# CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

## FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

Institute of Political Science

# Master's Thesis

**2011**                         **Gabriela Tibenská**

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# Current Geopolitical Representations in Slovakia and Hungary

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## Anotace

Táto diplomová práca skúma súčasné napäté vzťahy medzi Slovenskom a Maďarskom a vplyv tohto vzťahu na systém štátov v Karpatskej kotline. Zároveň ponúka možný scenár budúceho vývoja tohto vzťahu. Metodologicky je práca založená na nových geopolitických prístupoch Gérard Dussouy's (2010) a Gyula Csurgai (2009) a ponúka systémovú, dynamickú a interdisciplinárnu analýzu vývoja Karpatskej kotliny. Práca identifikuje kľúčové faktory, ktoré spôsobujú napätie medzi Slovenskom a Maďarskom. Štúdia následne ponúka prognózu slovensko-maďarských vzťahov a ich reflexiu v Karpatskej kotline. Táto analýza ponúka tiež možný scenár vývoja geopoliticky významnej Karpatskej kotliny.

## Abstract

This work aims to examine the complexity of the current turbulent relationship between Slovakia and Hungary and its influence on the system of Carpathian states. The work is based on the Gérard Dussouy's (2010) and Gyula Csurgai's (2009) new geopolitical approach and offers a systemic, dynamic and interdisciplinary analysis of the development in Carpathian basin. The work indentifies the key factors that are feeding the Slovak-Hungarian relations. Consequently, it offers further prospectives of these relations and their reflection within the Carpathian Basin. Moreover, the analysis enables measuring of further development of the Carpathian region.

## Klíčová slova

Karpastká kotlina, slovensko-maďarské vzťahy, systém, regionalismus, identita

## Keywords

Carpathian Basin, Slovak-Hungarian relations, system, regionalism, identity

**DECLARATION:**

I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work, based on the sources and literature listed in the appended bibliography. The thesis as submitted is 167 000 keystrokes long (including spaces), i.e. 93 manuscript pages.

Gabriela Tibenská                                            20th of May 2011

**Charles University of Prague**
**Faculty of Social Science**
**Institute of Political Studies**

**THE PROJECT OF THE DIPLOMA THESIS**

TOPIC:

# Current Geopolitical Representations in Slovakia and Hungary: Comparative Case Study

Author: Gabriela Tibenská
Specialization and year of the study: Geopolitical Studies, 1. year of the Master Study
Academic year: 2010/2011
Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Just, Ph.D.
Date of submitting: 9th of November 2010

I agree with the supervision of the diploma thesis: _____

# Aims and the structure of the Master Thesis

## The Problematic

Changes in the geopolitical situation of Europe after the fall of Berlin Wall lead to the revitalization of historical biases. A primary example of such historical biases is the Slovak – Hungarian relationship. In the history of both nations there were clearly problems. The violent assimilation of Non – Hungarians by the Habsburg Empire during the 19th century and the effort of Slovakians to be recognized by the monarchy created a situation where the Slovaks were fighting for their identity in the direct conflict with the Hungarians. After the World War I, the Trianon Treaty established new borders.[1] The border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary led through an area occupied by different ethnic groups. During the Soviet era the only political organizations allowed in Hungary and Slovakia were the communist parties and dissent of any kind was not allowed. As a result ethnic tensions were easily surpressed.

Since the creation of an independent Slovak Republic (1993), the Hungarian Minority living on the Slovak – Hungarian borderland has been a focal point of Slovak – Hungarian relations. The relatively high level of ethnic heterogeneity makes the position of the minorities' one of the important socio – political issues in Slovakia.[2] The inclusion of Hungarian minority representatives in the Slovakia power structure reflected its maturing democracy - an important criterion for Slovakia admission to the EU. Representatives of the Hungarian minority have been bringing complaints to international institutions since the beginning of the Slovak Republic's existence, according to Deák.[3] Moreover, Hungary applied the idea of "national reunification"[4]

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[1] The Rye Island was joined to Czechoslovakia after the appeal of Hungarians, because the island was naturally and economically closer to Bratislava. This 'island' problem and the treaty itself became a problem that Hungarians has never overcome. See Deák Ladislav, *Hra o Slovensko (The Game for Slovakia)*, 1995.

[2] "In Slovakia 14 – 18 per cent of the population declares itself to be other than Slovak. Slovakia belongs between those countries in a Post – Soviet space as one of the most ethnically heterogeneous in Europe. With the exception of the ex – Soviet Republics, Slovakia is in 4th place after Macedonia, Spain and Croatia."(Dostál in Kollár and Mesežnikov, 2000, pp.175 -189) According to the Statistical office the ration of the Hungarian Minority is decreasing from10.8 per cent in 1991 to 9.7 per cent in 2001.

[3] In 1993 the Slovak Delegation had visited the European Council. One of the members was P. Csáky (member of Hungarian Christian Democratic party) as representative of the Hungarian Minority. On this occasion he passed to the European Council a Memorandum without informing other members of the delegation. Information in this memorandum had universal and philosophical character and they were misinterpreted. The sources used had Hungarian origin as for example Hungarian Observer that uses the same philosophical and universal interpretation of information as the Memorandum has been written.

in the Carpathian Basin to its political agenda in 2001. Consequently, this led to an escalation of tension with its neighbors. The uneasy relationship between the Slovaks and Hungarians is further complicated by a "number of historical facts and their mutually incompatible interpretation as well as some very contemporary problems." (Harris E., 2007, pp. 49) Since the establishment of democracy, the main objective of both countries has been European integration and hence another actor has been added to the Slovak – Hungary equation.

## The Aims and Objectives

1) To define the main causes of the problematic relationship between Slovakia and Hungary.
2) To provide the latest qualitative evidence on the development of Slovak – Hungarian relations.
3) To apply geopolitical analysis to Slovak – Hungarian relations by compering their positions on the problematic Slovak – Hungarian borderland.
4) To map the current state of affairs in both countries.
5) To offer a complex perspective on the Slovak – Hungarian borderland and the relations of both countries.
6) To introduce dynamics into the analysis by offering possible scenarios for future geostrategic developments in the region, and evaluating the prospects of cooperation between the two countries. In daling with their problems.
7) To prpose a direction for futher research.

## The Subject Significance

Unfortunately, little scientific research has been devoted to geopolitical changes and problematic relationships between the newly emerged neighborhood of nation states within Central and Eastern Europe, following the fall of socialism. Moreover, the problem has been shifted beyond the boundaries of nation states, so there is a need to consider it in a wider European perspective. Understanding the complexity of the problematic relationship between Slovakia and Hungary can help define a practicable

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[4] Kántor Z. and col. (2004).

compromise, if possible, in the future. Therefore, examining the causes of the Slovakia - Hungarian problematic relationship is important for both nations.

## The Methodology and Research Questions/Hypotheses

The research is inductive. Geopolitical analysis[5] is used for examining the relationship between Slovakia and Hungary. The research focus is on the Slovak – Hungarian borderland, where several factors are selected and compared. Key factors are applied and a correlation between them is identified. The factors are:

1) Identity
2) Ethnic composition and demography
3) History
4) Boundaries
5) Strategy of actors
6) Socio – Economic factors
7) Geopolitical representations
8) Factors of physical geography

The second part of the research is deductive and following research questions are answered:

1) What are the key factors causing conflict between Slovakia and Hungary?
2) What are the characteristics of the problematic relationship between Hungary and Slovakia?
3) How do the Slovaks precieve their borderland with the Hungarian Republic?
4) How do the Hungarians precieve their borderland with the Slovak Republic?

**The Research limitations:**

There is a risk of reproducing biases due to the limited scope of the paper and lack of relevant information. In a work like this there is always a risk of an author's subjective selectivity.

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[5] Defined by Csurgai Gyula (2009)

# Provisional Structure

1. Introduction
2. Methodology
    2.1. Comparative case study
    2.2. Geopolitical analysis
3. Geographical phase of the Slovak – Hungarian borderland
4. History
    4.1.  The Interpretation of the Slovak national identity
    4.2.  The Interpretation of the Hungarian national identity
    4.3. Perception of the Slovak – Hungarian borderland
        4.3.1.  Mental maps
        4.3.2.  Slovak perception of the borderland
        4.3.3.  Hungarian perception of the borderland
5. Geopolitical representations in Slovakia and Hungary
    5.1.  Ethnic composition and demography
    5.2. Strategy of actors
    5.3. Socio – economic factors
6. Complex perspective of the Slovak – Hungarian borderland and the Slovak – Hungarian relationship
7. Conclusion
8. Appendices
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# Introduction

States of the Carpathian Basin hold a central position within the international relations of the European Continent. The basin has been the home of several nations and ethnic groups throughout the human history and continues as such to this day. Geographically and historically, for several decades the region served as a buffer zone between Germany and Russia (USSR). The region holds significant water reserves and good quality, fertile soil. Today, it became an economically potential territory that is attractive to foreign investors from all over the globe, as it slowly integrates into the European Union.

However, the Central European region went through various geopolitical changes over the last hundred years, which have affected the relations within the region. After the First World War, in Versailles, near Paris, the new face of Europe was delineated by the emergence of many new nation states – each fighting for its own identity and place on the map of Europe. In the heart of Europe, the former territory of the Austro–Hungarian Empire was cut into five new independent states – Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romanian, and Yugoslavia. The end of the Second World War brought the division of the old continent into the Capitalist West and Communist East. Forty years later, changes in the geopolitical situation of Europe after the fall of Berlin Wall led to the revitalization of historical biases within the Carpathian Basin,a primary example of which is the Slovak -– Hungarian relationship.

In the history of both nations there were problems. After the World War I, the Trianon Treaty established new borders. The border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary led through an area occupied by different ethnic groups. However, the Soviet ideology successfully suppressed any ethnic tensions. Since the creation of the independent Slovak Republic (1993), the Hungarian Minority living in the Slovak — Hungarian borderland has been a focal point of Slovak — Hungarian relations. The relatively high level of ethnic heterogeneity makes the position of the minorities' one of the important socio — political

issues[1] in Slovakia and it has also become an issue within Hungary. Moreover, Hungary applied the idea of "national reunification"[2] in the Carpathian Basin to its political agenda in 2001. Consequently, this led to an escalation of the tension with its neighbors. Recently, the tension has become extremely high, and thus two questions arise: what feeds the conflict between the two states? And, does this conflict somehow affect the Carpathian Basin?

Although much has been said and written on the geopolitical changes after 1989, a few works have been devoted to the problematic relationships between the newly–emerged neighborhood of nation states within Central and Eastern Europe, following the fall of socialism. Moreover, the problem has been shifted beyond the boundaries of nation states, so there is a need to consider it in a wider perspective. Understanding the complexity of the problematic relationship between Slovakia and Hungary can help define a practicable compromise, if possible, in the future. Therefore, examining the causes of the Slovakia – Hungarian problematic relationship is important for both nations

In order to understand the complexity of the contemporary Slovak – Hungarian tense relations, the systemic approach is applied in order to examine the key factors feeding the tension and its effects on the Carpathian region.

This work aims:

1. To define main causes of the problematic relationship between Slovakia and Hungary and their affect on the Carpathian region.

2. To provide the latest qualitative evidence on the development in Slovak – Hungarian relations.

3. To apply a social network analysis of Slovak – Hungarian relations in comparing the two countries' positions, in the Carpathian region

4. To map the current state of affairs in both countries.

5. To offer a complex perspective on the Slovak–Hungarian relations.

6. To introduce dynamics into the analysis by offering possible scenarios for future developments in the region by evaluating the prospects of the problems and cooperation of the two countries.

7. To offer the directions of further research.

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[1]"In Slovakia 14 – 18 per cent of the population declares itself to be other than Slovak. Slovakia belongs between those countries in a Post – Soviet space as one of the most ethnically heterogeneous in Europe. With the exception of the ex – Soviet Republics, Slovakia is in 4th place after Macedonia, Spain and Croatia." (Kollár & Mesežnikov, 2000, pp.175 -189) According to the Statistical office the ration of the Hungarian Minority is decreasing from10.8 per cent in 1991 to 9.7 per cent in 2001.

[2]Kántor Z. and col. (2004).

To fulfill these goals, the work refers to the of analysis of international relations. The first part of the work is descriptive and static — inductive, indentifying the key actors and links between them in four defined and–objective spatial, and an individual action spatium. The second part of the work is analytical, deductive and dynamic. The dynamic of the two states' relations is measured through the element of conflict and cooperation. The following hypotheses are tested:

*H1: The subjective geopolitical representation of Slovaks and Hungarians are the key factors feeding the tension between the two states.*

*H2: The tense relations between Slovakia and Hungary are not reflected in other areas of the Carpathian Basin.*

The system is a complex of integrated subsystems creating connections between each other. Moreover, a system interacts with its surroundings and also it is affected by its environment and if there are some modifications in the subsystem and their connection, these changes ultimately result in a conversion somewhere else within the system. Therefore, changes in one relation may be diffused into other. Not affecting the current international order, it is possible to measure a complex system by defining individual action spatia into one in a specific perspective that can reflect and suggest further development in the defined region.

The work is divided into three parts. The first section summarizes the theoretical and methodological deliberations of the analysis and delineates the Carpathian Basin. Due to the importance of the methodological background explanation the first part is more extent. The second part defines all five action spatia of the Carpathian Basin. The third section empirically verifies the hypotheses1-2 and offers the prospects of the tension.

# Chapter 1

# Systemic Geopolitical Analysis – Theoretical and Methodological Deliberations

In 1899, Rudolf Kjellén Swedish political geographer, who is also considered the forefather of geopolitics, described this new approach to international relations as "the theory of state as a geographical organism or phenomenon in space" (Cohen, 2003:11) Alexander B. Murphy (2010), professor of political geography at Oregon University, USA, in his article *Gérard Dussouy's "Systematic Geopolitics"*, claims that geopolitics is the most complicated, contingent and dynamic domain of social science. Therefore, geopolitics is a wide system of ideas that describe the interaction between the geographical environment and politics, turned into multiple forms of control over space.

This work attempts to define and illustrate the complexity of the tense Slovak – Hungarian relations in the current geopolitical configuration of the Central European region. Hungary and Slovakia are geographically based in Central Europe within the Carpathian Basin. To narrow the scope of the work the region of Carpathian Basin is delineated. The analysis incorporates some methodological and theoretical essentials of political geography – geopolitics, physical geography, international relations, demography, regionalism and macro-economics.

Firstly, the Carpathian Region is delineated within the Central European region and described (1.1). Secondly, the evolution of geopolitical thought, as it applies to the Central European region, is presented (1.2.). Consequently, the systematic analysis in international relations/geopolitics as a method of social science is defined (1.3). Finally, systematic geopolitical analysis of the Slovak–Hungarian relations is introduced (1.4).

In addition, the Central European region refers to various synonyms such as Eastern Europe, East-Central Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, Central-Southern-Eastern Europe and also the German term Mitteleurope. For the purpose of this study the term Central

Europe or Central European region will be used.

## 1.1 Central Europe–Delineating the Region of the Carpathian Basin

Autumn 1989 brought a significant change in the balance of power in international politics and therefore the redefinition of the 'old' continent started. Immediately, the geopolitical changes of powers, as a turning point of history, became the central theme of 'all' types of publications[1] both inside and outside the region. The division of Europe into Western – Capitalists and Eastern – Communists, which lasted from 40 to 70 years, was replaced by the emergence of the post–socialist countries and the transformation of 'New Europe' began. However, "...the post-socialist states of Central Europe have once again found themselves in the traditional geopolitical position for this region: between Germany and Russia, powers which for centuries have competed for spheres of influence in Central-Eastern Europe. (Stańcyzk 2002:179) The object of this investigation – the Carpathian Basin – belongs to the Central European region.

The term Central Europe has historical origins. In particular, it first appeared in the 19th century when it was evident that Eastern Europe and Balkans represent regions with different cultures and characteristics than those of Western Europe (Chlapcová 2002:58-59). The term also represents the concept of *center* — an engine for development and *peripheries* — lagging in development (Chlapcová 2002:59). The region had been occupied by regional powers[2] from medieval times until the outbreak of World War I, when new nation states formed this European core. The diverse group of Central European nations, each complicated by cultural, dialectical and social differences, caused innumerable problems, and often were considered dangerous to European peace (Roucek 1946). Several geopolitical concepts were formulated at the time for this part of Europe. In the 19th century Friedrich Naumann, a German liberal politician, formulated the concept of Mitteleuropa stretching "from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Adriatic and the southernmost edge of the Danube plains" and encompassing the lands lying between the Vistula and the Vosges between Galicia and Lake Constance"(Stańcyzk 2002:172, ). Almost an opposite formulation "was put forward by the Hapsburg monarchy which located the area of Central Europe in a more south-easterly position, stretching from the Austrian Alps the Carpathians to the Balkans" (Stańcyzk 2002: 172-173). Another formulation of the region defines Central Europe as lying between the German-speaking area and the Orthodox East

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[1] The significant number of publications (books, articles) has been written about the events in Central and Eastern Europe in the early 1990's, for e.g. the well known *The End of History and the Last Man* written by Francis Fukuyama in 1992 or Samuel Huntington *Clash of Civilizations* and the *Remaking of World Order* (1996).

[2] Regional powers of the region were Prussia, Austria, Russia and Turkey.

(Hnízdo 1995, Okey 1992). The Central European region was perceived as a buffer zone between East and West.

Fixing the Carpathian Basin within Central Europe is a task that depends upon the subject of investigation and technical capability. The definition of Central Europe is unclear within the scientific field. Various researchers and politicians have not been able to define identical territorial ranges of the Central European region (Stańcyzk 2002, Magocsi 2002, Hnízdo 1995). There is a wide range of definitions of Central Europe. The broad geographical space of the region can include the area from the Baltic Sea to the Northern part of Italy and from the Rhine to the Eastern Carpathians (Hnízdo 1995). Particularly, there is a problem of identifying what specific provinces of Central Europe to include in the region or how to subdivide it into geographic zones (Stańcyzk 2002, Magocsi 2002, Hnízdo 1995). "For instance, geographers reject the notion that rivers can serve as borders of geographical units, because by their very nature rivers are bodies of water that unify rather than divide surrounding areas" (Magocsi 2002: 2). However, "rivers have been used as unifying boundaries of political units" (Ibid). Rivers that physically surrounding the Central European region are, according to Magocsi (2002), the Order-Neisse, Danube, Sava, Drina, Zbruch, and Prut rivers.

The concept of a region is a very broad category in the social sciences and more specifically in political science. From the political geography perspective a region can be found at all political levels. To specify limits of the region bv focusing on the spatial differences among distinct locations is a challenging task for a researcher(Romancov 2007: 420). In political geography the term encompasses basically two types of area defined by their cultural, economic, social, historical or political distinctions from surrounding areas (Dahlman 2009b, Cihelkova 2007, Csurgai 2009). The first type is the world–region, such as South Asia or Oceania, which is a collection of states organized within a specific geographic subdivision (Dahlman 2009b). The second type of region represents a smaller area at the sub–national level which is mostly associated with a particular local ethnic identity (Ibid).

The macro–scale perspective provides three types of international political regions (Hnízdo 1995, Romancov 2007). The first is a *continental region*[3] or in traditional terminology pan-region. Usually this continental region is unified by specific political and civilizational elements that distinguish the region from other regions. The second type is a *transnational political region*[4] that unites two or more states and integrates their political and cultural factors. The third is a *trans–border political region*[5], which connects the border areas of two or more states in a single political unit ignoring state borders as limits of sovereignty (Hnízdo 1995: 64–91).

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[3]Continental regions or pan-regions are for example Middle East, Latin America and Australia.

[4]Transnational political region is for example Scandinavia or the Greater Columbia in 1819–1830, uniting the today territories of Venezuela, Columbia and Ecuador.

[5]Trans –border political region is for example between Russia and Georgia - the Caucasian Ossetia.

