

CHARLES UNIVERSITY PRAGUE

Faculty of Social Sciences

Institute of Economic Studies

International Master in Economy, State, and Society

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**A Holistic Analysis of Polish Return Migration
Programs**

M.A. Dissertation

Prague, 2011

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First marker: _____
Second marker: _____
Date of Defense: 20 June 2011
Assessment: _____

Bibliographical record

CHLEBEK, Claudia. *A Holistic Analysis of Polish Return Migration Programs*. Prague: Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Fakulta Socialnich Ved, Institute Ekonomickych Studii. London: University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, 2011. 129 s. Vedouci diplomove prace Jiri Vykoukal, Ph.D.

Abstract

Migration and return migration contain the potential to benefit all parties. However, it also inspires costs, sacrifices and dilemmas. Large outflows of emigrants may lead to a nation facing challenges such as brain drain, lack of innovation and slower economic development. Return migration programs are subsequently required to plant the seeds within migrant networks to entice migrants to return by appealing to their sense of belonging and more importantly, with more favourable opportunities. Like migration itself, return migration and the programs designed to influence it, face their own challenges. To be successful, several elements must be carefully considered including migrant readiness, resource mobilisation, and the social and economic circumstances in the home and host countries. Preparation and planning at all stages of the migration process, from pre-departure to return, can also be invaluable to a migrant; it will build human capital, establish migrant and business networks, whilst maintaining and fostering stronger bonds with the homeland, and promote the flow of remittances.

In this dissertation, the effectiveness of three Polish return migration programs will be analysed against a combination of return migration theories and economic channels. It will examine the motivations behind their conception, and the services, grants or initiatives implemented with the aim of addressing the needs of new and existing migrants, improving communication channels, and most importantly, developing the environment, means and incentives that will attract migrants to return to their homeland. Any failures to properly identify and address the needs, desires and aspirations of migrants with the structure of the return migration programs greatly delimit the success of the respective program through lesser participation and diminished societal impact.

Keywords

conceptual approach to return migrants, entrepreneurship, law of migration, migration theory, Poland, return migration

Statement:

1. This statement is to confirm that this paper is a product of my own work and also to confirm that I used the listed sources in producing it.
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Prague, 28 May 2011

Claudia Chlebek

Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Dr. Jiri Vykoukal for providing me insightful advice, which was of great value to my dissertation. His resources, guidance, and expertise were integral in my progress.

I am very grateful for the financial support provided by the Directorate-General for Education and Culture, of the European Commission, which I received in the form of the IMESS Erasmus Mundus Studentship.

I am indebted to Mrs. Holland, Debra, Kenny, Natalie and Sara for their support and insights into this topic. Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their support. The feedback, proofreading and encouragement all of these individuals were critical for the successful creation of this dissertation.

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List of Abbreviations

UK	United Kingdom
WRS	Worker Registration Scheme
PPS	Personal Public Service
BAEL	Badania Aktywnosci Ekonomicznej Ludnosci
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
HC OP	Human Capital Operational Program.
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
PR	Public Relations
NELM	New Economics of Labor Migration
EURES	The European Job Mobility Portal
WSM	Wskaznik Selektywnosci Migracji
WSMP	Wskaznik Selektywnosci Migracji Powrotnych
ESF	European Social Fund
ISP	Instytutu Spraw Publicznych
OBM	Osrodek Badan nad Migracjami

List of Polish Terminology

Badania Aktywnosci Ekonomicznej Ludnosci	Labor Force Survey
Baza Migrantow	Database of Migrants
Bazy Migrantow Powrotnych	Return Migrants Database
Centrum Rozwoju Zasobow Ludzkich	The Human Resource Development Centre
Formularz E 301	Form E301
Formularz E 303	Form E303
Instytutu Spraw Publicznych	Institute of Public Affairs
<i>Masz Plan na powrot?</i>	<i>Do you have a plan to return?</i>
Narodowego Spisu Powszechnego	National Census
Osrodek Badan nad Migracjami	Centre of Migration Research
Policealne	Post-secondary education
<i>Powroty</i>	<i>Homecoming</i>
Srednie zawodowe	Vocational Secondary Education
Srednie ogolne	General Secondary Education
Tabela Opłat Konsularnych	Consular Fee Table
Wojewodstws	Province
Wskaznik Selektywnosci Migracji	Migrant Selectivity Indicator
Wskaznik Selektywnosci Migracji Powrotnych	Return Migrant Selectivity Indicator
Wyzsze	Tertiary education
Zasadnicze zawodowe	Trade School
<i>Zostańcie z nami</i>	<i>Stay With Us</i>

1 Introduction

Migration and return migration has the potential to benefit all parties involved: the host country, the home country and the migrants themselves. For the host nation, migrants can stimulate the economy by satisfying labour demands, fill industrial and professional shortages, contribute local and specialised knowledge or skills, perpetuate economic growth and even catalyse or revitalise industries. In return, migrants may gain the opportunity to earn higher wages, allowing them to increase their consumption and savings as well as developing valuable experience, knowledge and skills. More importantly, conceivably, connections and networks are established in their chosen industry and amongst the migrant population.

With emigration, the home country can benefit from remittances, an extension of national and familial ties and socio-economic development. These migrant networks and their remittances contribute to the national economy. On the other hand, long term emigration may also yield unexpected costs including but not limited to: population decline, a decreased labour pool, a larger aging population and brain drain. In these cases, despite the benefits remittances and the resultant economic contributions may bring, perpetual brain drain and emigration will necessitate a shift in migration patterns. They require return migration and the rewards thereof.

Not only does return migration reunite family members, it reinforces national identity and increases the labour pool, diversifying the types of knowledge, labour and skill available. Return migration catalyses development in numerous sectors as returning migrants bring the local and specialised knowledge and skills developed abroad, together with the contacts and ties to other networks developed abroad in the former host country. Fortified by these business and trade networks and even the transfer of intellectual property, return migration programs cultivate entrepreneurship and help establish the need for further highly skilled labour and even more return migration.

In essence, return migration programs plant the seeds within the migrant networks, enticing prospective return migrants with more favourable opportunities and helping to reverse brain drain. Nonetheless, return migration like migration itself requires several elements to be considered - among them migrant readiness, resource mobilisation and the economic or social climate in the host and home countries (Cassarino, 2008, p. 102).

Return migration programs must primarily appeal to the migrants in the host countries, by communicating the favourable circumstances or opportunities available effectively, and providing adequate assistance for return. While one's homeland will always naturally appeals to migrants due to the values of familial ties, linguistic and cultural familiarity, return migrants will not only seek these qualities but also economic conditions that are more favourable and a promise of reintegration (Cassarino, 2008; Dustmann 2007; Kilic *et. al.*, 2007). Any program deficiency therein will inevitably induce lesser participation and subsequently, economic growth. Therefore any return migration programs or strategies must properly identify or entice prospective return migrants, by appealing to their desires and adequately meeting their needs and values.

Therefore, this dissertation will address the questions relative to return migration. The dissertation will identify who the migrants are, their desires and needs. Furthermore, the dissertation will assess the elements that co-author their return. Through the explorations of return migration programs, their strategies and the contrast and comparisons thereof, this paper will demonstrate how return migration programs can either motivate or deter return migration and yield economic benefit. Specifically, I will add an analysis of Polish labour migration since 2004 to determine the effectiveness of government assistance in helping migrants return home and resettle. I will also analyse the factors that induce return migration by evaluating three government programs. To evaluate these programs, a rubric will be

created that encapsulates the most important factors for return migration as identified through various theories.

In section 1, the topic of return migration is introduced. The limitations of the data and dissertation are presented in section 2. Section 3 provides descriptions of migration. In section 4, the different types of migrants are discussed. Migration strategies are presented in section 5. Return migration theory is discussed in the following section, 6 while the economic channel through migrants can influence the economy is analysed in section 7. Section 8 focuses on three return migration programs. The evaluation method is presented in section 9 while section 10 contains the evaluation. In section 11, the theoretical underlining of programs is discussed is analysed. Improvements to the programs are included in section 12. The dissertation concludes with section 13.

1.1 Polish Migration Background

While labour migration can provide a form of developmental support, especially through remittances, transfer of knowledge-based skills, methodology, and intellectual property and the creation of business and trade networks, it also can help mitigate other conditions. This includes the prospect of unemployment relief by absorbing any increases in the homeland labour force, and the strengthening of migrant networks abroad. The latter potentially increased the remittances and the opportunities for the Polish migrants in the host nations. Therefore, Poland and the Polish migrants benefitted from all of the previously mentioned exchanges and the elaborate yet close-knit migrant Polish migrant labour networks.

The divergence of Polish migrant patterns, the shift in demographics to the young age of migrants and the shift in host countries all warrant attention and investigation. Whereas Polish migrants traditionally worked in (Kahanec, 2010, p. 16) specific German sectors

where they could receive a (often seasonal) work permit, Poland's 2004 accession to the EU granted Polish migrants greater opportunities. As the United Kingdom (UK) and the Republic of Ireland opened their labour markets allowing the employment of Polish migrants, more attractive circumstances and environments arose, cultivating further Polish migration ("Britain's," 2011). Therefore, according to Kahanec and Zimmerman (2010), there was a natural selection for greater chances to fill various jobs in more sectors in Ireland and Britain instead of the more limited and often seasonal opportunities in Germany.

Appreciating the benefits and the potential rewards of migrant labour, the UK and Ireland developed and implemented their open labour policies, casting forth an image as an open economy and attracting a disproportionate share of young, highly skilled or university-educated migrants from Poland. While the Poles are hardly Britain's toughest integration challenge—their popular image is one of devoutly Christian, family-loving, football-mad beer-drinkers with a strong work ethic, the Poles also found integration easier with the UK's social and cultural landscape very much congruent with their own. Given these elements, it is not surprising that an estimated 1.5 million eastern migrants headed to the UK between 2004 and 2011¹.

Even though Germany is home to an estimated 40,000 Polish people, with the number of self-employed Polish migrants doubling since 2004, Germany remains a "closed country". Kahanec (2010) of the Institute for the Study of Labor, a think-tank in Bonn, reveals, "Even though Germany tried easing rules for graduates from the east, it did not counter its image as a 'closed country.' [It put] off younger, better-educated migrants." In contrast, Kahanec (2010) contends, "Britain became 'known for openness', attracting a much bigger share of young, skilled migrants and graduates than Germany did: a British win."

¹ Although approximately half of these migrants would later return home (Drinkwater, 2009).

In short, the UK employed the appropriate policies—backing free movement across a united Europe. This approach attracted the best-educated who wished to work legally, at the same time pushing lower-skilled migrants (large numbers of whom would have arrived regardless) into legal, taxable work. Based upon the previous discussion on the potentiality of labour migration, the flow of migrants, labour, skills, and knowledge, the UK and the Polish migrants capitalised upon an opportunity and by extension, so did Poland itself (Kahanec, 2010).

1.2 Return Migration Trends in Europe


Migration patterns in and across Europe changed again in the twenty-first century. As evidenced by the *EuroStats Report*, in 2008 and 2009, an overall downward trend in immigration numbers was noted (Oblak Flander, 2011, p. 1). An increase in return migration has been noted across Europe. This trend continued from 2006 when returning nationals accounted for 14 percent of all immigrants in the EU (Herm, 2008, p. 2), numbering close to a million people (Herm, 2008, p. 3). In 2008, 15 percent of the total migrants to EU member states were national, counting for more than a half of a million immigrants. Citizens from other EU member states accounted for 43 percent of the remaining immigrants (Oblak Flander, 2011, p. 3).

1.3 Polish Migrant Emergent Patterns Following EU Accession

Poland's accession to the EU in May 2004 provided the opportunity for many Poles to freely and legally move and work across much of Europe with members of the EU increasingly allowing Polish migrants full access to their labour market (Republic, 2007, p. 1).

From 1 May 2004 to the beginning of 2007, roughly one million people have emigrated from Poland (Republic, 2007, p 1). The most dynamic emigration has been to the UK and Ireland, witnessing the largest increase, see figure 1 below. Nonetheless, Germany still receives the largest amount of Polish immigrants (Republic, 2007, p 1).

Figure 1. Polish migrant numbers in the UK between 2004 to 2006



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009

While accession to the EU provided greater opportunities to Polish migrants, only three countries, namely Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, initially fully opened their labour markets to Poland and the other new member states. On 1 May, 2006, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy (1 July, 2006), Portugal, and Spain followed while the remaining member states are slowly opening up their labour markets (Republic, 2007, p 3; Igllick, 2010)

Due to the increasing migrant outflow, in 2007, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered a report to determine how many Poles had left. However a very specific definition and criteria was used in the 2007 report that thereby engendered various conflicting estimates of migrants. More importantly, this special criterion made it difficult to contrast, compare and

verify data to the special requirements. For example, one such report from Instytutu Spraw Publicznych (ISP) (Institute of Public Affairs) based on data from the European Citizen Action Service estimated that 1.12 million Poles migrated between 1 May 2004 to the end of 2006, with 534,990 Poles migrating to Germany, more than 264,000 to the UK, and more than 100,000 to the Republic of Ireland (Republic, 2007, p 3)².

Herm (2008) reveals there were 59,771 Poles in the UK and 152,733 Poles in Germany in 2006 (p.9-10). According to Vasileva (2009), there were 392,800 Poles in the UK, making up 9.9 percent of the total population, while in Germany, there were 413,000 Poles, making up 5.7 percent (5). This report also illuminated that 35 percent of migrant Poles were living in Germany and 33 percent in the UK, as of 2008 (Vasileva, 2009, p. 4).

When comparing and contrasting these various reports, each report produces inevitably different numbers. This demonstrates difficulties in recording and difficulties in gathering actual numbers. Therefore, all data obtained has limits. Nevertheless, the data provided from the following *EuroStats* reports reveal the emergent Polish migrant trends and patterns.

This outflow of Polish migrants induced several unexpected and unintended consequences for Poland, and introduced other circumstances and unexpected inflows for the host countries. For this reason, the prevalence of Polish migrants in EU migration was well-documented by *EuroStats* research. In fact, Poles, along with Romanians, accounted for half of all immigrants of EU-27 member states in 2006 (Herm, 2008, p. 1). In 2008, Polish migrants constituted the second largest group of immigrants to EU members (Oblak Flander, p. 4). Immigration to Ireland doubled between 2002 to 2006 (Herm, 2008, p. 2). As of January 2009, around 1.5 million Polish are residing in member states of the EU (Iglicka, 2010).

² Based upon comparison of statistics, these numbers seem incorrect. However, the specific criterion established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes it difficult to determine the validity of the numbers.

The flow of Polish migrants has not always been steady or followed the same patterns. Migration patterns have inevitably been cultivated or restrained by circumstances or events in Poland and by the degree to which Poles were welcomed into host countries and their labour markets. As evidenced by the following reports, Polish migration is not immune to the previously mentioned factors and forces. In fact, the number of Poles abroad in the EU decreased from 2006, when more than 290,000 Polish immigrants were estimated to be abroad (Herm, 2008, p. 3). According to Oblak Flander (2011), Poland along with Germany, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were the countries in the EU that experienced more emigration than immigration (Oblak Flander, 2011, p. 2). The main destination for Poles in 2006 was Germany, with more than half of immigrants settling there (Herm, 2008, p. 4). While Germany has historically been attractive to Polish migrants, the opportunities for these migrants within Germany are very restricted. In contrast, the increased number of Poles in the UK and Ireland suggest the open labour policies implemented were successful in avoiding in European trend. These policies helped the UK and Ireland meet their labour demands, their economic goals, and also promoted consumption, savings, and the transfer of knowledge and skill within their borders and beyond (“Britain’s,” 2011; Kahanec, 2011). Despite this, Poland still experienced negative population growth (-0.047 percent) and negative net migration rates (-0.47 percent) during this time, see Table 1 below.

Table 1. Polish Demographics

Polish Demographics	
Population	38,482,919 (July 2010 est.)
Population growth rate	-0.047% (2010 est.)
Net migration rate	-0.414 migrants / 1000 population (2010 est.)
<i>Source: Migration Information Source (2010)</i>	

Notably, too, the type of Polish migrants that entered the host countries differed from previous generations. Because they were younger, more educated and from urban areas both the host countries and the Polish migrants benefitted.

In order to promote increased transfers of knowledge and skill, cultivate entrepreneurship and self-employment and facilitate further socio-economic development, the Polish government needed to develop return migration programs like Greece, Spain, and Ireland had in the past. It needed to accurately assess the flow of post-2004 Polish migrants, and discover who they were, their strategies, and desires, and appeal to them through culturally moderated and acceptable means. Most importantly, based on this data, the Polish government's "return migration" programs had to entice return migrants and potential return migrants and reasonably ensure readiness to return and reintegration (Cassarino, 2008, p. 100).

1.4 Analysing and Assessing 2004 Post Accession Poland Migration Trends

In order to develop, implement and improve return migration programs and address its economic and industrial deficiencies, Poland needed to analyse and assess emergent migration trends and patterns, especially among post-2004 migrants as it differed significantly from previous generations. In fact, the recent, 2004 post-accession Polish migration is described in Grabowska-Lusińska (2010) as migration in the sense that it is unrestricted in both movement of people, as in "spatial mobility" (Salt 2008), and it is unrestricted in that migration not fully planned. In this sense, it is "intentionally unforeseeable" (Drinkwater, 2009).

Due to the development of fluid migration in Europe generally with the opening of borders, this circumstance has fostered the not fully planned spatial mobility (Grabowsk-


Lusinska, 2009). In turn, it cultivates fluid migration, which allows a person to continuously migrate for a better opportunity. Thus, it perpetuates a never-ending migration, with constant movements between home and new host countries. More importantly, today's migration encapsulates simultaneously being in both the host and home country, without fully implanting one's roots. Although such a migration process may result in a migrant maximising his or her skills and desires, there are negative consequences to this migration pattern and form as well, most of which are unexpected and unintended.

