This thesis focuses on the less studied electoral systems, which are called ordinal. These methods allow the voters to order the candidates according to their preferences. The work provides a historical insight into this issue with regard to economics and political science theories, based on the concept of the Condorcet winner. Condorcet winner is the person who defeats all other candidates in pairwise elections and by theorists of the electoral system is the ability to choose the Condorcet winner essential. The work examines three electoral methods – alternative and supplementary vote and Borda rule. These electoral systems are analyzed in terms of effects to system of political parties, political actors and the electorate, with the emphasis on the utilization rate of preferential votes. These aspects are examined on the basis of the actual election results obtained from the website of the electoral commissions and independent institutions. Based on these data, a mathematical model that compares the effects of electoral systems is then created. The conclusion summarizes the results of the analysis and the author expresses further recommendations to address these electoral methods, not only professionally and scientifically, but also as real alternatives for real election.