Figure 1.1: The Carpathian Basin



The Carpathian Region belongs to the second type of international political regions. In spite of the common historical and cultural background, the ethnic heterogeneity makes the region very diverse. The objects of this work, the Slovakian and Hungarian territories, are fully situated in the Carpathian Basin. Other countries' territories, such as those of Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania and Ukraine, partly extend to the physical geographical delineation of the Carpathian region. (See Table 1.1 & Figure 1.1) Physically, the region can be defined by the Carpathian Mountains to the north and north-east, the Transylvanian Alps and Serbian Mountains to the east and by the Dinaric Ranges to the south. The Alps close the basin from the west, and the north–west is delineated by the Morava and Danube rivers. The Carpathian Basin is also home to diverse ethnic groups such as Slovaks, Magyars, Romanians, Carphatho-Rusyns, Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukrainians, Germans, and Slovenes (Magocsi 2002). Many of these ethnic groups can be found living outside their nation states but still within the Carpathian region. (See 2.4)

Nevertheless, the delineation of the Carpathian Basin is not the primary goal of this study. Therefore, in practical terms, the analysis bounds the region in a manner that is compatible with other studies of Central Europe. The delineation is based on the physical geography of the Carpathian Basin within the Central European region and is therefore a naturally formed region.[6]

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[6]Natural region is defined by the physical attributes of the earth's surface.

Table 1.1: Historical Territories of current nation states within the Carpathian Basin

| Country | Historical Territories within the Carpathian Basin |
| --- | --- |
| Slovakia | Árva, Spiš and Tatra regions |
| Hungary | Hungarian Plain, Northern Baranya |
| Austria | Burgerland |
| Slovenia | North-Eastern Styria - Prekumorie |
| Croatia | Slavonia, Syrmia, South-East Baranya |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | Sava Basin |
| Serbia | Vojvodina (Bačka & Banát) |
| Romania | Transylvania |
| Ukraine | Transcarpathia |

*Source: Magocsi 2002:126-203*

## 1.2 Geopolitics of the Central European Region

Classical geopolitics defines the sovereign state as a spatial unit struggling with other similar entities in an attempt to enlarge its power by increasing control over territory in order to strengthen its safety and eliminate dangers and threats (Dodds& Atkinson 2009:10). Throughout the history of Central Europe, tremendous numbers of political, social and economic events have created the picture of the region as we know it today. Particularly, since the end of the 18th and through the 19th century, when the national awakening began, a specific 'geopolitical consciousness' started to take form in Central Europe (Krejčí 2010). The emergence of the Central European geopolitical tradition was caused by direct changes to the political map of Europe, specifically by the constant expansion of Prussia–Germany and Russia. Another factor influencing the 'regional awareness' was British imperialism.

The unification of Germany and Prussia and the growing power and territorial expansion of Russia into the Central European region created natural tendencies towards centralization and were displayed in the thinking of Štúr but also in various ideas about Mitteleurope. Two remarkable concepts of Europe have been/were been developed - the idea of Pan-Germanism and the idea of Pan–Slavism — both based on historicism (Krejčí 2010:96).

In the first half of the 19th century the idea of Mitteleurope was a concept of economic interests, which later became a specific national idea. Friedrich Ratzel in his work Politische *Geographie* (1897) searched for ways how a state within the European continent to gain continental dominance[7] as a consequence of natural biological expansion[8] and create *Lebensraum*. A state (Germany), which wants to become a continental power, has to conquer a territory at least five million square kilometres in size(Krejčí 2010: 97). Ratzel's

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[7]Friedrich Ratzel saw Germany as a leader for continental dominance within Europe.
[8]German geopolitical school was based on Social Darwinism and Geographical Determinism

theory became a fundamental basis for the German geopolitical school. Rudolf Kejellén, a Swedish political scientist of Geopolitical School claimed that a state, like a living organism, should expand its territory through colonization: either unification or conquest. Following Ratzel's line of thinking, Karl Haushofer formulated his theory of Pan-regions. Without going into detail, "the pan-German vision of a united Europe and also Euro-Africa in its ultimate form, meant the organization of these regions around Germany as a state of super-power" (Krejčí 2010:98).

The most well–known model of Central Europe was introduced by Friedrich Neumann in his book Mitteleurope (1915). His concept of the Central European region was based on the idea of a "…Mitteleurope Union which should become a 'political expression' of the region …The fundamental assumption of this vision was centralization of certain institutional political activities of Germany and the Austro–Hungarian Empire in new organs" (Krejčí 2010:107–108). The growing German expansionism and its radicalization in the sense of German superiority over the Slavs, as well as subscription to anti–Semitism, led to the emergence of hard–line Pan–Germanism, which spawned Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany (Krejčí 2010; Dodds& Atkinson 2009 ).

Conversely, the idea of Pan–Slavism was formulated as the opposite vision of Central Europe, but it was much more moderate. Slavs as a 'super–ethnicum' should be united within a single state (Krejčí 2010:125). For example, Josef Jungman[9] already in the beginning of the nineteen century saw the Slavs' future in the friendship with Russia as a balance to German dominance. However, Ľudovít Štúr's[10] geopolitical vision of Slovaks and Czechs was based on three models: Austro–Slavism[11] , a Slavic Federation and a Russian–Slavic Empire. But instead of unification of all Slavs, his vision was based on the division of Slovaks and Czechs (Krejčí 2010:132). It should be noted that the concept of Austro—Slavism did not exist in Austria.

Karel Kramář, a Czech politician, formulated the secret project of the "Slavic Empire" led by Austria. Consequently, the *Constitution of the Slavic Empire* was written defining the size of the territory from the Pacific Ocean to the Šumava, in 1914 (Krejčí 2010:159). In the early 1940's Milan Hodža's[12] idea of a Federation of Central Europe matured. The Federation states would be: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romaniam, Bulgaria and Greece. His geopolitical vision of Central Europe was based on the conception of two corridors: Western-European and Central-European, with civilizational, organizational and agrarian significance (Krejčí 2010: 197–203).

Magyars (Hungarians), as one of the largest ethnic groups, were also looking for their

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[9]Josef Jungman (1773 -– 1847) was Czech historian, linguistic and poet.

[10]Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft, Slovansto a svet budúcnosti [Slavism and the World's Future] —- written around 1853.

[11]A similar view was held by František Palacký (1848), a Czech historian and writer.

[12]Slovak and Czechoslovak politician, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia 1935-1938.

place within the Central European region. "But Herder's[13] prediction concerning the absorption of Magyars by surrounding Slavs, Germans, Romanians, and other peoples had a traumatic effect…" (Sugar& Ledger 1967: 264) Consequently, this fear persisted, but also served as a justification for the Magyariztion[14] on the non–Magyar inhabitants of the Austro–Hungarian Empire in the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th of centuries.

In addition, Harford Mackinder, the British geographer (1919) saw the Central European region as a buffer zone between Germany and Russia or between democracy and despotism and as preventing an alliance between Germany and Russia (Heffernan 2000: 38).

Although neither author offers an advanced analysis of the implications for the Central European region, their works had significant influence on further development. During the 20th century the idea of Pan–Slavism started to disappear and was replaced by ethnography, comparative linguistics and literary science. "Pan–Slavism had never become a leading idea of the big Slavonic states such as Poland or Russia; conversely, Pan-German radical visions had influenced the German ruling class" (Krejčí 2010: 126). Both vision of Central Europe brought dualism to Central European politics. Events in the first half of the 20th of century (two World Wars) and their consequences sealed the Central European picture for nearly a century and integrated this region under the influence of the Soviet Union.

The geopolitical perception of international relations in the 1990's changed. The world politics started to reconfigured along cultural lines (Hungington 1993) and the Central Europe experienced first a geopolitical transition. According to Taylor (1990) the Cold War order was more or less free of geographically based power relations; however, the post–Cold War period suggests 'geopolitical disorder —- without any alternative (O'Loughline 1994: 92). As Mersheimer (2001: 360) states – the new world order brought 'equality' among all international players, and cooperation rather than security competition.

From a geopolitical perspective, the Central European region belongs to the Western and Trans–Atlantic sphere of influence in the 21st century. The states within the region have limited possibilities of influence due to the size of their territory, especially in the case of the Slovak Republic (Krejčí 2010). Today, geopolitics cannot be limited by geographical factors. The dawn of the new millennium brought new views and several new concepts such as globalization, informationalization, deterritorialization and proliferating techno–scientific risks (Ó'Tuathail 1999; Albert, Cederman & Wendt 2010). Can the 21st century reality be explained by classical geopolitical determinism?

The re–conceptualization of the new geopolitics refers to "geographical possibilism"

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[13]Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744 -– 1803) was German philosopher and theologian.

[14]Magyarization is a subsequent effort make Magyar the universally accepted language in the multinational Austro–Hungarian Kingdom.

Table 1.2: The Types of Geopolitics Studied by Critical Geopolitics

| Type | Object of Investigation | Problematic |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Formal Geopolitics | Geopolitical thought and the geopolitical tradition | Intellectuals, institutions and their political and cultural context |
| Practical Geopolitics | The everyday practice of statecraft | Practical geopolitical reasoning in foreign policy conceptualization |
| Popular Geopolitics | Popular culture, mass media, and geographical understandings | National identity and the construction of images of other peoples and places |
| Structural Geopolitics | The contemporary geopolitical condition | Global processes, tendencies and contradictions |

*Source: O'Tuathail 1999: 111*

rather than geographical determinism (Criekamans 2009). Geography has a "simplifying" rather than pure effect, but is still one of the crucial conditions in international relations for strategic purposes (Dodds & Atkinson 2009; Dahlman 2009c). The political environment provides a number of parameters, limitations and opportunities and the political decision–maker, a 'man', has to make decisions (Criekamans 2009:38). The evolution of geopolitics has brought about new non–geographic factors such as economy, identity, nationality or information dimensions and crowed out the military/security oriented vision of the world regions.

The postmodern geopolitical (or critical) approach seeks "...to recover the complexities of global political life and expose the power relationships that characterize knowledge about geopolitics concealed by orthodox geopolitics" (Ó'Tuathail 1999:108). As Ó'Tuathail (1999) points out, geography is an inescapably social and political *geo–graphing*– thus a cultural and political writing of meanings about the world. Critical geopolitical studies began to expose the spatial assumptions, and representations of statecraft also become progressively more sophisticated in terms of analytical frameworks and subject matter (Dodds & Atkinson 2009: 11). Postmodern geopolitics divides geopolitics into four categories. (See Table 1.2)

The scope of this paper applies practical geopolitical reasoning, but also popular geopolitics[15]. Practical geopolitical reasoning is based on the assumption that: "...Foreign policy decision makers use practical and pragmatic geopolitical reasoning whenever they try to make spatial sense of the world, implicitly utilizing inherited forms of geographical knowledge to enframe particular questions and tacitly deploying cultural geographic discourse to explain certain dramas and events" (Ó'Tuathail 1999: 113).

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[15]Critical geopolitics is based on social constructivism — the researcher has to realize that the world is a social construction (Criekemens 2009:38).

Therefore, practical geopolitical reasoning is part of everyday life where actual foreign policy making is affected. Also, it is applied to the education, socialization where it creates certain national identities, and geographical/historical consciousness (Ó'Tuathail 1999: 114). Each of these elements have been a significant part of the modern nation state development, although they also bring a paradigm into geopolitics. Popular geopolitics is also relevant because it contributes to the dissemination of the popular political culture and thus forms 'common sense' geopolitics[16].

Nevertheless, the postmodern geopolitical tradition is too broad and heterogeneous[17]. Due to its wide scope of interest, critical geopolitics methodologically does not offer a single and modal analysis of international relations in a specific international region. Moreover, it is also subject to criticism for the absence of a clear position on what 'critical geopolitics' actually means; can it be applied to non–hegemonic states or international political actors? It does not distinguish between foreign policy decisions and the operational results of these decisions. It also pays less attention to material environmental variables in comparison with other geopolitical concepts such as 'classical geopolitics' or 'cognitive geopolitics' (Criekemens 2009: 40).

## 1.3 Systematic Analysis in International Relations/Geopolitics

Geopolitics as an integral part of the social sciences does not dispose with its own methodological approach towards international relations. Therefore, it can refer to various kinds of research designs. The question of how to approach geopolitics methodologically and theoretically has not been matched by any literature (Murphy 210:155). Moreover, international relations theories often lack of a comprehensive explanation of states' particular behavior and their conflicting relations. Contemporary international relations theories, such as realism, idealism, functionalism, among others, offer oversimplified explanations and therefore inaccurate diagnoses of the tensions, wars or crises, which can lead to a faulty implementation of national strategies (Csurgai 2009:48). Also, according to Pierson (2004) "the political science as whole has undergone a 'de–contextual revolution'" (Albert, Cederman & Wendt 2010: 11). The deepening of global governance and globalization of every aspect of day–to–day life is forming a single world system (Albert, Cederman & Wendt 2010: 4). For an explanation of the complexity and dynamics of the structure, theoretically and empirically, the most usable is the systems theorizing approach[18].

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[16]Ó'Tuathail (1999) claims that in some cases 'common sense' geopolitics can be created as ethnocentric and stereotypical knowledge about the world, which can produce bad foreign policies

[17]Critical geopolitics is interested in the question of how the meaning of places and geopolitical space is contrasted in (foreign) policy (Criekemens 2009: 38)

[18]Systematic theories also refer to the modeling of political system (Říchová 2007: 168).

### 1.3.1 Systematic Analysis in International Relations

Systematic (holistic) approaches allow one to capture the social complexity —"the entire international system or large parts thereof, including complex interaction typologies that are determined by explicit social interactions that may engender and transform the key actors" (Cederman & Wendt 2010: 11). According to Cederman & Wendt (2010: 9)" *understandings, systems theories strive to account for large-scale social forms by uncovering their structural logic and the processes that (re)generate the*". However, system-theorizing in international relations was adopted mostly from cybernetic and social science, where the turning point was the Talcott Parsons definition of politics as a functional subsystem of society[19] (Stačiokas & Rimas 2004; Říchová 2006; Říchová 2007). Apart from that, much merit goes to Kenneth Waltz (1959) who as a first offers a more systematic analysis of international relations[20](Drulák 2003; Albert, Cederman & Wendt 2010).

However, the idea of a complex organized whole, which cannot simply be reduced to the sum of its parts, was not ignored even by Greeks or medieval thinkers (Dussouy 2010a:134). In fact, Aristotle proposed that the whole is larger than the total of its component parts and this concept did not permit a successful understanding of the physical world (Stačiokas & Rimas 2004: 146; Dussouy 2010a: 134). Nevertheless, it was only Galileo, who did not refuse the reference to the whole and made possible the progress in Western physics. During the 18th and 19th centuries a mono–causal method emerged, but from the beginning of the 20th century the tendency to conceive holistic interdependence returned to the sciences. This meant that any modification of a unit or variable was supposed to have a direct or indirect effect on the other units (Dussouy 2010a: 134). The concepts of the system are not abstractions, but instead reflect reality as mobile and flexible phenomena which are generalized (Stačiokas & Rimas 2004: 145). Therefore, within the discipline of international relations, using these concepts is appropriate, and *geopolitics* relates the most. The central means of its understanding is a territorial and political configuration of the world (Romancov 2007: 408).

The international relations traditions such as Realism, Neo-realism, Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism or the English school define the international system as *anarchical*. The distinction between these approaches is within the objects of their interests (Drulák 2003: 146). While realists and neo–realists[21] focus on the balance of power; liberalists, neo-liberalists[22] and liberal intergovermentalists focus on international institutions/regimes and transactions. Others, for example Bull Hedley, one of the leading figures of English school, in his book *The Anarchical Society: The Study of Order in*

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[19]Parson's conception was further elaborated by Almond G.A. within structural-functional analysis.

[20]However, Morton Kaplan in his book System and Process identifies the international system as social system of action already in 1957.

[21]For example: KISSINGER Henry. *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22, 1957. (Doctoral dissertation.)*

[22]For example: MITRANY David. *A Working Peace System*, 1943

*World Politics* (1977) also recognizes the international system as anarchical society - as a maintenance of order through common institutions. Another significant branch of the international relations tradition is the critical (normative) approach, which focuses on the international system's structural effects[23] (Drulák 2003: 111). Therefore, a question arises: what defines a *system* within the international relations?

An "[I]international system is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between each other, and have sufficient impact on one anothers' decisions, to cause them to behave -– at least in some measure — as parts of a whole" (Bull 1977:9) Conversely, Kenneth Waltz's understanding of a system is based on the assumption that an international system does not have any structure (its decentralized – anarchical) and every unit (state) has to act for itself — process of constant interaction of power relations (Drulák 2003: 61–62). Morton Kaplan, in his book *System and Process in International Politics* (1957), defines elements which are coupled separately in a large system whose dynamic is based on an equilibrium which guarantees the stability of the system (Kaplan 2005: 21–22). Kaplan identifies six possible international systems :" (1) the 'balance of power system', (2) the loose bipolar system, (3) the tight bipolar system, (4) the universal system, (5) the hierarchical system in its directive and non directive forms and (6) the veto system"(Kaplan 2005: 34).

The critical tradition in international relations understands the system differently. Immanuel Wallerstein defines international relations as the capitalist world-economy. In his *World system theory*, he assumes that state interactions are guided by invisible forces, and distinguishes between two types of international relations systems organized either into an empire or world economy. The world economy system is divided, in the sense of dependency theory, into core, periphery and semi–periphery (Drulák 2003 114–115). According to Karl Marx, the international system is characterized by a capitalist configuration of production. In the 'global capitalist system,' state interactions are defined in terms of social class, where the individual belongs to the bourgeoisie or the proletariat (Kratochvíl & Drulák 2009: 144).

Scholars believe that the systematic approach is relatively 'neutral,' and this fact can be an advantage to this method (Říchová 2007: 169). Using systemic thinking about the problems of international relations has an advantage because a *system* actually acts like one (Braumoeller 2010: 158). Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1967) conceived that the term system serves as an expression of internal unity and nonlinear relations between elements (Říchová 2006; Kessler & Kratochvíl 2010). David Easton, a political scientist —- Behaviorist —- and advocate of systematic thinking, uses this assumption as the core to understanding how political systems operate. The system is structured by three components:

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[23]For example: WALLERSTEIN Immanuel. *The Modern World-System, vol. I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century.1974; The Capitalist World-Economy .1979; The Modern World-System, vol. II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750. 1980.*

(1) clearly–defined elements such as actors or institutions, (2) interdependence between these elements, and (3) definite borders that clearly delineate the system from its neighborhood.[24] Easton, in his work *A System Analysis of Political life* (1965), assumes that a system's inputs, which can be differentiated as demand and supports — expressed by the members of the society, consequently outputs —- everything that is 'transmitted' into the system neighbourhood and obviously feedback. The concept of feedback constructed by Easton (1965) presents the understanding of interaction between input, output and the surrounding environment (Říchová 2006: 45–58, Almond 1997: 219–229).

Thus, to capture the essence of the whole international system — states and dyads cannot be neatly excised from their actions in isolation from one another (Braumoeller 2010: 158). Therefore, the research method concentrates on logical abstractions and simultaneously involves the generalization and analysis of theoretical propositions.

However, another criticism has been made against the systemic approach within international relations. Two major critiques have been expressed by Relationalists[25] towards the *holistic* assumption of the system theories; (1) premises of the bounded domain of social and political interaction – the plausibility of pre-constituted entities against individuals that may struggle, and (2) own sets of micro-macro problems – especially eliding the crucial role of local relations in maintaining or transforming aggregate structures (Nexon 2010: 104–105). Moreover, the systemic approach is characterized by a significant degree of interaction, complexity and endogeneity. These issues are usually poor candidates for verbal theorizing or testing because qualitative analysis has difficulties in assessing relative casual weight on relative variables (Braumoeller 2010: 162). However, critical interpretative synthesis allows for the integration of interpretive work by production of an account of disparate forms of evidence —- "all accounts should be grounded in the evidence, verifiable and plausible, and that reflexivity will be a paramount requirement" (Dixon–Woods et al. 2006: 39)

Also, some practitioners of discourse analysis in international relation traditions claim that system theory is a powerful discourse and therefore "opposition or mutual neglect between system theory and discourse analysis is unfortunate and not inherent to a system theoretical approach" (Jaeger 2010: 69).