As evidenced by Table 2 and Figure 2 below, the Post-2004 accession flow of migration, perpetual migration can induce several problems. These problems include: a smaller labour pool, a disproportionate aging population and even brain drain, see table and figure below.

Table 2. Polish Demographics

Polish Demographics	
Population	38,482,919 (July 2010 est.)
Population growth rate	-0.047% (2010 est.)
Net migration rate	-0.414 migrants / 1000 population (2010 est.)
<i>Source: Migration Information Source (2010)</i>	

Figure 2. Annual Emigration and Immigration in Poland, 2004 to 2009 (in thousands)



Source: Based on data from Central Statistical Office (2010).

For these and other reasons, the migration that occurred after the 2004 accession has been contrasted with the past, the traditional migration type and flows (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009).

Due to the versatile nature of migration, most migration studies follow the flow to host countries and the prevalence of migrants within them. They focus their attention on the job sectors filled, the economic growth of the host country and/or remittances to the home country. Therefore, the concept of a return migrant has been diluted and difficult to capture in the majority of methodical studies.

Nevertheless, more recent return migration patterns in Europe previously discussed also apply to Polish migrants. In many ways, the return of Poles from their stay in the old EU member states is similar to the previous return of labour migrants from Greece, Spain and Ireland. However, these home countries, Greece, Spain and Ireland experienced the return of their migrants many years after joining the EU, which helped develop their economies and continued flow of remittances. These countries even developed active policies to stimulate the return of their labour migrants. Furthermore, they understood the value these return

migrants possessed, in particular the skills, knowledge and connections to networks in their former host countries along with the potential to contribute to the socio-economic development within their homelands.

Poland has traditionally been an emigrant nation. The cultivation of migration and return migration has always generated an amplified interest in return migration. The strong emotions evoked by this topic, has meant that Polish media and politicians have, and will continue to devote time and attention to it. Despite the fact that the majority of EU immigration is from non-EU states, Polish media still continues to devote cover return migration in great detail. Migration always has stakeholders; however, return migration intensifies the connection between the migrants and their homeland. It re-contextualises and revitalises the ideas of culture, ethnicity, shared history and national identity. In essence, return migration re-establishes social and economic cooperation and the return migrants' value to the home country.

2 Registration of Migrants

When researching return migration, the fundamental problem encountered is its measurement. Its measurement, like that of migration, suffers from various circumstances and conditions; incongruent policies between the host and home countries, dissimilar registration and reporting procedures and even the fluid movement co-authored by the Post-2004 migration trends engaging spatial mobility and more constant shifts between the home and host country. For these and other reasons, which will be discussed and addressed in the following passages, it is difficult to precisely know how many return migrants there are for various reasons. Notably, the reasons for this limitation extend from the problems of capturing migration.

While identifying, selecting and reporting the return migrants in Poland has proven problematic, other researchers studying migration and return migrations trends related to Poland have also experienced similar difficulties. In fact, Marek Kupiszewski of the Central European Forum for Migration Research in his “Migration in Poland in the Period of Transition – the Adjustment to the Labour Market Change” report contends, “[...]that the official statistics on both internal and international migration are far from satisfactory for two reasons: inadequate definitions and under-registration” (2005) Kupiszewski (2005) further elucidates how the intricacies of migration statistics also limit validity, how youth in Poland migrate predominantly from rural to urban areas and from small towns to cities, how they are not registered by official statistics and how migrants fail to register their migration (p. 5). For this and other reasons, As Kupiszewski (2005) detailed in passages that followed,, analysis based on such official statistical data, “[...] should be taken with certain scepticism” (p. 5).

2.1 Registration of Migrants

In accordance with Kupiszewski's (2005) findings and limitation, the primary reason for data insufficiencies is related to registration and the nature of migration (p. 5) While host countries may require migrants to register, migrants usually do not register upon entry. Therefore actual migrant numbers are impossible to capture. Since host countries do not require exit forms or registrations, these countries do not note when migrants leave. Similarly, migrants do not have to receive permission or register once they do return home. Usually registrations are for work purposes. Thus, those unemployed and/or self-employed migrants that are not working can easily be missed in office data. Notably, those missed from this data might also reflect, the unskilled, aged and untalented workers. Therefore, the number of registrations reported is almost assuredly less than the actual numbers of migrants. Nevertheless, there are methods to work around these limitations like data extraction from various sources and data contrasts and comparison from previous and current sources (Dustmann, 2007, p. 5).

Since there no exact number or figure captures this migration population for all of the aforementioned reasons, only estimates can be extraneously deduced from varied sources. By identifying the sources of registration in the home and host countries, contrasting, comparing and synthesising their data, a more refined calculation or estimate can be obtained. For example, a figure can be determined for how many legally registered Polish workers there are in the United Kingdom (UK) by comparing the number of approved applicants to the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) in 2010, which was 10,150 with that of the 2007 figure revealing , 35, 800 registrations. Based upon the comparison of these figures, the number of Polish workers in the UK significantly decreased from that of 2007. As evidenced by this example, this type of contrast and comparison and the subsequent analysis thereof reveals a

decline or change in migration pattern and also quantifies the shift. It provides a view of the seemingly immeasurable population (Iglicka, 2010).

Yet another method of discovering how many Poles are in the UK is to see how many National Insurance Numbers were allocated to Poles in the UK. For the period 2007-2008, 210,031 numbers were allocated while for the period of 2008-2009, 134,000 numbers were allocated (Iglicka, 2010). Through this contrast and comparison, the results reveal the Polish immigrant population decreased by 10.54% in 2009, and dropped to 484,000 Poles by the end of 2009 (Iglicka, 2010). For Ireland, an estimate of Polish migrants can be derived by looking at the number of Personal Public Service (PPS) issued. In 2007, 79,816 were issued. This figure decreased by 47 percent in 2008 to 42,554 while in 2009, the figure decreased again by 67.5 percent to 13,794 (Iglicka, 2010).

While using such measures also raises a fair amount of scepticism one must understand how and why those measures were selected. For example, in order to work in the UK, foreigners with EU8 nationals included must register with the WRS. It should be noted that EU8 nationals do not have full access to welfare benefits (Drinkwater *et al*, 2009, p. 163). Because of this, the WRS only provides estimation of how many Poles are in the UK. However, there are various reasons why the WRS should not be used as an absolute source on the figure of Poles in the UK. First, there are problems with the WRS registration itself. Labor migrants are supposed to re-register every time they change employers or if they are employed at various locations. Because migrants often move to host countries for economic opportunity and send remittances, the costly registration would understandably impose hardships or additional costs. Because of this, many migrants would forego such registrations especially if no fines were imposed for themselves or the employers. In this light, as well, the costly registration process begs three questions:

Hence, the number of registrations can capture the same migrant re-registering or working at various locations. The WRS does not capture those migrants that are not registered. For instance, people who are not working do not need to register, meaning children, retirees, those who haven't found a job, stay-at-home parents, etc. The number reported by the WRS then reveals a lesser than actual migrant population.

Nonetheless, in their study, Drinkwater *et al.* (2009) verified the descriptive statistics of the migrants in the WRS to the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which is a representative cross-sectional survey that is conducted every quarter with a sample of around 60,000 households. They found that while the exact percentage may vary the overall trends and patterns are similar between the two databases (Drinkwater *et al.*, 2009, p. 169). For these reasons, the WRS serves as an important source and greatly informs the research, surveillance and analysis of trends.

2.2 Return Migration Services

Another method to obtain an estimate of the number of people returning home is analysing the number of requests for Form E303 (Formularz E303), which transfers welfare benefits for the unemployed from foreign states and Form E301 (Formularz E301), which permits welfare benefits for the unemployed to be calculated using the period hired abroad and the amount of taxes paid for such services in the host country to be added to the total period of time employed. However, it has only been possible for migrants to submit such petitions since May 1, 2005 (Anacka, 2010, p.25).

For the first six months of the existence of this possibility around 2 thousand petitions were filed for Form E301. In 2006, the number of petitions increased to 4.5 thousand. This figure was at 5.7 thousand petitions in 2007 and at 8.7 thousand petitions for Jan. –Oct. 2008.

The highest numbers of petitions were for migrants returning from the UK, accounting for 26 percent of the petition. Germany accounted for 18 percent with the Czech Republic receiving 11 percent. These countries were followed by the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, and Italy with 10, 10, 8, and 4 percent, respectively (Anacka 2010, p. 25).

2.3 The Return Migrant Database (Baza Migrantow Powrotnych)

While it is impossible to take a sample of the pool of Polish migrants, it is possible that data may also miscalculate migrants for other reasons. As Grabowska-Lusinska (2009) contends there is a percentage of migrants who are unable to find job in the local market in their home province (województws) and migrated abroad. These same migrants are then unable to find employment in the foreign market and return home since they were unable to bear the difficulties of living and working in a foreign country. Such migrants would have been negatively selected twice.

However, the opposite can also be true. Skilled and talented persons may also migrate to foreign market for greater and more challenging job opportunities. Those that excel and see greater opportunities for more career acceleration back in Poland may leave the host country for the home country. This would be an example of positive selection. Combinations of the two selections above are also possible. In effect, such positive and negative selections can serve as a balancing force but must be controlled for or factored in whenever possible.

Additionally, the Return Migrant Database (Baza Migrantow Powrotnych), compiled from the Labour Force Survey (Badania Aktywnosci Ekonomicznej Ludnosci (BAEL)), provides an alternate way to measure return migration to Poland. The Database is

composed of 600 migrants who returned to Poland between 1999 to 2008³. According to BAEL's definition, a migrant in this database is someone who has returned to Poland after being abroad for at least two or three months⁴. BAEL follows each household for 6 months a year. Based on the data in sections ZD- ZG in BAEL, the researchers (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.78-9) created a database () for each household where they keep basic information about each member of the household and a few characteristics of the household itself. From this you can identify those people that are abroad. There are 6,173 migrants with 600 of those who are returnees (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.78-9). These values are good up to the first quarter of 2008. This method understandably reveals many of the hidden aspects undisclosed through other studies and statistics. By following these households, it is possible to discover how circumstance and other factors serve as migration determinants, the reasons for migration, the return migration and the economics thereof.

Through all of the aforementioned strategies, data contrasts and comparisons and the analysis thereof, the data limitations are more fully addressed. Nonetheless, as Kupiszewski (2005) articulated, this data and all statistics regarding migration and return migration should be viewed with a healthy amount of scepticism (p. 5).

³ Only data for the first quarter of 2008 was included (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.78-9).

⁴ The reason for the discrepancy is a change in methodology in 2007. Up to 2006, a return migrant was someone who returns after being abroad for two months. Since 2007, the length of time abroad was extended to three months (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.78-9).

3 Types of Migrants

Francis Cerase (1974) categorised migrants into four groups by combining and factoring the situation within the host and home countries, along with the prior attainment of their migration goals. The four categories are: 1) return of failure, 2) return of conservatism, 3) return as innovative, and 4) return of retirement. According to Cerase, return migration can be classified as a failure when the migrant was unable to attain the goals set prior to migration. Return of failure can also refer to a migrant returning because they were unable to integrate into the host country's society. Return of conservatism occurs once a migrant reaches his or her financial goal, which is also the only purpose for the migration. The most dynamic is return of innovation. This migrant has achieved success abroad and now returns home hoping and believing that they can achieve success at home, utilising the financial and capital attained abroad. On the other hand, the least dynamic of returns is return of retirement. These migrants wish to spend their retirement years in their home country, but have little to no desire to utilise, enhance or employ the capital they gained abroad domestically (Cerase, 1974).

In George Gmelch's (1980) typology, both motivations and intentions for migrating and return are used to categorise returning migrants. In the first classification, a return migrant is one who has accomplished their goals abroad and therefore, is returning home. The next class of migrants desire to settle into their host country and stay permanently. However, they may return for 2 reasons: 1) If faced with external difficulties such as, assimilation of family members into their new culture and environment, and 2) deteriorating economic conditions within the host country. Finally, a return migrant can be someone who planned to settle in the host country but did not due to internal, personal difficulties in integrating into the host country (Gmelch 1980).

Within Polish migration, Weinar (2002) developed a typology for Polish return migrants. According to Weinar, a migrant decides to return because 1) it is a rational decision to increase economic capital, or, 2) it is an emotional decision due to their desire to reside in their native country. For this type of return migrant, social and culture capital is more important than monetary factors. The last type of migrant returns home as a result of both of the above factors: rational and emotional (Weinar 2002).

Polish migrants in London have been classified in another study (Trevena 2008) according to their migration strategy: 1) drifters, 2) career migrants, and 3) economic migrants. According to this study, migrants are classified according to how readily they are able to utilise their qualifications. The first category includes migrants who are unable to readily utilise their education, primarily due to difficulties in translating or verifying their qualifications, or due to their lack of linguistic skills. Trevena (2008) found the majority of these migrants were young, single, and without any obligations. Thus they are able to migrate freely and view the experience and an opportunity to “live life on full” or in Polish, “zycia na full”. Enjoying life and living in the moment are the main priorities of this group. Since this group is more concerned about a satisfying lifestyle, employment is seen as a means to attaining their desired living standard, and not a goal of itself. Drifters are able to function even when they work below their qualifications (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.225).

The next group of migrants, the career migrants, according to Trevena (2008), are primarily concerned with advancing their careers. This groups’ reason for migration was to either start their career abroad, or to gain experience and skills. Career migrants use their contacts, determination, qualification, language skills, and inside knowledge of the industry, sector, or functional area in an attempt to advance their careers. Their attention is directed towards their career. Finally, the economic migrant’s primary goal is to save their funds for future use in Poland. This group has been unable to utilise their skills or qualifications and

work in the secondary market, typically for extended hours. These migrants often leave their families behind while they go abroad to work; thus, these migrants have a strong motivation to return home (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.225). This type of migrant is very similar to the seasonal or cyclical migrants of the transformational period who travelled abroad for work mainly to satisfy their material needs (p. 227).

Three predominant types of migrants emerge from the various typologies: 1) those who participate in short-term or cyclical migration, 2) those who are uncertain as to their future plans and decide to “wait and see” what happens, and 3) those who have decided to stay permanently (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.213).

4 Description of Polish Migrants


To determine whether the programs emplaced are effective, first a description of the characteristics, behaviours, attitudes, strategies, etc. of migrants is required. The first article to review and analyse return migration in Poland was Grabowska-Lusinska (2009). This paper provided the first report on Polish return migration and its subsequent components, which included scale, demographic structure, destinations for both emigration and immigration, and reasons and strategy for return and re-integration into the Polish labour market. Any evaluation of government programs directed towards return migration must consider these components.

4.1 Characteristics of Polish Migrants

Unlike past migration waves, the post-European Union accession migration wave is much more diversified in terms of social groups partaking, duration, goals, motivation, destination, method of organisation departure, foreign stay, temporary or permanent migration, and labour or non-labour migration. This diversification has meant that existing migration theories have lost their full explanatory powers.

The single most dynamic characteristic of post-accession migrants (as shown in Figure 3 below) is the majority are young adult aged between 20 to 29. Migrants in this age category represent three times more than in the general population of Poland.


Figure 3. Number of Immigrants to Poland and Emigrants from Poland for Permanent Residency by Age (2008)



Source: Iglicka, 2010.

Furthermore, to demonstrate the dominance of the 20 to 29 age group, Poles that are 50 years and older were under-represented by eight times (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.96). A breakdown of the general and migrant population into groups of five years, as presented below, further highlights this phenomenon.

Figure 4. Polish migration pre and post-accession into the European Union by age (in thousands)




Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

The two dominant categories lie between the ages of 20 to 29, with migrant numbers aged between of 20 to 29 increasing further following accession into the European Union (EU). Other than the 30 to 34 age bracket, all other categories decreased (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.97).

This increased volume of young migrants has been the main driver in the small decrease in the average age of migrants. The figure below shows that the post-accession migrants are 31.36 years old compared to 32.90 years (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 98) for pre-accession migrants. A closer inspection reveals that despite a fall in the number of migrants in the 15 to 19 age group post-accession, the growth in the 20 to 24 and 25 to 29 age groups was enough to reduce the average age. These figures are consistent with the average migrant age seen across the EU (Herm, 2008, p.6).

Figure 5. Average age of Polish migrants by gender



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

Examining this phenomenon further, the average age decreased for both sexes. The average pre-accession male migrant was 33.26 years old compared to 32.44 years for

females. Following the accession, the average age decreased to 31.68 years and 30.77 years, respectively (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 98). Compared to other migrating nationals in the EU the difference between average male and female age was at least two years higher (Herm, 2008, 2008, p. 7). The young structure of Polish migrants again reflects the trend of migrants to the EU, which is dominated by those in the 20 to 30 age category (Oblak Flander, 2011, p. 1).

The gender and age groups dominating were confirmed by the EuroStat report (2011). In this report, women represented just under half of immigrants at 48 percent. Interestingly the main reasons for migration differed between genders. Males aged 25 to 54 primarily migrated for employment, while females in the same category cited family reasons (Oblak Flander, 2011, p. 6).

Overall, there are three key characteristics of the age of the post-accession migrant. Firstly, compared to the general population, there is an over-representation of those 20 to 44 years old, also known as the mobility age. Second, there is an under-representation of those 45 and older, also known as the immobile years. Finally, the average age of a migrant decreased following accession into the EU, although prior to accession, the average age of a migrant was also low.

In terms of sex, the pre and post-accession migrant population is predominantly male, despite being outnumbered in the general population. Pre-accession, for every 100 females, there were 133 male migrants. Post-accession into the EU, the male dominating trend continued increasing by 37.6 percent to 183 males for every 100 females (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.96).


Another key characteristic of post-accession migration of Poles is the over-representation of the relatively well-educated and an under-representation of the relatively under-educated (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.99). This is a critical issue for Poland since

many migrants are typically employed at jobs that are below their certifications and skill-levels leading to the risk of brain drain and social losses.

