaining access to the coast of Persia. It is almost a case of Mackinder taking his “*eye off the ball.*” He regarded Russia as a major threat and Germany only as a minor threat. It is a fact that he regarded the potential of the two continental powers of Russia and Germany in an alliance as a significant threat to Britain: “*The oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight. This might happen if Germany were to ally herself with Russia*” (Mackinder, H. J. 1904: 436). Interestingly, Mackinder feared an assertive Russia as well as acknowledging that an alliance between Russia and Germany would be an even worse scenario but he never thought of German being the so-called singular future “*spoiler.*”

From an African perspective, it is interesting to note the “*Pivot paper*” view of global imperialism. Blouet argues that Mackinder’s fear that the balance was moving from sea to

land power. “The shadow of the pivot would fall across the world, weakening the British Empire.” Furthermore, Blouet believed that the “*Pivot paper*” carried a message: “*unite the imperial territories economically to provide the resources to allow Britain to compete in the emerging new world order and prevent the decline of the country in world affairs by creating an ‘economically integrated empire’*” (O’Tuathail, G. 1992: 105). Further to this is the implication that Mackinder was employing the threat regarding the re-emergence from the heartland of Euro-Asia as a “*catalyst for imperial unity*” (Blouet, B. W: 2004:1). Mackinder felt that there was no more room for expansion as the world’s “*closed system*” disallowed any further expansion. The process of colonialism had brought the entire world under Europe’s influence. “*Power politics of the future, Mackinder speculated, would be marked by a competition over the old territories rather than a quest for new ones*” (Fettweis, C 2000: 2).

Mackinder’s belief that there was a new closed-space world, Britain had a legitimate interest in every part of the globe and within this milieu; he presented British imperialism as a rationally directed force of nature. Free will almost obliged the British or at least the Anglo-Saxon people to their “*momentous obligation.*” Mackinder believed that the British Empire had to “*hold its place according to the universal law of survival through efficiency and effort*” (Mackinder, H. J. 1911: 83). Thus, the British had to ascend above the “*mere fatalism*” of the seemingly cycle of the rise and decline of empires (Mackinder, H. J: 1919:3).

With the fact that the closed system ensured that there was no more vacant land, “*a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos,*” developed to act as a type of safety valve for European rivalries (Mackinder, H. J. 1904: 422). Across the world, the Great Powers now had to compete with each other directly for resources, trade, markets and even military allies. The British Empire’s survival depended on how it would be able to extend itself throughout the world. The post-Columbian age brought new challenges that ensured the old liberal policies of non-interference in the affairs of other countries were no longer adhered to. Furthermore, the *laissez-faire* attitude displayed during the Victorian times was no longer possible. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Mackinder believed that free markets – either domestically or globally - only exposed the practitioner to abuse by less-liberal economies. Mackinder also believed that that there should be racial purity and social reform exercised within Britain. All British peoples – whether they were in Britain, Canada, and Australia or even in the United Kingdom should implement unity. “*Dark man-power*” within the colonies

should also be utilised within a “*satisfied*” colonial system with specific emphasis on the struggle to come (Kearns, G. 2006:75-76).

Mackinder’s strong imperialistic vision went so far as to regard “*Australasia, South Africa and Canada as set like a crescent on the Turkish flag, with India in the place of the star.*” Venier believed that this method of symbolically visualising the imperial community of the white colonies in a crescent centred on India is significant as it is “*symptomatic of the way in which racialist views were central to imperial thinking in the age of social Darwinism and Anglo-Saxonism.*”

Mackinder was also considered to be one of the founding philosophers of another subfield of geopolitics, that of geostrategy, which in broad terms can be seen as matching a means to an end. Grygiel places geostrategy in clear terms when he states that “*geostrategy describes where a state directs its military and diplomatic efforts. Because of limited resources, states, even the most powerful ones, must choose where to project their power and influence, imparting a clear geopolitical direction to their foreign policy*” (Grygiel, J.J. 2006:10). Mackinder’s Heartland theory, the more general classical geopolitics and geostrategy were all highly influential in the making of US strategic policy during the period of the Cold War and in this regard the America’s stance on geopolitical developments in Africa during that period. To place geostrategy into greater perspective within the present frame of reference one only has to view the writing of the former Secretary for State during the Carter administration, Zbigniew Brzezinski who wrote, “*the words geopolitical, strategic, and geostrategic are used to convey the following meanings: geopolitical reflects the combination of geographic and political factors determining the condition of a state or region, and emphasizing the impact of geography on politics; strategic refers to the comprehensive and planned application of measures to achieve a central goal or to vital assets of military significance; and geostrategic merges strategic consideration with geopolitical ones*” (Zbigniew, B. 1986: 16).

1.5 AFRICA DURING WORLD WAR ONE: COLONISATION STRENGTHENS

This thesis will not analyse Africa's involvement in the First World War. What should be noted is that by 1914 colonial rivalry had little to do with the direct commencement of the War but it did contribute to the cause. Rivalry strained relations between European powers and there were various clashes between these powers. Colonial rivalry led indirectly to the formation and strengthening of *ententes* and alliances. For example, Italy turned to Germany and Austria when it believed that it had been beaten in obtaining Tunisia as a colony by France. The reality was that Italy, due to its "government's impotence" had failed to act as assertively as France had regarding the manner in which Ali Bey, the Turkish bey was intimidated by France to accept a treaty in 1881 that made "Tunisia a French protectorate in all but name" (Pakenham, T. 1991: 116-121). Rivalry amongst the colonial powers allowed for an increase in the arms race. After the Jameson raid on the Afrikaans Republic of Transvaal, South Africa in 1896, and Germany clearly saw that it could not provide military assistance to the Boers, without a strong navy. It was shortly after the raid that the German Minister of the Marine, Admiral von Tripitz announced that Germany needed a strong navy and from 1896, Germany began the construction of additional battleships. Hostilities between the colonial authorities remained just below the surface as reflected by the first and second Moroccan crises and the situation in Sudan in 1896 when France and Britain nearly went to war.

Germany, as with all other colonial powers had a "concept" strategy to ensure that it maintained a competitive advantage on its rivals in Africa. Academics identified the region between its colonies of German East Africa (Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania excluding the island of Zanzibar), German South West Africa (Namibia), and Cameroon. These could be annexed and an adjoining unit could be created that would cover Africa from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This region with its natural resources would, it was believed, bring wealth as well as economic self-sufficiency. This level of German strategic thinking identified a specific geostrategic region within central and east Africa entitled *Mittelafrika*. This strategy would theoretically allow for an agglomeration of German colonies and also showed Germany's foreign policy objectives before World War One. The idea goes back to the 1890s when the then Chancellor of Germany, Leo von Caprivi, obtained the Caprivi Strip in the

Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. This strip of land allowed Germany a “finger” into the middle of Africa (Fischer, F. 1968: 143).

Figure 1.4 within the attachment at the end of this thesis, entitled “*European Imperialism in Africa, 1914: Commencement of the First World War*” provides a stark overview of the level colonialism had reached when the First World War had begun.

The involvement by the various countries within Africa pertaining to their participation and support of their colonial “masters” will be briefly discussed. It should be remembered that the vast majority of Africans had very little idea about the intricacies of developments surrounding the commencement of the War. Basically, each colonial power expected the local inhabitants in their portion of Africa to uphold their stance but without the support of chiefs and local leaders, European powers would not have been able to muster troops and carriers to support the war effort on the continent. The British gathered the support of chiefs so as to obtain men. In British colonies, Black soldier’s motive for fighting focused on the belief that the Germans would take their land. A Nigerian who served as a porter during the 1916-18 Cameroons campaign was told “*that we were going to the great war to help the King’s soldiers who were preventing the Germans coming to our country and burning it.*” There were also misgivings by whites towards blacks fighting in the war. A Colonial Officer informed the War Office in 1915 that “*it must not be forgotten that a West African native trained to use of arms and filled with a new degree of self-confidence by successful encounters with forces armed and led by Europeans was not likely to be more amenable to discipline in peace time*” (James, L. 1999: 230 - 231).

Senior British commanders believed that it was important that imperial prestige should be maintained by white soldiers and the vast majority of the fighting. Apart from 136 000 soldiers from South Africa, the African colonies produced 57 000 soldiers and 932 000 porters and labourers, most served in the German East African campaign. The majority of the African soldiers were recruited through a compulsory service order in 1915 that covered the East African region and included all those aged between 18 to 45 and by 1917 included the Uganda Protectorate. Despite these figures the Colonial Office was apprehensive about black men fighting whites and senior officers imagined that the “*negro lacked the steadiness and fortitude of the European*” (Killingray, D. 1989: 99).

The Belgium government was more robust and forced recruitment compelled 260 000 men from the Congo to be porters who carried soldiers equipment and provisions. The French actually conscripted Africans from within their colonies and there was compulsory service for all African males. By 1912 the French began to create a permanent black army and by the start of the First World War 14 785 troops were in service. This escalated and by 1915-16, 50 000 more had been recruited through chiefs. African soldiers who were under French command were combatants. Blaise Diagne who has been mentioned earlier in this document was, in 1918, appointed as the French High Commission of Recruitment of black troops. According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) over two million people in Africa made “*enormous sacrifices in Africa and for their European allies*”. One hundred thousand men died in East Africa and 65 000 soldiers from French North Africa and French West Africa also died during the First World War (www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica).

Figure 1.5 found in the attachment at the end of this thesis entitled *African Colonies and Military Conflict during the First World War*, indicates on a map of the continent the level and location of conflict that took place on the continent during the First World War

The military conflict in Africa or the “*African Theatre*” was regarded as a side show when compared to the massive destruction and loss of millions of lives in Europe. Despite the low profile that Africa had, the colonies were seen as extensions of their respective “colonial masters” and as extensions were occupied and fought in and over in that regard. The five European powers; Germany, Great Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium added by their allies fought the “European” war by extension. The East African campaign saw various battles and guerrilla actions in German East Africa, which extended up to sections of Mozambique, Northern Rhodesia, Uganda, Kenya and the Belgium Congo. Conflict in German East Africa (an area that included Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda as well as sections of the Great Rift Valley, Lake Tanganika and Lake Victoria) began in August 1914 when German troops stationed in Rwanda-Burundi shelled some villages in the Belgium Congo. This incident was followed up with a German naval vessel on Lake Tanganyika firing on the harbour of Albertville (presently known as Kalemie). The German colonial forces (or *Schutztruppe*), began with 200 officers, 1 700 German soldiers and 2 500 *askari* was led by Colonel Paul Erich von Lettow-Vorbeck. Although Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck had a sizable force he fought a guerrilla

campaign during the entire First World War. In 1916 General Jan Smuts of South Africa was tasked with defeating von Lettow-Vorbeck. Smuts had a much larger army of 13 000 men that included Rhodesian, Indian and South African soldiers. Furthermore, he had the support of a Belgium contingent as well as a large force of Portuguese soldiers stationed in Mozambique. The military operation was seen as a South African operation under the command of Smuts. It should be noted that by 1915 Lettow-Vorbeck's force had grown to 3 500 Germans and about 12 000 *Askaris*. Despite this growing German force, General Smuts had pushed Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces back and by 1916 the German railway from the coast at Dar-es-Salaam to Ujiji was under British control, while the administrative centre of central German East Africa, Tabora was under the command of Belgium forces (Anderson, R. 2004: 177-197).

As mentioned earlier, Belgium made a sizable contribution to the war effort in Africa. More than a quarter of a million men were used as porters. The colonial armed force (*Force Publique*) captured Kigali in 1916 as well as Burundi in the same year. The *Force Publique* took large areas of Tanzania and had to be "tactfully" withdrawn by General Smuts to ensure that Belgium not claim the territory as part of its colonial territory. Between 1917 and 1918 attempts were made to destroy von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces but with little success. By the end of 1917 von Lettow-Vorbeck moved south into Portuguese Mozambique and for the next nine months operated through that territory attacking small Portuguese garrisons and conducting guerrilla warfare. By August 1918 von Lettow-Vorbeck crossed into Northern Rhodesia and would have continued with his actions had he not been shown a telegram which announced the signing of the armistice, which allowed him to agree to a cease fire.

Other areas of conflict included the small German colony of Togoland. This colony was surrounded by British and French forces and by August 1914 was occupied by British forces deployed from the British Gold Coast (Ghana) and a small French contingent from French Dahomey (Benin). Despite one high power long wave transmitter and a port facility to contain coal refuelling depots the small colony had little else to offer from a strategic perspective. The other colony of Kamerun (Cameroon) had approximately 1 000 German soldiers who were supported by 3 000 African soldiers. The British and French and Belgium's attacked the colony from different directions in 1914. Fighting was intense and it was only by 1916 that the last German forces surrendered. Cameroon had slightly more strategic value than Togoland with three high power long wave transmitters and various port facilities to contain

coal refuelling depots (Moberly, F. J. 1931: 67-68). South West Africa (Namibia) had a large German colonial population, centred on the capital city of Windhoek. The colony had about 3 000 German soldiers and 7 000 adult male colonists. Although South Africa, which was the lead country regarding attacking South West Africa, had some initial problems pertaining to strong support for the Germans, the country succumbed to the South African attack and by July 1915 German forces surrendered. Soon after this Windhoek was captured (Strachan, H. 2001: 67).

By the end of the First World War, little had changed for the black man. African soldiers under French, German and Belgium command were used in combat situations. Those under British command were on the whole, not. South Africa, which led the War effort for Great Britain in Africa, lost 7 000 men and 12 000 were wounded. Interestingly, it was estimated that for each one person that was killed in battle in Africa (on the British side), at least 30 were killed by diseases.

Very few were black as those blacks that served did so in non-combat roles. King George V placed the matter in the patronising political perspective of the time when he informed a group of black South African soldiers that: *“Without munitions of War my armies cannot fight; without food they cannot live. You are helping to send these things to them each day and in doing you are hurling your spears at the enemy”* (James, L. 1999: 230-231). It should be noted that Canada also did not allow black Canadians to be used in combat units and that black Canadians who did serve, were placed in one segregated labour battalion.

The debate about whether to use black troops from the colonies to fight extended beyond the borders of Europe and Africa. In an article in the New York Times in 1916 the question was asked whether it was the Germans or other European colonial powers that first used *“black troops in East Africa.”* The article, which was strongly pro-German, asks the question.... *“Can anybody expect the commanders of the numerically inferior German white troops in the Cameroon and East Africa quietly to sit down and have their men slaughtered by superior enemy forces”* (The New York Times, 13 February 1916). The impact of the First World War on Africa was not as significant as that in Europe but there were numerous effects that had influenced the continent in various ways. Many Africans observed a war in which Europeans were killing fellow Europeans on a massive level. This drove through the belief that colonial regimes had little right to lecture Black leaders or tell them how to conduct their affairs. This

attitude was compounded by the fact that many returning Europeans retook jobs that had been filled by Africans, thus Africans were demoted which obviously added to the level of resentment. African servicemen who returned were more politicised and radicalised.

From a developmental side Africa was retarded by the First World War. Many projects and buildings as well as infrastructural initiatives' such as railway and road had to be postponed due to the war. Compounded to this was the influenza pandemic of 1918 to 1919 that killed an estimated 2% of the African population (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4350050.stm>). It should also be noted that African trade with Europe was disrupted by the war and also the colonial authorities raised taxes to fight the war. The majority of Africans lived on a subsistence level and the pressure to pay a tax was immense. With the ending of the war Africa was also affected by the post-war depression. Commodity producers were in less demand and unemployment rose. Added to this was the fact that thousands of troops were returning home and being demobilised. After the war and for numerous years after, Africans who had been educated in Europe and the United States were returning to the continent and these educated elite be they teachers or preachers began to ask to be involved in the political process within their country and to be allowed to participate in debate. These elite's already started to feel dissatisfied and excluded despite being educated within an environment where free speech and a free press was, to a great extent encouraged although more so in regions outside Africa.

1.6 POST WORLD WAR ONE: THE FRAGMENTATION OF AFRICA CONTINUES

After the war, European powers were a great deal poorer than they were in 1914. From the imperial perspective, the colonies were now regarded as being units that had to “*pay their way*” and if possible to even add to the financial well-being of the imperial authority. Although the moral authority of the First World War such as issues revolving around democracy, liberty and self-determination were stressed by the new powers, “innovative” theories were being suggested. For example a French stance of *La Mise en Valeur* (enhancing the value) of its colonies was being proposed. In this regard, development in the colonies was to be increased, which in turn would lead to the value of these territories being increased. The

British began to review the approach of “*the Dual Mandate.*” By this approach, Africa would (theoretically) be developed for Africans and the rest of the world. African standards of living, education and general quality of life would be enhanced and in a subtle method of exchange, Africa’s resources would be made available for trade (Mills, W. G. 2008: 25).

Before the colonial powers could begin with their new approach to their African colonies, which now also included a “civilising mission” they had to divide up their “spoils of war.” The Treaty of Versailles, in 1919 compelled Germany to give up all her imperial claims. Ironically, the allies had fought against Germany and its allies on the joint understanding that they were not interested in annexing territory. The allies continued to maintain this stance as late as 5 November 1918 in a pre-Armistice declaration when Germany was considering whether to surrender. This position changed and by the time that peace negotiations commenced the Allies displayed an eagerness to take over German territory in Africa. An accord was reached at the Paris Peace Conference which was written into the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed on 28 June 1919. This Covenant described “*agreed principles for collective security of member states, international arbitration, limitation on arms*” and within the African framework, a system according to which German colonies would be distributed amongst the Allies as mandates. Of the 434 articles, the harshest was article 231 which allowed blame to be levelled at Germany and her allies for causing World War One. The articles surrounding the loss of all German overseas colonies were also a painful reminder as to how quickly a new Scramble for Africa emerged. (Lenman, B. P. 2000: 866). In essence the victorious Europeans were dividing up the “spoils” amongst themselves, which were portions of the African continent.

Within Article 22 of the Covenant identifies three different forms of authorization were created, namely A, B and C Class mandates. Mandating powers were required to “*secure just treatment of the native inhabitants of territories under their control, secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour for men, women and children, maintain public order and morals, guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, end slavery, limited military development to policing and defence within the mandate territory, and take steps to prevent and control disease.*” It should be noted that only two of the three categories of mandate were regarded as appropriate to Africa.

League of Nation Class A Mandate Territories: A Class A territory was regarded as being economically and politically advanced enough that a provisional independence could be granted although it had to be under the administration of a League of Nations Member State, “subject to the rendering of administrative advice and the assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone (Paragraph 4, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919). African countries were not considered advanced enough to fall in the Class A mandate. This was reserved for the former Turkish provinces of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine – all Class A mandates obtained full independence by 1949.

League of Nation Class B Mandate Territories: A Class B territory was seen as not being politically or economically advanced enough and that independence would be granted over time. In the interim the territory was placed under the authority of a League of Nations member state. The “*administration of the territory under conditions {would} guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic*” (Paragraph 6, Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1919) and that there be no military build-up and that there be no “*military training of the natives*” except for defence and policing. This type of mandate was applied to the previous German colonies and protectorates in Africa: Kameruh, Togoland and German East Africa.

The division of Togoland continued in 1922 when the country was split along a north-south line. The west became British Togoland and administrated from the Gold Coast. The other part (approximately two-thirds) in the east became French Togoland (later named just Togo) and was administered as a single part within French West Africa. The German colony of Kamerun (Cameroon) was mandated to France while a small part of the north-west on the border with Nigeria being administrated by Britain. German East Africa was mandated to Britain. This process was strongly encouraged by General Jan Smuts of South Africa and this section was named Tanganyika (1922). The small territory of Ruanda-Urundi (presently Rwanda and Burundi) was mandated to Belgium in 1923. By 1925, Belgium established an administrative union between the mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgium Congo. A small portion of land to the south of German East Africa (the Kionga triangle) was handed over to Portugal and incorporated into the colony of Mozambique (Glassner, M.I. 1996: 262—264).

League of Nations Class C Mandate Territories : A Class C mandate territory was seen as not being able of sustaining an independent state due its small population, size and remoteness. German South-West Africa (present Namibia) was given to the Union of South Africa as a class C mandate in 1922 (Glassner, M.I. 1996: 262—264).

In theory mandates were supposed to be supervised by the League of Nations permanent Mandates Commission but the countries that had the mandates actually controlled these countries. After World War Two the system was replaced (1946) by United Nations trusteeships.

The departure of Germany and her imperial claims did not go unnoticed - in some areas in Africa. Germany had been a strong trade partner to colonies. For example, Sierra Leone's trade had been dependent on Germany by as much as 80%. In other parts such as in Calabar, on the coast of Nigeria there were shortages of salt, sugar and milk which encouraged hoarding and panic. It should be noted that the German colonies were only given as "mandates" of the League of Nations thus the mandated country or government was theoretically in the position of a trustee of a ward. Therefore, all the former German colonies were being taken over by trustee governments and it was the responsibility of these respective (new) colonial countries to improve the position of the subject people, and in the long term, to ensure that they were prepared for independence and self-government. By extension, the notion that trusteeship would eventually lead to independence (even if it took hundreds of years) was carried over to the regular colonies as well.

Following the war and during the Peace negotiations there remained a growing belief that the Scramble for Africa and the process surrounding the social Darwinist approach (namely that many people should be governed only by survival of the fittest and domination of the strongest), within international relations was amoral. This belief was reinforced by notions of self-determination and the redrawing of political boundaries in Europe. The creation of the new states of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia attested to this development. President Woodrow Wilson and his 14 Points served as a point of departure for many African's regarding the long-term future of the continent, for example, Point five of Wilson's approach placed issues in perspective; *"A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight*

with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.” (Roberts, J.M. 2004: 902-904). Some Africans who claimed to represent their people(s) appeared at the peace conference. All were turned away and were not permitted to attend any formal settlement negotiations. This was based mostly on the assumption that Africans were still not ready to have these type principles applied to them and a colonial administrator would fulfil such a requirement.

As with the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 Africans were not invited to participate and debate in proceedings during Peace talks or when discussions were held regarding the future of the colonies. There was a collective attitude by the European and imperialistic powers that Africans did not have the ability or aptitude to rule themselves. There was an expectation that the United States would not allow “*colonial greed*” to extend beyond the Peace Negotiations. In retrospect, the United States (apart from declining any “Mandates” itself from the League) could do little to follow-through on Wilson’s stance. This was due very much to do with the fact that due to domestic politics, the United States never became a member of the League of Nations, which in effect ensured that the institute was flawed from conception (Roberts, J.M. 2004: 902-904).

After the imperialistic powers (with the absence of Germany) had established their future intentions for their colonies in Africa, they ensured that a colonial policy of control was either established or be continued for an undetermined period. This section will briefly review some of the more prominent colonial policies and discuss the futility of the various policies. Britain had the most colonies in Africa and after obtaining South West Africa (despite it being mandated to its colony, South Africa) and Tanganyika following 1919, its dominance of the continent was unquestionable. France could be regarded as receiving the second prize and obtained Togo, Kamerun (to become Cameroon). Belgium later - in 1923 - obtained Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) while the minor World War One participant, Portugal obtained the small triangle in the south of former German East Africa (Kionga triangle), which was incorporated into Mozambique.

Mention must be made of the writings of the renowned America/German academic Hannah Arendt in her renowned book: *The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1951*. Although it is doubtful that she wanted to stimulate debate around totalitarianism and Africa *per se*, numerous

linkages can be made between developments and attitudes in Europe and how they digressed towards Africa during this period.

In the *Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt divided her book into three volumes, namely – Anti-Semitism, Imperialism and Totalitarianism. The book begins with the rise of Anti-Semitism in Central and Western Europe in early and mid-nineteenth century and continues with an examination of the New Imperialistic period from 1884 to the outbreak of World War I. Arendt elaborates in her work and states that the modern nation-state brought about the process of totalitarianism movements – although she does not find the nation-state directly responsible for totalitarianism. According to her, the Europe’s nation-state system was undermined by pan-movements and rising imperialism both these factors emanated from nation-state institutions or peace treaties made at the end of the First World War, This allowed for the creation of minorities as well as revolutions. This in turn created the movement of refugees. All these factors played a contributory role (Arendt, H. 1979: 269 -270).

The end of the First World War saw the collapse of three empires: the Austria-Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman. These empires had had multinational structures that placed immense pressure on the core, which could not hold or adapt! From the ruins of these empires emerged two groups of victims; namely the stateless and minorities.

New nation-states were shaped by the victorious countries. However, it was realised that a certain *status quo* had to be maintained. Thus, only a few nations obtained self-determination and sovereignty. The remainder had a choice; immigration or live in their homeland without equal rights. Millions of people left their homes and emigrated to Central and Western Europe (Arendt, H.1979: 269). A “*completely new element of disintegration was introduced*” in post-war Europe. No place could be found for these people in Western Europe due to the fact that rights were only being given to their own citizens. This assumption stresses that every nation has its own state, legal and political system – whether being democratic or not. This accorded their citizens certain rights and protection within and outside its borders. Stateless people, on the other hand were placed in an ambiguous situation within the legal system(s) of the nation-state. There was no official representation given to support and protect their fundamental rights.

According to Arendt, these individuals were placed in a more difficult position than a common criminal. This was due to the fact that a criminal had certain recognised rights in the

eyes of the law. A stateless person had no such rights and was not represented by any country or power. In this type of situation the individual belongs to only the human race and not to any political entity. The position of the stateless person reminded Arendt of the position of the colonial population in countries under European rule. This relationship was made even more significant during the Imperialist period of the nineteenth century. Europeans who were introduced to African tribes assumed that these tribes had little background pertaining to their political entity or their civilization. Thus they were treated in a very different manner. They (due to power distances and cultural differences) could not have the rights of citizenship according to colonial laws at the time - as they were regarded as barbarianisms. The unequal status of these people(s) did not have a significant impact on developments in Europe. However, the position after the First World War of stateless people and minorities within Europe was the same as that of the status of colonial people(s). The irony of this was that this situation was taking place in middle-Europe to people who had very similar beliefs and cultures with other Europeans.

Stateless people lost their rights with the collapse of the various empires and they became second-class citizens under the new nation-state authority. These minorities, without any rights within these structures, were very much at the mercy of the great powers. *“Representatives of the great nations knew only too well that minorities within the nation-states must sooner or later be either assimilated or liquidated”* (Arendt, H.1979: 273). Thus, in reality, minorities were denationalised by the victorious governments within their new countries.

The stateless people had little loyalty to the state itself and their relationship with their territory was not strong. These so-called *“Eastern society characteristics”* had now come into the centre of the European nation-state. This situation, according to Arendt created a fear amongst European governments, entitled *“the fear of modernity”*. This was not new. In previous centuries in Europe the relationship between the nation-state and Jews was an extremely negative one. In general, Jews had not allowed themselves to be identified with a state and did not gravitate to a specific nation. Furthermore, their class identification was ambiguous they were nor represented by any specific class – in the case of the nation-state, class and nationality were inevitable and vital components of the structure. A typical situation, which created an untrustworthy relationship between government and the Jewish community, was reflected in how Jewish bankers operated within a specific milieu. During modern

European history when there had been revolutionary change, Jewish bankers had rapidly switched their loyalty from one government to the next. *“It took the French Rothschild’s in 1848 hardly twenty-four hours to transfer their services from the government of Louis Philippe to the new short-lived French Republic and again to Napoleon III”* (Arendt, H. 1979: 23-24).

Governments had begun to send refugees back across their borders – legally as well as illegally. Arendt stressed that the international congress’s main concern about the stateless were focused on the question of *“how these people can be deportable”* (Arendt, H. 1979: 284). She went on to state that the practical solution founded by Hitler *“to make stateless people deportable by camps”* was not invented by the Nazis. *“Indeed, as early as the thirties this was the only ‘country’ the world had to offer the stateless”* (Arendt, H.1979: 284).

On Imperialism, Arendt spoke of the drive to send *“ideal capital and idea; labour”* abroad to ensure productivity. With specific reference to Western European imperialism, it went to Africa. The drive to Africa was for profit and expansion for its own sake.

This policy and ideology regarding colonial expansion between the 1870’s and the beginning of World War I in 1914 was termed *“New Imperialism”*. This period was seen as an unprecedented pursuit of what was termed *“empire for empires sake”*. There was aggressive competition between European countries for overseas territorial acquisitions and the creation within countries that had been colonised of the doctrine of jingoism. Evens stated that, *“the name itself has become a synonym for chauvinism or extreme and pugnacious patriotism”* (Evens, G, 1998: 286). The approach also denied the very ability of subjugated peoples to govern themselves. Africa became Europe’s primary target for their ‘new’ imperialist expansion, an expansion which secured European powers nearly 23 000 000 km² in overseas possessions.

Arendt wrote of the Mob and saw this body as a caricature of the people. Their actions were best seen during the anti-Semitic riots that accompanied the Dreyfus affair in France. The Mob came from *“all strata of society and is recruited from all classes. In the section on Imperialism, Arendt wrote of the Mob in the shape of the “superfluous men”, who were “spat out”* by society (Arendt (1979: 189), who gravitated to South Africa due to the rush for gold and diamonds in the late nineteenth century. These *“superfluous men”* who had not joined the workers movements had instead joined the imperialist mob. As with the anti-Dreyfusard mob

they did not have a place in a structured society. These members were physically uprooted, freed from normal restraints and expectations. Arendt described them as *having “escaped the reality of civilization”* into a *“phantom-like”* existence in which there was no sense of responsibility for their acts, specifically because in Africa they were preying on a totally alien native population that had never been gathered into Peoples, only into tribes. Arendt explicitly contrasts *“Tribe”* with *“People”* and specifically links the difference to the *“world”*. Genuine *“People”* she states have worked on nature to create a human world, a human reality (Arendt, H.1979:192) and thus have histories; whereas prehistoric tribes lived in and on nature, like animals without building a *“human reality.”* Arendt believed that the Boers of South Africa demoralized by this example had themselves turned into a tribe, *“alienated from the pride which Western man felt in living in a world created and fabricated by himself.”* Faced with African tribes, the Boers had also responded by developing a racist ideology, and this was eagerly adopted by the immigrant white mob. It legitimized their violence and offered them a new bond of unity based on nothing but their skin colour.

Arendt connects these pathologies of overseas imperialism with what she calls *“Continental Imperialism”* in Eastern Europe; the Pan-German and Pan-Slav movements that also recruited Mobs. Arendt links *“tribal nationalism”* to these movements and compared their racism with the (civilized) nationalism of Western nation-states, specifically France. Major differences was that human achievements has been passed down through generations in Western Europe ensuring unity amongst the people and allowed for the expansion of people in harmony in an objective world. Tribal nations were almost the opposite and did not share any territory or institutions. Instead, due to their ideology they shared Russian soul and German blood. Thus they shared internal characteristics, not an objective world (Arendt, H. 1979: 2-194).

Arendt identified two devices for political organisations that ruled over foreign people, which was used during the first decades of imperialism. Race was the emergency explanation of human beings that civilized man could understand. Race was also the Boers answer to inhumanities of Africa – a continent of savages. Arendt believed that the Boers *“extermination”* of Hottentots’ tribes, the murderous actions by Carl Peters in German South East Africa and the millions killed in the Congo. Modern racism was according to Arendt – an ideology within the Boer population, starting during the Great Trek and qualified as an *“ideological”* weapon for imperialism.

2. COLONIAL RULE: DIVIDE AND RULE – VARIOUS IMPERIALISTIC APPROACHES – GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSES

The Imperialist countries maintained different policies in the various African countries that came under their power. The approaches utilised varied from country to country in Africa as well as the processes implemented by the colonial powers. To implement these policies the colonizers created a geopolitical discourse which allowed them to centralise their control and legitimise their different ideologies. With the passage of time an anti-geopolitical discourse emerged which questioned the exploitation and oppression of Africans.

2.1. BRITISH COLONIAL RULE: INDIRECT RULE

As mentioned above, Britain was the largest colonial power in Africa before and after the First World War. In fact she managed to extend her colonial reach as she obtained previous German colonies. In many ways Britain had experimented with how to distribute and delegate power and she had used South Africa as a type of “drawing board” on the formulation and development of its colonial policy. In South Africa, three different approaches had been used by the British administration throughout the nineteenth century, within the regions of; Natal, the Cape Colony and Basutoland.

The Cape Colony: Policy of assimilation and no differentiation

The Cape’s liberalism stems from missionary attempts to have different legal status, which was based on colour, eliminated. Cape liberalism centred on Ordinance 50 of 1828 was followed by the “*colour-blind*” franchise, which was introduced in 1853 that allowed for representative government. This stance was mute if seen in isolation due to the fact that the missionaries intended to protect the Khoikhoi (Hottentots) as well of those of mixed race and did not cater for black African who at that stage were not in the Cape Colony. It was only later when different areas where blacks dwelled were incorporated into the Cape that they were placed within the Colony. However, blacks were classified as “*foreigners*” and a separate territory within the Cape Colony, entitled Kaffraria was established where Xhosa law and custom could be practised. By the 1850’s Sir George Grey, the Governor of the Cape

stated that a policy of assimilation would be the policy of the Cape and this remained the policy until 1936. It is interesting to note that Grey believed that assimilation would be an evolutionary process. White magistrates would gradually be replaced by African chiefs and headmen. Until that took place there would be a process of “*direct rule.*” Magistrates would apply Xhosa law and custom to cases but Roman-Dutch law would be introduced as much as possible. In criminal cases Roman-Dutch law would apply.

Natal – policy based on differentiation

Whites and blacks were placed in different categories and each racial group had their own political and legal system. The Lieutenant-Governor was classified the “supreme chief” and his authority was represented by some white officials and magistrates who enforced the law. African’s did not fall under Roman-Dutch Law but to “*Native law and custom.*” Natal did have a system which allowed blacks to vote but it was so stringent that few blacks applied. Mills believed that the legal and political level was a “*prototype*” of an apartheid system.

Basutoland – no assimilation and indirect rule

Basutoland was given by the British government to the Cape Colony in the 1860s with the specific proviso that no law of the Cape Colony would apply unless so proclaimed. In 1879 the Cape Government attempted to introduce a Gun Law into Basutoland which was met with a revolt. In 1882, despite some military action, the Cape government informed the British administration that it was abandoning Basutoland. The British had to, once again resume responsibility. After negotiations a system of indirect rule was established whereby a traditional African system of law was attempted. The king, chief magistrate and headmen acted as judges (whites were advisers on legal matters) and collected taxes. The Chief magistrate was a super paramount chief, senior to the king and the British monarch’s representative in the country.

This form of indirect rule was also used in Bechuanaland in the 1880s when Britain declared it a protectorate. The British maintained a varied relationship with their African colonies and a strange “balancing act” was undertaken in different colonies throughout the continent that balanced direct rule against indirect rule and preservation of traditional society, laws and customs and assimilation. Wallace G Mills saw British colonial rule after the First World War as a “*hodgepodge of different relationships and origins.*” Mills placed these relationships in

different categories within the strata of “*origins and responsibilities*”. Within this milieu, he classified the following:

1. Foreign Office – Zanzibar and south east Nigeria (Biafra)

Zanzibar was classified as a “*true*” protectorate and was under the protection of Great Britain. Biafra was made a British protectorate due to an international agreement that centred on the suppression of the slave trade during the early nineteenth century. Egypt was a unique case. The government of the Khedive was overseen by Britain on behalf of an international committee of six creditor nations (Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Austria and Italy). At the same time, Sudan was a “*condominium*” of Egypt and Britain.

2. Charter Company acquisitions

This classification concentrates on the “primary” institution within a specific country. In this regard, Mills mentions the Rhodesia (British South African Company. BSA). Nigeria, (Royal Niger Company) and the Uganda Protectorate (for a short time held by the British Imperial East Africa Company). It should be noted that when the company could not manage, due to various restrictions including a lack of capital then the Colonial Office would once again take over responsibility. The BSA Company remained in operation until 1922.

3. Colonial Office

These territories had been annexed directly by Great Britain and normally had a “crown colony” status. Treaties and agreements had been undertaken during the Scramble for Africa, which restricted any independent action to develop policies.

4. League of Nations Mandates (Tanganyika, Togo and Cameroon).

A great deal about the granting of mandates to the World War I victors have already been discussed above. In general, colonial powers were seen as “*trustees*” and” “*step parents*” rather than owners.

5. British Crown Colony Government

In general, most examples of a British Crown Colony Government (as far as approach) were very similar but the models themselves were extremely different. The judiciary was connected

to the governor but the judges were seen as independent. Although the governor was regarded as having absolute power he had to work within a specific structure with other officials. Within each Crown Colony Government there was an executive body that comprised the governor and his most senior officials within a type of cabinet. This body was seen as the administration.

A legislative body was responsible for the establishment of new laws and regulations. Normally, the governor and various members of the executive body, included with the chief justice (who acted as the Chairman or speaker) was part of the legislative body. This body would also be represented by business men, and representatives of the local population. These representatives were appointed by the governor, normally with London's advice. The point of departure was that local people would have some form of involvement in government. It was only after the 1950s that Africans were appointed. Before this time missionaries were selected as representatives. It is interesting to note that it was these types of institutions that help make the transition to majority rule and then independence in the 1950s and 1960s (Mills, W.G. 2008: 15-19: 5).

In essence, the British colonial authorities attempted to concentrate on a policy of Indirect Rule, which was regarded as being "*a practical expedient characterised by flexibility and common sense.*" Indirect Rule passed through three phases. Firstly as a useful administrative tool, then as a political doctrine and finally as a religious dogma. Although officially abandoned in 1947, Indirect Rule stressed the relevance of ruling through indigenous authorities. In effect, the objective of British officials (except in the case of taxation, military forces and the alienation of land), "*was to advise, not demand.*" Indirect Rule was, throughout the 1930s seen by many white officials as an occult science...*"dead of creative development"* and seemed to preserve the old and often corrupt oligarchies. It was regarded by many as a failure as an administrative device and was subject to abuses. Ironically, many African elite regarded Indirect Rule as an "*imperialistic device*" to maintain British influence and control while at the same time many members of the British "establishment" strongly believed that Indirect Rule would help African people "*adjust to the traumatic impact of contact with the West without losing their dignity and identity*" (Collins, R.O. 1970: 83-87).

2.2 THE FRENCH APPROACH

French colonial rule was on the whole seen as being a more “*direct rule*” as compared to the British administration. Furthermore, traditional leaders and chiefs were on the whole ignored. French colonial policy fell within two broad approaches, namely; association and assimilation. French policies within these structures stressed the fact that the country was on a “*civilizing mission*.” France believed that its economic position and the country’s intellectual achievements almost forced it to assist underdeveloped countries. France was of the opinion that “*a superior society has the right to dominate and instruct the lesser one.*” The white man’s almost had an obligation even a “*duty*” to transform the African traditional governments in the colonies and uplift the Africans (Rymond, B.1961:30).

The French used the process of “*civilizing missions*” to legitimise the country’s imperialist expansion and all people throughout the world should gravitate towards the mores and values of Great Britain or France. Further to this, conquest was regarded as liberation and deliverance and that the civilizing mission brought about peace and order to societies that were trapped in constant wars. The civilizing missions stopped corruption and allowed honesty and implemented efficient governments that followed the application of law. It was stressed that military conquest put an end to all the suffering. Furthermore, European colonizers were expanding their belief that they were the best rulers and reformers. Christian missionaries were an important tool in implementing the civilizing mission and their motivation centred on the stance that their religion was superior to all others (Adas, M. 1989:200).

The historical writing in *The Black Jacobins* by C.L.R James, which reviews the Haitian (San Domingo) Revolution of 1791-1803, provides a unique perspective of French colonialism. James identified the process whereby colonialism had created various yet distinct social classes in San Domingo, which allowed for support to be given to the different groupings during the revolution. James looked at how the slaves in San Domingo were divided into complex class divisions. The classes themselves were classified into “*big whites*”, “*small whites*”, “*mulattoes*”, “*free blacks*” and “*slaves.*” James sees (social) class distinction as being more significant than race and noted that the French Revolution acted as a catalyst for the Haitian Revolution led by Toussaint L’Ouverture who was himself originally a house servant. The fundamental issue was how relevant the alignment with power was to the

hierarchical classes and how important a role this played throughout the revolution (James, C. L.R.1989: 78-103).

Assimilation

Throughout the nineteenth century colonial theory in France centred on the doctrine of assimilation. The approach itself originated from the Roman Empire where its Latinized term was used for the same concept (Rymond, B.1961:11). It was from the ideals of the French revolution that the belief emanated that the values of equality, freedom and fraternity should be applied to all individuals who were French. No matter what was their race, or colour. Interestingly the French had applied this policy to the residence of the cantons of Saint-Louis in Senegal in the 1790s. There was a great deal of resistance to this approach by conservative, monarchist and catholic politicians within France itself and the situation in Senegal remained unstable, to the effect that when the republicans were in power in France then they had the vote. However, when the monarchists were in control they restricted the constitution to the extent that the Senegalese could not vote. Due to the resistance that prevailed in France over this issue, the approach was never applied to other African countries until after 1945.

Michael Crowder provides a more detailed look at assimilation and what the policy meant for Senegal, bearing in mind the fact that assimilation meant different things at different times. Crowder examined seven different meanings throughout Senegal's colonial history. In this regard Crowder stated that at assimilations commencement;

-During the revolution, the *métis* population was assimilated and they were able to take opportunities; after the restoration of 1815 the rights of black French people were downgraded.

-The constitutional monarchy of Louis Philippe conferred political rights on all free residence in 1833. This allowed 12 000 Africans to acquire voting rights in addition to whites and *métis* who already had these rights.

-Senegal was entitled to elect a deputy to the French National Assembly. However, Emperor Louis Napoleon withdrew political rights in the 1850s and 60s.

-In the 1860s Governor Faidherbe began a process of expansion and conquest of Senegal (which established a pattern in the conquered areas of the new French African Empire). The privilege accorded to initial “*citizens*” of the four communes on the coast was not extended to the interior. It was at this stage that the distinction between “*citoyen*” and “*sujet*” began.

-The right to have a deputy represent them was regained in 1871 during the Third Republic. Furthermore, an elected body was established in Senegal for citizens but not subjects. These rights were the last political rights given by the French to Africa until 1944.

-By 1900, whites had lost their political power within the cantons to the *métis*.

-Although the right for Africans to vote was retained by 1914 Africans in the cantons did not obtain their full rights as “*citoyen*”.

-By 1912 a French law stated that only West African subjects could become “*citoyens*” and strict requirements were put into place. Due to this between 1924 and 1922 only 94 “*subjects*” became “*citoyens*” and by 1937 only about 2 000 had been able to do so, throughout the entire French West Africa.

-In effect, although assimilation gave Africans rights and privileges only a few were actually “*assimilated*” and from the end of the 19th Century until 1944, the process was continuously being questioned and was restrictive in implementation (Crowder,M.1967:151).

Despite assimilation being seen in many liberal quarters as a progressive process the policy itself had many shortcomings. Assimilation was based on the presumption that French culture was “*superior and civilised*”. There was a belief that it was the duty of France to civilise “*barbarian*” people and eventually turn them into Frenchmen. Although the implication was there that African were to a greater or lesser extent equal, as they were capable of becoming Frenchmen, African tradition and culture was regarded as non-existent. In effect French culture was seen as being the most superior while all others were subordinate.

As France’s dominant position with its colonies developed, there was a growing reaction in France itself against the policy of assimilation. Some groups believed that trade was more important than spending time and capital on developing the Africans. Algeria was constantly in the foreground with its large and influential French settler population who were seeking special privileges and rights as compared to the larger Moslem population in that country.

Association

The policy of association attempted to stress cooperation between ruler and the ruled in more direct term or in another perspective of the relationship between the conqueror and the conquered. The policy attempted to respect the institutions and cultural as well as political values of African who should not be transformed into "*black French people*". Economic development, in theory was regarded as being for the mutual advantage of both Africa and France. After 1918, supporters of this approach looked at the British model of indirect rule as being more practical. Association, it was believed would allow Africans to retain their traditional customs and law. Furthermore it was a cheaper administrative process to maintain and provoked less resistance from Africans. Association was seen as a softer policy than assimilation and it meant that "*the colonial power would respect the manners, customs and religions of the natives and follow a policy of mutual assistance rather than exploitation*" (Crowder, M. 2000:185). However, the core values of assimilation remained in the association policy.