### 1.3.2  Systemic Analysis in Geopolitics

The French (or 'possibilistic geopolitics') Geopolitical School has brought the idea of systematic modeling into the geopolitical approach . The central goal of 'possibilistic geopol-

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[24]EASTON, D. The Political System. New York: A.A.Knopf, 1953; EASTON, D.A System Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965; EASTON, D. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hal, 1965

[25]MATTERN Bially. Power in Realist?Constructivist Research. 2004; JACKSON Patric. "The Present as History," in The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, ed. Charles Tilly and Robert Goodin, Oxford University Press, 2006.

itics' is to reconstruct the strategic behavior of a system's actors (Criekemans 2009:23). The emergence of this approach was mostly influenced by the events of 1968 in order to understand a geopolitical conflict or rivalry. Yves Lacoste states that it is necessary to understand the reasons and ideas of the main actors -– states' rulers, leaders translating and influencing the same public opinion he represents (Claval 2009: 241-242). As mentioned above, classical international relations traditions such as realism, idealism or functionalism often lack of an interdisplinary and multidimensional approach and, moreover, usually offer oversimplified explanations of the contemporary relations, which can lead to faulty diagnostics of states' affairs (Csurgai 2009: 48). Also, international relations mostly focus on the question of balance within international relations (Dussouy 2010b: 179). Thus, these traditions might have missed capturing the complexity of contemporary international relations (Dussouy 2010a: 131).

Systemic modeling in geopolitics was introduced by the French scholar Gérard Dussouy. As Alexander Murphy claims "following Dussouy, no two–dimensional map can possibly capture the multi-scalar intersection of physical, demographic, strategic, socio-economic, and cultural-ideological forces at work in the geopolitical arena; instead, we need to think in terms of the interaction of all these things in deferent places and under varying circumstances" (Murphy 2010: 151). Therefore, the attempt to produce a systematic framework for geopolitical analysis — in order to capture the complexity of contextual influences, has invoked a vast discussion among scholars. Essential to systematic geopolitics is to investigate the behaviour of participants in the international system as well as search for the properties and modifications of the system overall (Dussouy 2010a: 137). The modeling is based on German Hermeneutics[26] — an assumption that strategies (of participants) are placed in a context, which has a structure – the structure is built because "nothing is given, everything is built" (Dussouy 2010a: 139). According to elements of complexity and system, it is not possible to adopt a strictly axiomatic approach in all social sciences, to any a priori verification (Dussouy 2010a: 135). Basically, two complementary approaches are combined within Dussouy's work: hypothetical—deductive and empirical-inductive. According to Cohen, (2010: 163) systematic geopolitics is a method for gathering data that can serve as a fundamental base for an empirical–inductive theory — not general theory.

Dussouy builds his global system model from five action spaces, and each of these fields is based strictly on logic and obstacles – subjected to spatial analysis, capable of extraction. The action spaces are: (C1) physical, natural space, (C2) demo-political global space, (C3) diplomatic military space, (C4) socio-economic space, (C5) symbolic, idealistic and cultural space (Dussouy 2010a: 143–144). (See Figure 1.2)

The model has certain advantages but also limitations. Indeed, it offers an original visualization of the contemporary world system. (See Figure 2) Moreover, it is broad

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[26]Followers of German Hermeneutics include Max Weber, Wilhelm Dilthey and Gaston Bachelard

Table 1.3: Dussoy's Five Axioms of Systematic Geopolitical Modeling

| Gérard Dussouy's Axioms | Example of an Empirical Evidence |
| --- | --- |
| 1. Systematic configuration is based upon the intention and capacity of a/the participant to act in a global system. | The rise of the modern nation state. |
| 2. The relative space that constitutes the geopolitical configuration is organized around different and alternative centers. | The birth of the Cold War system. |
| 3. The tangible reality of a geopolitical infrastructure interfaces with intangible reality to determine the configuration. | The emergence of nationalism due to global economic expansion. |
| 4. The global system induces geopolitical spatial forms, mainly territory and network, which are the results of participants' strategies. | The European Union and its integration processes. |
| 5. Refutation of historical linearity and developmentalism. | Refused by the author. |

*Source: Cohen 2010: 156–160*

enough to encompass any dimension[27] of geopolitical practice. This particular method of systematization offers a useful framework for capturing all contextual influences in practice. However, its usefulness is rather limited. Dussouy's work is based on five axioms. (See Table 1.3) While the first four axioms are widely accepted within the scientific field, the fifth axiom is discarded by the author (Cohen 2010:157). This rejection is, however, subject to criticism by Saul Bernard Cohen, who stresses that the "geopolitical system evolves along developmental principles whereby periods of great changes serve as historic milestones that mark its progress" (Cohen 2010: 161)

It is also not clear how the model helps to construct a narrative that allows one to be convinced of a particular ingress (Murphy 2010: 154). Moreover, the general interconnections are questioned because of the complexity of the heterogeneity of the system. In addition, Dussouy's approach does offer any instructions on how to build individual action fields.

As already mentioned, geopolitical analysis as a method of study provides a multidimensional, interdisciplinary approach and is able to reflect the complexity of contemporary international relations (Csurgai, 2009: 48). The analysis does not justify any territorial claims, which are often based on a subjective construction of history, geography and cultural factors of certain actors. Thus, geopolitical analysis offers an interpretation of these claims on a given situation.

Conversely to Dussouy, the Hungarian geopolitician Csurgai Gyula (2009) has intro-

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[27]The conception encompasses everything from environmental change to anti-globalist nationalism – from intensified economic interdependence to anti-globalist separatism (Murphy 2010: 151).

Figure 1.2: Dussouy's "Global Interpretation Method of the Global World System"



**Axis of Power/Maximum dominance**

C 5

C 4

C 3

C 2

C 1

**Orientable planisphere with variable centrality**

duced the *constant* and *variable factors* of geopolitical analysis. Moreover, he emphasis that these factors, and the interactions between them, have to be taken into consideration in a geopolitical approach when studying a particular tension, crisis, or war. "Permanent factors refer to the geographic position and configuration of a given territory and to enduring elements of cultural identity such as language and religion. Variable factors are those that change on both the internal level (inside of state borders) and external levels (interstate and global level). These variable components refer to demography, sociopolitical structure, alliance configuration, strategic motivations, geo–economic interests and technological factors among others." (Csurgai, 2009: 50)

Therefore, this dimension of geopolitics[28] -– analysis method takes into consideration geographic, historic, identity, strategic, political, economic and demographic factors and, within the given situations, attempts to systematically 'map' the interaction between territorial dimensions and socio–political situations. Csurgai Gyula (2009: 50–51) defines nine factors as the most important parameters of geopolitical analysis:

1. Factors of physical geography

2. Natural resources

3. Identity factors

4. Geopolitical representations

5. Ethnic composition and demography

6. Boundaries

7. Historical factors

8. Socio-economic factors

9. Strategies of the actors.

These parameters are "ldot not isolated and often overlap." (Csurgai 2009: 51) Moreover, continental, regional dimensions have to be taken into account when geopolitical analysis is used on a local geopolitical situation. Therefore, geopolitical analysis is applicable on every level of the international system —- global, regional and local.

Similarly to Dussouy, Csurgai also does not offer any hint on how to infer from these factors any conclusions. This paper aims to produce an interdisciplinary and multidimensional reflection of current Slovak–Hungarian relations. Therefore, the geopolitical analysis cannot "borrow" systematic approaches from other segments of the social sciences without certain modifications.

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[28] According to Csurgai (2009) Geopolitics has three dimensions: representation, practice and method.

## 1.4 Systemic Geopolitical Analysis of the Slovak–Hungarian relations

Slovakia and Hungary, as part of the transnational region of the Carpathian Basin, are limited by territorial, political and cultural factors. Geographically, the region belongs into the above—mentioned Central Europe (See 1.1) and therefore the states are limited by their position. To evaluate the tense relations between the two neighbours, new geopolitical thinking – systemic geopolitical analysis — is applicable. Multidimensional approaches within political science are becoming more popular because they widen the scope of the applicability of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Also, this assessment improves the rigor and transparency of the results (Dixon–Woods 2006: 28). According to Csurgai, (2009: 48) the current international system's stability is challenged by identity conflicts — "destroyed" states, resource wars, minority issues, and economic rivalries. This paper's goal is to apply an interdisciplinary approach; a method (combination of systematic modelling with geopolitical approach) that has been offset within the academic agenda.

The individual selection of Slovak–Hungarian relations action spaces (fields) includes elements of Csurgai's, (2009) as well as Dussouy's (2010a) approaches. The core of the work is based on the intangible elements of the system —- Dussouy's 'symbolic dimensions' which include mental maps, history, identity and geopolitical representations. In order to achieve objectivity, these symbolic spatia of Slovakia and Hungary are compared with each other. Other spaces, such as legal, political and technological, are 'incorporated' at all five remaining action spatia, and therefore are mentioned within each action spatium. These spatia are carefully selected according to the researchers possibilities to access available data. (See Figure 1.3)

### S1: Subjective Geopolitics

The subjective geopolitical dimension includes the elements of human actors, and thus all subjective factors that can affect the geopolitical analysis of the international tensions. Csurgai (2009: 54) has given the name geopolitical representations to ideas that refer to the collective mentality which is shared by a group of people in a given territory, and which is connected to national symbols, religion and a specific interpretation of history. Historical changes such as territorial gains or losses in certain periods of history bring about territorial balance[29] which affects the life of the nation state. Through geopolitical representation, mental maps usually arise, which are a reflection of two or more groups competing for the same territory and which are also the source of conflicts or tension (Csurgai 2009: 54-55). However, the mental maps of decision makers are also crucial

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[29]"Territorial balance refers to the process of state formation on a given territory, territorial expansion and territorial contraction with border changes of the state"(Csurgai 2009: 73).

Figure 1.3: Five Spatia of the Slovak–Hungarian Relations within the Carpathian Basin



S2: Physical spatium

S5: Economic spatium

S1: Subjective geopolitics of Hungary and Slovakia

S3: Military spatium

S4: Demographic policy spatium

because they reflect the biases and values of their holders (Gould & White 1974: 176). Therefore, maps also have political origins and meanings (Csurgai 2009: 56).

According to Csurgai (2009:57) community life is also affected by ethno–cultural and national identity —- *collective mentality* —- which influences peoples' beliefs, perceptions, norms and values. This affects the behavior, attitudes, reasoning processes and strategies of actors in a given territory. Therefore, there is a fundamental link between territory and identity.[30] Geopolitical representation is also reflected in the perception of the borders.

The nation state is a natural and necessary representation of modern society[31]. Örkény Antal (2006: 33) mentions that "delineation of the nation is important, not only in physical terms but also as the definition of group borders along lines of national identification". Therefore, national identification is more than a political or legal mean of national affiliation, but is also a "symbolic confirmation of the nation as a community, and [thus] an important psychological resource of national identity" (Ibid). However, in many states, the relationship between the two identities is viewed as conflicting. The civic (national) identity[32] refers to the western concept of nation-state[33]. The second dimension refers to the ethno–cultural origins of national community[34].

To conclude, representation can be used as a powerful medium because actors/agents can reproduce and enhance preferred images, which they present as accurate and entirely 'truthful' (Shirlow 2009: 310).

## S2: Physical Spatium

Sempa Francis (2009) argues that geography is the most fundamental and permanent factor in international politics. "One of the aims of geopolitics is to emphasize that political predominance is a question not just of having power in the sense of human or material resources, but also the geographical context within which that power is exercised…"(Gray & Sloan, 1999: 2) Usually, within international transactions an opposition, resistance, struggle or conflict is underlined by factors of location, space and the distance between integrating parties – sovereign states. Therefore, the policy, economy and security of sovereign states are influenced by the *location, size, physical shape of the territory and climate* (Wiassová 2007, Csurgai 2009, Dussouy 2010a) Moreover, "the constant factors of geography influence the way of life of populations, and are therefore also constituents of the collective identity" (Csurgai 2009:54). Thus, how people see themselves and the out-

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[30]Through history the division and control of territory of a society has been a constant physiological factor (Csurgai 2009: 57)

[31]Anthony D. Smith (1983)

[32]Civic nation: "All persons living in a given territory, delimited by state sovereignty, are citizen if that state regardless of their ethno – cultural origin." (Csurgai Gy., 2009: 58)

[33]Wodak Ruth and col. (1999) or Csurgai Gy. (2009)

[34]Wodak Ruth and col. (1999) or Csurgai Gy. (2009)

side world on the world map relates to geopolitical representation (Subjective geopolitical Spatium).

Frontiers form the territory of the state, and also delineate its sovereignty. However, borders' functions are also real, symbolic and even imaginary (Csurgai 2009, Mountz 2009). Lines that create a state's territory also limit the spatial distribution of language, religion and ethnicity. As Csurgai (2009) states, from the geopolitical point of view the most important question is: Does a state(s) accept its (their) territorial status quo with its (their) border limits or not?

Nevertheless, one of the fundamental sources of political, military and economic power is the size of the territory. Micro-states such as Bhutan or Liechtenstein have access to communication lines and natural resources; however, macro-states such as Canada, the USA or China (with significant territorial sizes) have a wide range of natural resources and also the possibility to choose communication lines (Waissová 2007). Therefore, their possibilities to act in the international arena are greater. Another source of the political, military and economic power of states is access to the sea. In the current world order, nearly all states have access to the sea; however, there are still 44 states with no access to the sea —- landlocked countries[35]. Seas are geopolitically important communication and traffic media, and also rich in natural resources. Some states have partly-restricted access to the seas, only through the territorial waters of other states[36] . "These states are semi–landlocked countries." (Waisová 2007:39)

Thus, geographical parameters influence the power of the state — geography "can provide opportunities and signify vulnerabilities in periods of peace and war" (Ibid). While favorable geographical factors can elaborate efficient strategies to seize the state's opportunities, negative geographical factors can necessitate the elaboration of a strategy which can reduce the vulnerabilities of the state within international relations (Ibid).

## S3: Military Spatium

Within geopolitical traditions, international balance has its significant role. Therefore, as Csurgai (2009: 81) states, "the use of spatial dimensions in the logic of armed conflict, the application of geographic reasoning in the conduct of war and in the organization of national defense" comprises an important element within the evaluation of tension and conflict in international relations. However, issues such as identity, ideology, race or ethnicity cannot be excluded from consideration as a matter of national defense.

Another important element carrying influence is *integration* on several levels of international relations because, since the mid–1990's, economic and military integration has widened within the international arena[37] and, consequently, this fact cannot in practice

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[35]Landlocked countries are for example Vatican or Serbia.

[36]Semi-landlocked countries are for example: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Slovenia or Belgium.

[37]For example: integration of European Union or NATO.

be overlooked. However, when analyzing national security, the most important factors are the technology[38], military capability[39] and resources (economic possibilities) of the international actors (Dussouy 2010, Csurgai 2009, Gilmartin 2009).

## *S4: Demographic Spatium*

In geopolitical analysis, demographic factors and inter–ethnic relations are also considered crucial. For instance, a "minority group living in a border zone of the nation-state and representing a majority of the population in this area can be perceived, by central authorities, as a potential threat to the territorial integrity and unity of the nation-state" (Csurgai 2009: 62) The distribution of the population within a given territory can be an important geopolitical indicator. The population rates and socio–economic conditions not just within a state but also in different regions can provoke social unrest, inter-state migration and even secession movements (Csurgai 2009: 76–77). These factors may lead to cooperation, but also conflict.

As Jackson (2007) states, one of the conditions of the state is the population, which also has a strategic role. For the implementation of the state's strategies, an adequate size of population is needed. Therefore, the crucial elements within geopolitical analysis are: ethnic composition, population density, population growth, socio–economic conditions (e.g. unemployment, health care, and welfare), educational system, level of law enforcement etc.

## *S5: Economic Spatium*

Csurgai (2009) and Dussouy (2010a) emphasize that economic strength plays an important role in the maintenance of a state's military and political strategy. Without economic power, the state is not able to implement its strategies within the international arena. "In contemporary international relations, the use of geo-economic strategies to achieve the objectives of the state [for instance, to enlarge its zone of influence] can be more than the use of military power" (Csurgai 2009: 75). A good example of geo–economic strategy is the European Union integration process. According to Cihelková (2007:13) the 'depth' of any regional economic integration[40] is dependent on the degree of integration in the economic relations of its actors. The objectives of geo-economic strategies are influenced by domestic incentives: to ensure socio-economic cohesion and create favorable conditions for development; therefore, a state can attain or preserve a favorable position in the international field (Csurgai 2009: 83). Consequently, when analysing the economic spatium, the

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[38]Availability of conventional and non–conventional weapons.

[39]Availability of army, navy or also indigenous forces.

[40]Distinguishing from the shallowest to most advanced forms of economic integration it is possible to define: regionalization, regional forums, state-supported regional integration, free trade area, customs unions, common markets, monetary unions, economic unions, and political unions (Cihelková et all. 2007).

following elements should be considered: regional wealth, the level of economic development, center and periphery inequality, taxation and legal system, labor force capabilities, foreign investment, etc. But what also influences the geo–economic strategies of nations are cultural, historical and geopolitical factors (Csurgai 2009:84).

In order, to define the strategic organization of relations within the six action spatia, the work refers to the method of social network analysis (SNA)[41]. Therefore, what characterizes a social network (SN) A social network is a graph of structures where *nodes represent actors* in the network and *ties represent relations*. The SNA "maps and measures formal and informal relationships to understand what facilitates or impedes the knowledge flows that bind interacting units" (Serrat 2009: 2). Therefore, the number, variety and interdependence of units are crucial for social network analysis (La Porte 1975). The fundamental concepts within the SN are: actors, relation ties, dyad (in some cases triad), subgroups, groups, relations and networks (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 17). The purpose of this work is based on the analysis of the particular Slovak – Hungarian relation tie. Consequently, for achieving this goal the fundamental concepts of the work are actors[42] -– collective social units — states, linked by relation ties and forming a most basic level of the system dyad.

In order to evaluate the dynamics of Slovak–Hungarian relations, the analysis must measure Slovak and Hungarian relations directly, as well as indirectly, within the international system. Therefore, the analysis has to include other actors — states within the region. In case of Slovakia and Hungary the actors – states are defined according to the former Austro–Hungarian Empire; more specifically, states formed from the former Hungarian territory – *the Carpathian Basin*. The system of the Carpathian Basin is composed of: Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Serbia (Kosovo), Croatia, and Slovenia, and excludes Ukraine. The current international system is also characterized by the influence of non-state actors. Consequently, in the case of strategic influence, these actors need to be mentioned.

The following section is divided into two parts. The first stage of the analysis is inductive, static and descriptive. Firstly, the subjective geopolitical representations in both objects of the analysis (Slovakia, and Hungary) are characterized. The following question is answered: *What are the main characteristics of the subjective geopolitical spatium of the Slovak–Hungarian relations?* Due to the limited scope of the paper, specific events are carefully selected within the period of the 20th and 21st centuries. Following, key nodes (actors) and ties within individual Slovak-Hungarian relation spatium (S3 — S5) are identified. Within the demographic spatium (S4) the subjective representations of other states in the basin are indirectly delineated due to the limited scope of this work. The following, key nodes (actors) and ties within individual Slovak-Hungarian relation spatium (S3 – S5) are identified. Therefore, these particular questions are answered:

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[41] According to Serrat (2009) the term was coined John Barnes 1954.

[42] Actors can be also individual, corporate (Wasserman & Faust 1994: 18)

1. *What are the main actors (nodes) and ties within the network of the Carpathian military spatium?*

2. *What are the main actors (nodes) and ties within the network of the Carpathian demographic spatium?*

3. *What are the main actors (nodes) and ties within the network of the Carpathian economic spatium?*

The second part of the analysis is analytical, dynamic and deductive. It implicates the possible short, medium and long-term scenarios of the Slovak-Hungarian relationship. It concludes the possible evolution of the current Slovak-Hungarian relations in the region, its prospective and impact on the Carpathian region. As already mentioned above, (1.4.) geopolitical prospective does not tell the future (Csurgai 2009: 50).