Pre-accession to the European Union, the trade school educated, high school educated and vocationally qualified were the three dominant categories (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.100).

Following the accession, the largest increase in migration numbers occurred for those with tertiary qualifications, followed by the middle school, high school and vocationally educated as shown in Figure 6 below. Prior to the accession, the tertiary qualified only accounted for ten percent of migrants and was under-represented with respect to the general population (c. 12 percent). Following the accession, this category grew to more than 16 percent, representing an increase of more than 60 percent. In contrast, migrants that with a trade school qualification or that were only educated up to an elementary school level, saw dramatic decreases of 14 and 30 percent respectively (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 100). Migrants with post-secondary degrees experienced no change.

Figure 6. Polish migration numbers by education level



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.


Despite these changes, the post-accession migrant population still predominantly comprises of those with a vocational, high school or trade school education representing roughly 61 percent of all migrants (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 99).

Finally, according to Grabowska-Lusinska (2009), the difference between male and female levels of educational attainment is still maintained following accession. Both groups experienced a fairly equal increase among the university group of migrants. Males do dominate the trade school category with 38 percent of all migrants compared to 18.9 percent of female migrants who also have attained this educational level. The final striking difference is that 21.7 percent of female migrants have university degrees compared to only 13.7 percent of males, meaning that not only has female participation in migration increased since Poland's accession into the EU but the participation of well-educated women has also increased (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 101). In their analysis of labour participation of various migrants from the new EU member states, Drinkwater et al (2009) found that Poles have high levels of education despite being employed in low-skilled and low-paying jobs (p. 180). In their study, Drinkwater et al. (2009) found that Poles have the lowest returns to education out of all migrants to the United Kingdom (UK) (p. 178). This may be possible evidence of decapitalisation. However, for a Pole, this is not necessarily true since the migration abroad may lead to less tangible development in the English language, and the experience and culture of working abroad.

Another important determinant in migration is the geographical background of a potential migrant. Roughly 40 percent of all migrants are from villages (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.102). Post-accession, nearly 37 percent of the Polish population (p.102) lives in villages – the most over-represented population group. This category was also over-represented prior to accession, however at an even higher percentage (c. 45 percent). It is

interesting to note that following EU accession, this category decreased by 11 percent. At the other end of the spectrum are large cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants (p. 103). This category has been underrepresented prior the accession (c. 20%) and continues to be underrepresented. Following the accession, migrants from this category have increased to 24 percent. Large cities and villages represent the two largest categories for a “migrant’s origin” and account for almost 64 percent of all migrants. The remaining 36 percent of migrants come mainly from towns with twenty to fifty thousand and ten to twenty thousand inhabitants, representing eleven and seven percent, respectively. These two categories, along with towns with five to ten thousand inhabitants, are also slightly overrepresented with respect to the general population. Towns with 50 to 100 thousand inhabitants and town with less than five thousand inhabitants are very minimally overrepresented (p.103), see Figure 7.

Figure 7. Localities according to population density (in thousands)



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

After the accession of Poland to the EU, the increase of migrants from large cities was accounted by a six percent increase for women in this category while the participation of men in this category increased by three percent. The decrease of migrants from rural villages was greater in women. The participation of women in this category decreased by five percent while for men, the participation only decreased by four percent. As it was described above, the post-accession migrant is younger than the pre-accession migrant. The participation of younger migrants (those under 30 years old) increased the most in the “over 100 thousand” population category from 52.9 to 60.4 percent while the participation of younger migrants increased slightly in villages from 53.1 percent to 55.4 percent (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.103).

To determine whether or not return migration can be beneficial for Poland, the regions from which migrants are leaving is critical to know. If a migrant comes from a poor region, it can be assumed that any remittance sent home would help alleviate the disparity in the poor regions that would have a compounded effect.

Figure 8. The provinces of Poland




Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

Poland can be divided into 16 provinces as shown in the figure above. The accession of Poland to the EU has increased the participation of inhabitants from 10 out of 16 provinces.

As the graph above shows, increases in migration participation were seen in the following ten provinces: Masovia (Mazowieckie) (c. 3 percent), Silesia (Śląskie) (almost 4 percent), Greater Poland (Wielkopolskie) (almost 2 percent), Łódź (Łodzkie) (less than 2 percent), Lower Silesia (Dolnośląskie) (around 0.5 percent), Kuyavia-Pomerania (Kujawsko-Pomorskie) (2.5 percent), Pomerania (Pomorskie) (c. 0.5 percent), West Pomerania (Zachodniopomorski) (almost 2 percent), Świętokrzyskie (Świętokrzyskie) (c. 1 percent), and Wamira-Masuria (Warmińsko-Mazurskie) (less than 0.5 percent). Decreases in migration participation were seen in 6 provinces including: Lesser Poland (Małopolskie) (5 percent), Lublin (Lubelskie) (2.5 percent), Subcarpathia (Podkarpackie) (1 percent), Lubusz (Lubuskie) (less than 0.5 percent), Podlaskie (Podlaskie) (3 percent), and Opole (Opolskie) (5 percent). The seven most over-represented provinces including Lesser Poland, Lower Silesia, Lublin, Kuyavia-Pomerania, West Pomerania, Świętokrzyskie, and Podlaskie. Subcarpathia is also extremely overrepresented. However, this over-representation is maintained from the pre-accession period. The provinces of Kuyavia-Pomerania and West Pomerania are the only two that became over-represented following the accession into the European Union. There are two extremely underrepresented provinces: Masovia and Silesia while the other highly underrepresented provinces are Greater Poland and Łódź. The regions of Lesser Poland, Lublin, Podlaskie, and Opole, witnessed the largest decreases, 5, 2.5, 3, and 5 percent respectively (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.105), see Figure 9.

Figure 9. Pre and post accession migrant




Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

Another important characteristic to consider is migrant occupations. The British Institute for Public Policy Research report from 2007 found Poles to be very attractive for employers in the UK. This report noted Poles to be active in the labour force, well-educated, hard-working and willing to work overtime. Furthermore, they did not abusive the welfare system, capable of establishing and running their enterprises or businesses, and most importantly, accepted the lowest salaries among migrants (Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), 2007, as cited in Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.149). Dustmann (2009) found that Poles were willing to accept low wages compared to other migrants in the UK (p.180), despite being over-qualified and over educated.

The figure below confirms the steady increase of Polish migrants in the UK following accession into the EU in 2004.

Figure 10. Polish migrant numbers in the UK between 2004 to 2006



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

Poles in the UK are very active in the labour market with 85 percent of post-accession Polish migrants employed compared to only 62 percent of pre-accession Poles (IPPR, 2007, as cited in Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.149; Drinkwater *et al.*, 2009, p.171). Drinkwater *et al.* (2009) found that Poles have the highest labour participation rates compared to other new EU member states (p. 171). According to this report, the unemployment level for Poles was four percent in 2006 compared to thirteen percent in 1996. Self-employment among Polish migrants equalled that of British unemployment, at thirteen percent. Poles are among other nationalities – France, USA, Nigeria, Canada, and Iran – who have received more of education than a British citizen. In Poland’s case, the difference is three years (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.151). Poles are less likely to use social welfare benefits due to the fact that the unemployment rate is quite low for Poles and due to the young age of most migrants, who means they are healthy and do not receive health assistance. The only social service where Polish migrants rank high is assistance for children. However, the single most important factor why Polish migrants are so competitive on the British labour market is due to their willingness to take low wages. The report analysed the earnings of 26 different ethnic groups

and found that Poles receive the lowest wages, receiving an average of 7.3 pound sterling (GBP) per hour. The average wage of Poles and other EU8 migrants were also found to be low in other studies (Drinkwater *et al.* 2009, p.172). This wage is half of the highest average wage for foreigners; Americans on average receive 17.1 GBP per hour. An average British worker receives 11.1 GBP per hour (p.151). One reason for the difference in wages is of course the sector the migrants are employed in. The low pay may also be a determinant in the short-term stays in the UK.

Another method to analyse the welfare of Poles abroad and to determine if and how migrants are utilising or maximising their skills and talents is to analyse which sectors they work in. This can be difficult to analyse determine because some countries place restrictions on migrants preventing them from being able to work in certain sectors. Such restrictions in the past can continue to influence employment preference post full labour market opening, creating a concentration of migrants in certain sectors. For example, there is a concentration of Poles in farming and agricultural services in Germany and the Netherlands or in the building/construction sectors in the UK, Ireland, and Norway. For this reason, the employment sectors will be analysed for only the UK and Ireland, the main destination of Poles following these countries opening of their labour markets.


According to the *Labour Force Survey* from 2006, Polish men were mainly employed in the “construction and building” sector with 19.1 percent of the Polish male migrant population. The hotel, restaurants, and catering industries employed 10.9 percent of male migrants; jobs associated with transportation and travel agencies received 9.6 percent and those working in the food processing industry received 8.2 percent. Polish female migrants dominate three categories: *hospitality* = hotel, restaurants, and catering industries (14.1%), self-employment and small entrepreneurial activities e.g. cleaning services (13.2%), and in health services and social work e.g. taking care of the elderly or children (12.6%)

(Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.154). By 2006, 20 percent of Poles were employed in hospitality and catering (Drinkwater *et al.*, 2009, p.167). This same study found that only 10 percent have professional or managerial jobs (p. 172).

Prior to the accession, Poles were not abundant in Ireland. Only with the opening of the labour market in did Ireland become a key destination country for Poles (Central, 2008).

Prior to the accession, roughly one percent of migrating Poles would choose Ireland as their migration destination. Following the accession to the EU, this value increased to almost ten percent (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.85). For Ireland, an estimate of Polish migrants can be derived by looking at the number of Personal Public Service (PPS) issued. The PPS number is a personal identification number used to obtain many services in Ireland as well as for identification purposes. In 2007, 79,816 were issued. This figure decreased by 47 percent in 2008 to 42,554 while in 2009, the figure decreased again by 67.5 percent to 13,794 (Iglicka, 2010), see Figure 11 below. Approximately 70 percent of those requesting PPS in Ireland are Poles (Iglicka, 2010). The large spike of migrating Poles in Ireland can be seen in the graph below.

Figure 11. Number of Personal Public Service (PPS) issued to Poles in Ireland



Source: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

The sectorial employment of Poles in Ireland is similar to that of the UK. The construction and food processing sectors both employed 18.3 percent of Polish migrants followed by wholesale and retail sale at 13.9 percent and hospitality (hotels and restaurants) at 13.2 percent (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.155).


The concentration of Polish workers in these sectors is similar to the concentration of Polish migrants in other countries even though in the UK and Ireland, the labour market is fully opened. In Germany, 15.5 percent of Polish migrants work in the agriculture industry, 16.7 percent in the processing sector, 12.1 percent in sector health care services, 12.8 percent in the domestic services, 11.4 percent work in commerce, and 9.1 percent in hospitality (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.156).

4.2 Description of Polish Return Migrants

To understand return migration, the different characteristics of migrants will be discussed below. Age was the most significant variable in determining which migrants

would return to Poland. According to Anacka (2010), those aged between 20 to 39 were twice as likely to migrate than the general population; however, they were slightly under-represented in the return migrant population, receiving a Return Migrant Selectivity Indicator (Wskaznik Selektynosci Migracji Powrotnych (WSMP)) value of negative 0.05 (p. 19), see figure below. The WSMP measures the proportion of return migrants with a given characteristic compared to the entire return migrant population. A score of one would signify an equal representation in the return migrant group. As can be seen, migrants 20 to 39 years old are under-represented.

Figure 12. Participation of various age groups in migration and return migration




Source: Anacka, 2010.

The largest differences between the migrant and return migrant populations were in the 20 to 24 and 35 to 39 age groups and to a smaller degree between the 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 age brackets. Under-representation in the return migrant population occurred in the 15 to 19, 20 to 24, 25 to 29 and over 65 age groups. Over-representation in the return migrant population occurred primarily in 30 to 54 year olds, signifying that older migrants are returning home. This can have both positive and negative consequences. One can speculate that the older migrants are returning home because they have gathered enough money and skills to take

back with them. However this characteristic is not consistent with EU trends. The median age in the EU for returning nationals was 30.6 while only 12 percent of EU returning migrants were between 49 and 65 years old (Herm, 2008, pg. 6). The sex of return migrants differs insignificantly from the sex of the total migrant population with very similar amounts of males and females in return migrants although Herm (2008) shows that there was a slight prevalence of females in return migrants in 2006 (p. 5).

Education is another determinant that can be used to analyse the differences between those that migrant and those who return. As presented in the graph below those that are trade school or middle school and lower are overrepresented in the return migrant population, meaning that more migrants with less education are returning back to Poland, see figure below.

Figure 13. Polish emigrant and return migrant comparisons




Source: Anacka, 2010.

Although the middle school and lower are over-represented in return migration, this group accounts for nine percent of returnees, while migrants with university or technical

degrees are underrepresented. The majority of migrants having obtained trade school (40 percent) or vocational (25 percent) qualifications.

There are six regions that are strongly over-represented in the return migration population than would be expected, given the region’s participation in emigration and their population weights. The three regions are: Świętokrzyskie, Lubelskie, and Wielkopolskie (Anacka, 2010, p. 22). In the above section, E. Lee’s *Push-Pull theory (1966)* was explained as a conceptual method to explain what factors may cause a person to leave their home country and what factors may influence a migrant’s decision to return home, see Figure 14.

Figure 14. Characteristics of Poland (Map of Poland adjacent for reference)



Source 1: Anacka, 2010.
Source 2: Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

Another method is to analyse which regions are pushing migrants away or pushing them back (above). In *Poakcesyjne Powroty Polakow*, Marta Anacka (2010) defined provinces with *pushing* characteristics as those with a Migrant Selectivity Indicator WSM value that is positive and a WSMP value that is negative. For *pulling* provinces, the WSM value is less than zero and the WSMP value is positive. According to this definition, pushing

provinces include Zachodniopomorskie, Lubelskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie, Podlaskie, Opolskie and Malopolski. These provinces have been at one point in time, traditional migrating regions. Regions pulling migrants back home are Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Wielkopolskie, Lodzkie and Dolnoslaskie (Anacka, 2010, p. 26). Finally, in her analysis, Anacka (2010) found return migrants to be predominately from rural areas with over half of return migrants from villages. This category was also the only category to be over represented (Anacka, 2010, p. 23). Guglielmo Meardi (2007) has found that post-accession migration for Poles to the United Kingdom is longer than three months but less than 12 months and usually is taken by singles who display the “living life to its fullest” philosophy (as cited in Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.230).

The one certain thing about the migration in Poland is that it has taken on various forms and shapes, with different goals and motivation since Poland entered into the EU. Poles are now provided with more opportunities - more importantly, opportunities that they can choose from and match with their own preferences. This ability to decide for one’s self has transformed Polish migration into a more fluid form. Poland’s EU membership is associated with Poles being able to make formal demands allotted to them by such membership, such as welfare benefits and transfer of unemployment benefits (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 229).

4.3 Qualitative Description of Migrants

To understand what types of programs are most effective and needed for return migrants, it is important to understand migrants’ views and opinions upon returning. There have been a few qualitative studies whose task it was to gather migrants’ views/opinions on returning, their future plans, and their intentions. These studies are informative; however, the majority of them do have issues of representativeness. These survey studies can be divided into 2


categories, those that spoke with migrants while still abroad and those that interviewed them once they have returned home. Both situations/locations have their own issues to deal with. In the interviews that were conducted while in the host country, these conversations are in terms of how the migrants envision their return primarily, without any evidence of a return. For example, the migrant may say that they intend to return but did not in reality.

When interviewing those that have returned home and asking them about their return, why they returned, what problems they incurred, one is only asking the group of migrants that actually returned. It would then be more beneficial to speak to migrants that wanted or intended to return but did not, to learn how to improve the programs. Furthermore, it is not known why some migrants that talked about returning, didn't return. In the context of this thesis and evaluating the return migration assistance programs, it would be beneficial to know how to improve the program to encourage/assist those that are not returning to return. What would motivate these migrants to return? As the Grabowska-Lusinska (2010) point out, there are certain demographics that are over and under-represented in the Migration Database (Baza Migrantow). It is important to understand how the programs' design encourages and affects different demographics.

The University of Surrey conducted a survey to investigate the intentions Polish migrants returning or staying permanently in the UK in 2007. Almost 30 percent of those interviewed expressed that they did not know whether or not they will return or stay in their host country, see figure below. This figure corresponds with the 25 percent of registrants in the WRS that indicated they were unsure how long they wanted to stay (Drinkwater *et al*, 2009). Those declaring a permanent stay equalled 15 percent of those surveyed while those planning to stay six months or less amounted to 18 percent (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 207). However, Drinkwater *et al*. (2009) found that sixty percent of respondents indicated that their intention was to stay for less than one year (p. 165). In March of 2008, a similar

survey was conducted in Dublin by the Wojewodzkiego Urzedu Pracy w Gdansk to assess the attitudes of Polish migrants in Ireland. Almost half of the respondents declared uncertainty; forty percent stated they have decided to return while twelve percent expressed their intent to stay in the host country (Konkol, 2008).


Figure 15. Migration Length Intention for Polish Migrants in the UK



Based on Data from Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009.

Another survey of Polish migrants in the UK and Ireland found that close to half of the respondents had plans to return to Poland within four years, with even more declaring a desire to return after five to ten years of migration (ABC Rynek i Opinia, 2007), see figure below.

Figure 16. Return plans for migrants in Ireland and UK



Based on data from: ABC Rynek i Opinia, 2007.