African communities were placed into cantons (districts) and chiefs were expected to display loyalty towards France or they were rapidly replaced. Little respect was shown to traditional practise and culture. At a later stage advisory councils were established so as to maintain knowledge about African custom and law. However, these councils had very little authority or power. To make issues more complex there was a dual legal system; French law for whites, *métis*, the few Africans in West Africa, and Africans residents of Saint-Louis who were naturalised "*citoyens*." "*Sujets*" fell under another legal system called *justice indigene*. This legal system did nothing to revive African justice and law. French administrators with African assessors delivered judgements on criminal and civil justice according to a type of African law, which was very much based on what the white administrator thought, was African law.

A system called *indigénat* allowed governors to define various offences by decree, which allowed local administrators to summarily try individuals. Colonial administrators also placed certain responsibilities on the African population such as the system of *prestation*, which obliged Africans to provide 12 days of free labour for public works a year. Furthermore, compulsory labour as well as conscription in wartime was introduced. Association actually introduced a higher degree of authoritarianism and withheld rights for African "*sujecs*". Until 1945 rights in Francophone areas were highly restricted (Collins, R.O. 1970: 161 -165).

2.3 THE BELGIAN COLONIAL POLICY

After the First World War, the Belgians intensified their involvement in the Congo and by 1923 the country obtained Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) these developments allowed Belgium to concentrate on developing its system to the extent that it had the most thorough colonial administration in Africa. The Belgians based their administration on the idea of direct rule. Mixed into the system was an intensive attitude of paternalism. Compounded into this was penetration from three different sectors (which became known as the “*Trinity*”). These three sectors was; the colonial administration (government), private companies and the Roman Catholic Church

During the two wars the administration assisted in recruiting labourers for plantations and mines. Each year workers were expected to provide 60 days of (compulsory) labour within the field of public works or agriculture. The administration had specialists in various areas such as medical, agriculture, labour and education although the church was also deeply involved in these areas as well. The church had signed a special *concordat* with the Vatican in 1906, which gave responsibility for the Congo over to Belgian churches and orders. There were various mission stations situated throughout the country and these stations were entitled to utilise 200 hectares of land for food and other areas that might be able to generate revenue. The mission stations also had state subsidised schools operating on their property. The third link in the Trinity, namely companies operated within the field of agriculture and there were large plantations of rubber and palm oil. From the 1920s mining also became a profitable venture and commodities such as copper, tin, diamonds and gold were sought after.

Civil servants were ordered to support business and often supplied Africans to act as labour. It should be noted that there was a great amount of linkage as reflected by the fact that colonial civil service was very much like the military and after 23 years service officials could retire and receive a pension. Civil servants thus retained good relations with company enterprises and many pursued a second career in private business after retirement.

The Belgium Congo was well administrated from an organisational perspective. Government services were provided at a basic level. Education was provided but only at elementary level more advanced levels of education only became available after the Second World War. Medical treatment and economic development was at a more advanced level as compared to

the rest of Africa (Mills, W. G. 2008:59). There can be little doubt that the small European country of Belgium placed a great deal of emphasis on developing a solid structure within the Belgium Congo. However, with these efforts came the belief that Belgian colonial rule came with a system of “*Platonism*.” As described Thomas Hodgkin, “*Platonism*” is implicit in the sharp distinction between, social and legal, between Belgian philosopher-kings and the mass of African producers; in the conception of education as primarily concerned with the transmission of certain unquestioned and unquestionable moral values and intimately related to status and function; in the belief that the thought and behaviour of the mass is plastic, and can be refashioned by a benevolent, wise, and highly trained elite; that the prime interest of the mass is in welfare and consumer goods (footballs and bicycles), not liberty; and in the conviction that it is possible, by expert administration, to arrest social and political change (Young,C.1965: 88).

2.4 ITALY IN AFRICA BETWEEN THE WARS

Before Italy could invade Ethiopia it had to stabilise its position in Libya. Since it had taken position of that country in 1911, the country had been fighting against the Sanusiyya Muslim Brotherhood of the eastern Libyan Desert. The Brotherhood had been fighting a guerrilla campaign until 1931. It was in that year that the Italians captures and executed the Sanusiyya leader Umar al-Mukhar. Many civilians had been placed in concentration camps during this conflict and it is estimated that as many as 100 000 civilians had died in these camps.

In October 1935 the Prime Minister of Italy, Mussolini launched the Second Italo-Abyssinian War by invaded Ethiopia. Emperor Haile Selassie fled the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa on 2 May 1936 and by 5 May the Italians entered the city. Eritrea, Italian Somalia, and newly captured Ethiopia were merged by the Italians into Italian East Africa (*Africa Orientale Italiana, A.O.I.*). The invasion was not challenged too strongly by France and Great Britain, who possibly did not wish to alienate Italy as a potential ally against Nazi Germany. Victory was announced on 9 May 1936 and Mussolini declared the creation of the “*Italian Empire*” (Lowe, C.J. 2002: 289). By 1938 the Anglo-Italian Pact was signed. One of the requirements of this agreement was that the British government would recognized Italian sovereignty over

Ethiopia and agreed to use its influence to convince other countries to do the same (League of Nations Photo Archive- <http://www.indiana.edu/~league/1938.htm>).

The Italian King, Victor Emmanuel III added Emperor of Ethiopia to his titles. Furthermore, Mussolini had aspirations of sending millions of Italian settlers to Italian East Africa, and Italians had hopes of turning the area into an economic asset. However, by overrunning Ethiopia, a member of the League of Nations, Italy attracted widespread international hostility. During the 1930s, emigration to the colonies was encouraged due to a belief that Italy was suffering from "excess population". Most went to Libya which by 1938 contained 89,098 Italians, primarily concentrated in the coastal cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. The coastline of Libya was referred to as Italy's "*Fourth Shore*" (*quarta sponda*). There was emigration to Italian East Africa as well. According to the 1931 census, there were 4,188 Italians in Eritrea and 1,631 in Italian Somaliland. (Howard, M. 1998: 95). During the five-year occupation of Ethiopia approximately 300,000 Italians were absorbed into East Africa, fully one third of these were military personnel (Barker, A. J. 1971: 154). After an unfortunate period under Rudolfo Graziani, Italian East Africa was ruled more successfully by Amedeo, 3rd Duke of Aosta. The Duke brought a program of progressive improvement that included 2,000 miles of new paved roads, 25 hospitals, 14 hotels, dozens of post offices, telephone exchanges, aqueducts, schools, and shops. Even so, the strong grip on security that the Italians held did not extend far beyond the main population centres (Barker, A. J. 1971: 152).

2.5 PORTUGAL'S ROLE BETWEEN THE WARS AND SPAIN'S LIMITED POSITION

Portugal's traditional method of extending its colonial rule inland was to reward large tracts of land to commercial companies, which were chartered for that specific purpose very much parallel to what Rhodes had done pertaining to his establishment of the British South African Company in Rhodesia.

This thesis cannot afford to digress into the specifics of different colonial policies. However, an overview of the policies of the longest established colonial power will allow the reader to ascertain an understanding of the various approaches. In this regard, the "*prazo*" system will be briefly reviewed. The system was introduced in Portuguese colonies and centred on the

provision of land grants. The “*prazo*” system was a mixture of local political structures and the Portuguese political system.

The system of rule was indirect as it took away land from African rulers and was given to Portuguese settlers. In effect, this gave the Portuguese the power to control African people. Due to the fact that Portuguese rule was not structured or strong, Portuguese retainers of land grants (*prazo*) legitimised their land control by establishing relationships with African royal families by marrying into these families. The Portuguese rulers as from 1629 gave themselves the titles of (African) chiefs and attempted to rule as such. Portuguese settlers (soldiers, landless and clergymen) had almost total control over the indigenous labour via the “*prazo*” system. The Portuguese began over time to build up slave armies and virtually independent fiefdoms, which were throughout the centuries ruled by Africans who were descendants of the original Portuguese rulers.

Following the 1884-1885 Berlin Conference the Portuguese government gave large concessions to charter companies the most well known being the Zambezi Company. The Company was active in the development of Mozambique and was responsible for developing the rail link between the port of Beira and Zimbabwe in Mozambique. Other charter companies were answerable only to their own authority such as the Niassa Company and the Mozambique Company. As mentioned above, Portuguese colonial rule was relatively weak and authority in Portuguese East Africa was delegated. After World War One, the territory was divided into two parts. The one part was a colony under the authority of Lisbon, while the other fell under company rule and the Mozambique Company controlled the central districts of Sofala and Manica along the Zambezi River. The company’s charter only ended in 1942 and these regions were only then merged into the rest of the colony.

António de Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968), the right-wing leader of Portugal entrenched Portuguese rule over the colonies during the 1930s. He was regarded as an ardent imperialist who imposed a dictatorship over the country entitled “*the New State.*” Little was done to develop Portuguese colonies during this period as reflected by strong laws that forbade Africans in Mozambique from trading or owning their own business. Furthermore, the *chidalo*, a forced labour policy was implemented. If a citizen of Mozambique became an *assmilado*, a status that could be obtained through land ownership, education or employment then various rights were granted, which ensured that Salazar’s policies and the *chidalo* did not

apply. The practise of migrating to South Africa to work in the mines became a characteristic of Mozambique's economy and also placed these workers in that category.

Spain's involvement between the two wars was not a high profile endeavour. Morocco, which had been divided between Spain and France in 1911, began to experience rebellions by the Rif Berbers and in 1921 the Spanish fought and suffered defeat at the Battle of Annual against Moroccan insurgents. A series of defeats was seen throughout Spanish military garrisons and it was only due to the establishment of the Spanish Legion a year earlier and the action by Moroccan Regulars who were transferred by sea that saved the entire colony from total collapse. Nevertheless, Spanish loses were more than 20 000 soldiers. It was this situation which allowed the socialist Spanish leader Indalecio Prieto to state to the Spanish Congress of Deputies that ... *"We are at the most acute period of Spanish decadence. The campaign in Africa is a total failure, absolute, without extenuation, of the Spanish Army."* The statement reflected the atmosphere of the country. The uprising uncovered the utter corruption and ineffectiveness of the armed forces and destabilised the Spanish government, leading to authoritarianism. It would seem that the only "successful" campaign from a Spanish perspective was the fact that the Spanish African army, led by a veteran of the Moroccan campaign, Francisco Franco, started the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), (Woolman, D.S. 1968: 76-86).

2.6 WORLD WAR TWO AND THE COLONIES

When the colonial powers went to war for the second time in the same century, their African colonies were drawn once again into the European conflict. Italy was late regarding its participation with the Scramble for Africa. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the country's actions before and soon after the First World War left a great deal to be desired especially when compared to the actions of other colonial powers such as Britain and France. By the time that the Second World War started Italy was a strong presence in Africa. The country had forces that were 280 000 strong and more than half of them were colonial troops (or *Askari*) comprising of Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somali's. From an equipment viewpoint, Italian forces had about 300 combat aircraft and a large flotilla of naval ships in the Red Sea,

which comprised of seven destroyers, five motorised torpedo boats and eight submarines (Mallett, R. 2003: 49-56).

When Germany invaded Poland in 1939, Italy remained neutral. Thus at the time, the Italian presence in East Africa was not seen as a significant threat for the British either in the Red Sea or the Suez Canal. When Germany invaded France in 1940, Italy declared war against France and Britain and the British had to speculate where Italy would next involve itself in Africa. Three days after its declaration of war in 1940 the Italians attacked both the Sudanese and Kenyan borders. However, the Italian thrust into both countries amounted to little as reflected by the fact that in Sudan they did not go further than the Blue Nile and in Kenya the Italian army only advanced 60 miles into the country. By August Italian forces felt confident enough to invade British Somaliland and in little over two weeks were able to force British forces out of the territory. British Somaliland was absorbed into Italy's East African territories. The Italians suffered from logistical shortages and over time due to attacks by Commonwealth forces they had to withdraw to defensive positions so as to try and retain Somaliland, Ethiopia and Eritrea. By December 1940 Italian troops had been pushed back into Libya and in January 1941 the invasion of Ethiopia had begun with Britain feeling confident enough to commence this military campaign and push the Italians out of East Africa completely. Haile Selassie returned to southern Sudan to lead a group of Ethiopian Patriots. Thousands of soldiers were utilised and came from Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. Belgium dispatched a small force of African soldiers from the Congo while the Free French allocated a small contingent from Equatorial Africa. Volunteers came from Rhodesia and Nyasaland and South Africa sent a force of 200 000 volunteers (a third of them were black but as in the First World War, these black soldiers were not allowed to bear arms). Some of the fiercest fighting took place in Karen in Eritrea until the end of March 1941 the Italians ferociously defended the town through which a road and railway ran to the capital city of Eritrea, Asmara. However, by April 1941 the British had taken this key town. By May 1941 Addis Ababa, capital of Ethiopia was retaken and Emperor Haile Salassie was re-established on the throne. Britain recognised Ethiopia's independence but retained a force in Eritrea and the Ogaden. The remainder of Italian troops surrendered to Commonwealth forces on 27 November 1941. At that stage and within a five year period Mussolini's vision of a grand African Empire had disappeared (Blinkorn, M. 1984: 26-47).

When the war commenced there were up to 80 000 regular African troops who had been sent from French West Africa to fight for France in that country against Germany's invasion. When France was defeated in 1940 these colonial troops suffered heavy casualties. With France's defeat the colonial authorities in French North and West Africa proclaimed their loyalty to the Vichy government, loyal to Marshall Petain. In Chad, the black governor, Felix Eboué originally from French Guyana in South America decided to support the Free French government led by Charles De Gaulle. Governors of other French Equatorial territories followed his approach and for a period, Brazzaville became the capital of "*Free France*" in exile (www.bbc.co.uk/worldservices).

The French authorities stressed that colonial troops be forced to join the army and between 1943 and 1945, more than 100 000 soldiers from French West Africa were conscripted. Numerous French Equatorial Africans served during the Ethiopian campaign in 1941. French colonies in Africa were divided into two groupings. Vichy France under the leadership of Marshal Petain was supported by French West Africa, which comprised of Senegal, Togo, Guinea, Benin, Mauritania, Tunisia, Mali and Burkina Faso while the countries within French Equatorial Africa, namely; Chad, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, Niger and Cameroun sided with General De Gaulle. By 1942, the Allies invaded Vichy North Africa and it was at this stage that the French colonial authorities of West Africa shifted their loyalty to de Gaulle's Free French. Africans of French West Africa provided raw materials and soldiers for the Allies. By 1943, Africans from Equatorial Africa and French West Africa comprised more than half of the total Free French army (Shillington, K. 1995: 78).

The British recruited African soldiers who volunteered and chiefs were utilised as the main recruiting agents. Africans were pressurised to produce more cotton and groundnuts and areas of western Africa became the only source of palm oil for the Allies. Up to 18 000 miners were used as forced labour in Nigeria's tin mines. In effect, the entire British east, central and southern Africa was required to cultivate special fields for the growing of extra food for the war effort with the cooperation of African chiefs. The British colonial authorities established marketing boards to ensure that African producers were organised for export. Official price controls were imposed. Thus, although African palm oil, rubber, sisal, cotton, coffee, groundnuts, cocoa and tea were in high demand and extremely expensive in Europe - due to wartime shortages, African producers did not benefit from this. Prices paid to the African producers were maintained at low fixed rates. Colonial governments were able to profit from

this type operation and even able to send subsidies to the war effort. However, Africans were expected to grow more export crops so as to ensure that the same amount of imports was bought.

It should be noted that the military and commercial demands of the War encouraged many colonial governments into investing into Africa's infrastructure and Africa's airports and harbours. The harbours of Freetown and Lagos were deepened and the facilities greatly improved. Freetown became an important port for Allied command in the south Atlantic while Accra airport was an important terminus for the transportation of troops to the North African campaign. In turn, many Africans moved from the rural areas to the urban centres to work in such places as in naval harbour constructions where wages were high.

A much more subtle approach was taken by the European powers to their colonies in Africa at the commencement of the Second World War. While in the First World War colonial powers used a strong degree of power to coerce Africans to support their interests in the war. African support for the war was encouraged and Africans were "encouraged" to participate by the European powers. Propaganda and misinformation was used as a tool to motivate colonial subject to participate. The British utilised the radio, films and officially-sponsored newspapers to "*inform*" their subjects of international developments and they were encouraged to volunteer for military service or to produce more raw materials and food. The influence of newspapers were extremely high as reflected by the fact that a single copy of a newspaper reached a wide audience due to the fact that it was read aloud at village meetings and markets.

Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 stunned many Africans. The country had been regarded as a symbol of independence and self-respect and it reflected a link between cultural domination and political sovereignty. When the British Commonwealth helped liberate the country in 1941, with soldiers from Africa other African's were inspired by the fact that, if it could happen in Ethiopia, it could well occur in other countries on the continent.

In some colonies in Africa, notably in French colonies, inflation and forced conscription allowed for growing dissatisfaction to develop against colonial administration. In this mix came the returning servicemen who had gained global exposure and now they had to once again contend with the mentality of local colonial magistrates and minor chiefs. The returning soldiers who had in the past, only viewed Europeans from a "respective" distance had interacted during the war with white soldiers on an equal level and had fought and killed

Europeans. Thus they saw that the white soldiers were little different to themselves. The prestige and aura of Europeans in Africa was seriously undermined by the returning soldiers who had gained newly established experience and attitudes.

Europeans attitudes had also changed after the war. There was a strong realisation that Africa had assisted Europe and had supplied manpower and material support. Also there was a degree of support in liberal quarters that Africa should be thanked for its involvement. To ensure that they receive the local populations support, the European administrations were obliged to stress that economic, political and social reforms would be implemented after the war. This stance was reinforced by General De Gaulle at a Free French conference in Brazzaville in 1944 when he promised a “*new deal*” for citizens in the French African colonies despite the fact that there were no Africans present at the conference itself (Crowder, M. 1968: 487-489)

An ultimate irony to France’s stance regarding its colonies was the position retained by the Free French and supported by British and American commanders regarding the liberation of Paris on 25 August 1944. General De Gaulle wanted Frenchmen to lead the liberation of Paris. Although black colonial troops who made up about two thirds of Free French forces were readily available, a senior command decision was made to remove black soldiers from these units. White soldiers from other units were brought in to ensure that whites liberated Paris. To add to this irony was the fact that many of the (replacement) French soldiers who ultimately liberated the city were in fact North African, Syrian and Spanish (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7984436.stm>).

2.7 GEOPOLITICAL THEORISTS BETWEEN THE WARS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO AFRICA

This section will discuss the relevance of various geopolitical theorists during the First World War, in the period leading up to the Second World War and during the war itself.

There is no doubt that the most influential academic within Germany during the above mentioned period was Karl Haushofer who was a professional soldier and only when he retired at the age of 50 in 1919 did he concentrate on his second career, that of a geopolitician.

Before leaving the army, Haushofer had reached the rank of Major General and had led an experienced military career. In 1908 the German army sent him to Japan to study the Japanese army and to advise it as he was an artillery instructor. From 1909 to 1910 he was a military attaché, which allowed him to meet with many senior influential Japanese politicians as well as the emperor of Japan.

On his return to Germany, Haushofer travelled through Korea, Manchuria and Russia to Germany. Whilst in the army he worked on his doctorate of philosophy from the University of Munich. When World War One commenced Haushofer was a brigade commander on the western front. It was during this time that he enhanced his reputation as well as his ability for “*precognition*”, which he had initially gained as a young field officer in the Bavarian army. This “*gift*” allowed him to develop the extra-ordinary ability to predict with high accuracy, enemy shelling, attacks, where random shells would land and the exact number of casualties (www.geocities.com/intergral_tradition/haushofer.html).

Haushofer entered academia with the objective of restoring and revitalising Germany. It was due to Germans’ lack of geographic knowledge and geopolitical awareness - Haushofer believed - that led to the country’s defeat in the First World War. This was also due to the fact that the country had made a poor choice of its enemies and allies for example he argued that Germany should never have allowed itself to fight against Russia. In 1919 Haushofer began his academic career as a *Privatdozent* for political geography at Munich University. His doctorate dissertation dealt with the “*Basic Contours of the Geographic Development of the Japanese Empire 1854-1919*”. It should be noted that even during the First World War Haushofer was already looking for a German “*Caesar*” and was already creating a legend pertaining to the belief that there had been a “*stab-in-the-back*” process. Letters to his wife blamed the Reich’s impending defeat on socialists, liberals, pacifists and capitalists” (Herwig, H.H. 2006: 223-224).

In 1923 Haushofer became president of the “*League for the Preservation of Germandom Abroad*” and thus retained strong ties with German’s living outside the borders of the country. From a political perspective Haushofer was a member of the German Peoples’ Party until 1925 when he expressed his support for Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg to become president of the Weimar Republic. It was thought that Haushofer met Rudolf Hess soon after he joined the University of Munich and before long a strong bond had developed between the

two men, Hess was believed to be a firm Haushofer student. In other publications it is reported that Haushofer met Hess during the First World War and that Hess was for a period his *aid-de-camp*. By 1922 Haushofer founded the Institute of Geopolitics in Munich from which he publicized various geopolitical ideas. By 1924 he was regarded as the leading authority within the school of *geopolitik* and Haushofer established the publication *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*. It is thought that Haushofer met Adolf Hitler through Hess as early as 1919. Haushofer admitted that his teachings could well have had an effect on Hitler's thinking but he denied that he had in any way contributed to *Mein Kampf*. Furthermore, Haushofer did not provide any reviews of Hitler's book in his monthly publication *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik* as Hitler's book had "*little to do with geopolitics*" (Haushofer, K, November 1945, BA, n413, Vol 2). Haushofer claimed to remain apolitical to the extent that when he was approached to join the National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP) he declined. However, this stance did not restrict him from maintaining a strong link to Deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess (Freeman, T.W. 1989: 95-104).

Critics state that *Geopolitik* was basically just a consolidation and recording of other theories, which were then placed within a scientific framework. An important point of departure is the fact that the focus of this approach is on land-based empire as opposed to naval imperialism. With regard to the various approaches to this subject, the important issues were structured as follows:

- *Lebensraum* – This was a revision of colonialist imperialism. Although Haushofer claimed that he never advocated for Germany to attack Russia and use that country's territory for *Lebensraum*, he did believe that geopolitics was part of applied geography and that highly populous countries (such as Germany) should have the right to expand. *Lebensraum* (living-space) was a concept started by Ratzel, who as mentioned earlier was seen by many as the father of political geography. Haushofer believed in *Lebensraum* in so much as that should Germany ally itself to Russia (through non-violent means) it could be done through a peaceful process (www.geocities.com/intergral/tradition/haushofer.html). It is interesting to note that although Haushofer initially stressed that *Lebensraum* should be a peaceful process, by July 1941 he was quick to state that "*Barbarossa*" constituted "*the greatest task of geopolitics, the rejuvenation of space in the Old World.*" He saw Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union as a bold attempt to "*positively and creatively*" ensure the forging of

“Euroasia and Eurafrika into reality.” In a strong endorsement of Hitler’s attacks, Haushofer stated that *“a variable cornucopia of space-related, economic and geopolitical task will be showered down on Eurasia, one whose vast dimensions not even the guardians of the new order can fully fathom”* (Herwig, H. H. 2006: 236).

- Autarky - This was a new expression of tariff protectionism. In its twentieth century version, autarky as an objective was a policy goal to achieve economical self sufficiency. In effect, a country would strive to produce enough goods by itself to the extent that it did not need to import goods - with specific regard to raw materials such as iron ore, coal and oil. This goal was encouraged by Haushofer and actually sought after by Nazi Germany. The actual policy goal at the time was to maximise trade within the economic block and minimize trade outside it. In the 1930s Germany endeavoured to do this by trying to minimize trade with countries such as France and the USSR. The logic was that Germany would eventually go to war - possibly against them - and could therefore not rely on them for specific commodities (Sempa, F.P. 2007:32). It should be stressed that the objective was not to attain absolute economic autarky but to have a strong degree of central (German) control *“over the union and empire that economic interactions between Germany and the major industrial states had developed”* and *“would not threaten Germany's political independence and power”*. The system of external economic relations had to be so constructed, however, that temporary autarky in the event of a major war would be possible (Smith, W.D. 1989:113).

In the earlier part of this thesis mention is made of mercantilism and the relevance that this broad policy had on Europe’s initial relationship with Africa. Although Haushofer gave little mention to the African continent, the fact that he emphasised the need for an autarky approach (which is a strong element within mercantilism) for Germany, strongly suggests that through colonialism, which in itself is an important component of mercantilism that there is linkage between the need for the raw materials of Africa and Germany’s demand for these commodities and by extension also the possibly of space for Lebensraum.

- Strategic control of key geographic territories – in this perspective the control centres on territories on land rather than at sea. The most well known from a geopolitical

perspective are choke points. These are seen as “*bottlenecks*”. In practical terms this symbolises a point where an attacker must come through a channel, which would normally be carefully guarded. Choke points that control access to and from the sea include “naval” choke points as identified by the Admiral John Fisher, British Admiral of the Fleet who attempted to defend British colonialism and important colonies. In this regard naval choke points are identified as features such as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope and the Strait of Gibraltar. In regard to this paper, strategic control of “*geographic territories*” refers to control of land such as a valley or defile (narrow pass or gorge) between mountains or hills. An ideal example of this would be “*the defile formed by the woods at Agincourt and caused a choke point for the French army*” which helped the English to defeat the French at the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 (Curry, A. 2000: 12-13).

- Pan-regions – was a combination of a strategic and economic concept. Haushofer borrowed from the strategic concept of the Heartland as originally identified by Halford Mackinder. The belief was that if Germany could control a vast portion of Eastern Europe as well as huge portions of Russia then it would be able to maintain command on this territory and hostile sea power would be denied any access. Haushofer maintained that Germany should form an alliance with Japan and Italy which would compliment Germany’s strategic control of Eurasia. The pan-region concept was adapted from the American Monroe Doctrine which emphasised the idea of national as well as continental self sufficiency. Furthermore, the Doctrine, implemented in 1823 stressed that any further efforts by European governments to colonize land or interfere with states in the Americas would be regarded by the United States of America as an act of aggression, which would require US intervention (Evans,G.1998:336). Until 1941 the pan-regions (as seen by Haushofer) was divided into four principle regions, namely; Pan-America, led by the United States, Greater East Asia led by Japan, Pan-Germany led by Germany and Pan-Russia led by Russia. There were lesser pan-regions, which were incorporated into the larger regions. In 1939 the Nazi-Soviet Pact – along with Germany’s alliance with Japan seemed too many to be the very apex of Haushofer’s theories. The German invasion of Russia in 1941 was seen by many German *Geopolitik* thinkers of the time as a “*gross blunder*”. This did not prevent them from revising their thinking on the fate of the Soviet Union

in Germany's New Order. Interest in Eurafrika as a pan-region that could well be considered for expansion was replaced by an "emphasis on Eurasia as the *"natural"* sphere for German expansion" (Parker, G. 1985: 73-76). It should be noted that Haushofer focused on Germany's commanding stance in Eurasia, which was the country's weakness (namely its "position between") and at the same time its strength. Germany was regarded as displaying the *"indispensable nexus between East and West, capitalism and communism and it had a civilising and imperial key-role for the rebirth of Europe's civilisation and power"* (Chiantera-Stutte, P. 2005: 1-10).

- Borders or Frontiers - Haushofer saw borders and political boundaries as living organism and therefore as places of continuous struggle; places of conflict in the relationship between larger and smaller powers. *"Everywhere we encounter the frontier as battlefield."* Haushofer did not see or want to understand the concept of the "exact border line" instead he saw the frontier as an ever-changing border region, which in effect allowed for a degree of uncertainty and instability, which in turn encouraged permanent war and revolution. Boundaries were seen as *"temporary halts, breathing spells for a nation on the march to expansion"* (Herwig, H.H. 2006: 228-229).

Many observers argue that the basics to Haushofer's geopolitics were not as original as he might want to have portrayed. It was from Ratzel that he took over the notion of space who had by 1897 already defined the notion of *Lebensraum*. It was during long social occasions with Haushofer and his father that Ratzel tested his theories on this matter. Ratzel's objective was to develop political geography as a discipline and the Darwinist thrust pertaining to the *"struggle for survival"* could be better adapted as a *"struggle for space"*. It was from Kjellén that Haushofer borrowed the word *Autarky* or National self-sufficiency. For the Swede, *"state"* and *"power"* were synonymous. States develop because they are powerful and retain their position and status as long as they remain powerful. In Kjellén viewpoint the state was seen as *"a biological revelation, a living being"*. States were vigorous and had limited space (Germany was seen as the ideal example) and were not controlled by laws or constitutions but were rather by *"the categorical imperative of expanding their space by colonization, amalgamation, or conquest"* (Herwig, H.H. 2006: 220). It was obvious that Russia was seen as being the most desirable territory for future expansion by Germany in the early 1940's but

there is little doubt that Africa could well have been placed in this category at a later stage should Germany have been successful in its expansionist endeavours at that time.

It was from Sir Halford Mackinder that Haushofer identified the concept of the “*heartland*” according to which countries of the world were position into two camps. These being the land power of inner Euro-Asia and the maritime states sea power that were categorized as “*robbers of the steppe*” and “*sea robbers.*” Mackinder saw the heartland (Russia) as “*a continuous land, ice-girt to the north, water - girt elsewhere, measuring 21 million square miles or more than three times the area of North America*”. To this extent by 1904 Mackinder was warning his fellow countrymen that German could well ally itself with the “*pivot state, Russia*” (Herwig, H.H. 2006: 220-221).

Haushofer had a specific stance which was consistently relayed to thousands of Germans via the radio due to his monthly broadcasts on the *Deutsche Welle* on issues such as politics and geopolitics, which began in 1924. He stressed that German’s should think “*geopolitically*” and that German’s should realise that they had an “*eternal and indestructible geopolitical power base*” (Murphy, D.T. 1997: 242). Haushofer’s political career seems to reach new heights when the Nazi’s came to power in Germany in 1933 and in the same year his *Zeitschreft für Geopolitik* reached its apex with an annual circulation of 700 000. Although, as stated earlier in this section, Haushofer never joined the Nazi Party there was clear indications that he was a supporter of Hitler’s actions and policies. On his 50th birthday in 1939, Haushofer in a somewhat fawning manner celebrated the Führer’s birthday as a “*statesman*” who combined in his person “*Clausewitz’s blood and Ratzel’s space and soil*”. In late 1940 Haushofer was stating that “*Hitler and Hess were men guided by the Highest Human principles.*” By 1941, following Hess’s flight to Scotland in 1940, Haushofer was left with little patronage and he was arrested and questioned by the Gestapo. But in the same year he informed his readers that “*Barbarossa*” constituted “*the greatest task of geopolitics, the rejuvenation of Space in the Old Order and that the invasion of Russia was the Führer’s bold attempt ‘positively and creatively’ to forge Eurasia and Eurafrica into reality.*” In 1944, following his son, Albrecht’s knowledge on the attempt on Hitler’s life in July 1944, Haushofer was arrested and spent a month in Dachau Concentration Camp (Herwig, H. H. 2006: 232-235).

With the execution of his one son, Albrecht at the close of the Second World War and accusations being levelled against him by the American occupying forces that he had played a role in influencing Hitler's expansionist policies, Haushofer committed suicide. At the time of his death it is believed that his major scholarly regret was that "*the Nazis with the half-educated Hitler and Hess at their head had never understood his geopolitical theories*" (Walsh, E.A. 1947: 22).

Professor Nicholas Spykman a Dutch-American academic made a significant mark in the field of geopolitics, which placed him in a similar category as intellectuals such as Alfred Mahan and Halford Mackinder. Spykman was a professor of International Relations at Yale University in the United States. He stressed the "*power relations*" among states and the impact of geography on politics. He rejected many of the approaches of the German school of *Geopolitik*. In three of his most well-known publications, namely; *Geography and Foreign Policy* (1938), *America's Strategy in the World Politics* (1942), *the Geography of the Peace* (1944), Spykman questioned various weaknesses' in Mackinder's thinking. Spykman felt that Mackinder had overemphasized the Heartland power potential, its relevance decreased due to challenges regarding internal transportation and by accessibility through the various barriers that surrounded it. The second issue was the background to the Heartland, which was not just about sea power versus land power. What Spykman believed was that Eurasia's real power was in the region that Mackinder had identified as the "*Inner or Marginal Crescent.*" This region was called the Rimland by Spykman. In his view the Rimland was vulnerable to both sea and land power and should thus operate in both areas. Due to the fact that throughout history alliances were continuously made between Rimland powers or between Rimland and Heartland powers. Thus Spykman's dictum was:

"Who controls the Rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world."

Spykman's Rimland was divided into three sectors: the European coast land, the Arabian-Middle Eastern desert and; and the Asiatic monsoon land.

In his articles and publications, notably "*Geography and Foreign Policy, 1938*, Spykman examined the effect of regional and world location as well as country size on the foreign policy of nations. Spykman believed that the country's geography was the most important factor that influences the states policy. Due to the fact that "*the geographic area of the state is*

the territorial base from which it operates in time of war and the strategic position, which it occupies during the temporary armistice called peace” (Spykman, N.J. 1938: 29). Although there are factors that influence a state foreign policy such as economic structure, population density, personalities of the statesmen, and type of government - geography seems to be the most permanent due to the fact that *“geographic characteristics of states are relatively unchangeable.”* He went on to state that *“the geographic demands of those states will remain the same for centuries”* (Spykman, N.J. 1938: 29).

Spykman noted that the majority of powerful states were large in size, although he acknowledged that some smaller powers (Holland, Great Britain and Venice) that had been able to control the sea had also been able to rule large empires. Spykman stated that it *“is not strength but potential strength, the size of a nation can be either a weakness or strength, this all depends on technical, social, moral and ideological development, on the dynamic forces within a state, on the political constellation of the past, and on the personality of individuals”* (Spykman, N.J. 1938: 32-33). Further to Spykman’s stance in the essential element of a powerful (large) state was “effective centralized control” which hinged on *“the existence of an effective system of communications from the centre to the periphery.”* It is of interest to note that Herbst also analysed the impact of underdeveloped infrastructure on the projection of authority within Africa (Herbst, J. 2000: 114). Spykman saw how the Incas, Persians, Romans, Chinese, French and Russians built highways, roads and canals to *“knit” their empires together. In more recent times this extended to airports and railways and this “made possible effective integration over wider areas.”* Spykman saw that the geopolitical trend was for states to have the ability to exercise effective political control over increasingly larger areas. He saw that in the future, *“fifty years from now the quadrumvirate of world power will be China, India, the United States and the USSR”* (Spykman, N.J. 1938: 34-39).

Even more importantly than the states size, was its location within the world and the region itself. Spykman regarded the geographic location of a state as *“the most fundamental factor of its foreign policy.”* Spykman went on to state that the belief that the facts of location do not change. Relevance changes due to shifts in communication in routes of communication in the technique of war as well as within the centres of world power.

Spykman saw a *“geopolitical world framework”* within two massive landmasses, Eurasia and North America: three islands, South America, Africa and Australia: as well as five major

bodies of water; the North Polar Sea, the South Polar Sea, the Atlantic, Pacific and the Indian Oceans. Spykman examined historical shifts in the global centres of power and identified four “spheres” of world power. Each of these spheres was dominated from different centres. In this regard, the centre for the Far East was Japan; the United States was the centre for the America’s, the heartland of Eurasia was centred from Moscow and the Eastern Atlantic and Indian Oceans from Europe. As far as position was concerned, the United States was “*the most favoured state in the world from a point of view of location,*” with direct access to the Pacific and Atlantic basins (Spykman, N.J, 1998: 43). At a regional level, Spykman placed states into three types; “*landlocked states,*” (of the 40 landlocked countries in the world, 14 are in Africa, namely Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The independence of Eritrea in 1993 caused Ethiopia to become landlocked. It is interesting to see that should South Sudan obtaine autonomy after a planned referendum in 2011 the new country will also be landlocked), secondly “*island states,*” and “states that have both sea and land frontiers.” In his view, landlocked states normally have challenges surrounding security from their immediate neighbours. Island states normally face possible pressure from other naval powers. However, if they are island states (Japan and United States) they might also face security problems from close costal powers. Offshore island states use the tactic of colonizing or conquering various coastal regions, maintaining costal buffer states and/or supporting “*a balance of power between continental powers.*” States that have both sea and land frontiers use various factors to determine their principle security, namely; the extent of their land and sea frontiers and the power “*potential*” of their neighbours.

Spykman placed France, Germany and Russia (although all three had both sea and land frontiers) as primary land-orientated powers. Their various security challenges from a historical perspective originated from Great Britain, Japan and the United States, Island States gravitated towards sea power. The United States was regarded as an Island as she had no main security issues on her land-frontiers with either Mexico or Canada. Italy and China had both land and sea frontiers and a mixed land-sea orientation due to their regional and world locations (Sempa, F.P 2006: 1-5).

When Spykman wrote the above mentioned article in the 1930’s Japan was fighting on the Asian mainland. The Spanish Civil War had taken place and German expansion in Europe and Italy’s conquests in North Africa had been checked by Western democracies ineffective

policy to appeasement. Spykman saw that the world was gravitating towards another world war and he tried to explain the factors and policies of states in the internal milieu. Spykman also believed that states could not escape their geography “*however stilled the Foreign Office and resourceful the General Staff*” were. A state’s foreign policy should factor in geographic facts. “*It can deal with them skilfully or ineptly; it can modify them; but it cannot ignore them. For geography does not argue. It simply is*” (Sempa, F.P. 2006: 4).

With the Second World War and America’s full participation, Spykman wrote “*America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (1942)*”, which has been described as a “*masterful analysis of world politics and U.S grand strategy informed by geopolitical realism*” Spykman described the book as an analysis of America’s position in terms “of geography and power politics” so that the U.S could “*develop a grand strategy for both war and peace based on the implications of its geographic location in the world*” (Spykman, N.J. 1942:77).

Spykman was of the opinion that it was in the United State’s interest to ensure that Germany remain strong after the end of the Second World War. This he believed would counter the USSR’s power. In strategic terms he believed that there was no difference between Germany controlling the Urals or the USSR having absolute control of all the territories in Central and Eastern Europe both prospects presented equal threats. Spykman predicted that Japan would lose the war while Russia and China would remain “*in struggle*” with each other over boundaries. He also saw China becoming a powerful nation in Asia and that the United States would have to take responsibility for Japan’s defence. Just before his death in 1943, Spykman stressed that the Allies should position their post-war policy on stopping the consolidation of the Rimland. He was also opposed to European integration and argued that American interests favoured balanced power in Europe rather than integrated power (Glassner, M. I. 1996: 326-327).

2.8 DECOLONISATION: THE PROCESS TO AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE

There is no doubt that the Second World War acted as a trigger mechanism to decolonization. It can be argued that, had European powers held an active role in the continent during the war (rather than only dealing with internal matters) that this might have prevented decolonization. This scenario might have allowed for a “*more incremental withdrawal/independence strategy*” that could have prevented African wars of independence that followed. At the same time it can also be argued that had Europeans tried to amalgamate their ideologies with previous African tribal customs rather than trying to force Western-type democracy on them, matters would well have been different. However, ultimately the decolonisation process had progressed and there was little that the European powers could do to prevent it (Paaiz, M. 2009: 1-2).

If one had to analyse the actual commencement of the road to decolonization, one would have to look further back than the period following the Second World War. It would be more beneficial to possibly begin the process in 1922 when Britain granted its colony Egypt, limited independence. This development ultimately allowed Egypt to end its protectorate status and become a sovereign state with a king, Sultan Ahmad Fuad as its head of state. The reality after this was that although Egypt was ruled by a king and his prime minister, the British high commissioner held a great deal of power and authority. Britain’s intention was for Egypt to achieve independence through a well managed and controlled long-term timetable.

In theory, Egypt had become a decolonized state but in reality the country was still strongly linked to Britain. The country’s economy, which was based on cotton, a cash crop for the cotton mills of northern England was controlled by Britain. World War II allowed for the decolonization process in Egypt to cease. The country was seen as a strategic interest for the Allied forces as the country controlled the route through North Africa to the oil producing regions of the Middle East as well as providing the vital communication and trade route through the Suez Canal, which linked the rest of the British Empire. Egypt was made the central military base for Allied operations in North Africa. However, after the war had ended, complete economic independence was sought and pressure was placed on the Egyptian government by the Muslim Brotherhood for the establishment of an Egyptian/Islamic state. In

1948 the Prime Minister of Egypt, Mahoud an-Nakrashi Pasha was assassinated by the Brotherhood. Despite strong action being taken against the Brotherhood their strength and influence continued to grow. Another group that developed in Egypt at the time was a cabal of Egyptian army officers who were known as the “*free officers.*” On 22 and 23 July 1952 this group, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser overthrew King Faruk in a *coup d’état*. The group experimented with civilian rule then on 18 June 1953 a republic was declared and Nasser was made Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (Boddy-Evans, A: 2009: 2-4).

After the war the main colonial powers began to formulate plans for reform. Many of these powers wanted to ensure that that their empires go from an administrative responsibility to a modernization or economic development phase. Government planning, part of everyday life in modern Europe was transferred to the colonies. New infrastructural development projects took place throughout the colonies and this allowed for the development and expansion of roads, ports, airports and hospitals. Efforts were being made for “*Westernization*” and to move away from the “*native world.*” By the time that the United States became an influential force in the rapidly decolonising Africa, this process of change became known in some quarters as the “*Coca-Colazation*” of the world.

From an internal political perspective development within the colonies in Africa, until soon after the Second World War was dominated by two political minorities, the colonial administration and the colonial elite. These groups had a great deal in common with each other and less so with the general population. The two groupings spoke the same European language and used the same political philosophy. In effect, the relationship between the two groups was one of confrontation as well as cooperation.

In general, after the Second World War, European powers were in decline. This was also reflective in their colonial rule. It should remember that with the exception of Great Britain, no colonial power emerged from the war as victorious. In the case of Great Britain, the country might have survived the conflict and claimed victory at its end but the country was bankrupt. The country had a huge debt that it had to pay and massive loans and grants from the USA had to be serviced. This situation was compounded by the fact that although Britain had entered the war as one of the world’s richest countries by its end the country had virtually no wealth left. The country had been significantly weakened. The general logic at the time

was that wealth had to be rebuilt and this would be done through trade. Trade with America was far greater than any trade that the country had with its colonies. Thus emphasis was placed on increasing trade relations with the United States to the detriment of the colonies. The fact that general public sentiment in Great Britain at that time also centred on the fact that the country had to be rebuilt and that holding on to foreign lands with little possibility of a beneficial return ensured the continuation of the decolonization process (www.friesian.com/british.htm).

Decolonization is basically the process by which former colonies or non-self governing territories become self-governing states. The basic fact is that decolonization is the undoing of a colonial relationship. From an academic perspective the decolonization process operates at four levels. Firstly, an independent government with full authority within the boundaries of the colony is established. The colonial power no longer controls the political structure of the colony. A new elite takes over power. Secondly, government services and the provision of public goods is managed and controlled by the new government. The colonial power will no longer pay for the “operational costs” of running the colony. Thirdly, new economic and social institutions are established and these bodies objective is aimed at improving the social well-being of the population as well as establishing political rights. Finally there might be an effort made to begin a process whereby distinct cultural groups were incorporated into the community. This process can include different population groups as well as non-native settlers. The process can be violent as one group might attempt to dominate others.

The decolonization process was unforeseen as regard to the rapid dismantling process. As mentioned earlier in this section, the war caused strains on the European colonial powers, which allowed many to lose their overseas empires. Some lost their “possessions” during the war, and just found it too difficult to restore control over their colonies after the conflict. Others, such as Great Britain were so strained economically that the maintenance of a colony, seen as too much of an effort. Another factor that encouraged the decolonization process was the fact that after World War II, the educated elite amongst the natives of the colony were encouraged in their actions to obtain political power by the process of restoration and self-rule in Europe, which would have strengthened the pursuit of the same goals within the colonies.