The following research questioned are answered:

1. *What are the key factors feeding the conflict in Slovak–Hungarian relations?*

2. *What are the characteristics of the problematic relationship between Hungary and Slovakia?*

The following hypotheses are constructed:

H1: *The subjective geopolitical representation of Slovaks and Hungarians are the key factors feeding the tension between the two states.*

H2: *The tense relations between Slovakia and Hungary are not reflected in other areas of the Carpathian Basin.*

Empirical data are collected from English, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian scientific textbooks, journals (International Relations, Foreign Affairs, Geopolitics, Journal of Conflict Resolution, etc.) and monographs. The work implies also online sources of international institutions and domestic institutions (statistical offices databases), European Union database and media reports.

### *Limitations*

The work is very ambitious and the researcher has to use various international and geopolitical traditions often conflicting with each other. Therefore, the work is limited on several fields. Firstly, the project combines several assumptions of systemic analysis and the problem of model deviance – system inputs, outputs and feedback. Moreover, the work also combines two approaches of geopolitical analysis (Dussoy and Csurgai). Secondly, due to the grandiosity of the research, there is a risk of incomplete and biased empirical data production. Thirdly, in a work like this there is always the risk of the author's subjective selectivity. The fourth limitation rises from the placement of the SN and consequently its

existence in the reality of the international system. Fifth, actors and links between them are evaluated, though the connections between individual spatia are partly excluded. Finally, the work is limited in scope therefore this also can product an incomplete false results.

Generally, the limitations are what the researcher can really offer to the policy making and practice, and also the researcher's knowledge can be fallible (Dixon–Woods 2006: 30).

# Chapter 2

# Slovak–Hungarian Relations within the System of Five Action Spatia

Slovak–Hungarian relations are part of the Carpathian Basin system of states that emerged after World War I and have been re-formed by events during the past 90 years, such as World War II, governance of communist ideology, and the desintegration of this communist ideology. A system interacts with its surroundings and is also affected by its environment and, if there are some modifications in nodes or links, these changes ultimately result in a conversion somewhere else within the system. For example, if there are changes within Slovak–Hungarian relations this may have effects on other relations within the system.

Therefore, Slovak- Hungarian relations as the dyad cannot be examined in isolation[1] , but rather needs to be analyzed within the complex system of the Carpathian Basin. Consequently, it is possible to measure the dynamic of the Slovak-Hungarian relations. The system dynamic interaction is examined within the six action spatium. The research distinguishes between five action spatia subjective geopolitical spatium (S1), physical spatium (S2), military spatium (S3), demographic spatium (S4), and economic spatium (S5).

## 2.1 Subjective Geopolitical Spatium of Slovakia and Hungary (S1)

### *Hungary*

The geographical position of Hungary predestined the history[2] of the state. The state has existed in one form or another for more than a thousand years and, even though its mul-

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[1]"States and dyads cannot neatly excise the context that prompts their actions and analyzed in isolation from one another..." (Braumoeller 2010:158).

[2]Different Slavonic tribes (Croats, Valachs – Romanians, Slovaks, etc.) were living in the region, when the Magyars were conquering the region. During medieval period of history different western settlers mostly Germans arrived.

tiethnic composition underwent constant evolution, it still remained a 'disadvantage' that led indirectly to the 'traumatic' events of the first half of the twentieth of century. In 1900, Hungary was constructed along seven statistical–geographic parameters, which did not corresponded of the geographic distribution of nationalities, but each with an internally differentiated ethnic composition such as Hungarians, Romanians, Germans, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Ukrainians, and others on the territory of the Hungarian Kingdom (Eberhardt 2001: 268). (See Appendix A. 1)

The most traumatic events for the Hungarians were the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy at the end of the 1918 and the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, which delineated the new, sharply reduced borders of the Hungarian republic and which had a strong influence on the Magyars' collective mentality. Understandably, the area of Hungary was reduced (excluding Croatia) from 282, 000 square km to 93, 000 square km – only 29% of its pre–World War I territory, and the number of inhabitants was reduced from 18 to 7,6 million (Niederhauser 1993, Eberhadt 2001). According to the Treaty of Trianon (1920) the territory of Hungary was divided between the newly-formed nation-states of Czechoslovakia; Romania; the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes[3], and Austria[4] . Therefore, about 3.3 million ethnic Magyars found themselves among the aforementioned nationalities under the sovereignty of foreign states (Neiderhauser 1993: 263). (See Appendix A.2)The spatial distribution of the ethnic Hungarian population was highly differentiated, for example the borderlands of Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) and Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) were mostly inhabited by Magyars (Eberhadt 2001:290). The most significant demographic acquisition was made by Romania, where more than 5 million people lived in the former Hungarian territory (Ibid). The treaty was a national catastrophe felt by everyone who had relatives in neighbouring countries, or those who had fled from them (Niederhauser 1993: 263). This was a serious blow to the Hungarian national consciousness, which persists even today[5]. The pre–World War I dreams of territorial integrity[6] vanished (Niederhauser 1993: 262-263). Hungary became a fully sovereign nation–state, but one in three Hungarian lived outside the borders of this new independent state. Appendix 2 shows the dramatic changes within the demographic structure of the country by comparison with the pre–first-world-war situation. (See Appendix A.1 and A.2)

However, Magyar politicians ignored no opportunity for territorial revision[7] of the Ver-

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[3]Became Yugoslavia in 1929

[4]The borderland with Austria was determined by the St.-Germian-en-Laye (1919

[5]Michael Stewart (2009) claims that within Hungary a 'Trianon syndrome' exists

[6]Around 1900, a left-wing group (Huszadik Század—Twentieth Century) led by Oszkár Jászi, demanded the reorganization of the national lines —- in effect, the establishment of an East-European Switzerland. Later, just before the end of the First World War, these ideas were also published in a book (Niederhauser 1993: 262).

[7]SUGAR, Peter F.; LEDER, Ivo. Nationalism in Eastern Europe. Seattle: University of Washington. 1971.; NIEDERHAUSER, Emil. The National Question in Hungary. In: TEICH, Mikuláš; PORTER, Roy (ed.). The National Question in Europe in Historical Context.USA: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

sailles system. The source of this 'revisionist nationalism'[8] was, according to Sugar & Ledger (1971), national pride. "Revisionism not only blurred the vision of Hungarian leaders, making them vulnerable to their own propaganda, it also implied the insincerity of their pledges to cooperate with neighboring countries in order to avoid some disastrous consequences of the depression" (Sugar & Ledger1971: 287-288). This fact had been reflected as well in two revolutions —- the democratic October Revolution in 1918, and the revolution of establishing the Soviet Republic led by Miklós Horthy in 1919. Consequently, ordinary life within the country was affected; for example, Sugar & Ledger (1971: 288) mention that in this period there were signs saying "No!No!Never!" and featuring the images of four 'detached' black pieces of Greater Hungary grouped around the white body of the 'truncated motherland'[9] all over public places such as parks, offices and schools. (Appendix B. 1) Obviously, revision of the Trianon Treaty was refused by the entente powers.

Influenced by the uniqueness of the Magyars in the Carpathian basin, the "third road" concept was formulated by the Populist Contribution (László Németh and Imre Kovács) to Magyar nationalism. This concept implied that Hungary had to resist both German and Russian expansionism, and suggested that Hungary and its neighbors had some common interests that had to be explored and strengthened (Sugar & Ledger 1971: 296). Another concept, different in ways but still very close to the "third road" concept, was initiated by Endre Bajcsy–Zsiliszky and later developed by Achim and Gömbös. It claimed that the only road to an independent Hungary was through the cooperation and social elevation of the Magyar peasant (Sugar & Ledger 1971: 297). However, the reality of the era and the Horthy regime did not allow this kind of 'humanism,' and the concept became an empty political idea.

Thus, post–World War I Hungarian nationalism, after some initial hesitation and reluctance, took a more aggressive part in the 'reorganization' of the CE. In the larger extent, revisionist Magyar nationalism was a revival of the historical myth of Hungary's mission in defense of Christianity against the Bolshevik threat and a justification of Magyar supremacy in the Carpathian, relying on the 'doctrine of Holy Crown,'[10] which stressed spiritual–historical rather than ethnic rights, since Hungarian territorial claims went far beyond the areas inhabited by Magyar minorities (Sugar & Ledger 1971: 291). The Hungarian government started to seek help from the enemies of the Versailles system, firstly from fascist Italy, and secondly from Hitler's Germany. With their aid, Hungary regained

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[8]Later dated Marxist historical writings speak much about the economic and social interests of the ruling classes were behind the revision in order to disconnect the everyday problem on Trianon (Niederhauser 1993: 263).

[9]Another example: two million children were twice a day required to recite, along with their prayers, the 'Magyar Creed': "I believe in one God, I believe in one Fatherland, I believe in divine eternal Truth, I believe in the resurrection of Hungary. Amen."(Sugar & Ledger 1971:288)

[10]The doctrine of the Holy Crown is an unwritten constitution -– the severing is the Holy Crown not the King (Varga 2006).

some of its previously lost territory during World War II — from Czechoslovakia in 1938 and 1939, and from Romania 1940, without any military intervention. In the case of Yugoslavia, German military intervention helped Hungary regain Bačka and small pieces of Baranya (Magocsi 2002: 179).

With the end of World War II and defeat of Hungary, the frontiers of 1937 were re–established with a minor correction to the borders on the right bank of the Danube river near to Bratislava, where three more villages were added to the Czechoslovak territory[11]. In 1946, the victors made an agreement with Hungary about an exchange of inhabitants in order to prevent a one-sided expulsion of Hungarians (Neiderhauser 1993: 265). The most significant exchange of inhabitants was between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where around 100, 000 Magyars (See table 8) were transferred to Hungary in exchange for 70,000 Slovaks returning to Czechoslovakia (Ibid) Specifically, the ethnic structure visibly changed in comparison to the 1930's and the immediate post-World War II period. The dramatic changes are visible not only for Slovaks living in Hungary – the decrease of Slovaks in number is 78,800 and Germans living in the country – the decrease of German population in number is 454,700. (The dramatic changes in demography are visible not only in the exodus of some 78,000 Slovaks from Hungary, but also in the ethnic German population, which was decreased by 454,700.)The reduction of the inhabitants of ethnic groups was visible except in the largest ethnic group of Hungarians where the number grew by more than one million. (See Appendix A. 3 & A. 4) The post–World War II era was marked by a lack of perspective in Magyar nationalism (Sugar & Ledger 1971: 299). The era of the Peoples' Republic of Hungary (1948 — 1989), as was the case all over Central Europe, was characterized by loyalty to the Soviet Union and to the Communist Party, both of which were incorporated into the Magyar nation-concept (Sugar & Ledger 1971: 300).

In 1989, a full–fledged nation state emerged from the ruins of socialist Hungary, which brought new liberties for individuals, the rule of law, and full sovereignty of the state. The representations within the state, after more than sixty years of the existence of the independent country still inclines to a 'vivid' nationalism and is a significant physiological and political force in Hungarian society (Ökény 2006: 28). Elements of the post-socialist national identity turned out to be reminiscent of the past, and the positive changes had negative effects when the successful national liberation and independence gave impetus to the 'fetishization' of the national state (Ökény 2006: 29). Therefore, in 1994, a generally radical and nationalist organization started to campaign vociferously for the creation of dual citizenship (Stewart 2009:12). To cut a long story short, as evidence that these tendencies are reflected within the country's collective mentality, and therefore in the legislature, three cases are worth mentioning.

Firstly, in 2001, the Hungarian parliament, led by Viktor Orbán adopted a law reg-

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[11]The small territorial The changes were adjusted by the Peace Treaty of Paris, 1947.

istered as Act LXII of 2001–the so-called 'Status-law'[12]. The idea was to help ethnic Magyars living outside the borders of Hungary to study and work their motherland. The law "attempts to define the 'status' of those citizens of other states vis–a–vis the Hungarian state, and provides a series of concessions to these people when visiting Hungary as well as subsidies or financial support in their own countries" (Stewart 2009: 3) and simply created a status of a dual citizenship. The law has been applied to those Hungarians who are not Hungarian citizens and who reside in Croatia, Yugoslavia, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia, and who lost their Hungarian citizenship through means other than voluntary renunciation, or who are not in possession of a permit for permanent residence in Hungary (Act LXII of 2001, article 1). The main argument of the formulation of the law was that Hungarians living beyond the borders of their motherland have to do "little more than establish their credentials as ethnic Magyars and then commit themselves to remaining as residents of their birth-state" (Ibid). Therefore, there has been an effort to create a "legal relationship between the home-state and co-ethnics abroad and in this sense sets up a 'transitional' or a cross-border form of 'citizenship'" (Ibid). The status law has defined a number of goals such as political, cultural, economic and cultural *strictu sensus*. "Culturally", the aim is to improve the living standards of Hungarians beyond the borders; economically the aim is to improve the living standards of these same persons and the cultural politics comes down to the ambiguous "idea of the unification of the Hungarian nation" (Stewart 2009: 14). Zsolt Németh, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1998–2002) explicitly described the law as a means to overcome 'our nation's 80–year–old Trianon trauma' (Stewart 2009: 32). However, the law later proved difficult to implement.

Secondly, in 2010, the parliament, again led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, adopted a controversial new Hungarian citizenship law, Act XLIV of 2010. The naturalization of ethnic Hungarians became much more open as gaining Hungarian citizenship became more accessible for non–Hungarian citizens with Hungarian nationality with the amendment to the law on Hungarian citizenship of 1993. These people can preferentially gain Hungarian citizenship on the basis of Hungarian origins and knowledge of the Hungarian language. The previous law had stated that preferential citizenship was accessible to those non-Hungarian citizens with Magyar nationality who had at spent at least one year living in the territory of Hungary, had Hungarian origins or Hungarian nationality, and also were able to prove they had knowledge of the Hungarian language[13].

Hungarian domestic politics and sentiment imply the so called 'homeland nationalism'[14] or 'kin–state nationalism'[15] . This defines a new phenomenon: transnational politics[16] (Stewart 2009). Therefore, Hungarians have a distinctive regional indent and inter-

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[12]The law was passed by an overwhelming 93% of votes in the Hungarian parliament (Stewart 2009: 2).

[13]The Act from 1993 also set more conditions for gaining preferential Hungarian citizenship.

[14]Brubaker (2006)

[15]Fowler (2002)

[16]Transnational politics can be defined as "social relations [which] build 'fields that cross geographic,

ests and goals beyond their borders (Stewart 2009:26). One of the claims of the Hungarian government has been that the Status law provides "the future of Europe" and the model for cross-border relations with co–nationals (Orbán 2001 in Stewart 2009: 27). Therefore, strong nationalistic tendencies within the country are present in modern-day Hungary and are also reflected in the state's policy towards its 'former citizens'. Therefore, the Magyars' collective mentality is strongly influenced by the formation of Hungarian identity, which has been created on an interpretation of history and its subsequent reflection in political (geopolitical) representations of the state.

Recently, the Hungarian government has adopted a new constitution (April 2011) which, for example, extends the possibility of voting in Hungarian national elections to Hungarians living beyond the borders of the Hungarian Republic. This should be further specified by a constitutional act. Unfortunately, a deep analysis of the new constitution is not possible due to the time restrictions of this thesis.

## *Slovakia (Czehoslovakia)*

Independent Slovakia is a relatively young state with a shorter history than Hungary. Therefore, the national identity and collective mentality of Slovaks has developed differently than in Hungary .The pre–World War I national consciousness was rather low and based on individuals' words and acts (Sugar & Ledger 1973:186). After the disintegration of the Hapsburg Empire, the Slovak territory became part of the newly-created Czechoslovakia. Eberhadt (2001:131) mentions that "Slovak nationalists saw separation from Hungary as the realization of their dreams: the salvation of the Slovak nation from encroaching acculturation" (Ibid). Therefore, national consciousness started to flourish. However, the Czechs rejected the idea of a federation and instead "they proclaimed a unitary, centralized 'Czechoslovak nation-state, the domain of a 'Czechoslovak nation', in which Czechoslovak would be the official language" (Sugar & Ledger 1974, Irmanová 2005). According to the Pittsburg Agreement of 1918, Slovaks were promised their own administrative system, diet, courts, and the official use of the Slovak language in the territory of Slovakia (Sugar & Ledger 1974: 194). However, the central government in Prague did not fulfil the agreement, instead making only a few concessions to Slovak autonomy[17]. For Slovaks this meant coping with the same situation as before 1918.

The new borders defined by the Trianon agreement transected ethnic lines; a belt of

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cultural and political borders' so that people develop multiple and intense involvements in two places simultaneously" (Stewart 2009: 24–25).

[17]Czechoslovakia practiced parliamentary democracy permeated with the liberal-humanitarian philosophy of President Masaryk (Sugar & Ledger 1974:194) In comparison with other countries within CE, minorities suffered less in Czechoslovakia because, as Czechoslovak citizens, they were guaranteed full political, religious, and economic equality with the dominant Czechs and Slovaks. "There is no doubt that discrimination against Germans and Magyars was practiced in the execution of the land reform and in the awarding of government jobs and contracts" (Sugar & Ledger 1974:194).

land inhabited by Magyars was incorporated on the Slovak side of the border. The population censuses conducted in 1921 and 1930 in table 6 and 7 show the differences in the population in the current territory of Slovakia. Not just the decrease of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia is visible in the numbers. In contrast to Slovaks, where the percentage grew by 4.4%, the difference in the number of ethnic Hungarians in 1930 was 78,700 less than in 1921 but still constituted the largest minority in that period. (See Appendix A. 5 & A. 6)

However, the ruling Czech administration had influenced Slovak resistance and therefore the national conciseness grew into unchained and hypersensitive nationalism (Sugar & Ledger 1974, Eberhardt 2001). Slovak dreams of autonomy were especially strong among the Catholic clergy, rural bourgeoisie, and peasantry centred around the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka (Sugar & Ledger 1974: 195). Therefore, the idea of the 'Czechoslovak nation' —- 'Czechoslovak identity' became impossible to grow.

The Munich Agreement and the subsequent Žilinna Agreement and the Vienna Award of 1938-1939 led to the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. Hittler proclaimed an independent Slovakia and the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. Slovakia, according to the Vienna Award, ceded to Hungary the southern part of Slovakia (the territory form Komárno to Kosice), inhabited mostly by Hungarians[18].

The puppet Clerico–Fasistic Slovak Republic (1939–1945) was led by Monsignor Jozef Tiso. This period was marked by rabid ideology and police brutality closely related to the Third Reich. Although the violence of the era brought some prosperity, Slovaks did not lose consciousness of the fact that they were in effect vassals of Nazi Germany (Sugar & Ledger 1974:199). "It served as a symbol for Slovak masses of their ability to run their own affairs"(Ibid).

Moreover, the Slovak National Council in London, a broad national front of Communists and right-wing opponents of Jozef Tiso, together with partisans and regular army elements, started in 1943 to organize a national uprising. The uprising broke out in late August, 1944, and carried on for two months. The uprising was declared in the name of the Slovak nation and thereby announced the wish for a return to brotherly coexistence with the Czech nation.

After the end of World War II, the Czechs accepted Slovaks as an equal nation closely bound by language and culture and representing 'Czechoslovak unity' (Ledger & Sugar 1974: 201). The "Magna Carta of Slovaks," announced as a part of Košice Program in 1945, proclaimed that Slovaks should be masters of their Slovak lands in the same way as Czechs in their country (Ledger & Sugar 1974: 202). However, the unclear definition of the competences of the Slovak National Council led to disputes with the Czechs (Irmanová 2005: 118).

The alteration of frontiers, where Czechoslovakia permanently lost the Sub–Carpathian

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[18]Ruthenia was first part of Hungary but later become part of the Soviet Union in 1945.

Rus, as well as the resettlement policy[19] of ethnic Germans, were reflected in the composition of the population in the part of Slovak territory (See Appendix A. 7) and also in the Czech territory. The 1950 census, when compared to the 1930 census, showed that the number of Germans was reduced by 143,000. According to Eberhardt (2001: 154) "a possible resettlement of ethnic Hungarians also was discussed, but the idea was never adopted or implemented. In spite of this, significant population movements took place in the Slovak-Hungarian borderland." A comparison of the 1930 and 1950 censuses reveals that the number of ethnic Hungarians declined by 217,400. A decline in the numbers of other ethnic groups is also visible, except for Slovaks, whose numbers grew by 664,700.

