

**Title:** *Using Carrots to Bring Peace? Negotiation and Third Party Involvement*

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How to make peace? This dissertation answers what impact third party incentives have on peace negotiation, more specifically on negotiation strategies in internal armed conflicts based on self-determination grievances. This study further assesses when the ripest time for the employment of incentives is, and in what way external incentives have an impact on possible negotiation asymmetries. Incentives in the following negotiation processes were analyzed: GoSL-LTTE in Sri Lanka (Eelam, 2002–03; 2006), GoI-GAM in Indonesia (Aceh, 2000–03; 2005), and the GRP-MILF in the Philippines (Mindanao, 2001–08). The findings indicate that those third party incentives which are linked to the core conflict issues are most likely to have some impact on the negotiation, but that committed pro-process leadership by the conflicting parties is also a necessity. The research also indicated that third parties have only limited options in employing incentives that can have an impact on the core conflict issues; and that, in any case, they are rarely willing to pursue such options. Committed strong leadership, presence of ripeness (far more frequently stipulated by an MHS than MEO), and mitigation of issues enhancing negotiation asymmetry, are issues that motivate parties to adopt a problem-solving strategy. Furthermore, disincentives can contribute to process derailing and their opting for a contending strategy, especially if they further increase the power asymmetry. Moreover, the study discusses limitations third parties face in this context, indicating that peace conditionality employed in this particular context is not likely to have a strong impact, highlights the differences between the responsibilities of the mediator and facilitator, and introduces the concept of *process entrapment* which describes challenges third parties face in asymmetric peace negotiations. The study concludes that in the selected cases, the incentives on their own did not create the conditions for ripeness and shows that external parties are not keen on stipulating MEOs.

**Keywords:** Peace negotiation, third party involvement, incentives, leverage, ripeness, mutually enticing opportunity (MEO), peace processes in Sri Lanka (Eelam, 2002–08), Indonesia (Aceh, 2000–03; 2005), the Philippines (Mindanao, 2001–08)