The decolonization process specifically in Africa ran parallel to the rapid economic rise and the economic integration of Europe in the 1950's and 1960's. In 1960 alone, seventeen

African colonies obtained their independence from both Britain and France. It should be noted that both these European countries had continued to experience economic hardships until the end of the 1940's. These European countries (Britain more so than France) began at that time to shift their economic and financial priorities and restrict their colonial funding to allow them to finance their internal post-war reconstruction. Thus the process of (economic) decolonisation, justified by economic realities, had begun earlier. Another factor, highlighted by Gata and Garoup was the fact that there were "*high value and low value colonies*" in the eyes of the colonial powers. High value colonies were more likely to experience a colonial war, whereas a low value colony was more likely to achieve independence in a peaceful manner (Garoupa, N.R & Gata, J.E, 2000: 1-7).

Figure 1.6 at the end of this thesis, within the attachment provides a *Map depicting the Process of Decolonisation in Africa*.

With reference to literature on decolonization, there are four main views on the decolonization process, namely;

- (i) The Commonwealth view. Authors of this view looked at decolonization as the "*natural conclusion of a long process of power delegation.*" A colonial war is regarded as a "*mistake*" caused by disagreements over the timing of such processes. This view was influenced by the decolonization of British India.
- (ii) The Imperialistic View sees decolonization as being due to the weakening of imperial control following the destruction in physical capital due to the Second World War and the moral changes brought about by the rise of the left in Europe. Colonial wars were regarded as a consequence of "*the violent resistance by the colonial powers to the breakdown of imperial isolation,*" for example maintaining an exclusive or semi-exclusive trading area. This theory is seen in the process of decolonization in the Southeast Asia colonies of the Dutch and the French as well as in Africa.
- (iii) The Romantic Nationalist View regarded decolonisation as a consequence of the rise of nationalistic movements due to the politicization of the masses in the colonial territory. Colonial wars were seen as legitimate independence struggles for freedom, fairness and equality.

- (iv) Political Economic View sees colonial wars as being violent competition for control of national resources. This view saw decolonisation as a “*direct consequence of competition between the western allies and the Communist world.*” The majority of independence movements were supported by the USSR while the U.S. assisted the colonial struggle with political support and foreign aid. The approach saw the continuation of this process after independence by a civil war with one party supported by Moscow and the other by Washington (Garoupa, N.R & Gata, J.E, 2000: 1-7).

As previously mentioned after World War II, Britain retained the general attitude that the country should be inward looking and that the various colonies should be “let go.” At the time many observers thought that Britain had a rather “Kipling-eaque” attitude and that Africa was regarded as a continent of “children” in need of guidance. In general, Africans were seen as being essentially different from Europeans and for most of the time should stay that way. This approach bordered on racism and strongly implied that Africans were not only different but also inferior. In general, the most concerning factor for the British during this period was the possible spread of Communism throughout Africa. A 1950 British Foreign and Colonial Office report stated that “*generally speaking, it is the detribalized native who responds best to communism, as he misses the narrow confines of tribal life and a leader on whom to bestow loyalty*” (www.bbc.co.uk).

The “red scare” from Africa could well explain why the British declared a state of emergency in Kenya in 1952 when the Mau Mau “troubles” began. However, by 1956 it was not communism but nationalism that saw unprecedented British and French action against an African state. Lieutenant-Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser prompted a British/French/Israeli response to his actions. In July 1956, the United States cancelled funding to Egypt. The capital in question would have assisted Egypt to build the Aswan High Dam (project). Initially the U.S had agreed to provide Egypt with US\$ 56 million directly and then to also arrange for another US\$ 200 million through the World Bank. However, the United States cancelled the funding due to what that country saw as Nasser’s overtures (selling cotton and buying weapons) to the USSR and Czechoslovakia. In turn, Nasser declared that Egypt would nationalize the Suez Canal. Britain responded by freezing Egyptian assets and mobilizing its armed forces. Developments escalated when Egypt blocked the Straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Agape. The strategic locale was seen as vital to Israeli, British and French interests. On 29 October 1956 Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula. By 5 November 1956

British and French troops had made an airborne landing at Port Said and Port Faud. This Tripartite Invasion was condemned by the international community as by the Soviet Union and United States. The United Nations pressurised France and Britain to withdraw, which was done by 24 December 1956. However, Israel refused to relinquish Gaza. A direct consequence of this tripartite invasion was the fact that African nationalists throughout the continent saw that power had shifted from the colonial masters to the two new superpowers. Both Britain and France lost influence and face (Boddy-Evans, A: 2009: 3-4).

France had a very different approach to Great Britain with regard to decolonization. The country had a (theoretical) policy of incorporation of African territories into the French Republic but in reality this process fell far short of the reality. The constitutions of the third (1870 to 1940) as well as the Fourth (1940 to 1958) and the Fifth (1958) Republic's left open the possibility of African incorporation into a growing French Republic in very much the same way that the United States expanded from thirteen to fifty states (Liebnow, J.G. 1986: 28). France regarded its colonies as part of *la Communite Francaise*, which can be described as an extension of the francophone family. Thus the French position regarding the decolonisation process was "*tantamount to breaking up the family.*" The sentiment was strongest felt with regard to Algeria. This emotive regard for Algeria was linked to the fact that about one million people of French ancestry lived in that country. The link was so strongly established that Algeria was, according to the constitution of the Fourth Republic considered to be a *département* of France with the same legal status as Upper Alsace or Vaucluse and not just a colony. After Libya had been liberated by Italy and the cutting of ties with Tunisia and Morocco, the people of Algeria felt that they were ready for independence (Paaiz, M. 2009:1-2).

Before and during World War II, French policy to its colonies had centred on association, i.e. separate structures for administration, law, political rights, etc. However, after 1945, association was abandoned and French policy moved towards assimilation. This would concentrate on political representation in parliament for all the African colonies (Mills, W.G. 2009:3). Interestingly, the French approach towards decolonization ensured that French colonies in Africa obtained their independence later than British colonies. Many Francophone African's rejected the concept of independence until nationalistic movements in other areas of Africa almost forced them to see and accept the "*inevitability of separation.*" As Léopold Senghor stated in the French National Assembly in 1957: "*We do not wish to leave the*

French compound. We have grown up in it and it has been pleasant to live in it. We simply want to build our own house which will enlarge and strengthen the family compound, or rather the French hexagon" (Liebnow, J.G. 1986: 29).

After the war Belgium's policy towards its colonies in Africa remained very much the same. Like France, Belgium had created a legal class of *évolués* who were better educated and trained in certain skills. These individuals had better housing and had gained from the so-called "*attributes of Western civilization.*" However, unlike their counterparts under the French, the Congolese *évolués* were in all intense and purposes "*political eunuchs*". Liebnow stresses that Belgian's colonial programme was about "stomach rather than status." In effect this came down to the needs of the *évolués* being satisfied in a paternalistic manner within "*new urban communities*" around mining concerns in the Province of Katanga. It should be stressed that Belgium derived some benefit from its relationship with the Congo as reflected by the fact that between 1939 and 1953 the value of exports from the Congo increased fourteen times. It is interesting to note that any association, let alone party that might create a process of political activism were banned until the eve of independence. Education was only for the privileged and stopped at the end of secondary level for all, with the exception of those who wanted to become priests. It is estimated that by 1956 that there was only about 120 Congolese held the *carte d'immatriculation* and that there were only thirty university student in all the Belgian Africa colonies (Congo, Rwanda and Burundi) out of a population of 13 million. Furthermore, no African soldier held a rank higher than sergeant (Young, C. 1965: 77).

Portugal's policy stance towards its African colonies following the Second World War also remained unchanged. The country was the poorest European colonial power and had little ability to develop the agricultural and mineral resources of its African colonies. It was only after the war that Portugal approached institutions in the U.S, Germany, South Africa and Britain so as to secure capital for projects in Angola. Apart from receiving port and railway transport fees from South Africa and Rhodesia the only major capital injection that Portugal received regarding Mozambique was from South African mining houses for the recruitment of Mozambique miners who went to work in South African mines. The administration of vast tracks of territory in Mozambique was left to be undertaken by private companies who had obtained agricultural concessions. In many ways Portuguese colonial rule resembled the French model. But in reality they were very different. Unlike the French, the Portuguese

stated that they did not have colonies, “only overseas provinces of the Portuguese state.” As mentioned earlier in this thesis, Portugal had created a legal “*status for evolved Africans*” that was called *assimilados*. However, although they had the same status of equality as Europeans and Portuguese citizens, the qualification for *assimilado* status was raised on a continuous basis. Thus in total, only about 1% of the African population ever obtained this status (Liebnow, J.G. 1986: 36-37).

3. THE SECOND SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

This section will discuss the process regarding what is referred to as the second scramble for Africa and will cover the period from the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cold War.

The 1955 Bandung Conference was intended to establish and build on existing cultural and economic cooperation between Africa and Asia. The initial purpose of the conference was to establish an opposition to colonialism throughout the world. It was during this period that African leaders came to the realisation that they could manipulate growing Cold War tensions to benefit their positions.

In 1957, Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah declared the colony of the Gold Coast independent. Apart from Liberia and Ethiopia, which had never been a European colony, Ghana was the first “black” African country to obtain its independence but it was not until 1960 that the country broke its constitutional link with Britain, which had identified the British queen as the head of state. Furthermore, the ceremonial rule of the governor-general ceased. After this time, Ghana became a republic with Nkrumah as president. Apart from leading his country to independence, Nkrumah was a leading initiator of Pan-Africanism, the belief of African brotherhood and unity. By 1958 Nkrumah was chairing the first Conference of Independent African States, which took place in Accra – which in turn would lead to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). In essence Nkrumah wanted to establish Pan-African unity. In 1959 Ghana established a union with Guinea, which had obtained its independence from France in that year. By 1960, Mali also joined the union. This union never actually achieved reality. In 1960 Nkrumah had sent troops to support Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. Ghana at that stage was regarded as the torchbearer for black African, having been the first black African country to obtain its independence after the “*wave of decolonisation*” had spread south following all the African countries in North Africa, which had obtained their independence in the 1950s (Owusu-Ansah, D & McFarland, 1995: 210).

The formulation of Pan-Africanism was a short lived attempt to unite the new independent African states and to protect their interests from real and perceived threats. Stephen Walt places these countries concerns in perspective in his paper entitled “*Alliance Formulation and*

the Balance of World Power, 1985.” Walt identifies four main criteria to evaluate threats posed by a state on another, namely; its geographical proximity, its aggregate strength (population size and economic capabilities), offensive capabilities and its offensive intentions. Further to this Walt notes that, the more that states see a rising state as possessing these qualities, the more likely they are to see it as a threat and balance against it. They do this by allying against a perceived threat although very weak states can also attempt to “bandwagon” with the rising threat in order to protect their security (Walt, S.M. 1985: 4—38). This development was seen throughout Africa’s decolonisation period, which eventually led to the establishment of the OAU and later the African Union (AU). During the second Scramble period this was also experienced on a more informal manner when the so-called “front line states” attempted to establish a unified block against the hegemony of South Africa.

Ghana’s example, as inspired by Nkrumah and enacted upon earlier by Egypt followed by other North African countries - allowed Africans to intensify their struggles against colonialism. By the 1960s, the second wave of independence for almost thirty black African countries had begun. The process of decolonisation was strongly supported by the international community as reflected by the passing of the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* by the United Nations Security Council which is contained in *General Assembly Resolution 1514* (1960). As stated, the first and most essential goal of the Declaration is to help uphold the protection of human rights enshrined in the *Charter of the United Nations* (1945) by extending that protection to those people still living under colonial rule. The Declaration recognized that colonialism not only seriously hindered world peace, but also decreased international economic cooperation, and the progress of developing communities. It sought, therefore, to transfer power in the remaining non-self-governing territories (NSGTs) “to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire.” *General Assembly Resolution 1541* (1960) outlines the three paths to self-government that the authoring General Assembly recognized as available to NSGTs: free association with an independent State, integration into an independent State, or independence. (United Nations General Assembly. (1960, December 14). *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries*. (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm).

It was during this period that political power passed to new leaders who were all members of new political elite. Most of these members had higher education gained through Western

institutions and this was compounded by the fact that they had become politically active. The new African political elites followed Western ideals of modernisation regarding their ambitions. The Western approach had first been introduced into Africa during the first part of the twentieth century and at that stage was of the highest priority. The approach complimented other significant factors such as social justice, autonomy, economic development and autarky. The African nationalists strongly believed that these processes could only be achieved through the rapid liberation of the continent. It should be noted that “democracy” was not a specific primary objective on the continent (Clapham, C. 1996: 84), at this stage as it was too closely associated to the West that had the label of colonialism pinned to it.

When power was transferred by the colonial power it was done in its entirety. Territories had defined borders and the country had a certain physical infrastructure and was expected to have the means to control it (in the term of a police force and an army). However, the vast majority of countries lacked the capacity, capital or experience to allow for the machinery of the state to continue untroubled. Furthermore, there was an established bureaucracy with individuals with specific skills with the means to coordinate the bureaucratic process. In other words, the machinery of the state was passed on (at various levels of development) in its entirety. The new leaders began to “Africanise” the modern institutions that they now controlled. In many cases the former colonial power continued to maintain authority over the newly independent state through circumlocutory means. This control was normally exercised through the civil service and the army of the newly independent country. This scenario will be expanded upon later in this thesis. It is suffice to mention at this stage that all the former colonial powers France exercised this practise the most effectively with the majority of its colonies in Africa. Belgium also attempted to undertake this action in the newly independent Congo but achieved little success.

With the first African countries in Africa obtaining their independence, there was little clarity as to how the bureaucratic and administrative structures would operate yet alone continue to survive. The possibility to merge various countries into a Pan-African union had not been successful. There were also some attempts to restructure country borders and change the previous colonial demarcations. Examples of this can be seen with the attempts to form a Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union (as mentioned above) as well as a later Mali Federation (including Senegal and Mali). Egypt had also tried to form a United Arab Republic (UAR) with Syria.

The coup d'état in Togo that resulted in the assassination of President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963 shocked many African countries and seems to have reinforced African leaders' stance that any attempts to splinter the existing boundaries and that the fragmentation of political space on the continent should be resisted. In 1963 the OAU stated that the national borders drawn up by the European colonial powers would from that period onward be regarded as sacrosanct. This stance remained unchanged until the 1990s (with the singular creation of the country of Eritrea which was achieved following Ethiopia's defeat by Eritrean forces) and even at present the African Union continues to maintain this position. An example of this is the present position maintained by the AU regarding Morocco's attempts to incorporate Western Sahara, which the vast majority of AU countries continue to reject.

For the purpose of this paper, Africa has been divided into different regions. Due to the fact that no change has been made to the territorial integrity of Africa by the ruling elites following independence the political geographical positioning of countries has remained consistent. It must be noted that the division of Africa is to a great extent arbitrary and various scholars and international organisations do not always concur on the actual naming of regions or the position of countries into a given region. The United Nations for example has divided Africa into five regions, namely: Northern Africa, Western Africa, Middle Africa, Eastern Africa and Southern Africa. Despite these various approaches, for the sake of consistency in this thesis, Africa has been divided up into five regions, these being; North Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Central Africa and Southern Africa. Figure 1.7 provides an overview of the five regions pertaining to the various countries in each respective region as well as the date of their independence and which European country(s) was the African country's original colonial power.

3.1 AFRICA AND THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS DURING THE SECOND (COLD WAR) SCRAMBLE

This section will review the independence process during the period regarded as the Second Scramble for Africa. Developments taking place in the five regions within the continent will be briefly discussed. To allow for better perspective of the process of decolonization as well as, which colonial powers controlled respective African countries, the continent has been sub-

divided into five specific regions and the dates of independence as well as the details on which colonial powers controlled countries within the various regions have been included in a table (Figure 1.7) within this segment.

Figure 1.7: Found in the attachment is a table that provides the *Dates of Independence for African Countries from their respective colonial powers.*

3.2 AFRICA’S REGIONS: NORTH AFRICA, EAST AFRICA, CENTRAL AFRICA, WEST AFRICA SOUTHERN AFRICA

The first colonies in Africa to gain their independence were situated in North Africa. These countries included Libya granted its independence (by the United Nations) in 1952. It was only in Algeria, which had a substantial European settler population that independence required a war. What is recognised throughout the process of decolonisation is the consistent involvement of the former colonial powers in a type rear-guard action, which reflected a hesitance and even reluctance by the former powers to “let go” despite the fact that in general terms it was acknowledged that decolonisation had to take place. Italy had little choice pertaining to how and when its former colonies would obtain independence, due to its weak political position as it had been an Axis power despite changing sides and joining the Allies in 1943. The two other prominent countries in the region; France and Great Britain deliberately prolonged the process leading up to independence in efforts to secure commitments from future friendly or at least cooperative government regarding their future strategic concerns. Ironically, it was this very deliberate stalling tactic that ensured a strong negative sentiment in many of the former colonies that prevails to this day.

With the increasing demand by African countries in East Africa for independence came the reluctance from the British for the actual process to commence. Although there was a tacit acceptance that colonies would have to obtain their independence this was accompanied by the stance that these newly independent countries would receive their freedom but as allies of the United Kingdom. Any resistance to nationalistic aspirations that did not “conform” to Great Britain’s vision for itself and the future political as well as socio-economic model for the future independent colony was seen as being communist inspired. Hence the process of

labelling nationalism with communist threats, the so-called “red-scare” scenario. This process was clearly seen during Uganda’s attempts to achieve independence and even more so during the process for Kenya self-determination. A contributing factor to Britain’s reluctance was the fact that both countries had settler populations – Kenya with as many as 60 000 – which contributed to the mother country’s reluctance to relinquish control. It was only after a low-intensity (Mau Mau) rebellion, decisively won by the colonial authorities that independence was given.

France also wished to maintain control but through erstwhile methods that have been discussed in this document. There was also a strong tendency to manifest French authority within the colony for even longer that the British had. Initially France attempted to retain the leadership role for all its former colonies in Africa and expected its former colonies to expand within the “francophone family.” There was an emotive almost passionate belief that former French colonies in Africa should be linked not only economically and politically to France but almost more importantly through culture and language. In the majority of cases, France managed to retain a certain *status quo* with the participants of the independence process and in this regard was a great deal more successful than Great Britain regarding post-independence relationships. Although the island of Madagascar proved to be more challenging, France’s influence in the Comoros and notably in Djibouti indicated just how successful France has been at securing a positive balance regarding its geopolitical interests in East Africa.

The reforms *loi cadre* as passed by the French Fourth Republic in 1956 allowed for the ending of the integrationalist phase of French colonial policy and permitted a great deal of internal autonomy. This allowed each territorial assembly to formulate its own domestic policy although France continues to take responsibility for economic aid, higher education, defence and foreign affairs. With the creation of the of the Fifth Republic in 1958, legislation now allowed for the free association of autonomous republics within the newly created French Community of which France was the senior member. The community had jurisdiction over raw materials and foreign policy, defence, common ethnic and financial policy on strategic raw materials and if not specifically identified higher education, external and internal communication and the law courts. The president of the Fifth Republic presided over the executive of the Community, which also had an executive council and a senate that was elected indirectly by each member state in proportion to the population. At the same time each

member state would have its own government and a separate constitution. (Neuberger, B. 1986: 248).

Both Ethiopia and Somalia proved to be a more difficult relationship to manage not necessarily for Britain or France but for the two Cold War superpowers, namely the USSR and the USA. These two powers recognised the strategic positions and geopolitical relevance of Somalia and Ethiopia and the importance of developing relations with these two East African countries. The fact that both Somalia and Ethiopia interchanged their alliances between the USSR and US during the Cold War and, that both superpowers allowed this to happen not only reflects the fact that both superpowers had weak long-term strategies but also indicated how little the two Cold War powers actually knew how to interact with African countries.

Central Africa experienced a great deal of conflict during the decolonisation period which centralised on the massive land mass of the Congo. It can be argued that Congo was not ready for independence due to a myriad of factors, the most prevalent being that Belgium; the colonial authority had not made any effort in preparing the country for the inevitable. In turn the international community represented by the United Nations was also caught unprepared for any type of action pertaining to conflict resolution.

Involvement by the USSR and the United States to secure their geopolitical interests within the Congo manifested itself for the first time only after the Prime Minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba stated in 1960 that he would request support from Soviet Union for material due to the retarded pace on United Nations action.

To the north of the Congo, the country of Congo, Brazzaville at the same time began to experiment with “scientific socialism,” soon after the country obtained its independence from France and after concluding a twenty year friendship pact with the USSR, which allowed for other East Bloc countries such as North Vietnam, the Peoples Republic of China and North Korea to establish diplomatic Missions in Congo, Brazzaville.

The former French colonies of Cameroon, Chad and Gabon began a quasi-harmonious Community relationship with France within the framework of the *loi cadre* as legislated by the French Fourth Republic in 1956 and further enhanced by the creation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. However, as described later in this paper, France continued to involve itself and

influence political and socio-economic developments within their former colonies before, during and after independence.

The two newly independent countries of Rwanda and Burundi obtained their independence from Belgium with equal uncertainty as did the Congo. Conflict and ethnic tensions, which had been repressed as well as encouraged at different stages during Belgium rule so as to maintain a process of “divide and rule” ignited during the decolonisation period and threatened these two countries for decades after independence.

Equatorial-Guinea, Spain’s only colony in the region was rapidly granted independence in 1968 while Portugal continued to rule over São Tomé and Príncipe until 1975 when a *coup d’état* in Portugal allowed these two small African islands to gain swift independence from Portugal.

The region of West Africa comprises a diverse mix of ethnicities, cultures, religions and ideologies, more so than any of the other African regions. Even from an occupation perspective the region ranges from a country like Liberia, which was never colonized to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, which only obtained their independence in 1974.

At independence, the vast majority of West African countries had little strategic value for either the east or west within the conflictual framework of the Cold War. Although oil had been discovered in Nigeria, the demand for this resource in Europe and North America was at that stage easily met by domestic production from the Middle East and Iran. There was however an eagerness by both the USSR and the US to secure African countries support (or rather their vote) in the international fora such as the United Nations where the new emerging independent countries soon discovered the relevance of their ballot within the African bloc of countries or within the Non-Aligned Movement. Clapham notes that the USSR was actively seeking allies in sub-Saharan Africa from the 1970’s onwards (Clapham, C. 2006: 137). Ghana was the first black African country to obtain its independence in 1957, which had great symbolic value for all other aspiring independence seeking African countries. Two other British colonies, Sierra Leone and Gambia in 1961 and 1965 respectively achieved their freedom with little conflict while in the case of Nigeria it proved to be a far greater challenge, not only due to the country’s North/South divide but also with regard to the country’s diverse ethnic communities and their specific aspirations and concerns.

France managed to retain the cooperation (some observers would go so far as to state, loyalty) of the majority of its colonies in West Africa with the most valuable and profitable, the Ivory Coast remaining firmly entrenched in the French Community. Guinea paid the price for its refusal to remain within the French sphere of influence when the country under the leadership of Sékou Touré moved rapidly towards the East and paid the price by the withdrawal of Western interests and support. Agreements with Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany placed Guinea firmly in the Soviet “camp” despite claims from Touré that the country regarded itself as being a Non-Aligned country. A reflection of France’s stance towards how strongly it wanted to retain a strong degree of control over its position that its former colonies should remain within its sphere of influence was the fact that when President Touré declared his country “*completely independent in 1958, Paris announced that it would withdraw all its officials from Guinea within two months. Touré’s response was that they should withdraw within eight days. Three hundred and fifty officials and their families left the country. French administration stopped and the departing French took all removable assets including medical supplies, official records, air conditioners and even electrical wiring*”. Ironically, Touré’s statements were more rhetoric than action with regard to Guinea’s relationship with France. Within months the country had begun negotiating to enter into the French Community. It stayed in the franc zone, began to once again receive technical and financial aid from France and retained its foreign exchange in the *Banque de France*. (www.state.gov).

Touré became isolated from the West and turned to communist countries to supplement his country’s multilateral trade. Guinea signed agreements with East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Polish trade delegations, which constituted 30% of Guinea’s trade. This allowed for the country to export many of its agricultural products such as palm kernel nuts, bananas and coffee to the Eastern bloc (Time, 16 February 1959:19). From an international relations perspective Touré joined the NAM and was eager to establish a political union with Ghana, which was done in 1958 when he held discussions with Ghana’s president Kwame Nkrumah. The union never became effective but a reflection of how strong the two countries’ relationship was, was that in 1966 Touré granted Nkrumah political asylum when he was deposed and even went on to make him joint-President of Guinea (www.britannica.com).

Following the general shift towards decolonisation in Africa, Southern Africa received the most attention from the different protagonists during the Cold War. Numerous factors contributed to this the most obvious being the various countries strategic location, a more

developed infrastructure centring on the extraction and availability of strategic minerals and commodities and the fact that there was a large European (white settler) populations in many of the Southern African countries, which made rapid disassociation by the colonial power that much more difficult. In other parts of Africa infrastructural decay was rapid and continuous for example as Reno states... *“Long before Mobutu fled into exile in 1997, the essentially privatised Congolese state had ceased to deliver even the most basic services. A decade later, less than one-sixth of the roads bequeathed to the nascent Congolese state by the departing Belgian colonial administration are still serviceable”* (Reno, W. 1998: 154). The British colonies of Malawi, Rhodesia and Zambia had sizable white populations while in the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and more so in Angola a similar situation prevailed.

Until the mid-1970s British and Portuguese foreign policy revolved around attempts to; meet the nationalist aspirations of the black majority and the fears of the white minorities. As these two polarised positions grew into open conflict in those African countries that had not obtained their independence, it seemed that both powers were to a greater extent able to manage the insurgents and the low-intensity conflicts. However, the military *coup d'état* in Portugal in 1974 proved to be a watershed regarding the future of colonial rule in Africa. There is no doubt that without the *coup*, Portugal would have remained in the continent thus ensuring a protracted political and military situation, which would not have allowed for rapid domino-like disintegrate and change of other administrations reaching as far South as South Africa. Had it not been for this unexpected change in Lisbon, Portugal would not have allowed for Angola – its only economically viable colony - to obtain independence so rapidly. In fact, the manner in which the Portuguese colonies were granted their independence – in an extremely hasty and irresponsible manner could well have served as a case model on how not to transfer power to a colony.

In Southern Africa, Angola was throughout the 1970s and 1980s the pivot of foreign interest primarily due to the geopolitical significance. The fact that Angola had significant mineral deposits and sizable oil reserves categorised the country as having strategic importance for both the East and West blocks. A significant factor at the time was the so-called oil-shock experienced by the world system due to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) decision to raise oil prices unilaterally in 1973. This culminated in allowed for a four-fold increase in oil prices to more than eleven dollars a barrel by January 1974 (Evans, G,

1998: 299). This development highlighted – particularly for the West – the fact that the availability of oil was rapidly becoming a commodity of strategic importance.

The USSR and its allies became hastily involved in the civil war in Angola and both material and personnel were provided by the East block to support the MPLA government. The US and the West also provided assistance to its proxies, namely the FNLA and UNITA and went so far as to alternate its support between these two movements depending on which seemed stronger at a given time. South Africa, despite its pariah status was also deeply involved in supporting the FNLA and later UNITA. The fact that the capital city of Mozambique, Maputo was only 50km's from the South African border played an important geopolitical factor in South Africa's involvement in that country and the support that it provided to the dissident group, RENAMO.

During the Cold War South Africa's policy towards its neighbours was one of dominance. Southern Africa was seen as Pretoria's "backyard" and South Africa was regarded as a "regional superpower" or "regional great power" (Albright, D.E.1991: 551). Factors such as trade control of transport routes and migrant labour was used by South Africa to ensure that its neighbours became economically dependent on their powerful neighbour. Militarily, its weapons and arms arsenal allowed South Africa to attack any of the countries at any time. Pretoria used its capacities, for example, to prevent these countries from allowing African National Congress (ANC) bases to be established. Thus, South Africa used its economic and technological superiority in its approach towards African states north of itself.

South Africa can be classified as a maritime nation and sea-borne trade accounts for 55% of the country's GDP. Its location at the southern tip of Africa gave and continues to give the country a strategic position as a major choke point in the Cape Sea Route linking the Indian and South Atlantic oceans. The Cape Sea Route continues to remain a vital artery of world trade. Forty percent of US and 60% of European oil imports, as well as 25% of European food imports, pass around the Cape. South Africa is dependent on the security of the Cape Sea Route for 95% of the tonnage and 80% of the value of its imports and exports. The country also claims an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extending 200 nautical mile from its coast (Butts, KH & Thomas, R. 1986: 44). South Africa also had the world's largest reserves and is a leading producer of a variety of strategic and industrial minerals. Its reserves of chrome and manganese ore are the largest found in any single country. South Africa is the world's leading

producer of alumina-silicates, chrome ore, ferrochromium gold and platinum-group metals (South African Yearbook, 2007: 139).

In Angola geopolitical interests clashed the MPLA's core support came from the *melato intelligentsia* in the capital, Luanda as well as the Mbundu ethnic group. The organisation had links to Soviet and Eastern European Communist parties. The fact that foreign entities began to provide material and financial support indicates the MPLA level of influence as well as the fact that it was used as a proxy to extend communist or rather Soviet involvement and influence during the Cold War in Africa. Military and humanitarian support for the MPLA came from Algeria, Bulgaria, Cape Verde Islands, Czechoslovakia, the Congo, Cuba, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, North Korea, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Romania, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Soviet Union, Sudan, Tanzania, Vietnam and Yugoslavia. It is interesting to note that the PRC also provide assistance to two other insurgency groups in Angola the FNLA and UNITA.

Two other groups were also conducting insurgency campaigns. The *Frente Nacionalde Libertação de Angola* (National Front for the Liberation of Angola; FNLA) under the leadership of Holden Roberto was concentrated in the East of the country and also had members who were eager for the province of Cabinda to separate from the rest of Angola. Roberto was the brother-in-law of President Mabutu of Zaire and a great deal of support emanated from that country. The FNLA would in many respects have been regarded as a proxy of the West as its support came from Israel (military training in the 1960s and arms during the 1970s), France (personnel and £1 million interest free), South Africa and the United States (since the Kennedy administration). However, other countries also provided it assistance namely, Ghana, Algeria, Romania (arms in 1974) and the PRC, which provided military equipment and at least 112 military advisers (Write, G. 1997: 193-196). The *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; UNITA), under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi was concentrated in the south of Angola. UNITA was a proxy of the West and received its support from Bulgaria, Egypt, France, Israel, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Zaire, the United States, Zambia and South Africa.

On 31 January 1975, a transitional government was sworn in and a very fragile truce commenced. Within days the truce was broken when the MPLA attacked supporters of the FNLA in Luanda. During the transition period foreign powers involved themselves in Angola

and it soon became an East-West struggle. By January 1975 the United States had given US\$ 300 000 to the FNLA. By March 1975 the Soviet Union had begun to provide further arms to the MPLA. The US responded by increasing funding to the FNLA as well as to UNITA. By mid-1975 Cuba, which had been assisting the MPLA since the mid-1960s sent military instructors and combat troops and by early October there were between 1 100 and 1 500 Cuban military personnel operating in Angola. By April 1975 Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana announced that it would support Savimbi as the leader of Angola. He also had the support of Nigeria, Ghana and some francophone states. By August the transitional government had collapsed with fighting between the three nationalist groups increasing. Further to this the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) implemented a plan for a covert program to commence whereby American and European mercenaries fought with the FNLA (Africa Confidential, 3 October 1979:4-9).

South Africa had been deeply involved in Angolan affairs during the Portuguese colonial times and shared intelligence and South Africa and Portugal shared a joint command centre in Cuito Cuanavale in southeast Angola since 1968 from where South African troops operated against Angolan insurgents and the Angolan-based insurgents of the South West African Army Organisation (SWAPO), the insurgency group fighting for Namibian independence against South Africa. With the prospect of an independent Angola, Pretoria which was concerned about the communist influence of the nationalist movements went to the aid of the FNLA and UNITA in August 1975 and occupied the Ruacaná hydroelectric complex and other key positions along the Cunene River. By 23 October 1975, 300 South African troops assisted by 3 000 South African trained Angolans moved rapidly north and advanced 1 000 kilometres to come 100 kilometres from the capital, Luanda. The MPLA had consolidated its position in Luanda and had declared itself the rightful government of Angola calling it the People's Republic of Angola. The FNLA-UNITA alliance established itself in the southern city of Huambo and named the territory it controlled the Democratic People's Republic of Angola. UNITA-FNLA alliance called for other countries to recognise its existence. However, due to South African involvement no formal recognition was forthcoming and many African countries began to view the Soviet and Cuban support for the MPLA as legitimate. Portugal at this stage was eager to withdraw from the country and instead of recognising any regime "*ceded independence to the people of Angola*" (Young, T. 1986: 224-228).

In January 1976 the MPLA had the support of between 10 000 and 12 000 Soviet and Cuban troops. Furthermore the Soviets had provided arms worth US\$ 200 million to the MPLA. It was clear that the MPLA was the winning side. In northern Angola the FNLA and its mercenary contingent had been defeated. South Africa under international pressure had withdrawn and the MPLA took over Cabinda. US support to the FNLA and UNITA had also ceased due to the US Senate's Clark Amendment which prohibited all direct or indirect assistance to any Angolan group. The OAU formally recognised the MPLA government as did the UN, Portugal and eighty countries (Africa Confidential, 22 April 1981: 2-4).

3.3 AFRICA AND THE COLD-WAR: ANTI-GEOPOLITICS AND COLONIAL ANTI GEOPOLITICS

This segment will concentrate what has been termed the Second Scramble for Africa and will discuss the anti-geopolitical approach and colonial Anti-Geopolitical theories. It should be noted that the majority of African leaders in the newly independent countries did not actively seek to sever their links with their former colonisers. However, African leaders sought alternative alliances (with the USA, USSR and even China). Further to this Soviets and US penetration and involvement on the continent will be analyzed from a geopolitical prospective. The case studies of conflict in the Horn of Africa and Angola will be utilized to bring emphasis to the realities of the Cold War tensions. Furthermore France as well as China's participation in scenarios in Africa during the Cold War has been discussed.

The most prevalent framework within the study of geopolitics to discuss the reaction by the majority of Africans to the actions of the colonial countries and their elites is within the structure of anti-geopolitics and then to expand the discussion to the process within the study of colonial anti-geopolitics.

The position of anti geopolitical-resistance to colonialism was based on the stance that independence for countries and people under imperial control had to be secured. This was originally done through various nationalist organisations and resistance movements whose primary goal was to acquire independence and sovereignty for their respective countries (Routledge, P: 2006: 233). The United Nations was rather late in implementing action on the status of colonised countries. However, by 14 December 1960 the organisations General

Assembly had passed the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples - resolution 1514 (XV)* which stated that "*the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the United Nations Charter, and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation, and that steps should be taken to transfer, unconditionally, all powers to the Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories so that they might enjoy complete freedom and independence*" (<http://www.un.org/en/documents/index.shtml>).

Numerous examples of African countries, which have resisted a dominating state, have been provided earlier in this thesis. In the colonial anti-geopolitical and anti-geopolitical debate the resistance to domination does not necessarily concentrate on wealth, ideology, military strength or culture but rather on obtaining independence from the dominant authority (Zinn, H. 1980:22). Routledge characterises these histories as "*geopolitics from below*," which challenge the political, military, economic and cultural hegemony of the state and the elites. These actions are "*counter-hegemonic struggles*" as they show resistance to the coercive force of all policy actions and thus deleting consent to be ruled "*from above*." In these circumstances the expression anti-geopolitics emerged.

The stance of anti-geopolitics is seen as an "*ambiguous political and cultural force in civil society*", these being those structures that are not part of the processes of material production within the economy or part of the state in any form pertaining to funding or control (e.g., the media, trade unions, educational or religious institutions). Thus, as Routledge states, anti-geopolitics "*challenges the material (economic and military) geopolitical power of states and global institutions and second, it challenges the representation imposed by political elites upon the world and its different peoples that are deployed to serve their geopolitical interests*" (Routledge, P. 2006: 233).

Structures of resistance within anti-geopolitics can take diverse opposing configurations from armed resistance and terrorism to intellectual resistance. Anti-geopolitical exploits are mostly centred within the political borders of a country and the state is seen as the main opponent although conflict does extend outside these parameters as viewed during the anti-colonial struggle throughout Africa during the decolonisation period. This process, apart from being linked to the character of the political and economic system was according to Routledge, place specific in outcome and character. Some ambiguities are inherent within the practice of

resistance. For example, in South Africa during the Anglo-Boer war, both the British occupiers and the Boers had racist views and treated the black population of the country in a dehumanising manner. Further to this was the fact that both conflicting parties displayed disturbing practises towards each other as reflected by the utilisation of child soldiers by the Boers or the British practise of interning Boer women and children in concentration camps where more than 20 000 perished (Routledge, P. 2006: 235). This ambiguity can further be seen throughout Africa following independence and during the Cold War period. The various accusations levelled against the colonial authorities of Britain, Belgium, France and Portugal by the resistance movements regarding human rights abuses and the general abuse of power were repeated after independence, in many cases in a more severe manner and with more intensity than during colonial rule.

During the colonial period, the imperialist powers managed to control their African colonies by creating a geopolitical discourse which, to an extent allowed them to legitimize their ideologies and policies. As resistance developed the new discourse of anti-colonial geopolitics emerged, which directly challenged the existing order. An example of how an imperialist country attempted to meet this challenge was seen in Frances attempts to adapt and even change its colonial strategy from exploitation to the promotion of interdependence, hence the example of vacillating between assimilation and association and attempts to co-opt colonies followed by the process of *loi cadre* reforms within the French Fourth Republic as mentioned earlier in this document. Ultimately France, like all the other European colonial powers failed to retain its grip on its colonies but it should be noted, was able to maintain a far greater successful relationship than the other imperialist powers through its French Community approach.

The nationalist movements used varied and violent means to defeat and remove the colonizing forces (Routledge, P. 2006: 236). As conflict and resentment grew so did the division between the coloniser and the colonized. Frantz Fanon wrote about the dehumanization of the colonized and the methods used to legitimize their action in his book "*The Wretched of the Earth*," Fanon stated that the division between the colonizer and the colonized continuously developed and that the colonized were "*alienated*" by the Manichean world of the colonizer (Routledge, P: 2006: 236). The acts legitimize the actions that advocate the removal of the colonizer and moves towards independence. However, Fanon believed that independent states do not automatically establish the new humanism and the colonial authority are only

substituted by a new (African) *bourgeoisie*. Although Africans strived for decolonisation, in the end the elite discarded their claims that they represented the mass and identified themselves with the West.

The fact that Fanon, an African wrote about the continent and its challenges during the decolonisation period allows the observer to obtain a unique perspective of the African attitude towards anti-geopolitics which has not been distorted or re-evaluated from a Western perspective. Fanon attempted to explain how the mechanisms whereby independence could be obtained. His argument was that that, since colonisation was forced on people of the third world, independence and decolonisation could be obtained through violence as well. Due to the fact that the colonized have obtained the knowledge that the West was limiting economic and social opportunities as well as oppressing people's liberties, they should revolt against such scenarios and rebel against the numerous humiliations. Fanon's book "*is a call for violent decolonisation to take place during the stalemate of peaceful coexistence between the eastern and western blocs. Colonialism is (a) violation; therefore the colonised can liberate themselves effectively only by violence. This is an act of disinfection, a medical treatment: 'la violence distintoxique'*" (Ansprenger, F. 1989: 323).

Fanon connected the process of decolonisation with violence and as a psychiatrist he argued that colonisation was not just the physical exploitation of land but also affected the psychology of the peoples. Fanon looked at the "*complexity of violence*" which was used by the colonisers. The colonised believed that they must defend their culture, identity and land. Fanon stressed that the solutions expressed by the nationalist bourgeoisie was unacceptable due to the fact that they would compromise with the colonial system, which in turn would undermine the revolutionary claims. Further in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon included new geographic divisions and compared European nations with the underdeveloped regions and focused his observations on "*Negros, Arabs, Indian and the Yellow races*". Fanon revolted against Eurocentric geopolitics and he identified new approaches such as the "*geography of hunger*" to highlight what he saw as discrimination and exploitation throughout the world. He went on to refer to the wealth of Europe being obtained from Africa and Latin America and the various countries from these regions should demand for a redistribution of wealth (Fanon F. 1963:102).

The relationship that existed between the “*crowd and the elites*” within the colonised country was reviewed by Fanon. The peasants struggled for independence while the elites who were assimilated opposed these claims for freedom. At the same time the elites were trapped within a dichotomy of searching for independence and maintaining good relations with the coloniser (Fairchild, H: 1994, 195). He went on to stress that the elites would not be as assertive as the lower classes to achieve independence as they would not be so prone to use violence to achieve their objectives. The stratification of social classes also according to Fanon centres on the policies used by the colonisers to “*facilitate their rule.*” The elites would become the substitute leadership by which the coloniser would maintain ties of interdependence with the colonies after independence/freedom. Fanon looks at the reverse in position within the geopolitical discourse and contradicts the Western dialogue which looks at a “*top to down*” relationship. Fanon asserted that the middle class and the anticipated leadership role that this stratum will assume will not be adequate and that grouping will not provide the leadership expected. Their presence will ensure that colonialism will not end because they will depend on the colonisers to solve their political and economic challenges. Thus, the elites are seen as agents of the West as they do not seek “*national development*” rather their objectives will be to strengthen the evolution of the “*brothel of Europe*” (Fairchild, H: 1994: 196). Furthermore, the action of the middle class will “*reproduce the coloniser rule*” in which the lower classes were exploited. To emphasize this fact is the stance made by Fanon that the belief in inferiority by the African race was used by the colonisers as a discourse to justify their civilising mission (Fairchild, H.1994:198).

In the conclusion of his book, Fanon stresses the need to transform the world but at the same time he rejects the European model as this will lead to disintegration. The responsibility he states lies with the third world so as to begin a new history for mankind and to obtain solutions to human relationships. “*The third world today faces Europe like a colossal mass whose aim would be to resolve the problems to which Europe has not been able to find the answer*” (Fanon, F: 1963: 314). This position summarises the anti-geopolitical discourse which, bases its opinion that the mass in developing countries should implement change. African intellectuals clearly understood that through the process of colonisation the imperialist discourse, aimed to legitimise the process of dominance and exploitation. Hence, the destiny of African states does not depend on the objectives of Western policy makers.

Fanon, along with numerous other African intellectuals believed that the supremacy of the West had been reached through the mistreatment of Africans and, the oppressed peoples should, almost as an obligation, overthrow the coloniser using the same methods as what the coloniser had used and therefore violent revolution, decolonisation and independence was strongly endorsed (Fanon, F. 1963: 337).

Memmi in his literary work, “*The Colonizer and the Colonised*” compliments Fanon’s position. He also looked at the psychological effects of colonisation namely on Algerian nationals as well as the French colonisers. He noted that colonisation is destructive to both cultures. Memmi also reviewed the negative aspects that accompanied colonialism such as racism and the dehumanisation of Algerians so that economic production could be increased. Unlike Fanon, Memmi saw two solutions to (French) colonial rule; either open revolt or assimilation of French and Algerian culture. The two opposing poles obviously inspired opposing developments. With assimilation comes a negotiated solution while with revolt, which was the case came violence and death (Memmi, A. 2003: 13).

Memmi saw a form of subservient frame of mind being formed under colonial rule, which he gave the psychological term “*Nero Complex*” to. Further to this, Memmi believed that any European who lived in the same economic position as the colonised, in a colony and who might not have any more economic or political privileges as the colonised is still a colonial and he goes on to state that any colonial who attempts to assist the colonised is a “*traitor.*” Memmi therefore drew an implicit border between the two groupings. He notes that “*colonisation is above all economic and political exploitation,*” which identified the key regard to all colonies pertaining to the majorities’ belief at the dawn of the Cold War following independence (Memmi, A. 2003: 13).