The period from 1946–1948 brought the Communist government to power, which meant moving away from federal solution and towards centralization. Slovaks were guaranteed only regional autonomy but the legislative and executive organs were subject to control by Prague. The remaining self-administration was canceled by the strong centralization in 1960 (Irmanová 2005: 119). However, in the period from1968–1969 during the former centralized structure of Czechoslovakia was transformed into a federation of two equal States and the "new Czech–Slovak Socialist Republic had two new capitals, Prague and Bratislava, with their own parliaments and government, but Prague's control remained in place (Irmanová 2005: 120). However, the question of Czechs and Slovaks was formally settled, though practically the solution was unsatisfied on both sides (Irmanová 2005: 121). The forty–one years of Communist rule suppressed nationalist tendencies within the country.

In 1990, when the Czechoslovak Democratic Republic emerged from the ruins of the communist regime, the national and social question came to the fore. Therefore, a revival of national consciousness started in both countries. The future development of the country was seen differently in Prague and in Bratislava. The Czechs preferred to maintain central control over the reforms and transformation processes without consideration of the specific needs of Slovakia. This served to evoke mistrust on the Slovak side. Slovaks were trying to create a 'true' functional federation. After difficult negotiations, the Czechs and Slovaks split and created their own independent nation–states.

In the early days of the independent Slovak Republic, the state struggled to respond to the democratic transformation, especially during the period from 1994-1998 (Bilčik 2001, Irmanová 2005). The dividing line of domestic representations seemed to be between the 'Nationalists' and 'Europeanists' (Bilčík 2001: 6). In the 1994 election, a nationalist coalition[20] was formed and led by Vladimír Mečiar. Domestic as well as foreign policies became very questionable. For example, in 1995 the Slovak parliament adopted a law of Usage of the National language [21] which severely limited the usage of minority languages

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[19]Beneš Decrees

[20]The coalition was created by HZDS -– Movement for Democratic Slovakia, SNS — Slovak National Party and ZRS —- Association of Workers of Slovakia.

[21]Act 270/1995 of the Usage of the National Language of the Slovak Republic [Zákon č. 271/1995 Z.z.

and of ethnic groups. The strict rules set up by the law encountered strong opposition from the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which had its own representation within the Slovak parliament and strongly opposed the adoption of this law. Mečiar's government promised to adopt a legislative specification of the usage of the minority language, but this attempt was never fulfilled (Irmanová 2005, Bilčík 2001). The immediate post–independence era was strongly marked by strong nationalism in domestic politics, which also led to the 'cooling down' of the foreign relations.

The next government, elected in 1998 and led by Mikuláš Dzurinda, brought some slight changes to the formulation of the minority language legislation[22] through a re-adaptation of the conditions from 1990. Therefore, the usage of minority language in official relations was possible in places were 20% or more of the residents were of an ethnic minority (Irmanová 2005: 200).

The strong Hungarian ethnic minority living in the southern borderland of Slovakia (see 2. 4) has a strong influence on the domestic political field. The Hungarian question within Slovak politics has led to much conflict and tension, not only in the domestic political scene, but also in foreign relations.

The problem of Hungarians living in Slovakia is an issue that has been present since 1920. The recent amendment of the law of the usage of the national language of the Slovak Republic in 2009 has provoked a discussion within the society . Moreover, on the 21st of August, 2009, the unveiling of a statue of the first king of Hungary was held in Komárno. Local authorities of Komárno invited the Hungarian President L. Sólyom to this event. This visit was not officially announced by Hungarian diplomats, but, none the less, Slovak diplomats banned Sólyom from coming. Curiously, the President of Slovakia was not invited to Komárno. The Slovak Prime Minister R. Fico has pointed out that 21st of August 2009 is the 41st anniversary of the occupation of former Czechoslovakia by troops of then-Warsaw Pact countries, which meant also by Hungarian soldiers. As Vrábel (2009) mentions, that day, before this incident a celebration of Hungarian statehood was held in Budapest. The Hungarian President on this occasion took part in the swearing in of new soldiers of the Hungarian Military. In his speech, he blamed Slovakia for punishing Hungarians living in Slovakia for using the Hungarian language. He also claimed that the idea of the Hungarian state should be celebrated not just in Hungary but also in the entire Carpathian Basin and all around the world.The punishing of Hungarians living in Slovakia is evidently false information. During the diplomatic crisis (2009), and after, the Hungarian side pointed to the era of European integration, European Law, Schengen, etc. The European Union refused to deal with the conflict between Bratislava and Budapest. However, the entry of the Slovak Republic to the European Union did not subvert

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o štátnom jayzku Slovenskej republiky].

[22] Act 184/1999 of the Usage of the Minority Languages [Zákon č.4/1999 Z.z. o používaní jazykov národnostnych menšín].

its sovereignty. "This sovereignty is reflected in the fact that according to the International law, country is sovereign if no other country carries power over it. Any act of foreign state power is inconceivable on the territory of sovereign country" (Vrábel, 2009: 25). The Slovaks also fail to be united within the policy, rhetoric and diplomacy towards the minority living in the country's territory, as well as towards Budapest.[23] Turbulence was also caused by the amendment of the Law of Citizenship in 2010, which stipulates that if a Slovak citizen adopts the citizenship of another country, he/she loses his/her Slovak citizenship ex–lege. Therefore, double citizenship is an unwanted element. This adoption has been especially criticized by Hungarian political parties in Slovakia.

The representations within Slovakia are often conflicting. On one hand, there are national attempts to consolidate the 'Slovak conciseness' including within the legislature; on the other hand there are much more 'moderate voices'. This is visible in the failure to find a satisfactory solution for minorities living in Slovak territory within the legislature of the country. In conclusion, if the results of the national election represent the 'wishes' of the voters, the ambiguity within the geopolitical representation of Slovakia are present[24].

The subjective geopolitics of the Slovaks and Hungarians is mostly defined by the subjective interpretation of history and therefore its implementation within the current foreign and domestic policy. In Hungary, there is a strong national policy strong national identity policy build on the subjective interpretation of their history not just within the borders of the state however also behind the state, since the beginning of the emergence of the democratic Hungarian nation state. In Slovakia, the policy is ambivalent towards the national minority of the state. Obviously, verbal attacks between the two countries are graduating between the two neighbours and also the diplomatic relations are affected too.

The minority living in the country has its own representation in the Slovak parliament (Most–Híd). It has to be emphasized that in the recent elections (2010) this political party, which is much more moderate has been elected instead the much more radical SMK (Slovak-Hungarian Coalition). Conversely, in Hungary in election (2010) the nationalistic FIDESZ had been elected and gain more than two–thirds in the parliament. The elections can reflect the attitude of Hungarians in both countries. Hungarian coalition is composed by the nationalistic FIDESZ led by Victor Orbán, (who has two–thirds majority) and extremist JOBBIK who support stronger national policy, as is already visible by the adaptation of the new constitution. In Slovakia the 'fragile' coalition led by Iveta Radičová is much more moderate therefore it should balance in the relations between the two nations. FIDESZ is described by the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformist (AECR) dangerous political force tending towards authoritarianism and the alliance also compares' Viktor Orbán to the Russian former president and currently Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

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[23]Moreover, Sólyom had been warned by both Angela Merkel and Swedish Presidency of the EU before his planned visit (Klimeš 2010

[24]The results of elections within Slovakia every four years usually see the opposition of the previous term voted into power.

The Slovak and Hungarian subjective politics within the Carpathian Basin can be characterized by: (a) subjective national domestic policy/ foreign policy (b) subjective interpretation of history, (c) strong nationalistic Hungarian policy, (d) ambivalent Slovak policy towards minorities.

## 2.2   Physical Spatium (S2)

The map of Europe clearly shows that the Carpathian Basin is an oval-shaped area, surrounded by mountain ranges, in the middle of the continent. The basin is part of the Alpine–Carpathio–Dinaridic system of orogens, including the substrate of the Pannonian and Transylvanian basins (Schmid & coll 2008: 139). As mentioned above (See1.1.), physically, the physical limits basin can be defined by the Carpathian Mountains to the north and north-east, the Transylvanian Alps and Serbian Mountains to the east, and by the Dinaric Ranges to the south. The Alps close the basin from the west and the west-north is delineated by the Morava and Danube rivers. The region, however, lies between the so–called West (former Entente) and East (former USSR) and thus creates a buffer zone between the two. The regions' area is approximately 300,000 square kilometers and its alrgest river is Danube, which enters from the western part, cuts across the basin and leaves at the Balkan massif and flows to the Black sea. Hungary and Slovakia are territorially fully incorporated within the Basin, and because these two states are the key actors of this study, the investigation of the physical spatium is limited mainly to these two actors. The Romanian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Austrian territories partly extend into the territory of the basin. The region's the climate is characterized by four seasons with continental climate conditions and an average rain fall of 605-864 mm per year (Climatetemp).

The geographical position of Slovakia places the country in the 'heart' of Europe. The spatial distribution of its territory is 49 035 km2, which ranks it among the small countries. The Slovak Republic borders Poland to the North, Ukraine to the East, Hungary to the South, Austria from the South-West, and the Czech Republic to the North–West. Therefore, Slovakia is a semi-landlocked country. The capital city is Bratislava, situated in the south-west corner of the country and its city limits touch the borders of its neighbors -– the Hungarian and Austria borders. The distance between the southern and eastern spots of the country territory is 429 km and the highest geographical point is the Gerlachovský Štít —- 2,655 m above sea level in the High Tatras, while the lowest point is on the Bodrog River, 94m below sea level on the border with Hungary. The surface of the country consists of lowlands particularly in the south, and on the central and northern part, valleys, hills, highlands and mountains. Due to the special and unique tectonic structure of Slovakia, a significant amount of mineral and geothermal springs are located in the country (FRVŠ č. 2511/2008). The largest river is the Váh (403 km), which flows into the Danube River. The Danube River is an internationally important navigation route, which flows into the

Black Sea. The River Ipeľ creates the border with HungaryThe Poprad and Dunajec rivers flow northward, into the Baltic Sea[25].

Agriculturally important is the Danubian lowland in the southern part of Slovakia. Specifically substantial is the area in the center of Danubian flatlands, the so-called Žitný ostrov (Rye Island), which is part of the lowlands. The Rye Island is the largest river island in Europe, lying between the Danube and its tributary, the Little Danube (Tourist–Information). The territory of the lowlands also creates the southern border of the country, shared with Hungary. The natural attraction of the region is its richness of fresh water reserves. Here in addition, the area is home to a whole system of dead channels. The Little Danube is the main catchment river; it is fed surface waters and groundwater from the rest of the region by a system of canals (Ibid). In the sediment of Rye Island are stocks of good quality drinking water estimated to be around 10 billion m3 (Ibid). The region was appointed in 1978 as a protected area with a significant amount of drinking water for Central Europe (Ibid).

Hungary is also situated in the heart of Continental Europe with a territory 93,030 km2 and is a landlocked country. The country neighbors Slovakia to the north , Ukraine to the north-east , Romania to the south-east , Serbia and Croatia to the south , Slovenia to the south–west and Austria to the west. The distance from the northern point to the western point of the country is 250 km and from the eastern point to the most western point is 524 km. The capital city is Budapest and its distance from its northern neighbor, Slovakia, is 28 km. The second largest river is the internationally important navigation route, the Danube (417 km). The country has also a significant numbers of thermal springs.

The territory is mostly formed by plains, especially the Little Hungarian Plain is a plain of approximately 8,000 km2 in north–western Hungary, south–western Slovakia and eastern Austria, along the lower course of the Rába River, with high quality agriculturally qualitative soil (Hungary). Also, the Great Plain incorporates the basin of the Tisza River — the longest river, whose branches encompass more than half of the state territory (Ibid). It is delineated by mountains on all sides and terrains, including regions of fertile soil, sandy areas, wastelands, and swampy areas (Ibid).

The Great Plain and Little Hungarian Plain are part of the so–called Pannonian Plain, which is part of the Carpathian Basin. The eastern part incorporates not only the Tisza, Danube and Raab Rivers, but also the Drave and the Sava, currently in the territories of Croatia and Serbia. The western part of the Plain includes the rivers Váh and Ipeľ in the territory of Slovakia. The Hornád is a transborder river between Slovakia and Hungary and the Somreş is also a transborder river between Hungary and Romania. About one third of these rivers are navigable (Hungary). The region has also a significant number of smaller rivers[26] . Therefore, the Basin has significant water channels.

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[25]The two rivers flow into the Vistula River via the territory of Poland.
[26]E.g. : Torysa in Slovkia; Bodrog in Hungary, Baleia River in Romania etc.

According to the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP), Europe has abundant water resources which are unevenly distributed between and within countries and, considering the population density, the distribution of the water resources per inhabitant is striking. Due to the changing climate, states or areas that traditionally had access to adequate water resources may suffer shortages (UNEP).The quality of Europe's rivers, lakes, and groundwater is threatened by the discharge of sewage and industrial waste (often a legacy from past industrial development) and by excessive use of pesticides and fertilizers. The risk of a water shortage is projected to increase, most specifically in southern Europe. Therefore, the water resource differences between European regions will widen. Moreover, the increasing demand for water is leading to over-exploitation of local reserves in many regions — 20 European countries are dependent for more than 10% of their supply on river water from neighboring states (UNEP). (See Map B. 2) According to UNEP, countries' such as Czech Republic, Poland, Germany total renewable water resource per capita is very low (between 0–2000 m3 per person per year). Ukraine, Italy, and Bulgaria total renewable water resource per capita is low (between 2000 –5000 m3 per person per year. [27]

The Carpathian region is a complex system and its physical spatium is interconnected with human constructs. The physical environment is significantly important to human inputs. The human constructs are influenced by these variables: (a.) the buffer position, (b.) natural resources (water, fertile soil), (c.) navigable rivers.

## 2.3 Military Spatium (S3)

The military capability of the Austro–Hungarian Empire was significant. The Royal Hungarian army was established in 1868 and by 1973 had over 2,800 officers and 158,000 men in eighty–six battalions and fifty-eight squadrons (Rothenburg 1976: 85), not including the Hapsburg forces. After the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and due to the Trianon Treaty (1920), the Hungarian army was reduced to 35,000 men and the army was forbidden to possess tanks, heavy armor, or an air force (Pačenka & Luňák 1999: 525). However, the disintegration of the Austro–Hungarian Empire and the emergence of the new nation state had brought about a split of forces within the Carpathian region.

The 1920 split of forces is more or less comparable to today's situation. However, the seven regional states (nodes) are not the only actors within the military spatium. However, due to the limited scope of this study, there is no space for either supranational or non–state actors. Neither of the actors possessed a nuclear capability and are thus Non-nuclear-weapon States.

The military forces of Hungary emerged with the Democratic Hungarian Republic in 1990.The country has a modest-sized army composed of ground forces and the Hungarian

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[27] As well as France, Spain, Turkey, UK.

Air Force (Magyar Légierő, ML) under the unified command of the Ministry of Defense since 2007, under the Home Defense Forces. Naturally, the land forces are used for the guarding the borderland, defense, and in the case of catastrophe as a helping force for the fulfillment of commitments resulting from international treaties to which the Hungarian Republic is bound. The current number of active soldiers is 26,000 (est. 2010) but Hungary disposes of 4,640,516 men and women available for military service (CIA) . However, the current professional forces, an all-volunteer military, have high requirements. The ground forces are divided into 3 combined arms divisions in order to eliminate various independent brigades. The main military bases are located in Pécs, Debrecen and Budapest. According to the National Security Strategy (2003) the key values and interests are peace, national and regional security and stability, sovereignty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Consequently, these influence the Home Defense Forces' missions and tasks.

The modern Home Defense Forces dispose, for example, of ATLAS-2 Mistral missiles and multiple rocket launcher systems such as the BM-21, as well as other defense equipment. The army also has different types of vehicles, for example UNIMOG or MAN army trucks, Mercedes-Benz G 270 CDI, and different types of all terrain vehicles (MNO). The Hungarian Ground forces also dispose of heavy armor and T–72tanks. The Hungarian Air Force mostly disposes of JAS 39 Gippen jetss and Mi–24, Mi–8 and Mi–17 helicopters. Hungary also hosts a US Air base in Taszár.

The military forces of Slovakia were established by the independent Slovak Republic in 1993. In 2002, the army underwent a series of modifications affecting elements such as command, control inspection, mobilization and preparations, in order to create decisive(MOSR).

The Slovak army's duties are to guarantee the defense of the Slovak Republic and the security of the state from an external armed attack by a foreign power; the fulfillment of commitments resulting from international treaties to which the Slovak Republic is bound and participation in the maintenance of public order and security of the state; maintenance of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of the Slovak Republic's borders (Ibid). The Slovak army disposes of a professional army structured as: Ground Force, Air Force, Forces of Training and Support, and Military Healthcare. The number of professional soldiers is unknown, but according to the CIA factbook, in 2010 Slovakia disposed of a total manpower available for military service of 1,405,310 males and 1,369,897 females of military service age. The military forces are equipped mostly with heavy armor (Axtis 4x4, Alligator, AM 50, AMB – S, BVP 1, etc.) and also missiles systems, such as the BRAMS, SA–6 or S–3. The specific numbers of the army's capability are not available. The Slovak army is specialized in military engineering such as working with explosives, mining and sweeping, and building fortifications, roads, bridges, etc.

After the changes in 1989, the Romanian army went through several organizational

changes. Due to the country's recent entry into the European Union (2008), theRomanian military for underwent a process of structural modification and modernization. According to the Military Strategy of Romanian (2005), the fundamental objective of the armed forces is to guarantee the strict observance of human rights of all Romanian citizens in a sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible state. The Romanian army disposes of Land Forces, an Air Force, a Navy and a Division of Special Operation. The Land Forces are composed of combat support brigades; combat support and combat service; combat support and combat services battalions; live firing ranges; education and training structures (RNMD). The Air Force is divided into Air Flotillas, Surface to Air Missile Unites, Electronic Warfare Unites . The structure and inventory of the Navy is unknown. The inventory of the Romanian Land forces includes for example the missile air defense system 2K12M "KUB" (SA–6), Gepard anti–air systems, CA–94s and TR-85 M1 Tanks, but the exact numbers of the equipment is unknown . The Air force disposes of radar, fighters (MiG–21PFS), helicopters, reconnaissance aircraft, surface to air missiles and antiaircraft artillery — specific numbers of the inventory are not available. The armed service in Romania are voluntary and the exact number of the active soldiers in the Romanian military is unknown. However, the manpower available for military service by 2010 was 5,601,234 males and 5,428,939 females (CIA). Romania is also to only former Warsaw–Pact country to host a US airbase on its territory.

In the beginning of the 1990's, the Serbian army was a part of the Yugoslavian military, which was composed of ground forces, an air force, and a navy. With the collapse of Yugoslavia in the period from 1996-1997, the armed forces focused on the transformation of the organization and structure in order to meet new security requirements. A milestone for the Serbian military was reached in the year 2010, when the complete reorganization of the military started. According to the Serbian White Paper on Defense of the Republic of Serbia (2010), the forces are grouped into branches of Land Forces Command , Air and Air Defense Forces Command. The current Air Force has, for example, MiG-29A/B Fulcurums, MiG-21bis/UM Fishbeds, G–4 Super Galebs and G-2 Galeb fighter-bombers and J/NJ -22 Orao fighter-bombers. The Serbian Missile Defense inventory is equipped, for example, with the SA-5 Gammon, SA-6 Gainful, SA–13 Gopher ZRK-BD, numerous SA-9s and the SA–14 Gremlin. The Land Forces dispose of, for example, M-86 and BTR-50 armored vehicles, M84AB1and T-72 tanks, as well as other artillery. From January 2011, compulsory military service has been canceled. The number of active personnel is 28,000, however, the manpower available for the military was around two-and-a-half million in 2010. In addition, there is a US base —Camp Bondsteel —in Kosovo on Serbian territory.