Another study conducted, by Garapich (2007), interviewed Poles already abroad to get to perspectives on their stay and return migration, with the results shown in Figure 16 above. In this study, nearly 35 percent of those surveyed, who had just arrived, stated that their intent was to stay in the UK or Ireland for up to six months. Close to 11 percent of those who have been living in the UK or Ireland from one to two years declared their intention of returning within the next six months. In total, 13.4 percent of the respondents stated they intended on returning home within the next six months. The next category, return to Poland within six months to two years, received 12.6 percent of the respondents where as 16.9 percent of respondents intended to return within two to five years. The most interesting finding of this research question was that 30.3 percent of the respondents declared they were unsure when they would return or if they were staying permanently (p. 23), see Table 3 below. This is a common feature of the current migration wave after the European Union accession found in various research studies.

Table 3. Planned length of stay in host country, considering length of stay to date


Planned Length of Stay in Host Country	Length of stay in host country to date						
	Less than 6 months	Between 6 months and 2 years	Between 2 and 5 years	More than 5 years	Permanently	Unsure	Total
Less than 6 months	34.8	4.1	10.8	7.8	3.3	8.3	13.4
Between 6 months and 2 years	13.4	21.5	11.2	11.4	9.8	4.2	12.6
Between 2 and 5 years	11.2	19.0	23.4	15.9	14.1	4.2	16.9
More than 5 years	5.8	11.6	10.8	16.5	14.1	4.2	11.7
Permanently	8.9	14.0	11.9	17.7	25.0	50.0	15.2
Unsure	25.9	29.8	31.9	30.8	33.7	29.5	30.2
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Garapich, 2007.

This research also purposes that there are 3 types of migrants: 1) short-term migration: where the migrant returns home once the goal of migration is attained; 2) those who are undecided and are assuming a trial period; and 3) those who have decided to permanently stay in the UK or Ireland (Garapich, 2007, p. 24). Their research found a third of the respondents plan to return (p. 24). The authors postulate this small percentage is due the fact that the current economic situation is one of many, various factors that determines whether or not a migrant will return. Some of the other factors mentioned are the length of stay in host country already, how integrated the migrant is in the host society, standard of living in Poland, familial relations, etc. (p. 24).


However, around 40 percent agreed that they observe and watch and wait to see if conditions are improving before considering a return; however, 29.9 percent strongly disagreed with this statement (Garapich, 2007, p. 25), see figure 17 below. An even higher percentage of respondents, 39.9 percent, strongly agree that they are actively considering a return to Poland based on communication with family and friends on the economic situation, see figure 18 below.

Figure 17. Percentage of migrant Poles monitoring home conditions before deciding whether or not to return.



Based on data from Garapich, 2007.


Figure 18. Percentage of migrant actively considering a return to Poland based on communication with family and friends on the economic situation



Based on data from Garapich, 2007.

More surprisingly, 54 percent of the respondents stated they divide their lives between Poland and the UK or Ireland and are therefore interested with the conditions and developments of both countries (Garapich, 2007, p. 25), see figure below.

Figure 19. Percentage of migrant who divide time between Poland and the UK or Ireland and actively monitor developments in both countries



Based on data from Garapich, 2007.

This study, similar to other research, suggests that the migration patterns for Poles are very diverse and are not linear, in which there is immigration and then return migration. The latest research does point to the individualisation of post-accession migration. This migration, unlike previous ones, is based and centred on the individual determining what the best next step is for them based upon personal factors like age, marital status, employment opportunities, etc. (Garapich, 2007, p. 26). Another phenomenon frequently presented in the research is that many don't see a return to Poland as a final destination. For many, it is possible to migrate out of Poland once again. Another possibility is to live "in between" the host and home countries (p. 26), capitalising on the best opportunities presented.

Although these are not definite figures of the number of migrants returning, these statements do reflect the views Polish migrants have towards return migration. Dustmann (2007) found that many EU migrants do in fact return to their home country before ten years abroad with 45 percent returning before five years have elapsed (p. 7). It must be noted

however that this study did not differentiate between Polish or EU8⁵ migrants. However, he failed to mention that in his study the departure of a migrant does not necessarily mean the migrant has returned home. All it means is that the migrant is no longer in the UK and may have migrated to another country. Another report by the Institute for Public Policy Research in London found a similar result. In their research, the Institute found that between May 2004 and the beginning of 2008, half of the migrants from the new EU countries in the UK had returned home, equating to around half a million less migrants. However, this figure is not just for Poland but all new EU countries.

These studies have found that sex is not a significant factor in the migrants' intention of staying or returning. However, the studies show that age and education does affect a respondent's intention. In the Konkol (2008) study, 50 percent of the respondents aged 20 to 29 years expressed a desire to return to Poland while the "wait and see" strategy was dominant among the 30 to 39 and 40 to 49 year olds (Konkol, 2008). The well-educated, those with a tertiary education, saw their migration experience in terms of greater job experience. As such, this group of people expressed a desire to obtain some experience and quickly return. Those with technical skills composed the largest group in the "wait and see" category (ABC Rynek i Opinia, 2007, p.211). Another research on Polish migrants in the UK and Ireland found roughly 30 percent of the respondents had taken the "intentionally unforeseeable" strategy, a position of "waiting and see" or anticipatory. This strategy manifests in the lack of any preparations for future plans connected to one, specific location (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.211).

From their discussion with return migrants, Grabowska-Lusinska (2009) identified several factors that discourage migrants from returning was primarily based around conditions in their home country: work environment/atmosphere, work culture, narrow-

⁵ EU8 refers to the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

mindedness of employers, traditional behaviour, and discrimination of females, these observations were often given by those higher education and/or are self-employed. In addition, respondents perceived the lower standard of social etiquette people discouraged them from returning, including the lack of trust, lack of engagement of others, or taking up interest in others (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 214). Another factor discouraging the return of migrants is the responsibility and commitments made on their part. For example, 27 percent of Poles in the UK have obtained mortgages, signifying they have obligations in the UK and decreasing their likelihood of returning (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.215).

Several factors encouraging return were identified. The economic development of Poland was of primary reassurance. Those who had higher education and/or were able to utilise their skills by working in an appropriate job expressed a belief that the improvements to the Polish economy ensured a positive return to their human capital in Poland. Another factor encouraging return is the low cost of living in Poland, which allows for higher living conditions – particularly for migrants living in relatively costly cities such as London (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.214). Often the importance of living in one's own country is overlooked. When you live in your own country, you know how things function and how to function.

Other studies (Garapich, 2007; Grabowska-Lusinska, 2010) also demonstrate that similar factors can cause or stimulate migration and return migration. For example, if Poles migrate because they see the act as developing or enhancing their human capital or technical skills, utilising their skills, possibility of future development, new challenges, or being ahead of the curve and if return migration fulfils these needs or motivational factors then return migration is the next logical step. However, if returning home is viewed as a step backwards, then it can become a discouraging factor. However, these studies showed that family and family life was the most important factor in deciding to migrate (if a loved one was already

abroad and there existed no possibility of returning) or return migration (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.215).

5 Migration Strategies

In Garapich's theory of the intentionally unforeseeable return strategy, the authors present this theory without much discussion of any negative aspects. If migrants are monitoring if something better comes along, then they cannot truly settle down and begin a new life anywhere. They will continue to live in two countries, maintain two lives and two identities. Although it is possible to maintain this lifestyle short term, however, in the long-term this becomes unsustainable. For example, it is particularly difficult to keep together a family, under this strategy. Therefore, one must be aware of the social costs migrants may endure for the economic benefit of their host and home countries.

When you combine the reasons for migration with the various motivations for return and factor in migrants' declared plans of return, two return migration strategies emerge. These strategies convey the generalised characteristics and mind-set of migrants. The two types are: intentionally-completed return and intentionally-unforeseeable return.

5.1 Intentionally-Completed Return

In this model, the migrant has decided that the country of his permanent stay will be their home country. This desire is due to the connection the migrant has developed with their home country, as a place of home and family (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.217). As such, he or she takes on an active role in their career, social, and cultural life in the home country. Migration for this type of migrant is for the purpose of both financial and human capital accumulation. Once the migrant accumulates this capital, he or she terminates the stay abroad and returns home (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.216). Upon returning to their home country, the migrant has the belief that the skills they obtained abroad will be beneficial to their home profession. An additional element of this model adds that migration can occur

multiple times in the form of short-term, purpose-specific trips that nevertheless result in a return (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.217). Another characteristic of migration for this group associates stress and difficulties adjusting to life in the host country (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.218). However, it is possible that this may be due to their short term goals abroad and therefore do not genuinely try to adjust to a new and different life.

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These migrants do not definitively define their stay in any single location since their main priority is maximise their opportunities (Eade 2009). If this means returning, then they return. If it means moving to another location, they migrate again. In one way, this group is

very dynamic, very mobile, and actively searching for better opportunities. From their interviews with return migrants, Grabowska-Lusinska *et al.* (2009) noted that this group's decision to return was influenced by economic and social factors. Many of their respondents cited employment in their qualified profession, remuneration and job satisfaction are the main reasons for both migration and return, together with a loss of a job or resources to maintain their living standard (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p.218). These researchers place a special emphasis on the differences between wages since the migrants displayed indifference between their host and home countries. For this reason, a return to Poland would not necessarily be perceived as beneficial.

In conclusion, this strategy maintains flexibility and is adaptable to changing circumstances or environments. This may entail migration, a return home and possible remigration, a change in employment, career path, or profession, or the advancement of career. Such a strategy has only become possible with the accession of Poland into the European Union and the complete opening of access to the labour market of three members. Prior to this and for the remaining countries, Poles were and still are required to obtain work visas or enter through bilateral agreements.

While some Polish migrants experience migrant failure abroad and return home, this type of migration is rarely captured through statistics and economics. Since failure abroad results in lesser or no remittance, lesser opportunity to attain a better economic position, skills and knowledge abroad. This type of return migration influences return often without planning and/or accumulated savings. Nevertheless, the Matthew Hickley (2006) *Mail Online* article, "Polish charity workers arrive to take migrants home," reveals how the UK experienced an unexpected flow of migrants⁶ and invited the Barka Foundation into the UK to assist the Polish migrants who were homeless, jobless and/or sought return to Poland. As Hickley

⁶ (Hickley 2006) contends that more than 400,000 Eastern European migrants entered the UK even though Britain expected only 13,000 per annum.

(2006) revealed the Polish team of volunteer aid workers planned to offer Polish migrants a £50 return bus ticket to Warsaw or help finding employment and housing if the Polish migrants were determined to stay in the UK. Notably, as well, the Barka Foundation (Hickley, 2006) during its week-long fact finding visit also hoped to establish a network of help centres for destitute workers in the UK. Greatly assisted by funds from the Polish government, the Barka Foundation hoped it could persuade destitute Polish migrants to return home. Most often, these migrants were workers whose temporary contracts had expired. (Hickley, 2006) Additionally, Westminster City Council received the cash grant from the Home Office to help Eastern European migrants to return to their homeland, but funds were limited and expected to run out within a month or two.

6 Return Migration Theory

Several factors and forces influence migration, compel the travel costs incurred, familial, linguistic and cultural separations required, and even underwrite and influence the economic gain, attainment, social and emotional aspirations and consequences thereof. While numerous theorists have studied and explicated the interaction of these factors and forces, Ernst Ravenstein's (1889) "Law of Migration" serves as the theoretical foundation and provides the framework upon which all subsequent theory builds, examines and explores, contrasts and compares the previously mentioned facets. After all, the "Law of Migration" established and illustrated the premise for the dichotomous interaction of motivation and rewards, the "push-pull" process of migration. Contending that unfavourable situation(s) or environment(s) thereby "push" people to migrate to the location that holds more favourable conditions and environment, Ravenstein (1889) demonstrated how these better economic opportunities or the perceived potentiality thereof "pulled" people and therefore lured and enticed them to embark upon the journey. While this "Law of Migration" and its "push-pull" premise seem overly simplistic and reductionist in nature, its tenets substantiate how and why migration occurs and informs many other migration theories.

In light of this, Everette Lee (1966) expanded upon the Ravenstein (1889) "Law of Migration" increased its breadth and depth through further study of the circumstances, events and motivations that informed migration. While Lee did not discount Ravenstein's "Law of Migration," or its "push-pull" premise, Lee emphasised the push factors, granted them more weight, and also detailed, expanded and more distinctly identified the contributing factors. He also granted them more applicability and culpability. Additionally, Lee elucidated the forces these push factors inherently contained. Accordingly, Lee (1966, p. 285) established the connection between four push-pull factors--origin factors, destination factors, *intervening obstacles* and personal factors and their effects (Wolfel, 2005, p. 6). Lee demonstrated the

factors' effects on migration by more clearly defining the factors themselves and revealing their potential to influence migration through applicability and culpability. Therefore, Lee believed these factors were determinants. Based upon the exploration of Lee's (1966, p. 285) four major factors: origin factors, destination factors, intervening, opportunities and personal factors, this becomes clear.

Intervening obstacles are anything that impedes or makes it difficult to migrate; this could include physical barriers, immigration laws that prohibit movement, or having children or other dependents (Lee, 1966, p. 51). Another contribution of Lee was on the selective nature of migration. Lee demonstrates how differences in people's demographics and social class affect how they are affected by various push factors. Those that are negatively affected by them are more inclined to migrate. However, this may also negatively affect them during migration in the host country. For these reasons, Lee described migration selection as bimodal (p. 56). Lee contended that personal abilities served as the key factor in the migration success.

With respect to return migration, the Neoclassical Economics approach centres on the differences between the financial capital of host and home countries and concerned with correcting negative wage differential. This theory fundamentally views migration as the result of wage differentials that results from the supply and demand for labour primarily on the global scale (Sjaastad 1962; Todaro, 1969). As such, high wages in countries that have high demand for labour, but a scarce supply of it, will pull people to become migrants from countries where labour is in surplus or where wages are low for whatever reasons. The segmented labour-market theory expands the neoclassical theory by proposing that developed economies are structured so that immigration must have occurred since their economies are structured dualistically or are segmented into two labour markets. The first labour market is primarily for natives and the high-skilled; the second is for low-skilled, mainly migrants. The

low wages and poor conditions detract natives but because of wage differentials, foreign workers take these jobs (Piore, 1979). While the world-theory agrees that global capitalism has created structural economic problems in the less developed countries, it pushes migrants out and pulls them into the developed economies (Sassen, 1988).

Wage differentials, according to Borjas (1987), will prevent high-skilled labour from migrating to their home countries where wages are low. Nor will these migrants return if their skills are not needed or valued. Therefore, the composition of labour force skills and competencies and the corresponding wages greatly influences return. Since the neoclassical approach views migration as a result of people wanting to maximise their wage and expecting higher wages in the host country, this theory postulates that migration will be permanent and will result in family unification. Therefore, fundamentally, this theory suggests that return migration is a result of a failure of the expatriate to fulfil their expectations for permanent settlement in a country where higher wages are prevalent, and ultimately, for family reunification (Cassarino, 2004, p. 255). Under this theory, the return to the host country is viewed as a consequence of failed experiences abroad, or as a result of a lack of an expected reward for human capital (Cassarino, 2004, p. 255). The failed experience is due to a lack of the required skills. However, it is unclear whether the skills acquired abroad are rarely transferrable to the home country because there is little need for them there. Whether the failure was a result of miscalculating the costs of immigrating to the host country or lack of higher earnings, the return to the home country is seen as unexpected and undesirable. Under the Neoclassical thought, since the attempt to migrate failed, the migrant is seen as unsuccessful and unable to maximise the opportunities in the host country.

Similar to the Neoclassical Economics theory, the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) theory is also largely based on economic and financial factors, but it differs sharply on its view of the return to the home country and the intention of the migrants

to do so. The NELM moves away from the single-directional focus of migration and therefore views return migration in the only possible way, in terms of failure – NELM views return migration as “calculated strategy” that occurs once a migrant has met the predefined goals of migration (Cassarino, 2004, p. 255). Since these goals are made with the family, the NELM moves migration from the “individual independent to mutual interdependence” (Stark, 1991, p. 26). This interdependence is reflected in the phenomenon of remittances. NELM suggests that this view of a successful return to the home country is associated with the partial remittance of the migrants’ income while in the host country to the household. Remittance becomes a major component of the migration strategy established prior to the absence of the migrant from the home country. Remittance was also a collective decision made by the household. Having a migrant family member also diversifies income risk and provides the household with financial stability (Stark, 1991). According to Stark, since migration is planned and has specific targets, this has an effect on migrants’ behaviour.

The inclusion of remittance also has a relationship to the migrants’ behaviour in the host country and to the notion of a planned return, according to the NELM theory. Based on analysis of data by Constant (2002), remittance influences migrants having higher rates of employment in host countries (Constant, 2002, p. 27), as well as on the level of work effort, (Stark, 1991, p.392), ability to save more money (Stark, 1990), and even on the level of socialization while in the host country (Cassarino, 2004). Stark (1990) contends migrants have the incentive to acquire more skills or on-the-job training since the probability of their return is great, this being a possible goal of migration. Overall, migration is seen, according to this theory, as being a temporary phenomenon met to attain pre-determined goals. As such, return migration is a successful completion of a temporary settlement of meeting such goals as higher incomes and accumulation of savings and increase in a household’s purchasing power. Contrarily, the NELM theory views the returnee as an individual who

embodies success as having met the goals, which were set prior to the migration and thus becomes a financial intermediary for the family. According to these theories wage differentials and ability and amount of consumption are key factors in either staying in the host country or returning to the home country. Finally, Neoclassical Economic theory states that the cost of consumption can determine if return will occur. If the cost of the preferred consumption is higher in the home country, the return migration will occur (Borjas, 1987; Dustmann, 2007). An example of this type of return migration can be seen with retiree migrants who prefer to retire and consume goods in their home country. However, if a migrant's consumption needs are being satisfied in the host country then the migrant won't return. In addition to having a higher preference of consumption in the home country Dustmann (2007) argues that return migration will take place if there is a higher purchasing power of the migrant's foreign wage in the home country and/or if the migrant's time experiences, and skills, abroad increase.