Although the purpose of this study is to concentrate on Africa from a geopolitical prism, mention should be made of the process of post colonialism which allows the reader to place the position of African into perspective within the study of geopolitics. The nature of postcolonial theory allows for the Western approach to be diminished thus permitting the subaltern to come to the fore and produce alternatives to the dominant discourse. The term “*subaltern*” as defined by Gayatri Spivak refers to dangers of reviving subaltern voices which could well simplify heterogeneous groups, which in turn allows for the creation of stereotyped impressions of varied groups (Sharp, J. 2008: 148).

Post colonialism does not simply concentrate on the era following the colonial period. In many facets it can be regarded as an extension of colonialism, in various structures of new (power) relationships and the control over production and knowledge (Gregory, D. 2007: 561). The primary stance of postcolonial theory gives a framework that questions and attempts to deconstruct the West's "*inherent assumptions*" surrounding the "*discursive legacies of colonialism*". The work by Edward Said in his 1978 book "*Orientalism*" allows one to better understand the West's power (over the East) to basically name and control. This concept is vital in understanding colonialism and the process of post colonialism (Sharp, J. 2008: 156).

Before delving into the intricacies of the Cold War within Africa from a geopolitical perspective mention should be made of the position and relevance of a third and less prominent block, namely that of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In theory the NAM was not aligned with or against any of the power blocks it was founded in 1955 as an alternative to both the pressures and influences of the USSR and its satellites and the US and its allies. The purpose of the NAM as highlighted by Fidel Castro in a speech made to the United Nations when he served as Chairman of NAM on 12 October 1979, was to ensure "*the integrity and security of non-aligned countries*" in their "*struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign aggression, corruption, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and block politics*" (Fidel Castro, 12 October 1979: Government of Pakistan, 2003).

Although the NAM's objectives was to remain independent of both the actions of the East and the West, this approach proved to have serious flaws and many of its members actually were closely aligned with one of the two great powers. Although the NAM countries represented almost 55% of the world's population, the majority of the countries within the movement came from the developing of so-called third world. In essence the NAM achieved little from a practical sense during the Cold War, the fact that the organisation's members made up two-thirds of United Nations members allowed for the organisation to speak with one voice on various international developments and issues within Africa (Collins: Dictionary of the 20th Century History, 2004: 370). The emergence of Black African states as actors in international politics within such representative bodies as the NAM has been one of the surprising developments in the latter half of the twentieth century. This factor has in many ways

reshaped the manner in which the contemporary international community engages in political behaviour.

3.4 SOVIET UNION AND AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR

The USSR and USA together with their allies interfered in African Affairs during their own power struggle between themselves. China played a vastly secondary role during the period of the Cold War. The continent was seen as a pawn during the Cold War struggle between the communist and capitalist blocks and it was very much in Africa where the Cold War became a hot war. Independence found many new African countries in the middle of the Cold War with one of only two choices from a foreign policy perspective pertaining to which block to support. For example initially, the United States perceived any assertion of national self-determination as 'communist,' which had to be challenged and destroyed by force if necessary and by manipulation and deception if possible. In contrast, African governments faced a simple choice either establish (or maintain) stable relations with Western government, which would ensure their internal position as at that stage the Eastern Block did not present any realistic alternative as they had little interest in Africa and were not in a position to provide the same level of support and assistance as the West.

Initially Africa had little reason to be involved in the conflict between the West and the East. The continent was too poor, with few known natural resources and too peripheral to be of much interest from both poles. But over time both powers began to seek strategic advantage from involvement in Africa. The Soviet Union's first involvement in Africa was in Egypt where Nikita Khrushchev provided economic and military support to Nasser's Egypt in 1954. Soviet armaments to Egypt were initially provided indirectly through Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, the USSR provided development assistance for the construction of the Aswan Dam. Despite this development it should be noted that the primary Soviet interest in Africa was strategic. The country suffered from an "*encirclement complex*". The USSR had no natural access to a warm water port and had also been invaded from the West twice during the first half of the twentieth century. The Cold War and the doctrine of containment increased Soviet concerns and the feeling of being threatened. Thus, an aggressive policy of extending the country's boundaries of influence was persuaded. The policy of influence expansion

dovetailed into the communist ideology of creating an international revolution of the proletariat. Furthermore, both the US and USSR sought opportunities to antagonise each other. Thus, when the US regarded Africa and parts of it of strategic interest, the USSR believed that its involvement would be a method to limit American influence. The Soviet Union had an advantage pertaining to perception. The fact remained that the Soviet Union had never been involved in colonial or imperialist expansion in Africa, as had the capitalistic democracies (Kanet, R.E. 2006, 1-6).

The USSR portrayed itself as an ally of the new independent country of Africa. There were various similarities which allowed many independent African countries to gravitate towards the USSR for example the fact that the Soviet Union shared the African nationalists' anti-imperialist sentiments. In fact many African countries declared themselves socialist at independence. With the shared ideology, officials in Moscow had a sympathetic regard for various African countries (Thomson, A. 2004: 152-154). Guinea, which had a strong leaning towards communism and was strategically located, became the first sub-Saharan country to obtain support from the Soviet Union. Mali soon followed as did Ghana, under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah.

The USSR recognized that it was not able to compete with the United States beyond the Soviet periphery with anything more significant than nuclear capabilities. Thus, throughout the 1960s, Moscow continued efforts to establish and strengthen relations with African countries and national liberation movements who were eager to develop relations with Moscow. However, by the mid-1960's the Soviet role was restricted to providing military training and weaponry as well as some limited technical assistance. Many African students also studied in the USSR as well as other communist European countries as part of an effort to influence future elites. It was only after efforts made to upgrade a blue water navy and long distance heavy transport aircraft in the late 1960's and early 1970's that the USSR could extend its reach to Africa thus allowing the country to project conventional forces at long distance. An example of this was by 1976 Moscow had built up the Soviet fleet to the extent that the USSR had 188 nuclear submarines, 46 which carried strategic nuclear missiles (Kaylor, W.R 2001: 438).

In 1975 a paradigm shift took place in Africa due to the focal point of the Cold War shifting from South East Asia to Africa. This was the year of America's defeat and withdrawal from

Vietnam and more significantly for Africa was the collapse of Portuguese rule in the colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea - the last European Empire in Africa. At that stage the geopolitical question was, which power would “*pick up the pieces*” of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, the USSR or the US (Mamdani, M. 2004: 63)?

Following the 1974 *coup d'état* in Portugal, the country made a complete U-turn regarding its colonies. The wars in Africa were unpopular and the new government in Lisbon diverged itself of all its African colonies (as well as East Timor in Asia). The leftist government wholly transferred power as rapidly as possible with little concern regarding Marxist organisations obtaining power in Mozambique (FRELIMO) and Angola (MPLA).

The US disaster in Vietnam allowed the Soviet Union to correctly deduct that public opinion in the United States would not allow that country to involve itself in any further Third World conflicts or struggles against neo-colonialism (Pravda, 3 November 1977, Speech by Brezhnev on the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution). Another important factor from the Soviet perspective was that the power position of the two superpowers and their various allies was the fact that “*the changing international correlation of forces*” almost guaranteed victory during the global competition for the “*progressive*” forces linked with the Soviet Union. The concept which developed during the mid-1970s within the Soviet lexicon centred on the global competition between the two superpowers. At that time the Soviet Union had increased its nuclear capabilities and claimed that it had superiority in nuclear weaponry thus the possibility of the US using “*nuclear blackmail*” to restrict the USSR from supporting liberation movements in the former colonial world would not materialise. The socialist world had obtained more new states whose leaders committed their countries to the Soviet model of development. Thus, the Soviet claim of the inevitable global revolutionary wave was now justifiable and the new Communist “Community of Nations” was positioned to threaten the internationalist capitalist system (Aspatunan, V. V. 1980: 1-18).

The United States interest in Africa was during this period, very low key as best reflected by the American national security adviser, Henry Kissinger’s stance on issues pertaining to Africa in general. The fact that the entire fifteen-hundred-page first volume of his memoirs dealing with the period 1969 to 1973 contains only fleeting reference to Africa; two to the civil war in Nigeria and two to the later (1975-76) crisis in Angola reflects the lack of interest the continent held for the Nixon administration (Minter, W. 1988: 221).

The Soviet Union managed to “penetrate” various African countries. From an ideological perspective Leninist principles stressed that a major goal of the Revolution was to spread Communism abroad. A strong belief was retained that Africa offered “*a profitable, exploitable target for such activity.*” Given the factor of risk, Soviet leadership viewed involvement in Africa in terms of “*maximum-minimum principle.*” Africa offered maximum gains for winning world influence with minimum risk to the Soviet Union. From a military strategic perspective the U.S saw the Soviet Union as seeking bases from which western forces could be effected and trade routes could be interdicted “*so as to sever Western nations from their sources of oil and other strategic materials*” (Grey,C,S, 1977: 44-47).

Soviet penetration in Africa had various shapes and the establishment of diplomatic relations and development of economic relations did not necessarily constitute penetration. At the same time certain trends were consistent. For example, in every country in Africa where there had been a prolonged struggle against a foreign colonial power after 1960, the USSR had successfully penetrated the independence movements and after independence had maintained a position of influence. This process was seen in Algeria (FLN), Angola (MPLA), Equatorial-Guinea, Guinea-Bissau (PAIGC) and Mozambique (FRELIMO). This was also the case with Namibia (SWAPO), Zimbabwe (ZANU) and South Africa (ANC) although by the time that SWAPO and the ANC came to power the Cold War in Africa had drawn to a close. The Soviet Union became involved in the poorer and less stable African states although no evidence indicates that “*the Soviet Union followed a particular geopolitical strategy; one territory seems as good as another to extend Soviet influence.*” The fact that Marxist ideology regarded the poor as the greatest source of discontentment within a prevailing social order made the process that much easier. Thus, governments that lacked adequate economic and political infrastructures were more likely to welcome economic progress and security assistance for both pragmatic and altruistic reasons (Brayton, A, A. 1979: 237 -266).

From a geopolitical perspective within the framework of the Cold War a penetrated (African) state regarding Soviet activity was one whereby the USSR had greater influence than any other country. Further to this was the fact that the Soviet Union was in a position to influence the local governments decisions as well as be able to extract special concessions. Although this section concentrates on the Soviet Union’s actions in Africa in the Cold War, a similar scenario was seen regarding America’s involvement with its African proxies and can still be

seen in the present day between the former colonial powers and their previous African colonies. Brayton provides six indicators of such influence include:

1. *“The presence of Soviet military bases or access to military facilities;*
2. *The presence of substantial Soviet-bloc (including Cuban) troops or military advisors (significantly more than in comparable African states);*
3. *Extensive trade relations which make the Soviet Union a major trade partner;*
4. *Equipping the armed forces with a preponderance of Soviet-bloc military equipment;*
5. *Substantial numbers of students from that country studying in the Soviet Union (significantly more than from comparable African states); and*
6. *Governments which proclaim themselves to be Marxist-oriented with a “special relationship” with the Soviet Union.”*

During the latter part of the Cold War Brayton identified three categories of penetration in Africa and listed specific countries in Africa which fell into these categories. The first category was *“Colonial Penetrations”* in which the USSR supported a successful independence movement during a period of colonial conflict. In the majority of cases this led to a rather high level of Soviet activity after independence to the extent that the country was regarded as being penetrated. Furthermore, Marxist-Leninist ideology and significant aid allowed for the spread of Soviet influence in these countries, which were Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The second type of African country case is called *“Leverage States”*. These were countries where a major internal or external confrontation occurs, which caused the leader of the country to turn to the Soviet Union. In these countries the Soviet Union gained at least temporary influence. These countries were Egypt, Libya and Guinea. The third category of country was the *“Targeted States”*. These were countries whose penetration by the USSR was planned in advance. In these countries the Soviet Union did not have the benefit of an exploitable colonial conflicts or the unplanned advantageous shift in policies by a threatened African government. In this regard the countries that fell into this category included Benin, Congo (Brazzaville), Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda (Brayton, A, A. 1979: 237 -266).

US-Soviet behaviour followed a path of attempting to reciprocate each other's activities. The geographic dimension of superpower (in this case the U.S. and the USSR) is primarily a geographic one. Superpower is defined in terms of "*global reach, control of worldwide networks, global projection of power, control of territory, size of spheres of influence, etc*". In very much the same way, the U.S and USSR were competing over spheres of influence in Africa. Vayrynen researched the relationship and tensions between "*systemic (global) and subsystemic (regional, local) forces in regional conflicts*". Hence, in the case of Africa the superpowers were interacting between these two forces. Over time, Vayrynen believed that subsystemic forces would slowly grow in relevance relative to systemic forces. In effect the superpowers would decline and regionalism would rise (Vayrynen, R. 1984: 337-359). In Africa the US and USSR competed for spheres of influence and an indirect dimension channels were utilised, i.e., via other actors in the system. Thus the "*United States and the USSR meet one another, not face to face, but in the territories of third parties*" (Jay 1979, 489).

In many incidents a third country was sought as a potential ally that could be brought into the two competing superpowers spheres of influence. This was seen, for example Egypt in the 1970s. In other cases a third country played a vital role as an ally of either superpower. In the case of the U.S it was the United Kingdom and for the USSR it was Cuba. In unique cases the inclusion of a third actor did not wholly explain this specific development as a fourth country materialised as in the case of Cuba acting as a surrogate for the USSR in Angola (Nijman, J. 1992: 686). There was no doubt that superpower rivalry increased regional conflict. It has been suggested that the rivalry between capitalism and communism in Africa acted as a type of release valve for the superpowers as they were unable to engage in direct conflict due to the nuclear deterrent. Further to this was the fact that the two superpowers ensured that their own or allied forces did not wage direct actions against each other and in the case of Africa (as with other Cold War conflicts), the fear of an escalation in a conflict was also an effective deterrent.

The Soviets went from being the suppliers of weapons, trainers of troops and policy advisers to countries such as Egypt and Syria (who were involved in domestic and regional conflicts) to becoming an active participant in ever-increasing regional conflicts (Kanet, R. E. 2006: 7). The fact that Moscow had gained the confidence and the ability to project itself further outside its sphere of influence allowed it to start direct involvement in Africa. In 1975, with a

Soviet naval escort, Cuban troops landed in Angola. By 1976 more Cuban troops moved into Ethiopia and in 1977/78 there was a massive Soviet surge of influence in the Horn of Africa in support of the Ethiopian regime (Baynham, S, 1992: 3-4).

Moscow sold weapons to most African countries where it believed it could gain influence although tanks, MIG aircraft and SAM missiles were reserved for “*prized clients*” such as Angola and Ethiopia. Just fewer than 50% of Africa’s governments took the opportunity. During the post-colonial period, Soviet weapons sales to Africa rose from US\$ 150 million in the 1960’s to US\$ 2.5 billion in the 1970’s (Thomson, A.T., 2004: 152 – 154). Thus, one of the most tragic developments of the Cold War had begun, which was the escalation of an African arms race. Other statistics given, show that between 1967 and 1978 the USSR supplied US\$ 2.7 billion worth of weapons to various African countries while the US contributed US\$ 1.6 billion during the same period. It should also be stressed that there were other contributions such as France, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Israel and South Africa which, it is estimated contributed US\$ 1 billion to UNITA alone. (Thomson, A. T. 2004: 158). This trend continued throughout the Cold War. The provision of arms by the two super powers saw an escalation of sales to the extent that between 1981 and 1988 the Soviet Union dominated arms supplies to sub-Saharan Africa. It provided a total of US\$ 18.9 billion worth of arms, as compared to less than US\$ 1 billion for the US. Soviet involvement in Africa, with its substantial arms transfer to Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia was aimed mainly at regaining some of the influence it had lost in the Middle East and its failures in the global competition during the 1980’s (Beri, R. 1996: 4).

This study cannot possibly discuss the entire continent in detail regarding the involvement at the two supporters during the Cold War. Two regions will be discussed in greater detail and be much as case studies to greater highlight the manipulation undertaken by the two blocks which illustrate two proxy wars fought on behalf of and supported by the two superpowers. In this regard, this study will discuss Soviet / US actions in the Horn of Africa during the mid 1970’s to the mid-1980 and developments in Southern Africa, namely Angola - also during the same period.

3.5 ANGOLA AND ITS GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION

The process leading to Angola's independence and the conflict within the country was discussed earlier in the thesis. However, the actual geopolitical complexities will be examined and the fact that the USSR and US ensured that the FNLA, UNITA, MPLA, South Africa and Cuba fought a proxy war in Angola will also be studied.

Soviet support for the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was confirmed by 1975. The MPLA was Marxist in orientation and had a long-standing relationship with Fidel Castro's Cuba. The USSR saw that the US had been unable to react due to its recent withdrawal from Vietnam and the Soviet's intervened directly in 1975-76 by providing weaponry, logistical support and direct transportation for Cuban troops started with a Soviet naval escort, which allowed the first Cuban force to land in Angola in December 1975. Thus Angola was seen as a turning point as the Soviets "*changed the rules of the game*" which, up to that point had been in place in the superpower interchange. By "*working with their Cuban allies to intervene directly in a regional conflict they challenged the overall interests of the other side*" (Cullather, N. 1999: 79).

With Soviet commitment assistance followed. The USSR and communist countries provided the bulk of FAPLA's armament and some advisors, while Cuba gave technical assistance, combat support and training services. Other communist countries such as Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, the Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea), Poland and Yugoslavia also gave arms and aid. With the naval transportation and massive Soviet airlift of arms and more troops was forthcoming during 1975 and 1976. Moscow and Havana remained the mainstay of the MPLA regime as reflected by the fact that 90% of Angola's arms imports (and 25% of all Soviet arms to Africa) came from the USSR. Total equipment purchased between 1982 and 1986 is valued at US\$ 4.9 billion. In comparison, Poland and Czechoslovakia arms provided during the same period came to US\$ 10 million and US\$ 5 million respectively. It should be noted that despite weapons the East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Cuba also assisted in the creation and development of Angola's State security and intelligence services (www.nationsencyclopedia.com).

Cuban troops served as a Soviet proxy forces. The fact that Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact and was at the same time a participant in the NAM allowed Cuban troops presence to be regarded as more "*acceptable*" than to a superpowers (direct) military

presence on the continent (Fontaine, R. W. 1978: 21). By 1982 there were 35 000 Cubans in Angola which escalated to the maximum at 50 000 in 1988. It should be stated that Angola paid an estimated US\$ 300 million to US\$ 600 million annually for their service (www.nationsencyclopedia.com). Thus, what was seen was that the Soviets supplied the weapons, economic support and strategic directives while the Cubans supplied the USSR with an acceptable surrogate “*foreign legion*” and the Cubans provided tactical direction and direct action roles for the MPLA (Wiggins, R. V. 1984: 3).

Vanneman and James identified two possible objectives for the Soviets regarding their intervention in Angola: The first Soviet objective in southern Africa, in general, was access to its enormous reserves of raw materials. As one Soviet representative stated: “*Africa holds a leading position in the world both in reserves and output of many kinds of raw material. The deposits of some of the minerals in Africa are unique, most of which are concentrated in Southern Africa*”. The second goal that Vanneman and James note is that of denying the access of other powers to these resources, “*Soviet planners were strongly aware of the strategic value of restricting the access of the United States and China to raw materials in the Third World. The Soviet Press stressed the strategic value of Southern Africa’s raw materials, suggesting that China sought to exploit them just as other so-called ‘imperialists’ were doing now*” (Vanneman, P & James, R. 1976: 95).

The fact that Africa seemed to be the last major source, outside the borders of the Soviet Union and China, of many strategic industrial raw materials was important in the formulation of Soviet goals for Angola and Africa in general. From an international position, this centre of attention on the ability to garner raw materials is highlighted by Van Rensburg. Although his work concentrates exclusively with South Africa, it is enlightening to review his comments. He noted, “*It is also becoming clear that competition for supplies of raw materials will play an increasingly important role in the economic development of nations and in the balance of power. This realization has contributed materially to shifting the emphasis in the conflict between East and West. The Soviet Union has come to appreciate that the supply of industrial raw materials represents a major vulnerability of the industrialized nations of the West. They have intensified their efforts to gain points of leverage with respect to the lifelines of supplies to the West, initially by diplomatic and economic means, but lately, in a more direct and aggressive fashion*” (Van Rensburg, W.C.J. 1978: 42).

Thus, the facts are comprehensible regarding the involvement of the strategic goals of the Soviets for the region and the Angolan intervention. Bissel stated that, “*While the revolutionary tradition of the Soviet Union in Africa has much to build upon, there exists a new song in the wind that sounds distinctly different from the Internationale. Some Soviet policymakers call not for the revolution and disruption, but rather for influence and regularization. There are influential leaders that argue for working with the power centres that exist, rather than destroying them with a Marxist faith in the future of the dialectic. The Soviet empire builders are leaving their tracks in Africa, and recent years have provided abundant evidence of their existence*” (Bissel, D.E. 1980: 6).

Present day evidence suggests that a major portion of the Soviet objectives in Angola revolved around two specific long-range, goals. The first was the Soviet desire to gain access to Angola’s natural resources, and the second was to provide a springboard from which their naval forces could threaten the Cape Route. Some authors have suggested that another important Soviet consideration was attempts to constrain Chinese influence within the emerging third world countries of Africa. It is more probable that such a limitation was to be a natural result of a wish for Soviet exclusive domination pertaining to the emergence of the MPLA as the winner of the Angolan Civil War. Hence, the support provided by China to UNITA (Sullivan, T.P. 1984: 2-3).

US interest waned considerably during the Carter Administration and for the period of his Administration the USSR seemed to have free reign in Southern Africa regarding its approach to hegemony. Once in office President Reagan began to address what his Administration regarded as the mistakes made by President Carter. The Reagan doctrine was enunciated in early 1985 and it was stressed by President Reagan that... “*We must not break faith with those who are risking their lives, on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, to defy Soviet aggression.... Support for freedom is self-defence*” (Kanet, R.E.3 August 2006: 340). It was during Reagan’s second term in office that a period of *détente* was observed that unfortunately did not extend to Southern Africa as was seen by the level of support provided by the Reagan Administration to such organisations as RENAMO in Mozambique and UNITA in Angola.

The basis for US support to rebel movements in Southern Africa as well as Soviet assistance for organisations that resisted against pro-Western governments was the fact that throughout

the Cold War, as long as there was bipolar international tension, the two major superpowers would almost always (almost automatically) take opposing sides in Third World conflicts, as they did in Angola, Mozambique as well as in the Horn of Africa just to provide some examples.

It was only in 1988 when cracks was being noticed in the Soviet alliance and in a new spirit of détente that the two superpowers came to the conclusion that the conflict(s) in Southern Africa could not be resolved through military intervention but rather through a negotiated peace settlement. The political situation at the time was placed in perspective by Krause and von der Ropp when they wrote that ...*“In the second half of 1988, American, Soviet and British secret diplomacy successfully managed to persuade Angola, South Africa and Cuba to conclude the {December 1988 New York Accords}”* (Krause, J & von der Ropp, K, January 1991: 89). Leading from this situation was the fact that by March 1990, Namibia obtained its independence, which also allowed for the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola. By May 1991 the US and USSR managed to persuade their respective proxies to negotiate on a process to successfully end the 16 year old civil war in Angola (Beynham, S. 1992:2).

3.6 SOVIET UNION AND US INVOLVEMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

The USSR involved itself geopolitically in the Horn of Africa at an early stage of the Cold War as best reflected by Nikita Khrushchev’s “sacred wars of national liberation” speech on 6 January 1961, which strongly indicated that the Soviet Union intended to influence the region and at the same time challenge Western hegemony in the region by offering economic and military assistance to developing countries, *“free from any political or military obligations”* (Lefebvre, J. A. 1998: 611).

At the time America’s long-term strategic interest in the Horn of Africa, which commenced in January 1943 centred on the Kagnew facility, a fixed communications centre at the former Italian naval radio station (Radio Marina) located outside Asmara, Eritrea. The US interest concentrated on the fact that the base was well located to compliment the US defence communication network, which also allowed it to gather intelligence in the Middle East and

Africa: By the mid-1950's Kagnew was regarded as one of the "*most important radio facilities in the world: and the greatest factor in security in the whole area*" (US Home of Representatives, the Middle East, Africa and Inter-American Affairs, Vol XVI, Selected Executive Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1951 – 1956 ((p. 335 – 336).

President J. Kennedy followed President Eisenhower's approach for the Horn of Africa which identified three primary US policy objectives: (1) to deny the area to USSR, China and the U.A.R.; (2) to reduce tension between Somalia and Ethiopia; and to maintain access to Kagnew (NSC Report, NSC 6028, 30 December 1960). By 1961 factors began to change, however, the United States believed that Africa could no longer remain as an "*exclusive Western preserve*". The security establishment in Washington saw African leaders trying to "*play East and West against the other and to extract the maximum amount of aid and assistance from both sides*" (National Intelligence Estimate, 31 August 1961((p 299 – 300).

This development was best reflected by 1961 when the Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Shermarke obtained a US \$44 million economic credit agreement and discussed Somalia's military programme with Soviet officials during a state visit to the Soviet Union (JA: 1998: 625). To counter the possibility of Somalia purchasing East block weapons Washington offered the country a US\$ 10 million military aid package, which the Somali government considered "*inadequate*". By 1963 Somalia had accepted a US \$30 million Soviet arms package, which to the government of Somalia seemed to be the best method to alter the regional imbalance of power. Lefebvre notes that Washington's long-term strategic and political interests lay with Ethiopia and "*far outweighed the geopolitical importance of Somalia.*" By 1964 the US had provided emergency military airlifts to assist Ethiopian forces during the Ethiopia-Somali dispute in the Ogaden. The US had placed its support firmly behind Ethiopia as reflected by this issue as well by the fact that between 1955 and 1969, Ethiopia received approximately 70% of all US military aid provided to sub-Saharan African countries (Lefebvre, J. A. 1998: 640 – 642).

Throughout the 1960's and until the mid-1970 the United States maintained its strategic relationship with Ethiopia. At the same time the relations suited "Addis Ababa's geopolitical objective of maintaining access to the Red Sea." Added to this was the country's fear of a "*contagion affect*" which could well fragment the empire compounded by Somali domestic policies regarding the Ogaden Issue (Lefebvre, J. A. 1998: 640 – 643). While the United

States continued to support Ethiopia, the Soviet Union engaged in the politics of the Horn, “not only for its strategic geographic location, but also to divert Western attention and resources from Europe where it felt more vulnerable militarily” (Lefebvre, J. A. 1996: 206 – 209).

It was the Ethiopian revolution and the emergence of a Marxist regime in 1974 that greatly changed relations between countries in the region with the two superpowers. The fact that Somali claims to the Ogaden in Ethiopia to form a “*Greater Somalia*” continued to strain the relationship between the two neighbours. Relations between Ethiopia and America had steadily waned throughout the early 1970’s which had been heightened by the almost criminal neglect the Ethiopian government showed for the victims of a drought that was effecting vast parts of the country. Developments in satellite communications and the construction of a US naval base on the island of Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean made the importance of the Kagnew communications base near Asmara, increasingly redundant. In fact, by 1973 President Nixon approved that Kagnew be phased out. Furthermore, an Ethiopian request to the US for US \$450 million for military assistance had been denied. Despite this, “*throughout 1975 the US remained the largest single supplier of economic assistance to Ethiopia and US military aid in grants and sales actually increased in both 1974 and 1975*” (Pettersen, D. 1986: 627 – 629). In quantitative terms for the entire period, between 1945 and 1975, the total amount of U.S. military aid to Ethiopia came to US\$ 618 million. (Francis, S. T. 1978: 2).

Despite America’s previous relationship with Ethiopia the Carter Administration decided that due to “*human rights*” issues that military aid should be suspended in February 1977. The fact that the Mangistu government had announced in late 1974 that it would turn Ethiopia into a one-party socialist state also did not endear itself to the US either (Pettersen, D. 1986: 631). In the absence of US military assistance Ethiopia turned to the Soviet Union in 1974 and 1975. By 1976 an arms agreement was concluded, which was estimated at US\$ 385 million. In 1977 the Soviet Union’s relationship with Somalia, which had begun in 1969 began to fall apart. The President of Somalia, President Mohamed Siad Barre stated that he was unhappy with the Soviet advisers in his country who were “*overbearing and officious*”. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had begun to supply weapons to Ethiopia. Said believed that the Soviet Union was “*playing two sides*” and in November 1977 Somalia abrogated its treaty of friendship with the USSR and expelled Soviet military advisors (Pettersen, D. 1986: 639). The U.S. saw an opportunity for securing the strategic naval bases at Berbera, which had been a Soviet base.

The US supported Somalia with humanitarian and military aid. At that stage (late 1977) Somalia needed assistance as its army had suffered heavy losses during fighting against Ethiopia in the Ogaden Region. Nosotro saw *“the Somalia conflict as presenting an intriguing aspect of Cold War strategy. Even through, the Soviet Union was aiding Ethiopia in its fight against Somalia; they were aiding Somalia at the same time. It seemed as though; the Soviet Union was trying to ride both sides of the fence. On the one hand, they were building an army for Somalia and yet on the other hand, they were giving so much aid to Ethiopia that it was able to defeat Somalia. Then the United States, who had previously supported Ethiopia, began to aid Somalia. This twisted game which the two superpowers played, and which often resulted in the demise of their third world pawns became more and more manifest as the Cold War progressed”* (Nosotro, R. 2004: 11).

On 28 November 1977 the Soviet Union began a major military airlift of weapons and material to the Horn of Africa. Following the airlift seagoing cargo vessels contributed to deliver an estimated US \$1 billion of ammunition, artillery, tanks and fighter bombers to the Ethiopian regime of Lieutenant Colonel Mengistu. The Soviet Union provided a massive morale boost to the Ethiopian army, which had been disbursed in the Ogaden desert, under attack by Somali-supported rebels who were fighting for a *“Greater Somalia”*. With the support of Cuban combat soldiers and Soviet technicians/advisors, Ethiopia was able to mount a successful counter offensive and regain the Ogaden by March 1978. By November 1978 Ethiopia also regained Eritrea in the same month Moscow signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Ethiopia which abrogated the one signed with Somalia the year before (Dayton, G. D. 1979: 1).

The actions undertaken by the Soviet Union’s demonstrated the USSR’s ability to project military force abroad so as to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Until 1977 the Soviet Union had only been involved in limited foreign interventions. Before this time the only marked projection of force by the East Block in sub-Saharan Africa was the assistance given to Angola by the airlift of weapons and troops to that country via Aeroflot as well as by troop ships. This success encouraged the Soviet Union to undertake the same strategy with Ethiopia in a sixty day airlift, which included as many as 225 transport planes or 15% of the Soviet military transport fleet. (Francis, S.T. 1978:1 – 7).

Following events in the Cold War with the reverse of information a new understanding of Soviet involvement in both Angola and Ethiopia can be better ascertained. According to Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States in the mid-1970s, Moscow came under pressure from the “*militant Cubans*” as in Angola to involve itself in Ethiopia. In fact Dobrynin acknowledges that little was gained by supporting the Ethiopians “apart from the thanks of a brutal dictatorship in an impoverished landlocked country and solidarity with Fidel Castro”. The fact that the Soviet Union managed to damage relations with the United States did not go unnoticed in Moscow. As Dobrynin stated, “*We made serious mistakes in involving ourselves in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia and in the war in Angola. Supply of military equipment to these areas, the activities there of Cuban troops, and especially our airlift to get them there, persuaded Americans that Moscow had undertaken a broad offensive against them for control over Africa. Although that was not really the case, these events strongly affected détente*” (Gaddis, J.L. 2007: 206-207).

The Soviet airlifts to Angola in 1975 and two years later to Ethiopia in 1977 displayed, amongst other factors, efforts made by the USSR to develop its airlift capacity which had begun in the late 1960’s and throughout the early 1970’s. Observers have no doubt that both actions saved the Marxist governments’ in Angola and Ethiopia from defeat against dissidents and neighbouring countries who were in turn supported by the U.S. The airlifts served to prove on a very practical level the willingness by the Soviet Union to commit itself to its Marxist government allies in Africa. The Soviet airlift showed, as Seversky wrote that airpower must be employed primarily as a strategic weapon and used against targets that had strategic significance (Merlinger, P. S. 1995: 187).

Although Seversky concentrated on “bombardment” aircraft, the concept on airpower remains the same in principle. Seversky subordinated the army and navy to the air force and stressed that complete air supremacy is possible. The side that had air supremacy has the other at its mercy. Seversky, in this book “*Victory Through Air Power*” placed a power equation between Eurasia and the American continents. The vast part of Africa and all of the South-east Asia were part of the area under Soviet dominance. U.S. air dominance was prevalent over South America, while there was an “*area of decision where both the USSR and U.S.’s air dominance overlapped*”. This area covered most of the USSR and the US, all of Europe and large parts of central and West Africa as well as the whole of Southern Africa. Moscow’s

airlift to Angola took place within Seversky's area of decision while its airlift to Ethiopia was within the USSR's area of air dominance. (Jones, S. B. 1955: 502 – 503).

3.7 FRANCE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR

Although conflict in Africa centred on the rivalry that existed between the two superpowers and their proxies other (lesser) powers displayed a keen and active interest in the continent. The United Kingdom, Portugal and Belgium acknowledged the loss of their colonies to independence and to a greater extent withdrew politically from the continent for a certain period of time. France on the other hand deployed a very different strategy regarding its relationship with its former colonies. When France granted independence to its colonies it never fully disengaged itself from its African colonies. President De Gaulle was seen as being *“more intent on keeping the African continent within the bosom of France than liberating it”* (Philcox, R, 1999: 102). Within this relationship francophone African States obtained their *“political independence without economic independence”* (Athow, B & Blanton, R.G., 2002: 220-221).

There is no doubt that France was eager to secure a privilege position within francophone Africa which the country maintained throughout the Cold War. France's policy towards francophone Africa was strongly based on cultural interests, which centred on the *“French language and intellectual traditions.”* During the Cold War, culture remained the pivot upon which French policy centred on pertaining to the country's relationship with Africa, to the extent that economic relations were *“both parallel and integral to the promotion of French culture.”* (Schraeder, P. 2000: 398).

After independence francophone African countries remained reliant on France to the extent that a common currency, the *Commununaute Financiere Africaine (CFA)* franc was utilised in thirteen of the country's former colonies and France acted as the central bank. (Schraeder, P, 200: 398). Thus France was able to maintain monetary stability and French influence throughout francophone Africa (Schraeder, D. 2001: 162). It was through this relationship that France guaranteed that its former colonies remained reliant and dependent on France. Trade patterns indicated that there was a strong neo-colonialist relationship based on powerful

French control over its former colonial territories: “*After the end of colonialism, France played a definite role in building economic institutions, thus maintaining the trade relations that existed during French rule and perpetuating its trading system*” (Athow, B & Blanter, R.G. 2002: 221). Basically France maintained a privileged position in Africa which was justified through its geographical location and historical relations (Schraeder, P. 2000: 389). France regarded Africa as its *chasse gardee* (private hunting ground) and believed its position should be maintained and protected against other industrialised countries and in turn condemned foreign intervention in francophone Africa – even from its allies (Milburn, S. 2001: 77).

In the Cold War the US accepted France’s *chasse gardee* due to the fact that Washington was eager to contain communism. Some exceptions occurred such as the US intervening in the Congo in 1965 when the country supported Mobutu Sese Seko, which allowed France to realize a potential threat to its exclusivity (Schraeder, D. 2001: 163). Although America showed a degree of indulgence its attitude was centred on a broad alignment of shared interests. This distance that France retained with the US and other NATO members also kept the USSR from any deeper engagement in francophone Africa which in turn would have encourage the US to counteract (Gregory, S. 2000:436).

Gregory describes the development of independence in Francophone states in Africa as the “*transition from colonial to new-colonial dependence*” which ensured “*the survival of the colonial system in spite of formal recognition of political independence in emerging countries which (thereafter became) the victims of an indirect and subtle form of domination by political, economic, social, military or technical means*” (Gregory, S. 2000: 435 – 448).

From the end of the Second World War France’s behaviour towards other Western powers regarding Africa was viewed by many in the West as unpredictable and seemed to be designed to annoy, with specific emphasis on the United States and its relations with Africa. Observers have noted that French behaviour was obviously based on the country’s history and geography which had taught its people contradictory lessons. “*On one hand, the French deeply fear being controlled by greater powers; on the other, they have neither the weight to single - handily counterbalance a power like the United States nor the effortless capability of coalition-building needed to create a sustained attention to greater power. They therefore operate in contradictory ways over time and at different levels. Thus behaviour arrives from*

geopolitical realities and not as many Americans might believe, out of sheer malice” (Friedman, G. 12 February 2003: 1).

As Friedman noted that to understand French geopolitics it should be remembered that France had a “*near-triumph*” from 1792 to 1814 and “*two extraordinary catastrophes*” which were in 1870/71 and 1940. France won the First World War (despite severe damages) and was able to establish the most powerful war machine in Europe before 1939. Napoleonic France almost conquered the entire Europe with the development of a global empire, which ended in disaster. The First and Second World War “*cost France first, a generation of men, and second, its sovereignty until liberated by the allies*”. Thus, French history, in the last two centuries vacillated between two extremes - from near-triumph to near-annihilation. With this historical perspective in-mind, French foreign policy was based on a search for an alliance in which France could maintain the senior position. However, both Britain and the United States did not qualify due to the fact that Paris distrusted both countries. Friedman explains that this was not a “*French neurosis, it was French geopolitical reality, borne of being trapped on a continent it could neither dominate nor trust to restrain from attempts to dominate it*” (Friedman, G. 12 February 2003: 2).

Charles de Gaulle represented the very dilemma of French foreign policy which also represented the Napoleonic claims of France although at the same time de Gaulle realized that these claims were beyond his country’s reach. De Gaulle saw membership of NATO as a threat for his country as he believed that there was a strong imbalance of power between the USSR and the US with the fact that the United States maintained the greater amount of power. At the same time, although he was a committed anti-communist de Gaulle wanted to tilt France’s position to “*redress some of the imbalance*”. De Gaulle’s interests were not theoretical. He saw the world as being in disequilibria: “The United States had great power, and NATO had curtailed France’s freedom to act independently. A less powerful United States and more powerful Soviet Union would be in France’s interests. The United States, which never genuinely felt it had the upper hand, during most of the Cold War, saw France’s actions as threatening Western security” (Friedman, 12 February 2003: 3). During the Cold War France cooperated with the United States and Britain against the USSR but it should be stressed that the process of cooperation never evolved into direct collaboration.

France's behaviour was (and in many instances continued to be) contradictory. It wanted an anti-American coalition (based on the basis of national self-interest) but it is difficult to achieve when working with a power as great as that of the United States. Thus the country realising that it cannot achieve its objectives based on national interests on its own, attempts to obtain accommodation. Thus the country's "*national interest is torn between resistance and accommodation*" (Friedman, G. 12 February 2003: 2 - 4). This stance shown by France was strongly observed during the Cold War and with the country's relations with Africa.

France managed to maintain a "*virtual empire*" in sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War which centred French Policy, concentrating on the national interest and national advantage. Ironically France also laid claim to Third World leadership. Furthermore, France sought strategic resources with emphasis on oil and uranium as well as an open market for French goods, culture and French ideas (Gregory, S. 2000: 436).

During the various presidencies of de Gaulle, Pompidou, Giscard, d'Estaing and Mitterrand, France's relationship with Africa remained complicated and multilayered. There were bonds of language as well as the deep-penetration of French companies which also enhanced the close personal links between African and French elites. Further to this were the actions by Jacques Foccart who served in the *Elysée* as Secretary General of African and Malagasy Affairs under President de Gaulle. Foccart's links with French intelligence assured that he continued his role to de Gaulle's successors.

During the Cold War the French military established different types of formal defence and military cooperation agreements with Francophone states in Africa, which also included the former Belgian colonies of Burundi, Rwanda and Zaire. The agreements allowed France to maintain "*hegemony and regional stability by force if necessary,*" which France exercised regularly. Between 1962 and 1995 France intervened (outside UN operations) 19 times in Africa. Although France was always eager to stress that its intervention activities in Africa during the Cold War was to protect French nationals living in African countries, the majority of observers saw French actions as the best method to subdue rebellion and support pro-French elites. In the Cold War and three years after it, France intervened in Senegal (1962), Gabon (1964 and 1990) Chad (1968, 1972, 1978, 1983 and 1986), Mauritania (1977), Zaire (1978 and 1991) Central African Republic (1979), Togo (1986), Comoros (1989 and 1995),

Rwanda (1990, 1993 and 1994), Djibouti (1991), Benin (1991) and Sierra Leone (1992) (Gregory, S. 2000: 437).

3.8 CHINA AND AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR

This section will review China's relationships with Africa from the beginning of the Cold War until the end of this period of conflict in 1989. Mawdsley identified three main areas of Sino-African relations; namely the Mao years (1949 – 1976), the first decade under Deng Xiaoping (1978 – 1989) and the post-Tiananmen Square years (from 1989). The first two areas will be analysed in this section.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 cemented Sino-African relations during the 1950's and continued up to the end of 1970's. It was at this conference where the ideals, achievements, tensions and weaknesses of this relationship were indicated. Twenty-nine Asian and African countries adopted the "*Five Principals of Peaceful Co-existence*", which had been agreed upon between India and China in 1954 (Camilleri, J. 1980: 22).

The central theme of the conference saw respect for sovereignty, economic and technical cooperation, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence respect for the needs and rights of developing nations. This stance reflected the wish for a multi-polar world specifically rejecting US-USSR neo-imperialistic superpower rivalry and European colonialism. In reality, their aspirations were soon overtaken by events and were undermined by political and economic tensions and weakness as well as rivalry between the newly independent nations and the decolonising countries, which was increased by pressures coming from the West and the Soviet Union (Mawdsley, E. 2007: 208).

China's long-term objective was to promote social revolution in Africa, which was underpinned by the country's own experience with colonialism as well as a willingness to assist exploited nations. However, in the short to medium term, these ideological objectives was translated into modest support for anti-colonial liberation movements such as the FLN in Algeria as well as the various newly independent African countries that were in the process of obtaining their independence. At that stage China was seeking allies to secure its own international position, specifically in the UN. This was achieved in 1971 when the PRC

displaced the Taiwan-based Republic of China in the UN. Of the seventy-six votes for the PRC, twenty-six came from Africa (Larkin, B. D. 1971: 12).

China was economically weak thus solidarity was mostly expressed through technical assistance (much as doctors, nurses, engineers and agriculturalists), educational scholarships, delegations and the establishment of diplomatic relations. China also provided infrastructural development such as the building of a massive railway line linking Zambia and Tanzania. However, bad maintenance meant that the Chinese reputation suffered. China involved itself in West Africa and capital was provided to Ghana and Mali as well as support provided to Patrice Lumumba in the Congo. Although China did supply more support to other liberation groups it had little effect. The country did attempt to involve itself in Burundi, which proved to be disastrous and was only slightly better off regarding its involvement in the Congo. Despite this development the country that China was successful with was Tanzania. The country was one of the most anti-Western and radical nations in Africa. China had maintained relations with Tanzania as from independence in 1964 and had signed a friendship agreement with the country in 1965. President Ngerere introduced his own form of African socialism and close political and economic relation developed between the two countries.

During the Cultural Revolution (1966–1968), China closed all its embassies except for its Mission in Egypt. Aid was cut and the country changed its policy to an anti-imperialism policy rather than promoting conflict. Even before this development China's relations with Africa was influenced by Sino-Soviet rivalry. For example, China broke off diplomatic relations with Angola due to that country being regarded as being too close to the USSR. African countries were at times also cautious of China's agenda and were not always willing to alienate the USSR (Snow, P. 1988: 78).