According to the Ministry of Defense of Croatia, the Croatian Armed Forces (CAF) are specifically designed task forces, developed and prepared for defense of the country by military means (CAF). The structure of the Armed Force is composed of the General

Staff of the Croatian Armed Forces, with Military Representative Offices and General Staff Units, three services – the Croatian Army, Croatian Air Force and Air Defense, and the Croatian Navy - and the Croatian Defense College "Petar Zrinski" and Support Command transformed in 2006. The key goals of the CAF are joint missions and multinational operations including those beyond the borders of the country. The current number of active personal is 23,100 persons in peacetime, out of which 18 100 are active duty personnel, 3 000 civil servants and support personnel, and 2 000 voluntary conscripts (Ibid). The manpower available for military service in 2010 was 1,016,234 males and 1,017,355 females (CIA). The main weapon system and equipment of the CAF include the Air defense Gun 20/30, the Tak M–84, Light armored vehicle (EW, C), MANPADS "Igla", Missile ship RTOP, costal radar, the Mig–21 BIS D and others.

The Slovenia belongs to the group of small countries. The Slovenian Armed Forces were reorganized in 2004 in order to provide military defense independently or within an alliance, in accordance with international agreements. The Slovenian Armed Forces are structured in free main branches: the Armed Force, Navy and Air Element (EDI). The missions and tasks of the Slovenian military are to provide military defense to the Republic of Slovenia (RS), deter military aggression against the Republic of Slovenia, reestablish national sovereignty over the entire territory, contribute to international peace and stability, maintain operational readiness, contribute to international peace, security and stability, contribute to international peace, security and stability and other (SAF).The army is relatively small in numbers — 7,583 active personnel with approximately 1,654 ready reserves in 2010. The Manpower available for military service in 2010 was 477,592 males and 464,301 females (CIA). The military inventory of the Slovenian Armed Force has at its disposal M-84 tanks, Pandur Armoured Personnel Carriers, Bell 412 EP helicopters, Super Dvora MkII Coastal Patrol Vessels and other equipment.

The Austrian Armed Forces are united under the Joint Forces Command, which manages and deploys troops within Austria and abroad. Austria declared neutrality in 1955, although the state disposes of a significant Air Force (Luftstreitkräfte). Militaryservice is compulsory in Austria for those aged 18-35, and voluntary service is possible from age 16, followed by an 8–year reserve obligation (CIA). The manpower fit for military service in 2010 was males 1,579,862 males and 1,554,130 females (Ibid). The current number of active personnel is not available.

The main tasks of the Air Force are maintaining the sovereignty of its air space, providing reconnaissance, transport, liaison and combat support for its ground forces, and acting in an emergency relief capacity both at home and abroad. Austria also disposes of an air defense system, Goldhaube (Golden Hat), which has been operational since 1988. Moreover, it also disposes of the Saab Draken, which consists of fixed radar sites and mobile radar stations. Two Saab 105s or two Eurofighter jets are permanently held on quick reaction alert to intercept unidentified aircraft approaching the border (AAF). Ac-

cording to the Austrian Armed Forces, the "Luftunterstützungsgeschwader (Air Support Wing) consists of three staffel (squadrons), the first two being equipped with S-70 "Black Hawk" and "Alouette" III transport helicopters" (Ibid). The Helicopter Wings are based near Innsbruck and the Surveillance Wing is equipped with Eurofighters and Saab 105 aircraft operated from airbases in Zeltweg, Styria, and Hörsching, Upper Austria (Ibid).

The seven actors (nodes) of the Carpathian region do not exist in a vacuum. They participate in particular international military organizations. Therefore, they are connected to other channels —- links. The main links are NATO, OSCE and UN. However, the intensity of these channels differs among the Carpathian states.

Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Croatia and Slovenia are all full members of NATO. Serbia and Austria are partner countries to NATO. Military operations and exercises are held on a regular basis under joint command. According to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, member states are to provide collective defense to each other in response to an attack against one or more of them. Austria joined NATO forces in 1996 and signed an individual partnership program, participating in peacekeeping, peace-support operations and international security assistance, as did Serbia (2006)[28].

The second channel which includes states within the Carpathian region is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The organization views security in three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. It is the world's largest regional security organization forum for political negotiations and decision–making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts the political will of its participating states into practice through its unique network of field missions (OSCE). Decisions made on the OSCE platform are legally not–binding, and therefore political.

The third channel is the international organization for peacekeeping, peace–building, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance and many other – the United Nations (UN). The Charter gives the Security Council the power and also responsibility to maintain international peace and security. The organization does not have its own military force, However, all member states undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security (Ch7/A 43 of the UN Charter).

From the analysis of the military spatium of the Carpathian basin it can concluded that all armies have become more specialized and professional, and the current military strength within the basin is relatively equal. (see Appendix A. 12) The integration within the international military organization shows the deep intensity of integration. The matrix of symmetrical relationships is constructed on four levels of cooperation: (1) —- single–

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[28]Austria and Serbia do not participate in any other military operations than crisis response operations or collective defense operations.

channel links (shallow depth of integration); (2) — two/channel links (moderate depth of integration; (3) – three-channel links (strong depth of integration); (3*) —- Three–Channel Links (strong depth of integration). These links express partner state relations within NATO —- not part of the overall strategy of NATO. (See Appendix A. 9) The strongest military integration is between Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and Romania. Serbian and Austrian relations with others in the Basin are deep within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The military spatium of the Carpathian Basin as a human constructed space is defined by: (a) professional armies, (b) the strong intensity of the relations between the nodes, and (c) the Seven Carpathian States as not the only nodes.

## 2.4 Demographic Spatium (S4)

The Carpathian Basin is home to approximately 30 million people. Ethnic diversity is significant within the region. The region is home to at least eleven major ethnic groups. (See Appendix A.8) The region belongs to the post–Communist territory. Comparing the social situation with Western Europe, the living standards are lower. The region mostly experiences low income, unemployment, poor health, social isolation and also a crime rate which has increased since 1989 (Lelkes 2006). However, the situation is slowly improving due to the influence of European Union integration and the opening of market economies in the Carpathian states. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the society living within the basin is modern and urban. Due to the history of the region, the ethnic situation in each state is an important underlying factor in domestic and international policy. Therefore, this study concentrates on the ethnic situation within each node. The largest ethnic group living beyond the borders of its 'mother country is the Magyars. Approximately 2,572,300 (est. 2000) Hungarians live within the entire Carpathian Basin (Magocsi 2001).

*Nodes.* The largest community of Magyars living beyond the borders of its mother country (1,624,959) lives in Romanian Transylvania. Other ethnic groups living in the country are Germans, Serbs, Slovaks etc. The total population is 21,904,551 (CIA). The national minorities speak several regional languages, and two non-territorial languages: Romany and Yiddish (Murăruş 2010). According to Murăruş (2010), most of them correspond to the majority languages spoken in the states situated in the immediate vicinity of Romania (Bulgarian, Hungarian, Serbian, Ukrainian), or in territories which are not in direct linguistic contact with the Romanian language (Armenian, Czech, Italian, Polish, Slovak). "Other idioms are dialects historically related to a language of origin: it is the case of Swabian (Schwäbisch) and Transylvanian Saxon (Sächsisch) which must be related to the standard German language" (Murăruş 2010). The official language is Romanian, although the Constitution of Romania (1991) and other legal texts and regulations guarantee the right to use one's mother tongue in private and in public, the right to be correctly addressed by one's own name and first name, the right to use bilingual inscriptions in all

the localities, in areas where there is a significant proportion of minority population, the right to use one's mother tongue in local public administration and in the courts of law (Ibid)[29]. Education in minority languages is possible at all levels of the school system, from pre-school to university.

In Serbia, the ethnic minority is mostly concentrated on the northern part of the country, in southern part of the Danubian Plain, in the autonomous province of Vojvodina[30]. The largest minority groups living in Serbia are the Magyars, Slovaks and Croats (Magocsi 2001). The Hungarian minority living in the province is not without its political demands and grievance (Hagan 2009: 613). The gain of the autonomous status of the province has been accompanied by a great Hungarian campaign based on the argument that the Hungarian minority does not have adequate political representation and cultural institutions and that the Serbian government does not fully protects minorities from growing threats of ethnic violence and discrimination (Ibid). Conversely, the Serbian constitution provides protection for of the rights of all minorities living within the country according to the standards of the European countries[31]. The official languages within the province are Serbian, Hungarian, Slovak, Croatian and Romanian. The possibility to be educated in one's mother language is well represented. In addition, the country is ethnically very diverse, not only in the north but also on the eastern, southern and south–western borders were Roma, Germans, Valchs, Ashalki, Bosniaks, Albanians, etc. live. The total population of the country is 7,310,555 (CIA).

In the early 1990's, the guarantee of minority rights and freedoms was marred by intolerance and jingoism in Croatia (Tatalović 2006: 46). The legacy of the 1991–1995 war and discrimination against minorities was a challenge within the country after the war. Relations are still polarized especially towards the Serbs (Minorities in Croatia 2003: 4). The political transition of the country, which started in 2000, brought certain improvements and in 2004, the country successfully implemented minority rights and freedoms into the Constitutional, which regulates the use of language, education and alphabets of national minorities, and reached the standard normative level of minority protection rights (Tatalović 2006: 47–48). According to the minority report in Croatia (2003) comparing the 1991 census with the 2001 census the size of minorities has decreased with the exception of Roma and Slovaks. In Croatia the most sizeable ethnic minority is Serbian, 4.5%, and other, 5.9% (including Bosniak, Hungarian, Slovene, Czech, and Roma), spread all over the country. The total population of the country is 4, 483,804. The official language is Croatian, but other widely used languages include Serbian and Hungarian (Minorities in Croatia 2003: 6).

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[29]Education in the ethnic group language is possible within the territory of Romania, for example there are over one hundred elementary and secondary schools teaching in the Hungarian language.

[30]The province has been gaining and losing some of its autonomous rights more or less since 1945.

[31]The Serbian constitution incorporates the Human and Minority Rights and Freedoms according to the European Convention on Human Rights and Freedoms.

Of the 2,000,092 (July 2011 est.) people living in Slovenia, the major ethnic minorities are Hungarians (0.3%), Italians (0.1%), Roma (0.2%) and Germans (680 persons)[32] (CIA). Within the country the minorities are divided into 3 categories (1) autochthonous communities — Hungarian in the region of Prekumorje and Italian on the coast, (2) the Roma community and (3) other minority communities —- mostly nationalities of the former Yugoslavia. According to the Slovenian Constitution, article 11, the official language of country is Slovene (FUEN). Article 64 of the Constitution guarantees to the autochthonous communities the right to use their symbols, preserve their national identity, establish economic, cultural and scientific activities, the right to education and schooling in their own language (preschool until secondary school), etc. Moreover, paragraph 2 of the article guarantees the right to establish their own self–governing communities in the geographic areas where they live and also representation in the bodies of local self–government and in the National Assembly. Within the municipalities where these two ethnic communities live, the authorities work bilingually, and street names, street signage, etc. must be bilingual (Ibid). The schools from pre-school until secondary school can be bilingual. The state adopted both the Framework Convention the Protection of National Minorities, as well as the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Therefore, the country has strongly established the protection of the rights and freedoms of its minorities(Ibid).

The major ethnic groups living in Austria are Slovenes, Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks and Roma. The total population is 8,217,280 (July 2011 est.), of which, according to the census of 2001, the minority groups are composed of people from the former Yugoslavia (4%), Turks (1.6%) and others (CIA). The official language is German, but bilingual education is possible in the languages of the recognized national minorities. All minorities have legal protection as stated in the "Saint Germaine Treaty" No. 303/1920, Articles 66 — 68, which is incorporated in the Constitution (1929), which also establishes the advisory body for the protection and financial distribution of state funding amongst the linguistic minorities on the regional and central levels. Additionally, minority protection in Austria has been law since 1976, though without universal application[33]. Therefore, in 1992 the country adopted the European Charter for minority or Regional Languages, which became effective under international law in 1998 after its ratification (Second Report on Republic of Austria 2007: 12–24). The recognized ethno–linguistic groups are Burgenland–Croat living in about fifty municipalities in Burgenland and Vienna, Slovenes living mostly in Carinthia and Styria, Hungarians living mostly in Vienna and Burgenland, Czechs living in Vienna and Slovaks living in Upper Austria and Styria. The Roma minority is spread throughout the entire territory of the country (Ibid). The numbers of these national minorities is relatively low. The institutional frameworks for minorities are well developed. For

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[32]The community of Germans is not recognized as a minority due to its low number.

[33]The "Ethnic Group Act" (Volksgruppengesetz No. 196/1976 provides minority rights for Slovaks, Romanies, Burgenland Croats, Hungarians in Vienna and Burgenland, Carinthian Slovenes and Czechs.

example, there is the Carinthian Institute for Ethnic Minorities, which is an association for research in minority issues. Since 1955, education in bilingual primary schools has been mandatory in municipalities where 25% or more of the inhabitants are minorities (WDM & IP). Bilingual secondary schools are rather rare [34].

The population of the Slovak Republic, according to the Statistical Office of the state, was 5,433,385 in 2010. According to the 2001 census, the largest ethnic group, Hungarians, lives in the southern part of country in the borderland near Hungary. - 9.7% Magyars lives in territory 3500 km2 of the state area. They comprise 9.7% of the total population, and live in a territory of 3500 km2. The second largest ethnic minority is the Carpatho-Rusyn group living in the eastern borderland near Ukraine (130,000) (Magocsi 2001: 199). Other minorities living in the country are Czechs, Germans, Poles, Roma and others. The Slovak Constitution (1992), article 34, refers to the national minorities and ethnic groups and defines their individual and collective rights and freedoms, such as right to be educated in their own language, the right to use their language in official communication or participate in problem-solving regarding their ethnic group or national minority[35]. Consequently, the law also provides the right to participate in public life —- e.g. forming local governments. The official language is Slovak. The Roma language was recognized by the ratification of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Language in 2001. In the country, the Magyar minority has been the difficult issue — since the end of the First World War.(See 2.1.) Education in ethnic minority languages is possible. The largest minority, Hungarians, have access to schools were they are educated in their mother tongue, not only from pre–school to secondary school, but even at university. There are also several cultural organizations which support the cultural heritage of the ethnic minorities[36]. The Institutional framework for the protection of minority rights and freedoms is composed of the Ombudsman Institution, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, Minorities and Regional Development, the Committee of the National Council for Human Rights and Minorities, Strategic Programs for the issues of the Roma Population, NGO's and etc.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000), in Hungary, minorities make up some 10% of the population. The total population estimated by 2011 to be is 9,976,062 (CIA). Hungary was for century ethnically diverse, and therefore the ethnic groups living within the country profess dual identity; their consciousness is as strong as their national ties (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest 2000: 1). Hungary adopted the Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minority, which recognizes minorities as a component of the state on the criteria of 100 years of settlement history in Hungary, and therefore recognizes national or ethnic minorities such as Germans, Bulgarians, Greeks,

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[34]There is one secondary school in Burgenland that offers bilingual Croatian/German and Hungarian/German courses (WDM & IP)

[35]The law does not define what a national minority or ethnic group is.

[36]For example: Theater Thalia in Košice (Hungarian), Theater Alexandra Duchnoviča (Ruthenian) etc.

Croats, Romanian, Slovenes, Slovaks, Polish, Bulgarian, Armenian, Roma and Ukrainian ethnic groups (Teller 2002:73). These ethnic groups are spread all over the country in more than 1500 settlements and their legal status is conditioned by at least 1,000 voters (Ibid). The National and Ethnic Minorities Act (LXXVII of 1993) provides minorities the rights to participate in public life, use their native languages, foster their culture and identity, and use their mother tongue in education. Consequently, the act establishes the background for the representation of interests and for the cultural autonomy of minorities (Teller 2002:74). The enforcement of minority rights is the responsibility of the government, although there are a variety of special minority rights organizations and institutions which also support the enforcement of the act[37](Teller 2002:79). In the country, the Hungarian language become dominant and therefore education in minority languages has been waning (Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Budapest 2000:4). There are three types of schools for minorities: schools were the minority language is considered a foreign language; dual-language schools where the humanities are taught in the minority language and science in Hungarian; and schools where all subjects are taught in the minority language except Hungarian language and literature. However, these schools are rather rare because of the lack of suitable teachers, as well as for other reasons (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest 2000:5).

An external actor supporting the Hungarian minority within the Carpathian region is the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (HHRF), which helps Hungarian minority communities secure their rightful place in the political, cultural and economic world of the 21st Century (Ibid). However, this organization is an NGO, which helps Hungarian minorities in Central Europe. The organization is based in the USA and devoted to the rights of ethnic Hungarians in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, Croatia and Slovenia (HHFR).

Another important actor (node) is the European Union (EU), because five (Austria, Slovakia, Hungary Romania, and Slovenia) of the seven examined states are members of the Union. The European Union has several institutions, programs and a strongly-developed legislature which influences national policies/legislation of its members.

However, the EU can be also seen as a link between the member states because Article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights states that "The Union respects cultural, religious and linguistic diversity" and the European Parliament has adopted a series of resolutions promoting action on regional and minority languages (EC). Moreover, the five states are permanent members of the institutions of the Union – the European Council, which defines the direction and policies, and the EU Parliament which passes EU laws, of which some are legally binding.

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[37]For example: the Parliament's Human Rights, Minority and Religious Committee; the Office for National and Ethnic Minorities – connected to Action Plan for the Roma; the Ombudsman Institutions and NGO's.

The second channel link within the Carpathian Spatium is the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) and its Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (SCPPHR), where members are elected every three years by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The commission was created in 2006 and currently, the members of the commission from the Carpathian Basin are Romania and Hungary. The mandate of the commission is to monitor and report any violation of human rights. All Carpathian states are members of the UN. The commission does not dispose of any legal mechanisms which can bind a state.

The third channel link within the demographic spatium of the Carpathian Basin is the OSCE, which, as already mentioned above (section 2.3.), covers three dimensions of security, including the human dimension. "The OSCE identifies and seeks resolution of ethnic tensions that might endanger peace or stability. It promotes the rights of national minorities and pays particular attention to the situation of Roma and Sinti" (OSCE). All states of the Carpathian region are members of the OSCE. However, its decisions are not legally binding, as already mentioned in the previous section (2.3.).

The fourth channel link within the Carpathian space is the Central European Initiative (CEI). Since its establishment in 1989, its mandate is to help foster political and socio–economic development in the region aimed at avoiding new division lines in Europe (CEI). Therefore, it helps to promote regional cooperation within Central and Eastern Europe. All seven states of the Basin are members of the initiative. The resolutions of the CEI are not legally binding, though they have supporting role because they form different cooperation programs, funds and instruments. From a demographic point of view, the most important activities are those concerning human development, such as the CEI University Exchange Network Program and CEI Science and Technology Network (CEIS & TN).

The ethnic structure of the Carpathian Basin is diverse. The most numerous ethnic group in the basin is the Hungarians, who live in all states on the Carpathian region, mostly in the areas bordering Hungary. The largest minority living within the basin is the Hungarian, which lives in every states of the Carpathian region mostly on the borderland with Hungary. (See Appendix A. 8  A. 13) All states have relatively well–developed protections of freedoms and rights of minorities within their legislatures. In the case of Serbia, the legacy of the war in the nineties has left difficulties, but the situation is improving. Education in minority languages is possible in all states except Croatia. In Slovakia, Romania and Serbia it is even possible to gain a university degree in minority languages. The Hungarian minority has an especially strong representation within education. Even with well–developed protection of rights and freedoms, the non–governmental Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, based in the USA, has a considerable presence in the region, and helps to connect Hungarians and support their interest. Considerable is the existence of non-governmental Hungarian Human Rights Foundation based in USA, which is connecting and helps the Hungarians living within the Carpathian Basin even, thought the

protection of rights and freedoms is on the very well developed level.

The matrix of symmetrical relationships displays four levels of demographic cooperation: (1) shallow depth of integration (single–channel link — not available); (2) — moderate depth of integration (two-channel links — not available); (3) — strong depth of integration (three-channel links —- OSCE, UN and CEI), and (4) – very strong depth of integration (four channel links —- OSCE, UN, CEI and EU). (See Appendix A. 10) International dialogue of minority protection between Serbia, Croatia and Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania is deep. There exists a very deep level of integration between Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania (OSCE, UN, CEI and EU).

The demographic space of the Carpathian Basin can be characterized by: (a) a modern society, (b) ethnic heterogeneity, (c) a significant Hungarian minority, (d) influence of the European Union and external actor HHRF, and (e) inequality in the intensity of channel links between the actors.