These economic approaches to migration do fall short in their considerations of other contextual factors; primarily regarding migrants themselves and social, cultural and familial factors. By creating a success/failure paradigm as demonstrated above, the theories largely classify the migrants as financial intermediaries (Taylor, 1996, as cited in Cassarino, 2004); individuals whose impact comes from the financial or human capital achieved abroad. This classification of migration as financial intermediaries is emphasised by the success/failure paradigm supported by the neoclassical theory. By viewing the returnees only through the lens of their financial impact as opposed to taking into consideration certain situational or structural factors that are addressed in the preceding theories, there is no accounting for the impact of the social, economic, or political home environment on the return migration or these factors once the return migration has occurred beyond the confines of the returnee's household. The greatest critique of the aforementioned theories is that they are only

concerned with economics and financial factors and primarily with wage differentials and consumption, as if all decisions are made in an economic and financial vacuum. Only “financial intermediaries,” not ushers of modernity or new technology or skills, are seen in this lens (Taylor, 1996, as cited by Cassarino, 2004, p.257). The only contact or interaction with home is seen through the lens of sending remittance and there is no further discussion of it.

6.1 Structural Approach to Return Migration

Based on theoretical works by anthropologists, sociologists, and social geographers, the structural approach focuses primarily on the contextual factors. It primarily relates to the social and institutional factors of the origin country and how the returnee perceives these factors. The paradigm of this approach centres not on the experience of the individual migrant experiences, but rather around the reality of the economy and society in the home country and the expectations of those environments by the returnee (Cassarino, 2004). The paradigm of this approach centres not around the experience of the individual migrant experiences, but rather how these experiences fit within the real situation of the economy and society in the home country and the expectations of return migration has on that environment. Drawing from the NELM approach, financial and economic resources brought back to the home country are of great importance in the structural approach because they relate to 1) the migrant’s expectations upon return, 2) the reality of the economic and societal conditions of the home country, and 3) reintegration of the migrant. This complex relationship is best depicted by Francesco Cerase’s article on Italian returnees from the United States where he identifies four types of returnees based on their aspirations, expectations, and needs. In essence, the structural approach analyses the four various results that can be produced and

occur between the returnee's expectations of return and the reality of the return within the real economic and societal environment/situation (Cerase, 1974). A description of the four types of returnees can be found in the types of return section.

Cerase's typology has been formative to the discussion of the structural approach to return migration, demonstrating the significance of the situational and contextual factors in the origin countries as they relate to a returnee's success or failure once the migrant has returned. This theory of return migration was furthered by George Gmelch (1980) who related the intentions and the motivations to return with the level of expectations the migrant returns with, whether or not those intentions are real (Callea, 1986). According to Gmelch, a decision to return is based upon situational and structural factors (1980). However, since it is difficult for migrants to be able to gather the appropriate and accurate information on the social, political, and economic changes in the home country, migrants will be "ill prepared for their return" (Gmelch 1980, p. 143).

Even though they have the means to bring innovation or change, the reality of the home country does not permit it, demonstrating the power contextual factors have on shaping return migration/ returnee's experiences back home. There are two elements that can determine how effective migrants will be in impacting their home country: time and space.

Time is comprised of two components within the structural approach: the length of time in the host country where the migrant has obtained skills and duration of time where social changes have taken place. The balance of both times is delicate. According to Dustmann (2003), a migrant should maximise the length of time abroad so that the migrants gains new skills and better skills in order to increase the migrant's ability to use the skills when they return. Time must also be balanced in the sense that if a migrant is away for too long, then the migrant will have "to readapt [and re-socialise] to the changed cultural and

behavioural patterns” (Dumon, 1986, p. 122). The migrant must balance these two factors.

The second element that can determine return migration’s effectiveness is space. The element of space in relation to a return migrant’s reintegration and expectations relates to the area/location to which the migrant returns (Cassarino, 2004, p. 260). Returns to rural areas tend to only improve the living standards of the household, but not on values and traditions of the area (Colton, 1993). By resuming life as it was, Colton contends that the migrant reinforces the pre-existing values and traditions (1993).

When institutional factors do change and a business-friendly environment is created, than migrants are able to greatly impact the home country. However, when institutions have not changed and structural constraints exist, structuralists then argue that the skills and capital the migrant acquired is wasted. It is in this context that the migrant must readjust to the realities that still persist in home country. If readjustment does not occur then the disgruntled migrant may re-emigrate. One way, structuralists argue, migrants readjust is through obvious consumption and unproductive investments (Byron, 1996) by building large houses, buying expensive cars and other luxurious goods for the household. By readjusting to the behaviour of the local society, the migrant is welcomed and accepted back by the community (Byron, 1996). This action reinforces the dependence of the home country on the host country for the maintenance of its consumption.

The extremely limited impact on the home country, due to the contextual settings of traditional familial and societal expectations, which the return migrant must adhere to in order to be reaccepted, accounts for the structuralists’ negative assessment of return migration. In the end, it is this rift between the modern world of immigration and the more traditional home countries where the return migrant finds he is unable to forge a bridge between the two where the ideas, skills, and incomes attained while away could be put to use

to better the situation in the home country. The structuralists' view in reference to Poland is quite out-dated. This view could have held ground during the communist period but not anymore. Institutional and societal changes have been ushered in with the transformation period and accessing into the EU. Modern technology makes it possible for migrants to be informed and prepared and in contact with networks in home country. This approach assumes there is no communication or linkage maintained between the migrants and home country.

6.2 Transnational Approach to Return Migration

The Transnational approach is an attempt to analyse the social and economic links between the host and origin countries. Contrary to the Structural approach, Transnationalism focuses on regular maintenance of links between home and host countries and how it is maintained over time (Portes, 1999). Under this theory, migrants proceed through multiple return visits or cycles of migration between host and origin countries, which allow them to maintain significantly stronger social, economic, and familial ties.

Transnationalists differ from the previous approaches in that return migration does not have to be an end; return migration can be part of circular migration. The ease of movement and existence of strong links forms the identity of migrants as dual identities but also has a strong positive influence on the home country. Since migrants are frequently visiting and maintaining the links, they are able to prepare for their return and are better equipped to reintegrate. Finally, the movement between the two countries and the strong links allows migrants to be able disseminate information and knowledge in the home country.

This notion of transnational mobility or the periodic visits to the country of origin (Portes, 1999), creates what transnationalists argue is the second primary component of the

theory: the transnational identity of the migrant. Transnational identities are a result of a “combination of migrants’ origins with the identities they acquire in their host countries” (Cassarino, 2004, p.262). In contrast to the structuralists’ viewpoint, which argues for the readjustment of the migrant upon return, the Transnational approach suggests that the two identities of the migrant are, in fact, complimentary to one another allowing for adaption as opposed to adjustment as the method by which the migrant can find their place in society upon return (Cassarino, 2004, p. 262). Transnationalists concede that there may be difficulties in re-entering the home country, but the consistent linkages maintained while in the host country allows for a considerably easier reintegration.

Aside from the linkages maintained between the migrants and their households in the home countries, transnationalism also suggests that there exists a link between migrants to each other on the basis of “common ethnic origins and in-group solidarity.” (Levitt, 1998a, 4). This sense of belonging results in transnational activities and social capital.

In her paper, Reynolds (2008) found social capital to be formed by transnational family relationships in her study on return migration to the Caribbean (p. 2). This social capital prepared those who decided to return with the appropriate skills and knowledge to successfully return. She also highlights the importance of the Diaspora and social networks in the host country (in this case, the UK) in supporting return migration (Reynolds, 2008, p. 2). The Diaspora and social networks served to channel information about the conditions and opportunities back in the home country. In her research Reynolds found family narratives about returning to the homelands, the “myth of return” as she called it, to sustain and enhance an emotional attachment to the homeland (Reynolds, 2008, p. 2). As communication and transportation becomes cheaper and more readily available, it is easier to create and maintain bonds with those in both the host and home countries, new members of the Diaspora and old family and friends left behind (Reynolds, 2008, p. 3). These bonds are strengthened by local

ethnic community groups, ethnic associations, and support groups (Reynolds, 2008, 3). Social capital is “the values that people hold and the resources that they can access, which both result in and are the result of collective and socially negotiated ties and relationship” (Edwards *et al.*, 2003). Social capital - through networks of trust, values, and reciprocity is central for a society, community, and individual relationships (Putnam, 2000).

Al-Ali and Koser found the connection and identity migrants share with their home country is a significant factor in their decision to return (2002). Under this approach, migrants are very valuable because their network spans multiple societies and countries (Al-Ali, 2002, p. 10). The movement to institutionalise the migrant’s relationship with the home country into coordinated development projects demonstrates how these migrants can be agents of social change (Al-Ali *et al.*, 2001). Furthermore, “transnational communities can wield substantial political, economic and social power” (Al-Ali and Koser 2002, p. 12).

Although return occurs with migrants possessing informational and capital resources, return of the migrant may still be met with “traditional vested interests and social pressures that characterise their origin societies” similar to those established in the readjustment practices of the Structural approach to return migration (Cassarino, 2004, p. 264). However, with the focus on the strong linkages that exist as a result of transnational mobility and transnational identities, “the transnational approach to return migration seems to encapsulate their initiatives and projects at home in a fundamental set of mutual obligations, opportunities and expectations stemming from common ethnicity and kinship” (Cassarino, 2004, p. 265). The migrants do not return until the environment is favourable. In addition, return under the transnationalists’ perspective is viewed as a prepared act through the consistent return visitation to the home country and occurs once the determined amount of financial resources and benefits are acquired to sustain the household and also when the conditions in the home country are favourable (Cassarino, 2004, p. 269).

6.3 Social Network Theory's Approach to Return Migration

Each theory thus far has been partially established based on the commonalities between it and the preceding theory. The Social Network Theory is no different. In this instance, it shares the view that cross border linkages are of paramount importance as was established above in the transnationalists' theory. However, for Social Network theorists, the significance is placed on the tangible and intangible resources that are attained as a result of these relationships and the migrant as a social Actor within them; as opposed to the linkages that are established in the Transnational theory based upon commonalities of attributes, such as origin. (Cassarino, 2004, p. 265)

According to the Social Network Theory, "social structures increase the availability of resources and information while securing the effective initiatives of return migrants" (Cassarino, 2004, p. 265). It is logical then to place importance on how these networks are comprised and to "examine the fundamentals that define and maintain the cross-border linkages in which return migrants are involved" (Cassarino, 2004, p. 265). Such importance is placed on these networks for two reasons: 1. because networks, by nature, are selectively organised (Church *et al.* 2002, p. 23) and 2. membership in such a network requires both the actors themselves as well as the other members of the group to concede to the inclusion of a network member and allow for the flow of resources and, in this case, the maintenance of cross-border linkages (Cassarino, 2004, p. 266).

This group involvement represents a relationship between members that is viewed as mutually beneficial, with each member bringing something to the group that can benefit the others while the individual benefits from other members as well as the group as a whole. This regular exchange of mutually valuable resources, or social capital, between actors is what

Social Network theorists suggest has an influence on the “success of returnee’s initiatives and projects following their return” as well as being beneficial prior to the migration. (Cassarino, 2004, p. 266).

In its simplest terms, Social Network theory breaks down into two arguments: 1. that migrants are viewed as “social actors who are involved in a set of relational ramifications” and that membership in these organisations “highlights the multiplicity of involvement(s) of these actors, as well as the types of organisation that are influential on their behaviours” (Cassarino, 2004, p. 266-267) and 2. that varying opportunities can be gained from different networks with varying orientations and strategies. (p. 267). With this in mind, it is evident that these networks differ from the transnationalists’ relationships in that there is an inherent “organisational pattern, goal(s), and configuration” not present in the aforementioned relationships but rather “a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects, or events...on which a network is defined [and possessing] some attribute(s) that identify [individuals] as members of the same equivalent class for the purposes of determining the network of relations among them” (Cassarino, 2004, p. 267).

This membership identification of networks to others outside of them, grants migrants a level of awareness which Social network theorist argue should be taken into account. It cultivates a sense of distinctiveness, relating to their process of identification, which returnees enjoy as it “shapes the returnees’ feelings of belonging to an entity, which not only generates mutual understanding and conveys referents, but also delimits the boundaries of the social networks in which actors are involved” (Cassarino, 2004, p. 267).

There exists in the Social Network Theory a level of dependency on the cross-border linkages in relation to resources attained for the return migration in the form of information, social, economic, and institutional opportunities, and a level of distinctive identity that comes along with the association or membership in a network (Cassarino, 2004, p. 269). Above all,

this theory stresses “meaningfulness for actors of being involved in network structures” as well as the “perceived position in the patterns of partnerships [which] seem(s) to have a certain bearing on the extent to which these actors subjectively identify themselves with the networks of social relationships” (p. 267).

6.4 Cassarino’s Conceptual Approach to Resource Mobilisation

While the study of return migration has brought great insight into the motivations and patterns of who migrants are and why they choose to return, whether or not these returnees become agents of change in their origin countries remains to be determined. The variables of time in host country, reason for return, and tangible and intangible resources have all been used by the preceding theories to establish their arguments for return migration. Together these three variables comprise what Jean-Pierre Cassarino describes as the preparedness of the migrant for their return and are ultimately what determines the success or failure of a returnee to impact the country of origin (Cassarino, 2004, p. 271).

In Cassarino’s Conceptual approach to return migration, a successful return is dependent upon three factors: 1. the migrant’s preparedness, 2. the migrant’s resource mobilisation, and 3. the circumstances in the host and home country (p. 271).

Preparedness means having the free will and having the readiness to return i.e. deciding to return willingly and mobilising resources (Cassarino, 2008, p. 102). There are three degrees of return preparedness: 1. return migrants that believe they possess and have gathered the needed resources, both tangible and intangible, to be successful upon their return, 2. those whose were abroad for too short of a period for any resources to have been attained and therefore are unable to mobilised any resources (Cassarino, 2008, p. 102) and 3. those who did not choose to return willingly. In extension, they were also unable to prepare

for the return (Cassarino, 2008, p. 103). Davids and Van Houte (2003) view return as “an ongoing process ... which requires time” (as cited in Cassarino, 2008, p. 101). In this light, Cassarino (2008) highlights the importance of “readiness” a term he used to describe a migrant’s ability to “mobilise the adequate tangible (i.e. financial capital) and intangible (i.e. contacts, relationships, skills, acquaintances) resources needed to secure their return” (p. 101).

For resource mobilisation, a return migrant mobilises on contacts and social and economic network, what Cassarino calls intangible resources and on tangible resources such as financial capital to make the return a success, to learn how best to return, when to return, and also uses these resources for reintegration back into the home country (2004).

One main component of Cassarino’s approach involves the resources that migrants both acquire while abroad as well as those that they may bring abroad with them. It has become evident through the discussions of the preceding arguments that tangible and intangible resources are of paramount importance to the reintegration of the returnee. Here too resources such as financial capital, social capital, contacts, relationships, skills, and even acquaintances play a distinct role in the level of preparedness of a return migrant. The mobilisation of these resources for return reveals patterns in behaviour that result from the social backgrounds and migration experiences of migrants and influence the level of preparedness for such return (2004, p. 271).

The act of gathering such resources and utilising the social resources a migrant has in order to collect information about the conditions in the origin country, represent a level of preparedness that includes the willingness and readiness to do so (Cassarino, 2004, p. 271). Rather than viewing return as a free choice or a success/failure paradigm and instead taking into consideration the willingness and readiness of a migrant, brings to light a few important insights to take into consideration.

Resource mobilisation takes time. Therefore, the act is not only voluntary but also one that is planned for and executed carefully (Cassarino, 2004, p. 272). Irrespective of a migrant's legal status or motivation (i.e. labour migrant, refugee, or asylum seeker) they differ in terms of preparedness and resource mobilisation patterns. While the reason for the migration is irrelevant, the length of time in the host country does have an impact on the ability to invest human and financial capital acquired abroad, which may be influenced by the status. In other words, a labour migrant that spends years in the host country has more time to mobilise (p. 272). Preparedness is dependent upon the experience abroad along with perceived changes in the home country. In addition, pre- and post-return conditions shape the level of preparedness and resource mobilisation patterns of the migrants; meaning that changes in the political, institutional, economic, and social arenas have an impact on how resources are applied both prior and upon return (p. 272). Preparedness of returnee impacts the level of development a migrant can have upon return to the home country (p. 273).

From these insights, it is evident that the level of preparedness is influenced not simply by resource mobilisation but also pre-and post-return conditions, length of migration, impact of preparedness on the reintegration process, and developmental potential identified in the home country. These variables, therefore, impact the ability of the migrant to become an agent of change upon return to the home country with regard to the level of preparedness (Cassarino, 2004, p 273-274). There are three levels of preparedness. The first one is "High Level of Preparedness," which relates to a migrant who has significant levels of tangible and intangible resources and highly developed social contacts, skills, and knowledge to organise his own return and carry out initiatives successfully at home. Return migration will occur after analysing the changes that have taken place in the home country and after analysing the costs and benefits of return migrants. The information used for this comes from the involvement in social and economic networks (p. 274). The second one is "Low Level of

Preparedness,” which is more often associated with a short stay abroad and inability to acquire needed resources and experience due to a situation caused by abrupt or unexpected changes in circumstances. Therefore, the migrant will have little resources to rely on or mobilise or utilise upon return. Finally, the last level is where the migrant has no preparedness. This occurs most frequently as a result of a forced repatriation or rejected application for stay in the host country. In cases of no preparedness, the migrant had not planned or prepared for return resulting in extremely difficult conditions upon return to the home country (p. 275).

6.5 Conclusion

Modern migration creates a need to identify the underlying variables for return migration and the ability of some returnees to become agents of change. The argument can no longer be made that the difference lies between skilled and unskilled labour migrants but rather the motivations, resources, preparedness and resource mobilisation of these individuals. As shown in the above theories, initial motivations for migration, length of stay abroad and the return conditions become of paramount importance when analysing preparedness, willingness, readiness, and the impact of return (p. 275).