By the late 1970's and throughout the 1980s a significant shift in Sino-African relations became apparent as a more pragmatic approach was adopted under Deng Xiaping. China's leadership became less concerned by rivalry with the USSR and support for anti-imperial struggles and started concentrating on securing economic growth. In essence, "Deng Xiaping demanded economic investment and a non-conflictual approach to international politics. As a result, non-ideological relations with the United States, Western Europe and Japan based on expanding trade links and co-operation took a priority in China's foreign policy formulation (Taylor, I. 1998: 410).

During this period, Chinese aid to Africa declined as well as the number of delegations by political representatives. Although the rhetoric of South–South relations continued there was a “*cold new realism*” that became apparent in Chinese diplomacy. China was focussed on its own modernisation and its few resources were used to develop the country rather than aid Africa. During 1976 and 1980, China’s overall trade with Africa increased by 70% (Snow, P. 1988: 84).

4. THIRD SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA

4.1 END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of 1989 marked the conclusion of the Cold War. The Soviet Union began to disengage itself from involvement in Africa. At the same time the U.S. then under the presidency of George Bush (senior) accepted the fact that his country had become the sole superpower and declared a “*New World Order*” had been born.

With Moscow’s demise as a superpower came the almost immediate cessation of proxy wars in Africa. By 1990 the USSR stopped supplying weapons to Ethiopia. “*This removed both external interests and external resources from this particular conflict*”. A year later the Mengistu regime fell to an alliance of rebel forces. Obviously, this would have not occurred had Soviet support remained with Mengistu. The same pattern was seen in Southern Africa. External patrons were unwilling to fund proxy wars, which allowed for a number of negotiated settlements to occur in sub-Saharan Africa such as in Mozambique, Angola and Namibia. In Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko was deposed. The majority of the leaders in African countries who had received assistance from the superpowers saw their “external resource taps” being cut. Washington had also informed its African clients that they had to deal with local realities on their own and could no longer rely on superpower patrons to prop up their regimes (Routledge, P. 2006: 156 – 161).

Global economic trends also contributed to Africa’s woes at that time. Africa had been suffering economically since the early 1980’s for different reasons such as the various oil “*shocks*” and the general slowdown in world economic growth, debt crisis and the mismanagement of local economies. The majority of African countries could not adjust well to external economic shocks. Furthermore, they had borrowed money which had not been invested well while their exports “suffered” from rich country protectionism. These African countries had to experience structural adjustment which included devaluation, capital liberalization and the reduction of government subsidies and expenditure. A review of the GDP per capita in sub-Saharan Africa reflects this economic trend. The fact that in 1981 a person on average was earning US\$ 710 an annum and this had decreased to US\$ 520 in 1985

and only began to improve gradually to US\$ 586 by 1988 indicates the dire economic crisis individuals were experiencing on the continent at that time (<http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/economics-business/variable-638.html> - GDP by country 1960-2006).

The growth and development of the European Union at that stage also ensured that priorities by former European colonial powers were concentrated on domestic issues. Africa was not totally ignored as reflected by actions taken by Britain and France that the EU give preferential trading status to their former - colonies through the Lomé Convention. However, preparations for European monetary union saw less favourable terms for African countries as shown by France's devaluations of the CFA franc in 1995, which reduced by half the country's fiscal subsidy of *la Francophonie*. The death of Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire symbolised the changing relations between France and its former colonies. Although three former French presidents and six former Prime Ministers attended his funeral it was apparent that no future African leader would have the same level of intimacy with France (Routledge, 2006: 161).

Superpower interest in Africa decreased markedly after the Cold War and "*African despots could no longer insure their grip on power by playing off Washington and Moscow against each other. In country after country they have fallen. As they go, Africans are demanding democratic government*" (*The New York Times*, May 17, 1992:4).

As far as development aid was concerned, it did not cease in the New World Order but it now came with political conditions attached. This process was reflected by statements made as early as 1990 by the British foreign minister, Douglas Hurd who spoke about "the need for good governance" in Africa. At that time French President François Mitterrand declared that aid from France would not be possible to "*regimes that have an authoritarian approach without accepting a solution towards democracy*". European countries seemed committed to this stance as reflected by the suspension of aid by Paris to Zaire in 1991 and Togo in 1993. Both countries regimes had failed to implement democratic reforms. Congo also (during the 1990's) came under Western pressure to implement reforms (Routledge, 2004: 161 – 162).

What was being experienced was "*a global shift away from authoritarianism and a virtual end to the international ideological struggle between political pluralism and Marxism – Leninism, in favour of democracy and democratization*". The rapid "*demise of highly*

repressive regimes in Eastern Europe had profound repercussions for Africa catalysing demands for democratic reform and an end to single-party hegemony” (Baynham, S. 1992: 4).

Baynham noted the characterisation by Francis Fukuyama of “*the end of history*”. He stressed, that it was somewhat premature but that liberal democracy and market values had won over totalitarian ideology and bureaucratic central planning. During the late 1980’s and early 1990’s “from Equatorial Guinea to Ethiopia and from Morocco to Madagascar, Africa’s military and one-party dictatorships are under unprecedented attack from an increasingly impoverished and deeply disillusioned populace” (Baynham, S. 1991: 263–268).

The process of democratisation is (according to Baynham) unstoppable and could well have serious consequences for Africa. The move towards democracy also emanated from Western countries who “regard the implementation of multiparty politics and open government as a *sine qua non* for structural adjustment and improvements in economic spheres” (Raynham, S. 1991: 266). Thus the West regards the twin processes of economic recovery and political reform in Africa as inseparable. With the relaxation of geopolitical tensions between the West and East and the end of the Cold War era, “*a new criterion is beginning to make itself apparent as a proviso for external assistance. The new litmus test relates to military spending*” (Raynham, S. 1991: 3).

Africans ruling elites reaction to the various internal as well as external pressures was varied. At the time Raynham placed African leaders (re)actions into three categories. Firstly those leaders who had seen the “writing on the wall: and had started on the apparently genuine multiparty route such as in Ghana, Togo and Nigeria. Secondly were the African leaders who had seen the “*writing on the wall*” but had tried to “*manage*” the process so as to preserve one-party domination and keep themselves in office such as in the Cameroon, Kenya and Zaire. In the third position were those who were labelled as “*total recalcitrant’s or the die-hards*” such as Sudan’s military leaders in Khartoum (Bachman, S. 1991: 1-2).

A mixed yet volatile reaction was seen during the early 1990’s. To place this into context was the fact that “*in the twelve months between June 1990 and June 1991 OAU summits, no less than nine African leaders lost their positions – the highest “turnover” since the OAU was created in 1963*”. More widely, political changes in Africa since 1989 had led to a doubling

of the *de jure* multiparty states from 10 to 20 by the end of 1991. Another two dozen had committed themselves to democratic reform (Raynham, S. 1992: 4).

It was believed that at the end of the Cold War in Africa that conflict would subside. In reality the major conflicts in Southern Africa and the Horn of Africa had ceased but the capacity of African states for war making had been greatly enhanced due to their role as Cold War proxies. Lodge placed this situation in perspective when he wrote that, “*the end of international bipolar geostrategic competitions in Africa should logically have reduced such capacity. Instead, its consequence has been an overall weakening of African States and an intensification of rebellions against their authority*”. (Lodge, T. 1999: 1).

Since the demise of interest by the superpowers in Africa following the Cold War, conflict in Africa has in fact increased. In research undertaken by Harbom and Wallensteen incidents of armed conflicts in Africa escalated from 12 in 1989 to 16 in 1991 and 1994 respectively. By 2009 armed conflict on the continent had decreased to only 12. Harbom and Wallensteen classify armed conflict as ranging from “*minor armed conflict*” when at least 25 battle-related deaths occur in a year but fewer than 1 000 to “*War*” when at least 1 000 battle-related deaths happen within a year (Harbom, L & Wallensteen, P. 2009: 501-508). Lodge provides an overview of seven issues that has promoted conflict since 1990, there being;

- **Ethnic Competitions for Control of the State.**

In this regard Lodge provides the prominent examples of Burundi and Rwanda, which saw both countries experiencing “struggles for ascendancy between the culturally similar Tutsi and Hutu groups.

- **Regional or Secessionist Rebellions.**

Although there are numerous, one of the most protracted and bloody was, after the Biafra conflict, the civil war in Sudan, which had begun in 1957. Regional rivalries helped to sustain the conflict with the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) receiving assistance from Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen, although Libya changed sides so as to support Khartoum as from 1985. During the 1990’s the Sudanese government in the north also obtained military support from Iran.

In West Africa regional rebellions were seen in northern Niger, which saw two Tuareg uprisings, sporadic local insurgences operating in southern Chad and the actions taken by the Casamance secessionist movement in southern Senegal.

- **Continuation of Liberation Conflicts.**

Lodge noted the remnants of issues surrounding tensions following the Angolan civil war as well as political competition between various liberation movements in South Africa which had caused 14 000 deaths in the KwaZulu-Natal province during the period 1990 – 1994.

- **Fundamentalist – Religious Opposition to Secular Authority.**

In Algeria as many as 50 000 people had died due to a civil war that reached that country following the declaration of a state of emergency by the government in 1992.

Lodge noted that Militarised Islamic opposition movements were active in other North African countries, including Egypt and Libya. It is interesting to note that Muslims did not have a monopoly on anti-secular rebellions as seen in northern Uganda with the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), established in 1987 by the prophetess Alice LeKwama, which sought to establish a government in Kampala based on the principles of the Ten Commandments.

- **Warfare Arising from State Regeneration of State Collapse.**

The conflict that developed in Sierra Leone, Liberia and the DRC was due to the collapse of state institutions that had been weakened by decades of “*corrupt predatory government and elite factionalism*”. In Zaire/DRC “progressive state inability” was reflected by the deterioration of the country's communication system that saw the all-season road network shrink by 1980 to twenty per cent of its 1960 total. The fourth major conflict that came along due to state collapse was in Somalia, which had begun in 1991 with the overthrow of Presidential Said Barré. As with Liberia, the organisation of state structures around regionally organized patronage networks based on kinship and clan systems, made its especially susceptible to fragmentation with the removal of external support for central authority.

- **Protracted Conflict within Politicised Militaries.** Lodge saw this category as an early symptom of State collapse. The mutiny of the Guinea-Bissau army was a consequence of Guinean involvement in limiting the actions of the Senegalese Casamance secessionist movement. Fighting between army militias loyal to rival political leaderships in Congo-Brazzaville between 1993 and 1997 intensified the conflict in that country. The Angolan army also became embroiled in this conflict due to the previous support Congo (Brazzaville) had provided to the Angolan government during its conflict with UNITA. In the Lesotho there remained a “*traditional affinity*

between the army and the Lesotho National Party”, which allowed for hostility to increase between military commanders and the governing Basotho National Congress which had been elected in 1993. Factionalism was so prevalent that the country had a series of violent mutinies, which finally resulted in a military response by South Africa.

- **Border Disputes**

Disputes over the exact location of colonial frontiers saw military tension in the case of Cameroon and Nigeria, Eritrea and its neighbours and Namibia and Botswana. In Namibia and Botswana’s case the dispute came in 1993 over Sedudu Island in the Chobe River. Although the disagreement was placed under international review, Botswana began an aggressive programme of military expansion. In the Horn of Africa, the new State of Eritrea contested its boundaries with South Yemen and Djibouti as well as with Ethiopia. In 1998 a “*large scale*” tank and artillery battle took place between Ethiopia and Eritrea following Eritrea’s occupation of the Yigra triangle. Sporadic fighting between Nigerian and Cameroonian soldiers took place over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula before the issue was submitted for international arbitration.

Various developing trends have been noticed through the 1990’s in Africa that continued in the 2000’s, the most prevalent being;

- The most protracted and severe civil wars occurred in countries in which the state had been the weakest, which is normally the consequence of the absence of marked pre-colonial political institutions (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia), that is exasperated by a specific “*cursory brand of colonial administration*” (Sierra Leone, Somalia, Southern Sudan). These developments are increased by the negligence of a binding action by anti-colonial nationalist movements (Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC and Somalia).
- Africa also saw an increase of national rivalries within regions, with emphasis being placed on the acquisitions of regional hegemonic status. This was seen with specific regard to the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in Liberia, which many observers saw as an expression of Nigeria’s ambitions for regional political dominance, which in turn fuelled the armed struggles in Sierra Leone. A ripple – effect was seen by this development as factors such as a large refugee community

developed. Furthermore, the scope of conflict also extended to the Great Lakes region.

- A relatively new development was seen regarding religious opposition to secular States in Africa.
- Democratic shifts favouring the young, the struggle over resources (particularly land) and conflict itself eroded patriarchal authority in Africa. Power (rather than authority) had moved into the hands of the very young as reflected by the establishment of “*child soldiers*” in conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia as well as in South Africa.
- A developing tendency to question the frontiers as originally laid down by the Congress of Berlin and supported by the OAU as well as the AU continued to grow, which reflects the fact that the African State systems, which had remained stable throughout the twentieth century is facing new and unprecedented challenges (Lodge, T. 1999: 1 – 5).

Africa was left very much to its own devices at the end of the Cold War. The continent experienced a drastic strategic marginalisation. As Mainger wrote, “*without indispensable strategic choke points’ and no competing power block, the strategic role faded. Economic decline, poverty, disease, famine, corruption, dictatorship and general political instability had already become synonymous with the African continent, whose various ethnic groups sought self-determination in countless uprisings. With accelerated marginalisation, mainly governments in Africa were unable to exercise administrative control over great parts of their territory, entire regions being under the de facto control of rebel movements and / or ethno nationalist separatists*”(Mainger, S. 1999: 1 – 4).

The West was apathetic towards Africa that was highlighted after the Cold War, which was compounded by Globalisation that further reduced the continents geopolitical importance. The fact that the worlds “*last remaining superpower*” had to rapidly retreat from Mogadishu, Somalia after “*humiliating losses by the US intervention troops highlighted the fact that America was not willing to involve itself militarily in military interventions in Africa*”. Furthermore the “*paralysis*” of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) during Africa’s most blatant genocide showed the lack of willingness by Europe to involve itself in

and significant numbers during the mid 1990's in Africa. Thus, in essence during the post-Cold War period it was a "*combination of geography, receding Western power, and Africa's apparent inability to secure stability and development that provides the framework for the marginalisation of the continent*" (Mainger, S. 1999: 4).

A significant footnote to the end of the Cold War was the loss of "*strategic value*" of President Joseph-Desiré Mobutu to the West. Reno notes that President Mobutu had been under considerable pressure from the USA, France and Belgium to initiate political reforms in his country (Reno, W. 1998: 157). Despite these attempts to implement "*major reforms*" Mobutu was ousted from power by Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo – Zaire (AFDC) in May 1997 in a military campaign supported by Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda. However, a year later in 1998, Uganda and Rwanda had turned from Kabila and supported a new rebellion against him. In turn, Kabala found new allies in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola. Thus from 1998 to 2003 a war in the DRC, to be termed "*Africa's first world war*" saw the countries of Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Angola as well as Namibia, Burundi, Libya and Sudan conflicting with each other (Kisiangani, E. 2009: 40 – 41).

The war during this period was "*carried out only part time*". Military interventions rapidly became privatised and looting became a natural tendency for all combatants due to the fact that most fighters remained unpaid for long periods. Civilians became the main target. Arson, rape and torture became operations for the "*combatants*" who were regarded more like vampires than soldiers. "*Indeed, during the Congolese conflict the armies have generally avoided contact with one another and almost all casualties have been civilians. The slaughter in the DRC was compared to the thirty years war of 1618–1648*" (Sunday Times, 4 January 2009).

Africa's First World War was the world's deadliest since 1945: some 4 million people died. Most were silent deaths from hunger or disease rather than bullets, blades or bombs (The Economist, 17 November 2007: 44). What was also seen during this time was the use of rape as a weapon of war.

4.2 FRANCE'S CONTEMPORARY ACTION IN AFRICA

France continues a tentative, deep yet extremely challenging relationship with Africa that still centres on cultural and commercial interests. Central to this is language which was the country's main geopolitical thrust in Africa. To the majority of observers the difference between Francophone and Anglophone is symbolic and linked to Africa's colonial history. But the differences are vast and of extreme concern for France as well as for Africans themselves who seek "*support from different alignment in the regional and international system*" (Cilliers, J. 2001: 1 – 3).

Throughout the 1990's and even up to the mid-2000's France retained a fear of Anglophone encroachment (particularly from the United States) in Africa. With this fear came the realisation that Africa was opening to the rest of the world and could no longer be France's private domain. As the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher noted in 1996, "the time has passed when Africa could be carved into spheres of influence, or when outside powers could view whole groups of states as their private domain" (Schrader, P. 2000: 395).

In the 1990's French President Mitterrand stressed the need for France to support democracy in Africa and that French aid would be delivered "*more enthusiastically*" to African States that moved towards democratic reform (New Your Times, 22 June 1990: p A3). However, the reality was that this process threatened pro French leaders in Africa and in the long term would affect France's privileged position on the continent. Thus little was done to support the democratic process on the continent as France felt threatened and its "Anglo-phobic" nature continued so as to maintain its influence over francophone Africa. Thus, the rhetoric of Mitterrand's claim "*was obviated by the reality of ongoing foreign aid programmes designed to keep pro-French elites in power.*" (Schraeder, P. 2000: 407).

An example of how Mitterrand's administration was eager to assist authoritarian African regimes was seen in 1992 when France provided financial support to Paul Biya, who won Cameroon's first multi-party elections against his major opponent who was an Anglophone politician (Schneider, P. 2000: 408). However, it was with the role played by France in Rwanda that reflected the measures France would go to protect its interests in Africa. By 1994 France had replaced Belgium as the primary proponent and protector of Hutu power in Rwanda. To France, Rwanda was important not only because French was the country's second language (after Kinyarwanda) but also because it was situated on "*a political fault line*

between Francophone Central and Anglophone East Africa". The fact that the Tutsi population had since 1962 continually fled to Tanzania and Uganda during periods of "selective genocide" many descendants of these refugees had grown up in English speaking African countries, to the extent that Uganda was termed "Tutsiland" by some within the French military and Tutsi power became associated with Anglophone influence. France supported Hutu power and became Rwanda's primary supplier of weapons between 1990 and 1994. France had upgraded its security agreement with Rwanda to an *Accord de defense* in 1992 and due to this assistance helped the Hutu government defeat two invasions (1990 and 1993) by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda (Cilliers, J. 2001: 2).

With the death of the Hutu President (Habyarimana) in April 1994, a genocidal "final solution" led by "the ethnic majority Hutu militia" commenced. Between 500 000 and one million mainly civilian Tutsis were slaughtered. In this chaos the FPR attacked for a third time and advanced across Rwanda defeating the government army. In the same month, France send 500 troops to Rwanda to evacuate French nationals and "personalités rwandaises" which included key government officials some of who had been implicated in the genocide. In late June 1994, France led a UN multi-national force to Rwanda. France later claimed that this action (Operation Turquoise) was intended to stop "the killing, stabilise the situation, advance the principles of humanitarian intervention and uphold the role of the United Nations". France also stressed that it was willing to act while others vacillated. Many saw the action as an attempt to save a crumbling regime as the FPR moved through Rwanda and to create "safe havens" for fleeing Hutu's and protect those who were accountable for the genocide (Geregory, S: 2000: 439 – 440).

When Jacques Chirac came to power in 1995 it was expected that France would move away from Mitterrand's actions. This was not the case as reflected by French actions during 1996 in Niger and Benin. In fact, between 1994 and 1997 analyses of African polices at President's Mitterrand and Chirac indicated a continuity of ideas as seen by France's continued intervention in Comoros (1995) in the Central African Republic (1996) and in the Congo (1997). With the collapse of Mobutu Sese Soko's regime in 1997 and the US brokered power transfer to Laurent Kabila, France's authority continued to erode. As the former defence minister, Francois Leotard stated: "events in Zaire have produced a triple failure for France: tactically Mr Kabila was backed by the US and Anglophone African countries, morally because France had given the impression (sic) of supporting the discredited Mobutu to the

end, and geopolitically because Zaire was an essential element in the French presence on the continent” (Gregory, S. 2000: 44).

France’s status in Africa was confirmed after developments in Zaire but events in Rwanda reinforced this situation three years earlier. Rwanda was the point at which “traditional patterns of French policy in Francophone Africa ceased to serve even narrowly defined French interest. France had sleepwalked into a disaster on the assumption that established policy would continue to work. Subsequently it was unable to escape the consequences of either its association with a murderous regime or its failure to provide security for that regime or for the Rwanda people” (Gregory, S. 2000: 441).

Under the direction of France’s new Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, France began a strategy of “*disengagement*” from the continent. This process included reducing military spending, rebuilding defence relations and reducing French troops on the continent. Further to this was the shift away from the doctrine of unilateral military intervention and support of the development of African regional forces. Intervention would still continue but only if it was necessary (Financial Times, 2 December 2005: II). Jospin’s disengagement policies as implemented in 1997 seemed to be countered by President Jacques Chirac who won a second presidential term in 2002. President Chirac began a policy of “partial re-engagement” and justified this process of the use of force in Africa by stressing that France “*must work to strengthen justice*”. In the same year France involved itself in the developments in what was an attempt to rescue the imploding African country of Cote d’Ivoire. (Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2003: p A1).

Many observers see French reaction to developments in Africa as the continued reduction of France’s geopolitical relevance on the continent. As Gregory wrote, “*A loss of French legitimacy and influence, displacement from the Great Lakes region, and the encroachment of the United States, Britain and Anglophone states (particularly Nigeria and South Africa) have ended the exclusivity of French influence in Francophone Africa. In the future France will have to “cherry pick” links with those Francophone states that will serve its best interests*” (Gregory, S. 2000: 442).

One of France’s greatest fears from a geopolitical perspective regarding its relationship (that of the “Anglo” influence) with Africa became a reality as English became increasingly prominent in francophone Africa. Africans began to perceive that learning English was an

essential step towards moving forward in life. “Rwanda, for example, introduced English as an official language after its relations with France turned sour” (Johnson, D. 1997: 14).

France has taken a different path to representation in Africa such as initiating a multilateralism policy, an “Africanization” of regional security which allows for a multinationalization of Western interest as reflected by the Franco–British and American led initiatives to establish peacekeeping forces (International Herald Tribune, 10 February 1997). In this regard France has established RECAMP (*reinforcement des capacités africaines de maintiendes la paix*) to assist African States to manage peacekeeping issues. RECAMP – which falls under the aegis of the UN and closely cooperates with the AU plans to train and equip an African force of between 4 000 to 5 000 troops so as to intervene in regional crises (Lewis, J. A. C. 1996: 23).

French businesses continue to maintain their longstanding operations in Africa and approximately 5% of France’s exports go to the continent. Africa remains an important supplier of metals and oil to France and there are about 240 000 French nationals living in Africa. There is an on-going debate in France as to Africa’s relevance to that country with many believing that France’s future economic and geopolitical interests are better placed in Asia and South America (Henderson, A. 22 March 2007: 1-3). Uranium was discovered in Gabon in 1956 and Niger in 1970. This discovery allowed for France to have a reliable source of uranium which permitted de Gaulle to obtain a dedicated source of material for the *Force de frappe* as well for (electrical) energy needs (Peterson, N. 2000: 14).

Although it can be argued that France obtained little commercial return for its relationship with its former colonies in the case of Niger and Gabon the relationship was based on the need for uranium for France, which placed this relationship within a robust geopolitical context. Both Niger and Gabon have extensive uranium deposits. Over 35% of France’s total energy requirements and 78% of the country’s electricity demands are met by nuclear energy. Furthermore, France maintains approximately 450 nuclear weapons for her defence. To operate these weapons France requires a significant source of fissile material, specifically uranium. Presently France has to ensure that it continues to receive this highly strategic material from Gabon and Niger. There is a belief that both Niger and Gabon’s primary value for France was the fact that both countries provided France with a reliable and controlled

supply of uranium. France intervened militarily in those two countries whenever the French leaders felt their supply of uranium was threatened. (Pederson, N. 2000: 3- 12).

With the election of President Nicolas Sarkozy as President of France in 2007 came yet another new approach by France towards the African continent. The objective of Sarkozy's stated new "*relations with Africa are based on seeking the demise of the informal network of the previous France/Africa relationship of "France Afrique"*". Even when he was French Interior Minister, Mr Sarkozy sought a more transparent relationship between France and the continent. However, on the more conservative side of the "new" approach towards Africa, Sarkozy has seemingly two specific agendas, firstly on his outspoken views on African issues, including what he views to be Africa's "problems" and secondly his hard-line approach towards curbing illegal immigrants, also (some might say particular) from Africa.

In a speech given to the South African Parliament in Cape Town on 28 February 2008, President Sarkozy stressed that he would ensure that all defence agreements between France and African countries would be published in full and that he would involve the French parliament in setting out the major guidelines for France's policy in Africa. In this speech Sarkozy spoke on an issue that had been viewed with great a deal of suspicion by many young Africans that of bilateral defence agreements which had maintained questionable African leaders in power since the Presidency of Charles de Gaulle. As France's colonies in Africa gained their independence in the early 1960s, most signed bilateral treaties pledging various degrees of military cooperation and support. The majority of the treaties remain today, though some are still secret. It is believed that France has about 26 military accords with various francophone countries in Africa. These agreements ranged from "*full-blown defence agreements that allow for military intervention as in the Central African Republic in 2008 to co-operation on training and arms sales*" (Financial Times, 29 February 2008: 4). At present France has 9 000 troops deployed at four military bases in Africa, the largest at Djibouti in the Horn of Africa. The other bases are at Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean and in Senegal and Gabon in West Africa. France also has troops in Ivory Coast, Chad and the Central African Republic (International Herald Tribune, 29 February 2008: 3).

France maintained the role of "*regional gendarme*" in Africa. In mid-June 2009 the country made a significant strategic shift when its first permanent naval base in Abu Dhabi within the United Arab Emirates was established. The 400 strong military base will be located close to

Iran. This development, practically illustrates that President Sarkozy has possibly begun to shift France away from its former colonial terrain. This factor indicates the fact that “*France could well be moving away from military assistance for former colonies towards a ‘strategic arc’ running through the Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa, the Gulf and on the South Asia*” (The Economist, 20 June 2009: 20–30).

During the same period Omar Bongo, President of Gabon and Africa’s longest serving ruler (42 years) died. Bongo was a “*lynch-pin of French interest on the continent and many observers felt that with Bongo’s death that the “incestuous network of political and business favours known as ‘Francafrique’ will end*” (South African Press Association, 12 June 2009).

Relations between France and Africa, until the end of the Cold War were marked by a traditional imperial stance on the part of France which Lévy describes as “*a mix of openness and aggressiveness, of a part ambition and a current decline*”. During the Cold War, the threat from the USSR allowed France to continue to behaviour in an old-fashioned manner, which received an “*acceptable level of legitimacy amongst its western partners*”. During the period of independence for former colonies African dictators obtained empowerment from their French partner. As Lévy states, “*African leaders became stronger at first because of their very weakness and also because of the enormous political emptiness that their predatory states dug every day more deeply in their local societies.*” In turn France or rather French companies obtained various returns (mostly from minerals and agricultural commodities), which over time diminished in relative terms. In operational and economic terms the “*imperial connection*” (from De Gaulle to Mitterrand) “*worked as a system completely locked by its three operators. Thus the French state, some French firms and the “French-speaking” African states made up three taps’ directly fuelled by the French national budget and covered as well as corrupted by each other*” (Lévy, J. 1998: 279–280).

The end of the Cold War saw France change very little regarding its approach to Africa, rather its style of support to client states was changed but on an extremely superficial level. However, the system had reached its limits. Lévy states that there were three main events that damaged the *status quo* markedly these being:

1. The impact of the end of the Cold War. The fact that the USSR had withdrawn from activities in Africa allowed for France to no longer being able to justify defensive action in Africa.

2. The pressure of humanitarian NGO/mass-media in “*ignored zones*” allowed for the moral and political distances between France and African countries to be dramatically reduced.
3. Numerous cases of corruption involving leaders from various political parties and large corporations to be exposed.

A combination of these three elements undermined the status of the “*restricted area*” of France’s African policy (Lévy, J. 1998: 280–281).

France’s geopolitical paradigm has been fundamentally destabilised. Not only from a moral perspective but also due to the fact that the imperial programme was no longer profitable. Despite various policy changes by the different French administrations to improve the French – African relationship the underlining fact is that France has lost its authority and influence in Africa and presently plays an increasingly secondary role regarding the geopolitical process on the continent.

In the present sense the intervention in Africa by various European Union members, notably by France has been viewed with suspicion by numerous African countries. As described earlier in this section and stressed by François–Xavier Verschave, *Fraçafrique* was “*the secret criminality in the upper echelons of French politics and economy, where a kind of underground Republic is hidden in view*”. (Verschave, F/X. 2008). *Fraçafrique* cast doubts on any motives of French involvement in Africa. The country has been discredited for unilateral interventions in Rwanda (1994) and Zaire (1997) and the country’s military actions in Côte d’Ivoire (2002). Present suspicions are reinforced by the French-led EU intervention in DRC in 2003 and the EU force in Chad as well as in the Central African Republic, which was deployed in 2008 to support the UN/AU mission in Darfur (Concept Paper, from Eurafique to Afro-europa, 11 September 2008).

Despite President Sarkozy’s promised “*new relationship*” with Africa at the beginning of 2008 little has changed with regard to the country’s interaction with African elites. There is a strong perception amongst supporters within various anti-government institutions in *francophone* Africa that France still takes a “*preponderant role in the making and unmaking of governments*” in various countries in Africa. Although the French government continues to stress that the country has moved away from its perceived neo-colonialist approach, there continues to be indications that the country is following a “*parallel policy*” in private. In this

regard French officials try to discourage close review of allegations of corruption against various African leaders as well as continuous reports on human rights abuses. As the International Herald Tribune reported in late 2009, “*French officialdom complains that it is trapped in a double bind*”. For us, the relationship with francophone Africa is especially difficult,” Mr Alain Joyadent (French secretary of state for co-operation), was reported as stating. “*When we do too much they say we’re colonialist. And when we don’t do enough, we hear complaints that ‘Africa doesn’t interest you any more’*” (International Herald Tribune. 13 November 2009: 3).

4.3 BRITAIN AND AFRICA

Since decolonisation Africa was regarded as not that important for the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). African issues were not of any great relevance (human and financial). In general, diplomatic representation was reduced and African policies of successive British governments concentrated on damage limitation of problematic situations. The attention that Britain did place on Africa was focussed on South Africa and other Anglophone states, particularly Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana and Uganda. In short, British aid and trade investments and political interest were concentrated on selected countries within Commonwealth Africa (Williams, P. 2004: 2 – 8).

Following the end of the Cold War the United Kingdom moved from a previously low-key commercially led approach to becoming a major diplomatic voice calling for change in Africa. Prime Minister John Major began to place Africa more prominently in the International Agenda when he stressed the need for African debt relief to be placed on the G8 industrialised countries agenda. By 2001, Prime Minister Tony Blair stated that Africa was “*a scar on the conscience of the world*”. At the same time the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated that “*Africa matters. It matters if you want to produce a stable world. You can’t have four continents going forward and one going backwards.*” (Thomson, A. 2004: 163). The most successful part of Britain’s policy to Africa was the African Conflict Prevention Pool which was established in 2001. The fund had approximately £ 50 million per annum and allowed for the British government to assist with conflict prevention in Africa. The African Pool provides for Britain’s to assist regarding capacity building for conflict prevention on the

continent. The fundamental approach by Britain was that Africans were expected to resolve their own problems but could be assisted by British training, money and equipment but without the participation of British soldiers (Williams, P. 2004: 3).

The Blair administration enthusiastically supported NEPAD from as early as 2002. NEPAD was seen by the United Kingdom as addressing the various challenges that Africa had. It was also an example of African-led partnership and not of the West imposing their agenda and will. It also gives an opportunity for African leaders to be accountable to their citizens. Furthermore, NEPAD was seen as a vehicle for Africa to reach the UN Millennium Development Goals. The programme was also regarded as an opportunity to motivate different multilateral forums to help Africa with its problems (Williams, P.: 2004: 15).

It was Britain's return to Sierra Leone in May 2000 which helped to end the ten-year civil war that further signalled the country's practical commitment to Africa. Prime Minister Tony Blair's limited but extremely successful African interventions surprised the international community. The United Kingdom's involvement showed a humanitarian objective that also allowed Africa to believe that Britain was, to a degree committed in assisting Africa (Richards, P. 2004: 1).

From a commercial perspective, Blair's government stressed the relevance of private investors being part of the solution and the British government was keen to encourage African States to sign and comply with the World Bank's principles of "*good governance*" and to implement neo-liberal economic reforms. To promote the relationship between economics and politics the British Labour government also noted that foreign direct investment (FDI) to Africa is essential. To promote their own principles and geopolitical interest the United Kingdom works in close cooperation with some of its major transnational corporations in Africa including Unilever, ICI, British Petroleum, Marconi and British banks such as Standard Chartered and Barclays (Williams, P. 2004: 10).

At a keynote address on his last Africa tour before resigning as British Prime Minister in May 2007, Tony Blair stated that "*Africa is close to my heart... it has also been at the top of my foreign policy for the last ten years.*" This statement dearly overstates the actual level of the United Kingdom's commitment. However, Britain had successfully intervened in Sierra Leone in 2000 and this action was seen as "*much welcomed success story*" by the international community. Also, Blair's Commission for Africa was also seen as a

commendable effort after it was launched in May 2004. (Concept Paper – From Eurafraque to Afro-europa”, 11 September 2008). Despite Britain’s involvement in Africa the process has been selective, with a great deal of effort and debate centralising on the United Kingdom’s inability to influence President Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe. There is no doubt that President Mugabe has destroyed the democratic process (as well as the economic core) in his country. However, there are other regimes in Africa such as in Cameroon, Madagascar, Eritrea, Swaziland and Gabon who are far less democratic than Zimbabwe but who receives little to no criticism from Great Britain.

In conclusion regarding Britain’s relationship with Africa, a clear approach under the Conservative government with John Major as Prime Minister (1990–1997) saw the need to “*improve and adapt*” its “*response mechanism*” to African crises, which reflected the need for “*new thinking*”. While changes under the Blair (since 1997) and the present Brown administration saw a willingness to intervene in African Affairs which was emphasised by the need to give “*a new priority to Africa*” (Cumming, G. D. 2004: 1-2).

It should be stressed that Britain’s post-colonial relationship with its African colonies when contrasted with France can be deemed to be relatively non-interventionist. At the same time Britain’s bilateral economic and military assistance programmes “*focussed heavily on the 19 African countries* (Botswana, Cameroon, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) *that had experienced British colonial rule*”. Once again, opposite to what France had done in Africa, Britain was careful to avoid itself in military conflict in Africa and withdrew its last force from the Suez by 1971 and had abandoned its last African military base in Simonstown, in 1975. Cumming notes that after the post-Cold War era, Britain concentrates on a “*multi-lateralisation of its relations with Africa in which Britain works through the European Union and World Bank to stress African economic and political reform*”. At the same time Cumming notes that Britain has started to cooperate more closely with France on factors such as conflict prevention in Africa (Cumming, G. D. 2004: 3).

4.4 THE US AND AFRICA

American involvement in Africa during the New World Order was extremely brief and commenced with involvement in Somalia during the early 1990s when the US participated in the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM), which took place from March 1993 until March 1995. During this Mission an incident occurred on October 3 and 4, 1993, which became known in popular culture as the “Black Hawk Down” operation, which saw the death of 18 American soldiers during an operation to capture senior military advisors of the former President of Somali, General Mohamed Farrah Adid. With this single development, full-scale US participation in Africa humanitarian missions ceased. Not even reports of genocide in Rwanda in 1994 would persuade Washington to deploy ground troops in Africa (Thompson, A. 2004: 163).

Despite the fact that America did not commit troops to Africa this did not prevent the country from supplying “*nonlethal*” military assistance to the new leader of Rwanda, Paul Kagame following the Rwandan genocide. Furthermore, US Special Forces assisting in training his forces as well as supplying intelligence to “*rebels*” who invaded Zaire to overthrow President Mobutu. Additional to this, military aid was provided to Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea during the period that the US maintained a low profile on the continent. During the Clinton administration America seemed to equip and train African troops who would bring down Francophone governments in Rwanda and Zaire and replace them with English speaking troops (Newsweek, 30 March 1998). Despite America’s covert involvement the only direct US action that took place during the 1990’s was the bombing of an alleged chemical weapons factory in Sudan. This was in direct retribution for the Islamic – inspired terrorist attacks against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

In the final analysis regarding the Clinton administration policy towards Africa the majority of African’s saw the American government “*siding strongly with a group of unabashed African authoritarians in Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea and briefly Congo*”, that it believed were the continent’s “*renaissance leaders.*” Observers stress that the US approach could well have spread the conflict that was prevalent in Africa at that stage (International Herald Tribune, 18 July 2009: 2).

With President Bush a twin-track policy developed pertaining to the countries interaction with Africa that was based on two levels. The first was a more dedicated Hard power approach

regarding peace and security issues that became strongly prevalent following the so-called 9/11 attacks on the US. The second was a Soft Power approach which was based on assisting Africa with various challenges the continent faced. The Bush administrations two-pronged approach to Africa can be seen in a Soft Power / Hard Power perspective as written by Joseph Nye in his books "*Soft Power*" and "*Paradox of American Power*". In this regard "*Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideal and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our Soft Power is enhanced.*" Although Soft Power includes propaganda it is much broader. The approach is much more than "*image, public relations and empirical popularity.*" It includes very real power (an ability to gain objectives). Other forms of Soft Power use "*instruments*" such as culture, history and diplomacy. In contrast, Hard Power is regarded as the use of "*military and economic cohesion*" to influence the behaviour or interests of other political bodies. Hard Power stands at the "*command end of the spectrum*" of behaviours and indicates a country's ability to pressure another nation(s) to follow a certain desirable course. This is normally done via military power, which has elements of threats and force so as to create alliance and wars. The ultimate objective is to obtain deterrence, protection and coercion. Furthermore, economic power can be utilized, which makes use of bribes and economic sanctions to coerce and induce. (Nye, S. 2004: 17–52).

Within the dimension of international relations national powers includes both Hard Power and Soft Power Nye describes Soft Power as the ability of a country to attract countries by ideas, values and ideology: the ability of a country to let other countries to think what it thinks. The power is closely connected to formless powers such as ideology, social systems and culture. A country that has the ability to determine rules and norms through such factors as its cultural universality, regards them as key resources for a nation's power (Nye, J. S. 1991: 25–26).

Japan's Institute of Comprehensive Studies in a report entitled "*Japan's Comprehensive Natural Power*" stressed that Soft Power plays an important factor when calculating a country's comprehensive national power. The report stresses the need for a country to have a "*strong national spirit*" so as to be able to deal with potential international crises. Furthermore, a country needs a strong culture with "*global appeal*" so as to have a say in international activities. The report notes three factors indicate a country's comprehensive natural power, which is: survival ability, capacity to contribute to international scenarios and

coercive capacity. In this regard a nation should be positive about engaging in international affairs, be eager to develop its survival abilities by projecting its national will and establish alliances. Coercive capability reflects the way a country manages its foreign relations (Jian, H. 2001: 5).

Even before Nye coined the term “*Soft power*” in the late 1980s many academics had discussed the issue of Soft power albeit with different wording. Collins in “*Grand Strategy*” identified the following elements of national power: The people’s character, ethics and education and any other prominent, factors including political forces with influences in both the domestic and international areas (Collins, J.M. 1974: 74).

Frankel saw national power as the ability to affect the behaviour and psychology of others. He stressed the psychological factor and linked it to society and international strategic status as components of national power (Frankel, J. 1988).

Morgenthau saw national power within such factors as national ethics, diplomatic quality and nationality while the geopolitical theorist Nicolas Spykman saw Soft power as “*national homogeneity, social comprehensiveness, political stability and national ethics so as to play an important part to national power*” (Majis, Z. 1 April 2009: 2).

The Chinese academic, Huang Shuofeng sees comprehensive national power as a country’s entire power. To influence outside its borders of its territory the nation must use both material and mental power to survive and develop. Mental power can also be regarded as ‘Soft powers’. In this regard it has such “*soft elements as psychology and intelligence which give tangible shape to the role of Hard Power. Soft power is composed of political, cultural and educational diplomatic and synergic powers. Political power includes the political system, strategic goals, social stability and national cohesiveness, as well as its national system of leadership, organization and policy-making*”. Educational and Cultural power includes such factors as the development of human resources, quality of labour, the standard of the educational system, its universities, quality of the lecturers, television and films, broadcasting, the publication of books, journals, periodicals and their impact internationally. Diplomatic power includes foreign policy, activity and foreign relations (Shuofeng, H. 1992: 164–165).

Using culture as a type of Soft power is an important part of comprehensive national power. Countries use Soft power as a strategic option to highlight their competitiveness and

international influence. Within the context of international relations, Soft power plays a primary role. Nye analyzed the importance of Soft power in “*Bound to Lead*” and noted that to make another country change a directive an even dictatorial applications of power needs to be applied. The most important means includes attractions (“*carrot*”) or threat (“*stick*”). There is however, another way to apply power indirectly. In the ambit of international politics a country can achieve its objectives/expectations because other countries would see it as an example and will expect systems conducive to such results. Within international politics it is important to provide directions, establish the environment and stimulate reforms in other countries. Nye named this power “*cooptive*”. In this regard, if a country’s culture and ideology are attractive, other would like to imitate it and follow. The United States at present has the strongest traditional Hard power than any other nation. Furthermore, it has a great deal of resources in Soft power within institution and ideology factors that can assure its leadership in the newly interdependent countries, including Africa (Nye, J. S. 1991: 25–26).

In order to become preponderant in Hard power and especially in Soft power Nye points out that the United States should enhance the co-optive power of its attractive lifestyle and culture. From a strategic perspective this allows America to establish its ideological dominance not only in Africa but throughout the world. Nye asked whether the United States has the political leadership and strategic perspective to channel these Soft power resources into real power (Nye, J. S. 1991: 215). Majie sees Soft power playing a strong reactive role in international politics and its positive influence can assist a country to make workable national strategy, direct national enthusiasm, shape and unite will and enhance cultural power. Soft power promotes the development of comprehensive national power and improves the country’s international status and influence. An influencing power when establishing its national strategy must concentrate on creating a better environment and making its development model, values, lifestyle and systems “*attractive, appealing and inspiring and to incorporate both tangible and intangible power in order to assure the achievements of national interests. Therefore, Soft power is always the first option or tool for countries to deal with various affairs in contemporary international relations*”. (Majce, Z. 1 April 2009: 4).

It was within the dimension between Hard and Soft power that the Bush administration attempted to implement an experimental combined defence, diplomacy and development strategy, the so called “*three D approach*”, which was evidently lacking in other American experiences regarding its post-war reconstruction scenarios (Esquire, 27 June 2007: 44).

From a Soft power perspective President G. W. Bush involved his administration in assisting Africa to a greater extent than any of his predecessors or any other American administration had ever done. In combating disease on the continent, the US was actively involved in assisting to address this ongoing surge. During Bush's presidency the US government was the largest supplier of condoms to Africa, a major initiative to prevent Sexually Transmitted Diseases the most devastating being HIV/AIDS. President Bush also initiated the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), which spent US\$ 18.8 billion – mostly in Africa. In early 2008 President Bush asked the US Congress to extend the PEPFAR to 2015. In total this programme will cost US\$ 48 billion (Economist, 16 February 2008: 44). Under this initiative there are 1.7 million people receiving antiretroviral drugs from the US. President Bush also assisted in addressing other tropical diseases when he made US\$ 350 million available, over a five year period, to assisting in combating other “*neglected*” tropical diseases such as river blindness, hookworm and schistosomiasis (International Herald Tribune, 21 February 2008: 5).

