Temporality and Madness in Hegel
Kristin Gissberg

The project considers Hegel’s conception of madness, which is the potential limit of the coherency and identity of subjectivity. Madness, we argue following clues from Hegel, is reason caught up in its own retrograde temporality – or to state otherwise, reason’s temporal regression. The thesis put pressure on Hegel’s claim that madness is one meaning of subjectivity – it is not just an instance of being outside of self, but is an immediate expression of the self, that everybody, in a way, experiences. To this end, alterity is inherent to subjectivity. In temporal terms, madness is an entrapment in the past—and an inability to project into the future. A way to transgress this blockage in solipsism, we argue, can be found in the therapy of work, trust, and humor.