By emphasizing these areas, return becomes more complex than simply voluntary and involuntary. Instead tangible and intangible resources, cross-border social and economic networks and the impact of the migrant to acquire and maintain these upon return lessen the need for the returnee to become reliant on others in the home country. With high levels of preparedness marked by these variables, migrants have a greater impact on development upon return because the reliance shifts from dependency of others to autonomy. It must also be reiterated that pre-and post-return conditions do have a direct impact on these variables

and the ability to impact such that they create the social connections so integral to the migrants level of preparedness (p. 275).


Therefore, the components of length abroad and type of migration, which were originally presented as strong cornerstones of the relationship between returnees and development, are presented here as influencers on the greater foundation of preparedness, resource mobilisation, pre-and post-return conditions, and cross-border networks; for it is these factors that allow for an autonomous return experience and the use of resources upon reintegration (p. 275).

7 Economic Channels of Return Migration

With the difficult transition period behind, the Polish economy has been booming. The country is catching up to Western living standards, has seen its unemployment sharply decrease, and its currency has strengthened against the British Pound and the Euro, all of which has decreased the appeal of working abroad (Dougherty, 2008).


A fall in unemployment has been the general trend since November 2002. In October 2008, unemployment was around 6.9 percent; “recession-induced” unemployment rose by 2.9 percent, see Figure 19. The economy has been growing since 2002. The anticipation of EU accession and the period following saw Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates at a steady accelerated pace of 6.5 percent in 2007 (Dougherty, 2008), or 6.8 percent according to the World Bank. Despite the global recession, Poland’s growth rate managed to be positive – the only EU member state to attain positive growth rates – at 1.7 percent in 2009 – and continued to grow in 2010 (Bartyzel, 2011), see figure 20 below. The strength of the Zloty against other global currencies like the Euro and British Pound reinforces the strength of the economy. Since Poland entrance to the EU, the Zloty has appreciated against the Euro by 32.73 percent. This gain was lost during the “peak” of the global financial crisis. However, since February 2009, the Zloty has once again appreciated against the Euro, see figure 21.

Figure 20. Poland's GDP growth rate, 1991 - 2009



Source: World Bank, 2011.

Figure 21. Poland's Unemployment rate, 1997 - 2011



Source: Eurostat, 2011.

There are three ways return migration may affect the economy - by boosting economic dynamism through entrepreneurship, addressing the labour shortage, and increasing financial capital. This will be examined further below.

7.1 Entrepreneurship


Entrepreneurship has a strong and vital effect on a country's economy by promoting and enhancing economic development and growth. Such importance has been ascribed to entrepreneurship ever since Schumpeter's theory of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934). Entrepreneurship fosters innovation, creates jobs, increases competition, promotes efficiency and increases productivity (Estrin *et al.*, 2009; North, 1990). Given its positive effect on the economy, a large and strong presence of entrepreneurs would be desirable for any transitional economy, including Poland.

An entrepreneur, according to Schumpeter, promotes economic development by pursuing personal wealth creation through taking on risk and becoming an innovator. Schumpeter's entrepreneur brings change through *creative destruction* (Schumpeter, 1934). An entrepreneur achieves creative destruction by creating new processes and technologies that destroy old ones. In order to carry out innovation, an entrepreneur must have control over the means of production and in extension must be able to keep the rewards of his innovation (Schumpeter, 1934). Another view of an entrepreneur is from Kirzner (1973). Kirzner's entrepreneur possesses the "highest order of knowledge" (Kirzner, 1973, p.68). With this knowledge, the entrepreneur discovers and recognises new market opportunities. According to Baumol (1996), entrepreneurship can be productive, which involves innovative activities. The type of entrepreneurial activity that is pursued depends on the quality of formal institutions and the attitude and culture promoted by informal institutions (McMillan and Woodruff, 2002). Entrepreneurship carried out by returning migrants is also important in

that its effects are similar to that of social remittance. Levitt (1998b) defines social remittance as “the ideas, behaviour, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities” (p.926). Social remittances can influence the home community’s concepts on legal and political organisations and inclination towards business entrepreneurship (Reynolds, 2008, p.8).

Given that the benefits of entrepreneurship are far-reaching to society at large, it is not surprising that entrepreneurship is a channel through which return migrants can positively influence their home country. Entrepreneurship can boost a country’s economic dynamism by introducing new services and innovation ideas into the marketplace. By boosting economic dynamism, a country’s Production Possibility Frontier (PPF) expands outward since the “maximum combination” of goods that can be produced, for a given a set amount of inputs, increases, see figure 22 below (Perloff, 2007, p.321). As such, increasing a country’s PPF will cause the economy to expand and grow. It is through this process that entrepreneurship fosters innovation, creates jobs, promotes efficiency and increases productivity (Estrin *et al.*, 2009; North, 1990).

Figure 22. An Unbiased Expansion in a Production Possibility Frontier



Source: Based on Perloff, 2007.

Entrepreneurship therefore serves as the only realistic way a return migrant can have a multiply effect on the economy. This is especially true since remittance goes to consumption and the low-skilled labour shortage is being met by increasing migrant labour forces from less affluent countries. This in turn creates the issue of skilled labour shortages and difficulties in matching the right people with the right jobs. Therefore, increasing the opportunity for entrepreneurial activity has the greatest potential effect on Poland's economy

In reference to migration, this process can occur when return migrants are able to productively reintegrate and allocate the resources and experience gained abroad. More and more highly-skilled workers are migrating from their home country. Between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of foreign-born, highly-skilled workers rose by more than 63 percent in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states (Lucas, 2008, p.9). In 2000, about 42 percent of these migrants with tertiary education were from OECD member states (Lucas, 2008, p.9). Migration with the EU for EU member states, as described above, confirms the current dynamic movement of EU citizens.

Highly-skilled migrants facilitate trade, capital flows, and technology transfers from their host country to their home country (Lucas, 2008, p.11). Such transfers are possible through migrants' connections and networks back home. In Saxenian (2002), skilled migrants were found to be an important channel in the transfer of technology (Lucas, 2008, p.12). Stark and Wang (2002) found this type of migration to encourage further education within the home country. This transfer of skills and experiences gained abroad for a developing country like Poland, which suffers from constant emigration, is great. Furthermore, there could be an intangible benefit from the influx of people with first-hand knowledge of the advanced economies west of Poland (Dougherty, 2008).

Lucas (2008) contends that countries with low-incomes comprise a larger share of countries sending tertiary-educated migrants, referencing Eastern Europe (p. 10). The number of foreign students that do not return home after their studies compounds this brain drain. Future research is required on this topic may look into the rate of return of Polish students to Poland. Thus far, only one researcher has analysed the return of tertiary graduates. However, this study only focused on foreign-born graduates in the United States (Finn, 2001, as cited in Lucas, 2008, p.10). The greatest challenge may be encouraging the return of these migrants. However, Bartocz (2009) illuminates how “[...] the grants under the Foundation for Polish Sciences' *Powroty* (Homing) program and the *Zostańcie z nami* (Stay With Us) program run by Polish newsweekly magazine *Polityka* entices young Poles to return from abroad and develop their scientific careers in Poland.” As evidenced through Mikołaj Olejniczak, Ph.D., a Polish national who was educated in the United States and conducted post-doctoral research under these grants with the purpose of return migration to Poland, encouraging return migration among this population is not impossible (Bartocz, 2009). Rather, as Olejniczak (as cited by Batocz, 2009) reveals, “The main advantage of working abroad is the opportunity to put your current knowledge into practice, see scientific problems in a wider perspective, and gain experience in a new area. All this is very useful on return to Poland. It is also worth remembering that all over the world a postdoctoral training position is regarded as an essential part of scientific development.” Based upon these grants and this example, this type of return or circular migration holds value to both the migrants and the home county and increases the further development of economic sectors and capital investments.

A critical assumption in the transfer of human capital from host to home country is that migrants were employed and utilising their skill set or gaining a higher one. It is common for migrants to obtain employment with higher remuneration, despite working at a

lower skill level (Lucas, 2008, p.6). The largest impact that gained human capital has on growth is via technical progress not improvements to worker's productivity (Davies, 2003, as cited in Lucas, 2008, p.7). Questions remain, however, about how the new qualifications of returnees will integrate with the needs of the Polish economy.

However, this does not preclude that a migrant working at job below his or her skill level cannot observe products or services in their host country that are unavailable at home. Entrepreneurship does not hold working at your skill level as a necessary requisite for successful opportunity.

7.2 Labour Shortage

Due to the aging population and shortage of labour, return migration can be beneficial for the Polish economy (Igllicka, 2010). The latest migration flows has created labour shortages in two primary categories: young, university graduates and low-skilled migrants. A benefit of migration of low-wage workers is the pool of workers in this group diminishes, leaving more opportunities for those who remain (Lucas, 2008, p.9). In theory, the flow of labourers out of Poland can increase the number of active labour participants. More people who are unemployed are able to take up employment by taking the jobs left by those migrants since there is less competition. However, instead of driving wages up for local labourers, there has been an increase in the inflow of foreign migrants. For example, the Polish government has been able to address the outflow of the second group by allowing citizens from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus since February 2008 and Moldova (June 2008) and Georgia (November 2009) to work in Poland without a work permit for six months in a 12-month period. Originally, citizens from Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus were only allowed to work without a permit for three months in a six-month period between August 2006 and February 2008. The

fact that the program was originally intended only for the agricultural sector and then it was extend to all other sectors illustrates how perverse the situation was (Iglicka, 2010).

Interesting the allotment of permits continued to increase despite the return of Polish migrants. In 2008, 18,022 permits were given while in 2009, this number increased to 29,340 permits (Iglicka, 2010). This fact illustrates how unlikely it is that low-skill return migrants would retake low paying jobs in Poland due to the large wage differentials between Poland and the host countries.

The labour shortage can be noted in interviews with employers. Since 2008, more employers are complaining about the difficulty in finding desired labour, with 51 percent of employers surveyed voicing this view. In 2009, the figure was at 48 percent (“Na rynku,” 2010). A lack of highly-trained physical workers such as electricians, plumbers, cooks, hairdressers and even project managers has been noted (“Na rynku,” 2010). However, the greatest shortage of labour is noted in the construction and building trades. An example of the shortage in the construction and building sectors is highlighted in the difficulty the government has had in utilising EU funds to implement infrastructure investment projects, due to the shortage of labour (Dougherty, 2008). Another example is construction firms having to hire labourers from countries like Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Mongolia, China, Ukraine, Bulgaria, etc. because there is a lack of unskilled Polish labourers desiring to work in these sectors in Poland (Dougherty, 2008).

On another employment website, the lack of engineers and qualified personnel in the energy sector was presented (Maciaszek, 2009). There is a lack of experiences and qualified specialist, which is the main impediment to fostering industrial/economic growth in Poland (“Otwarcie,” 2010). However, a more accurate description of the labour shortage problem lies in matching an appropriately qualified worker with a given job (“Na rynku,” 2010). One reason for this issue is that return migrants often lack appropriate job experience when

applying for jobs in Poland due to the fact that while they were employed abroad, their role was either below their qualification or in an unrelated sector (Bar, n.d.).

With a strong economy and labour shortages in certain fields, migrants are seeing opportunities in Poland itself (Dougherty, 2008). With return migration, the composition of the labour force can change to a more skilled one with foreign work and life experiences. The composition of the labour force and return migration can influence the economy by increasing the supply of labour, which would increase production of goods and services (Barro, 2010, p.77). With the economy growing, a multiplier effect occurs and various positive outcomes occur. More goods and services will be produced, leading to an increase in exports and a decrease in trade balance. A booming economy then feeds itself by creating more jobs, products and services (Krugman, 1987).

7.3 Remittance

The largest benefit of migration for the home country in general terms is remittance. Positive benefits can be derived from migration where unemployment and insecurity exist in the home country. However, remittances are subject to host country economic environments and even the home country's economy and strength of currency. While remittance more than doubled after Poland's accession into the EU from \$4.7 billion in 2004 to \$10.7 billion in 2008, remittances in 2009 decreased to \$8.5 billion, reflecting the economic downturn (Iglička, 2010). Understandably, the value of remittance would increase if migrants return with their accumulated savings from abroad (Dougherty, 2008). They would allow return migrants to capitalise upon the knowledge, skills, and networks gained and established abroad, while infusing the economic channels through the business sectors and homeland consumption.


Nevertheless, the value of the accumulated savings from abroad is also subject to the value of the savings in with respect to the Zloty.

With the strengthening of the Zloty, as evidenced by the 2011 European Central Bank Euro to Zloty Exchange Rate, see figure 21 in the preceding section, the remittances back home do not have the same buying power as they did before. Therefore, large transfers of capital are no longer realistic and will not impact the economy beyond increasing the purchasing ability of the immediate recipient. However, increasing the aggregate purchasing power of citizens does increase the aggregate demand, which results in the economy to producing more. Nevertheless, the valuation of these remittances influences a potential return migrant's willingness and readiness to return, and the amount of advanced planning required. They also inform how successful reintegration might be. Given all these factors, return migration programs and services increase the impact of accumulated savings from abroad, remittances, and resultant investments when these contributions are promoted and extended through programs like the EU grant for small business establishment and services offered through *Powroty*.

Remittance is, of course, another benefit of migration for a home country for other reasons (Lucas, 2008, p. 1). New financial capital brought into the country via migrants' savings is vital for personal and national investments. Using migrants' savings can influence the economy in the most basic sense by increasing capital within the country. An increase in capital can have two effects. First, it leads to an increase in access to savings and financial services if the capital is put into a financial intermediary such as a bank. Banks can then match these new sources of capital with those who are in demand for credit (Perloff, 2007, p.569). An increase in available capital decreases interest rates, which increases investments and expansion of business as the cost of borrowing or cost of capital decreases (Perloff, 2007, p.569), see figure below. Increases in investments or expansion of business both have further


positive multiplying effects on the economy, i.e. increasing goods produced and employment (Barro, 2010). Increase in capital also increases the purchasing power of recipients, which increases the aggregate domestic demand; see figures 23 and 24 below (Barro, 2010, p. 137). This, too, has further positive effects.

Figure 23. Capital Market Equilibrium



Source: Perloff, 2007.

Figure 24. Effect of an Increase in Real Income on the Household Budget Constraint



Source: Barro, 2010.

For many developing countries, remittance inflows are only second to direct foreign investment as a source of financial inflows and thus being more important than debt flows and official development assistance (Lucas, 2008, p.7). Remittances are further vital to the home country because remittances tend to increase or stay stable when the home country has found itself in an economic crisis (World Bank, 2006, as cited in Lucas, 2008, p.7). During such times, other financial flows tend to flee out. As such, remittances are less volatile than other external capital flows (Lucas, 2008). Despite these benefits, it is disputed whether or not remittances stimulate domestic investments and in extension economic growth (Chami *et al.*, 2003; Catrinescu *et al.*, 2009, as cited in Lucas, 2008, p.8). Some studies have found the remittances are used to increase spending on housing and education (Edwards, 2003, as cited in Lucas, 2008, p.8). However, Azam and Guber (2005) found remittances increased withdrawal from labour force participation and/or reduction from labour participation (as cited in Lucas, 2008, p.8).

Return migration should be encouraged and supported. The mind-set of migrants intending to return is different than that of those intending to permanently stay in the host country. These migrants send more remittances home, maintain their ties and contacts, and return home with new perspectives, experiences, and attitudes (Lucas, 2008, p.16).

In economic terms, migrants provide great economic assistance to those remaining in the home country through remittances, which affects the local economy most strongly (Jones, 1998; Carling 2002). However, remittances can lead to a culture that is dependent and consumptive, and result in economic decline (Reynolds, 2008, p.7). Chevannes (1996) attests a decline in work ethic to dependency on remittances (as cited in Reynolds, 2008, p.7) and decline in personal and professional aspirations (Hillman, 2003). Nevertheless, remittances have particularly positive and influential effect on the individual and household levels. An additional benefit of remittance is it increases and enhances the attachment and sense of responsibility to the home country in migrants.

8 Polish Return Migration Programs

8.1 *Powroty*

The heading of this website succinctly describes this program: *Masz Plan na powrot?* This literally means “do you have a plan for your return?” The “pl” in the word “plan” is capitalised, referencing the abbreviation for Poland (“Masz,” 2008). According to Maciej Szczepanski (2009), Coordinator of *powroty.gov.pl*, “the [Powroty] program [was] launched in November 2008 by the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, with the support of governmental institutions,” the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the Human Resource Development Centre (Centrum Rozwoju Zasobow Ludzkich) and the EU Social Fund Human Capital Program (“Human,” 2009). Non-Governmental Organisations and other experts additionally support the website (Szczepanski, 2009).

The purpose of *Powroty* “is to assist Polish nationals in their repatriation process by providing resources and information” (Szczepanski, 2009). Therefore, *Powroty* is supposed to provide practical advice on everything that has to do with return migration for all Polish migrants. Because it is accessible to all Polish migrants, regardless of locality or time zone, this website greatly influences return migration given that the *Powroty* website was designed to be a central communication channel between Poland and Poland nationals seeking repatriation. As such, it most effectively targets the migrants seeking return and their social and migrant networks. Since the Polish Diaspora is a close-knit community that has strengthened its traditional bond with the Motherland thanks to new, modern technologies: by low-cost airlines, Skype and the Internet (Dougherty, 2008), the *Powroty* website and its placement are a natural extension of this interaction.