## 2.5 Economic Spatium (S5)

After the events of 1989, the Central and Eastern European Economies went through a transition from centrally–planned economies to open, free-market economies. Therefore, these economies opened to the rest of the European continent and the world. However, the market–oriented reforms throughout Central Europe reordered both prices and the spatial character of the markets (Herzog 2000: 501–502) and therefore all post–Soviet countries suffered from economic decline. The real GDP rates were far below the level of the previous decade, resulting in high inflation or hyperinflation, and significantly increased unemployment rates occurred within the countries with transitional economies (Hamilton 1999:136). The openness of Europe brought the integration of the central–eastern states into western structures -– the European Union. According to Cihelková (2007: 196), the specifics of the whole European region is that it is a "region in its own category" based on the existence of the European Union. The union was mostly formed by the inter–political and economic motives of its members in order to create a "luxury zone" of free trade (Cihelková 2007: 197) After the fall of the Berlin Wall, one of these visions, that of an "exclusive market", become a major motive for the integration of the newly emerged democratic states. Consequently, twelve countries of the former Soviet bloc expressed interest (in the early 90's) in joining the EU, ten of which became members of the Union in 2004, and two in 2007. Of the Carpathian states, Austria entered into the EU in 1994; Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia joined in 2004 and Romania entered three years later in 2007.

*Nodes*. Since the separation of Czechoslovakia, the independent Slovak Republic has made significant reforms of its taxation, healthcare, social welfare and pension systems, which helped to bring the country in line with EU structures. Moreover, Slovakia became one of the first countries of the former Soviet bloc to adopt the common European cur-

rency in 2009. The Slovak economy, with its 19 % flat tax rate, has become very attractive to the investors from all over Europe[38]. As a result, foreign firms, especially in the car industry, flooded in. The republic has become very attractive to investors from all over Europe and the world. The country is a magnet for multinationals, which use it to produce and distribute goods cheaply and efficiently to the vast European market. The major sources of investment by 2000 were from Germany 22%, Austria 20%, the Netherlands 15%, the USA 12%, the Czech Republic 8% and the United Kingdom 6% (SARIO). The largest/principle investments in Slovakia are in automobile plants[39]. In 2009, it was expected that in less than two years' time, Slovakia would produce more cars per capita than any other country in the world. It is not only car manufacturers who have come to the country, but also other industries have built their huge, flat–roofed, white buildings over an area that used to be empty, grassy countryside (MRICS 2011). The Slovak Republic, along with other new EU members, contributed only 4% towards the EU economy immediately after joining EU. Experts predicted that this would grow as more investors started looking eastward, and their predictions have come true. However, there is little of this kind of investment outside the capital, Bratislava. The east of Slovakia is still frustrated by poor infrastructure and unemployment, which currently stands at 18%. (In comparison, unemployment in the Bratislava region is currently 6.1% and the average unemployment rate is around 14.4%[40].) Due to its geographical position, there are three important international railway corridors through the country: corridor IV, corridor V, and corridor VI[41]. In 2010, Slovakian GDP (Purchasing Power Parity — PPP) reached $121.3 billion and GDP per capita (PPP) $22,200, which places the country in 57th place in the world (CIA). GDP composition by sector is agriculture: 2.7%; industry: 35.6%; services: 61.8% (CIA).

Hungary's economy belongs to the EU twenty–seven average. The transition from a centrally–planned to a free market economy, and consequently, entrance into the EU, brought foreign investment into the country. The low corporate tax rate of 16% became very attractive to foreign investment, as was the case in Slovakia, and a strong car industry [42] has developed in the country. Unemployment in the state is around 11.2%, according to European Union statistics. According to the Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency (ITD Hungary), the country hosts around 350 companies manufacturing car components, as well as their subcontractors. Major investors are from the USA, the Netherlands, Austria, the United Kingdom, and France. Hungary also has a strongly developed pharmaceutical industry. Central Hungary – the capital city, Budapest, and its surrounding

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[38]Recently, the government adopted a law that temporarily increased the rated from 19 to 20 %, until the country will once again be able to match the Maastricht criteria.

[39]All over the country there are vast car manufacturing plants opened by Peugeot-Citroen, Kia — motors, Volkswagen, Ford Motor and Hyundai.

[40]According to data's of the Statistical Office of Slovak Republic – 2011.

[41]Pan European corridor IV (Berlin-Prague-Bratislava-Budapest-Istanbul/Thessaloniki); corridor V (Terst–Bratislava–Uzhorod–Lvov); corridor VI (Gdaňsk-Lodz-Žilina)/

[42]Audi, Opel and Suzuki have all opened plants in Hungary.

area —- is an important transport node deeply integrated in the Pan-European transport system; therefore, there are not only manufactures but also textile production companies (ITDH). The northern part of the country is a traditional farming area with agricultural and food industry–related machine manufacturing. The southern part of the country is characterized by a wide territory of 'puszta' (steppe). There are two important roads: the Trans–European corridors IV, X, VII (ITDH). The region is home to a food processing industry, agriculture, energy production, tourism and logistics centers (ITDH). The western part of the country, due to its frontiers with Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia and Croatia, is one of the most developed territories in Hungary (ITDH). The area is mostly industrialized (multinational automotive and electronics companies) and attractive for tourism, mainly due to its spas and medicinal waters, protected natural beauty and listed buildings, wine, gastronomy and folk traditions (ITDH). In 2010, Hungary's GDP (PPP) reached $190 billion and GDP per capita (PPP) is $19,000, which places the country in 63rd plqce in the world (CIA). The GDP composition by sector is: agriculture—3.3%; industry– 30.8%; services– 65.9% (CIA).

Like other countries in the Carpathian region, Romania went through the entire process of transformation not only economically, but politically and socially as well. The country for a long time struggled with an economic recession, however, due to strong demand from European Union export markets, and recovered in 2000 (CIA). Romania fulfilled the Maastricht Criteria and became a member of the European Union. The major disadvantage of the country remained corruption, even though the legislature changed drastically (EU Business). Unemployment in the country is relatively low — 7.3% (by 2010) according to EU statistics. The economy of Romania experienced growth in 2009 in comparison with the EU 27 average (Eurostat). The EU Business domain mentions that Romania is a very attractive destination due to its well—educated workforce, low wages, geographic location, and abundant natural resources.

Major investors in the country are the USA, the Netherlands, Austria, Italy, Germany, France and others (SNC). Within the market, the most active fields for investments are automotive, telecommunications, energy, metal production, and oil and gas processing. The country is traversed by Pan–European corridors IV, IX,. The country's coastline is 245 km long and the Danube crosses over 1000 km of its territory. Therefore, the country disposes of a significant number of ports, and the shipbuilding industry in the country is significant. For example, the largest new constructions and ship–repairs yard in Europe is located in the Black Sea area – Santierul Naval Constanta SA, accessible by sea through the Bosphorus Strait, by river via the Danube —- the Black Sea Channel, and by air via the International Airport "Mihail Kogalniceanu" (Constata Shipyard). In 2010, Romania's GDP (PPP) reached $253.3 billion, and GDP per capita (PPP) is $11,500, which places the country in 97th place globally (CIA). The GDP composition by sector is: agriculture– 12.8%; industry– 36 %; services- 51.2% (CIA).

Serbia, as a former state of Yugoslavia, suffered from the devastation of its infrastructure, international sanctions and mismanagement of its economy, due to the war in the 90's. The turning point for the state became the decision to extradite Slobodan Milošević to the UN War crimes tribunal in 2001, and the country started to recover from the conflict and has started to emerge from isolation (Dickson at all 2009). The unemployment rate has been around twenty percent for a decade and by 2010 the unemployment rate had decreased to 19.2%. However, 6.6% of the population lives below the poverty line and one third of the country lives "barley above" (Dickson at all 2009: 8). The transformation process – economic liberalization - which started in 2001, has been limited by political uncertainty within the country. "Serbia finds itself at a political crossroads and a pawn in the increasingly bitter dispute between Russia and the EU over their respective spheres of influence" (Dickson at all 2009: 5). Major investments in the country are in the banking, telecommunications, energy and airline sectors, due to privatization. The geographic position of the country determines the state to be a 'gateway' to the Balkans. Therefore, the country is an important transportation corridor — Pan European corridors X, VII, and V. However, the infrastructure needs to be constructed. In 2010, Serbia's GDP (PPP) reached 80.49 billion and GDP per capita (PPP) is $11,000, which places the country in 102nd place worldwide (CIA). The GDP composition by sector is: agriculture – 12.6%; industry – 21.9 %; services— 65.5 % (CIA). The country has been an EU member candidate since 2000 but the constant failure to cooperate slowed down the integration process. The current pro-Western government — Boris Tadić (since 2008) made EU integration the top priority of its agenda.

Similar to Serbia, Croatia also suffered from war in the beginning of the 90's, and the economic transition from a closed economy to a free market economy. In 2000, the situation started to improve. Due to its geographic position, the country has access to the sea and the coastline is one of the most attractive tourist destinations in Europe. Also, the country's infrastructure — the motorway is one of the best developed in the former Soviet bloc. The major ports are in Rijeka, Split and Dubrovnik. Through the country The Pan European corridor V crosses the country and ends on the Adriatic coast. However, the country's high unemployment rate -– 17.6% (CIA) places the country as having the highest unemployment rate in the Carpathian region. The country set up the Foreign Investment Program in 2002 to attract all types of investments, as well as the realization of investment projects in the country. Key industries in are textiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and petrochemicals. In 2010, Croatia's GDP (PPP) reached 78.52 billion and GDP per capita (PPP) is $17,500, which places the country in 67th place in the world (CIA). The GDP composition by sector is: agriculture- 6.8%; industry– 27.2%; services– 66% (CIA). Croatia started a negotiation process with the European Union in 2005 and the screening process is currently in progress.

Slovenia belongs among the former republics of Yugoslavia, though the country does

not struggle economically as much its former 'colleagues'. The country has the highest GDP per Capita in Central Europe ($28,400 by 2010). Slovenia was the first country from the former Soviet bloc to enter into the Eurozone. The well–developed infrastructure, physical landscape, technological networks and platforms, centres of excellence and clusters as evidence of high–level innovation activity make it a location of choice for many types of businesses (EU Business). The highest levels of state control over the economy positions the country as the most developed within the former Soviet bloc. Although the country suffers from a relatively high level of unemployment — 7.3% — with comparison to Romania whose total area is much larger. The Pan — European corridor V goes through Slovenia . According to the Investment Agency of Slovenia (2011), the major investors in the country are Bosch Siemens, Deloitte, Goodyear, GKN Driveline, Grammer Automotive, Gruppo Bonazzi, Henkel, Johnson Controls, Microsoft, Sandoz Group (Novartis), Oracle, Palfinger, Renault and others. . In 2010, Slovenia's GDP (PPP) reached $56.81 billion. The county's place in the world economy in terms of GDP per capita is 50th (CIA). The GDP composition by sector is: agriculture – 2.4%; industry – 31%; services – 66.6% (CIA).

Austria is the only country of the Carpathian spatium that did not belong to the Soviet territory of occupation. The country did not have to go through the same difficult transformation processes as other countries in the region. Economically, Austria belongs among the very well–developed, rich European nations, with a high living standard. The country joined the EU structures in 1994. The unemployment rate is 4.5%, which means that the country has the lowest unemployment in the Carpathian Spatium. In 2010, Austria's GDP (PPP) reached $332.6 billion and GDP per capita (PPP) is $40,300, which places the country 20th place worldwide (CIA). The GDP composition by sector is: agriculture-1.5%; industry – 29.4%; services – 69.1% (CIA). The country's major industries are textile, iron and steel production, heavy trucks production, chemical production and other. The country also has a strong banking sector, though it needed reconstruction (or reforms) following the recent economic crisis.

*Links*. When talking about the links within the Carpathian economic spatium, it is necessary to emphasize the presence of the European Union. As already mentioned, five of the seven examined states are part of the EU. The other two states have begun integration processes. EU membership means the free movement of people, capital, goods and services. Therefore, the union offers its member's access to an exclusive trade market. Moreover, the organs of the Union can legally bind its member states because member countries have transferred some of their law-making authority to the EU in certain policy areas, such as agriculture and fisheries (Europa). Other fields such as culture and policy-making are shared between the EU and national governments (Europa).

The second connection is the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), which was created by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 in 2006. From the

Carpathian region, its members are Croatia and Serbia. The Agreement's "objectives are, inter alia, to expand trade in goods and services and foster investment by means of fair, stable and predictable rules, eliminate barriers to trade between the Parties, provide appropriate protection of intellectual property rights in accordance with international standards and harmonize provisions on modern trade policy issues such as competition rules and state aid"(CEFTA).

The third channel link within the economic spatium of the Carpathian space is the Central European Initiative (CEI), just as within the demographic spatium. (See section 2.4) Within the Central European Initiative, imports are the activities connected with Enterprise Development — including Tourism.

The fourth link between the Carpathian states is the World Trade Organization, which deals with trade rules between nations on the principle of non–discrimination. Its main goals are to help producers of goods and services, exporters, and importers conduct business (WTO). All states of the region are equal members of the WTO.

The fifth channel link of the economic spatium is the European Economic Area (EEA) established by the European Union. This agreement concentrates on the implementation of the four basic pillars of the EU — the free movement of people, capital, goods, services and other areas are consumer protection (Europa). Austria, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are joined to the EEA.

From the analysis of the economic space of the Carpathian Basin, it is possible to envision that there are differences between the states. The Austrian economy is the strongest, with the highest GDP per capita — $40,300 - and the lowest unemployment rate - 4.5%. This is underlined by the fact that the country has been a part of the western capitalist world since WWII and did not have to go through an economic transition in the 90's. The weakest economy is Serbia, with the lowest GDP per capita — $11,000 – and the highest unemployment rate — 19.2%. However, Croatia is the country with the second lowest living standard within the economic spatium of the Carpathian Basin. Countries such as Slovakia, Hungary and Romania are at the average level, and Slovenia has the highest living standard of the former Soviet bloc countries. There is a visible significance between the countries of European Union and non –European members. (See Appendix A. 14)

The matrix of the relationships displays the relatively strong interaction of the Carpathian states within the economic spatium. Two levels of depth of integration are identified: (1) shallow depth of integration (single–channel link -– not available); (2) —- moderate depth of integration (two–channel links — not available); (3) —- strong depth of integration (three-channel links — WTO, CEFTA and CEI), and (4) — very deep depth of integration (four-channel links -– WTO, EEA, CEI and EU). (See Appendix A. 11) Economic cooperation between Serbia, Croatia and Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Romania is deep. A very deep level of economic cooperation exists between Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania (WTO, EEA, CEI and EU).

The expanding Carpathian economy spatium can be characterized by: (a) the strong influence of European Union; (b) the existence of a strong regional economy and global economy; (c) relatively large differences between the economies; (d) disparity in the intensity of integration between economies.

# Chapter 3

# Connecting the Five Spatia of the Slovak–Hungarian Relations

The five spatia do not exist without the influence of external players. Moreover, the states often influence each other within the system. Therefore, the system of the Carpathian region, and Slovak–Hungarian relations, do not exist in a 'vacuum'. The spatia are basically components of the complex system of the Carpathian Basin. Consequently, a change in one spatium affects other spatia, and these affects are non–linear. The nine primary possible channels of the effects of Slovak–Hungarian relations within the Carpathian Basin are illustrated in Figure 3. 1.

Clearly, the human–made spatia (S1, S3 – S5) do not influence the physical spatium (S2). However, certain elements of the physical spatium shape the human–made spatia (S1, S3 -– S5). As Csugai (2009) emphasizes, physical conditions contribute to the advantageous power position of the state, which is usually influenced by history. Moreover, the position of the state can determine the strategic vulnerability of the country.

The first effect between the physical spatium and military spatium in the basin is its location. The states within the basin lie between the eastern great power (former USSR) and western power, Germany. However, the Carpathian states do not dispose of any significant arms strength, as all countries in the region have recently reduced the capability of their armies in order to create professional military forces, which creates the second effect between the military spatium and the demographic spatium. Moreover, like the rest of the Western Europe and other countries of the world, all Carpathian states are members of specific military alliances (NATO, OSCE, and the UN) and there is a low probability of any suspicion of military attack between the neighbors. From a security perspective, the states rely on defense support from NATO. None of the actors have nuclear weapons. The states' borders have been in place for several decades and are therefore fixed. From a physical–geographic perspective, the region is valuable due to its fresh water resources (See 2.2). Of specific importance is the Žitný ostrov (Rye Island), which is the largest river island in Europe, with enormous fresh–water reserves. The island is in the southern

Figure 3.1: The nine Possible Channels Relations within the Carpathian Basin

part of Slovakia, mostly inhabited by the Hungarian minority living on the borderland with Hungary[1].

The subjective geopolitical spatium is also affected by the physical space, especially in the case of Hungary. But at the same time, the ethnic heterogeneity of the basin affects the subjective geopolitical spatium. The Hungarian state is mostly surrounded by Slavic nations and the state's unique position influences its domestic and foreign policy.(See 2.1) Hungarian politics is strongly focused on building strong national identity through its legislature, not only within the country's borders, but also in its neighborhood (New Constitution, Act LXII of 2001, Act XLIV of 2010). Slovak domestic policy towards the minority is mostly ambivalent and unclear, as is its foreign policy. Therefore, the physical spatium influences the subjective spatium and consequently the subjective geopolitical spatium affect the demographic spatium and vice – versa. These are the second, third and fourth effects. The strong Hungarian minority living all over the region form strong communities in other states. The Hungarian legislature strongly supports its these minorities/the Hungarian Diaspora and moreover, the external actor HHRF connects the Magyars within the basin. Another actor, the EU, plays an important role, notably because, with the removal of physical borders, Hungarians living in Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia and Romania are able to move between without obstruction, thus creating the fifth channel link.

Due to the geographic position of the basin, the economies of the states have to go through a transition in order to develop a 'high quality level' of free market. Consequently, the European Union integration has started. Therefore, the physical affects the economy spatium, and creates the sixth link in the Carpathian Basin. The level of economic development and investment within each Carpathian states is different. The main difference is between members of the European Union and non–EU members. Therefore, the economic spatium affects the demographic spatium, which implies the existence of different living standards within the system, thus creating the seventh channel of the inter-state effects. There is a difference between the EU members and non–EU members, but also within the EU itself (between Austria and Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania). The largest economic difference is between Austria and Serbia, whose respective per–capita GDPs were $40,300 and $11,000 in 2010. (See Appendix A. 14) The eighth channel link is between the economic spatium and military spatium. In order to manage the economic transitions of the early 1990s, states of the Carpathian region professionalized their armies and reduced their number in order to lower costs and increase effectiveness.

Finally, the ninth link is between the economic spatium and military spatium. The Carpathian states, due to the economic changes — transformation processes (not just economic but also political) – cut down their expenditures and created professional armies.

Clearly, within the system there are more channel links with greater or lesser effects.

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[1]The phenomenon of Magyars living in the borderland with their mother country is typical for the entire space of the Carpathian region.

However, due to the limited scope of this paper, these are not the object of this work. The object of this study is the current Slovak–Hungarian relations and, therefore, the questions arise: *What are the dynamics of these relations? What are the perspectives of Slovak–Hungarian relations within the system of the Carpathian Basin?*

The analysis of the subjective geopolitical spatium shows that there are definitely issues which cause tensions within the region. Especially in case of Slovakia and Hungary, in the realm of foreign relations, both countries' politicians often express their hostility towards each other. (See 2.1 ) The interesting fact is the Hungary national policy which strongly supports national indentity by constructing it through legislation. Moreover, its legislature indirectly affects (transnational policy) the sovereignty of its neighbors, not only on the level of legislation, but also through the government supporting activities for Hungarians living beyond the state's borders. The picture of Hungary from 1920 is still 'alive' within the Hungarian conciousness. (See Appendix B. 1)On the diplomatic these activities were especially in case of the Slovak Republic this has been visible. From a diplomatic angle, these activities have visibly been most sharply felt in the Slovak Republic. In the case of 'Komárno'(see 2.1) the diplomacies of both countries failed.