The Bush administration concentrated on humanitarian and economic—not political structures. There seemed to be a genuine commitment to assistance as reflected by the doubling of foreign aid worldwide during the eight years of the Bush administration. To obtain this aid, developing countries were encouraged to undertake economic and political reform. US government development aid to Africa increased by more than 400%, from US\$ 1.3 billion in 2001 to over US\$ 5 billion in 2008. Most of the capital concentrated on education, health care and civil society. Africa also obtained US\$ 3.5 billion in additional funding from President Bush's Millennium Challenge Cooperation initiative, which provided capital to poor countries that encouraged economic growth, as well as providing good governance and improved social services for its people. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) enacted by the Clinton administration were expanded upon in 2004. This legislation allowed 40 African countries to obtain various trade benefits from the United States. As from 2001, American exports of Africa increased by more than 100% to reach US\$ 14 billion while African exports to the US went up more than 300% to reach US\$ 67 billion, of which US\$ 3.4 billion was in goods other than oil (International Herald Tribune, 5 September 2008: 4). Joseph Nye's focus on Soft power tends to concentrate more on state-based actors. In the African context there are a myriad of non-state organizations from the U.S. that are involved in a wide area of assistance and development that ranges from the improvement of medical conditions to

assistance in agricultural techniques, human rights and security factors to name just a few within the vast spectrum of US NGO involvement on the continent. Dependence theories will stress the fact that these NGOs create an environment of entitlement and dependence but the fact remains that the NGO's play an important role regarding providing a service in many African countries where none exist. Furthermore, these NGO greatly expand America's Soft Power on the continent.

From the Hard Power perspective America has placed strong emphasis on establishing military relations to involve itself indirectly in defence issues throughout the continent. The vehicle to this development throughout the Bush administration term in office was in direct response to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States and the country's reaction to what it saw as a global war on terror (GWOT). Although members of the administration did try to dilute the US rhetoric and preferred to speak about a "*global counter insurgency*", the fact remains that the terror threat from Africa, as developed by Al-Qaeda networks under the supposed direction of Osama bin Laden, in American eyes remains significant. Other factor that has prompted the US involvement is the rapidly developing strategic importance of the continent for America which impacts directly on America's geopolitical interest. However, American administrations continued to stress that its interests go beyond its geopolitical concerns. Despite the country's Soft power involvement, as expanded upon earlier in this section, the country centres its relationship on various security concerns. At the time of writing, the US concentrates on ten factors that relate directly to its geopolitical agenda. These being:

- Preventing Terrorist Flows from the Middle East and preventing the Rise of Militant Islamism across Africa
- Laying the Foundations for Long Term Military Engagement
- Balancing China's Expansion in Africa
- Developing Maritime Capacity
- Helping Rebuild Liberia
- Assisting to restore normality to Côte d'Ivoire
- Dealing with Islamist Radicals in Somalia
- Stopping the Genocide in Darfur
- Engaging in Nigeria's Future; and

- Preparing for the Transition in selected African countries such as Guinea, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.

(Pham, J. P. 2006: 1–5).

Although these various actions have a tendency to flow into each other, this section of my thesis will concentrate on the primary geopolitical concerns that presently dominate the US's developing relationship with Africa and effects made as to how to address these challenges. Since 2004 the US saw threats developing regarding the growth of Islamic fundamentalism. North Africa specifically, is seen by many in the security establishment as “an incubator for terror.” This developing issue has also expanded into sub-Saharan Africa. The US started assisting countries within the field of counterterrorist training and assistance. These countries; Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia all are predominately Muslim (New Your Times, 13 – 14 December 2008: A 20). Further to this is the fact that many of these countries form part of the Sahara, which has been described by the Economist as “*under governed spaces*” of dessert “*where people have been in various states of rebellion for years and which more recently have been visited by radical Islamist clerics and new terrorist groups*” (*The Economist*, 16 June 2007: 45). Further to these countries is the direct involvement by the US in operations against Al-Qaeda in Somalia. In this regard the Pentagon has trained Ethiopian troops for counter terrorism operations. On 24 December 2006 Ethiopia invaded Somalia in an action that was seen as being tactically supported by the Bush administration Al-Qaeda Islamists were believed to be operating in Somalia and the invasion, strongly assisted by US intelligence and military aid soon dislodged Al-Qaeda's influence in the country (International Herald Tribune, 24 – 25 February 2007: 2). This presently has been re-established.

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century statistics indicate that North Africa is the centre of fundamentalist action. For example “*between 2001 and mid-2007, of the 209 terrorist attacks that took place in Africa, 123 occurred in Arab League States, where terrorist groups are able to evade central government forces by hiding in dessert regions*” (United Press International, 10 July 2007). It is estimated that up to a quarter of all foreign fighters in Iraq are mostly from Morocco and Algeria. This indicates in practical terms the continued creeping “*radicalisation: of Africa's Muslims*” (New Statesman, 14 June 2007: 28).

As mentioned earlier, due to events of September 2001, the Bush administration began to rapidly recognise that Africa was becoming a key area for America's counterterrorism operations. To actualise its military (and Hard Power) role in Africa the US Pentagon had for eleven years sought a unified command for its forces on the continent, which was finally actualised by the announcement by President Bush that a new military command for Africa entitled the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) would be created to *"enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa, and economic growth in Africa."* (Hanson, S. 3 May, 2007: 1-3). AFRICOM area of responsibility for US operations is in 53 African countries with the exception of Egypt.

From a operational view-point AFRICOM has a single command post and reports directly to the Pentagon on US military relations with the 53 countries. AFRICOM's headquarters is based in the German city of Stuttgart (SAPA, 3 October 2007). It is realised that beyond the Soft power rhetoric is the fact that the US needs to train *"deployable African peacekeeping battalions"* and train professional African militaries that will be able to stop external threats, *"foil planned terrorist attacks and protect sensitive areas such as oil installations."* However, the fact remains, as noted by Mesfin that although the US will continue to pay *"lip service"* to what he regards as hollow concepts such as humanitarian assistance, *"AFRICOM will focus partially on providing better support for the pursuit of renewed US interest in Africa, which can be accurately summarised in three words; oil, China and terrorism"* (Mesfin, B. April 2009: 6-7).

America officially continues to assert that AFRICOM will not have one single headquarters in Africa, but rather *"small regionally based staff presence."* Despite American enthusiasm for a new vehicle to project its hegemony and military actions in Africa, the African continent saw the establishment of AFRICOM in a very different perspective. The majority of African countries feel *"nervous and insecure"* about a US presence that could well lead to an increase in terrorist attacks. Many African leaders were worried that AFRICOM could be used to support friendly dictators and project and support US foreign policy (News 24. 18 February 2008). Africa has been approached by the US with various requests to allow for a base to be established on African territory. The majority of African countries have rejected the possibility of an increase of an American presence in Africa. An example of this was the position displayed by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) defence ministers decision in August 2007 that *"no member state would host AFRICOM and more*

armed US soldiers” should not be welcomed to the continent (Business Day, 30 August 2007: 4). SADC’s position was not unique as reflected by other African countries when they were approached by the US on a bilateral level. In the South, South Africa, Botswana, Zambia, Namibia and Tanzania rejected US advances to host AFRICOM. Even traditional allies such as Morocco, Egypt and Algeria rejected the opportunity to have AFRICOM’s base located on their territory. It seems that the only country that might allow AFRICOM to place its headquarters on its territory is Liberia, a state that presently exists very much due to America’s grace (The Guardian, 26 June 2007: 1).

Despite African opposition, the US seems determined to establish itself in Africa for a long term period. The country has already located itself in Djibouti as from May 2003 and there are at present an estimated 1 500 US soldiers deployed in the country. The US had also established three additional bases in Ethiopia and another in Kenya. By 2012 it is anticipated that the US will have created an additional 24 bases on the continent. The Americans - regarding locating themselves in Africa, follow a specific pattern. Firstly the country will establish itself where the former colonial powers established their previous military bases. Then use special operations for so-called capture, kill missions, which are complimented with military training programme for African units. This action will be followed by more established bases throughout the continent (Esquire, 27 June 2007: 4-6).

With the elections of President Barack Obama came a belief from Africa that with his ancestral roots in Kenya, Africa could well benefit from his presidency. To date, little has changed on a practical level between the Bush and Obama administrations presidency. To mark his first visit to Africa as President, Mr Obama identified Ghana as the first country in Sub-Saharan Africa to visit due to the fact that the country has become a *“model of democratic development and rule of law in a region that struggled with both”*. It was also during this 10 July 2009 visit that he gave a speech at the Ghanaian parliament in which he laid out this new policy regarding the US relations with Africa. The most prevalent factor was the emphasis he placed on assistance to be provided in the area of food and agricultural development. Furthermore, he stressed that the African continent should start to move away from talk about the legacies of colonialism and other policies of wealthier nations. The new president made other comparison between South Korea and Kenya. He noted that when his father had gone to the US to study, his home country, *“Kenya had an economy as rich as that of South Korea on a per capita basis Today, Kenya remains impoverished and politically*

unstable, while South Korea has become an economic powerhouse.” Using the example of South Korea again, President Obama noted that the country had worked with the private sector and civil society to create institutions to allow for transparency, accountability and efficiency that, in turn allowed for extraordinary economic progress to take place. In this regard there was no reason why African countries could not do the same (International Herald Tribune, 11–12 July 2009: 1).

As Huntington stated in his book *“The Clash of Civilization”*, *“in the post Cold War, the most important distinctions amongst peoples are not ideological, political or economic. They are cultural”*. Thus in essence international system alignments will be shaped by cultural and not political ideology. He further noted that although the West will remain the most powerful civilization for many years its power is declining. The West is trying to *“assert its values”* and defend its interests. Huntington noted that non-Western societies face a choice, either emulates the West and *“bandwagon”* with it or, in contrast, Islamic and Confucian societies expand what Nye sees as *“Hard Power”* to *“balance”* against the West. Huntington regards the *“central axis of post–Cold War world politics”* is *“the interaction of Western power and culture with the power and culture of non-Western civilisations”* (Huntington, S. P. 2002: 21–29). Africa has a stark choice which centres on succumbing to American Soft Power and deriving benefits from its relationship with the U.S. or gravitating to the Soft Power advances of China, which will be discussed in more detail later in this document.

In the new millennium American Soft power has developed into a hybrid process which is basically a combination of Hard and Soft power into a strategy entitled *“Smart power”*. Nossel who gained primary credit for the phrase identified this new approach in an article written for the publication *Foreign Affairs* in 2004. In her article Nossel stresses that the US has made a mistake by a pursuing an agenda - following the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 - that concentrated on combating terrorism, aggressively pre-empting perceived threat and stressing the right for the U.S. to act unilaterally.

Nossel argues that Washington should follow a foreign policy based on liberal internationalism. In this regard she believes that the US should provide robust, economic, diplomatic and military leadership. This will allow the country to advance various goals such as self – determination, free trade, human rights, the rule of law, the elimination of dictators

and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as improve economic development (Nossel, S. 2004: 1).

Foreign policy focuses beyond the Smart use of power, which through norms, institutions and a grid of allies promotes U.S. interests and also strongly influences the world behind America's goals. Nossel reviewed President Woodrow Wilson's failure to stabilise the international order after the First World War and looked at how President Franklin Roosevelt was able to harness Wilson's internationalist vision to rally its allies to defeat Axis forces. Follow the Second World War President Harry Truman joined his pragmatic approach "*with Wilsonian Idealism in a liberal internationalist agenda that guided such seminal accomplishments as the creation of a global free trade system and the reconstruction of Europe and Japan*". The U.S. was able to develop institutions (such as NATO and the U.N.) and establish allies. The US shared responsibility for maintaining the international order. The origins of America's power (such as political, moral and economic) reinforced each other and international organisations spread US values, which also encouraged an eagerness for US products. Political influence and trade feed each other and in turn US values grew internationally.

President J. F. Kennedy's administration maintained an assertive stance with the USSR and stressed the need for democracy, human rights and self-determination he also created the US Agency for International Development and the Peace Corps. Both these institutions promoted America's ideas. Following Kennedy's death liberal internationalism stalled and with America's involvement in Vietnam, the US lost its credibility as a country that represented liberal change. Following the country's failure in Vietnam, the US withdrew from direct involvement after disasters in both Lebanon (Regan administration) and Somalia (Clinton administration).

Nossel notes that President Clinton tried to revive liberal internationalism through his actions in the former Yugoslavia and he tried to expand free trade and develop NATO. However, all actions were "*met with resistance from across the ideological spectrum*". With President Bush taking office in 2001 the new administration abandoned its international commitments as reflected by avoiding nation-building, withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol. This process was severely compounded by the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Bush administration moved "*from a detached to a defiant unilateralism*". Added

to this was that President Bush applied a militarist, evangelical agenda to his foreign policy although there were periods when his administration tried to revert back to “*the idealistic rhetoric of his liberal predecessors.*” (Nossel, S. 2004: 3). However, these actions were limited and in general ineffectual.

Nossel states that a superpower such as the US can stress factors surrounding human rights and democracy but, a country (such as the US) that has tainted liberal internationalist ideals “*will not be trusted as a purveyor of liberalism*”. There is a stark juxtaposition between what the US achieved in post-war Japan and Germany and what the country is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. The perception America has created is that it is an oppressor and that the country is hungry for power and oil. The country has in effect increasingly become seen as extremely hypocritical.

The Bush administration is blamed for initiating a cycle that has allowed US power to be depleted. Due to a lack of willingness to act multilaterally, the US has allowed for an attitude of distrust of America’s agenda and permitted hostility to develop.

Nossel believes that the majority of countries still believe in the ideals of liberal internationalism and the US has the opportunity to “*reframe*” its foreign policy to create confidence for certain processes so as to advance freedom, human rights and trade, which in turn is the best method to guarantee America’s security against numerous threats. She stresses that the US must “*embrace a smarter, less draining brand of power, guided by a compelling and coherent conception of national interest*” (Nossel, S. 2004: 3–4). It should be noted that Nossel emphasise that efforts to “*seed democracy*” and develop free markets in strategically relevant territories will always be seen as hypocritical and regarded as “*narrow self-interest*” unless it is also accompanied by a wide foreign policy that is viewed by the majority members of the international community as being genuinely liberal. Liberal internationalism can motivate America’s public as well as the international community and efforts to rehabilitate failed states and encouraging democratisation by authoritarian states do, in the long term yields results and can be seen as a “*smart investment*”.

Roosevelt and Truman’s global order was, according to Nossel, like an electrical grid that ensured equilibrium amongst different users and power sources. However, over time the grid has become old and unmaintained. Smart power can be feed into the grid, which in turn allows the US to understand that using its own initiative is not always the best “*way forward*”

for the US. Other entities can be used, which in turn can allow US goals to be realised through subtle diplomacy, the power of ideals, alliances and international instructions: Nossel stresses that to strengthen the “*grid*” certain new initiatives should be considered, there being:

- The creation of a stabilization corps which would be a new branch of the US military that should concentrate on post-war reconstruction and stabilisation
- Revive burden-sharing which should reflect a total commitment to recreating relationships. America should also pressure its allies to ensure that alliances are renewed and that allies meet their responsibilities. These allies are also located in Africa
- United Nations reform Nossel believes should concentrate on improving the institutions bureaucracy, its operational capabilities, membership blocks, its committees and the US’s own diplomatic involvement. In essence the US must become more actively involved in the U.N. system.

The US has not been able to achieve its foreign policy objectives and has not been successful, particularly when following a unilateralist, militaristic approach. The fact remains that America has reached over-extension both financially and militarily, which means that America has to reassert “*an aggressive brand of liberal internationalism, reviewing tested strategies to meet a range of new challenges*” (Nossel, S. 2004: 14-17).

The concept of Smart Power was adopted by Joseph Nye as being the process that the US should follow pertaining to the country’s “*new*” foreign policy. Smart power has been described as being “*neither hard nor soft – it is the skilful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both Hard and Soft power*”. This approach requires a strong military but at the same time needs partnerships, alliances and institutional support to allow for the expansion of American influence. A Commission on Smart Power chaired by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage noted that the United States must become a smarter power and invest in the “*global good*”. To achieve this, the US must concentrate on 5 major areas:

- Global development. In this regard the US must align its foreign policy with its interests which in turn has to be aligned with the aspiration of other people outside the US
- Alliances partnerships and institutions: Nye and Armitage note that the US must reactivate its alliances, institutions and partnerships

- Public diplomacy. Impressions of America must be improved and long-term relationships regarding people to people issues need to be developed, particularly with the youth.
- Economic integration. Continuous development of the global economy is vital for prosperity and growth. Developing countries have to be included within the international economic sphere.
- Technology and innovations. Climate change and Energy security needs US leadership and global consensus is needed regarding innovations and solutions.

In essence the US government needs to reassess its foreign policy objectives (Centre for Strategic and International Studies, November 2007: 4-7).

Although the Obama administration has yet to solidify and provide clear direction on its foreign policy, Smart Power seems to be one of the areas the country will be concentrating on. In early January 2009, Hillary Clinton declared in her opening statement at her confirmation hearing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that: *“We must use what has been called Smart Power, the full range of tools at our disposal; diplomatic, economic, military, political. Legal and cultural, picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. With Smart power, diplomacy will be the vanguard of our foreign policy. This is not a radical idea. The ancient Roman poet Terence declared that ‘in every endeavour, the seemly course for wise men is to try persuasion first’. The same truth binds wise women as well”* Hertzberg, H. 26 January 2009:3).

This section has already identified the factors that presently concern the US regarding its geopolitical concerns in Africa. Despite the very real concern the US has pertaining to socio-economic factors and the high level of participation undertaken by the country in assisting Africa with its numerous challenges, there remains significant issues such as countering the growth of terrorism through such vehicles as AFRICOM, competing with the heightening profile of China on the continent, strategic locations in Africa as well as the need to ensure a continuous supply of strategic minerals with the emphasis placed on oil.

It was only from the start of the twenty-first century that the US almost “woke-up from a stupor pertaining to Africa’s importance to the West. According to the National Intelligence Council (NIC), the United States is expected to obtain 25% of its oil from West Africa by 2015. This would increase the present amount of oil from sub-Saharan Africa to America, which presently meets 16% of America’s oil needs (National Intelligence Council, December

2000:73). By 2002, the National Security Strategy of the United States declared that “combating global terror” and ensuring US energy security required that the United States increased its commitment to Africa and sought a “*coalitions of the willing*” to increase regional security arrangements in Africa (Foster, J. B. 2006: 6–7).

From a practical and commercial perspective West Africa alone has some 60 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (Foster, J. B. 2006: 7). Added to this is the fact that there are now “*new discoveries of reserves with new technological advances*”. Deep water drilling (more than 1000 feet) has allowed reserves to be easily obtained. The fact that the oil from West Africa in the Gulf of Guinea has a low sulphur content (making it cheaper to process thus allowing it to be more easily refined and permits the final product to easily meet EU and US strict environmental standards), makes its lustre that much greater. A great deal of the reserves are found off-shore, which reduces transportation costs and new technology, such as the Floating Production Storage and offloading Vessel (FPSO) allows oil to be extracted and then stored in huge containers that can hold up to 2 million barrels. The FPSO factor has allowed for drilling to take place up to 200 miles of shore. This process also allows for the oil to be shipped to refineries without the laying of costly pipelines which are subject to damage when located on conflict zones onshore. An additional issue that attracts numerous oil companies to Africa are the highly favourable contracts given by African countries called Production Sharing Agreements (PSA’s). PSA’s allow foreign oil companies to obtain licences to explore for oil (on the proviso that the company covers all cost) and on discovery the company will then share revenues with the host country, if oil is discovered on the block the company is allocated. This arrangement allows an oil company (or a relatively small up-front investment) to make billions in profit (Lin C. Y. 2007: 2).

Many strategists will argue that the central issue for the United States does not concentrate on the welfare of African States or their population but on the need for oil and the control of this strategic resource. As mentioned earlier in this section, the US has established as from 2002 a military base in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa. This provides the US with strategic control of the maritime zone through which 25% of the world’s oil production passes. Djibouti also allows the US to be closer to Sudan and permits the US to “*dominate the end of the broad oil swath cutting across Africa that it now considers vital to its strategic interests a vast strip running south-west from the 994-mile Hagleig–Port Sudan oil pipeline in the east to the 640–mile Chad – Cameroon pipeline and the Gulf of Guinea in the West*”. A smaller base in

Uganda allows the US the potential to dominate southern Sudan where the majority of that country's oil reserves are. In West Africa the US has established "*forward-operating locations*" in Mali, Ghana, Gabon and Senegal. In the south the US has undertaken a similar process in Namibia, which borders Angola in the south. It should be noted that America has signed "*access agreements*" with many of these countries thus allowing for rapid deployment of US troops (Foster, J. B. 2006: 7–9).

There is a new "*scramble for African oil*". This demand for Africa's petroleum resources sees Africa's older colonial powers such as Britain and France attempting to compete with the US economically but militarily they are working closely with the US to rescue Western imperial control of the region (Wall Street Journal, 25 April 2006: 4).

The new threat for Western powers and their hegemony in Africa is China's growing presence. The US Council on Foreign Relations states that "*China has altered the strategic context in Africa. All across Africa today, China is acquiring control of natural resource assets, outbidding western contractors on major infrastructure projects, and providing soft loans and other incentives to bolster its competitive advantage*". This development, according to the Council of Foreign Relations is nothing less than a "threat to Western imperialist control of Africa. China's role has ensured that the United States and Europe can no longer regard Africa as their private hunting ground." The rules are changing as China seeks not only to gain access to resources, but also to control resource production and distribution, perhaps positioning itself for priority access as these resources become scarcer. (Atlantic, April 2006: 33–34).

America's interests in Africa from a geopolitical perspective continue to expand and it can be clearly seen in that country's (re)positioning in Africa. Tension remains constant between itself and former European colonial powers pertaining to specific resources, with emphasis being placed on oil. However, with the emergence of China as a significant party on the African continent, factors such as America's dominance as well as need for explicit resources are placing a threat on the US and its very future. The US has developed a "*grand strategy*" to ensure its long-term hegemony internationally. As Foster states, "*grand-strategies are geopolitical in orientation, geared to the domination of whole geopolitical regions including strategic resources such as minerals and waterways, economic assets, populations and vital military positions*". What are being seen are attempts by the United States to establish a

global *Pax Americana*, which is growing due to the real and imaginary threats to US power. Foster notes that the US is attempting to lay the groundwork for a “*New American Century*”. Actions taken by America are “*aimed at taking advantage of its present short-term economic and military primacy to secure strategic assets that will provide long-term guarantees of global supremacy. The goal is to extend US power directly which, will deprive potential competitors*” (in the case of Africa this is China), “*of those vital strategic assets that might allow them eventually to challenge it globally or even within particular regions*” (Foster, G. B. 2006: 3–5).

4.5 CHINA AND AFRICA

China’s new dynamic relationship with Africa can be dated as from the very end of the Cold War in 1989. After the country’s rapid and brutal response to the democratic action that took place in Tiananmen Square. China’s stance towards Africa can be seen as the third phase of the country’s relations with the continent since 1949.

Followed the West’s strong response to the Tiananmen “*massacre*” and the nation’s sudden international isolation, China sought political allies from where it could be obtained. African leaders throughout the continent send messages of support and approval on China’s authoritarian crackdown. There was a sense of shared belief amongst many African and Chinese leaders that the West’s complaints about democracy and human rights were founded in “*neo-imperialist arrogance*”. (Medley, E. 2007: 411). Due to the events following Tiananmen Square and restrictions placed on China by the West, the country focused on older relationships and concentrated on greater South-South cooperation due to the fact that the Third World countries were silent and less concerned over Beijing’s domestic problems (Van de Levy, J. 2006).

China remained highly consistent regarding its relations with African countries and to this day maintains a dedicated stance on its foreign policy and relationships with the continent. The country’s relationship is grounded on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, as identified at the 1955 Bandung Conference. The five principles are “*mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence*” (Muekaila, B. J. 2004:

6). It should be stressed that China repeats the peaceful principles of peaceful coexistence in its diplomatic statements whenever the country comes under review for its support for questionable regimes on the continent.

Policymakers in China stress the “*peaceful nature*” of its foreign relations which has been described as a ‘Peaceful Rise’ pertaining to its influence and aspirations. The country, having noticed the international community’s concern over its ‘rise’ which is seen as a challenge to the present world order has changed the description of its policy to “*peaceful development.*” Despite this name change, China continues to balance “*growing geopolitical tensions that develop due to its changing influence and power with maintaining a positive reputation that promotes trade and domestic development*” (US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 18 March, 2008: 7).

It is interesting to observe how China has gradually augmented its foreign policy especially in light of the maxim stressed by China’s previous leader Deng Xiaoping who stated that China should “*be good at maintaining a low profile; never claim leadership*” for foreign policy. In Africa, the country has maintained its stance and gradually become more proactive (Wacker, G. 2006: 56).

China maintenance of its policy of non-interference has resulted in a “*live and let live*” approach to the country’s foreign policy. This approach which is grounded in the five principles of Peaceful Co-existence allows China to ignore other states international and domestic actions, on the condition that they do not conflict with China’s own interests. In this regard the Chinese government has maintained positive relations with trade and diplomatic partners despite criticism of the policies of its more questionable partners. This also allows China to distance itself from being drawn into multilateral efforts to sanction or restrict another nations behaviour to which the international community is attempting to alter (US – China Economic and Security Review Commission, 18 March 2008). China’s policy of non-interference has not hindered the Communist Party of China in developing various relationships with over 60 political parties in over 40 African countries, which has further reinforced Sino-African relations. (People’s Daily Online. www.english.Peoplesdaily.com.cn 21 June 2006).

Anshan notes that China is sensitive towards notions of sovereignty and equality amongst nations. He stresses that this approach is very much due to previous violations of China’s

sovereignty by other major powers. The previous experience has allowed China to follow the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations. This principle notes that all nations should be equal and no country can dictate the sovereign affairs of others. The principle of non-interference has allowed China to protect its own sovereign rights. On the position of human rights for example the West's position is the belief that human rights have risen historically from a need to protect citizens from abuse by the state which almost obliges nations to intervene and protect people(s) throughout the world. However, developing countries including China and the majority of African countries believe that state sovereignty is primary, mainly due to the fact that "*the human rights protection regime is a state-based mechanism*". China has gained the trust of African countries by maintaining that human rights should not be a reason for one country to interfere in another's internal affairs (Anshan, L. 2007: 74–75).

China's renewed interest in Africa also coincided with new attention from the West to promote liberal democracy and human rights. Following the end of the Cold War a Third Wave of Democracy seemed to move through Africa which had the support of the Western World. As mentioned earlier in this document this trend threatened the position of many African leaders throughout the continent. African and Chinese elites stress that they face common threats and enemies, namely neo-imperialism and imperialism. Many African leaders have a strong suspicion of criticism of their regimes in what they see as "*Western/centric*" norms of human rights and liberal democracy, which allows for domestic actions to be criticised (Snow, P. 1995: 285).

There is no doubt that China dovetails into this and asserts that human rights such as "*economic rights and rights of subsistence*" are the central priority of developing countries and is more essential than personal individual rights as highlighted by the West. China's stance is supported by numerous African leaders. The Director of the African studies section at the Chinese Academy at Social Sciences in Beijing, He Wen Ping places this attitude in perspective when he stated that ... "*we (China) don't believe that human rights should stand above sovereignty ... We have a different view on this, and African countries share our view*" (Mooney, P. 2005: 5). The theme of Chinese foreign policy since the Five Principles continues to centre in non-interference in state sovereignty and freedom from hegemony.

Melber argues that China's policy of non-interference does not benefit the majority of the African people and instead *"is an attractive tune for the autocratic leaders and oligarchs still in power, be it in Angola, the People's Republic of Congo, the Sudan, Zimbabwe or similar societies still run to a large extent like private property of cliques. Transparency and accountability are certainly not among the core values cultivated in African Chinese links. Instead these seem to increasingly offer another exit option from demands concerning the notion of so-called good governance"* (Melber, H. 2007: 9).

The fact that China does not seek to impose any ideological agenda of its own on Africa, in contrast to ideological concomitants of Western capitalism shows that the country poses less of a *"threat"* than the assertiveness of Western countries. However, Clapham believes that many Africans who have lived under brutal domestic regimes have a strong demand for human rights. This attitude is strengthened by the fact that more *"accountable regimes have been installed since the end of the Cold War"* (Clapham, C. 2006: 6).

A factor that China uses to its advantage when projecting its image is the fact that it was not a colonial power and had never occupied any African country. China itself was colonized by Western powers and the country retains a deep historical memory of this period. China, through its actions and rhetoric has stressed that it does not want to control Africa's political or economic systems. Furthermore, China has not appointed any military consultants to governments in Africa and thus far has not constructed any military bases on the continent. (Asia Times, 5 January 2007. www.atimes.com).

The background to China's contemporary relationship and position in Africa can be found in China's 'going out' strategy which was made public by former President Jiang Zemin at the 16th National Party Congress in 2002. President Jiang defined the strategy as a method to assist China to open up to the world diplomatically and economically. Jiang stated that *"We should encourage and help relatively competitive enterprises with various forms of ownership to invest abroad in order to increase export of goods and labour services and bring about a number of strong multinational enterprises and brand names. We should take an active part in regional economic exchanges and cooperation"*. (Jiang Zemin's Report to 16th Party Congress, 17 November 2002).

To fulfil the *"going out"* strategy Chinese multinational corporations were encouraged to concentrate on four different sectors namely: energy and resources, overseas contracting

projects, purchasing and merging with overseas research centres, and purchasing and merging with overseas sales distribution networks (Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China (PRC) 5 March 2004).

Sautman describes China's rapid move into Africa as having two distinctive sets of China-Africa links, which within the paradigm of China's Soft power, attracts relations with the continent's political and intellectual elites. The first set is describes as the "*Beijing Consensus which is an ideology within neo-liberal parameters that nevertheless takes seriously some aspirations of developing states often ignored or opposed by the West. The other set involves China's African aid and migration links which, unlike those of the West, are often seen by Africans as not exclusively serving foreign and elite interests.*" (Sautman, B.V. 2006: 6).

The Beijing Consensus (the popular reference to China's approach to Africa) as seen by Ramo are "*Chinese investments, aid and trade not being conducted by the demands made by the West and international institutions*". More conservative observers see the Beijing Consensus as "economic growth without the constraints of democratic institutions' or economic developments without political change" (Asia Times, 9 November 2005: 5).

Ramo sees the Beijing Consensus as the articulation of State and economy in China which is reflected in the country's approach to international relations. It is seen as a "*multi-faceted policy set that forefronts constant innovation as a development strategy (rather than a one-size-fits-all neo-liberal orthodoxy) and uses quality of life measures, such as equality and environmental factors in formulating the strategy*". In effect, Ramo regards the Beijing Consensus as a "*model*" (denied by China) within the neo-liberal paradigm, but with distinctive features. (Sautman, B.V. 2006: 15).

Both the "*Peaceful Rise*" and "*Going Out*" strategies fall within China's "*Greater Grand Strategy*", which is greatly determined by the goals of internal modernization. China's ultimate aim is to develop its economy without disrupting its internal stability (in the case of the political leadership, this refers to the Communist Party's control on power) so that China can once again become a recognized regional and international major power. Although the general goal has largely remained unaltered since the communists came to power, the method and strategies to approach this challenge have undergone sweeping changes (Wacker, G. 2006: 55).

2000 was a watershed year in China African relations with the first China African Co-operation Forum (CACF) held in Beijing from 11 to 12 October 2000 in what became known as the ‘great leap forward’. Forty-four African countries represented by 80 ministers attended the forum. In his opening address President Jian Zening said that “*China is the largest developing country in the world and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries... China and Africa are faced with both historical opportunities for greater development and unprecedented challenges. At this historical juncture, an in-depth discussion between us on how to strengthen co-operation and promote common development will undoubtedly exert a far-reaching important impact on the cross century development of Sino–African relations, closer south – south cooperation and the establishment of an equitable and just new international political and economic order*” (Muekelia, D.J. 2004: 8).

Two functional documents came out of the forum: The Beijing Declaration and the Programme for China Africa Co-operation in Economies and Social Development. The first was a political approach which highlighted how Beijing vision could help African states overcome their underdevelopment partly with China’s aid. The second, which was a more practical approach suggested promoting South–South cooperation, improve North–South relations and the involvement of international business on the basis of equality and the future development of a long-term partnership which would profit both China and Africa. Further to this forum was the fact that China also cancelled part of the debt of African countries, which was approximately US\$ 10 billion (Aicardi, M. 2004: 7).

In 2003 the second CACF took place in Addis Ababa. The two functional documents mentioned above were reviewed and new initiatives on how to move forward were discussed (Muskalia, D.J.: 2004: 10). The third CACF, which took place in November 2006 was the largest diplomatic gathering ever hosted by China. More than 1700 delegates attended including 48 African leaders. The slogan of the summit was “*Friendship, Peace, Cooperatives and Development*” and new form of strategic partnership was developed. At the conclusion of the summit the Chinese leadership declared that 2006 was the “*Year of Africa*” (Naidu S. 2007: 41).

China committed itself to assist the continent through an eight-point proposal to support African Development. In this regard the country stated that it would double its 2006 level of assistance by 2009. It would provide US\$ 5 billion in preferential loans and credits within

twelve years and provide US\$ 5 billion to assist Chinese companies to invest in Africa. Furthermore, China undertook to cancel debt of heavily – indebted poor countries, construct a conference centre for the African Union, increase zero – tariff export items to China from 190 to more than 440 from the last developed countries, establish more Sino-African trade and economic zones, and train Africans in the areas of science and technology, education, health and agriculture (Wenping, H. 2007: 25).

In early November 2009 the fourth CAFC was held in Sharm-el-Sheik, Egypt. China's Minister of Commerce, Chen Deming announced that the eight measures as identified at the 2006 CACF summit in Beijing has been fully implemented. China's Premier Wen Jiabao announced eight new measures to an Action Plan (2010–2012) which outlined guiding principles for China – Africa co-operation. The most significant part of the 4th CACF was China's announced commitment to provide US\$ 10 billion in concessional loans to Africa over the next 3 years as well as advancing sustainable economic development (Shelton, G. 22 December 2009).

Apart from the CACFs that provide China with a vast degree of multilateral exposure with the media, African countries in general and international institutions Beijing utilised other instruments in its formidable “tool kit” to ensure that China's profile and involvement in Africa received attention acknowledgement as well as reward. China's present action can be analyzed across the ambit of both Hard (economic) and Soft power actions. From an economic diplomacy approach China utilises three main tools, namely development aid, trade and investment.

4.5.1 DEVELOPMENT AID

The Chinese government frequently stresses that its aid to Africa comes with few political strings attached. The fact that Chinese assistance is not based on conditionalities regarding standards (such as democracy and human rights) contrary to the approach by Western donors makes offers of Chinese aid to African governments that much more attractive. The one condition that China will make is the issue surrounding the “*One China*” principle and the fact that the recipient of Chinese aid must recognise Beijing as the leader of the “*legitimate*” China (Tull, D.M., 2006: 463).

Van de Looy states that “*China’s aid to Africa was never unconditional*”. Over time Beijing restructured its aid strategy and more restrictions are included. Thus interest free loans by the Chinese government transform into discount loans through Chinese banks and aid grants are restructured into joint ventures and other types of cooperation. By the end of the 1990s China had more than 480 joint ventures in 47 African countries (Van de Looy, J. 2006: 8–9). Freemantle agrees with Van de Looy and notes that China is also a poor country and that there are as many people living below the poverty line in China as there are in Africa. Thus, “China does not talk of aid with Africa but rather frames its discourse in the context of mutually beneficial trade and cooperation (Freemantle, S. 9 May 2009: 3).

The aid provided by China to select African countries allows these countries, according to Walker to obtain an alternative source of funds, which in turn “*allows recipient governments to use these funds as a bargaining chip to defer measures that strengthen transparency and rule of law, especially those that could challenge elite power.*” Although both parties stress that there are “*no strings attached,*” Walker notes that this factor is not so benign. There is a combination of “*subtle and not-so-subtle conditions*” attached, the most obvious being the fact that the funds obtained are frequently conditioned on being used to purchase select goods from Chinese firms without the involvement of any bidding or tender process (International Herald Tribune. 23 March 2010: 8). In China’s defence it should also be noted that other countries providing aid to Africa have similar approaches. For example about 80% of US contracts and grants must be used to purchase goods and services from U.S companies and NGOs. In the case of Italian aid, about 90% must be sourced from Italian institutions while 60% to 65% of Canadian aid comes with similar conditions. Aid from Germany, Japan and France comes with similar preconditions (Sautman, V. 2006:24-25).

Le Monde also sees Chinese aid as supporting a separate agenda. The example of China’s export bank, Eximbank was provided. The bank provided an US\$ 2 billion line of credit to Angola at 1.5% over 17 years. The loan was to assist Angola to reconstruct infrastructure including administrative buildings and electricity railways. In return China was guaranteed 10.000 barrels of oil a day. Furthermore, Chinese companies were offered primary position for lucrative contracts for Angola’s reconstruction. One of the conditions for the loan was that only 30% of subcontracting work would go to Angolan firms while the remaining 70% were reserved for Chinese companies (Le Monde diplomatique, May 2005:1–2).

In the past when China provided aid to African countries it would normally do so through the provision of prestigious projects so as to stress that what it had provided was all that it could regarding technical and financial resources. Presently assistance and aid has become more pragmatic and China provides assistance within three main themes: Chinese medical teams; scholarships for Africans to study in China and building projects (Van de Looy, J. 2006: 6).

China started sending medical teams to Africa as early as 1964, the first country being Algeria. The Chinese note that up to 180 million patients have been treated in 47 African countries by as many as 15.000 doctors. Many African companies continue to support Chinese medical teams and pay their expenses. The programme of “*health diplomacy*” falls strongly within the ambit of China’s Soft Power approach. China’s health diplomacy is so well advanced that the country has actually allowed responsibility for health teams’ actions to be given at provincial level. Thus, the province of Fujian for example will manage health issues/teams for Botswana while Hunan province takes responsibility for Sierra Leone, Cape Verde and Zimbabwe, etc. (Thompson, D. 2005:3–5).

The Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Education and Science and Technology jointly use a fund to train and educate Africans. As from 2003, 6.000 Africans have been trained in Africa while 1.500 African students receive scholarships each year to study in China. Further to this, Chinese Universities have strong relationships with various African Universities (Van de Looy, J. 2006: 8).

The largest construction project China undertook was the 1.800 km Tanzania Zambia railway which cost over US 450 million and was completed in 1976. Since that time China has been involved in the construction of wells, roads and telecommunications facilities, etc. Political allies were almost traditionally guaranteed the development of large projects such as the construction of stadiums, palaces, factories and government buildings.

The fact that China claims that its aid and assistance do not have any political conditions is in stark contrast to the stance of Western donors who have according to Tull “progressively undermined the sovereignty of African states by imposing reform agendas on them: first in the guise of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s, followed in the 1990s by demands for democratic reform. In the light of the persistent stress which economic and political conditionalities have forced on African governments, it is hardly surprising that the Chinese stance on the issue of sovereignty is gratefully acknowledged by African

governments (Tull, D.M. 2006: 466). China has gained a reputation for completing a given project in Africa when implemented which, differs from the West and its response to developments regarding corruption which, when discovered normally results in a project being cancelled or at the very least being suspended.

Van de Looy provides a simplistic table which gives an overview of the different types of aid projects undertaken by China on the continent:

Figure 1.8: Found in the attachment provides a table which, lists the *Major Types of Aid and Project by China in Africa*.

The aid obtained from China benefit African governments more directly than the policies of donors from the West. The fact that the political elites in African obtain grandiose and prestigious buildings, which are highly visible allows for the people of the given country to see the assistance which in turn also allows for a degree of recognition to be given to the African leadership as to what they had obtained for their country. African allies are immensely grateful to this type of support from China.

Jakobson placed Chinese assistance to Africa in greater perspective. She states that China in the 21st century has provided little direct aid (i.e. direct capital) to developing countries. Instead China's aid comes in the form of concessional loans at very low interest rates (1% to 2%) given by the China Export Import Bank and China Development Bank (CDB) to Chinese companies so as to undertake infrastructure projects, which includes ports, roads, dams and railways as well as medical centres, power plants, oil facilities and mines. In essence China concentrates on "*hardware*" as opposed to the West which has a "*software*" approach. The West focuses on capacity building in the recipient country. The Chinese stress that their approach "*leads to tangible results that benefit the African populace.*" To lend vision to China's approach, Chinese leaders and diplomats stress the relevance of equality in their relationship with African countries and continuously attempt to avoid the words "*assistance*" and "*donor*" when talking about developments aid and rather use the term "economic cooperation" (Jakobson, L. 2009: 409–410).

Many of the "*aid*" Projects those Chinese companies are involved in are not commercial. Others are financed through "*tied*" Chinese aid. Initially many projects are not profitable as the Chinese tend to set costs below market rates. However, the Chinese realize that the short

term commercial profits does not exclude that investments will yield significant returns in the long-term. Political influence gained from goodwill projects also allows for doors to be opened for more commercially or strategically viable business in other sectors within an African country such as securing tenders for mining and oil concessions (Tull, I, 2006: 468). It should be stressed that China's aid projects are through state-owned companies and their actions do not have to be profitable as long as they fulfil China's overall objective. As Lyman writes, "*China can use aid, investment and technical inputs to win long term gains and access, with a willingness to "lose" much in the short term to gain in the long run*" (Lyman,P.N. 2005:5).

China's position on international non-interference in African political and economic reform notes that the country will in theory support African led efforts to establish sustainable development and sound governance when it is African-led, through such initiatives as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is promoted as "*a consensus framework of the (African) member countries to promote sustainable development, good governance, poverty reduction and stop the marginalization of African economies in an increasingly globalized world.*" China supports NEPAD but is eager to stress that it will do so through the framework of the China-African Cooperation Forum, thus in essence it avoids the awkward situation of having to actually promote and support the key structural elements that allow NEPAD to succeed namely, democracy, free press, transparency, independent judiciary, civil society and rule of law-all areas in which China itself has resisted within its own country (Thompson, D. 2005: 2). Detractors will go as far as to say that China's engagement with Africa has been in direct opposition to NEPAD and with other international bodies such as the United Nations and the World Bank which have been working to eliminate blatant corruption from the continent (Business Day, 8 November 2007: 13).

The 2009 US China Economic and Security Review Commission noted that concessional loans to Africa from China's Export Import Bank are not attached by conditions for fiscal transparency and political reforms. This is contrasted against loans from multilateral development organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, "*from advanced democratic nations including the United States and the European Union (EU), and Japan that usually require recipient governments to meet various standards.*" The Review Commission quoted the former U.S. Ambassador to Burkina Faso and Ethiopia, David Shinn to show how China's approach disrupts attempts by Bretton

Woods's institutions to encourage democracy and transparency. In this case David Shinn mentioned a loan given to Angola by China's Export-Import Banks to illustrate China's frequent approach to lending in African when he stated: *"the Chinese loan offer occurred when the International Monetary Fund was at a critical point in its negotiations with Angola for a new loan. Due to serious corruption association with the oil industry, the IMF was determined to include transparency provisions to curb corruption and improve economic management. After China offered its loan without such measures, Angola ended negotiations with the IMF. The Angolan government explained that China's loan contained 'no humiliating conditions' and that it greatly surpassed the contractual framework imposed on the Angolan government by European and traditional markets. An Angolan government statement added that China "understands the difficulties faced by a country that has recently come out of more than three decades of war and that it trusts in Angola's development potential and its ability to recover."* (Shinn, D. 2007: 241).

Many African countries do not want to follow the various *"restrictions"* placed on them by multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. Furthermore, China has rapidly—through its actions—ensured that these two organisations activities in Africa became increasingly irrelevant. As the South African media webpage allafrica.com states in early March 2010, *"China's no-strings-attached soft loans for economic developments are a far cry from IMF and World Bank "reforms" that require a reduction in spending on the aforementioned infrastructure. Why would governments look west and agree to voluntarily lower its citizens' living standards on the back of exorbitant loans when it can receive virtually interest free loans aimed at investing in development and improving people's living standards by simply looking east? Chinese loans and grants to Africa last year (2009) amounted to more than US\$ 8 billion to Angola, Nigeria and Mozambique, compared to the US\$ 2.3 billion granted by the World Bank to the entire Sub-Saharan African region. Therefore, as important as World Bank and IMF approval is as an indicator for countries and investors alike, the deepest and most generous pockets are found in the East."* (www.allafrica.com).