This website is designed to provide practical advice on a return to Poland for all Polish migrants and should provide the largest impact into return migration. The *Powroty* website provides up-to-date information on regulations and procedures, on employment and starting a

new business and the resources required to do so. It also details which documents are required to verify foreign employment and includes the criteria for unemployment benefits eligibility. Information regarding taxation and regulations concerning paying taxes on income gained in various countries is also available. Additionally, Polish migrants can consult with experts and practitioners via webinars or direct consultations. They can also learn about local and regional initiatives through the “Events section,” which has current information about job fairs or other events designed to help facilitate return migration to specific regions. Notably, migrants can discover which Polish employers and the Polish EURES (The European Job Mobility Portal) advisers will be participating at the advertised job fair. Through this method, the website helps Polish migrants plan their return to the Motherland and reasonably assures reintegration (“Masz,” 2008).

Much more than this, the “*Powroty*” website provides migrants with information beyond finances and employment. The website provides various information regarding personal matters. Migrants can learn how to register marriages that took place abroad and foreign spouses for residence in Poland, how to continue their children’s education upon return, etc. Finally, there is a section devoted to information from the various regions in Poland. In this section, migrants can find information regarding the labour market in that very region, special workshops, seminars, and schooling organised in the region, job fairs and work expos, as well as important information regarding other regional institutions that can provide additional assistance (“Masz,” 2008).

The method in which the *Powroty* website is organised is also very important. The site encourages migrants to go on the site, look around, and most importantly, ask questions. In fact, Szczepanski (2009) reveals that experts answer questions and respond to requests within four business days. Given that *Powroty* is advertised at all Polish embassies, institutes, and Polish magazines and publications abroad, the website received an average of 100 to 120 emails weekly (Szczepanski, 2009).

8.2 *Action 6.2 – Support and Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment*

The final program described in this section is entitled *Action 6.2 Support and promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment* and is under the Human Capital Operational Program. (HC OP). Action 6.2 attempts to encourage return migration by providing a financial incentive in the form of a grant to return migrants with the desire and skills to start their own business. It is hoped this will in turn increase domestic economic activity and labour participation levels (“Human,” 2009).

The scheme is not entirely Polish in its creation. The support and funding is sourced from the Operational Programme for Human Capital under the European Social Fund (ESF) in Poland (“Human,” 2009). The Human Capital Operational Programme is financed mainly with EU social funds with 15 percent of the Programme being funded by the national budget (“Human,” 2009). The Operational Programme for Human Capital is one of many Operational Programmes designed to meet the objectives of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) 2007-2013 (“Human,” 2009; “Introduction,” 2009). The Operational Programme was created to meet the various goals of the Lisbon Strategy. Some of these objectives include: 1. Enhancing Europe’s attractiveness for investments and new jobs, 2. Developing innovation and knowledge, and 3. Creating new jobs (“Human,” 2009). Three objectives of the Programmes relate to return migration: 1. Increasing professional activity and the ability of finding employment for both the unemployed and/or professionally passive, 2. Increasing social inclusion, and 3. Enhancing the adaptability of employees and enterprises to economic and business changes (“Human,” 2009).

This program is available to any return migrants who would like to start their own business, with each successful candidate receiving a grant of up to 40,000 Zlotys. This grant may also be paid to successful cooperatives instead of an individual. These grants are not repayable and may be used to fully fund any start-up costs. This may be very beneficial for

those that lack the financial means to develop an idea. However, the grant is paid in instalments, with the final 20 percent paid only as a reimbursement for expenses incurred (“Masz,” 2008).

The grant however does list impose some criteria including a maximum of 40 percent of the grant is allowed to be spent purchasing assets. Furthermore, these expenditures need to be justified in the application. The funding can also be used to transport equipment or franchise license. Once again, only 40 percent of the grant can be used for this expense (“Masz,” 2008).

This program does not only provide financial support for those starting their own business but also other assistance. For example, recipients also receive consultancy and training in basic task and knowledge necessary to establish and run a business. This includes training and advice on topics such as taxes, insurance, labour law, health and safety obligations, commercial law, marketing, etc. (“Masz,” 2008).

The grant was initially to be directed to those who have the greatest difficulty becoming and remaining employed. For instance, people who have been unemployed for at least 12 months in the last 2 years, women and in particular those who have left the labour market for childbirth, persons aged under 25 or over 45, the disabled, and finally those living in rural areas or urban areas with less than 25,000 people. Restrictions placed on this initial grant ruled out agricultural pursuits, current or recent business owners and those without standing taxes or social security contributions. The grant has since been extended to target the equally important return migrants (“Human,” 2009).

The *Powroty* website has taken an active role in promoting and informing returning migrants about Action 6.2 - "Support and promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment". Information detailing this opportunity and other crucial information including

the application and interview process, application requirements and other details are provided for migrants in a known, convenient location (“Human,” 2009)..

Information is provided detailing this opportunity and other crucial information about this program in a single convenient and accessible location. In addition to the information present above, using the *Powroty* website, migrants are able to learn about the application procedure, description of the interview process, the requirements of a preliminary outline business plan and obligatory annexes, and how to properly notify the various intermediaries. Finally, one of the conditions of applying for the grant is to complete training and advisory sessions (“Masz,” 2008).

The *Powroty* website also provides return migrants with information on how to obtain other forms of financial support for starting a business. If migrants want more information, the website provides them with a list of other locations or sources: regional employment offices, points of information on European funds, and consultation centres (“Masz,” 2008).

8.3 *Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski*

Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski (Blizej) is designed to expand the services offered by the Polish embassies and consulates - seen as an important tool in maintaining the link between the host and home country. This provides a channel to keep migrants informed about progress and changes in the business environment (and in general) in Poland. It also provides information on welfare services, business contracts, etc. directed to the migrant community with the goal of enticing migrants to return (Republic, 2007).

The large increase in migration of Poles has increased the need for consular services. According to their own calculations, the consulates have seen an increase of four times the amount of migrants requiring their services. The largest increase was in registering and non-

registering activities. Registering activities include: services related to passports, visas, legalisation, civil status, inheritance, etc. These services are listed in the Consular Fee Table (Tabela Opłat Konsularnych) and are regulated by the Decree of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 14.08.2003. There are 71 such services. Non-registering services include all other activities that are done for Polish citizens and others, which are not included in the Consular Fee Table. These activities include visits to prison, hospitals, cemeteries, legal, financial, and psychological assistance in difficult circumstances, extensive information campaigns, and cooperation and working with local Polish organisations and institutions in matters of Polish citizens (Republic, 2007, p.18).

To meet this demand, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which is governs the Polish consulates, created the *Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski program* in order to increase their “care” towards Polish labour migrants. This program was created in conjunction with seven other Ministries: Education, Science and Higher Education, Economy, Internal Affairs and Administration, Regional Development, Finances and Culture and National Heritage. This program demonstrates the coordination and cooperation between various Polish institutions (Republic, 2007, p.1). *Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski* means the closer you are to work, the closer you are to Poland.

The new Program has two main goals and a third supplementary. The first goal to meet the demand in requested services by Poles abroad by making it easier to access and contact the consulates and providing more accurate services at the consulates. The second goal is to provide basic information about the working and living conditions in a given country in addition to providing information on other institutions that can also provide useful assistance i.e. social workers, employing agencies, welfare benefits, etc. (Republic, 2007, p 5). Finally, the supplemental goal of the Program is to assists migrants in maintaining a connection with Poland and providing information about the current situation in Poland.

In order to meet the demands for information, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is providing information for every given country in Polish on the topic of living and working in the host country. This information is also being made available within Poland in order to help migrants prepare for the trip prior to leaving. New posts have also been created in the most popular destination countries for Polish migrants dealing with issues related to migration (Republic, 2007, p 7).

The goals of the Program are intended to increase preparedness prior to migration and to a lesser degree prior to return so that migrants can find better opportunities through which they can match their skills and desire and in the future can transfer them. This ensures increases the probability that migrants will be able to utilise their qualifications and human capital, which will allow migrants to increase and improve/ enhance their skills and if they do return home, then it will be with more human capital, facilitating the transfer of knowledge (Republic, 2007).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs realized this Program through three venues: restructuring the workers, restructuring the buildings and adding locations, and increasing access to information. Restructuring the workers: the Program increased the hours the consulate is opened including being opened longer twice a week, so people can come after work. There are now workers that are responsible for providing information on welfare benefits, work contracts, other laws, and information on housing, schools, language courses (Republic, 2007, p 5). Through this Program new locations were opened in Katanii, Manchester, Reykjavik, and Salonik. The number of consular employees has increased in various cities: London –2, Athens, Brussels, Helsinki, Lisbon, Malmo, and Oslo all to 1. The number of positions to be staff by local Poles in the country was increased in Dublin to 4, Oslo to 3, London to 2, and Brussels, Edinburg, Haga, Helsinki, Kopenhagen, Lisbon, and Milan all to 1 (Republic, 2007, p 6). Expanding personnel and operations has also resulted in

physical expansion. In three cities, Dublin, London and Oslo, the consulate is renting out neighbouring buildings to meet demand. Modernising, expanding and remodelling of 8 locations: Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Brussels, Malmö, Milan, Rome, and Stockholm (Republic, 2007, p. 6).

9 Creation of Evaluation Rubric

In the above Return Migration Theory section, I explained for each theory in detail how return migration is viewed, when it occurs, and what effect it has on the home country. In this section, I will take the most important element from the various theories above and combine them into one rubric that will be used to evaluate the three return migration programs. Overall, the theories above have made it clear that success upon return is dependent upon: 1) wanting to return, 2) being able to prepare for return, 3) having the means to return, 4) returning with social or financial capital, with new skills, abilities, experiences, and ideas, and 5) being able to do something with this capital once in the home country. Through the analysis of each program and their components, the rating system engaged and the analysis thereof, it becomes evident which programs fulfil these five areas assure the chances of return migration success (International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 2011) and appropriately address return migration.

Willingness to return is, of course, the most fundamental element to return migration. While economic theories reveal this desire to return stems from different desires and the conditions that engender them, each economic theory does address the desire or willingness to return. Although the New economics of labour migration's premise for return migration differs significantly from that of neoclassical economics, it contends return migration does occur simply because the migrant desires to return home. Whereas, in the Structural approach, nostalgia pulls the migrant home and motivates return. In the Transnational, Social Network and Conceptual approaches, however, return migration transpires because the migrant desires to return home and has maintained connections with family and friends. These connections are particularly important because these family and friends provide the migrant with important information about the current situation in the home country and

maintain a sense of rootedness in the home country. With this information, the migrant can make an informed decision whether or not returning is the right choice for them.

Since migrants have the time, resources, and network to research the new opportunities that exist in the home country, the migrant becomes more engaged in these new possibilities in their home country and is more able to achieve success upon return. Given these conditions, return migrants are successful; they are able to leverage all that they gained abroad: skills, experiences, knowledge, values, and acquaintances and merge it with the information gained from networks within the home country. This integration not only helps increase the desire to return, but also facilitates the migrant's level of planning and preparedness, the ability to do so and return migration outcomes.

Reasonably, the different levels of preparedness arise from the conditions that give rise to willingness to return, and/or the host country's environment and conditions. Preparedness also stems from a migrant's willingness to return. Under Neoclassical Economics, return migration occurs because the migrant had no choice but to return to the home country. This circumstance might limit preparedness in unexpected ways, especially if the host country's environment or its conditions change swiftly. The levels of preparedness experienced under Neoclassical Economics could then intersect those of the Structural approach. In fact, the Structural approach illustrates lack of preparedness because the return migrants did not obtain enough information about the conditions in the home country. On the other hand, the Transnational approach holds that returns only occur when the "conditions are favourable" (Cassarino, 2004, p. 269). This means when changes have taken place back home and there are new opportunities, the resultant favourable conditions elevate levels of preparedness and the desire and willingness to return home. Notably, as well, preparedness is a key element of the Social Network and Conceptual approaches to return migration.

Utilisation of skills, knowledge and experience upon return differs significantly among theories. Under the Neoclassical Economics and the Structural approaches, skills are wasted or not utilised once a migrant returns home. For Neoclassical Economics, the reasons for this inability to use these skills, knowledge and experience extends from an unsuccessful migration in the first instance, while Structuralism contends the return migrant is often old, ill, retired, and/or untalented. However, the utilisation of skills is an important characteristic of the Transnational, Social Network, and Conceptual theories. In these theories, experiences gained from abroad determine the migrants' future back home, ensuring that it progresses forward.

In majority of the theories above, savings and remittance primarily goes to family. Because of this, savings and remittances do not go towards the development of the country. This is true for Structuralism and New Economics of Labor Migration theories while no savings are brought under the neoclassical economics theory. Under the New economics of labour migration theory, migrants are viewed in a positive light of serving as “financial intermediary[ies]” (Taylor, 1996, as cited by Cassarino, 2004, p.257) More economic potential is ascribed to migrants in the Social Network and Conceptual theories. In the Social Network, migrants' savings are put to productive projects; while in the Conceptual theory, savings are put towards investment purposes.

Accordingly, based upon the characteristics, behaviours, attitudes, strategies of migrants and theories and the economic channels through which migrants can affect the economy, the following rubric was designed to explore how the programs meet the needs of return migrants and how the components satisfy the five factors that promote return migration and reasonably assure success. This rubric also incorporates the key factors the theories above stress as an important factor in encouraging return migration along with the identified economic channels. These program components and factors were also arranged in order to be

further examine them through Ravenstein’s (1889) “Law of Migration,” Everette Lee’s (1966) “Migration Theory” and Cassarino’s (2004) Conceptual Approach to Return Migration, as well, see Rubric 1.

Rubric 1. Holistic Approach to Return Migration Program Evaluation

Ravestein’s Law of Migration	Push factors		Pull factors					Return Success factors		Program pushes Program pulls and promotes return success		
Cassarino & Lee	Desire to return		Ability / Desire to return	Builds social & financial capital for return success & Possible reintegration	Means to return		Ability to use or build upon skills, knowledge, training gained abroad through economic opportunities		Reintegration Success Factors		Program ability to: cultivate desire to return, the ability to do so with financial and social capital in Poland, the skills, knowledge and ability to contribute economically and deter circular migration.	
Program	Cultivates Desire & Personal factors Push factor	Communication Channel efficacy/Connect with Poland	Economic Environment Favourable (pull)	Financial capital upon return	Social capital upon return	Skills , networks, knowledge obtained abroad	Satisfies attainment/ Able to do something with skills	Entrepreneurial Desires / Opportunities	Meets Readiness & Planning Needs (Success factors)	Reintegration Support	Program Total score	Average
Powroty	5	5	4	4	5	5	5	4	5	5	47	4.7
EU	5	2	5	5	0	5	5	5	5	0	37	3.7
BL	0	3	?	3	0	5	3	3	3	2	22	2.2

Source: Own construction based on Cassarino (2004); IOM (2011); Lee (1966), and Ravenstein (1889).

10 Evaluation

10.1 *Powroty* *

Powroty effectively cultivates desire to return or increases its level through the communication utilised, the play on words projected in its web address and the ways in which information is arranged. Infused with Polish language, roots of Polish culture and identity, it appeals to a migrant's sense of longing for home. Inevitably, that longing also contains numerous components including familiarity, family, shared history, and even a sense of belonging. From distant places in which Polish migrants live, the idea of "home" appeals.

Due to its web presence, *Powroty* combines the cultural elements and culturally moderated communication strategies with the technology most migrants use. As previously explicated, Skype, email and other web-based or VOIP communication venues connect family and friends with migrants. Therefore, using a website to disseminate information about planning one's return or exploring the possibility increases the longing or desire for return migration, which initiates planning and/or preparedness. These possibilities are promoted through "The Events" section through local social and business venues, job fairs, etc. In this sense, it serves as an appropriate medium. Since it is accessible 24 hours a day, on demand, from virtually any location, *Powroty* also projects Poland and the *Powroty* network and communications into the Polish Diasporas. Therefore, it "pushes" migrants to return home.

Moreover, Poland's programs like the *Powroty* naturally appeal to migrants willing to return. In fact, *Powroty* draws upon the Poles' connection with their homeland, the value that it holds, their familial ties, and their linguistic and cultural familiarity. Since the Polish Diaspora is a close-knit community that has strengthened its traditional bond with the Motherland thanks to new, modern technologies: by low-cost airlines, Skype and the Internet (Dougherty, 2008), *Powroty*, as a communication channel, effectively connects Poles abroad

with the information, services and community. It draws upon their sense of belonging and promotes the value of their skills, knowledge and expertise gained abroad; it pushes and pulls at the same time. It addresses the costs of migration, the sacrifices, the challenges and the associative dilemmas. Any migration program deficiency therein would inevitably induce lesser participation and economic growth.

Because the push factor is strong, “pull” factors (Ravenstein, 1889) can further induce return migration through revealing favourable economic conditions, establishing professional connections and social capital in Poland prior to return and preparing the return migrant for repatriation. By streamlining and facilitating the bureaucratic processes and the dissemination of this information, *Powroty* increases the push and pull factors. It also elevates the return migrant’s level of readiness through planning. Additionally, *Powroty*, acculturates the return migrants to some level through the nature of communication on its website.

Furthermore, *Powroty* attracts return migrants back home, especially those who are skilled, knowledgeable or have ideas for new businesses. As *Powroty* offers webinars for small business training, introduces grant opportunities for entrepreneurships, and details the application process for such grants, *Powroty* inspires aspiring return migrants to complete applications for such grants or at least envision the small businesses they could create. This is especially critical for the highly skilled or experienced migrant workers who have gained considerable knowledge, skill and social capital abroad. Since *Powroty* also provide information on social programs for return migrants for reintegration, this information also meets migrants’ economic needs through the transfer of unemployment benefits and connects the return migrants with government and state-supported services. As such, *Powroty* meets the requirements for successful return migration as set forth by Cassarino (2004). While *Powroty* tries to help integrate through accommodation and inclusion, it needs to assist returnees find employment and in adjusting to the Polish labour market to assure more

successful integration. Nevertheless, *Powroty* touches on all of the important factors identified by each theory. For all of these reasons, *Powroty* achieved the highest rating in the rubric and offered Polish return migrants the best chances for return migration. As such, *Powroty* also limits the chances of the need for a return to circular migration, which is prevalent in Europe.