Thus, the key factors causing tension in Slovak–Hungurian relations are: the failure of available diplomatic channels, and rhetoric based on subjective representations of both nations. There are no objective reasons for tension. It is also possible to assume the topic of Hungarians living in Slovakia is employed intentionally by politicians of both states. The nationality question can be an effective tool for communication with voters, especially attracting new voters and supporters. The counter argument is that the popularity of this type of statements in political discourse is produced when there is a certain demand from the population itself. The goal of the politicians is not the nationalization of the society, but enlargement of political support, the elimination of political opponents, or the diversion of the attention of voters from other problems in the country.

Objectively characterizing these relations is difficult, due to the subjective interpretation of the researcher. However, surely it is possible to describe these relations in terms of conflicting, tense on the diplomatic level and on the domestic level nationalistic in Hungary and inconsistent in Slovakia. Therefore, both states find it difficult to overcome the issues of their subjective versions of their own histories. For the Hungarians, the 'Trianon trauma' was a major setback, while for Slovaks, Trianon was a librating event. Consequently, this, and the attractiveness of the issue of the Hungarian minority along the southern border of Slovakia are reflected in the two states' relations.

*Prospective*. As Csurgai (2009: 51) mentions, prospective is not telling the future and when analyzing the trends by developing future scenarios. However, their vulnerability is dependent not only on the actions of the two actors, but also on the actions of their surroundings, such as external players — great powers, the EU, the UN, etc. Therefore, what are the prospectives of these relations?

The analysis has shown that armed conflict is highly unlikely. The integration of the two countries (economic, military, and demographic) is at a deep level, therefore the Carpathian region is stable, even thought it is geographically on the cross – road between big international players Germany and Russia. The image of conflict is used only to gain political power in both Hungary and Slovakia. However, this image will probably not change in the near future. The topic of Hungarians living beyond the northern borders will be always used for political 'capital'. Within the Carpathian region, the issue will resound in the basin.

In a long term perspective, by taking into the consideration the basic spatia (S2–S5) and forces that influence the system of the Carpathian Basin, other issues will become important. The issue of ethnic minorities living in the basin will become irrelevant due to the strong connections (especially economic and military) between each state, as well as further European Union integration. In a wider perspective, the region's importance will be shaped by its enormous water reserves, the growing population density, and fact the that today 20 European countries (for exmaple Czech Republic, Poland, Ukraine . . . see 2.2)are dependent for more than 10% of their water supply on river water from neighbouring states, (UNEP).

# Conclusion

The Carpathian region states form a geographically important part of Europe within international relations. The territory is home to various ethnic groups and its geographical position places the area in the heart of Europe, between Germany and Russia. The various changes that have affected the region in the last hundred years have left problems, which are reflected in the current situation in the region. The more visible effects are projected within Slovak–Hungarian relations.

This work has been concentrated on the complexity of contemporary Slovak–Hungarian relations and their further prospective within the Carpathian Basin. Through systematic modeling of the Carpathian Basin action spatial, based on Gérard Dussouy's (2010) and Gyula Csurgai's (2009) approach, and applying social network analysis, the work identifies the key factors feeding the Slovak–Hungarian tensions and their effects on the Carpathian region. Therefore, the work offers a systemic, dynamic and interdisciplinary analysis of the developments in the Carpathian basin. Two hypotheses have been examined: H1: The subjective geopolitical representation of Slovaks and Hungarians are the key factors feeding the tension between the two states. H2: The tense relations between Slovakia and Hungary are not reflected in other area of the Carpathian Basin.

The first part of the analysis is theoretical, descriptive, inductive and static. It defines the Carpathian Basin as a system of five action spatia (S1–S5) on the principal of four human–constructed spatia (S1, S3–S5) and one objective spatium (S2). The physical spatium (S2) of the Carpathian region is interconnected by the human-constructed spatia (S3-S5) —- subjective spatium (S1), military spatium (S3), demographic spatium (S4), and economic spatium (S5). The subjective spatium (S1) is measured by a comparison of the two states' representation. Then, by using social network analysis, the basic network of relation is displayed (S3–S5) using matrixes of symmetrical relationships.

The result is that within the Carpathian Basin seven actors are identified, with a relatively strong intensity of relations between each other, and there is only a very slight disparity between the states. The subjective spatium (S1) proves that there are clearly issues between Slovakia and Hungary with strong intensity of disparity. The physical spatium (S2) analysis identifies the region as geographically attractive and rich in water reserves, navigable rivers and fertile soil. The research of the military spatium (S3) shows strong military relations through common alliances and professional armies in all exam-

ined states. The Carpathian demographic spatium (S4) consist various of ethnic groups incorporated within a modern society with a slight disparity in the intensity of relations. Finally, the expanding Carpathian economic spatium (S5) is characterized by the existence of a strong regional economy with the European Union as the key external actor, and a slight disparity between the nodes.

The fact that a change in one action spatium transforms another action spatium is displayed in the nine possible channels of inter-space effects, which are: geographical location and military alliances ($S2 \rightarrow S3$), location subjective representation — common history ($S2 \rightarrow S1$); location and economy — economic integration ($S2 \rightarrow S5$), location and demography — mobility ($S2 \rightarrow S4$); economy and demography — different living standards ($S5 \rightarrow S4$); demography and military — military strength($S3 \rightarrow S4$); professional armies ($S5 \rightarrow S3$); Hungarian nationalistic policy ($S1 \rightarrow S4$); the large Hungarian ethnic group ($S4 \rightarrow S1$)

The second part of the analysis illustrates the five spatia in constant interaction with the physical surroundings, as well as human activity, and one dyadic relationship (Slovak–Hungarian) within it. Therefore, the synthesis offers a complex picture of the region and identifies that the key factors feeding the current tense relations between Slovakia and Hungary are caused by the subjective representation of both nations, and that this tension does not influence other areas of the Carpathian Basin. As a region can become an area of cooperation or conflict, this paper predicts the further development of the region and, moreover, measures the complexity and further development of Slovak–Hungarian relations within the wider context of the Carpathian region, offering its dynamics. The synthesis also shows that the hypotheses that have been offered are correct.

The conclusions are that the stability within the region does exists due to the deep integration of the Carpathian states into various international structures. The Slovak–Hungarian tension is caused by the subjective representations of Slovakia and Hungary, and consequently used as 'political capitalism'. Therefore the character of the two countries relations is described as conflicting, tense on the diplomatic level and on the domestic level nationalistic in Hungary and inconsistent in Slovakia. However, this tension does not have any affect on the system of Carpathian states.

Also, the most likely further scenario is offered as the outcome of development in the Carpathian region. It predicts that further development in the Slovak–Hungarian relation will not change, due to the fact that the image of the conflict between the two nations based on the issue of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Slovakia is used as a political tool in both states. The long–term prospective, however, predicts that the any ethnic issues will become irrelevant due to growing European integration and the fact that the Carpathian Basin is becoming a geographically important region because of its enormous water resources, growing population density, and the dependence of 20 European states on the trans–boundary water flow, will emerge the question of refugees. However, it is possible

to also expect that if any of the two actors will be in a "hard" situations the topic will always be relevant.

The geopolitical importance of the region should be investigated further. Firstly, in case of Slovak–Hungarian relations, there is a need for a similar investigation of relations within the space of the European Union. Secondly, the study can be enriched by more objective research, such as the strategies of the actors, or the role of external actors within the Carpathian Basin.The role of these actors within the basin may change the entire picture of the region due to the fact that the Carpathian Basin lies on the cross–road of the European continent.

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# Appendix A

# Tables

Table A.1: Ethnic Structure of Kingdom of Hungary in 1900, by Statistical-Geographic Province, by Population

| Ethnic group | Left bank of Danube N | % | Right bank of Danube N | % | Confluence of Danube and Tisza N | % | Right bank of Tisza N | % | Left bank of Tisza N | % | Confluence of Tisza and Maruša N | % | Transylvania N | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hungarians | 600,400 | 29.3 | 2,044,300 | 69.9 | 2,535,400 | 77.2 | 822,200 | 49.2 | 1,423,200 | 60.9 | 408,400 | 19.9 | 814,900 | 32.9 |
| Romanians | 400 | 0.0 | 1,000 | 0.1 | 2,600 | 0.1 | 1,200 | 0.1 | 574,300 | 24.6 | 821,700 | 40.0 | 1,397,300 | 56.4 |
| Germans | 155,900 | 7.6 | 576,000 | 19.7 | 399,200 | 12.2 | 103,500 | 6.2 | 77,800 | 3.3 | 451,700 | 22.0 | 233,000 | 9.4 |
| Slovaks | 1,273,600 | 62.1 | 19,300 | 0.6 | 91,000 | 2.8 | 493,600 | 29.5 | 77,700 | 3.3 | 44,700 | 2.2 | 2,300 | 0.1 |
| Croats | 2,900 | 0.1 | 170,300 | 5.8 | 3,400 | 0.1 | 500 | 0.0 | 300 | 0.0 | 5,500 | 0.2 | 800 | 0.0 |
| Serbs | 200 | 0.0 | 15,000 | 0.5 | 146,500 | 4.4 | 100 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 275,600 | 13.4 | 200 | 0.0 |
| Ukrainians | 200 | 0.0 | 100 | 0.0 | 10,300 | 0.3 | 231,800 | 13.9 | 177,000 | 7.6 | 1,200 | 0.1 | 1300 | 0.1 |
| Others | 16,100 | 0.9 | 97,400 | 3.4 | 95,900 | 2.9 | 18,400 | 1.1 | 5600 | 0.3 | 46,000 | 2.2 | 27,100 | 1.1 |
| Total | 2,049,700 | 100 | 2,923,400 | 100 | 3,284,300 | 100 | 1,671,300 | 100 | 2,335,800 | 100 | 2,054,800 | 100 | 2,476,900 | 100 |

*Source: Eberhadt 2001:269*

Table A.2: Demographic Losses of the Kingdom of Hungary Due to World War I, by Nationality

| In areas lost to | Total population | Hungarians | Germans | Slovaks | Romanians | Ukrainians | Croats | Serbs | Others |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Czechoslovakia | 3,576,000 | 1,084,000 | 266,000 | 1,702,000 | 22,000 | 436,000 | 3,000 | * | 63,000 |
| Romania | 5,265,000 | 1,705,000 | 560,000 | 31,000 | 2,800,000 | 16,000 | 2,000 | 55,000 | 96,000 |
| Yugoslavia | 1,499,000 | 458,000 | 304,000 | 46,000 | 77,000 | 11,000 | 88,000 | 384,000 | 131,000 |
| Austria | 392,000 | 80,000 | 250,000 | * | * | * | 48,000 | * | 14,000 |
| All areas lost | 10,732,000 | 3,327,000 | 1,380,000 | 1,779,000 | 2,899,000 | 463,000 | 141,000 | 439,000 | 304,000 |

*Source: Eberhardt 2001:291*

Table A.3: Ethnic Structure of Hungary in 1930 by Population

| Ethnic group | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Hungarians | 8,000,300 | 92.1 |
| Romanians | 16,200 | 0.2 |
| Germans | 477,200 | 5.5 |
| Slovaks | 104,800 | 1.2 |
| Croats | 47,300 | 0.5 |
| Serbs | 7,000 | 0.1 |
| Slovenes | 5,500 | 0.1 |
| Others | 26,800 | 0.3 |
| Total | 8,685,100 | 100 |

*Source: Eberhardt 2001: 293*

Table A.4: Ethnic Structure of Hungary in 1949 by Population

| Ethnic group | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Hungarians | 9,076,000 | 98,6 |
| Romanians | 14,700 | 0.2 |
| Germans | 22,500 | 0.2 |
| Slovaks | 26,000 | 0.3 |
| Croats | 20,400 | 0.2 |
| Serbs | 5,200 | 0.1 |
| Slovenes | 4,500 | 0.1 |
| Others | 35,500 | 0.3 |
| Total | 9,204,800 | 100 |

*Source: Eberhardt 2001: 312*

Table A.5: Structure of the Contemporary Slovak Territory in 1921 by Population

| Ethnic group | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Slovaks | 1,952,900 | 66.0 |
| Hungarians | 650,600 | 22.0 |
| Germans | 145,800 | 4.9 |
| Ukrainians | 89,000 | 3.0 |
| Czechs | 72,100 | 2.4 |
| Others | 48,200 | 1.7 |
| Total | 2,958,600 | 100 |

*Source: Eberhardt 2001: 132*

Table A.6: Ethnic Structure of the Contemporary Slovak Territory in 1930 by Population

| Ethnic group | N | % |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Slovaks | 2,337,800 | 70.4 |
| Hungarians | 571,900 | 17.2 |
| Germans | 148,200 | 4.5 |
| Ukrainians | 90,800 | 2.7 |
| Czechs | 65,400 | 2.0 |
| Others | 107,800 | 3.2 |
| Total | 3,321,900 | 100 |

*Source: Eberhardt 2001: 132*

Table A.7: Ethnic Structure of the Contemporary Slovak Territory in 1950 by Population

| Ethnic group | N | % |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Slovaks | 2,982,500 | 86.7 |
| Hungarians | 354,500 | 10.3 |
| Germans | 5,200 | 0.1 |
| Ukrainians | 48,200 | 1.4 |
| Czechs | 40,400 | 1.2 |
| Poles | 1,800 | 0.1 |
| Others | 9,700 | 0.2 |
| Total | 3,442,300 | 100 |

*Source: Eberhardt 2001: 155*

Table A.8: Ethnic Groups within the Carpathian Basin (by 2000)

| | Slovakia | Hungary | Romania | Transylvania | Serbia | Vojvodina | Croatia | Slovenia | Austria –Burgenland |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Poles | 3400 | | 4200 | | | | | | |
| Germans | 7700 | 21000 | 111000 | 109000 | | | | | |
| Romanians | 22000 | | | | | 39000 | | | |
| Ukrainians | 14000 | | 65000 | | | | 2500 | | |
| Magyars | 608000 | | | 1604000 | 345000 | | | 8500 | 6800 |
| Serbs | | | 34000 | | | | 582000 | 48000 | |
| Austrians | 1100 | 35000 | | | | | | | |
| Albanians | | | | | | | | 3600 | |
| Slovaks | | 315000 | 20000 | | | 64000 | | | |
| Croats | | 85000 | | | | 98000 | | 3000 | 15000 |
| Slovenes | | 5000 | | | | | | | |
| Carpatho–Rusyns | 130000 | | | | | | 57000 | | |

*Source: Magocsi 2001: 199 – 200 v*

Table A.9: Military Spatium (S3)-– Matrix of Depth of Integration of the Relations

|  | Slovakia | Romania | Serbia | Croatia | Slovenia | Austria |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hungary | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) |
| Slovakia | X | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) |
| Romania | X | X | OSCE NATO UN (3*) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) |
| Serbia | X | X | X | OSCE NATO UN (3*) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) |
| Serbia | X | X | X | X | OSCE NATO UN (3) | OSCE NATO UN (3*) |
| Serbia | X | X | X | X | X | OSCE NATO UN (3*) |

(1) – One-Channel Link (shallow depth of integration)
(2) – Two-Channel Links (moderate depth of integration)
(3*)– Three-Channel Links (strong depth of integration) – is expressing the partner state relations within the NATO — not part of the overall strategy of NATO
(3) – Three-Channel Links (strong depth of integration)

Table A.10: Demographic Spatium (S4) — Matrix of Depth of Integration of the Relations

|          | Slovakia | Romania | Serbia | Croatia | Slovenia | Austria |
|----------|----------|---------|--------|---------|----------|---------|
| Hungary  | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) | UN OSCE CEI (3) | UN OSCE CEI (3) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) |
| Slovakia | X | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) | UN OSCE CEI (3) | UN OSCE CEI (3) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) |
| Romania  | X | X | UN OSCE CEI (3) | UN OSCE CEI (3) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) |
| Serbia   | X | X | X | UN OSCE CEI (3) | UN OSCE CEI (3) | UN OSCE CEI (3) |
| Croatia  | X | X | X | X | UN OSCE CEI (3) | UN OSCE CEI (3) |
| Slovenia | X | X | X | X | X | EU UN OSCE CEI (4) |

(1) – One-Channel Link (shallow depth of integration)
(2) – Two-Channel Links (moderate depth of integration)
(3) – Three-Channel Links (strong depth of integration)
(4) – Four-Channel Links (very deep depth of integration)

Table A.11: Economic Spatium (S5) — Matrix of Depth of the Integration of the Relations

| | Slovakia | Romania | Serbia | Croatia | Slovenia | Austria |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hungary | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | OEU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) |
| Slovakia | X | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) |
| Romania | X | X | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) |
| Serbia | X | X | X | CEFTA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(3) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) |
| Croatia | X | X | X | X | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) |
| Slovenia | X | X | X | X | X | EU<br>EEA<br>CEI<br>WTO<br>(4) |

(1) – One-Channel Link (shallow depth of integration)
(2) – Two-Channel Links (moderate depth of integration)
(3) – Three-Channel Links (strong depth of integration)
(4) – Four-Channel Links (very deep depth of integration)

Table A.12: Military Strength of the Carpathian Basin

| | Active Personnel | Manpower available for Military service (by 2010) | Military Components |
|---|---|---|---|
| Slovakia | * | 2, 802, 207 | Ground Forces, Air Force (Specialized in Engineering) |
| Hungary | 26, 000 | 4, 640, 516 | Ground Forces, Air Force |
| Romania | * | 11, 030, 234 | Land Forces, Air Force, Navy |
| Serbia | 28, 000 | 2, 500, 000 | Land Forces (includes also Riverine Component, Air Force & Defense) |
| Croatia | 23,100 | 2, 033, 589 | Croatian Army, Air Force & Defense, Navy |
| Slovenia | 7000 (3000 reserves) | 941,839 | Armed Force, Navy, Air Element |
| Austria | * | 3, 133, 992 | Joint Armed Force— Special Air Forces |

Table A.13: Demography of the Carpathian Basin

| | Total Population | Major Ethnic groups | Education |
|---|---|---|---|
| Slovakia | 5, 433, 385 | Hungarians, Roma,Carphatho-Rusyns,Germans, Czechs | Mother-tongue Schools from pre-school until University |
| Hungary | 9,976,062 | Slovaks, Germans, Roma, Romanians | Mother-tongue Schools, Dual Schools, Schools were minority language is thought as foreign language |
| Romania | 21,904,551 | Hungarians, Germans, Serbs, Slovaks | Mother-tongue Schools from pre-school until University |
| Serbia | 7,310,555 | Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats | Mother-tongue Schools from pre-school until University |
| Croatia | 4,483,804 | Serbs, Hungarians, Slovenes | Not possible |
| Slovenia | 2,000,092 | Hungarians, Roma, Germans, Italians | Bilingual Schools from pre-school until secondary school |
| Austria | 8,217,280 | Burgenland-Croats, Slovenes, Hungarians, Slovaks | Primary and Secondary bilingual Schools (mandatory in villages with up to 25% minority population since 1955 |

Table A.14: Carpathian states economic power based on GDP (2010)

| | Slovakia | Hungary | Romania | Serbia | Croatia | Slovenia | Austria |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unemployment Rate | 14.4% | 11.2 | 7.3% | 19.2% | 17.6% | 7.3% | 4.5% |
| GDP | $121.3 billion | $190 billion | $253.3 billion | $80.49 billion | $78.52 billion | $56.81 billion | $332.6 billion |
| GDP per Capita (PPP) | $22,200 | $19,000 | $11,500 | $11,000 | $17,500 | $28,400 | $40,300 |
| GDP of agriculture | 2.7 % | 3.3% | 12.8% | 12.6% | 6.8% | 2.4% | 1.5% |
| GDP of industry | 35.6% | 30.8% | 36% | 21.9% | 27.2% | 31% | 29.4% |
| GDP of Service | 61.8 % | 65.9% | 51.2% | 65.5% | 66% | 66.6% | 69.1% |
| Comparison to the world economies (GDP per Capita) | 57 | 63 | 97 | 102 | 67 | 50 | 20 |

# Appendix B

# Maps

Figure B.1: Hungarian Mental Map 1920



*Nem! Nem! Soha!*

Figure B.2: Water Dependency in Central Europe



*Source: BGR*