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not maintain comprehensive information on each project the country is involved in Africa. However the information gleaned from the Ministry's website allows for an overview to be provided in as to what specific areas the

Chinese government has helped developed regarding assistance to respective countries in Africa – up to March 2006.

There seems to be a confusing mix to many of the development aid projects initiated by China and actual Chinese investment in African countries. The Wagner School reviews certain factors regarding Chinese involvement. For example it is noted that China has provided US\$ 9.4 billion so that natural resources/production can be undertaken. A further US\$17.9 billion was invested into infrastructure/public sector projects while US\$ 5 billion was classified as not specified/other (Wagner School, 25 April 2005). It would not be cynical to note the level of Chinese assistance/aid in specific areas specifically concentrates in sectors that will lead to direct benefit for China such as obtaining oil and employment for Chinese institutions. Many observers would believe that Africa's actual development might be regarding as of secondary importance.

Figure 1.9 : In the attachment a table is provided which, lists *Chinese assistance by country in Africa*.

4.5.2 INVESTMENT

Statistics and information surrounding China's investment in Africa is somewhat vague and contradictory. Confusion centres on terminology in the media, government information and academia regarding what China supplies as far as "*development assistance / aid*", loans and actual Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). It should be noted that China does not provide specific information pertaining to FDI to Africa. Thus, some observers might well conclude that the country is content to allow for the confusion to continue as much of the information distributed reflects the investment statistics as being a great deal more than what is actually invested. As the Economist noted, "*the accounting is so opaque that it is hard to measure*" (The Economist, 20 March 2010: 58). One example amongst numerous is the investment figures reported for Chinese investment in Africa for 2005. According to the reply by the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs to a Parliamentary question on 20 February 2007 as to what benefits Africa was receiving from its relationship with China, the minister stated that "*by the end of 2005, China had invested US\$ 6.27 billion in 49 countries in Africa*" (Replies by the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs to Parliamentary Question, 20

February 2007). In contrast, the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) reported that China's Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Africa by 2005 had reached a total of US\$ 1.6 billion (www.unctad.org.27march2007).

There is a developing growth in Chinese FDI to Africa but not as pertinent as what some sources report or as assertive as the trade statistics, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Between 1979 and 2002 China invested US\$ 818 million in the continent (Ministry of Commerce of China, 2003). This amount reflected 10% of China's total global FDI for that year. By 2004 China's FDI came to US\$ 900 million (Marks, S. 2006: 6). In 2006 Chinese FDI had increased to a total of US\$ 1.2 billion (Johnson, C. 6 September 2007). Most recent UNCTAD statistics show that in 2009 a total of US\$ 56 billion in FDI was invested by all countries into Africa (Pretoria News, Business Daily. 24 January 2010: www.businessdailyafrica.com). According to the Vale Columbia Investment Centre a forecasted US\$ 30.3 billion total FDI went to sub-Saharan Africa from international sources (Vale Columbia Investment Centre, 8 October 2009: 7).

It is estimated that there are more than 800 state-owned Chinese companies throughout sub-Saharan Africa. The most prominent sector in which Chinese companies concentrate in is oil although others attract capital flows from China such as mining, exotic woods, fishing and manufacturing industries. Furthermore, infrastructural development as discussed earlier also receives more attention (Africa and China: Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa: December 2006). A strong disadvantage to Chinese FDI into Africa is the fact that it is seldom characterised by skills transfer, the creation of domestic employment of any type or linkage to local business (Business Day online, 20 May 2009 www.businessdayonline.co.za).

China invests in countries from which it receives national resources. The most prominent being oil-exporting countries as reflected in 2004 when the oil-exporting countries of Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and Algeria received 54% of China's total investment in Africa (Van de Looy, J., 2006: 26). By 2008 Africa had only received 4% of China's total international FDI and approximately US\$ 5.7 billion in FDI had been invested by the country for that year. (Financial Times, 12 March 2010: 5). To date the largest direct investment China has made in Africa was to South Africa when in 2007 the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China purchased a 20% share in South Africa's Standard Bank for a total amount of US\$5.56 billion (Financial Times. 26 October 2007: 1). In real terms, from a FDI perspective China has

invested very little in Africa when compared to former colonial powers and the United States, Even Malaysia and India have invested more (Jakobson, L. 2009:411).

China's financial power raises expectations in Africa regarding future investments, which sees the country developing its foreign currency reserve by billions over short periods of time. For example in 2007 China had US\$ 1,202 trillion which by August 2009 had expanded to US\$ 2.1 trillion (Ferguson, N. 15 August 2009:1). This foreign currency reserve is the largest for any country in the world and allows the country to interact with a great deal of (economic) confidence.

4.5.3 TRADE

China has become a country that aggressively pursues trade agreements. At present the country is negotiating between 15 and 20 free trade agreements with various countries throughout the world at the same time. Kurlantzick notes that when the Chinese government signs a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that there is very little substance in it. The Chinese approach is basically to "*sign it, and then work at the substance later.*" China's approach wins a great deal of goodwill (Kurlantzick, J. 2007: 4) and allows the country access to established and developing markets.

The signing of FTA's is complimented with signing bilateral agreements specifically within the area of trade development and cooperation. China sends large delegations either headed by its Foreign Minister, Prime Minister or President to Africa on a regular basis, to such an extent that this has become an annual affair. These visits complement what is seen by many observers as a strategy followed by China in which each African partner has a role; one sells platinum, another provides oil while another will sell gold and diamonds; others will suggest alimentary goods or textiles. An example of how eager African countries want to enforce their relationship with China can be seen in 2006 when a Chinese mission led by President Wen Jabao came to the continent. During this period various commercial agreements were signed with Morocco, agreements were signed with Angola and Nigeria regarding the oil sector, Telecommunications and infrastructural sector development was signed with Congo Brazzaville, while agreements surrounding the power/electricity sector were underwritten with Kenya. Scientific and technological agreements were also signed with South Africa and

Egypt. During Wen Jiabao's visit he also signed thirteen bilateral agreements with South Africa (Gattamorta, M. E. July 2006: 2).

The main catalyst for China's relationship with Africa is based on trade. It is within this sector that China is unaccountably scrambling for commodities on the continent with specific emphasis on mineral resources and oil. China is highly dependent on natural resources and will continue to be so should it wish to continue its impressive economic growth trajectory. A significant pillar to this is African-China trade. To promote this and to add emphasis to it China's President Hu Jintao has visited Africa six times since 1999 and Premier Wen Jiabao has toured the continent on three separate occasions (in comparison President Bush only visited Africa twice during his eight year term while President Obama has paid a two day visit to Egypt and Ghana respectively). China has the world's largest population and a straining economy to develop. The state has a central role to secure resources. This has become a national prerogative. Most other governments would rely mostly on the "invisible hand" to meet expanding supply and demand needs. However, in China's case the state has due to its very character undertaken the responsibility to play the central role in meeting the country's strategic requirements.

To assist the Chinese government to develop its trade with Africa it has numerous state operated enterprises (SOEs) to meet its responsibilities. These SOEs have been given a mandate to procure resources regarded as being of strategic national interest. These resources, amongst others include iron ore, nickel, zinc, copper and oil and gas. The SOEs have direct political support and huge credit lines from Chinese banks and developing international business exposure. (Mail and Guardian, 14 February 2007: 4).

China has already replaced the U.S. as the largest market for copper, iron ore, aluminium, platinum and other commodities. It would seem that the country has an unstoppable appetite for raw materials. In 2003 China had imported as much as US\$ 140 billion in commodities. In the same year China imported 5.6 million tons of aluminium from 1 million tons in 1990. In 1990 the country imported 20,000 of refined copper by 2003 the country had imported 1.2 million tons. In 1993 the country imported 20,000 ounces of platinum, which had increased to 1.6 million ounces by 2003. While nickel, which had not been imported before, rose to 61,500 tons during 2003. In the same year China had already commanded 20.6% of the global copper market compared to 16% for the U.S. It was forecasted that China would by 2005 account for

21% of global aluminium demand compared to 20% for the U.S. The country produced 35% of the world's coal production, 20% of zinc output, 16% of phosphate output and 20% of the world's magnesium output. Within the steel sector China has become the world largest producer, producing 220 million tons a year – more than Japan and the U. S. combined. The country is undergoing a massive process of urbanization, hence a massive demand for steel continues. Furthermore, there is an “explosive demand” for cement. Since 1985 China commanded 40% of the world's cement production and by 2004 the country utilised more than 640 million tons a year, six times more than America was using. The country has begun to build reserves of raw materials and has 54% of the world's manganese resources, 23% of silver reserves, 23% of lead reserves, 11% of vanadium reserves, 12% of coal reserves and 6% of copper reserves. (Hale, D. 2004: 1 – 5).

Despite what China has been able to acquire and purchase the country continues to hunger for more to feed its rapid growth. Africa has many of the most strategic natural resources which China almost demands to acquire. The compounded growth of total trade between Africa and China between 1995 and 2009 increased by 25% a year with imports increasing by 27% and exports by 23%. The height of bilateral trade was in 2008 when total bilateral trade reached US\$ 106.75 billion and then decreased in 2009 to US\$ 90 billion. A breakdown of the top 20 products imported from Africa to China in 2009 saw mineral products at 79% ; base metals 5%; precious stones and metals 4%; wood products 2% and textiles and clothing 1%. These products account for 91% of Africa's total imports to China. Statistics regarding China's top 20 products exported to Africa in 2009 represent only 36% of total China's export to the continent. This indicates the diversity of the country's exports. This fact is reinforced by the fact that China's top five export products account for only 18% of total exports to African countries in 2009. The primary export products, which are mainly value-added manufacturing product, comprise of machinery 6%; transport equipment 5%; textiles and clothing 3%; footwear 2% and plastic products 2%. (www.tralac.org/cause_data).

China's major African trade partners in 2009 were Angola 19%; South Africa 17%; Nigeria 7%; Sudan 7% and Egypt 7%. The country's trade with these five countries represent 56% of China's total trade with Africa. Certain trends and developments are notable. China's total trade with Africa came to only 1% of its international trade but grew 3% to 4% between 2006 and 2009. During the same period the most dominant imports from Africa to China originated from Angola and South Africa. China's main exports to Africa have remained unchanged

although the composition of the main five products changed annually. For example in 2006 textiles and clothing was the main export product with an 8% share of total exports but by 2009 textiles and clothing exports came to 3% while machinery has been the main export product since 2007. A factor that cannot be ignored is the type of products being exported from Africa. The vast majority of exports are (resource based) commodities. If the main export from Africa namely mineral products (79% for 2009) is further analysed, 73% of this leading export is oil (www.tralac.org).

The graph in Figure 1.10 provides an indication of the massive spurt of growth in bilateral trade between Africa and China in the last ten years which was US\$ 6.49 billion in 1999 and US\$ 90 billion in 2009. Before the start of the global recession China's trade with the continent peaked at US\$ 106.75 billion in 2008.

Figure 1.10 Provides a graph in the attachment which indicates the growth and level of *Bilateral Trade – China and Africa: 1999-2009*.

China's demand for oil and Africa's ability to meet this demand is the primary reasons regarding that country's present and future relationship with the continent. China, though the Daqing oil fields in the north of the country was able to meet domestic demands until the beginning of the new millennium. By 2005 China was consuming 6.59 million barrels per day (bpd) while local producers were only able to provide 3.75 million bpd (Global Insight, May 2006:33).

It is estimated that China's energy demand will increase considerably and according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA) the country's oil demand will reach 14.2 million bpd by 2025. Furthermore, it is expected that in the same year the country will have to import at least 10.9 million bpd. Already China has become the second largest oil consumer after the U.S. and stimulates demand for almost 40% of the world's oil. Due to China's rapidly growing economy the country is not able to meet consumption requirements through domestic production and has sought oil from outside its borders. In this regard, from 1998 to 2003 almost 60% of China's crude oil originated from the Middle East (Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, 12 January 2005). Thus, in real terms, China was a net exporter of oil until 1993. The country's need for oil developed so rapidly, that already by 2004 the country had become the second largest importer of oil in the world (Soares de Oliveira, R. 2008: 158). 2003 saw China spreading its risk and securing oil from Africa to the extent that by 2005 China was

importing nearly 701 000 bpd from the continent, about 30% of the country's total oil imports and about 10% of the continent's total oil exports. It is believed that China has a strategy in place to increase imports in the near future (Hurst, C. July 2006: 4).

China's uses three main companies, namely China National Petroleum Corporation, Sinopec and CNOOC to pursue its foreign industrial policy. All three companies were established in the 1980s and are listed on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. These firms remain the "tools of the Chinese government" and reflect the Chinese leadership's ambition to compete with Western oil companies. Despite these companies capital strength Chinese oil companies have less capacity than Western oil companies operating on the African continent. Jin Zhang notes that Chinese companies do not have the technical ability and business approach as Western institutions. She states that Chinese oil firms are "*relatively backward*" pertaining to technological capacity (Zhang, J. 2004: 79). Despite these disadvantages the three Chinese companies now have interests in nearly 20 African countries, "*from Libya in the north to Nigeria in the west, Angola in the south and Ethiopia in the east*". (Chen, S-L. J. China's Oil Safari: 10 September 2006: 12-14).

Despite the challenges faced by Chinese oil companies that wish to establish themselves in Africa the fact remains that Africa has approximately 7% of the worlds known oil reserves and China desperately needs energy to drive its economy. The fact that new oil deposits are being discovered in countries such as Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia present opportunities China cannot ignore (Thompson, J. P. August – November 2007: 5).

It is estimated that (according to conservative estimates) sub-Saharan Africa will have obtained more than US\$ 200 billion in oil revenues by 2015, the most concentrated influx of revenue in Africa's history (Africa Today, September 2005). As highlighted by World Bank, since the mid-1990 oil-exporting countries have grown three times faster than non-oil exporting countries (World Bank ADI: 2008: 43).

In the Gulf of Guinea it is estimated that there is currently about 60 billion barrels of exploitable crude oil. Petroleum companies are gravitating to Africa and the opportunities preventing themselves to these institutions. Chevron Texaco for example has invested US \$ 20 billion in exploring new resources while Shell Petroleum in Nigeria is pumping more than a million barrels a day. (McCullum, H., Jan–May 2006: 2). It is within this milieu that Chinese companies are also seeking opportunities and establishing themselves.

An overview of what is presently being produced and what estimated oil reserves are in Africa can be found in Figure 1.11.

Figure 1.11: In the attachment a table is provided that identifies *African Oil: Production and Known Reserves*.

The African countries identified in Figure 1.11 are also the same ones that China is paying intense attention to regarding obtaining oil. China remains highly assertive regarding searching for oil and is a prominent investor within the oil industry in specific African countries. On a micro lever – Nigeria accounts for 3.07% of African oil exported to China, Equatorial Guinea 9.17%, Republic of Congo 13%, Sudan 24.66% and Angola 46.8% (Thompson, J. P. 2007: 5).

- **Angola and China**

As discussed earlier in this paper, China loaned Angola US\$ 2 billion, which the country is paying back in oil exports. The loan will allow also (in theory) for major infrastructure constructions to take place in Angola (Thompson, D. 2005: 24–25).

Of the more than one million bpd that Angola produces, the US obtain 50% while China obtains 25% and is gaining on the US. Of note is the fact that as from 2006 Angola has overtaken Saudi Arabia as the largest oil supplier to China (Thompson, J. P. 2007: 7). As discussed earlier, China secures its relations with countries in the form of agreements as reflected by the signing of nine co-operations agreements (most of them related to energy) during just one visit in March 2005 by China's Vice Premier Zeng Peiyang (Hurst, C. July 2006: 10).

An issue that has re-emerged in Angola in 2009 and that China is possibly well aware of is the conflict between the Angolan government and the rebel organisation FLEC-FAC, which is fighting for independence of the oil-rich Cabinda exclave. Each year there an average of 25 battle-related deaths in this region (Harbom, L & Wallensteen, P. 2009: 501-508).

- **Nigeria and China**

Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and the eleventh largest in the world. In the past China had reportedly been excluded from operating in Nigeria by the actions of Western companies. However, China remained persistent and was able to situate itself in Nigeria through such actions as technological contributions and by 2007 China had announced that it would launch a communication satellite for Nigeria. Nigeria has gravitated closer towards China as reflected by China (through the CNPC) signing an agreement to implement a US\$ 4 billion infrastructure development project. At the same time China was given first refusal right on four oil blocks in the country. Hurst believes that with continued resilience and the offering of more infrastructural developments, that over time, China could well replace Western firms when drilling licences come up for renewal (Hurst, C. July 2006: 11).

China's gravitation towards Nigeria is without doubt cause for concern from a geopolitical perspective. Furthermore, the environment of corruption within the country will not be addressed by the new presence of China. The fact that 75% of the Nigerian government's income is oil related, that the country loses an estimated 800,000 bpd of oil through leaks, stoppages and theft commodity known as "*bunkering*", which costs Nigeria about US\$ 4 billion a year reflects some of the economic challenges the country faces. Compounded to this is the fact that geopolitical tensions between the US, which obtained 22% of its oil imports from Nigeria in the first quarter of 2007 and China is expected to escalate over the demand for Nigerian oil. Nigeria's relevance as an energy source for the US is reflected against the background that Saudi Arabia imported 25% of the US's total oil imports for the same period. (Thompson, L. 22 June 2007: 3-4).

- **Sudan and China**

China began to establish itself in the Muglad oilfields of southern Sudan in 1995. By 2005 it was exporting 50% of the region's crude oil and of the 15 largest foreign companies operating in Sudan, 13 are Chinese (Le Monde Diplomatique, May 2005: 4).

The fact that the US had as from 1997 prohibited American companies from developing interest in Sudan (due to the civil war) allowed China to develop its interest with little competition. Due to this advantage China increased its oil inputs to 60% of Sudan's total oil

output, which made up to 5% of the country's total oil imports in 2006. (Wacker, G. 2006: 12). By 2007 (a year later) Sudan's oil made up 12% of Chinese oil imports. It is also believed that Sudan, which only started exporting oil in 1999, will surpass Angola in the near future as China's primary oil provider (Thompson, J. P. Aug – Nov 2007: 7).

Despite the fact that China obtains a small amount of oil from Sudan compared to other African countries, the country maintains as much as 4,000 non-uniformed forces in the country, which allows the country to protect its oil interests (Zweig, D & Jianhai, B. 2005: 25–38).

The fact remains that Sudan's potential as an oil supplier reflects its continued importance to China. At present Sudan is the third largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa and is rapidly becoming a future vital and permanent source of oil for China.

As mentioned previously, China's policy of "*non-interference*" in the domestic affairs of states is central to its appeal as a trade partner and ensures that its investments are not tied to such factors as good governance and human rights and allows China to benefit as so does the regime that it cooperates with. The regime has access to funds from China with "*no strings attached*." Furthermore, China is willing to invest in African countries that have experienced decades of civil war, poor infrastructure and lack of economic and political stability. This combination of factors best reflects the present China–Sudan relationships which is centralised on the amount and consistency of oil that China has secured and will continue to obtain from Sudan.

It has been reported that China has sold weapons to Sudan; which in no small part has contributed to the various conflicts which has continued between the south and north of the country, over ethnicity, religion and oil. It has been alleged that in Darfur, west Sudan, China had used its position as a permanent member of the UNSC to provide diplomatic protection to the Al-Bashir government. In the past China had continuously vetoed attempts within the U.N. to send international peace-keepers to Sudan without Khartoum's consent. During this period Sudanese soldiers and government-supported militias were allegedly committing human rights atrocities in Darfur (Thompson, J. P. 2007: 7).

China has relaxed its obstructive stance within the UNSC regarding vetoing all Peacekeeping initiatives. This can be attributed to the negative exposure the country was receiving over its

support of the Khartoum region and presently both African Union and United Nations peacekeepers are operating in different regions of the massive country.

It is estimated by Hurst that China has invested US\$ 20 billion into Sudan's oil industry and Sudan will be able to amaze as much as US\$ 30 billion or more in oil revenue – mostly from China by 2012 (Hurst, C. 2006: 8).

- **Congo (Brazzaville)**

Congo has to rely on outside technology and personnel to extract its oil as the majority of it is offshore. The Congo's level of production has increased markedly. China started importing oil directly from Congo in 2001 and by 2002 China was exporting 20,000 bpd. In early 2005 China signed two agreements with the Congolese government which allowed Sinopec to explore off-shore blocks (Hurst, L. 2006: 12 – 13).

- **Equatorial Guinea**

The country is presently Africa's third largest oil exporter. China came late to Equatorial Guinea and it was only in 2006 that the country signed a contract to obtain a 2,287 square km offshore block so as to drill for oil. In 2008 16% of Equatorial's oil export went to China (www.cia.doe.gov). Equatorial Guinea has without seen benefit from its oil exports as reflected in the fact that by 2006, the country had a GDP per capita of US\$ 17 269. A vast increase when compared to only ten years earlier when in 1996 the country had a per capita GDP of only US\$ 663 (<http://earthtrends.wri.org/text/economics-business/variable-638.html> - GDP by country 1960-2006).

China's influence within Africa's oil sector is expanding but the country remains a secondary influence when compared to the West. By 2008 it was exporting 9% of Africa's oil while Europe and America was exporting 36% and 33% respectively. Furthermore, China has invested US\$ 10 billion specifically in Africa's oil infrastructure while other international companies such as Total, Shell and Exxon Mobil has today invested US\$ 168 billion (www.pbs.org). Tull notes that China has a mercantilist approach towards securing oil interests in Africa and utilises the interconnectiveness of diplomatic, political and economic

strategies to secure oil supplies. China has concentrated on so-called niche markets in Africa, which is in effect countries in Africa where there is little competition, either due to political factors such as sanctions (e.g. Sudan) or where Western multinationals have limited access due to the countries being new oil producers (e.g. Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea), (Tull, D.M. 2006: 469 - 470).

The fact that China has become more assertive regarding involvement by its oil companies – which are owned by the state and is thus basically an “extended arm of the Chinese government” and also its strategic objectives in countries such as Nigeria and Angola, where the US and EU countries have been established in the oil industry to up to fifty years reflects the determination of China to secure its energy security policy and oil demands in Africa by what has been described as “*petro-diplomacy*”.

Houser identifies a concerning twist to China’s export of African oil. He calculates that China’s national oil companies (NOCs) produced approximately 681,000 bpd in 2006. If all this oil was returned to China, about 19% of the country’s total imports would have been met. However, Houser states that most of the oil does not actually get sent back but is sold on the open market to the highest bidder (Houser, T. 2008: 189).

An issue that will be expanded on in more detail further in my thesis is the growing resentment in Africa towards China’s influence and ambition on the continent. In Zambia for example (as in Algeria, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Namibia, Angola, Kenya, etc), Chinese companies have gained a reputation of abuse. During October 2010, various miners demonstrating at the Chinese owned Collum coal mine against their US\$ 4 a day salary package were shoot at and injured by their Chinese supervisors. Another incident in 2005 when a Chinese owned explosives factory exploded killing 46 Zambians resulted in little action taken by the Zambian government against the owners. The fact that in Zambia where it is estimated that only one in 10 workers has salaried employment, the 25 000 jobs in Chinese supported projects and businesses are badly needed (International Herald Tribune. 22 November 2010: 2).

4.6 CHINA'S SOFT POWER

From a diplomatic prospective, China claims that it has been exercising Soft Power diplomacy for centuries. From the time that trade commenced on the Silk Road, China's approach to forging relations centred on influence rather than open conflict and direct colonization.

China's geopolitical instincts have strong historical roots, which have seen kingdoms, warlords and empires rise and fall. The historical experience allowed Deng Xiaoping to prescribe seven guidelines for China to adhere to: (1) observe and analyze developments calmly, (2) deal with changes patiently and confidently (3) secure your own position (4) conceal our capabilities and avoid the limelight (5) keep a low profile (6) never become a leader; and (7) strive for achievements. (Mahbubanti, K. March – April 2008: 2). The fifth point is of specific significance as it describes China's behaviour pertaining to Soft Power within the international fora, including Africa. The willingness by the country to maintain a low profile remains an element of China's geopolitical strategy.

Presently, Naidu claims that China's use of Soft Power has allowed the country to forge diplomatic relations with 48 African countries. Actions such as the most recent promises by President Hu Jintao to establish an African Human Resources Development Fund (ADRDF) continues to emphasis the Soft Power approach taken by China. As discussed earlier in this document China does deliver on its commitments and in this regard the most recent ones as stated by Hu Jintao through the ADRDF will see, amongst others:

- 100 senior agricultural experts being sent to Africa
- The establishment of ten agricultural technology centres
- The construction of 30 hospitals in Africa
- 30 malaria prevention and treatment centres
- The dispatch of 300 youth volunteers to the continent
- The construction of 100 rural schools
- The expansion of Chinese government scholarships to African students from 2000 to 4.000 annually by 2009 (Naidu, S. 2007: 42).

Following Joseph Nye's book, *Bound to Lead*, interest in China's Soft Power approach received a great deal of attentions from academia and the Chinese government. The Chinese

government has come out strongly in support of the intellectual stance that culture is the “core” resource of a state’s Soft Power. Chinese intellectuals have in turn moved beyond Nye’s original theoretical approach to what is termed by many as “Soft Power with Chinese characteristics” (Glaser, S. & Murphy, M.E. 2008: 10–11).

The concept of Soft power received a great deal of popularity in China. It is believed that the theory resonates with traditional Chinese concepts; for example, “*Confucianism extols a King who relies on moral force not physical force, believing that the Kingly way will triumph over the hegemon’s way. Another explanation is propitious timing. Nye’s theory was introduced into China as the country was undertaking an in-depth investigation into the rise and fall of great nations, seeking not only to escape the fate of the Soviet Union but to transform China into a great power*”. (Glaser, S & Murphy, M.E. 2008: 12).

Glaser and Murphy write of two schools of thought in China around which the discourse on China’s Soft power is centred. The mainstream view is that “*the core of Soft Power is culture*”. A minority position, maintained by some Chinese international relations experts focuses on the use of Soft Power resources and focuses on the stance that political power is the core of Soft power. China’s leadership follows the role of culture in the exercise of Soft Power. This stance was best articulated by President Hu Jintao when he stated in a speech in 2006: “*The one who takes commanding point on the battlefield of cultural development will gain the upper hand in fierce international competition*” (Renmin Ribao, 12 November 2006).

China has begun to implement its Soft power approach through practical actions. Beijing plans to open 500 Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese and disseminate China’s culture around the world. Many of these countries where the centres will operate will also be located in Africa. Beijing has not yet articulated how the establishment of the Confucius Institutes will produce changes in other countries foreign policies.

The last sentence places the question; does China have a comprehensive Soft-Power strategy in place? Chinese scholars stress the importance of culture in developing comprehensive national power, which in turn is seen as essential to advance as well as protect China’s national interests. Further to this is the fact that the primary purpose of developing China’s Soft Power is defensive not offensive. Compounded to this is the fact that the country is using Soft Power to ensure that the international environment is favourable to the country’s

development. The country continues to maintain a low profile and avoid being regarded as being a leader. Within this approach is the fact that the country does not want to be perceived as challenging the United States either within the paradigm of Hard power or Soft power. Glaser and Murphy note that China does not have a coherent, comprehensive national Soft-Power strategy and the country seems disjointed regarding how to manage its Soft Power approach internationally.

Nye argues that China is “*far from America’s equal in Soft Power*”, and it is limited by the lack of “*cultural industries*” with global appeal and various other factors but the country has made some advances. Wuthnow notes that although China’s Soft Power is growing it is restricted by “*socio-economic challenges*”, problems of diplomatic “*legitimacy*” regarding China’s support for regimes in Zimbabwe and Sudan (Wuthnow, J. 2008: 3).

Nye notes that there are limitations to what Kurlantzick has termed China’s “*Charm Offensive*”. The Chinese model of Soft Power is, according to Nye only likely to work in “*places where an authoritarian model of rapid development is attractive*”. The US in contrast retains much of its international appeal. America’s foreign policy has initiated a backlash whereas China’s foreign policy (outside Taiwan and Japan) does not. At the same time it is China’s social and political system that concerns outsiders. In effect, it is much simpler to change your countries policies than it is to change your political system (Financial Times, 20 February 2007: 4).

Nye goes on to stress that China’s Soft Power has a long way to go. He notes that the country does not have cultural industries like Hollywood and its educational institutions are far from America’s equal. Politically, China has a great deal of corruption, lack of democracy, inequality, as well as deficiencies regarding human rights and the rule of law. Although the “*Beijing consensus*” seems attractive in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian developing countries, “*it undercuts China’s Soft Power in the West.*” An extremely restrictive factor for China is the lack of NGO’s in the country, which in-turn generates much of America’s Soft Power (Wall Street Journal, Asia. 29 December 2005: 9).

Glaser and Murphy in their paper “*Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics*” note that during their research they interviewed numerous Chinese academics who all stress the importance of the role NGOs play in the exercise of Soft Power and strongly call for the development of China’s civil society. These scholars stress that China must “*recognize the unique role played*

by NGOs in cultural diffusion and exchanges”. Some scholars acknowledge that although the Chinese government has good government-to-government relations with numerous countries, the Chinese government has poor people-to-people interaction, which undermines its Soft Power. Further to this China needs to cooperate with the foreign media and international NGOs so as to develop domestic NGOs, which are still in an infant phase. (Glaser, S. P, Murphy, M. E. 2008: 21).

In his book *How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World*, Joshua Kurlantzick see Soft power differently from Nye who uses the term to refer to the influence nations exert outside their borders through such factors as cinema and music to their actions as models of freedom and democratic government. In Nye's perspective military and economic power represents “Hard power”. Kurlantzick, in contrast also includes China's overseas investment and trade in his definition of Soft Power.

It is obvious that China's charm offensive falls within the paradigm of its Soft Power strategy towards winning friends abroad to achieve various concrete objectives. With regard to Africa this objective includes securing natural resources such as oil and specific minerals to feed its rapidly expanding economy. Within this strategy its actions such as befriending “pariah” states such as Zimbabwe and Sudan. With its policy of “non-interference” in the domestic affairs of other nations, China is actively countering efforts by the West to isolate these countries (Harvard International Review, Fall 2007: 25).

The government of China sees the expansion of Soft power as an important process so as to increase its influence throughout the world and has made numerous attempts to promote the country sometimes to the detriment of the US. For example, in 2005 China Radio International increased its broadcasts in English to 24 hours a day while at the same time, the Voice of America decreased its Chinese broadcasts to 14 hours – from 19 hours a day (Wall Street Journal, Asia. 29 December 2005: 9).

The trend to increase China's Soft power is continuing. In 2009 a new English – language government sponsored tabloid “*Global Times*” began to compete against the independent “*China Daily*”. The state television network, CCTV will over three years increase its foreign news bureaux' from 19 to 56 while in 2009 the company launched Russian and Arabic channels and will reportedly soon launch a Portuguese channel, which will complement the existing English, Spanish and French channels. Further to this “media blitz” the Chinese

Communist Party's wire agency "Xinhua" has moved into television and now screens short programmes outside embassies and in supermarkets on 3G telephones. It is estimated that the Chinese government will invest US \$ 6.6 billion to globally expand both CCTV and Xinhua both of which will eventually have a 24 hour English language news services (The Economist, 6 March 2010: 60).

Loro Horta, a visiting fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore lived and worked in Africa for ten years and while in the continent conducted a survey, based on 163 interviews to a "mix" of Africans ranging from junior military officers to a former President. He came to the following conclusions (from small sampling, hailing from Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia, Cape Verde and Zambia), namely; *"African elites clearly welcomed China's presence while the people are growing increasingly ambivalent."*

Horta further noted that discrepancies came from the different ways in which China impacts on different sectors of African societies. For example, in Angola, where international companies primarily use local labour, Chinese companies bring from 70 to 80% of their labour from China. Almost 90% of the US multinational Chevron's workers are Angolan including qualified personnel such as managers and engineers while Chinese oil companies employ less than 15% Angolan labour and all of them at the workers level.

Other significant deductions made were:

- *"The influx of thousands of Chinese migrants into Africa is becoming a major source of grievance for the local population. In Angola, Chinese streets sellers are fast putting out of business thousands of locals and Malian sellers who have been there for generations. The fact that many Chinese tend to live in isolations with little or no contact with the local populations further aggravates the resentment already present.*
- *China has also been accused of serious environmental damage in Mozambique, Southern Sudan and Equatorial Guinea to mention a few."*

Horta stresses that it is not only Chinese companies that are at fault on environmental issues but, regarding the hiring of local labour, Chinese firms have, *"by far the worst record"*. The large influx of Chinese migrants, many of them illegal, has caused severe damage to China's image as a great power in the eyes of the Africans. As noted by a Mozambican high school

teacher: *“They say China is a great power just like America. But what kind of great power sends thousands of people to a poor country like ours to sell cakes in the street and take the jobs of our own street sellers who are already so poor?”*

Horta argues that it is doubtful that China will employ more Africans in projects or protect indigenous industries. *“Judging by the record of Chinese companies in their own country there are great limitations to what the Chinese government may achieve. How would one expect Chinese mining companies in Africa to comply with environmental and safety laws in the mines they operate in when in China they are considered the most dangerous in the world?”*

Horta makes a significant conclusion to his reaction in an interview with a former Mozambican Minister of Foreign Affairs, who placed factors into perspective when he stated: *“In the end it’s up to us, the Chinese like anyone else have their interest and will plunder us to the extent that we let them. Africa’s future is in our hands like it has always been. Let’s stop blaming other and wait for people to feel sorry for us.”* (Horta, L. 2009: 1–3).

China only began to take part in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 1989 when it sent non-military experts on an observer basis to the UN Namibia Transitional Period Aid Group to oversee general elections in that country in 1989. Since that time the country has expanded its participation to become by February 2010 the 14th largest troop contributing country (TCC) to the United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) with a total of 2,137 military personnel, military observers and police personnel. The most recent information from the UNDPKO indicates that China presently operates in ten U.N. peacekeeping missions throughout the world (www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/countrib, February 2010).

Since China’s first involvement in Peacekeeping Operations the country has rapidly developed its capacity to the extent that it not only contributes military observers (UNMOs) but also police units, engineer battalions, transportation companies and medical teams. The country has now *“committed itself to permanently providing one standard engineering battalion, one standard medical team and two UN standard transportation companies to ongoing missions”* (Rogers, P.D. 2008: 1–3).

China has become highly active in UNDPKO missions and has increasingly placed its troops in more challenging environments. By August 2007 the country had one of its nationals, General Zhao Jingmin appointed as the first ever Chinese force commander of a UN Mission when he was made head of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO). (Bates, G & Huang, C. H. February 2009: 1–3).

Rogers points out that China's participation in UN peacekeeping missions in Africa outweighs its total contributions elsewhere. He also notes that China's participation gives the country global influence as a "*responsible stake holder in the international community.*" Compounded to this is the operational value gain by peacekeeping in Africa (Rogers, P.D. 2008: 5 – 6).

Although in real terms China utilises a Hard power stance when involving its military in Peacekeeping Operations in Africa, it can be argued that China is involved in a Soft power approach by actively participating in Peacekeeping projects which in theory is about taking aggressive authoritative action as opposed to securing the peace.

4.7 THE MODERN DAY SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA'S LAND

During 2008 Africa saw movement into the continent by wealthy countries that are unable to grow their own food. They are now buying or leasing land throughout Africa in what the United Nations has termed a "*land grab*" of immense proportions. This new "*scramble for land*" in Africa (although areas in Asia are also involved) has its roots in the international food crisis of 2007/08" when prices of rice, wheat and other cereals "*sky-rocketed*" across the world, triggering riots from Haiti to Senegal." (The Sunday Independent. 16 August 2009: 3).

Food importing countries realised that their dependence on the agricultural market allows them to be vulnerable to price surges but also supply interruptions. Two United Nations bodies, the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the International Fund for Agricultural Development released a report entitled "*Land Grab or development opportunity*" in May 2009 which reviewed the new "*farmland grab*" trend which showed how rich countries invest in overseas land to develop their own food security. These countries would then export all or most of the crop back to their country to feed their own population. The report which looked

at cases in five African countries in the last five years saw about 2.5 million hectares, which is equal to about half of the arable land of the United Kingdom being acquired by countries and institutions from outside Africa (Financial Times. 25 May 2003: 1–3).

It should be noted that the above report discusses only a portion of African countries. Further analysis indicates as much as 20 million hectares of farmland an area as large as France's entire farmland or a fifth of all the European Union's farmland and worth between US \$ 20 and 30 billion being acquired during the 2008-2009 period alone. (The Economist. 23 May 2009: 14). Presently there are more than twenty African countries that are leasing or selling land for agricultural purposes to countries and financial institutions outside Africa. Institutions heading the purchasing process are international agri-businesses, hedge funds, investment banks, commodity traders, international pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, foundations and individuals. Land is cheap as reflected by the fact that 2.5 acres in Ethiopia is leased for approximately US \$ 1 per year. In that country alone 815 foreign financed agricultural projects have been approved since 2007 (Mail and Guardian. 11 March 2010).

The International Institute for Environment and Development, the International Land Coalition, Action Aid, the NGO-Grain and other non-governmental organisations estimate that at present as much as 125 million acres of land, an area twice the active size of the United Kingdom has been obtained in recent years. Factors that have accelerated the land grab (apart from the above mentioned worldwide food shortages) include the high oil price rise in 2008, developing water shortages and the European Union's insistence that 10% of all transport fuel must come from plant-based bio-fuel by 2015. African countries where land is rapidly being acquired include Sudan, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Malawi, Ethiopia, Congo, Zambia, Uganda, Madagascar, Mali, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, Malawi, Angola and Egypt (Mail and Guardian. 11 March 2010).

In Africa more than 70% of the population rely on farming for their income and in many cases the very existence of people depend on land cultivation. The fact that about a fifth of the land purchases revolve around acquiring property by British, U.S. and German companies to grow bio-fuels makes the issue that much more contentious. Added to this is the claim by local activists that up to 75% of the land allocated to foreign bio-fuel firms is covered in forests that will have to be cut down (Sunday Independent, 16 August 2008: 3).

A factor that needs to be stressed and noted by foreign companies is the issue regarding land in Africa which is so central to identify, livelihoods and food security on the continent, which makes land such an emotive issue in Africa as can be seen with present developments regarding land/farm ownership in Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Kenya and Nigeria.

Africa is caught in a juxtaposition regarding interest displayed by external countries and institutions. Many of the deals are widely condemned by Africans as well as Western non-government groups as “*new colonialism*”, forcing people off the land and taking scarce resources away from the nationals of the country. At the same time Africa is keen for investment so countries on the continent have to be careful as to how to manage their relationship with interested parties. According to Grain, Africa is now being regarded as “*a new food supply strategy by many governments.*” Rich countries are seeing Africa not just for a healthy return on capital, but also as an insurance policy. Africa has a great deal of land when and compared with other continents and it is cheap. “*Farmland in sub-Saharan Africa is giving 25% returns a year and new technology can treble crop yields in short time frames*”. (Mail and Guardian. 11 March 2010).

In theory the investments into African countries should boost gross domestic production and government tax revenue and at the same time rural areas should gain livelihood improvements. However, in the vast majority of African countries it is only the head of state who knows all the details and in some cases provincial governors who are also involved in the transactions (Spiegel 30 July 2009). Many African governments remain secretive about actual transactions undertaken. Compounded to this is the fact that in some cases the respective governments have claimed that the farmland they offer is vacant state-owned property which is incorrect. The unfortunate factor is that the smallholders in many cases have no actual title, only customary rights (The Economist. 23 May 2009: 14). Whatever the case might be, there is no consultation with the indigenous population and in many cases land is taken away compulsorily and no compensation is given. As noted by the May 2009 report by the International Fund for Agricultural Development and the Food and Agricultural Organisation, data on land deals is “*scarce and of limited reliability*” (Business Day. 26 May 2009: 12).

However, there are various trends that can be identified as well as specific role players in the process of what some believe as being Africa slipping towards a new-colonial system or what

others have termed as a “*second generations of colonialism.*” Countries that feature prominently regarding the purchasing of leasing of land throughout the continent include:

- South Korea. In 2008 the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo Logistics signed an agreement with the government of Madagascar to take over about half the arable land in that country. This agreement, which would have allowed Daewoo to lease 1.3 million hectares for 99 years to grow palm oil and corn for export back to South Korea (International Herald Tribune. 21–22 November 2009: 12). The reported agreement was cancelled as popular protest developed which mobilized opposition to that country’s president to be overthrown in a coup in March 2009. Despite this development South Korea is the fourth largest importer of maize and it will have to find a country probably in Africa to meet its demand. In Sudan, South Korea has implemented agreements for 690.000 hectares mostly for wheat (The Economist, 23 May 2009: 61). South Korea has also agreed to “*develop*” 103.000 sq kilometres of land in Tanzania (International Herald Tribune. 21–22 November 2009: 22).
- Saudi Arabia. A country rich in oil money but poor in arable land has spent as much as US\$ 2 billion to purchase and develop 1.25 million acres of land in Ethiopia to grow wheat, rice, vegetables and flowers for the Saudi market. In Sudan, Saudi Arabia obtained 100.000 acres in February 2010 (Mail and Guardian. 11 March 2010). The fact that Saudi Arabia is closely located to Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia (just across the Red Sea) makes these African countries attractive to Saudi investors. At present Saudi Arabia is one of the most aggressive buyers of land. The country has identified strategic food crops such as wheat, barley, corn and rice. Saudi Arabia was the sixth–largest wheat exporter in the 1990s. However, water remains extremely scarce in the Kingdom and when the country imports wheat this also means it is importing water. Further property is being purchased in Mali, Uganda and Senegal. By using Africa to grow its staple crops, Saudi Arabia is not only acquiring African land it is securing the equivalent of hundreds of millions of litres of scarce water a year that was utilised to grow the crops.
- China. The country has secured the rights to grow palm oil for bio-fuel on 2.8 million hectares in Congo, which will be the world’s largest palm-oil plantation. The country is also negotiating to grow bio-fuels on two million hectares in Zambia. The Economist estimates that about one million Chinese farm labourers will be working in Africa by the end of 2009 (The Economist. 23 May 2009: 60). The Mozambique government has thus far

resisted the settlement of thousands of Chinese agricultural workers on the lands leased (The Sunday Independent. 16 August 2009: 3). It is believed that China has since 2007 signed 20 agricultural co-operation deals covering over 2 million hectares (The Economist, 23 May 2009: 62)

- India has provided money to some of its companies to buy 350.000 hectares in Africa (The Sunday Independent. 16 August 2009: 3). The government of India has also acquired 2.5 million acres of land in Ethiopia purchased for US \$ 4 billion (Mail and Guardian. 11 March 2010: 4).
- Egypt has begun negotiating with Uganda about leasing a million hectares of land for the production of maize and wheat. At this stage the talks have been suspended due to negative local public pressure on this anticipated agreement. In Sudan, Egypt has acquired vast tracts of land which is expected to produce two million tons of wheat for Egypt a year (The Economist, 23 May 2009: 60).
- Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar). Even the smaller states in the gulf are keen to obtain farmland in Africa. Qatar, which has only 1% of the land in the Arab Emirates, began negotiating with the Kenyan government to obtain 40.000 hectares to grow food in exchange for building a US\$ 2.5 billion deep-water port at Lamu in Kenya. Talks were suspended when the Kenyan government announced a state of emergency due to the civil unrest in the country (The Sunday Independent. 16 August 2009: 3). The Qatar government is negotiating with the Sudanese government to start an “*agriculture venture*”. Kuwait has signed a “*giant*” strategic partnership with the Khartoum government. Abu Dhabi has implemented a project to develop 28.000 hectares in north Sudan (Financial Times. 10 – 11 January 2009).
- The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has secured a deal with Sudan for 400.000 hectares in that country.
- South Africa has become involved in land purchases in the Democratic Republic of Congo where the president of the country offered 10 million hectares to South African farmers “*free of charge*”. The fact that South African farmers have practical experience regarding operation in Africa makes their popularity that much greater (Bloomberg News. 20 October 2009: 6).