10.2 Action 6.2 – Support and Promotion of Entrepreneurship and Self-Employment

Similar to *Powroty*, the *Action 6.2 – Support and promotion of entrepreneurship and self-employment (Action 6.2)* grant increases a migrant’s desire to return home by addressing a factor that is singularly important: money. The *Action 6.2* grant for starting a private business provides the “condition ... [that] motivate[s the] return” (Cassarino, 2008, p. 101). This condition is a very strong “pull” factor, which further stimulates return migration. As with *Powroty*, the grant is a “pull” factor because it creates a favourable economic environment for the returnee. According to Cassarino, if migrants increase their resources, experiences, and knowledge, their return experience will fare better (Cassarino, 2004). Whereas, the *Action 6.2* grant capitalises on migrants’ experiences and knowledge while providing migrants with the financial capital and opportunity to do so, the migrants themselves must be willing to return. While the *Action 6.2* grant does contain the potential to increase desire and willingness to return, the *Action 6.2* grant process understandably necessitates planning. It requires migrants to more fully prepare through the application process, through the necessary research to do so and even the deepening of connections in Poland. After all, the family ties and their networks provide information about the regions and conditions and the possibilities that exist.

10.3 *Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski*

Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski (Blizej) focuses on the preparedness aspect of return migration, since being prepared to return is critical to the successfulness of any migrant's return to their home country and it is what differentiates the various return migrants' experiences. As stated by Cassarino, return preparedness is a process which, "takes place in real life, through time, and is shaped by changing circumstance" (Cassarino, 2008, p. 95). Gathering the resources needed to ensure one's return and being able to return are vital elements in the return process (Cassarino, 2008, p. 95). In this regard, the design of the *Blizej* program assists migrants in increasing their preparedness. By facilitating this process, the program serves as a "pull" factor; migrants are aware that they are able to prepare themselves for a successful return.

The *Blizej Pracy, Blizej Polski (Blizej)* program serves as a "push" factor through its aim to make the migration experience abroad better by providing vital services to migrants once they are abroad. However, an overall assessment of *Blizej* shows that the program is marginally beneficial for return migration. In effect, the program is more of a public relations (PR) entity for *Powroty*. As such, it maintains the migrant sense of "rootedness" to Poland and its value. The *Blizej* program ensures that migrants will have positive experiences abroad by providing them with assistance to assure that they can return with value-added. This, in turn, co-authors preparedness, favourable situations in the Home country and the potentiality return migration contains. In essence, the *Blizej* program appeals to the younger migrants that see their time abroad as a stepping stone to their aims of return migration.

Based upon this evaluation, these programs meet various requirements of successful return migration. In some sense, these programs substantiate Cassarino's contentions that programs should enhance migrants' readiness, meaning increasing their awareness and informing them about the conditions in both the host and home countries (Cassarino, 2004).

This is the aim of the *Powroty* website. The EU grant capitalises on migrants' experiences and knowledge while providing migrants financial capital. As such, it fulfils the requirement set forth by Cassarino, who maintained that if migrants increase their resources, experiences, and knowledge, their return experience will fare better (Cassarino, 2004). However, reintegration is critical for the migrant and the society.

10.4 Re-integration and Re-adaptation

The theories above assume, to various degrees, integration has occurred or will occur. Integration is a key aspect which enables migrants to transfer the skills and know-how they have gained abroad to their home country. The integration of migrants is a concept often written in conjunction with migration when discussing host country and migrants' assimilation. However, this topic is not often mentioned in reference to those who have migrated back to their home country despite the issue of integration being as equally important for the success of a return. The theory of integration in migration is concerned with moving minority groups and the underprivileged from marginal position in society into the mainstream, and therefore, uniting and joining different social groups. For this reason, integration is a useful concept to use when analysing the opportunities and well-being of migrants, a group of people who are not native to society.

According to Grzymala-Kaz³owska (2008), the integration process of returning migrants can be analysed on three different levels: (1) as individuals, their individual experiences and situation as returning migrants; (2) the group level – the interaction between migrants and the home society; and (3) at the macro level - any legal and institutional barriers/ the interaction between migrants and the state i.e. institutions (macro level) (p.5).

In Grabowsk-Lusinska (2010), the authors contend that the concept of structural integration and its concern for the placement of a migrant in social structures and the process of exchanging resources, ideas, etc. that takes places between migrants and those already presented in society, (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006) can be applied to return migration since return migrants must also relocate themselves and engage in a process of exchange with the locals. Any departure from the home country and return will require a form of re-adaptation since cultures and societies are constantly evolving and changing (Grabowsk-Lusinska, 2010). According to Berry (1997) and Segal (2002) integration is a form of adaptation to a new environment. Incorporating the return of migrants to their home, Nowicka (2008) introduces the “home comer” model (as cited in Grabowsk-Lusinska, 2010, p.11). This concept is based upon Odysseus, who felt displaced within his own home in Ithaca and experienced shock and difficulty settling in a home that was very different than the one he left. Another perspective on this issue is through the two duelling paths a migrant may take to re-enter his world/society back home (Ni Laoire, 2008). The first one is effortless, re-entering and reintegrating into his former life. In the second path however, the migrant returns home a different person and struggles to accept his former life. This struggle may also be in reference to accepting the same position, job, lifestyle, institutions, society, etc.

The *Powroty* website is the only program that focuses on assisting returning migrants with reintegrating back into society. The website does this through a very practical approach. On the website, migrants can find very useful and very important information on topics ranging from finding employment, receiving social welfare, the tax system in Poland, health services, moving tips etc. Providing such useful information is important because it decreases the possibility of the returnee could have of running into difficulties, which would

increase the possibility of the returnee introducing doubt into his/her decision to return back home.

Re-adaptation determines how long the return migrant will stay and the quality of the stay. It is important for these programs to also address this issue. Furthermore, re-adaptation is also important during the migration period because both the migrant and the home country could have changed. For example, a migrant living in Ireland or UK will have become more familiar and possibly comfortable with the well-developed economy there during their migration. This element should be highlighted because the country that the migrants left is different from the country they are returning to and equally, it is different from the host country given Poland's accession to the EU; all of this requires re-adaptation (Gmelch, 1980). Although a return migrant is returning to his or her home, they once again must relearn to function in this country, to its laws and institutions, culture and society, and the functioning and idiosyncrasies of its economy. As stated above, the information gained through the *Powroty* and to a lesser degree from *Blizej pracy*, *Blizej Polski* facilitates the migrants' re-adaptation process.

To understand the importance of the re-integration and re-adaptation, a historical example is provided. Between 1989 and 2002, there was an influx of Poles returning to Poland, when returning Poles composed the largest component of migrants; more than 87,000 Poles returned to Poland during this period. However, 28 percent of these Poles left prior to the next census, citing the difficulties they endured in assimilating/ reintegrating back into Polish society and culture and finding employment. Their reasons for departure were: difficulty in creating a life for their entire family -assimilating back – and better job opportunities⁷. For these reasons, it is very important for the various programs address directly or indirectly re-integration and re-adaption to Poland and Polish society and

⁷ Although, the amount of 28 percent is high, the accession to the EU provided Poles with ability to legally work and set up their own businesses in certain countries (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009; Grabowsk-Lusinska, 2010)..

preventing such an outflow from occurring again (Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009; Grabowska-Lusinska, 2010).

10.4 Economic Channels

The effect return migration can have on an economy depends on many factors: the skill set of those who leave and who return. A critical element in ensuring positive effects from return migration is being able to match the skills return migrants bring with them back to their home country and the demands of the home economy (Lucas, 2008, p. 9). Migrants with new, unique skills may have a difficult time matching their skill set with the given conditions in the home country. Both the website and the EU grant address this issue; the website provides links to various job portals to help migrants find jobs and the EU grant allows those with special or unique skills to utilise them by starting their own business.

The *Action 6.2* grant addresses the concerns of the Transnational, Social Network, and Conceptual theories of utilising skills and experiences gained abroad. However, the Conceptual theory points out the migrants can be used to spur investment in the home country. By granting migrants the financial resources to start their own business; migrants become an investment in the country by opening a business, providing a new service to residents, and potentially hiring employees. As the *Economic Channels* section pointed out, with the strengthening of the Zloty, remittances back home do not have the same buying power as they did before (Dougherty, 2008). The *Action 6.2* grant to start a new business addresses the problem of a lack of funds and credit history migrants' may have to obstruct their endeavours in starting their own business. As such, the *Action 6.2* grant makes the successful return "physically" possible for those with entrepreneurial aspirations with the

Powroty prepares migrants for a successful return by helping locate potential places of employment.

Overall, in the respect to the economic development of Poland, the website and EU grant for starting a business are moving away from remittances-based development/sustainment of the local economy to a more long-term solution for utilising migrants for the local development. This approach can have a great benefit in Poland, given that there are more migrants from rural areas returning home (Grabowsk-Lusinska, 2010) and these areas are most in need of economic growth and stimulus. The Global Commission of International Migration (GCIM) has even put forth “new directions for action” calling for the utilisation of migrants and emigrant communities abroad for local development stating “countries of origin can gain a considerable advantage by harnessing the talents and resources of Diaspora populations, which have grown significantly in size and scope as a result of the recent expansion of international migration” (Global Commission of International Migration, 2005, p. 29, as cited in Markova, 2007). Furthermore, leveraging these talents and resources is coupled with migrant self-awareness of their ability to impact their home country.

In her study of Caribbean return migrants, Reynolds (2008) noted that many young returnees viewed their return as helping the country develop. These migrants were acutely aware of the benefit their knowledge and skills obtained in the UK were in the Caribbean. These migrants viewed their return as a “vehicle through which to reinvest and ‘give back’ to society” (Reynolds, 2008, p. 14). Such awareness is important for migrants to feel vested in the development of their country. *Powroty* achieves this through its play on words in the motto of the program: *Masz PŁan na powrot?* (“Do you have a PŁan to return?”), with the capitalised ‘PŁ’ referring to Poland (“Masz,” 2008). The EU grant provides return migrants with the opportunity to be vested in Poland and the possibility to contribute their skills gained abroad and innovate society through entrepreneurship. Coupled with the website and the EU

grant opportunity, these programs cultivate the idea that they are valuable to Poland within the potential return migrants. This was demonstrated with the scientist featured in the *Warsaw Voice* (Bartocz, 2009).

11 Theoretical Underling of Polish Return Migration Programs

While the previous section explored how programs meet the five conditions for successful return migration, these program elements can also be examined through the lenses of other theories and conclude with suggestions for improvement. While the five conditions for successful migration inevitably apply universally, the programs and their developments must also reach their target audience, encourage participation within the communication channel and the program offerings and also inspire action—return migration. For these reasons, this next section will explore Polish migration, theoretical applications, and preparedness.

Polish migration seems best described by a combination of Transnational, Cross-border social network and Conceptual theories of return migration in their intention and structure. The *Powroty* program follows the recommendation of the Conceptual theory of focusing intensely on the preparedness of the return migrants. The website provides return migrants with thorough information on every basic and important topic. Such preparedness ensures the great possibility of a successful return with the migrant being fully knowledgeable of the conditions awaiting back home. Fully prepared, a migrant is able to effectively re-integrate and move on in their new life back home.

Preparedness also goes hand in hand with being able to maximise the possibilities available once the migrant returns. In Cross-border social network, the networks provide migrants with vast amounts of information, which allows migrants to identify new opportunities back home. Preparedness, being aware of possibilities, in particular, supplemented by familial or network support is key components of migrants' success back home. By staying in contact with friends and family, through the *Powroty* website, or through the *Blizej pracy, Blizej Polski* program, migrants are kept involved and vested with the country in Poland. The *Blizej pracy, Blizej Polski* program maintains a more official link with the home country and migrants abroad, as well as assists migrants in the preparation.

However, the *Powroty* website is much more effective in the assistance of migrant preparation to return because it is easier to use. Migrants can go on the internet at whatever time of day and find the information that they specifically need.

Programs concur to following Cassarino's prescription of increasing preparedness and increasing utilisation of what has been gained abroad. Cassarino's theory is the only one that stipulates that migrant financial resources may be used for investment purposes (Cassarino, 2004). Although, he does stress that the migrant would need to be very well-prepared and organised for this to occur. The IOM guidelines, in *Designing a Programme for Assisted Voluntary Return*, do contend that the host country needs to and facilitate preparedness this. In fact, the IOM (2011) substantiates that this type of preparedness also assures greater success of return migration and thereby limits chances of a return converting into circular migration.

Both the *Powroty* website and the EU grant allow migrants to utilise human capital gain while abroad, although both programs do so in a dissimilar manner. As transnationalism stresses, the skills and experiences gained enhance upward mobility for the migrant. The *Powroty* website provides migrants with necessary information to ensure success abroad by finding an appropriate job back home. The EU grant, on the other hand, allows migrants who have needed skills or innovative ideas, the opportunity to investment in their home country with productive projects (Conceptual and Social Network). Another important effect of the programs is that by advertising all of the new possibilities and opportunities back home, these programs encourage migrants to return home. It is possible that a migrant who was not interested in returning back to Poland learns about the EU grant and decides to return solely to take up the opportunity to start his own business.

As was detailed, the programs do address and focus on factor identified by Transnational, Cross-border social network and Conceptual to be vital for the success of return migration.

12 Improvements

The aim of the program of the program is to prepare return migrants in order for migrants to have ensured a successful return. If migrants are well prepared, they will be more likely to utilise their skills and experiences. These programs aim to modernize and create a dynamic economy by leveraging its citizens abroad beyond enabling entrepreneurship in Poland or increasing aggregate demand for goods. However, remittances also represent a missed opportunity for Poland. There are no programs organising migrants' remittances towards specific development projects.

From these programs, one can conclude that Poland's intent is to prepare migrants, help them best utilise their skills or help them develop new skills and use their experiences from abroad to make Poland's economy more dynamic by giving migrants the possibility to make real their entrepreneurial ideas. By doing so, it also decreases the chances of these return migrants from once more engaging in circulatory migration.

However, in order to do this more efficiently and effectively, the focus should be placed on those who are more likely to return. Those migrants that leave with the intention of settling in the host country should not be the target group of the programs. Since the program resources are limited as is assistance, limiting the scope of participation increases the chances for the migrants most likely to return. The programs would also benefit by this inclusion because they would not have to provide the same assistance and opportunities as for other groups, including those they would need to convince to consider returning at all.

(Grabowska-Lusinska, 2009, p. 226)

Such focus on the groups most likely to return, would also limit the chances of people solely returning because of the EU grant. In such cases, the chances for reintegration success are limited because their desire or willingness to return is not as strong. It merely extends

from economic opportunity. Therefore, such return migrants may not be as prepared as others are, others who are more willing to return.

13 Conclusion

This paper has presented a compelling argument for wider, continued discussions on return migration. Within the European Union, more intergovernmental and interagency focus and participation is required on the issue in order to increase labour mobility, and offset the associated costs and unexpected consequences it yields. This will become increasingly important as more countries remove restrictions on their domestic labour markets. As evidenced through the previous exploration of three return migration programs, it is clear that the preparation and support of migrants abroad when combined with national strategies to stimulate return migration produce significant economic and societal gains. Therefore, instruments, organisations and financial institutions need to take full advantage of the opportunities existing in other countries in order to increase hiring and competitiveness in Europe (Marius, 2007, p 16), to facilitate further migration and sustain fluid mobility.

By doing so, increased mobility grants migrants the opportunity to earn higher wages, thus raising disposable income, consumption and living standards in the host and home countries. It also engenders the reciprocal transfer of knowledge and skills, which is beneficial. Most importantly, it extends networks in the home and host countries and fosters the flow of goods, knowledge, services and skills between them. It more expediently helps host countries satisfy their labour and skill deficiencies and effectively targets the prospective migrants, who can meet the labour demands. This, in turn can revitalise industries, and perpetuate economic growth. For the home country as well, migrants employed abroad can stimulate the home economy through remittances and savings, which alleviate economic disparities and consequences thereof. However, perpetual or unbalanced migration can also yield costs to the home country and its society, including but not limited to population decline, an ageing labour force, a decreased labour pool and brain drain. Such effects

outweigh the benefits. To negate this, return migration is required. However, such programs require careful planning and collaboration to promote return migrant success.

Such return migration programs must select the proper communication channels to deliver its messages. They must genuinely appeal to migrants abroad through culturally moderated and acceptable means and effortlessly yet effectively convey both favourable circumstances and opportunities within the home country and immediately connect prospective return migrants with adequate return assistance to promote return. Accordingly, return migration necessitates all of the components.

For the Polish government, return migration has required program development based on the theoretical framework that best reflects Polish migration patterns—the synthesis of transnational, cross-border social network and conceptual theories and paradigms of return migration. Since these theories concisely illustrate Polish migration, both in its intentions, and structure, Poland has utilised their premises, developed its outreach services, goals and appeals based upon these concepts, thereby preparing migrants long before they intend to return to Poland to insure success.

The programs aim to assist and prepare migrants to best utilise existing skills, whilst developing additional expertise abroad. They aim to provide efficient and accessible communications with migrants on the social and economic climate in Poland, as well as promoting and raising awareness of initiatives to entice migrants to return home. In doing so, these programs increase the chances for return migration success through preparation, planning, assistance and reintegration services. By doing so, these programs encourage greater return migration and its success. By engaging a more holistic approach, even preparing migrants before they work abroad, they focus on the social, emotional and societal costs of migration, suggest ways to offset them through skill and employment attainment in the host country with the goal of return. As they do so, they instil value in the Polish migrant,

value in Poland, value in the host country and even more value upon the return migrant more fully contributing to society. As they do, they not only cultivate return migration but also decrease the chances of these return migrants once more engaging in circulatory migration, which is prevalent in Europe and reverse brain drain.

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