4.8 SECONDARY COUNTRIES AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN AFRICA

There are numerous marginal “*players*” and countries operating in Africa and the vast majority are eager to obtain maximum benefit for their presence on the continent. From a bilateral level the EU remains Africa’s most important partner. The EU as a block is the continent’s largest trade partner with a total of US\$ 296 billion in 2006. Furthermore, the block is Africa’s largest aid provider with 35 billion euro given in 2006 (Melander, I. 20 November 2007: 1).

The EU and Africa have a joint strategy which was adopted at the second EU-Africa summit in Lisbon in December 2007. The two block’s policy priorities centre on; Peace and Security, Governance and Human Rights, Trade and Regional Integration and Key Development issue which will focus on the achievement of the U.N. Millennium Development Goals (www.chinaview.cn. 10 December 2007). The summit was the first between the EU and Africa since 2000 and was regarded by many as an attempt by Europe to revitalise a “new strategic partnership” and to try to “*showcase*” a new understanding to counter China’s growing influence in Europe’s “*backyard*” (Financial Times, 10 December 2007: 6). The fact remains that China’s actions in Africa worries the European Union and the organisation is concerned that it could in the future become marginalised. Despite these concerns the EU continues to stress the need that Africa “commit itself to ensuring a vibrant economic partnership with the EU, based on good governance and devoid of corruption, a proviso China does not demand, preferring a policy of non-interference.” (Business Day, 28 June 2007: 9).

As mentioned in the Financial Times, the EU must concentrate its efforts if it wants to succeed in Africa as President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal stated, “*Europe has nearly lost the battle of competition in Africa. With the price of one European car you can buy two Chinese cars*”. Regarding trade and aid, Mr Wade stated that the dominance of western donors was under threat... “*If I want to do five kilometres of road with the World Bank, or one of the international financial institutions, it takes at least five years. One year of discussions, one year of back and forth, one year of I don’t know what. With the Chinese it is a few days and I say yes or no. They sent a team and we sign.*” (Financial Times. 10 December 2007: 6).

A fundamental change has taken place in Europe's attitude as the EU have "*re-discovered the geostrategic significance of Africa in the globalization process as their dependence on energy imports deepens.*" As the then EU Commissioner for relations with Africa, Caribbean and the Pacific states, Lois Michel noted "*Africa has a pivotal role in the new geopolitics of energy, driven by high demand of oil and gas*" as it has 10% of the world's oil reserves and had taken on strategic importance in the race for oil fields and in the diversification of the sources of supply. Michel notes that the world powers such as the United States, India and Brazil "*have now made Africa the scene of a new 'Great game' as they were jockeying for positions*". Michel believes that "*Europe occupies a unique position vis-à-vis Africa by virtue of its geography and by virtue of history which has left us a common multifaceted legacy but the EU and its member states do not appear to be taking advantage of their unique position.*" Michel saw attitudes of the EU member states such as Afro-pessimism in Europe and the attitude of the African side towards the Europeans as the reasons. Afro-pessimism continues to prevail in Europe "not just in the circles of power, but in public opinion, too." Michel noted that Africa continues to be regarded as a "*problem*" by the Europeans. (Xinhua. 7 December 2007: 5).

Japan continues to cooperate with Africa and the most advantageous vehicle it uses is the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD). The 4th TICAD was held in Yokohama, Japan, In May 2008. Japan opened embassies in Botswana, Mali and Malawi and the country has doubled its annual aid budget to Africa to US\$ 1.8 billion. Japan believes it offers a middle-course in Africa. It contributes to emergency relief efforts and traditional efforts to eradicate infectious disease and involves itself in agricultural projects. At the same time the country is eager to secure access to platinum, nickel and cobalt from Africa without these "rare metals" Japan could not make the precision motors, mobile phones and other high-end electronics at which its manufactures excels. It is also believed that Japan wants to encourage African leaders to give their vote thus allowing the country "to realise its long-held ambition of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Financial Times, 27 May 2008: 4).

Canada's involvement in Africa centres on mining investments and was estimated to be valued in 2009 at US\$ 8 billion and expected to possibly double by the end of 2010. The country is the second largest mining investor on the continent after South Africa. From the aid side, Canada has between 2008 and 2009 given US\$ 2.1 billion in bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa. (African Decisions. 2009: 48–52). The country is eager to secure minerals from Africa

and does involve itself in assisting the continent with aid but the country remains a minor political role player on the continent.

Brazil has also concentrated its efforts to develop its relations with Africa as reflected by the President of Brazil, Mr Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva having visited 19 African countries during eight visits since coming to power in 2003. Cultural and linguistic connections have assisted Brazil's development model with countries such as Mozambique and Angola. Trade in raw materials, mainly oil, has developed rapidly with imports from Africa reaching US\$ 18.5 billion in 2008 while exports to the continent came to US\$ 8 billion (Financial Times. 9 February 2010: 7).

Turkey has also begun to involve itself in Africa. It was reported that Abdullah Gul became the first Turkish President to visit Congo and Cameroon early in 2010. The country has opened 12 new embassies in Africa and in 2005 the country declared that year as "*The year of Africa*" probably linked to the country's hope to secure a seat on the UN Security Council. It should be noted that the country has historical links to some African country due to the fact that Libya, Egypt, Algeria and Sudan were all once part of the Ottoman Empire. The fact that Turkey's exports to Africa grew to US\$ 10 billion in 2009 indicates positive developments. (The Economist, 17 March 2010: 29).

Even a "*pariah state*" like Iran has become more actively involved in Africa. In 2009 Iran conducted twenty ministerial visits to the continent. Although Iran has little direct influence in Africa it is possible that the country is seeking diplomatic support for its nuclear programme which can be translated into support in International bodies such as the United Nations. Israel is also continuing to heighten its profile in Africa and many states seek Israeli expertise in irrigation projects and also military and intelligence technology. Ethiopia which is confronting Islamic militias in Somalia purchases Israeli defence equipment and possibility exchanges intelligence (The Economist. 6 February 2010: 40–41).

It is apt that this section concludes with Russia's present geopolitical interest in Africa so as to provide a concluding perspective as to how Russia has progressed as opposed to the Soviet Union's actions throughout Africa during the Cold War as articulated in the previous section.

The collapse of the Soviet Union saw a "*massive disengagement*" from Africa by Russian foreign policy. It was not long before Russian politicians from President Boris Yeltsin to the

ultranationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky blamed Russia's dire economic situation due to the cost of aid the Soviet Union had provided to Africa and other developing regions. A reflection of Russia new attitude was the fact that during President Yeltsin's entire first term as president the only African head of state to visit the Kremlin was the South African President F. W. de Klerk in mid-1992. It was only during his second term that he invited a second African President, President Hosni Mubarak. It was also during this period that more than a dozen Russian embassies, diplomatic and commercial stations as well as consulates in Africa closed (Pham, J.P. 21 August 2008: 2).

Relations between Russia and Africa underwent a gradual renewal under President Vladimir Putin and in 2006 President Putin paid an official visit to Morocco and South Africa. This was followed by a visit in 2007 by the then Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov. This slow improvement in relations saw Russia write off US\$ 20 billion of African debt. Trade had also increased and by 2007 trade between Russian and Africa stood at US\$ 6 billion (Marks, S. 19 June 2008: 1). President Putin was accompanied by more than 100 business leaders. Various South African companies such as South African Breweries (SAB), the chemical company Sasol and DeBeers were encouraged to invest in Russia. At the same time the Russian oligarch Viktor Vekselbery purchased a 49% share in the United Manganese of Kalahari, which also provided prospecting rights in South Africa's North Cape, where approximately 80% of the world know commercially exploitable reserves of manganese are. Two years earlier the Russian company Norilsk Nickel made one of the largest Russian foreign direct investments when it acquired a 20% stake in the South African mining corporation, Gold Fields for US\$ 1.16 billion. Morocco is Russia's largest trade partner in Africa with bilateral trade at more than US\$ 1.5 billion annually, the majority of Morocco's exports to Russia includes raw phosphates and fertilizer. In Botswana, Norilsk Nickel commissioned a new plant with the capacity to process 12 million tons of ore per annum so as to process Nickel. The Russian petroleum producer Lukoil acquired a 63% interest in a 2,600 square kilometre deepwater block 100 kilometres offshore from Côte d'Ivoire in the Gulf of Guinea. The Russian company Sinterneftgaz has acquired oil exploration rights off Namibia while the company Oleg Deripaska's United Company RUSAL Aluminium firm acquired a majority holding in a Nigeria Smelter Company for US\$ 250 million. Russian companies have also established themselves in Guinea while Siverstal, the Russian steelmaker has spent US\$ 40 million to obtain control of Iron ore deposits in Liberia while a Russian consortium is

reportedly negotiating to acquire US \$ 2 billion worth of mining assets in Zambia (Pham, J.P. 21 August 2008: 2–3).

Russia also continues to promote arms sales to Africa. Between 2000 and 2007 African states purchased US\$ 1.1 billion worth of Russian weapons. Russia has developed alternative and flexible methods of payment for military equipment (Klomegah, K. 29 January 2009: 1). Russian companies and the government encourage the establishment of joint ventures in the mining and fishing industries. Furthermore, involvement in the oil industry, exploration of natural resources and the delivery of goods such as coffee, cotton and even diamonds in exchange for weapons is seen as acceptable. As mentioned earlier in this section, Russia has “*written off*” dept from various African countries in what can be regarded as an extreme pragmatic approach. It is realised that in the vast majority of cases, the money owed by various African countries can’t and never will be repaid. Instead the Russian government has begun to utilise a different approach to securing business and relations with various African countries. An example is Russia’s relations with Libya. During President Putin’s visit to Tripoli in April 2008 it was agreed that Moscow would forgive Libya’s US\$ 4.5 billion dept. In return Libya agreed to purchase Russian weapons at a sum that was at least equal to the dept value. Further to this, ten agreements were signed including a contract for Russian Railways to develop a 516-kilometre rail service in Libya, valued at US\$ 2 billion. Furthermore the Russian national gas company Gazprom and Libya’s National Oil Corporation established a joint oil and gas venture (RIA Novosti, 17 April 2008).

The scheme to promote Russian arms in markets previously held by the Soviet Union based on existing dept proves to be an effective *modus operandi* and has worked in other countries where Russia is owed capital, for example in Algeria where in 2006 Moscow agreed to forgive a US\$ 4.7 billion “*Cold War era dept in exchange for a deal to sell Algeria combat jets, submarines, warships and missiles valued at US\$ 7.5 billion*” (International Herald Tribune, 4 September 2008: 12).

Russia has moved further towards reasserting its geopolitical objectives to the extent that the Russian military has announced that it is planning to establish a naval base in Libya (Port of Benghazi) which, will compliment the countries long-term objective to build another naval base in Syria (Port of Tartus) and Yemen (Reuters. 16 January 2009: 7).

Russia has specific geopolitical goals that it is pursuing pertaining to its relations with Africa. The country's objectives were placed into perspective during President Medvedev's visit to the African countries of Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola during June 2009. Marks notes that the "Russian state seems far more 'upfront' about pursuing its grand geopolitical projects than the more cautious and patient Chinese". To this end, Russia's central goal is energy both obtaining it in the form of natural gas and supplying it in the form of nuclear power.

During President Medvedev's visit to Africa he was accompanied by the Russian Minister for Energy and the head of Rosatom. Presently, Rosatom emphasizes that it should be the company of choice to secure a US\$ 1.8 billion tender to build Egypt's first nuclear power plant. Furthermore, the company is expected to sign an agreement to search for uranium deposits in Egypt. During his visit to Nigeria, President Medvedev had discussion with his Nigerian counterpart pertaining to a nuclear co-operation agreement and in Namibia he promoted the fact that various Russian companies were eager to take part in joint ventures to exploit Namibia's uranium reserves. Furthermore, Russia also offered to sell (what is regarded as a controversial) technology for the building of floating ship-based nuclear reactors to assist Namibia to address its chronic electricity shortages (The Australian, 24 June 2009: 2).

It is in natural gas sector that Russia has concentrated its efforts within Africa and the Russian state owned corporation Gazprom has been the vehicle that the country is utilising to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As a net exporter of energy (the largest in the world) the Russian state has in the past used its energy strategy as a geopolitical tool. To harness further energy sources, specifically regarding natural gas in Africa, will undoubtedly secure the country's position regarding becoming the largest supplier of power to numerous countries including those within the European Union. By extension, the dependence by the EU for gas will be used as a means by Russia for political leverage.

Gazprom has entered into an agreement with the Algerian State gas company, Sonatrach to cooperate in the exploration, extraction and production of liquefied natural gas. Presently Algeria provides 13% of Europe's gas (Ten Hoedt, R. March/April 2008: 46). Should a Russian-Algerian strategic partnership mature successfully the two countries could jointly control up to 40% of gas supplies to the European Union (Marks, S. 19 June 2008: 3).

An interesting difference between Russia and China regarding Africa is that, China's main motivation is to secure raw material to feed its rising output while Russia is a significant raw

material exporter and the raw materials it exports to China provides Russia with the capital resources it requires to purchase global and African assets.

During President Putin's visit to Libya in 2008 Gazprom signed an agreement to establish a joint venture with the National Oil Corporation of Libya to produce, explore, transport and sell oil and gas (Financial Times, 18 April 2008: 3).

When President Medvedev visited Nigeria in 2009, Gazprom signed an agreement with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Nigeria's gas reserves are the seventh-largest in the world and the US\$ 2.5 billion gas deal will help Nigeria to develop its domestic gas infrastructure and at the same time allow Russia to gain control of a lucrative gas supplier (Financial Times, 26 June 2009: 6).

What will give the Russian state immense geopolitical power would be the construction of a grand US\$ 13 billion trans-Saharan gas pipeline 4,000 km across the Sahara, linking the Niger Delta to an export terminal in Algeria and then on to Europe. Gazprom representatives are investigating various scenarios to make this a reality (Marks, S. 19 June 2008: 4). Many European academics see Gazprom's actions in Africa from a geopolitical perspective. Professor Williem Buiter at the London School of Economics sees Russia's actions "*as part of a secret agenda to tighten the screws on Western Europe*". The Director of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) is more stringent in his stance and has stated that, "*a deal between Gazprom and Nigeria will increase European dependence on Russian gas. Russia has a deliberate policy aimed at controlling the whole gas market that is meant for Europe*" (Ten Hoedt, R. March / April 2008: 46).

Russia has started to utilise a certain degree of Soft power in its approach to Africa. Under President Putin, Russia once again began to grant scholarships to African students to study in Russian universities and other institutions. There are presently hundreds of African students studying at the People's Friendship University of Russia (formerly Patrice Lumumba University). It should be stressed that it would take a number of years to meet the amount of African students who used to study in the Soviet Union (a total of 50,000 finished their studies in that country during the Cold War). Pham writes that the old Soviet Association of Friendship with African Peoples, founded in 1959 with the mission of "*arranging meetings, social events, talks and exhibitions devoted to the national holidays of the African peoples, to anniversaries of people outstanding in the cultural field in Africa, and to other important*

events in the life of African nations,” has been reactivated by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is now entitled the Russian Centre for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation (*Roszarubeszhtsentr*). The *Roszarubeszhtsentr* is currently operating branches in Congo (Brazzaville), Egypt (Cairo and Alexandria), Ethiopia (Addis Ababa), Madagascar (Antananarivo), Morocco (Rabat), Namibia (Windhoek), Nigeria (Lagos), Tanzania (Dar es Salaam), Tunisia (Tunis) and Uganda (Kampala). Furthermore, the Institute for African Studies within the Russian Academy of Sciences also founded in 1959) was restructured in 2007 and presently has thirteen research units and employs one hundred academic staff members (Pham, P.J. 21 August 2008: 1–5).

Conclusion

This dissertation has reviewed the Scramble for Africa within three specific components, namely the period leading up to the “First Scramble for Africa”, which took place prior and following the Berlin conference of 1884/1885 as well as following the Treaty of the Versailles after the First World War. Furthermore developments following the Great War and leading up to the Second World War within the African context was analyzed. The Second Chapter looks at the so-called “Second Scramble for Africa” which began soon after the end of the Second World War and for the purposes of the study ceased with the end of the Cold War. The Third and Final Scramble analyzed developments from 1989 until the present day.

A great deal of emotive rhetoric and political demands are made regarding the consequences following the various “Scrambles for Africa”. Expectations are manifested and a stance centralizing on entitlement pertaining to what has been done (both real and perceived) against Africa and its population had developed. Imperialism, and Colonialism as well as the process of Neo-Colonialism have been blamed for the lack of progress and development by the vast majority of African leaders. This argument has in many ways served as a convenient mantra by many elites as to why the continent has not achieved success beyond its capabilities. The majority of African academic’s point of departure centralized on the fact that, had there not been the slave trade which had commenced as early as the 1440’s, Africa today would have been in a very different position not least economically and politically. Statistics vacillate between 12 and 28 million as to how many Africans were enslaved and forcibly removed from the continent. There is no doubt that slavery and at the later stage the developed Trans-Atlantic slave trade allowed for untold cruelty and disposition of rights and general liberties of the slaves predominantly from Europe to manifest itself.

Present demands by some African leaders for repatriation and compensation from the countries that controlled and profited from the slave trade is now being questioned. Recent research has shown that all parties including African elites of the time-participated and benefited in the commerce of slavery. As mentioned earlier in this document, when the slave trade began European powers only maintained costal forts on the fringes of the continent and did not venture into the interior. The fundamental question asked by a leading academic studying Africans’ role in the selling of human beings, Prof. Henry Louis Gates jr. from

Harvard University, is how did the slaves arrive at these coastal forts where an estimated 90% were shipped to the New World? According to Professor Gates and American historians John Thornton and Linda Heywood of Boston University the slave trade would have been impossible without direct involvement of African elites. It should be noted that the slave trade was a highly organized and lucrative business for the African sellers as well as for the European buyers. The scope of African involvement in this trade was immense. As Gates notes, the conquest and capture of Africans and their sale to Europeans was a major source of foreign exchange for various African kingdoms for an extended period of time. The 17th century African monarch, queen Njinga of the Mbundu fought wars of resistance against the Portuguese and at the same time conducted various wars against other African tribes, which extended about 800 km into the African interior during this period she also sold captives to the Portuguese. When she converted to Christianity she also sold African religious leaders into slavery, on the grounds that they violated her Christian principles. The Kingdom of Congo as well as the Ashanti Empire in Ghana exported slaves and from their proceedings imported gold. African monarchs at the time knew about the process of slavery and its implications as they also sent their children along with the same slave routes to Europe for education (International Herald Tribune, 24-25 April 2010: 6). The very fact that Africa's elites participated and benefited directly from slavery makes any modern day claim for repatriations null and void. Furthermore, the argument that so many millions of young Africans were forcefully exported from the African continent although factual, allows for the responsibility to be laid firmly at the doors of both the African and European slavers.

It is only fitting that attention to the evil practise of slavery was brought to the awareness of Europe and America by the actions of David Livingston and other European missionaries and explorers who exposed the horrors of the slave trade. The unfortunate side effect to this was the so called "Three Cs" which pushed the process of Commerce, Christianity and Civilization into Africa which was then shortly followed by the C of Conquest. Bishop Desmond Tutu positioned the African view-point in stark relief when he stated that ... "when the missionaries came to Africa they had the bible and we had the land. They said 'let us pray.' We closed our eyes. When we opened them we had the bible and they had the land." There is no doubt that the church acted as an ideological apparatus (as articulated by the French philosopher, Louis Althusser) to stress the need for the subservience of African people

and their rulers to the colonising powers moral, cultural, religious and by extension political authority.

The majority of African writers within the field of international relations and history argue that Africa's underdeveloped colonies needed to act as markets for goods and investments from the "modern capitalist" nations during the late 19th and early 20th century. It is stressed that without these markets capitalism would have collapsed. It is though this prism originally created by thinkers such as Hobson and Lenin that allowed for various mutated forms theories pertaining to neo-colonialism and dependency theories to be established. The unfortunate fact was that throughout the 19th and 20th centuries African colonies were of little to no relevance to the economic development of the European colonial powers, despite what was originally anticipated. The primary market for European powers was internal and centred on meeting the rapidly growing demand created by capitalism, which simultaneously allowed for ever increasing incomes. Foreign markets were centralized in Europe itself and remained the mainstay for European countries. An example of this is how Germany remained Britain's largest export market throughout this period. Any significant investment made was focused in advanced nations and secondary investments that were conducted in colonial countries tended to concentrate on countries such as New Zealand, Canada, United States, Australia and South Africa.

It was very much due to John Hobson's experience during the Second Boer War in South Africa, as a correspondent for the Manchester Guardian that more clarity can be gained as to the actual intent of colonial powers toward future colonies can be placed in better perspective. It is through his works such as *War in South Africa* (1900) and specifically in *Imperialism* (1902) that one can better understand the approach of that time which, according to Hobson centred on the fact that imperial expansion is resolute on the search for new markets and potential investment opportunities overseas and that imperialism itself is the direct result of the expanding forces of modern capitalism (Hobson, J. 2009: 109).

It can thus be argued that the initial motivation for imperialism was fundamentally economic so as to allow private entrepreneurs to obtain commercial opportunities although it should be noted that during the Scramble for Africa, as formalized at the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885, European powers sought primarily land in Africa so as to extend their authority and political power as well as grandeur of state. This objective extended far beyond their borders

and as discussed earlier in this dissertation, their capacities. There are numerous motivations for imperialism which include strategic, economic, cultural settlement of surplus population and reasons of prestige. Initially it was undoubtedly the economic motivation that provided the emphatics for western colonization of Africa. Lenin saw the imperialist Scramble for Africa as an outcome of economic forces operating in Europe to which surplus capital could be invested. Fieldhouse criticizes Lenin's capital thesis due to the fact that imperialist investment in Africa was negligible. Despite this opposing position the fact remains that initially it was economic motives followed by the motives, of prestige that provided the impetus. Tetteh Osabu-Kli places this development in greater prospective when he stated that the prestige motive provided the "spark" while economic conditions in Europe provided the "fuel". It is argued that industrial capitalism, which had begun in England spread throughout the European continent and necessitated the creation of markets outside the continent, which specific European countries could monopolize, drove the process of colonisation. The requirement of raw materials to supply industries meant that areas where these materials could be obtained cheaply had to be obtained. From a prestige motive prospective, the "spark" was initially provided by France. In 1871 the country had been humiliated when it had been defeated by Germany and had already lost most of its colonial possessions in the Americas. To demonstrate its position as a great power and to boost its nationalist spirit, the country began to acquire colonies in Africa. The country was soon followed by Belgium, Portugal, Britain and Germany. The concept of national pride allowed for the belief to manifest itself that the more colonies European countries possessed; the greater chances for political power and economic benefit would develop. Despite what the initial credence was pertaining to the need for capital and markets for Europe, the reality was very different.

The relationship surrounding Africa's association with the advanced industrialised countries has by many academics been viewed through the various prisms of Dependency Theory as initially developed in the late 1950s by the then Director of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, Raúl Prebisch. Much has been already written about Wallerstein's World System Theory in my thesis but I believe it apt to mention the studies undertaken by Prebisch as he was the first to highlight the fact that economic growth in developed industrialised countries did not necessarily led to growth in the poorer ones. In fact, his research indicated that economic progress in the richer countries led to severe problems in the poorer ones. Prebisch's solution at the time was that poor countries should begin

programmes of import substitution so that they would not have to buy manufactured goods (that had originally left their countries as primary commodities) from developed countries. Poor countries should still be able to sell their primary products on the global markets, but their foreign exchange reserves would not be utilised to purchase their manufactures from overseas (Pollock, D.H. 2006: 61-64). Prebisch's liberal reformist ideas contrasted starkly with writers such as Walter Rodney who, in his book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* argues that Africa was intentionally exploited and remained underdeveloped due to European colonial regimes. Rodney believed that power is the absolute determination in human society and when one society is forced to give that power up (as Africa did during the period of colonialism) to another society, it is a form of underdevelopment (Rodney, W. 1981). Rodney's book tends to oversimplify the numerous historical influences during the colonial period and advocates a strong Marxist political ideology pertaining to power politics and the economic exploitation Africa experienced. Eric Wolf, an anthropologist and also a strong Marxist, like Rodney focused on issues of power politics, colonialism and politics but went further to stress that non-Europeans were involved in global processes (such as the slave and fur trades). Therefore, they were deeply occupied in global history and were not "isolated" or "frozen in time" (Wolf, E.R. 1982: 15-18).

In general terms the colonies cost the European powers more to maintain and in commercial terms little was actually gained. For example Germany derived little benefit in economic terms and actually its naval build-up, to secure its Imperial Empire and project itself came at great expense. Britain in the eyes of its Prime Minister Disraeli regarded the majority of its colonies as "wretched little millstones," with little importance apart for India. In general the British Empire followed a policy of *laissez-faire* thus allowing traditional leaders to maintain the peace and minimize coercion. It can be argued that the benefit European powers did derive from securing colonies in Africa was status and prestige thus allowed them to be able to project a degree of power, due to geographic space far beyond economic capacity and competence or actual military ability.

At the time when decolonization began, it was believed that the majority of European powers gave up their colonies reluctantly as it was supposed that European expansion into Africa would further provide for the provision of important markets and outlets for exports. Contemporary academics argue that many colonial powers due to both financial deficiencies and political apathy - following the end of Second World War - recognized that political

change was necessary and begun the move towards independence. The *modus operandi* differed whereas a country like France sought a unified and integrated colonial community, the British sought autonomy and self-governance for its respective colonies. The juxtaposition that many newly independent African countries found was that although they had obtained freedom it came with empty promise. In the words of Kwame Nkrumah, “*seek ye first the political kingdom and everything shall be added to it*” was the mantra of the day. It was within this vacuum that the majority of African states fell into a neo-colonial relationship whereby a more subtle interaction took place between the people of African countries, and the resources of their country. From an outward appearance the independent country seemed just that. However due to the fact that the respective countries had little capacity to draw upon they were weak and were subjected indirectly and informally to the hegemony, authority and control of the powerful states of the world. Theories within the theoretical discipline of neo-colonialism see the difference between being a colonized country and one falling under neo-colonialism as being that, for a colonized country there is but one “master” and its resources serve the interests of imperialism as a whole, while the neo-colonized country, due to its weak position recognizes several “masters” and its resources are exploited to serve the interests of the entire imperialist “camp”. France’s relationship with its former colonies in Africa as discussed in this paper best reflects how a former colonial power conducted a neo-colonialist relationship with its former (*francophone*) colonies.

The Cold War saw involvement by both east and western blocks in various African regions. Both entities vied for influence, strategic location and client states who served as proxies. Both the west and east blocks attempted to expand their influence though the vehicle of imperialism. The West did not have a monopoly when it came to imperialist ambitions, the Soviet Union was also imperialistic, which was initially recognized during the Second World War when under the guise of liberating Europe from German imperialism, the USSR established its own brand of imperialism. Further to this the USSR also establish a neo-colonialist relationship with its satellites that signed the Warsaw Pact. It is within the paradigm of exploitation which took place under the cloak of imperialism during the first Scramble for Africa that allowed for a neo-colonialist approach to develop during the second Scramble. Contemporary academics have raised fundamental questions pertaining to the benefits derived by colonialism, which have previously gone unrecognized. This new colonialist discourse is champion by the British historian and author of “*Colossus: The Rise*

and Fall of the American Empire” and “*Empire*”, which evaluates the colonial rule of some colonial powers. Ferguson, contrary to Wallerstein, (who uses dependency theory to attempt to understand and explain the “periphery” by researching core-periphery relations and it has progressed markedly in regions such as Africa) suggests that colonialism laid foundations by tutoring imperial subjects to the final points of statecraft and by building secure administrative apparatuses. Further to this he believed that Britain invented capitalism and with it valuable ideas and institutions of the modern world such as the English language, private property, the rule of law, individual freedom, parliamentary structures and Protestant Christianity. Ferguson goes on to note that in the majority of cases Africans were only too happy to meet their new authority. The somewhat neo-conservative approach compliments the writings of the Dutch author Wesseling who in “*Divide and Rule. The Partition of Africa, 1880 – 1914*” notes that there was not a significant African resistance to conquest. “*Local chiefs jostled with one another to sell their ‘sovereignty’, not for a mess of pottage but for more attractive things such as bottles of gin and uniforms.*” He goes on to note that for the most part Africans collaborated passively in their supposed oppression. “*Without their collaboration colonial rule would not have been possible... Even under colonialism Africans largely remain masters of their own faith.*” Ferguson places the issues of previous colonial rule and present corruption in Africa in prospective when he stated “*Nobody, least of all me, claims that British imperial rule was perfect. But most sub-Saharan governments since independence have managed to treat their populations significantly worse than the British did. For all its imperfections, the Colonial Civil Service was not corrupt. When money was sent to build railways or schools, British officials did not simply pocket it.*” Further to this he noted that money provided to developing countries since 1950s have simply leaked back out very often to bank accounts in Switzerland. “*One recent study of 30 sub-Saharan countries calculated that total capital export for 1970 – 1996 was some \$ 187 billion, which, when accrued interest is added, implies that Africa’s ruling elites had private overseas assets equivalent to 145 per cent of the public debts their countries owed. The authors of that study conclude that ‘roughly 80 cents on every dollar borrowed by African countries flowed back (to the West) as capital flight in the same year.* (Ferguson, N. 2004: 236-258).

Unfortunately many African leaders today harbour a deep-rooted anti-western attitude, capitalized on by “new partners” such as China. Repressive regimes continue to use pseudo-intellectual theories on “neo-colonialism” and see tensions with the West along a North-South

divide. Any deficiencies within their own countries are continuously blamed on discriminating policies developed by the North. Malinge speaks of “*blame cultures*” where all problems are seen as being apparently external and not of their own making. Malinge notes that aspects of a cultural–development nature also impede progress and he highlights the fact that these centre on:

- Work ethics, e.g. the inability to understand the correlation between “*status*” and “*achievement*”;
- The inability to accept responsibility for individual or collective failure; and
- Nepotism, i.e. the extended family or clan as the basic unit of social organisation.

The fact remains that in many African countries blame is sought for a lack of delivery. Many elites do not see why they should bear responsibility for their own actions and its consequences. Lack of delivery and ability is directed at other factors / reasons as to why success has not been achieved and blame is inevitably levelled at the “legacies at the past” and never at themselves or their inept ideologies or management / administrative skills.

The third segment of this study discusses what is presently seen as being a new Scramble for Africa’s resources and land by countries outside the continent. America, as the only superpower plays a significant role in this regard.

In recent years world leaders such as the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Great Britain and President Barrack Obama of the United States have all stressed the need for Africans to stop blaming colonialism as a reason for Africa’s underdevelopment. African elites have since independence conveniently used the excuse that colonialism is the central reason for their country’s underdevelopment. The unfortunate irony to this is that even the two countries in Africa which never were colonized, namely Ethiopia and Libya continue to be underdeveloped and impoverished, on the same scale as many of the other former colonized African countries. A strong argument exists pertaining to the fact that colonisation allowed many countries to obtain a legal system, a functional infrastructure, a unified language as well as a strong educational system at independence. Other countries outside Africa who were colonized such as South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and India do not dwell on the “debilitating” factors surrounding their colonial history but are amongst the present leaders of the new industrialized world. The fact that colonialism in Africa lasted less than 100 years

emphasises the point that all Africa's ills cannot be blamed on colonialism alone. The economist Paul Collier highlights the true causes of Africa's post colonial familiar in his publication "*The Bottom Billion*". When he noted that the vast majority of sub-Saharan countries have digressed since the 1950s, and have fallen into so-called "*traps*". Many were trapped by dependence on natural resources (such as oil and diamonds), some by recurrent civil wars, some by being land-locked and the forth trap was that of bad governance.

It must be stressed that colonialism had numerous deficiencies and in general should have brought more development to the continent and in the majority of quarters, is not seen as having been a positive process in Africa. However, its benefits (limited as they might be) have long been purposefully ignored and all significant failures within the continent have been acquitted to the legacy of colonialism or the West's influence.

The third segment of this study discusses what is presently seen as being a new Scramble for Africa's resources and land by countries outside the continent. America, as the only superpower places a significant role on its involvement in the continent. In this regard the most relevant actions by the country took place as from the Bush administration's relationship with Africa. Within this context the country has followed a Hard power and Soft power approach, which sees on the one hand assistance and development aid being provided to African countries to meet their deficiencies within the field of education, social upliftment and general infrastructural development while the country is ever increasing its military presence and influence on the continent. An area which continues to be concentrated on is of medical assistance whereby various debilitating diseases are fought in cooperation with American authorities. The fact that America utilises civil society institutions such as NGOs allows the country's Soft power approach to be strengthen. One of America's core strengths is its civil society and the country needs to concentrate on developing this dynamic sector even further.

However the country needs to do more to project its image and its Soft power approach on the continent. America has deficiencies and needs what the historian Arnold Toynbee called "*marchmen*" the so called foot-soldiers of empire so as to spread values and win loyalty. Khanna notes that presently the US military has more musicians in US marching bands than there are Foreign Service officers. Thus the country needs more diplomats as well as an expanded Peace Corps. Within the paradigms of Hard Power, the US needs to concentrate on

developing solid relationships with African elites. Presently a lack of trust prevails amongst the majority of Africa's leaders as to the true intentions of the US in Africa. Benefits must be articulated and seen to be achievable. In the vast majority of cases it is realised that the US is eager to secure oil resources on the continent as well as address threat of terrorism which will impact directly on the country. In this regard the US defence force needs to highlight the relevance for African countries to collaborate regarding meeting defence issues. Securing energy resources for the country is an obvious factor and few if any African leaders would want to restrict any country's access to resources as financial gratification remains the fundamental objective. It should be noted that America, within the paradigm of Soft Power needs to continue to sustain its "competitive edge" and must continue to develop its technological capacity and knowledge so as to continue to innovate. In essence the root to power is via markets not empire. There is still strong requirement for American power for both economic and geopolitical reasons but further to this as Zakaria notes there is an even stronger ideological demand for it. Very few people in Africa let alone Asia wish to live in a Chinese – dominated world and in reality there is no "*Chinese dream*" to which people aspire. Only America can define universal ideals and through these concepts other countries want to affirm their own ideas and values. In essence, the combination of America's Hard Power and Soft Power are intrinsically linked. However, it is the even balance and combination of the two that gives America its dominant and unique role in global affairs.

China's thrust into Africa should be seen as an opportunity and not a threat and if Africa had more adept elites, the advantages offered due to the developing relationship could be better managed. The rapidly developing relationship should be managed in a comprehensive manner that brings more benefits to the continent. Joseph Nye's Soft Power approach within the context of China's relationship with Africa has been reviewed in this dissertation. The fact that the country conducts a mercantilist approach towards Africa has thus far gone largely unnoticed. China has followed the path of least resistance surrounding its relationship with Africa and in the short term the country has derived immense benefits from its policy of non interference towards African countries. It is believed that although the country has conducted a great deal of research on how to develop and maintain its relationships with Africa, in the medium to long term the country will pay a price for its assertive foreign policy.

Soft Power plays an extremely important role within China's foreign policy with Africa and many observers believe that it will surpass the West's and America's actions and image on the

African continent. There is no possibility of this process occurring within the next century. The reality is China, within the Soft Power context, offers very little in real terms. No African gravitates towards China as a possible country to immigrate to, reads Chinese literature or watches films in Mandarin or Cantonese. Furthermore, although Chinese food might have its attractions, other cultural aspects such as music and education are very weak draw cards. Furthermore, there are no role-models that the youth in Africa are drawn to, or wish to emulate. The fact that Chinese goods are cheaper and more abundant allows for their popularity but the fact remains the average African would rather purchase a reliable western car or goods rather than a cheaper and some would state, less reliable product made in China. American culture and products are idealized; brand products such as Coca-Cola, Nike and McDonald's are well known and respected. American music, cinema, literature and other cultural attractions are well known and respected. In general, America and Western values are seen as being the apex with regard to aspirations. The fact that China has no NGOs operating on the continent and that its poor human rights and governance abilities are questionable, is apparent to the majority of African elites. China conducts a relationship based on a "one size fits all" approach which in the medium term will reflect the country's deficiencies. Although the country has a vast population, its engineers, doctors, technicians and development assistance workers still need a great deal of experience to meet the cross-cultural challenges of working within the African milieu. It is noted that while China specifically conducts its relationships within the paradigm of a government to government relationship, the US and by extension the EU maintains an approach whereby civil society institutions are utilized to conduct a "people-to-people" relationships. The fact remains that Western and notably American values is what the vast majority of Africans aspire to, including the elites whereas China, its values and products are seen in a very distant second place. Ultimately it is the elites of Africa that must harness their capacities in a collaborative stance which would allow them to benefit from the myriad of opportunities available through their relationship with China, the US, the EU and other potential partners.

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Figure 1.2: Africa's Partition by 1887

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Figure 1.10: Bilateral Trade – China and Africa: 1999-2009.www.tralac.org. Accessed
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Figure 1.11: African Oil: Production and Known Reserves. (McCullum, H. January to May 2006: 2).

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


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


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


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


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Figure 1.7: Dates of Independence for African Countries from their respective colonial powers.

Region	Country	Date of Independence	Colonial Power
North Africa	Egypt	1922	Britain
	Libya	1943, 1951	Italy, Allied administration
	Morocco	1956.03.02.	France
	Tunisia	1956.03.20.	France
	Algeria	1962.07.03.	France
	Western Sahara	Territory under Moroccan control	
East Africa	Eritrea	1941, 1952, 1993	Italy, Belgium, Ethiopia
	Sudan	1956.01.01.	Britain, Egypt
	Madagascar	1960.06.25.	France
	Somalia	1960.07.01.	Britain, Italy
	Uganda	1962.10.09.	Britain
	Kenya	1963.12.12.	Britain
	Comoros	1975.07.06.	France
	Seychelles	1976.06.29.	Britain
	Djibouti	1977.06.27.	France
	Ethiopia	No colonization - Italian occupation 1936 – 41	
West Africa	Ghana	1957.03.06.	Britain
	Guinea	1958.10.02.	France
	Togo	1960.04.27.	France
	Mali	1960.06.20.	France
	Senegal	1960.06.20.	France
	Niger	1960.08.03.	France
	Burkina Faso	1960.08.05.	France
	Ivory Coast	1960.08.07.	France
	Nigeria	1960.10.01.	Britain
	Mauritania	1960.11.28.	France
	Benin	1960.08.01.	France
	Sierra Leone	1961.04.27.	Britain
	Gambia	1965.02.18.	Britain
	Guinea - Bissau	1974.09.10.	Portugal
	Cape Verde	1975.07.05.	Portugal
Liberia	No colonization - Independent Rep of Lib. 1847		
Central Africa	Cameroon	1960.01.01.	Britain, France
	Central African Republic	1960.01.01.	Britain, France
	Democratic Republic of Congo	1960.06.30.	Belgium
	Chad	1960.08.11.	France
	Congo (Brazzaville)	1960.08.15.	France
	Gabon	1960.08.17.	France
	Burundi	1962.07.01.	Belgium
	Rwanda	1962.07.01.	Belgium
	Equatorial Guinea	1968.10.12.	Spain
	Sao Tome & Principe	1975.07.12.	Portugal
Southern Africa	Namibia	1920, 1990	Germany, South Africa
	South Africa	1961.05.31.	Britain
	Tanzania	1961.12.09. as Tanganyika	Britain, Germany
	Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania)	1963.12.10.	Britain, Germany
	Malawi	1964.07.06.	Britain
	Zambia	1964.10.24.	Britain
	Botswana	1966.09.30.	Britain
	Lesotho	1966.10.04.	Britain
	Mauritius	1968.03.12.	Britain
	Swaziland	1968.07.06.	Britain
	Mozambique	1975.06.26.	Portugal
	Angola	1975.11.11.	Portugal
	Zimbabwe	1980.04.18.	Britain

Figure 1.8: Major Types of Aid and Project by China in Africa (Van de Looy, J. 2006: 7).

Infrastructure projects	Railways, roads, telecommunication facilities
Buildings	Stadiums, government offices, palaces, schools
Factories	Cotton or textile, timber, oil, cigarettes
Agriculture	Farming, tobacco, tea, sugar, production

Figure 1.9: Chinese assistance by country in Africa.
 (<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ent/wjb/zzjg/fzs/default/htm> (20 March 2006)).

Angola	Debt relief, US\$ 2 billion loan
Benin	Stadium, government office building, conference centre, hospital
Burkina Faso**	-
Burundi	Textile mill, hydroelectric power station, highway
Cameroon	Conference building, hydroelectric power station, hospitals
Cape Verde	Government office building, conference hall
Chad**	-
Central African Republic	Agricultural technological station, radio station, training centre, clinics
Congo (Brazzaville)	Stadium, hydroelectric power station, broadcasting station, hospital, factory
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	Stadium, trade centre, people's palace, factories
Comoros	Stadium, government office building, water supply project, people's palace
Djibouti	Stadium, government office building, people's palace, housing project
Eritrea	Humanitarian assistance, hospital
Equatorial Guinea	Hydroelectric power station, radio station, highways
Ethiopia	Highway, veterinary centre, power station, water supply projects
Gabon	Healthcare centre, primary school, assembly building
Gambia**	Stadium, hostel, health centres
Ghana	National theatre, irrigation project, vocational training centre, hospital
Guinea	Peoples palace, hydroelectric power station, cinema, presidential palace
Guinea Bissau	Housing project, power-generating equipment, technical cooperation
Ivory Coast	Theatre, water conservation project
Lesotho	Vegetable planting, convention centre, industrial park
Liberia	Sugar mill, rice project, sports stadium, hospital renovation, office building
Malawi**	-
Mali	Stadium, conference building, textile mill, sugar refinery, leather – processing factory, pharmacy
Mauritius	Stadium, bridges, airport terminal building
Mozambique	Textile mill, passenger cargo vessel, water supply project, shoe factory,

	parliament building, housing project
Namibia	Water supply project, civil housing project
Niger	Stadium, water supply project, textile mills, housing project
Nigeria	Railway upgrade
Rwanda	Highway, cement factory, veterinary school
São Tomé & Príncipe**	-
Senegal	Stadium, water conservation project
Seychelles	Swimming pool, housing projects, schools
Sierra Leone	Road bridges, stadium, sugar complex, office building, hydroelectric power station, civil housing
Somalia	Medical teams, medicines, disaster-relief materials
South Africa*	-
Sudan*	-
Swaziland**	-
Tanzania	Tanzania-Zambia railway, textile mill, rice project, sugar factory, coal mine
Togo	Conference building, sugar refinery, stadium, hospital, irrigation project
Uganda	Stadium, rice projects, factories
Zambia	Tanzania – Zambia railway, roads, factories, textile mill, water supply project
Zimbabwe	Stadium, hospitals, dams, factories

* The Amount of total aid is unknown

** These countries have diplomatic ties with Taiwan

Figure 1.10: Bilateral Trade – China and Africa: 1999-2009. (www.tralac.org).




Figure 1.11: African Oil: Production and Known Reserves. (McCullum, H. January to May 2006: 2).

COUNTRY	PRODUCTION (bpd)	EST. RESERVES (barrels)
Algeria	1.500.000	12.000.000.000
Angola	1.070.000	9.000.000.000
Cameroon	70.000	400.000.000
Chad	200.000	1.000.000.000
Congo Brazzaville	245.000	1.500.000.000
Equatorial Guinea	440.000	1.200.000.000
Gabon	250.000	2.020.000.000
Libya		12.000.000.000
Nigeria	2.700.000	40.000.000.000
São Tomé & Príncipe	n/a	4.000.000.000
Sudan	345.000	1.600.000.000